A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S...

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R Policies for Pandemic Influenza: Animal/Public Health Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MS, DVM, MPVM MPVM Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Population Health & Pathobiology Dept College of Vet Pathobiology Dept College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

Transcript of A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S...

Page 1: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Policies for Pandemic Influenza:

Animal/Public Health

Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM

Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept

College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC

Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM

Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept

College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC

Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

Page 2: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics

• Introductory Introductory commentscomments

• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations

• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective

• Introductory Introductory commentscomments

• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations

• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective

Page 3: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Animal and Public Health?

• 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people)(dangerous to people)

• The food US consumers eat in The food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countriesfrom 30 +/- countries

• The typical city has less than 3 The typical city has less than 3 days’ food supplydays’ food supply

• In US, there are ~750K MDs In US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMs and 75K DVMs

Of which 80%+ are companion Of which 80%+ are companion animal orientedanimal oriented

• 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” 75% of “CDC A&B/Emerging” Diseases are Zoonotic Diseases are Zoonotic (dangerous to people)(dangerous to people)

• The food US consumers eat in The food US consumers eat in one day, on average, comes one day, on average, comes from 30 +/- countriesfrom 30 +/- countries

• The typical city has less than 3 The typical city has less than 3 days’ food supplydays’ food supply

• In US, there are ~750K MDs In US, there are ~750K MDs and 75K DVMs and 75K DVMs

Of which 80%+ are companion Of which 80%+ are companion animal orientedanimal oriented

Page 4: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Animal and Public Health?

13.13. Viral Viral Hemorrhagic Hemorrhagic FeversFevers

14.14. Viral Viral Encephalitis Encephalitis Diseases Diseases

15.15. Brucellosis Brucellosis

16.16. Food/H2O Safety Food/H2O Safety Threats Threats

17.17. RetrovirusesRetroviruses

Likely ZoonoticsLikely Zoonotics

1.1. Ebola/MarburgEbola/Marburg

Human Health Human Health Impact in QuestionImpact in Question

1.1. Swine Vesicular Swine Vesicular Disease Disease

13.13. Viral Viral Hemorrhagic Hemorrhagic FeversFevers

14.14. Viral Viral Encephalitis Encephalitis Diseases Diseases

15.15. Brucellosis Brucellosis

16.16. Food/H2O Safety Food/H2O Safety Threats Threats

17.17. RetrovirusesRetroviruses

Likely ZoonoticsLikely Zoonotics

1.1. Ebola/MarburgEbola/Marburg

Human Health Human Health Impact in QuestionImpact in Question

1.1. Swine Vesicular Swine Vesicular Disease Disease

Definite ZoonoticsDefinite Zoonotics

1.1. SARSSARS

2.2. BSE (Mad Cow) BSE (Mad Cow)

3.3. PsittacosisPsittacosis

4.4. Rift Valley Fever Rift Valley Fever

5.5. Hi-Path Avian Hi-Path Avian Influenza Influenza

6.6. MonkeypoxMonkeypox

7.7. Hanta virusHanta virus

8.8. West Nile virusWest Nile virus

9.9. Q Fever Q Fever

10.10. Anthrax Anthrax

11.11. Plague Plague

12.12. TularemiaTularemia

Definite ZoonoticsDefinite Zoonotics

1.1. SARSSARS

2.2. BSE (Mad Cow) BSE (Mad Cow)

3.3. PsittacosisPsittacosis

4.4. Rift Valley Fever Rift Valley Fever

5.5. Hi-Path Avian Hi-Path Avian Influenza Influenza

6.6. MonkeypoxMonkeypox

7.7. Hanta virusHanta virus

8.8. West Nile virusWest Nile virus

9.9. Q Fever Q Fever

10.10. Anthrax Anthrax

11.11. Plague Plague

12.12. TularemiaTularemia

Page 5: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Value of Poultry to North Carolina

Page 6: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics

• Introductory Introductory commentscomments

• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations

• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective

• Introductory Introductory commentscomments

• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations

• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective

Page 7: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Pandemic Influenza: Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner

• [Both][Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy pandemics is fantasy

Doesn’t guide us, or help usDoesn’t guide us, or help us Argument from ignorance; poor policy basisArgument from ignorance; poor policy basis

• [Both][Both] Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is dubiousdubious

Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?Should we base plans on a single worst-case event? Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding, Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding,

health care, medical tools and practices are falsehealth care, medical tools and practices are false

• [Both] [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication Simple sound bites poor risk communication Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance

to the ‘next’ pandemic?to the ‘next’ pandemic?

