A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen May-June 2005...2 May-June 2005 Field Artillerytracking...

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. HQDA PB6-05-3

May-June 2005A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen

46 May-June 2005 Field Artillery

A Joint Magazine for US Field Artillerymen

David P. ValcourtMajor General, United States ArmyField Artillery School Commandant

May-June 2005

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

DISCLAIMER: Field Artillery—is published bimonthly byHeadquarters, Department of the Army, under the auspices of theUS Army Field Artillery School (Building 758), Fort Sill, OK. The viewsexpressed are those of the authors, not the Department of Defenseor its elements. Field Artillery's content doesn't necessarily reflectthe US Army's position and doesn't supersede information in otherofficial Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neitheraffirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsements.

PURPOSE: (as stated in the first Field Artillery Journal in1911): To publish a journal for disseminating professional knowledgeand furnishing information as to the Field Artillery's progress, devel-opment and best use in campaign; to cultivate, with the other arms,a common understanding of the power and limitations of each; tofoster a feeling of interdependence among the different arms and ofhearty cooperation by all; and to promote understanding between theregular and militia forces by a closer bond; all of which objects areworthy and contribute to the good of our country.

OFFICIAL DISTRIBUTION: US Army and Marine CorpsActive and Reserve Components FA units: seven copies to eachcorps artillery, division artillery, brigade and regimental headquarters;13 copies to battalions; and seven copies to separate batteries ordetachments. In addition, other Department of Defense or govern-ment agencies that work with Field Artillery or fire support personnel,issues, material, doctrine, training, organization or equipment mayrequest a limited number of free copies of the magazine. Theseinclude, but are not limited to, other coordination and support units,training centers and branch schools, recruiting commands, readi-ness groups, libraries and education centers, program/project man-agers, military arsenals and laboratories, state adjutant generals,liaison officers, military academies, ROTCs, major command head-quarters, military attaches and public affairs offices.

PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS: Those ineligible for Official Dis-tribution may subscribe through the US Field Artillery Association,P.O. Box 33027, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0027 or www.fieldartillery.org.Telephone numbers are (580) 355-4677 or FAX (580) 355-8745 (noDSN). Dues are $20 per year to US and APO addresses. Theinternational rate is $55 for a one-year subscription.

SUBMISSIONS: Mail to Editor, Field Artillery, P.O. Box33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311. Telephone numbers are DSN 639-5121/6806 or commercial (580) 442-5121/6806 or FAX 7773 withDSN or commercial prefixes. Email is [email protected]. Materialis subject to edit by the Field Artillery staff.

REPRINTS: Field Artillery is pleased to grant permission toreprint articles. Please credit the author and Field Artillery.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Field Artillery (ISSN 0899-2525)(USPS 309-010) is published bimonthly. Periodicals postage is paidby the Department of the Army at Lawton, OK 73501 and anadditional mailing post office. POSTMASTER: send address changesto Field Artillery, P.O. Box 33311, Fort Sill, OK 73503-0311.

ARTICLES

DEPARTMENTS

1 Crossed Cannons on Your Collar

4 Incoming

Redleg Hotline & Email(Organization, Material, Doctrine and Training)

DSN 639-4020 or (580) 442-2204 (24-Hours)[email protected]

CounterStrike Task Forcehttps://counterstrike.army.smil.mil

Field Artillery Home Page & Emailsill-www.army.mil/famag; [email protected]

Editor:Patrecia Slayden Hollis

Art Director:Fred W. Baker III

Managing Editor:Reta L. Rogers

Assistant Editor:Vacant

Official:

Front Cover: An Iraqi shows the sign of victory with one finger stained purple—proofthat she voted in Iraq’s first-ever democratic elections. The purple finger has becomean international symbol of the Iraqi’s courage and determination to become ademocratic nation.

SANDRA R. RILEYAdministrative Assistant to theSecretary of the Army, 0503306

Peter J. SchoomakerGeneral, United States Army

Chief of Staff

(US Air Force Photo by TSgt Cherie A. Thurlby, 1st Combat Camera Squadron)

HQDA PB6-05-3

INTERVIEW

10 Red Team Goes Maneuver—1st Cav Div Arty as a Maneuver BCTBy Colonel Stephen R. Lanza, Major Robert L. Menti, Captain Luis M.Alvarez and First Lieutenant Michael R. Dalton

17 Why Do We Have 20th Century FSCM for a 21st Century Force?By Colonel Gerald L. Smith, USMC

21 Tropic Lightning Convoy Ops Lane TrainingBy Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Neason, Jr., and Captains John D.Williams and J. Bradley Marvin

24 1st AD Hot Platoon in Iraq: POC to Brigade FSE CounterstrikeDrill

By Sergeant First Class Robert M. Castillo

26 Home Station Fire Direction Training for More Autonomous POCsBy Sergeant First Class Robert M. Castillo

28 1st ID in Iraq: The FFA HQ Mission EnduresBy Colonel Richard C. Longo and Major Michael R. Eastman

32 Hoosier Redlegs Train Afghan Kandaks: Semper GumbiBy Majors Kellard N. Townsend, Jonathan E. Marion, and Joseph W.Boler and Captain Madison M. Carney, All INARNG

35 The German Field Artillery in the Neues Heer StructureBy Brigadier General Heinrich Fischer, Chief of the German Field Artillery

41 2004 Hamilton Award Winner: C/3-178 FA, 151st FA Brigade,SCARNG

42 2004 Gruber Award Co-Winners: SFC William A. Covey, C/3-319FA, 82d Abn; and 1-12 FA, Vehicle Force Protection Project Team,17th FA Brigade

44 2004 Knox Award Co-Winners: F/7 FAR, 25th ID; and A/1-37 FAR,3/2 SBCT

5 Part I: Joint Effects for the MNC-I in OIF IIInterview with Brigadier General Richard P. Formica, Former Com-mander of the Force FA Headquarters (FFA HQ) and Joint Fires andEffects Coordinator, MultiNational Corps, Iraq (MNC-I)

sill-www.army.mil/famag May-June 2005 1

A Report fromHome Station Sill

Preparing for War Today and TomorrowPreparing our Field Artillery Soldiers

for war remains the most important thingwe do at Fort Sill—or for that matter—the most important thing any of ourField Artillery commanders do at homestation. I would like to share some ini-tiatives I have seen and applaud them.

Operation Bedpost. Fort Sill’s ArmyTraining Center (ATC) is now in fullswing executing what is called “Opera-tion Bedpost.” Operation Bedpost isanother name for the weapons immer-sion program where the trainee keepshis weapon all day and, literally, hangsit over his bedpost at night.

After a Soldier’s first basic rifle marks-manship in Week One of his training, hekeeps his weapon with him at all times,sort of like the old Army. Given thatphysical security in our ATC barracks—our “Starships”—is no less than that ofany Fort Sill range or in a forwardoperating base (FOB) somewhere inAfghanistan or Iraq, the weapons re-main with the Soldiers at night securedover their bunk bedposts and not inarms rooms. The only difference is inleader attitude as the young privatesknow nothing different.

Each Soldier is responsible for hisweapon 24 hours a day, including marks-manship proficiency, maintenance, se-curity and safe handling at all times. Atthe ATC, not only basic combat train-ing (BCT) Soldiers, but also advancedindividual training (AIT) and one-sta-tion unit training (OSUT) Soldiers par-ticipate in Operation Bedpost. Our in-tent is to conduct weapons immersionalso in the basic officer leader’s course(BOLC) II when it comes to Fort Sill inJanuary 2006.

Some old timers have coached me thatthis weapons immersion training is notnew. I “Roger that” but also acknowl-edge that peacetime migration has takenus away from that program and Opera-tion Bedpost brings us back to train aswe’ll fight.

