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Transcript of A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S...
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Policies for Pandemic Influenza:
Animal/Public Health
Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM
Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept
College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC
Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM
Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept
College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics
• Introductory Introductory commentscomments
• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations
• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective
• Introductory Introductory commentscomments
• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations
• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Animal and Public Health?
• 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people)(dangerous to people)
• The food US consumers eat in The food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countriesfrom 30 +/- countries
• The typical city has less than 3 The typical city has less than 3 days’ food supplydays’ food supply
• In US, there are ~750K MDs In US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMs and 75K DVMs
Of which 80%+ are companion Of which 80%+ are companion animal orientedanimal oriented
• 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people)(dangerous to people)
• The food US consumers eat in The food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countriesfrom 30 +/- countries
• The typical city has less than 3 The typical city has less than 3 days’ food supplydays’ food supply
• In US, there are ~750K MDs In US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMs and 75K DVMs
Of which 80%+ are companion Of which 80%+ are companion animal orientedanimal oriented
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Animal and Public Health?
13.13. Viral Viral Hemorrhagic Hemorrhagic FeversFevers
14.14. Viral Viral Encephalitis Encephalitis Diseases Diseases
15.15. Brucellosis Brucellosis
16.16. Food/H2O Safety Food/H2O Safety Threats Threats
17.17. RetrovirusesRetroviruses
Likely ZoonoticsLikely Zoonotics
1.1. Ebola/MarburgEbola/Marburg
Human Health Human Health Impact in QuestionImpact in Question
1.1. Swine Vesicular Swine Vesicular Disease Disease
13.13. Viral Viral Hemorrhagic Hemorrhagic FeversFevers
14.14. Viral Viral Encephalitis Encephalitis Diseases Diseases
15.15. Brucellosis Brucellosis
16.16. Food/H2O Safety Food/H2O Safety Threats Threats
17.17. RetrovirusesRetroviruses
Likely ZoonoticsLikely Zoonotics
1.1. Ebola/MarburgEbola/Marburg
Human Health Human Health Impact in QuestionImpact in Question
1.1. Swine Vesicular Swine Vesicular Disease Disease
Definite ZoonoticsDefinite Zoonotics
1.1. SARSSARS
2.2. BSE (Mad Cow) BSE (Mad Cow)
3.3. PsittacosisPsittacosis
4.4. Rift Valley Fever Rift Valley Fever
5.5. Hi-Path Avian Hi-Path Avian Influenza Influenza
6.6. MonkeypoxMonkeypox
7.7. Hanta virusHanta virus
8.8. West Nile virusWest Nile virus
9.9. Q Fever Q Fever
10.10. Anthrax Anthrax
11.11. Plague Plague
12.12. TularemiaTularemia
Definite ZoonoticsDefinite Zoonotics
1.1. SARSSARS
2.2. BSE (Mad Cow) BSE (Mad Cow)
3.3. PsittacosisPsittacosis
4.4. Rift Valley Fever Rift Valley Fever
5.5. Hi-Path Avian Hi-Path Avian Influenza Influenza
6.6. MonkeypoxMonkeypox
7.7. Hanta virusHanta virus
8.8. West Nile virusWest Nile virus
9.9. Q Fever Q Fever
10.10. Anthrax Anthrax
11.11. Plague Plague
12.12. TularemiaTularemia
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Value of Poultry to North Carolina
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics
• Introductory Introductory commentscomments
• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations
• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective
• Introductory Introductory commentscomments
• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations
• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza: Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner
• [Both][Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy pandemics is fantasy
Doesn’t guide us, or help usDoesn’t guide us, or help us Argument from ignorance; poor policy basisArgument from ignorance; poor policy basis
• [Both][Both] Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is dubiousdubious
Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?Should we base plans on a single worst-case event? Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding, Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding,
health care, medical tools and practices are falsehealth care, medical tools and practices are false
• [Both] [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication Simple sound bites poor risk communication Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance
to the ‘next’ pandemic?to the ‘next’ pandemic?
• [Both][Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy pandemics is fantasy
Doesn’t guide us, or help usDoesn’t guide us, or help us Argument from ignorance; poor policy basisArgument from ignorance; poor policy basis
• [Both][Both] Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is dubiousdubious
Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?Should we base plans on a single worst-case event? Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding, Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding,
health care, medical tools and practices are falsehealth care, medical tools and practices are false
• [Both] [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication Simple sound bites poor risk communication Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance
to the ‘next’ pandemic?to the ‘next’ pandemic?