• [Both][Both] Claiming to know periodicity of influenza Claiming to know periodicity of influenza pandemics is fantasy pandemics is fantasy

Doesn’t guide us, or help usDoesn’t guide us, or help us Argument from ignorance; poor policy basisArgument from ignorance; poor policy basis

• [Both][Both] Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is Linear extrapolation of 40-90 yr ago is dubiousdubious

Should we base plans on a single worst-case event?Should we base plans on a single worst-case event? Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding, Implicit assumptions of similarity in understanding,

health care, medical tools and practices are falsehealth care, medical tools and practices are false

• [Both] [Both] Simple sound bites poor risk communication Simple sound bites poor risk communication Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance Does knowing ‘how’ 1918 happened have relevance

to the ‘next’ pandemic?to the ‘next’ pandemic?

Page 8: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Pandemic Influenza: Take Homes via Kelley/Weiner

• [Kelley][Kelley] Response planning too dependent on Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of medical intervention during last phase of pandemicpandemic

Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested anti-virals and vaccinologyanti-virals and vaccinology

• [Weiner][Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changesdiffering genetic changes

How quick, how bad, how severe?How quick, how bad, how severe? We don’t understand all that we know, and we We don’t understand all that we know, and we

don’t know all we need to understanddon’t know all we need to understand

• [Kelley][Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effortbad enough, and worthy of extra effort

22ndnd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massivemassive

Not socially neutralNot socially neutral

• [Kelley][Kelley] Response planning too dependent on Response planning too dependent on medical intervention during last phase of medical intervention during last phase of pandemicpandemic

Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested Too dependent on ‘silver bullets’ of untested anti-virals and vaccinologyanti-virals and vaccinology

• [Weiner][Weiner] Genomics too imprecise to understand Genomics too imprecise to understand differing genetic changesdiffering genetic changes

How quick, how bad, how severe?How quick, how bad, how severe? We don’t understand all that we know, and we We don’t understand all that we know, and we

don’t know all we need to understanddon’t know all we need to understand

• [Kelley][Kelley] Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are Economics of ‘just’ a poultry event are bad enough, and worthy of extra effortbad enough, and worthy of extra effort

22ndnd order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be order effects (social/ psychol/ etc) will be massivemassive

Not socially neutralNot socially neutral

Page 9: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Pandemic Influenza Policies: Topics

• Introductory Introductory commentscomments

• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations

• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective

• Introductory Introductory commentscomments

• Summary of Summary of Kelley/Weiner Kelley/Weiner presentationspresentations

• Additional Additional comments from a comments from a veterinarian’s veterinarian’s perspectiveperspective

Page 10: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Additional comments

• Refreshing to hear people Refreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreakspotential ‘future’ outbreaks

DHHS has captured the entire DHHS has captured the entire agenda, to the detriment of agenda, to the detriment of us allus all

• I agree with some things I agree with some things you’ve heardyou’ve heard

• I am not as sanguine about I am not as sanguine about some commentssome comments

• Most, however, I just do not Most, however, I just do not know aboutknow about

• Refreshing to hear people Refreshing to hear people worried about BIRDS in worried about BIRDS in today’s AVIAN pandemic, as today’s AVIAN pandemic, as opposed to PEOPLE in opposed to PEOPLE in potential ‘future’ outbreakspotential ‘future’ outbreaks

DHHS has captured the entire DHHS has captured the entire agenda, to the detriment of agenda, to the detriment of us allus all

• I agree with some things I agree with some things you’ve heardyou’ve heard

• I am not as sanguine about I am not as sanguine about some commentssome comments

• Most, however, I just do not Most, however, I just do not know aboutknow about

Page 11: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Hi Path AI – Clinical Disease

High morbidity, high High morbidity, high mortalitymortality(Most get ill, most die)(Most get ill, most die)

High morbidity, high High morbidity, high mortalitymortality(Most get ill, most die)(Most get ill, most die)

six days after onset of signs...six days after onset of signs...

