A New European Defence Community

7/27/2019 A New European Defence Community

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A NEW EUROPEAN DEFENSECOMMUNITYBy Frangois Duchene

A T the mom ent when E ast Asia is emerging as the new/ - \ center of great-power confrontation, the old one, Europe.^ - ^ i s show ing signs of settling down. Eighteen years of almostglacially imperceptible movement have elapsed between thepost-Stalin "th aw " of 1953 and the wary "era of negotiations" of1971. But now the whole constellation of talks between theSoviet Union and its major Western adversaries, around theStrategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Ostpolitik, Ber-lin, force reductions and the convocation of a security con-ference, look like ratifying the stalemate between the two blocspainfully reached in E urop e over the years. Since this recognizesin pa rticu lar the frontiers between the contestants, it amounts notonly to a virtual settlement of the cold war hut to the nearestapproximation one can expect of a peace treaty ending theSecond World War. Moreover, this development coincides withanother of great importance. The likely enlargement of theEuropean Com munity from six to ten member countries, includ-ing Britain, is bound to open a new phase in the integration ofWestern Europe. With two such changes, European securit)^in the middle and later 1970s will necessarily he very differentfrom the patterns that have grown familiar during 20 years.On the whole, the natural expectation is a shift away from thequasi-military confrontation of the cold war to civilian andpolitical processes gradually increasing the interdependence ofindustrial societies with potentially complementary interests. Ifso, it will probably be the first time that an area vital to theworld balance, without being itself a great power, is broughtunder control not as a victim of rival masters but as a field ofcooperation sought keenly by the weaker states. It could healmost the equivalent in nuclear and international terms of theKing's Peace which brought the European nation-state out offeudal chaos. This is an intoxicating hope and it is not surpris-ing that one of the questions it inspires is whether the time hasnot come to lower the heavy military guard which has suc-


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70 F O R E I G N A F F A I R Sdemands at home; and because the last thing the decliningideological metropolis of Moscow would want would be acommunist Germany, let alone Western Europe, to dethrone italtogether from its already precarious monopoly. The economicand political cohesion of an integrating Western Europe, shel-tered by America's nuclear deterrent, could compensate for thesuperior military power of the Soviet Union.Talk of a new European security system rests upon such pre-suppositions. As pressed hy reformers in the establishments ofthe smaller East European states, such a posture even becomes aWestern duty. Only if Russia loses all fear of Western militarypower, they argue, will conservatives in the Soviet Politburo bestripped of their great alibi and forced to concede the experi-ments in liberal communism essential to lighten the Russianimperium in Eastern Europe. That the ultimate aim should he todeemphasize military confrontation as much as possible is al-ready virtually beyond controversy. It is the gospel after Presi-dent Nixon's "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's," which de-clares : "There is a growing impatience with confrontation. Weand our allies seek a . . . detente."The question is no longer the objective but the means, and inpa rticula r the means in terms of the requirements of security. Re-visionist American historians of the cold war tend to deny thattoday's stability in Europe owes much to the security balance.This is impossible, with today's knowledge, to prove one wayor the other. What can hardly be denied is that peace has beenstrong and not weak in the most heavily armed of all the conti-nents ; and that the acceptance of the existence of two blocs hasled not to a widening rift but to closer contacts in the last tenyears. The tragic expression of this was the way in which theSoviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was followed almost im-mediately by the unfurling of the Ostpolitik. It has been demon-strated as far as such things can be in politics that the securitycontrol of the European situation has been basic to the confidenceneeded for cooperation.This does not necessarily mean that an emphasis on securityhelps to accelerate cooperation now. It is conceivable that theSoviet Union might move rather faster to a consumer society ifit discounted the West as a military force in Europe and that this