We already are seeing positive resultsfrom this program with improved main-tenance, increased confidence andmuzzle awareness, and improved marks-manship.

FOBs at Fort Sill. The ATC has es-tablished a FOB for BCT and OSUTSoldiers to train them in a realistic con-temporary operating environment

(COE). It also de-creases the timeto transport Sol-diers to and fromtraining areas, al-lowing more timeto train the Chiefof Staff of the Ar-my’s designatedwarrior tasks andbattle drills.

Ultimately, weenvision aboutfive FOBs at FortSill in support ofschoolhouse train-ing: individualmobilization train-ing (IMT), officer

education system (OES), NCO educa-tion system (NCOES), warrant officereducation system (WOES), and IIICorps Artillery and mobilization unittraining.

Live-Fire Convoy Training. I men-tioned convoy live-fire training at FortSill in my last column. We are continu-ing this training to standard.

At this point, it’s worth coaching unitleaders that live-fire training at Fort Sillor your home stations is a higher riskevent. As unit leaders, you must ensurerange officers-in-charge (OICs) andNCOs-in-charge (NCOICs) are certi-fied properly, and, most important, youcommanders must assess the exactpoints of highest friction or risk on yourlive-fire lanes and mitigate those riskswith, among other things, leader pres-ence.

As part of its deployment training, IIICorps Artillery has used leader innova-tion with range control assistance tocreate convoy live-fire lanes. The train-ing on the transit hardball roads in-volves dual-side engagements with“Shoot” or “No-Shoot” targetry. In ad-dition, the convoy remains in a “redstatus” until it returns to the secure FOBmotor pool where Soldiers finally cleartheir weapons in “clear barrels.” That isrealistic training.

This training is further enhanced witha battalion command post (CP) in theFOB motor pool tracking the convoyalong its route. The CP uses radio com-munications as well as the movement

“Operation Bedpost” requires BCT, AIT and OSUT Soldiers to keeptheir rifles with them at all times—including at night, hanging on theirbedposts.


tracking system (MTS) avail-able in the continental US (CO-NUS).

Balancing Lethal and Non-lethal Training. Spot reportsfrom CONUS dirt combat train-ing centers (CTCs) suggest atrend of some concern. Giventhat the training rotation sce-narios reflect more nonstandardmissions and stability and sup-port operations (SASO), thereclearly is a tendency for FA unitsto focus entirely on deliveringand coordinating nonlethal ef-fects.

It is essential we continue tomaintain our ability to deliveraccurate, timely and responsivelethal fires.

I have asked the CTC observer/controllers (O/Cs) to emphasizethat units maintain a balanced rotation,ensuring they can plan and execute bothlethal and nonlethal fires and effects.

Augmentation for FA as ManeuverUnits. Also of concern is when an FAbattalion or Fires Brigade is given thenonstandard mission of serving as amaneuver formation because it requirescertain augmentation to perform itsmission; FA battalions and division ar-tilleries (Div Artys) deployed in theCentral Command area of responsibil-ity (AOR) frequently serve as maneu-ver units. This augmentation includesthe creation or assignment of an addi-tional fire support element (FSE) at thebattalion level or a fires and effects cell(FEC) at the BCT level.

The article “1st Cav Div Arty as a Ma-neuver BCT” by Colonel Steve Lanza, etal, discusses the augmentation requiredto serve as a BCT in Operation IraqiFreedom (OIF) II. The 1st Cavalry DivArty as the 5th BCT not only required aFEC, it also required further augmenta-tion, based on the mission, enemy, ter-rain and weather, troops, time availableand civil considerations (METT-TC),which Steve discusses in some detail.The standing Div Arty FEC was other-wise engaged with division-wide firesand effects.

Another article in this edition, “1st IDin Iraq: The FFA HQ [Force FA Head-quarters] Mission Endures” by ColonelRich Longo, includes information aboutthe Div Arty’s serving as a BCT head-quarters during OIF II. This Div Artyalso required a FEC and other augmen-tation, based on METT-TC, which Richdiscusses briefly.

FFA HQ and Fires Brigades. Thevalue of having a FFA HQ remains keythroughout the spectrum of militaryoperations, major combat operations(MCO) to SASO. At every echelon, theFFA HQ maintains the “high ground,”ensuring all available sensors and shoot-ers are linked, our delivery systems arecoherently positioned, gaps or redun-dancies in capabilities are resolved, andthe joint fires and effects communitycan support the maneuver commander’sintent.

At the unit of employment (UEx) level,a Fires Brigade likely will be assignedthe FFA HQ role. The three-star UExwill have the same force structure tofulfill the FFA HQ role as the two-starUEx will have. The UEx requires sup-port similar to the support the 75th FABrigade out of III Corps Artillery pro-vided the 1st Cav during OIF II whenthe 1st Cav Div Arty executed non-standard missions as the 5th BCT.

We will closely watch the 101st Air-borne Division (Air Assault) and 2dInfantry Division Battle CommandTraining Program (BCTP) Warfighterexercises this summer. Both divisionswill serve as UExs with Fires Battalionsorganic to their BCTs, and each willemploy a Fires Brigade.

In MCO, the ability to mass jointfires—including cannon and rocket ar-tillery fires—remains paramount. Theorganic cannon battalions that have twobatteries of eight howitzers (2x8) eachwill need additional reinforcing cannonand rocket fires from the Fires Brigade.

Determining the tactics, techniquesand procedures (TTPs) to ensure that

every available asset is in thefight at the decisive battlespaceand time demands we examineand define the support relation-ships among Fires Battalions or-ganic to the BCTs and the FiresBrigade battalions. This relation-ship will drive the FA’s abilityto leverage horizontal and verti-cal connectivity within joint firesnetworks.

Training the Organic FiresBattalions. I recently asked sev-eral maneuver brigade com-manders the question, “How willyou know when your organicFires Battalion is ready to fight?”The answer to that question isnot an easy one.

One strong indicator would befor the BCT commander to go toa hilltop with his Fires Battalion

commander, pick a target, direct that itbe engaged by 16 guns and then start hiswatch. This would give a good measureof marksmanship and the battalion’sability to master the five requirementsfor accurate predicted fire. But as mostof us know, that is only part of what theFires Battalion, in concert with theBCT’s FEC, brings to the fight.

The Army has decided there will be 12Fires Brigades: six in the Active Com-ponent (AC) and six in the Army Na-tional Guard (ARNG). Obviously, notevery UEx will benefit from the physi-cal presence of a Fires Brigade at homestation. And although base realignmentand closure (BRAC) announcementshave not been made at the time of thiswriting, I don’t expect the Army to sta-tion four Fires Brigades at Fort Sill. Thefour FA brigades on Fort Sill will trans-form into Fires Brigades with somestationed elsewhere. I expect that atleast four AC Fires Brigades will be onposts collocated with one or more UExs.

That said, I strongly advocate the FiresBrigades establish habitual relationshipsfor training and certification with theresident BCTs’ organic Fires Battal-ions. Given geography, the Fires Bri-gades’ training and certification of FAunits likely will cross AC-ARNG bound-aries.

But the more daunting issue is how totrain our future Fires Battalion com-manders, particularly those command-ing the organic cannon battalions. Asidefrom 10 days in the current FA Pre-Command Course (PCC), the last timemost battalion command selectees havehad schoolhouse fire support and artil-

III Corps Artillery Soldiers drive through the live-fire convoyrange on Fort Sill in preparation for deployment.


lery training was eight to ten years ear-lier during their captain’s career courses.Clearly, recent fire support and deliv-ery system training and experience pro-vides the most valuable credential in the“BCT trenches,” ensuring these FAcommanders are successful.