12 hours into disease...12 hours into disease...

24 hours into disease...24 hours into disease...

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Feed ProducerFeed Producer

Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution

IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)

Feed BrokersFeed Brokers

Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment

Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment

Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses

Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)

Feed ProducerFeed Producer

Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution

Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)

IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)

Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing

Feed BrokersFeed Brokers

Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment

Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment

Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses

Broiler BreedersBroiler Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)

Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)

Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)

ExportsExports

‘‘Spike Male’ LinesSpike Male’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)

Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)

Feed ProducerFeed Producer

ExportsExports

ImportsImports

Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution

Packer & Processor Packer & Processor (includes value-added(includes value-added

processing)processing)

Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)

IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)

High processed meats/proteinHigh processed meats/protein(sausages, deli prod’s, protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)

Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing

Feed BrokersFeed Brokers

Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment

Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment

Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses

Broiler BreedersBroiler Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)

Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)

Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)

ExportsExports

‘‘Spike Male’ LinesSpike Male’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)

Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows

DistributorDistributor

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)

Retailer, Restaurant, Retailer, Restaurant, InstitutionalInstitutional

Feed ProducerFeed Producer

DistributorDistributor

ExportsExports

ImportsImports

ConsumerConsumer

Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution

Packer & Processor Packer & Processor (includes value-added(includes value-added

processing)processing)

Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)

IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)

High processed meats/proteinHigh processed meats/protein(sausages, deli prod’s, protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)

Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing

Feed BrokersFeed Brokers

Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment

Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment

Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses

Broiler BreedersBroiler Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)

Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)

Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Chicks)(Commercial Chicks)

ExportsExports

‘‘Spike Male’ LinesSpike Male’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Genetics)Breeder, Genetics)

Chicken Food-ChainChicken Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Katrina and Agriculture

• 60-70% of US corn and soy go 60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New through the port of New OrleansOrleans

Harvests started mid-Harvests started mid-SeptSept

• Port regained partial function Port regained partial function by end of Septemberby end of September

Port personnel are an Port personnel are an issueissue

• Limited river barge travel Limited river barge travel started back by mid Octoberstarted back by mid October

Unknown how river has Unknown how river has changedchanged

Barge costs much higher Barge costs much higher via competition with via competition with clean-up needsclean-up needs

• 60-70% of US corn and soy go 60-70% of US corn and soy go through the port of New through the port of New OrleansOrleans

Harvests started mid-Harvests started mid-SeptSept

• Port regained partial function Port regained partial function by end of Septemberby end of September

Port personnel are an Port personnel are an issueissue

• Limited river barge travel Limited river barge travel started back by mid Octoberstarted back by mid October

Unknown how river has Unknown how river has changedchanged

Barge costs much higher Barge costs much higher via competition with via competition with clean-up needsclean-up needs

CHANGE IN CORN PRICESINCE END OF AUGUST

STRONGER <2%

UNCHANGED

WEAKER >19%

Page 17: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Avian Influenza H5N1 (now)

•Avian Influenza (H5N1) Avian Influenza (H5N1) 11stst seen 1997 Hong Kong seen 1997 Hong Kong Late 2003 was the new AI in SE Late 2003 was the new AI in SE

Asia Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)(called ‘chicken ebola’)

Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >>80 80 people in SE Asia, South Asia, people in SE Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and AfricaEastern Europe, and Africa

Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via destroying >1 Billion poultrydestroying >1 Billion poultry

•But that isn’t the scary part yet...But that isn’t the scary part yet...