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A N E W E U R O P E A N D E F E N S E 71attitudes. Jugoslavia is regarded as a thorn in Russia's flesh in itsown right. A fortiori, China is a powerful reason for Russiato tighten its control over, for instance, Rumania. It is oftenclaimed in Eastern Europe that fear of NATO played a largepart in the Soviet decision to suppress the Dubcek regime. Butit is highly questionable whether the Politburo would haveallowed w hat it regarded, probably rightly , as a loss of control inCzechoslovakia by the communist party even if NATO hadheen irrelevant to its discussions.Common to all these questions, as indeed to the change ininternal planning, or to Comecon integration, is the desire ofa rigid bureaucratic structure to maintain and enhance its power.NATO is tangential to this obstacle, which is rooted in thedomestic situation of the Soviet Union and which is likely to setthe ultimate limits on the speed of East-West cooperation. Thisis particularly so hecause the Czech crisis itself, and since thenpressures to reduce forces in both America and Europe havebeen monuments to the military passivity of the West. It will hehard in the future to argue seriously that military confrontationis a major factor in Moscow's attempts to maintain socialistorthodoxy as the communist party and the Soviet Union under-stand it. The political confrontation is harder to dispose of be-cause it cannot disappear so long as W estern Euro pe fulfillsaspirations indigenous to East European societies themselvesand these aspirations are thought to threaten the Soviet powerstructure. The only circumstances under which that could dis-appear would he if internal developments in Russia or the Westled to the convergence of societies, or if the Soviet Union estab-lished a hegemony over Europe as a whole and treated it as abackyard. In the former case cooperation is largely a product,not the sole or even primary cause, of convergence, and Westernsecurity policies, though relevant, are secondary; in the latter,the security of Western Europe itself is involved.

IIIn practice, therefore. Western strategies must not drop se-curity for cooperation hut seek to combine the two, rather as in

another phrase of President Nixon's which calls at once forlower levels of forces and costs and, protesting almost too


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72 F O R E I G N A F F A I R Sveloping for some time and are likely, barring sharp changes ofpolitical direction, to develop further during the coming decade.One is the feeling that if East-West cooperation is to mean any-thing, it must be possible to lighten the military apparatus inEurope and buy security more cheaply, or to put the East-Westbalance on a more codified and contractual basis, or both. Theother is that Western security policies must be tailored to asituation where the use of force seems remote, and yet to ignoreits possibility might in the end raise it up again or at least under-mine security and even the long-term hopes for equitable co-operation.The simplest way to reconcile these aims would be to confirmthe superpower control, based on nuclear caution, already estab-lished over Europe. It is in some ways the most likely develop-ment because it would require the minimum changes in inter-state relations and attitudes. It is hard to imagine the SovietUnion, the "elephant" of modern military power, diluting itspolitico-military primacy in Eastern Europe. There are moredoubts about the American "whale," because its insular positiongives it an inherent political mobility currently illustrated bythe Administration's policies in Asia.Yet it is in Europe, if anywhere, that American interestsare most firmly fixed. This is partly for economic reasons:Europe is not only the great foreign center of U.S. enterprisebut still represents 20 percent of the world's annual output,whereas the whole of Asia, including China and Japa n (thoughnot Siberia) reaches barely 15 percent. It is also cultural andpsychological: the family relationship between the two remainsclose and may become consciously closer if non-Western in-fluences increasingly shape the world. Everything in the attitudesof the American leadership suggests that in its eyes Europe isindeed as "indispensable as Alaska" and perhaps a lot less for-bidding. Moreover, though the relationship between Americaand Western Europe is very different from the semi-colonialsituation in the East, it is hard to see any alternative for yearsto come to the U .S. nuclear guarantee over W est G ermany. Brit-ish, French or European federal nuclear ambitions seem insuffi-cient or remote; and the one subject on which the Soviet Union,fearing that the Ostpolitik conceals German ambitions for reuni-