In theory, because these battalionsbelong to the BCTs, the BCTs train andcertify them; however, with the numberand complexity of units organic to theBCT, this is a “tall” order.

Where feasible, the 06 Fires Brigadecommander is the obvious one to helpthe BCT commanders train and certifythese battalions. However, he shouldnot have to depend only on his personalrelationships with those Fires Battalionand BCT commanders to do the job; hemust have a more formalized relation-ship with them. In cases where there isno 06 Fires Brigade commander, wemust look for alternative solutions.These might include Fires Battalion timeat the CTCs before their BCT rotationsor, perhaps, the use of Fort Sill-basedmobile training teams.

We don’t have all the answers yet. Butwhat is clear is the FA will not lower itsdelivery system or fires and effects co-ordination standards.

Joint Fires and Effects Course andTactical IO Course. Both the JointFires and Effects Course (second itera-tion) and the Information Operations(IO) Course (pilot) are now in the ex-ecution mode. The Joint Fires and Ef-fects course is well attended and feed-back is most positive. The current IOCourse is full with feedback from theattendees also positive.

The Joint Fires and Effects Course is

for personnel in all services, AC andReserve Component (RC), and focuseson teaching joint doctrine and TTPs forplanning, synchronizing and executingjoint fires and effects in support of ajoint task force (JTF) or joint forcecommander (JFC). Army seats for theAugust course are full; however, seatsare available for the October course viathe Army training and requirements sys-tem (ATTRS) or, for other-than-Armypersonnel, by calling the Fort Sill G3 atDSN 639-2199/5124 or commercial(580) 442-2199/5124 or the Joint andCombined Integration Directorate(JACI), Fort Sill, at DSN 639-1701/8671 orcommercial at (580) 442-1701/8671.

As the Army’s proponent for tacticalIO, we have developed the IO Coursefor NCOs, warrant officers and offic-ers, AC and RC, who coordinate lethaland nonlethal IO effects in joint firesand effects cells (JFECs) at the BCTlevel, in the fire support element (FSE)at the battalion level or on tactical IOteams at lower levels. It focuses on IOand effects-based operations at the bri-gade level and below. Seats are avail-able through ATTRS or by calling theFort Sill G3 at DSN 639-2199/5124 orcommercial at (580) 442-2199/5124.

New Command Sergeant of the FA.In April, CSM William E. High tookover as the new CSM of the FA and FortSill and became my new Battle Buddy.CSM High is fresh out of the GlobalWar on Terrorism, recently returningfrom Operation Iraqi Freedom as theCSM for the 101st Airborne Division(Air Assault) Artillery. He served as theCSM of 2d Battalion, 320th Field Artil-lery, also in the 101st Division.

Bill High not only brings strong lead-ership skills and the personality to getthe job done, but also an incrediblebranch-wide balance of Field ArtilleryNCO experience. He has served in heavyand light units and in every combatleadership position from Section Chiefof a Lance missile section and PlatoonSergeant of a multiple-launch rocketsystem (MLRS) platoon to First Ser-geant of five different firing batteries.He is airborne-, jumpmaster- and airassault-qualified and has served as aSenior Drill Sergeant and S2 Opera-tions NCO.

I welcome Bill High as the CSM of theField Artillery, a great leader who knowsSoldiers and knows what they need inthe COE.

The Field Artillery and Army are un-dergoing incredible change as we are atwar and, simultaneously, transforminginto a modular force. We, at Fort Sill,don’t have all the answers for the issuesfacing the branch, so I welcome yourinput: [email protected].

Be advised that, through it all, yourbranch leadership will ensure we main-tain the FA’s ability to provide accu-rate, responsive fires when and wherethe US Army, our sister services orallies need them. That’s the really im-portant part of our job, the part that cansave lives and turn the tide of high-intensity battles when the going getsreally tough.

Today, as some of the Army’s “smartguys,” Redlegs are devising uniquetraining at home station and adapting,innovating and firing artillery daily toaccomplish unique, nonstandard mis-sions in Afghanistan and Iraq. I amproud to be your Chief.

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Joint students interact during the Joint Fires and Effects Course in April at Fort Sill.

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CSM William E. High


Response to “Why Do We Have 20th Century FSCM fora 21st Century Force?”—Current FSCM Are Relevant

Colonel Gerald L. Smith’s article “WhyDo We have 20th Century FSCM for a21st Century Force?” in this edition high-lights a need for the Marine Corps toevolve its definitions and use of fire sup-port coordinating measures (FSCM). Heoutlines a current gap in the Marine CorpsWarfighting Publication 3-16 Fire Sup-port Coordination in the Ground CombatElement’s (MCWP 3-16’s) definitions ofFSCM. Finally, Colonel Smith suggeststhat we realign our thinking on FSCM.

We concur with Colonel Smith that thereis a lack of debate/discussion of FSCM.We also acknowledge that there are ir-regularities in the MCWP 3-16 and itsdefinitions of FSCM, and we do not desireto reflexively defend the status quo. Webelieve, though, that the intent of theFSCM remains the same: facilitate theattack of targets and safeguard friendlypersonnel.

The solution is either to adopt the FieldManual 6-20-20 Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures (TTP) for Fire Support atBattalion Task Force and Below’s (FM 6-20-20’s) definitions, which we believeare user friendly, or direct a formal reviewof MCWP 3-16. For example, FM 6-20-20 defines the purpose of a fire supportcoordination line (FSCL) to “…allow thecorps and its subordinate and supportingunits to expeditiously attack targets ofopportunity beyond the FSCL.” (Page 1-19) FM 6-20-20 goes on to say the attackof targets beyond the FSCL should becoordinated, but it still does not precludethe attack of targets beyond the FSCL

(Page 1-19).MCWP 3-16 defines the purpose of the

FSCL the same; however, it goes on to sayunits attacking beyond the FSCL mustinform affected commanders. “In excep-tional circumstances, the inability to con-duct the coordination will not precludethe attack of targets beyond the FSCL.However, failure to do so may increasethe risk of fratricide…” (Page B-2). Thisvague description leaves a question. Dowe have to coordinate fires beyond theFSCL?

Although Colonel Smith does not pur-port to have the complete answer, he doessuggest some new FSCM. Our solution tothe perceived FSCM problem differs fromhis. A major reason FSCM are perceivedas out-of-date is because fire supportersand fire support coordinators are not ap-plying them and (or) understanding themcorrectly. It is our job as artillerymen totrain our supported units and sell them onFSCM’s applicability.

We believe that Colonel Smith’s solu-tions merely change the name of existingFSCM. For instance, he conceived a dy-namic fire support area (DFSA) that“...opens a three-dimensional block ofspace at a specific time to facilitate at-tack.” This is really just a free-fire area(FFA) that “...is a specific designated areainto which any weapon system may firewithout additional coordination with theestablishing headquarters” (FM 6-20-20,Page 1-19).

In another example, Colonel Smith usesan immediate clearance area (ICA) that

“...involves pre-planned weapons and tar-gets pairing against critical vulnerabili-ties...” We argue that this concept is morerestrictive than our current FSCM be-cause it does not allow the flexibility tochange assets and/or engage targets at adifferent time. Additionally, in the time itwould take to promulgate the new ICA,the maneuver unit could have cleared themission on an individual basis.

New technologies and types of warfare(the “three-block war”) do not affectFSCM. The FSCM’s definitions are de-signed to transcend technological ad-vances so we don’t have to change theFSCM all the time. If anything, new tech-nologies should make it easier to attacktargets safely.

In the September-October 2002 edition,the article “Afghanistan: Joint and Coali-tion Fire Support in Operation Anaconda”by Lieutenant Colonel Christopher F.Bentley highlighted that, used correctly,FSCM facilitated the attack of targets inwhat he called a “nonlinear environment.”