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza: Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner
• [Kelley][Kelley] Response planning too dependent on Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of medical intervention during last phase of pandemicpandemic
Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested anti-virals and vaccinologyanti-virals and vaccinology
• [Weiner][Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changesdiffering genetic changes
How quick, how bad, how severe?How quick, how bad, how severe? We don’t understand all that we know, and we We don’t understand all that we know, and we
don’t know all we need to understanddon’t know all we need to understand
• [Kelley][Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effortbad enough, and worthy of extra effort
22ndnd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massivemassive
Not socially neutralNot socially neutral
• [Kelley][Kelley] Response planning too dependent on Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of medical intervention during last phase of pandemicpandemic
Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested anti-virals and vaccinologyanti-virals and vaccinology
• [Weiner][Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changesdiffering genetic changes
How quick, how bad, how severe?How quick, how bad, how severe? We don’t understand all that we know, and we We don’t understand all that we know, and we
don’t know all we need to understanddon’t know all we need to understand
• [Kelley][Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effortbad enough, and worthy of extra effort
22ndnd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massivemassive
Not socially neutralNot socially neutral
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics
• Introductory Introductory commentscomments
• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations
• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective
• Introductory Introductory commentscomments
• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations
• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Additional comments
• Refreshing to hear people Refreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreakspotential ‘future’ outbreaks
DHHS has captured the entire DHHS has captured the entire agenda, to the detriment of agenda, to the detriment of us allus all
• I agree with some things I agree with some things you’ve heardyou’ve heard
• I am not as sanguine about I am not as sanguine about some commentssome comments
• Most, however, I just do not Most, however, I just do not know aboutknow about
• Refreshing to hear people Refreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreakspotential ‘future’ outbreaks
DHHS has captured the entire DHHS has captured the entire agenda, to the detriment of agenda, to the detriment of us allus all
• I agree with some things I agree with some things you’ve heardyou’ve heard
• I am not as sanguine about I am not as sanguine about some commentssome comments
• Most, however, I just do not Most, however, I just do not know aboutknow about
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Hi Path AI – Clinical Disease
High morbidity, high High morbidity, high mortalitymortality(Most get ill, most die)(Most get ill, most die)
High morbidity, high High morbidity, high mortalitymortality(Most get ill, most die)(Most get ill, most die)
six days after onset of signs...six days after onset of signs...
12 hours into disease...12 hours into disease...
24 hours into disease...24 hours into disease...
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Feed ProducerFeed Producer
Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution
IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)
Feed BrokersFeed Brokers
Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses
Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)
Feed ProducerFeed Producer
Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution
Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)
IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)
Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing
Feed BrokersFeed Brokers
Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses
Broiler BreedersBroiler Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)
Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)
ExportsExports
‘‘Spike Male’ LinesSpike Male’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)
Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)
Feed ProducerFeed Producer
ExportsExports
ImportsImports
Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution
Packer & Processor Packer & Processor (includes value-added(includes value-added
processing)processing)
Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)
IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)
High processed meats/proteinHigh processed meats/protein(sausages, deli prod’s, protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)
Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing
Feed BrokersFeed Brokers
Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses
Broiler BreedersBroiler Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)
Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)
ExportsExports
‘‘Spike Male’ LinesSpike Male’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)
Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows
DistributorDistributor
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)
Retailer, Restaurant, Retailer, Restaurant, InstitutionalInstitutional
Feed ProducerFeed Producer
DistributorDistributor
ExportsExports
ImportsImports
ConsumerConsumer
Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution
Packer & Processor Packer & Processor (includes value-added(includes value-added
processing)processing)
Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)
IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)
High processed meats/proteinHigh processed meats/protein(sausages, deli prod’s, protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)
Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing
Feed BrokersFeed Brokers
Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses
Broiler BreedersBroiler Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)
Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)
Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)
ExportsExports
‘‘Spike Male’ LinesSpike Male’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)
Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Katrina and Agriculture
• 60-70% of US corn and soy go 60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New through the port of New OrleansOrleans
Harvests started mid-Harvests started mid-SeptSept
• Port regained partial function Port regained partial function by end of Septemberby end of September
Port personnel are an Port personnel are an issueissue
• Limited river barge travel Limited river barge travel started back by mid Octoberstarted back by mid October
Unknown how river has Unknown how river has changedchanged
Barge costs much higher Barge costs much higher via competition with via competition with clean-up needsclean-up needs
• 60-70% of US corn and soy go 60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New through the port of New OrleansOrleans
Harvests started mid-Harvests started mid-SeptSept
• Port regained partial function Port regained partial function by end of Septemberby end of September
Port personnel are an Port personnel are an issueissue
• Limited river barge travel Limited river barge travel started back by mid Octoberstarted back by mid October
Unknown how river has Unknown how river has changedchanged
Barge costs much higher Barge costs much higher via competition with via competition with clean-up needsclean-up needs
CHANGE IN CORN PRICESINCE END OF AUGUST
STRONGER <2%
UNCHANGED
WEAKER >19%
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Avian Influenza H5N1 (now)
•Avian Influenza (H5N1) Avian Influenza (H5N1) 11stst seen 1997 Hong Kong seen 1997 Hong Kong Late 2003 was the new AI in SE Late 2003 was the new AI in SE
Asia Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)(called ‘chicken ebola’)
Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >>80 80 people in SE Asia, South Asia, people in SE Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and AfricaEastern Europe, and Africa
Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via destroying >1 Billion poultrydestroying >1 Billion poultry
•But that isn’t the scary part yet...But that isn’t the scary part yet...