•Avian Influenza (H5N1) Avian Influenza (H5N1) 11stst seen 1997 Hong Kong seen 1997 Hong Kong Late 2003 was the new AI in SE Late 2003 was the new AI in SE

Asia Asia (called ‘chicken ebola’)(called ‘chicken ebola’)

Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed Fall/Winter 05-06: Killed >>80 80 people in SE Asia, South Asia, people in SE Asia, South Asia, Eastern Europe, and AfricaEastern Europe, and Africa

Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via Cost by Apr06 $18-35B, most via destroying >1 Billion poultrydestroying >1 Billion poultry

•But that isn’t the scary part yet...But that isn’t the scary part yet...

Page 18: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Poultry is THE major high quality protein source for the world

• Demand over 40 Demand over 40 years for all animal years for all animal proteins has grownproteins has grown

Ruminant meat Ruminant meat by 100-150%by 100-150%

Pig meat by 250-Pig meat by 250-300%300%

Milk by 100-200%Milk by 100-200% Poultry meat by Poultry meat by

almost 800%almost 800%

• Is a major source of Is a major source of economic wealth as economic wealth as wellwell

• Demand over 40 Demand over 40 years for all animal years for all animal proteins has grownproteins has grown

Ruminant meat Ruminant meat by 100-150%by 100-150%

Pig meat by 250-Pig meat by 250-300%300%

Milk by 100-200%Milk by 100-200% Poultry meat by Poultry meat by

almost 800%almost 800%

• Is a major source of Is a major source of economic wealth as economic wealth as wellwell

From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06

Beef

Sheep/Goat

Pig

Poultry

Cow Milk

Buff Milk

Sheep Milk

Goat Milk

Livestock Demand – Global - % Change 1959-1999

0% 200% 400% 600% 800%

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Poultry as Economic Underpinning: Prior to 2004

From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06From M Pappaioanou. Natl Inst Anim Ag Emerg Progr Conf. April 06

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%

WORLD

Afr

Amer

Asia

Eur

Oth

3%

5%

1%

2%

12%

4%

2%

0%

3%

0%

22%

0%

Export

Consump

POULTRY MARKET % DECREASESPrediction vs Revision, 2006

HPAI H5N1 World Consumption & Export Changes

• Movement Movement of H5N1 to of H5N1 to Europe in Europe in fall 2005 fall 2005 triggered a triggered a major major disruption disruption in world in world poultry poultry marketsmarkets

Local Local variationvariations occur, s occur, but the but the trend is trend is badbad

• Movement Movement of H5N1 to of H5N1 to Europe in Europe in fall 2005 fall 2005 triggered a triggered a major major disruption disruption in world in world poultry poultry marketsmarkets

Local Local variationvariations occur, s occur, but the but the trend is trend is badbad

Source: FAO, February 2006

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

US Trade Exposure: <15% of US Production

BSE in USA

Hurricanes hit Gulf Poultry

H5N1 in Russia H5N1 in Croatia, Romania, Turkey

H5N1 in Ukraine

H5N1 in 18 more Euro Area Countries

LoPath? AI in Texas

Page 22: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Ultimate HPAI Costs to Industry - Best Guesstimate• Economic losses mountingEconomic losses mounting

Waiting for others to make production adjustmentWaiting for others to make production adjustment Time period before adjustment depends on how Time period before adjustment depends on how

deep the pockets of companies and governmentsdeep the pockets of companies and governments

• Unusual situation where lower prices may not Unusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: stimulate increased consumption:

Loss Loss Lowered Lowered leg qtr pricesleg qtr prices $142 M / mo $142 M / mo Lowered Lowered breast pricesbreast prices $104 M / mo$104 M / mo

TotalTotal $246 $246 M / moM / mo

• Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.pork and beef wholesale prices.