It is never a bad idea to ask ourselves,“Why?” and we respect Colonel Smith forbringing the issue forward and sharing hisideas with the FA community. However,based on the discussion and operationalexample above, we believe our FSCM arecurrent and relevant on today’s nonlinearbattlefields.

Capt Travis R. Kundel, USMCCapt Tonio D. DeSorrento, USMC

Fire Support Instructors,FA Officer’s Basic Course

Fort Sill, OK

New USAF JACI Deputy Director OnboardLieutenant Colonel Neil E. Roghair,

USAF, will be the new Deputy Directorof the Joint and Combined IntegrationDirectorate (JACI), Fort Sill, Oklahoma,as of 22 May. He is a representative ofthe Air Force Doctrine Center at Max-well AFB, Alabama.

LtCol Roghair was an Air Liaison Of-ficer (ALO) and Assistant Director ofOperations in the 3d Air Support Opera-tions Group (ASOG), III Corps, at FortHood, Texas. He commanded the 712thExpeditionary Air Support OperationsSquadron at Camp Victory, Iraq, wherehe served as Director of the Air Support

Operations Center (ASOC) and Chief AirPlanner for operations in An Najaf in Au-gust and the second battle of Fallujah inNovember.

As a Forward Air Controller (FAC), he flewOA-37s. He also has flown F-15Cs and did anexchange tour with the French Air Force,flying the Mirage 2000C. He is a CommandPilot with 2,300 flying hours and has 2,600commercial hours with American Airlines.

He will work with the USAF Detachmentbeing stood up in JACI in August to trainjoint fires observers (JFOs) and work onother Army-Air Force joint training andeffects initiatives.

LtCol Neil Roghair, USAF, new DeputyDirector of JACI, stands in the Al FawPalace in Iraq.


Part 1: Joint Effectsfor the MNC-I in OIF IIPart 1: Joint Effects

for the MNC-I in OIF II

Brigadier General Richard P. FormicaFormer Commander of the Force FA Headquarters (FFA HQ) and

Joint Fires and Effects Coordinator, MultiNational Corps, Iraq (MNC-I)

INTERVIEW

Interview byPatrecia Slayden Hollis, Editor

The Threat and Environment. Dur-ing the time we were in Iraq, the insur-gency continued to develop. Today thereare still attacks against Coalition Forces,but we are seeing an increase in thenumber of attacks against Iraqi SecurityForces [ISF] and Iraqi civilians. Clearlya security challenge still exists.

But Iraq has continued to progress andis getting better all the time. Now thereare more businesses and more peopleon the streets, and children go to school.There’s a never-ending line of Iraqis

applying for jobs in the ISF—the IraqiArmy, Iraqi police and Iraqi NationalGuard [ING]. Even as the anti-Iraqiforces [AIF] increasingly target the ISF,there’s no shortage of Iraqis applying.They want to be ISF.

The enemy’s center of gravity is thewill of the Iraqi people. It’s a classicinsurgency: to the extent to which theinsurgents can garner the support of theIraqi people or at least avoid beingnegated by the Iraqi people, then theycan continue the fight. If we can isolatethe bad guys from the support of theIraqi people, then we can begin to de-feat the insurgency.

The Coalition Forces recognize thatthe “will of the Iraqi people” is notsomething that they can universally orunilaterally impose. In the long run, theISF and Iraqi people have the best shotat defeating the insurgency. They needus to help provide some of the securityso they can do that.

And as the ISF are better trained and

have better equipment and gain experi-ence in Coalition Force and indepen-dent operations, they are more capableof providing Iraq’s security.

Iraqi National Elections. The ISF’sincreasing effectiveness was never moreevident than during the national elec-tions in January. I believe the reason theISF stood so firmly on 30 January isbecause those were Iraqi elections. Wedistanced ourselves from the planningfor those elections because we didn’twant them to be seen as “Coalition” or“American” elections.

The Independent Election Commis-sion, Iraq, IEC-I, was the Iraqi organi-zation chartered with planning and run-ning the elections. The commission dida good job.

Everything Coalition Forces did thatyear was designed to increase securityso the Iraqi people could have success-ful elections. MNC-I prosecuted a se-ries of battles: Fallujah, An Najaf,Karbala, Al Kut, Sadr City in Baghdad,Samarra, Fallujah (again in November)and Mosul. [See the map in Figure 1 onPage 6.] Those battles eliminated theinsurgents’ safe havens and reducedtheir ability to conduct operations orinteract with the Iraqi citizens. They alsoincreased the confidence of the ISF.

The more Abu Musab al-Zarqawi andthe terrorists attacked Iraqis, the lesstolerant the Iraqis were of the insur-gency. It appears that trend is continu-ing, and more and more Iraqis are step-ping up and speaking out against theinsurgents.

During the elections, the ISF probablyperformed their best, to date. The ISFprovided that inner cordon of securityat the various polling places and in keyareas while the Coalition Forces pro-vided the outer cordon of support andquick-reaction forces [QRFs].

BG Formica, the Commander of IIICorps Artillery, Fort Sill, Oklahoma,deployed with part of his staff for Op-eration Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II in Janu-ary 2004. He served as the commanderof the FFA HQ and effects coordinator(ECOORD) in the Combined Joint TaskForce 7 (CJTF-7), which was com-manded by Lieutenant General RicardoS. Sanchez. He reported to the C3 ofCJTF-7.

On 15 May 2004, CJTF-7 was re-placed by both the four-star strategicheadquarters, MultiNational Forces,Iraq (MNF-I), and the three-star op-erational headquarters, MNC-I, thelatter commanded by Lieutenant Gen-eral Thomas F. Metz, who also com-mands III Corps. As the commander ofthe FFA HQ, BG Formica establishedthe Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC)for the MNC-I. He redeployed in Feb-ruary 2005.

Part I summarizes some of the con-tents of more than six hours of inter-views with BG Formica in March. Itfocuses on the operational environ-ment, organization of the MNC-I JFEC,integration of joint fires and counter-strike operations.

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INTERVIEW

Several ISF personnel diedintercepting vehicle-borneimprovised explosive de-vices (VBIEDs) to protectpolling places. The ISF dem-onstrated absolute couragethat day and became the keyprovider of security for theIraqi people.

The Iraqi people also showedgreat courage. The stories arenumerous of Iraqis who en-dured VBIED threats or mor-tar attacks and stood theirground at polling places. Theystayed in line for hours to havethe opportunity to vote. WeAmericans could learn fromthat.

On election day, the Iraqisdemonstrated that they wantdemocracy more than wewant it for them. That day,the people also showed dis-regard for the insurgents.When a VBIED attacker oran insurgent was killed at apolling place, Iraqis not onlyleft the bodies unattended(which is against their cul-ture), but also spit on themand then stepped over themto get back in line. The elec-tions marked a shift in the Iraqis’ levelof support for the insurgency.

Another example of that shift is the“purple finger.” If Coalition Forces hadbeen running the elections instead ofthe IEC-I, there would have been nopurple fingers. We were afraid it wouldmark someone who voted as a target forthe insurgents, and he’d lose that fingeror his life, or his family would be in-timidated. But the elections were run bythe IEC-I, and they wanted to dye everyvoter’s finger purple for election con-trol.

The purple finger turned out to be avery powerful symbol. Images of Iraqisholding up their purple fingers withpride raced around the world, symbol-izing the Iraqi people’s courage anddetermination in the democratic elec-tion process.

Eight and a half million Iraqis fromacross Iraq voted. I think we’ll see thebenefits of these elections as the politi-cal process takes center stage in Iraq.Hopefully, it will overshadow the secu-rity process.

It was very gratifying to help providethe secure environment for the Iraqis tovote.