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A NEW EUROPEAN DEF ENSE 73to agree on is the non-nuclear status of the Federal Republic.The danger of real U.S. withdraw al from Europe is probablyless likely than is often assumed in a Western Europe nervousof the cold, as the protected always are. The essential structureof the European security balance is likely to subsist. The risingimportance of Asia and of domestic priorities should reinforcethis tendency. Closer contacts, from SALT to joint productionventures and concern with the environment, could even grad-ually create constituencies of interest in both East and West con-cerned to temper rivalry with elements of genuine cooperation.In such circumstances, agreements on force reductions couldcodify the relationship in security terms and the process of civil-ian interchange gradually gain more weight and the militaryconfrontation less and the cold war be not ended but left behind.The almost unique character of Europe as a zone of peace inthe field of great-power confrontation could well be reinforcedand, for the East, improved.T he difficulty with this relatively serene pictu re is that deteritehas such a different impact on Eastern and Western societiesthat it may actually stimulate the dangers of conflict. Given thelong history of muffied explosions in Eastern Europe, East-Westcooperation, far from diminishing tensions, could ultimately in-crease them there. Simultaneously, the powerful pressures to-ward domesticity in the West could lead societies to downgradedefense to the point w here excessive risks are taken w ith security.It is plain that such pressures on governments in the West are fargreater than in the Soviet Union, as they were indeed im-mediately after the war. T he way in which the U nited States hasproposed negotiations on force reductions to forestall unilateraldecisions imposed upon it by Congress is symptomatic of asituation which also exists in Europe. There will be about 40,000conscientious objectors in West Germany this year. It is true thatthe West German laws are very liberal, a reflection of the factthat the authorities have more manpower than they know howto use; but the government has not decreed the fashion sweepingthe universities. In Britain, the all-volunteer armed forces shrinkyear by year (though recruitment tends to rise in a crisis andUlster has been no exception).


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74 FOR EIGN AFFAIRSAmerican troops in Europe. These tendencies on both sides ofthe Atlantic raise special doubts because NATO is alreadyweaker in combat forces and, above all, reinforcements, than theWarsaw Pact, and further reductions would compel excessivereliance on nuclear forms of deterrence which themselves inspiretrepidation.^ In psychological terms, and therefore political ones,the balance of security in Europe could become weighted againstthe West.

T he Soviet Union has more freedom of manoeuvre. Th ou gh itsrnany disarmam ent proposals may be sincere in tha t Russia wouldlike to economize and perhaps also exorcize as much as it can po-tential perils in East Asia, it does not seem to be under any-thing like the internal pressures that beset the West. T he prio rityon consumption figured much more prominently in the platformrhetoric of the 24th Congress of the CPSU than it does in theFive Year Plan. Moreover, troop reductions can hardly be ap-plied to forces within Russia, since these are required by the badrelations within the communist world. And so long as theseforces remain, any reductions in Europe only tend to empha-size the Soviet advantage in reinforcements. In such circum-stances, Russian disarmament plans, though worth taking up forthe chances they offer of maintaining cheaper security, seem atleast partly designed to reinforce political processes which workin favor of Soviet power.From this point of view, the general style of Soviet military-political behavior in recent years is not particularly promising.Fo r the Politburo, the use of m ilitary means to political ends hasbeen highly successful in Czechoslovakia. The blatant pressuresbrought to bear this year on Rumania and Jugoslavia by publi-cizing manoeuvres in Hungary and Bulgaria suggest furtherreliance on such means. Th is saber ra ttling does not mean dangerfor the West as such, but it does raise the question whether theSoviet Union is really seeking only to stabilize the Europeanstatus quo in the East or behaving according to the nature of anauthoritarian regime which exercises hegemony wherever itprudently can. In that case, the nature of the restraints N A T Ocontinues to place on Soviet ambitions remains important.The main problem is that a West aware of Soviet potential,


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A NEW EUROPEAN DE FENSE 75national policies and divisions of opinion about detente, mightbegin to doubt its capacity to face unforeseen crises. Europeanand American force reductions, economic rivalries and "inward-looking" attitudes in both societies could reduce each country strust in its allies and particularly that of Europe in an Americafaced with a potential nuclear crisis. In such circumstances,American opinion might grow increasingly irritated with theEuropean states while an element of appeasement could enterinto the policies toward the Soviet Un ion. "D eten te" would thenconnote mainly a shift in the balance of power in Europe infavor of Russia. The Soviet Union might increasingly in-terfere in Western policy-making, particularly on security issues,in the name of enlightened East-West relations and be sure tofind a party in the West responsive to its argum ents. In the longrun, it could come to regard itself as the righteous policeman ofa European security defined according to its standards and con-venience, exercising hegemonial pressure on the policies of WestEuropean powers whose very existence, culture, wealth andexample make them, willy-nilly, the specter which haunts thedomestic politics of Eastern Europe.Such a Soviet hegemony in Europe would not pose securityissues in the extreme form of "freedom or slavery," but it wouldplace West European governments in constant and sometimesacute discomfort. For instance, if the communists were to enterinto a governing coalition in Italy at a time of West Europeanself-confidence, this would be seen as a step in their absorptioninto the Western system. If confidence were lacking, it couldseem laden with the promise of various kinds of subordination toa politically backward superpower. All this remains wildlyalarm ist, of course, while one assumes the po litical effectivenessof the American umbrella over Western Europe. If doubts aboutit spread, the judgment might change. Much depends on theeffects of the new doubts which have cropped up between Am eri-cans and Europeans.