• Economic losses mountingEconomic losses mounting Waiting for others to make production adjustmentWaiting for others to make production adjustment Time period before adjustment depends on how Time period before adjustment depends on how

deep the pockets of companies and governmentsdeep the pockets of companies and governments

• Unusual situation where lower prices may not Unusual situation where lower prices may not stimulate increased consumption: stimulate increased consumption:

Loss Loss Lowered Lowered leg qtr pricesleg qtr prices $142 M / mo $142 M / mo Lowered Lowered breast pricesbreast prices $104 M / mo$104 M / mo

TotalTotal $246 $246 M / moM / mo

• Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. Also, overabundance of chicken is reducing U.S. pork and beef wholesale prices.pork and beef wholesale prices.

Estimates from : Bill RoenigkNat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic)

Estimates from : Bill RoenigkNat’l Chicken Council (Pers Communic)

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Response to Theoretical H5N1 in US Poultry

27%

25%

46%

Continue to eatchicken/other poultry

Reduce the amount ofchicken you eat

Stop eating that type ofchicken/poultry

(Among those who eat poultry, 96%)

Harvard School of Public Health Project on the Public and Biological Security, January 17-25, 2006.

Note: “Don’t know” responses not shown.

Page 24: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Lessons Learned : Avian Influenza 2005-6... maybe.

• Avian Influenza’s Avian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread (H5N1) spread means animal means animal health & public health & public health are the samehealth are the same

• But public health But public health will always be the will always be the prioritypriority

Public health Public health response can be response can be deleterious to deleterious to animal agricultureanimal agriculture

Prevention & Prevention & response is best response is best responsibility of responsibility of industryindustry

• Avian Influenza’s Avian Influenza’s (H5N1) spread (H5N1) spread means animal means animal health & public health & public health are the samehealth are the same

• But public health But public health will always be the will always be the prioritypriority

Public health Public health response can be response can be deleterious to deleterious to animal agricultureanimal agriculture

Prevention & Prevention & response is best response is best responsibility of responsibility of industryindustry

Page 25: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Threats in Spread of H5N1: Confusing, to say the least

Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006:Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006: Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...”domestic and wild birds...”

www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006:www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu expert “...A top bird flu expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach the United States this year via migratory birds, but the United States this year via migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the country...” infected birds smuggled into the country...”

Science Magazine- 27 April 2006:Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is what “...The question is what role wild birds now play as the virus hops across role wild birds now play as the virus hops across continents. There's growing suspicion that international continents. There's growing suspicion that international smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger role...” role...”

Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006:Joint statement by the OIE and the FAO- 13 April 2006: Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic Rome – “...transmission and spread of highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] avian H5N1 influenza virus [is essentially only by] domestic and wild birds...”domestic and wild birds...”

www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006:www,promedmail.org- 2 May 2006: “...A top bird flu expert “...A top bird flu expert on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach on Tuesday predicted that the H5N1 virus will not reach the United States this year via migratory birds, but the United States this year via migratory birds, but warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through warned it will eventually arrive -- possibly through infected birds smuggled into the country...” infected birds smuggled into the country...”

Science Magazine- 27 April 2006:Science Magazine- 27 April 2006: “...The question is what “...The question is what role wild birds now play as the virus hops across role wild birds now play as the virus hops across continents. There's growing suspicion that international continents. There's growing suspicion that international smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry smuggling of contaminated live poultry or poultry products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger products, such as fertilizer, may be playing a bigger role...” role...”

Page 26: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

“Planned Mismanagement”?

Making enough vaccineMaking enough vaccineVaccinating people against H5N1 Vaccinating people against H5N1

before a pandemic starts is not yet a before a pandemic starts is not yet a practical possibility, because not practical possibility, because not enough vaccine is available. This is enough vaccine is available. This is partly because all the vaccine factories partly because all the vaccine factories are being used to make vaccine for are being used to make vaccine for ordinary flu. ordinary flu.

There is, however, massive global There is, however, massive global capacity for making flu vaccine for capacity for making flu vaccine for chickens, and in April the WHO held chickens, and in April the WHO held a meeting to explore the possibility a meeting to explore the possibility of using these facilities to make of using these facilities to make human vaccinehuman vaccine. It concluded that the . It concluded that the manufacturing processes and manufacturing processes and standards are not that different, and it standards are not that different, and it should be possible to divert some should be possible to divert some plants. plants.