•Avian Influenza (H5N1) Avian Influenza (H5N1) 11stst seen 1997 Hong Kong seen 1997 Hong Kong Late 2003 was the new AI in SE Late 2003 was the new AI in SE
Asia Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)(called ‘chicken ebola’)
Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >>80 80 people in SE Asia, South Asia, people in SE Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and AfricaEastern Europe, and Africa
Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via destroying >1 Billion poultrydestroying >1 Billion poultry
•But that isn’t the scary part yet...But that isn’t the scary part yet...
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Poultry is THE major high quality protein source for the world
• Demand over 40 Demand over 40 years for all animal years for all animal proteins has grownproteins has grown
Ruminant meat Ruminant meat by 100-150%by 100-150%
Pig meat by 250-Pig meat by 250-300%300%
Milk by 100-200%Milk by 100-200% Poultry meat by Poultry meat by
almost 800%almost 800%
• Is a major source of Is a major source of economic wealth as economic wealth as wellwell
• Demand over 40 Demand over 40 years for all animal years for all animal proteins has grownproteins has grown
Ruminant meat Ruminant meat by 100-150%by 100-150%
Pig meat by 250-Pig meat by 250-300%300%
Milk by 100-200%Milk by 100-200% Poultry meat by Poultry meat by
almost 800%almost 800%
• Is a major source of Is a major source of economic wealth as economic wealth as wellwell
From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06
Beef
Sheep/Goat
Pig
Poultry
Cow Milk
Buff Milk
Sheep Milk
Goat Milk
Livestock Demand – Global - % Change 1959-1999
0% 200% 400% 600% 800%
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Poultry as Economic Underpinning: Prior to 2004
From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
WORLD
Afr
Amer
Asia
Eur
Oth
3%
5%
1%
2%
12%
4%
2%
0%
3%
0%
22%
0%
Export
Consump
POULTRY MARKET % DECREASESPrediction vs Revision, 2006
HPAI H5N1 World Consumption & Export Changes
• Movement Movement of H5N1 to of H5N1 to Europe in Europe in fall 2005 fall 2005 triggered a triggered a major major disruption disruption in world in world poultry poultry marketsmarkets
Local Local variationvariations occur, s occur, but the but the trend is trend is badbad
• Movement Movement of H5N1 to of H5N1 to Europe in Europe in fall 2005 fall 2005 triggered a triggered a major major disruption disruption in world in world poultry poultry marketsmarkets
Local Local variationvariations occur, s occur, but the but the trend is trend is badbad
Source: FAO, February 2006
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
US Trade Exposure: <15% of US Production
BSE in USA
Hurricanes hit Gulf Poultry
H5N1 in Russia H5N1 in Croatia, Romania, Turkey
H5N1 in Ukraine
H5N1 in 18 more Euro Area Countries
LoPath? AI in Texas
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Ultimate HPAI Costs to Industry - Best Guesstimate• Economic losses mountingEconomic losses mounting
Waiting for others to make production adjustmentWaiting for others to make production adjustment Time period before adjustment depends on how Time period before adjustment depends on how
deep the pockets of companies and governmentsdeep the pockets of companies and governments
• Unusual situation where lower prices may not Unusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: stimulate increased consumption:
Loss Loss Lowered Lowered leg qtr pricesleg qtr prices $142 M / mo $142 M / mo Lowered Lowered breast pricesbreast prices $104 M / mo$104 M / mo
TotalTotal $246 $246 M / moM / mo
• Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.pork and beef wholesale prices.