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As is the way with dependents, the Europeans have alwayshad doubts about their protectors. The fear that Asia might dis-


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76 FOR EIGN AFFA IRSvulnerable at home. These doubts have in the end proved easy tolive with. The new one looks more serious. It is rooted not innuclear parity but in a general impression of potential imparityin political will between the two superpowers, the one all toomodern and the other too old-fashioned. Such fears may be ex-cessively tied to short-term modes, like the aftermath of Vietnam ,but they are also related to a subtle shift in the European envi-ronment which does not look like a passing phase and is no lessimportant for being partly unavoidable.By i960, the major European empires were virtually dis-mantled, but the world system which accompanied them was pro-longed and the change disguised by American strategic andeconomic power, ringing and encroaching on Eurasia. Am erica'sretreat frotn these advance positions is beginning to exposeEurope to some of the consequences of its own earlier with-drawal. Strategically, the Soviet fleets are increasingly imping-ing on Europe's environment in the Mediterranean and Nor-wegian Seas as well as, more distantly, the oil routes of theIndian Ocean. On land, Jugoslavia is more concerned about se-curity than at any time since 1948. Economically, the UnitedStates is no longer able to guarantee European oil supplies, as in1956, or the monetary and trading context for growth. AndEuro pe is now beginning to feel a little naked in the winds of thelarger world.

IVT hat the U nited States reacts as a society rather than as a stateto world events, while Russia reacts as a state rather than as a

society, poses problems of American purpose. That the UnitedStates no longer shapes the environment and perpetuates theEuropean world poses problems of European purpose. This isthe basis of a third alternative to superpower control or Soviethegemony in Europe, the possibility of a West European entitybecoming an increasingly significant element in the securitybalance. The West European Ten together will have total forcesnum bering over two million men and 300 combat vessels, respect-able resources even by superpower standards. They do not meanmuch without a common political purpose, which is lacking, buteven the potentials of power have an effect on that.


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A NEW EUROPEAN DEFENSE ^yit and make it more credible, wh ich would be especially welcomeif the totals of West European forces and of American forces inEurope both go down. It could also help in the long run to add amore effective complement to the Am erican navy in the maritimeperiphery of Europe. This would not replace superpower con-trol over Europe but it would change its inner content andpossibly long-term prospects. The European option will be opento West European leaders seeking to face the new and less sereneenvironment or simply perhaps, in the cases of Britain andI- ranee, to prolong national ambitions through a collective effort.Without that they will be politically too weak to make their owiichoices.The differences between various hypotheses about Europeansecurity in the coming years presented here (and others onemight put forward) are less military than political. Unless forcesare maintained at levels very near the current ones, which seemsunlikely, military risks have to be taken by the present standardsof deterrence. But these risks may be politically acceptable incertain cases, as are the long-standing insufficiencies of NATOtoday, whereas in others they might seem unbearable. Thus, anagreement on force reductions with substantial cuts on both sides,accompanied by a general climate of cooperation, might main-tain the credibility of the NATO structure even if present stra-tegic concepts had to be modified, whereas smaller unilateralWestern cuts would sap confidence. Similarly, a West Europeandefense organization would be less likely to increase the numberof troops than promise a better use of a smaller number and,even more important, a more cohesive reaction of the Ten tounforeseen eventualities. M ore depends on political than militaryfactors, not least, timing.There will probably be a first symbolic cut in forces in 1972;the enlargement of the European Community should take placein 1973. If there are signs of satisfactory agreements on forcereductions within a reasonable time-scale, security policies maywell stick to multilateral approaches both within NATO and inthe East-West context. That will raise a minimum of diplo-matic problems for the Germans concerned with the Ostpolitikand the French and Italians with their communist parties. Itwill not force gaullism in France to face a change in nationalpriorities or the Scandinavians to touch the domestically thorny