JFEC Role and Organization. Whenwe became the MNC-I JFEC, our rolechanged. Instead of being a US Armycorps, we were a multinational corps,and MNC-I truly was coalition and joint.[See the organization chart in Figure 2.]

The commander, MNC-I, was anAmerican Army three-star general withBritish, Canadian and Italian two-starsas his deputies. He had a one-star Ameri-can chief of staff. Many of the MNC-Istaff were US Army because we camefrom III Corps, but all elements wereaugmented by coalition and joint offic-ers and NCOs.

Every night, Lieutenant General Metzhad a commander’s video teleconfer-ence with his multinational MSCs [ma-jor subordinate commands], who wereheaded by multinational commanders[shown in Figure 2]. Like all the staffelements, the JFEC organization wasboth joint and coalition.

The JFEC’s main task was to integrate

joint lethal fires and nonle-thal effects. We used theDecide-Detect-Deliver-As-sess (D3A) targeting process.As I left Iraq, we were begin-ning to integrate lethal andnonlethal effects more for-mally into the same D3A pro-cess. We had deployed want-ing to evolve to effects-basedoperations [EBO]—we neverreally got there, but we wereintegrating lethal fires andnonlethal effects.

To set up the MNC-I JFEC,we deployed the FFA HQand the FSE [fire support el-ement] from III Corps, bothheaded by US Army lieuten-ant colonels. The FSE in-cluded a Korean major, anindividual augmentee.

The FFA HQ conductedcounterstrike operations andsupervised echelons-above-division FA assets, includingradars and the 197th FieldArtillery Brigade from theNew Hampshire Army Na-tional Guard [NHARNG].The 197th was a theater se-curity brigade doing non-standard tasks in southern

Iraq. We also had a separate battalion,the 2d Battalion, 130th Field Artillery(2-130 FA) from the Kansas Guard, thatran the joint visitor’s bureau [JVB] andexecuted fixed-site security tasks inBaghdad.

Our FSE did the standard, stereotypi-cal fire support tasks in an insurgencyenvironment, such as targeting (bothoperational and “personality”), fire sup-port coordination in conjunction withthe corps MSCs and the integration ofjoint fires.

Aligned and functionally integratedwith the JFEC was the 3d Air SupportOperations Group [ASOG], which pro-vides direct support to III Corps andrejoined us when we became MNC-I. Itwas commanded by an Air Force colo-nel who was the corps ALO [air liaisonofficer]. The ASOG ran the ASOC [airsupport operations center] that executedthe air-delivery tasks integrated by theFSE.

The JFEC included the informationoperations [IO] cell. IO, like much ofthe corps’ organizational structure,

Figure 1: Iraq


Figure 2. Organization of the MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The figure also shows the Joint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) organization.

Chief of StaffUSA

Legend:ASOC = Air Support Operations CenterCAOC = Combined Air Operations Center

COMMNC-I = Commander, MultinationalCorps-Iraq

CSM = Command Sergeant MajorECC = Effects Coordination Cell

FFA HQ = Force FA HeadquartersIO = Information Operations

ISF = Iraqi Security ForceJSOTF-AP = Joint Special Operations Task

Force-Arabian PeninsulaMNB-NW = Multinational Brigade-Northwest

MND-B = Multinational Division-Baghdad

MND-CS = Multinational Division-Central SouthMND-NC = Multinational Division-North CentralMND-NE = Multinational Division-NortheastMND-SE = Multinational Division-SoutheastMNF-W = Multinational Force-West

TACP = Tactical Air Control Party

C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9Special

StaffJFECUSA

IO ISFFFAHQ

ECC

Joint Fires and Effects Cell

CAOC

ASOCTACP

CSMUSA

COMMNC-IUSA

MND-BUSA

MND-CSPolish

MND-SEBritish

MNB-NWUSA

MND-NEKorean

MND-NCUSA

MNF-WUSMC

JSOTF-APUSA

INTERVIEW

matured and changed over time. An AirForce colonel headed the IO cell. It alsoincluded an Albanian IO officer.

Then as a carryover from CJTF-7, weinherited the ISF cell. It served as thecorps implementation cell for the stan-dardization of ISF. This cell was headedby a British colonel. It was an anomaly—a cell with functions not directly relatedto JFEC operations. Over time, as theIraqi Security Forces became increas-ingly integral to coalition operations,the cell came under the purview of theMNC-I C3.

The JFEC was truly joint and coali-tion—but it also was an ad hoc organi-zation. Some of the JFEC positions werefilled by personnel designated by thejoint manning document [JMD]. Otherswere part of organizations—such as ourforce FA headquarters, the 3d ASOGand the field support team [FST] from1st IO Command.

The quality of the battle staff in theJFEC was terrific. However, the JFEC’sad hoc organization created challengeswith staffers rotating in and out of theorganization and on different rotationschedules.

The ISF cell had three chiefs in my 13months in the JFEC—three British colo-nels, two artillery and one infantry.There were five corps ALOs in 13months. Initially, the Air Force had allits personnel on 90-day rotations. Aboutseven months into our tour, the AirForce expanded that to 120 days. TheASOG commander and his key staffextended to remain 179 days, whichincreased stability.

The IO cell had the most turbulence.Although the IO cell had four IO staffofficers who deployed with us from IIICorps headquarters and remained forthe tour, it had five chiefs, one Armyand four Air Force. The IO FST of 14

professionals rotated on a four- to six-month schedule, so the cell had threeFSTs during our tenure. All these ele-ments rotated through the IO cell ondifferent schedules.

In addition, the IO cell was reinforcedby a PSYOP [psychological operations]support element that planned the PSYOPportion of MNC IO.

The manning of the IO cell had con-stant turbulence that contributed to ourchallenges to effectively employ IO.

The JFEC had five sections and nodeputy or chief of staff to integrate theoperations among the sections. Overtime, the corps deputy ECOORD[DECOORD] assumed chief-of-staff-like functions (along with targeting, firesupport coordination and the integra-tion of joint fires) and the ASOG chief(corps ALO), essentially, served as thedeputy. The ASOG chief was senior,experienced and the integrator of most


INTERVIEW

joint fires.As we examine how we

must change to get better,we need to be less ad hocand more deliberate in thedesign of the JFEC. Thatsaid, the overarching les-son learned is that a coher-ent JFEC enabled the corpsheadquarters to synchro-nize lethal fires and nonle-thal effects. We learned thevalue of having FA fires,the ASOC, IO and, poten-tially, civil-military opera-tions [CMO] incorporatedinto one coherent cell un-der a senior joint fires andeffects coordinator whiledistributed among the com-mand posts for planning andexecution.

Joint Fires. Our mainjoint fires were air-deliv-ered munitions—Air Force, Navy offthe carrier and Marine. We plannedATACMS [Army tactical missile sys-tem] fires a couple of times but neverdelivered them. Most Field Artillery-specific targeting was done at the divi-sions and brigades or lower.

We had a routine process for provid-ing joint fires. Everyday there was aseries of battalion-, brigade- or divi-sion-level operations ongoing in sup-port of corps operations. If units neededjoint fires, which were allocated by thecorps, they submitted ASRs [air sup-port requests] through their divisionsup to the corps. We preferred to get theASRs three days out. But we were nothamstrung by the air tasking order[ATO] process that defined the applica-tion of air power in more conventionalfighting. The CAOC, the Coalition AirOperations Center, was extremely re-sponsive to our requirements for jointfires.

In the JFEC, we prioritized the ASRsbased on the priorities established inthe targeting process. During intensecombat operations, we typically hadmore requests than we had air power,which is why the ground force contin-ues to need organic artillery and mor-tars.

The JFEC priorities enabled theCAOC, a CENTCOM [Central Com-mand] asset, to determine when to surgeaircraft at what times and over which

locations to maintain an appropriatetroop-in-contact, or “TIC,” response.