• Economic losses mountingEconomic losses mounting Waiting for others to make production adjustmentWaiting for others to make production adjustment Time period before adjustment depends on how Time period before adjustment depends on how
deep the pockets of companies and governmentsdeep the pockets of companies and governments
• Unusual situation where lower prices may not Unusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: stimulate increased consumption:
Loss Loss Lowered Lowered leg qtr pricesleg qtr prices $142 M / mo $142 M / mo Lowered Lowered breast pricesbreast prices $104 M / mo$104 M / mo
TotalTotal $246 $246 M / moM / mo
• Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.pork and beef wholesale prices.
Estimates from : Bill RoenigkNat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic)
Estimates from : Bill RoenigkNat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic)
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Response to Theoretical H5N1 in US Poultry
27%
25%
46%
Continue to eatchicken/other poultry
Reduce the amount ofchicken you eat
Stop eating that type ofchicken/poultry
(Among those who eat poultry, 96%)
Harvard School of Public Health Project on the Public and Biological Security, January 17-25, 2006.
Note: “Don’t know” responses not shown.
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Lessons Learned : Avian Influenza 2005-6... maybe.
• Avian Influenza’s Avian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread (H5N1) spread means animal means animal health & public health & public health are the samehealth are the same
• But public health But public health will always be the will always be the prioritypriority
Public health Public health response can be response can be deleterious to deleterious to animal agricultureanimal agriculture
Prevention & Prevention & response is best response is best responsibility of responsibility of industryindustry
• Avian Influenza’s Avian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread (H5N1) spread means animal means animal health & public health & public health are the samehealth are the same
• But public health But public health will always be the will always be the prioritypriority
Public health Public health response can be response can be deleterious to deleterious to animal agricultureanimal agriculture
Prevention & Prevention & response is best response is best responsibility of responsibility of industryindustry
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Threats in Spread of H5N1: Confusing, to say the least
Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006:Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006: Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...”domestic and wild birds...”
www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006:www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu expert “...A top bird flu expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach the United States this year via migratory birds, but the United States this year via migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the country...” infected birds smuggled into the country...”
Science Magazine- 27 April 2006:Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is what “...The question is what role wild birds now play as the virus hops across role wild birds now play as the virus hops across continents. There's growing suspicion that international continents. There's growing suspicion that international smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger role...” role...”
Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006:Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006: Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...”domestic and wild birds...”
www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006:www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu expert “...A top bird flu expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach the United States this year via migratory birds, but the United States this year via migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the country...” infected birds smuggled into the country...”
Science Magazine- 27 April 2006:Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is what “...The question is what role wild birds now play as the virus hops across role wild birds now play as the virus hops across continents. There's growing suspicion that international continents. There's growing suspicion that international smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger role...” role...”
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
“Planned Mismanagement”?
Making enough vaccineMaking enough vaccineVaccinating people against H5N1 Vaccinating people against H5N1
before a pandemic starts is not yet a before a pandemic starts is not yet a practical possibility, because not practical possibility, because not enough vaccine is available. This is enough vaccine is available. This is partly because all the vaccine factories partly because all the vaccine factories are being used to make vaccine for are being used to make vaccine for ordinary flu. ordinary flu.
There is, however, massive global There is, however, massive global capacity for making flu vaccine for capacity for making flu vaccine for chickens, and in April the WHO held chickens, and in April the WHO held a meeting to explore the possibility a meeting to explore the possibility of using these facilities to make of using these facilities to make human vaccinehuman vaccine. It concluded that the . It concluded that the manufacturing processes and manufacturing processes and standards are not that different, and it standards are not that different, and it should be possible to divert some should be possible to divert some plants. plants.
Making enough vaccineMaking enough vaccineVaccinating people against H5N1 Vaccinating people against H5N1
before a pandemic starts is not yet a before a pandemic starts is not yet a practical possibility, because not practical possibility, because not enough vaccine is available. This is enough vaccine is available. This is partly because all the vaccine factories partly because all the vaccine factories are being used to make vaccine for are being used to make vaccine for ordinary flu. ordinary flu.
There is, however, massive global There is, however, massive global capacity for making flu vaccine for capacity for making flu vaccine for chickens, and in April the WHO held chickens, and in April the WHO held a meeting to explore the possibility a meeting to explore the possibility of using these facilities to make of using these facilities to make human vaccinehuman vaccine. It concluded that the . It concluded that the manufacturing processes and manufacturing processes and standards are not that different, and it standards are not that different, and it should be possible to divert some should be possible to divert some plants. plants.
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Take Homes on Policy...
• Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrousbe disastrous
Over reliance on medical technology – what Over reliance on medical technology – what should be the last step in several to protect the should be the last step in several to protect the publicpublic
Ignoring where an agent is now means we have Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea where it will be tomorrowno idea where it will be tomorrow
• Risk based, science based decisions are the only Risk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensibleones that are defensible
Not, in reality, what we are doing now.Not, in reality, what we are doing now.