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78 F O R E I G N A F F A IR Sseek its new frontier more in common trade and finance policiesthan in security. Yet East-West negotiations on force reductionsare likely to be incredibly complex, and unless things go verywell, to raise more anxieties than they allay because of the im-parities between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In that case, theurge to launch the European Community on a more politicalcourse might well move into the area of defense.There are several reasons for this. One is the anxiety aboutsecurity in the governments of the larger West European coun-tries, which is greater than one might imagine from the atmos-pherics of the "era of negotiation," and to some extent is a resultof them. Prim e M inister Edw ard Heath always mentions securitybefore prosperity as an argument for British entry into theEuropean Community. The West Germans are conscious of aneed to anchor the Americans more firmly in E urope and to finda long-term alternative should the effort fail. A collective Euro-pean effort might help both. To a lesser extent, a Europeanoperation would also be attractive as the only way to bringthe heirs of de Gaulle back into the Western defense fold with-out a formal tie to NATO.A second reason is tha t if W estern disarmament reaches a pointwhere doubt is cast on present doctrines of deterrence, it mightwell drive a wedge into the triangle between Germany, Franceand Britain which is the core of West European relationships.The French and the British would be tempted to stress theirnuclear deterrents, and, whether they did so nationally or co-operatively, this would underline what divides them from Ger-many even if German attitudes to their deterrents are changingas doubts about the United States increase. This could be particu -larly imp ortant if o ther developments point the same way. Forcereductions would tend to apply to Germany, the terre d'electionof NATO. Similarly, attempts to meet manpower shortages byraising militia would affect Germany in the front more thanFrance in the rear and still more than Britain behind the Chan-nel. Should these fault-lines in NATO-Europe become toomarked they could disintegrate it, Britain and France empha-sizing nuclear deterrence, Germany the Ostpolitik. A Europeangrouping would counter this tendency. Finally, there are exist-


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A NEW EUROPEAN DEFE NSE 79The most extreme version of the skepticism about a Europeandefense organization one might expect would be that of the

French government. T hat at least is the assumption, and w ill notbe dispelled, since it is in the nature of President Pompidou'sstyle of government that his policies should be expressed in actionrather than declared principles. The moment for action cannotcome before British entry into the European Community. How-ever, for a gaullist, M. Pompidou has given hints which suggesthis mind may be more open than is supposed. H e has stressed theimportance of U.S. troops staying in Europe, and his anxietyabout withdrawals is well known. In his press conference ofJanu ary 21, 1971, he proposed that a E uropean confederationshould cover the major fields of government including politicalones. He stressed that the major decisions should be taken bygovernments, but did not exclude a role for the Commission inimplementing them. All this leaves some room for manoeuvreand a possibility that M. Pompidou is willing to consider pro-posals that serve a concrete purpose.

Indeed, it should be quite possible to establish effective de-fense cooperation inside the enlarged European Communityon terms the governments will accept. There could be two mu-tually reinforcing levels of operation: consultation between thegovernments on broad policies, and contracts to establish jointprograms in a few functional areas, like arms production, im-plemented in ways roughly similar to the Common Market's.An obvious theme for European consultation would be policyon East-West force reductions and arms control. The samewould apply to strategic and tactical conceptsthe use of forces,the control of nuclear escalation, and so onproblems whichthe major NATO allies must discuss in any case when Francedeploys its tactical nuclear artillery, Pluton, in 1973 or 1974 inthe only place where it makes sense, in Germany. This shouldbe carried on in a European N uclear Planning G roup ( E N P G )parallel to the very successful one which already exists in

NATO. Other committees could be set up to discuss manpowerand other policies. In themselves, such consultations need not


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8o FOREIGN AFFAIRSlevel, they almost certainly would have a larger political impactThe governments would also negotiate contracts, or treatiesestablishing common functional bodies mainly in the area ofwhat one might call Defense Supporttraining, logistics andthe procurement of arms. The governments could set the targetand timing and entrust the implementation to a kind of CommonMarket system with a Defense Commission proposing policiesand the national m inisters disposing of them . The lack of a singlelogistic system is a NATO weakness which could lead to seriousconfusion in a crisis. In an age of travel, training in a neighbor-ing country and learning a language as well as a trade could be acritical advantage over national systems in the recruitment ofotherwise reluctant soldiers. As for procurement, the aerospaceindustry, which accounts for almost 40 percent of arms spendinglooks like being reduced to perhaps three major European con-sortia in a couple of years' time. If so, the pressure for commonproduction in other arms industries, particularly in electronics,will be increased and the main remaining problem will be toovercome the particularisms of the defense staffs and ministries.One need hardly underline in an American journal that this isnever easy even within a single country, but a joint ProcurementAgency, proposing criteria for weapons not tarred by a nationalbrush, could help. A related M anagem ent Committee to stabilizegovernment-industrial relations would also be useful.