So, if we prioritized air, say in Fallujahand Baghdad, and something happenedinstead in Mosul, we could flex air fromone of those other two locations in re-sponse to a TIC. The JFEC representa-tive in the current operations section ofthe JOC [joint operations center] couldmake those decisions. The ASOC in theJFEC always had radios blaring in con-stant contact with the pilots and couldimmediately divert an aircraft to a higherpriority mission.

A TIC was the standard CAS engage-ment supporting friendly troops. Thecommander on the ground, usually atthe battalion or higher level, employedCAS. He had to positively identify anenemy force and determine that the useof CAS was proportional for the target.For example, we would not drop a 1,000-pound bomb on one guy with an AK-47rifle.

We tried to maintain a rapid TIC re-sponse capability in multiple areasacross the country. Our air power wasabsolutely agile and responsive.

The munition of choice was a 500-pound JDAM [joint direct attack muni-tion]. Most aircraft had JDAMs on boardalong with a few 1,000-pound and2,000-pound bombs. The AC-130 gun-ship, when available, was a particularlyeffective CAS platform in this environ-ment.

MNC-I Counter-strike. One of the pri-mary functions of theforce FA headquarters,at every level, is theprosecution of counter-strike operations to de-feat the AIF mortar androcket threat. The mor-tar threat is fought moreat the battalion, brigadeand division levels,while the rocket threatis fought at the brigadeand division levels un-der the umbrella of acorps operations plan.

The AIF fought non-traditionally; it impro-vised rocket launcherdevices and fired rock-ets from a box on theground, laid on a berm,mounted in the back of

a donkey cart or in the back of a van, orby other means. The counterstrike fightwas nontraditional.

As we adapted to counter the enemy,he adapted to counter our new opera-tions—each in a series of adjustmentsto the other. Any time we were predict-able, he figured that out and exploitedour predictability and vice versa.

At the corps, we analyzed his patternsand the trends—day or night, types ofmovement or attacks, points of origin[POOs], timing —to make the insur-gents more predictable. We adapted ourTTPs [tactics, techniques and proce-dures] from conventional counterfireoperations to counterstrike in an insur-gency.

In a conventional fight, there are fourelements required to conduct thecounterfire fight: take away his “eyes;”rapid, decisive maneuver; and conductproactive and reactive counterfire op-erations.

First, you take out his eyes. If you winthe counterreconnaissance fight, you’vetaken out his eyes.

The second element is rapid, offen-sive and decisive maneuver. If you areon the attack pushing him back, thenhe’s moving, he ain’t shooting at you.From a combined arms perspective, thattactic always has been effective in thecounterstrike fight.

The third element is proactive coun-terfire. A lot has been written about how

BG Formica and CSM Willie L. Byrd case the colors after transferring authorityof the MNC-I FFA HQ and relinquishing the MNC-I JFEC to the XVIII AirborneCorps in a ceremony at Camp Victory, Iraq, on 9 February 2005.

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INTERVIEW

to do that: intelligence analyses; tem-plating the enemy mortars and artillery;and deep attacks with helicopters, CASor ATACMS fires.

And then the fourth element is thestereotypical reactive counterfire fight.He shoots and you acquire the shot onyour counterfire radar and shoot back.

After we arrived in Iraq, we realizedthat counterinsurgency counterstrikeoperations had four parallel, yet differ-ent, elements.

First, although our units were not con-ducting a classic counterreconnaissance,they were doing personality-based tar-geting. For example, they targeted par-ticular cells or individuals who fired therockets or mortars, facilitated the rocketor mortar men’s operations, or financedthem.

Second, although we don’t conductrapid, offensive and decisive maneuverroutinely, units aggressively patrolled—kept the enemy moving and denied himaccess to firing points.

Conducting ground and air patrols todeny the enemy access to firing pointswas very effective but manpower-in-tensive.

Third, units conducted proactivecounterstrike when they established“snap” (impromptu) checkpoints orTCPs [traffic control points]; positionedsnipers near likely firing points, basedon pattern and trend analyses; and usedaircraft and (or) UAVs [unmanned aerialvehicles] to look for enemy or unusualactivities.

We employed air power innovativelyfor proactive counterstrike, includingnonlethal presence and show-of-forcemissions. In a presence mission, theaircraft flies over a TAI [target area ofinterest] so the population can see orhear the aircraft. The show-of-force ismuch more—the aircraft deliberatelyflies much lower to make the targetedpopulation very aware that coalition airpower is readily available. Neither mis-sion delivers any ordnance, but they areeffective nonlethal applications of airpower for counterinsurgency.

Another way units used air power andFA and mortar fires proactively was forterrain denial missions. The FFA HQperformed pattern analysis to identifythe rocket or mortar boxes the enemyshot from and then attacked those tar-gets in order to interrupt enemy opera-tions. We denied him the terrain he

wanted to fire from.Terrain denial by aircraft and fires

was very effective. It kept the enemyfrom establishing and improving posi-tions and getting known aiming refer-ence points, which would allow him toset up and shoot more rapidly. Terraindenial reduced the number of attacksand made them less effective.

However, terrain denial could have anunintended “harassing” effect on a partof the population we didn’t want toalienate. So a commander sometimesmade a conscious decision not to con-duct terrain denial missions becausethey would be counterproductive forhis IO program.

To avoid killing non-combatants andminimize collateral damage, units al-ways had “eyes on” the terrain beforethey fired on it.

Units used IO as part of their proactivecounterstrike. They passed out leafletsand flyers or engaged the local resi-dents to convince them not to tolerateinsurgents using their fields or emplac-ing weapons next to their homes toshoot at us or other Iraqis. (In reactivecounterstrike, we also used IO to con-vince locals never again to allow insur-gents to fire from nearby.) CMO, thoseoperations that earn the trust and confi-dence of the Iraqi people, also contrib-uted to proactive counterstrike.

The fourth element is the reactivecounterstrike fight. Sometimes we re-sponded with mortars or cannons andsometimes with CAS, ground QRF oran armed UAV.

Frequently, we employed a combina-tion of assets in reactive counterstrike.We might acquire enemy fires via a Q-36 radar, vector a UAV over the firingsite and respond with artillery fire. If theenemy mortar or rocket crew had al-ready moved, the UAV might track thecrew to a new location to be attacked byfires or have a QRF capture them, asappropriate for the target and location.

Just before the Iraqi national elec-tions, an indirect fire attack hit theAmerican embassy in Baghdad. Thatindirect fire came out of a corps TAI inthe 1st Cavalry Division AOR [area ofresponsibility].

The 1st Cav had been patrolling regu-larly and concentrating IO, CMO, TCPs,human intelligence [HUMINT] andother operations in that area. The 1stCav responded immediately with an

airborne platform over the firing site,which followed the shooters to a vil-lage. In a short time, a QRF captured theseven insurgents who launched the at-tack.

Shortly after we arrived in Baghdad,the force FA headquarters documentedall these counterstrike TTPs that unitshad been developing for more than ayear in a corps plan called, “Op PlanRocketman.” All the divisions and IMEF [I Marine Expeditionary Force]developed implementing plans. Essen-tially, they executed the tenets of OpPlan Rocketman in their AORs. OpPlan Rocketman also established corpscounterstrike priorities.

While counterstrike operations is aprincipal function of the force FA head-quarters, it was not all we did. At thecorps, the force FA headquarters pro-vided command and control of ech-elons-above-division FA units conduct-ing nonstandard tasks, provided a com-mand and control capability for othercorps operations and conducted futureplanning for FA units and operationalrequirements in theater.

In Part II of this interview in theJuly-August edition, General Formicadiscusses FFA HQ functions, IO andthe Battle of Fallujah.