Making enough vaccineMaking enough vaccineVaccinating people against H5N1 Vaccinating people against H5N1

before a pandemic starts is not yet a before a pandemic starts is not yet a practical possibility, because not practical possibility, because not enough vaccine is available. This is enough vaccine is available. This is partly because all the vaccine factories partly because all the vaccine factories are being used to make vaccine for are being used to make vaccine for ordinary flu. ordinary flu.

There is, however, massive global There is, however, massive global capacity for making flu vaccine for capacity for making flu vaccine for chickens, and in April the WHO held chickens, and in April the WHO held a meeting to explore the possibility a meeting to explore the possibility of using these facilities to make of using these facilities to make human vaccinehuman vaccine. It concluded that the . It concluded that the manufacturing processes and manufacturing processes and standards are not that different, and it standards are not that different, and it should be possible to divert some should be possible to divert some plants. plants.

Page 27: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Take Homes on Policy...

• Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrousbe disastrous

Over reliance on medical technology – what Over reliance on medical technology – what should be the last step in several to protect the should be the last step in several to protect the publicpublic

Ignoring where an agent is now means we have Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea where it will be tomorrowno idea where it will be tomorrow

• Risk based, science based decisions are the only Risk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensibleones that are defensible

Not, in reality, what we are doing now.Not, in reality, what we are doing now.

• All the same, there are cautionary tales of All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.importance.

H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...

Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...

• Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can Focusing on ‘what ifs’ rather than ‘what is’ can be disastrousbe disastrous

Over reliance on medical technology – what Over reliance on medical technology – what should be the last step in several to protect the should be the last step in several to protect the publicpublic

Ignoring where an agent is now means we have Ignoring where an agent is now means we have no idea where it will be tomorrowno idea where it will be tomorrow

• Risk based, science based decisions are the only Risk based, science based decisions are the only ones that are defensibleones that are defensible

Not, in reality, what we are doing now.Not, in reality, what we are doing now.

• All the same, there are cautionary tales of All the same, there are cautionary tales of importance.importance.

H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs H3N8 in horses since mid-60’s. Jumped to dogs around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the around 35-40 years later. We’ve followed the Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...Asian H5N1 for only 10 years...

Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...Diseases don’t need to be fatal to kill...

Page 28: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

UK Farmer who committed

suicide when his animals

were buried too close to water table, and his

household water turned

red.

UK April 2001

C. Brown, U GA CVM

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Policies for Pandemic Influenza:

Animal/Public Health

Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM

Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept

College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC

Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

Barrett D. Slenning Barrett D. Slenning MS, DVM, MPVMMS, DVM, MPVM

Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Animal Biosecurity Risk Management Group Population Health & Pathobiology Dept Population Health & Pathobiology Dept

College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC College of Vet Med, NC State Univ, Raleigh, NC

Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Agriculture Disaster Research Institute Research Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NCResearch Triangle Inst., Research Triangle Park, NC

Page 30: A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E Policies.

A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Understanding Pandemic Influenza

• Pandemics occur when Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that novel strain emerges that is:is:

1.1. readily transmitted readily transmitted between individualsbetween individuals

2.2. genetically unique genetically unique (pop’n lacks preexisting (pop’n lacks preexisting immunity)immunity)

3.3. increased virulenceincreased virulence• Facilitated by modern Facilitated by modern

population densities and population densities and movement of people, movement of people, animals, and products animals, and products

In spring 03, SARS In spring 03, SARS traveled to 5 countries traveled to 5 countries w/in 24 hr after w/in 24 hr after emerging in rural China emerging in rural China

• Pandemics occur when Pandemics occur when novel strain emerges that novel strain emerges that is:is:

1.1. readily transmitted readily transmitted between individualsbetween individuals

2.2. genetically unique genetically unique (pop’n lacks preexisting (pop’n lacks preexisting immunity)immunity)