Together, such innovations would establish what would be ineffect a European Defense Support Organization. What wouldstill be lacking, ap art from the inevitable nuclear absentee, wouldbe a Jo int European Com mand. Its attractions would increase ifthe troops in Europe declined significantly, because the bestcounter to small numbers is mobility, i,e. the ability to ordertroops from any member country to where they are most neededin an agreed area. That might be too much for the governments,particularly the French, to take, though it would in fact allowFrance to make her point that she will not accept an AmericanSupreme A llied Comm ander, E urope. For the Europeans to havetheir own N P G would also imply a grouping outside the N A T Oequivalent. But in both cases no decisions could be taken withoutthe Am ericans, so that the changes would in part be more formal


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A N E W E U R O P E A N D E F E N S E 8iministration has been favorable to the emergence of a European"caucus" in NATO, this could be turned to good account in re-newing the NATO contract between the United States and itsallies. A new agreement could be reached under the roof of theAtlantic Alliance in which new pledges for the commitment ofAmerican troops in Europe would be given in return forsigns of European self-help through integration, and consoli-dated by a "sense of the Senate" vote. This could invaluablystabilize the European-American relationship for a number ofyears ahead.One would expect the Soviet Union to condemn a EuropeanDefense Organization, or Community, for much the same rea-sons as the United States favors it. But there is no force to theidea a Community need hold up East-West cooperation, be-cause this ignores both the time factor and the military and po-litical context. The establishment of a Defense Support Organi-zation, however disliked, could hardly be invoked with successas a provocation; and even a stronger arrangement, a morethoroughgoing Community, would take place against a back-ground of falling forces and possibly agreements on them. Theactive emphasis of East-West exchanges would in any case beon negotiations and increasing economic contacts. In such cir-cumstances, a West European defense organization would standfor what it wasa minimum security insurance against a break-down in detente, which the West Europeans of all peoples havean interest in avoiding.

VIConfidence is, in fr.ct, the key. The problem for WesternEurope, in fact for the West tout court, with its affluent societiesso responsive to hopes of external peace parallel to their owndomestic ideals, is how to manage a period of detente whichremains full of uncertainty. The problem is a difficult one be-cause it involves opposite movements in the evolution of esti-mates of "intent" on the one hand and military capability on theother. While political expectations of a Russian invasion are

declining to near zero, it makes no political sense to stress themilitary aspects of security. But to take prospects of peace and


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82 F O R E I G N A F F A I R Swith means relevant to them, and when circumstances mean theSoviet Union, the means can only be American or collectiveEuropean or both. Such reserves of power are necessary to control detente, maintain confidence and restrain distortions of thepolitical process.The issue in Europe is an historic one. The nuclear stalemateis making it possible to move away from naked force towardpolitics and so to civilize conflict in one of the centers of gravityof the balance of power. If this can be done by freeing politicaforces rather than in the usual way of setting up an empire ovethem, it will mark a real moment of progress in internationatwentieth-century society. But, for all that, detente must be carefully controlled and the forces of political backwardness con-tained as they have already been during the cold war. In someways the situation is more dangerous because detente can makethe process reach into Eastern Eu rope itself. It is therefore morethan ever vital, in a period when attention is directed elsewhereto maintain a system of security insurance in Europe. This maybe possible without new means such as a European DefenseCom munity to bolster up the credibility of the Am erican nuclearguarantee. But if optimism were to prove wrong, it might be toolate to correct the political if not military degradation whichwould have set in. On balance, it seems wiser to control detenteby building up in Western Europe a Defense Community toshore up in new circumstances the peace which has made detentepossible.


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A New European Defence Community

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