Ed

Brigadier General Richard P. Formica hascommanded III Corps Artillery at Fort Sill,Oklahoma, since August 2002. He con-ducted split-based operations for 13 monthswhen he deployed a portion of the corpsartillery headquarters to Baghdad to estab-lish the Force FA Headquarters and theJoint Fires and Effects Cell (JFEC) for theMultinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) duringOperation Iraqi Freedom II. In his previousassignment, he was the Assistant DeputyDirector for Politico-Military Affairs (Europe),J5, on the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. Healso commanded the 3d Infantry DivisionArtillery (Div Arty) at Fort Stewart, Georgia;the 4th Battalion, 42d Field Artillery (4-42FA), part of the 4th Infantry Division at FortHood, Texas; and two batteries. Amongother assignments, he was the Deputy FireSupport Coordinator (DFSCOORD), Div ArtyS3 and a Brigade Fire Support Officer, all inthe 3d Division. He holds a Master of Arts inNational Security Strategy from the Na-tional War College, Washington, DC.


On 1 November 2003, the 1st Cavalry Division Artillery (DivArty), Red Team, at Fort Hood,Texas, received a mission that initiatedits historic transformation from a forceFA headquarters (FFA HQ) into the 1stCav’s 5th Brigade Combat Team (BCT)to deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom(OIF) II. The 5th BCT did not performthe traditional roles and missions asso-ciated with its prior life as the 1st CavDiv Arty. From the BCT’s activation inJanuary 2004 until its redeploymentfrom Iraq to Fort Hood in March, itoperated as a maneuver BCT that ownedground in the Al Rashid District of the

southeastern portion of Baghdad.To fulfill the FFA HQ mission, the

Div Arty cut the division joint fires andeffects cell (JFEC) and C Battery, 1stBattalion, 21st Field Artillery (C/1-21FA), the target acquisition battery(TAB), to the division for the deploy-ment. The JFEC was the coordinator ofthe 1st Cav’s joint fires and effects and

all the Q-36 and Q-37 Firefinder radarsand lightweight countermortar radars(LCMRs) in the 1st Cav footprint.

The transformation and simultaneouspreparation for combat operations inIraq presented unprecedented chal-lenges for the Red Team Soldiers. Toour knowledge, no Div Arty has trans-formed into a combined arms brigadewhile maintaining FA combat readi-ness. The prevalence of Army missionsrequiring combat operations in com-plex urban environments means thatunits may face similar transitions in thefuture.

The goal of this article is to provide

1st Cav Div Arty as a Maneuver BCTBy Colonel Stephen R.Lanza, Major Robert L.Menti, Captain Luis M.

Alvarez and First LieutenantMichael R. Dalton

RED TEAM GOES MANEUVER

A 5th BCT NCO engages the people of Al Rashid.A 5th BCT NCO engages the people of Al Rashid.


insights into this transformation and toshow that it is a viable option for unitsin the future. We focus on the changesin doctrine, organization, training, lead-ership and materiel required to trans-form a FFA HQ into a combined armsbrigade charged with conducting full-spectrum operations in Iraq.

Doctrine. This transformation pre-sented unique opportunities for innova-tion. Before deploying, the staff tookdoctrine as the foundation and modi-fied it to suit full-spectrum operationsin Baghdad. In addition to masteringmaneuver doctrine, the Div Arty staffapplied FA doctrine in innovative waysto meet the requirements of maneuverand fire support in an urban fight.

Most importantly, the 5th BCT imple-mented an information operations (IO)framework that constituted the BCT’sdeep fight in combat. Throughout theOIF II deployment, the 5th BCT em-phasized a holistic strategy of engage-ment with the local populace. This wasat all levels, squad to brigade.

The BCT quickly discovered that IOtruly is a decisive form of engagement,particularly in counterinsurgency op-erations. “Marginalize,” “co-opt” and“leverage” became doctrinal tasks intheir own right and were as vital to full-spectrum operations as “destroy,” “neu-tralize” and “suppress.”

Selected staff took part in two pre-deployment site surveys in Baghdadand brought back valuable informationto use in developing the 5th Brigade’spart of the 1st Cavalry Division’s cam-paign plan. The plan centered on thesimultaneous execution of five lines ofoperation (LOOs) with the desired endstate of a secure Baghdad. (See Figure 1.)

The staff understood that security is aprerequisite for stability, which, in turn,is a prerequisite for prosperity. The ul-

timate goal of a free and prosperousIraq has to be built upon a secureBaghdad, even if that end state takesyears to achieve. The 5th Brigade’s AlRashid District took a tremendous steptoward helping to achieve a free andprosperous Iraq when it had a 72-per-cent voter turnout in the January na-tional elections.

Our BCT staff displayed the adapt-ability and creativity typical of fire sup-porters. Incidentally, fire support doc-trine is ideally suited for full-spectrumcombat operations in an urban environ-ment. As shown in Figure 2, the 5thBCT modified the targeting model ofDecide, Detect, Deliver (Track) and

Assess (D3A) to synchronize lethal andnonlethal effects, including civil-mili-tary operations (CMO). By adaptingproven targeting tactics, techniques andprocedures (TTPs) normally applied tolethal fires and adding a fifth element—track—the BCT brought fires expertiseto bear on lethal and nonlethal targets inAl Rashid.

In Al Rashid, actions in LOOs 3through 5 (Figure 1) support setting theconditions for generating human intel-ligence (HUMINT) that leads to effectsto execute LOOs 1 and 2. The effectsgenerated in LOOs 3 through 5 influ-enced the populace’s perception ofCoalition Forces positively and thepopulace’s perception of the extremistanti-Iraqi Forces (AIF) conversely. Wethen exploited these positive IO effectsin HUMINT, leading to precision lethaltargeting information.

This concept is simple yet powerful.The 5th BCT routinely achieved 80percent lethal targeting effectivenesson its HUMINT-generated precisiontargets.

The Al Rashid battlespace is complex,requiring the BCT to execute synchro-nized activities across all five LOOsnearly simultaneously on any given dayduring the deployment. Figure 3 givesan example of the application of activi-ties in support of all five LOOs during

Figure 1: The Five Lines of Operations (LOOs) of the 1st Cavalry Division’s 5th BrigadeCombat Team (BCT). To help accomplish the five LOOs, the 5th BCT employed full-spectrum information operations (IO).

End State: Force protec-tion maintained throughoutthe Al Rashid District ofBaghdad and conditionsset to conduct elections ina secure environment. AlRashid transitions to astable free society that isgoverned, policed and ledby a democratic system.

1. Conduct combat operations.

2. Train and employ Iraqi SecurityForces (ISF).

3. Reestablish essential services.

4. Promote governance.

5. Promote economic pluralism.

Figure 2: 1st Cav 5th BCT’s Civil Military Operations (CMO) Projects Cycle. The decide-detect-deliver-assess (D3A) targeting cycle worked well for CMO projects development.Throughout the D3A process, the BCT used systems to track its projects’ planningapproval, resourcing, contracting, execution, inspection and advertising of their ex-ecution.

Potential targets be-come selected pro-jects; budgets andtimelines are drafted.

Potential targetsdiscussed at neigh-borhood/districtcouncils (NC/DC).

Targeting Meetingscreens potentialtargets.

Brigade/Task Forceproposes potentialtargets (projects).

Assess via patrols/engagements.

Gather information atChamber of Commerce& Town Hall Meetings.

Contractors executethe project.

Contractors openly bidfor projects at a Bidders’Conference.

Select the contrac-tors.

NC/DC Entry Point


Operation Falcon Freedom—Ministry of Interior (MOI)Commandos, Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the 40th IraqiArmored Brigade (-), US 1-8 Cav and US 1-7 Cav con-ducted a combined cordon and search of suspectedanti-Iraqi forces (AIF) in several Al Rashid zones. As theoperation neared completion, the committees in LOOs3, 4 and 5 began meeting.