• All the same, there are cautionary tales of All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.importance.
H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...
Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...
• Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrousbe disastrous
Over reliance on medical technology – what Over reliance on medical technology – what should be the last step in several to protect the should be the last step in several to protect the publicpublic
Ignoring where an agent is now means we have Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea where it will be tomorrowno idea where it will be tomorrow
• Risk based, science based decisions are the only Risk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensibleones that are defensible
Not, in reality, what we are doing now.Not, in reality, what we are doing now.
• All the same, there are cautionary tales of All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.importance.
H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...
Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
UK Farmer who committed
suicide when his animals
were buried too close to water table, and his
household water turned
red.
UK April 2001
C. Brown, U GA CVM
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Policies for Pandemic Influenza:
Animal/Public Health
Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM
Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept
College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC
Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM
Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept
College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Understanding Pandemic Influenza
• Pandemics occur when Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that novel strain emerges that is:is:
1.1. readily transmitted readily transmitted between individualsbetween individuals
2.2. genetically unique genetically unique (pop’n lacks preexisting (pop’n lacks preexisting immunity)immunity)
3.3. increased virulenceincreased virulence• Facilitated by modern Facilitated by modern
population densities and population densities and movement of people, movement of people, animals, and products animals, and products
In spring 03, SARS In spring 03, SARS traveled to 5 countries traveled to 5 countries w/in 24 hr after w/in 24 hr after emerging in rural China emerging in rural China
• Pandemics occur when Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that novel strain emerges that is:is:
1.1. readily transmitted readily transmitted between individualsbetween individuals
2.2. genetically unique genetically unique (pop’n lacks preexisting (pop’n lacks preexisting immunity)immunity)
3.3. increased virulenceincreased virulence• Facilitated by modern Facilitated by modern
population densities and population densities and movement of people, movement of people, animals, and products animals, and products
In spring 03, SARS In spring 03, SARS traveled to 5 countries traveled to 5 countries w/in 24 hr after w/in 24 hr after emerging in rural China emerging in rural China
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
018501850 19001900 19501950 2000200018501850 19001900 19501950 20002000
DAYS TOCIRCUMNAVIGATE THE WORLD
GLOBALPOP’N
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Turkey Food-ChainTurkey Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows
‘ ‘ Grandparent' LinesGrandparent' Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Female)Breeder, Female)
Retailer, Restaurant, Retailer, Restaurant, InstitutionalInstitutional
Feed ProducerFeed Producer
DistributorDistributor
ExportsExports
ImportsImports
ConsumerConsumer
Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution
Packer & Processor Packer & Processor (includes value-added(includes value-added
processing)processing)
Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl poults)(culls; incl poults)
IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)
High processed meats/proteinHigh processed meats/protein(sausages, deli prod’s, protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)
Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing
Feed BrokersFeed Brokers
Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment
Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses
Production BreedersProduction Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)
ExportsExports
‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Male)Breeder, Male)
Darkout SiteDarkout Site(2(2oo Breeder, Hens) Breeder, Hens)
Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Poults)(Commercial Poults)
Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Poults)(Commercial Poults)
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
Egg Food-ChainEgg Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows
Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment
Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment
‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(Genetics, male/female)(Genetics, male/female)
Retailer, Restaurant, Retailer, Restaurant, InstitutionalInstitutional
Feed ProducerFeed Producer
DistributorDistributor
ExportsExports
ImportsImports
ConsumerConsumer
Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution
Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)
IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)
Feed BrokersFeed Brokers
Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses
Multiplier LinesMultiplier Lines(Comm’l Layer Hens)(Comm’l Layer Hens)
Layer UnitLayer Unit(Commercial eggs)(Commercial eggs)
Egg Handlers Egg Handlers and Brokersand Brokers
Processed EggsProcessed Eggs(Bakery, commercial)(Bakery, commercial)
High processed High processed meats/proteinmeats/protein(See Poultry (See Poultry Meat Chain)Meat Chain)
Layer Growout SiteLayer Growout Site(Comm’l Layer Hens)(Comm’l Layer Hens)
Out-of-State EggOut-of-State EggHandlers/BroodersHandlers/Brooders
In-Line Egg Production (Direct Sale)In-Line Egg Production (Direct Sale)
Off-Line Off-Line Egg Egg
Production Production (Middlemen(Middlemen
))
Agriculture Disaster Research Institute
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
From Saif, Ohio State University, Current information on influenza virus infection. Feb 2006From Saif, Ohio State University, Current information on influenza virus infection. Feb 2006
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A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E
A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P
A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E