3.3. increased virulenceincreased virulence• Facilitated by modern Facilitated by modern

population densities and population densities and movement of people, movement of people, animals, and products animals, and products

In spring 03, SARS In spring 03, SARS traveled to 5 countries traveled to 5 countries w/in 24 hr after w/in 24 hr after emerging in rural China emerging in rural China

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

018501850 19001900 19501950 2000200018501850 19001900 19501950 20002000

DAYS TOCIRCUMNAVIGATE THE WORLD

GLOBALPOP’N

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Turkey Food-ChainTurkey Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows

‘ ‘ Grandparent' LinesGrandparent' Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Female)Breeder, Female)

Retailer, Restaurant, Retailer, Restaurant, InstitutionalInstitutional

Feed ProducerFeed Producer

DistributorDistributor

ExportsExports

ImportsImports

ConsumerConsumer

Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution

Packer & Processor Packer & Processor (includes value-added(includes value-added

processing)processing)

Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl poults)(culls; incl poults)

IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)

High processed meats/proteinHigh processed meats/protein(sausages, deli prod’s, protein (sausages, deli prod’s, protein suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)suppl’s, powdered, pet foods)

Out-of-State GrowingOut-of-State Growing

Feed BrokersFeed Brokers

Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment

Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment

Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses

Production BreedersProduction Breeders(2(2oo Breeder, Prod’n hens) Breeder, Prod’n hens)

ExportsExports

‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(1(1o o Breeder, Male)Breeder, Male)

Darkout SiteDarkout Site(2(2oo Breeder, Hens) Breeder, Hens)

Hatchery UnitHatchery Unit(Commercial Poults)(Commercial Poults)

Grower UnitGrower Unit(Commercial Poults)(Commercial Poults)

Agriculture Disaster Research Institute

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

Egg Food-ChainEgg Food-Chain Major FlowsMajor Flows Minor FlowsMinor Flows

Green lines/font = feed segmentRed lines/font = live animal segment

Purple lines/font = processing/marketing segmentBlack lines/font = immediate consumption segment

‘‘Grandparent’ LinesGrandparent’ Lines(Genetics, male/female)(Genetics, male/female)

Retailer, Restaurant, Retailer, Restaurant, InstitutionalInstitutional

Feed ProducerFeed Producer

DistributorDistributor

ExportsExports

ImportsImports

ConsumerConsumer

Feed Milling and Feed Milling and DistributionDistribution

Cull Hen MarketCull Hen Market(culls; incl chicks)(culls; incl chicks)

IndusIndustrial use trial use (rendering,(rendering, oils, fertilizer) oils, fertilizer)

Feed BrokersFeed Brokers

Non-food, non-feedNon-food, non-feedProducts & usesProducts & uses

Multiplier LinesMultiplier Lines(Comm’l Layer Hens)(Comm’l Layer Hens)

Layer UnitLayer Unit(Commercial eggs)(Commercial eggs)

Egg Handlers Egg Handlers and Brokersand Brokers

Processed EggsProcessed Eggs(Bakery, commercial)(Bakery, commercial)

High processed High processed meats/proteinmeats/protein(See Poultry (See Poultry Meat Chain)Meat Chain)

Layer Growout SiteLayer Growout Site(Comm’l Layer Hens)(Comm’l Layer Hens)

Out-of-State EggOut-of-State EggHandlers/BroodersHandlers/Brooders

In-Line Egg Production (Direct Sale)In-Line Egg Production (Direct Sale)

Off-Line Off-Line Egg Egg

Production Production (Middlemen(Middlemen

))

Agriculture Disaster Research Institute

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

From Saif, Ohio State University, Current information on influenza virus infection. Feb 2006From Saif, Ohio State University, Current information on influenza virus infection. Feb 2006

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E

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A N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U PA N I M A L B I O S E C U R I T Y R I S K M A N A G E M E N T G R O U P

A G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T EA G R I C U L T U R E D I S A S T E R R E S E A R C H I N S T I T U T E