Figure 3: Operation Falcon Freedom, conducted in December 2004, is anexample of simultaneous full-spectrum operations in Al Rashid execut-ing the five LOOs listed in Figure 1.

The 5th BCT’s Five LOOs:1. Outer cordon is set in combat operations.

2. Actions on the objective employed ISF; the tacticalcommand post was run by combined forces.

3. Essential Services Committee began meeting.

4. Women’s Governance Committee began meeting.

5. Blue Ribbon Committee for economic pluralism be-gan meeting.

Operation Falcon Freedomin December 2004.

To accomplish the mission,the IO effects coordinationcell (ECC) developed TTPsto synchronize events andassess targeting effects. TheECC treated each project orleader engagement as a con-ventional target with desiredeffects. The BCT leveragedthese effects to increaseHUMINT or change behav-ior toward Coalition Forces.The following steps outlinethe D3A targeting process thatthe BCT rehearsed at homestation and put into practicein Iraq.

Decide. Rather than achiev-ing the traditional kinetic le-thal effects on an enemy mili-tary force, the brigade had toachieve more subtle effectson the civilian population while main-taining the ability to execute lethal ef-fects on the insurgents. The priority wasalways force protection while the bri-gade contributed in Al Rashid to theoverall movement of Iraq toward secu-rity.

Achieving effects, such as gaining thetrust of the local nationals, ultimatelyled to HUMINT for the brigade’s Sol-diers who then contributed to the preci-sion targeting process. The 5th BCTalso sought to build Iraqi responsibilityfor political and business affairs, criti-cal infrastructure and security, devel-oping local institutional responsibilityto help achieve security and then stabil-ity in Al Rashid.

Detect. To achieve the effects identi-fied in Decide, the staff prioritized theneeds of the local population, the im-pediments to meeting those needs andthe “power brokers” capable of influ-encing public perception: imams,sheikhs, tribal leaders, technocrats andformer military leaders. The decision ofwhere to focus CMO had to includeinput from the Iraqi people and theirleaders.

The people’s expressed needs were“key terrain” in the urban fight andwere depicted in the integrated area ofoperations (AO) intelligence prepara-tion of the battlefield (IPB) that sup-ported lethal and nonlethal targeting.

Coalition understanding of the com-munity’s needs followed by quick ac-tions to empower the people to helpmeet those needs leads to local owner-

ship of security and reconstruction.Resources were limited, so selecting

the highest payoff projects was critical.The 5th BCT sought low-dollar, high-impact projects that produced high lo-cal employment and had an immediatevisible impact in Al Rashid. Most im-portantly, these types of projects gener-ated local national goodwill, which setthe conditions for effective HUMINTcollection and, subsequently, for preci-sion lethal targeting—hence, full-spec-trum operations.

To illustrate the effectiveness of thisapproach, the 5th BCT increased or-ganic HUMINT generation from lessthan 30 reports per month in April 2004to 120 reports per month by September2004.

Track. Unlike traditional artillery tar-gets, these targets were complex andachieved effects over a long period andthrough multiple, sequential and simul-taneous applications of the five LOOs.For example, a single CMO projectmight involve two or three sections ofthe brigade staff, a local contractor,non-governmental organizations, min-istries of the Interim Iraqi Governmentand higher echelon staffs.

It was not enough to propose or evenbegin CMO projects. The brigade hadto develop tracking systems to ensureits projects were planned, approved, re-sourced, contracted, executed, inspectedand advertised.

It was not enough to track only thenumber of projects ongoing or the dol-lars spent to date. Instead the doctrinal

idea of effects is more appro-priate when measuring theimpact of a particular project.

The BCT commander re-viewed this process weeklyat the nonlethal projects backbrief. Projects were catego-rized by sewer, water, agri-culture, etc., to facilitate dis-cussion. See the trackingspreadsheet for sewage andsolid waste CMO projects inFigure 4 on Page 13.

Deliver. Employing peoplefrom the local communitywas essential. As importantwas selecting a supervisorwho had as vested an interestin the project as the peopleworking for him. Local hiresled to local ownership, forceprotection and HUMINT.

It was critical to clearly dem-onstrate what Coalition

Forces were doing for the communitythrough the local newspapers and TVand radio broadcasts. The citizensneeded to know about the projects andhow they would benefit from them.Patrols (squad leaders and Soldiers),tactical psychological teams (TPTs) andcivil affairs teams (CATs) also deliv-ered the IO messages.

With Al Rashid’s low literacy rate,pictures were essential for effective IO.The 5th BCT developed battle damageassessment (BDA) books of before-dur-ing-and-after photographs of the pro-jects to show the population that coali-tion-enabled projects were having apositive impact on their neighborhoods.By continuously showing the local Iraqileadership what we were doing, we en-sured they couldn’t refute our goodintentions, which increased our abilityto hold them accountable for the secu-rity of their respective areas.

Assess. Good assessment requires ask-ing the right questions. What was theeffect on the population (was there achange in behavior)? Do “you” knowthat Coalition Forces did “this” for youand that Coalition Forces are concernedabout “your” needs? Was there an in-crease in HUMINT as a result of aspecific project? Did Coalition Forcesachieve neutrality in an area that used tosupport or give tacit approval to insur-gents?

The 5th BCT used a comprehensiveassessment system that had measures ofeffectiveness (MOE) and measures ofperformance (MOP). A key point is that


the subjective assessment of the leaderwho “owned” the ground was a criticalpart of the overall assessment of nonle-thal effects.

Organization. The Div Arty had tochange at all levels, from the separatecompany to the headquarters element.Three of the four organic FA battalionswere attached to other brigades.

1-21 FA (-), First Strike, the divi-sional multiple-launch rocket system(MLRS), was in the 5th BCT and dem-onstrated its flexibility. It trained anddeployed as a motorized infantry battal-ion and was prepared to provide a HotPlatoon of M270A1 MLRS, as the Mul-tinational Corps, Iraq (MNC-I) required.

The 68th Chemical Company and C/2-82FA were attached to Task Force (TF) 1-21 FA. C/2-82 FA deployed thebrigade’s battery of M109A6 Paladins.

The 1st Cav’s cavalry squadrons, 1-7Cav (-) and 1-8 Cav (Motorized),rounded out the 5th Brigade’s combatpower.

In preparation for the Iraqi’s nationalelections in January, the brigade lever-aged additional assets from the Coali-tion and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), toinclude 1-5 Cav, the 411th and 458thCombat Engineers and organic units,such as the 304th Iraqi Army Battalion,2d Iraqi Intervention Force Battalionand the 1-1 and 3-1 Iraqi Ministry ofInterior (MOI) Commando Battalions.After the elections, the BCT becamejoint as well as combined when it re-ceived operational control of (OPCON)2/24 Marines, a battalion that operatedin the southern Baghdad AO.

Combat Service Support (CSS). Thebrigade required a forward support bat-talion (FSB) to support the newly at-tached combat units. The 1st Cav cre-ated the 515th FSB as a capabilities-

based unit rather than a modified tableof organization and equipment-(MTOE)-based unit. The unit’s person-nel and equipment were designed toprovide the capabilities required for CSSto the 5th BCT, given that the 1st Cav’s27th Main Support Battalion (MSB),III Corps assets and civilian contractorswere pushing all classes of supplies tothe BCT.

The 515th FSB required 450 addi-tional personnel. The division resourcedall personnel and equipment internally,forming three companies from five bat-talion-sized units. The brigade alsoadded C Forward Support Company(FSC) to the 515th FSB for mainte-nance support for 1-8 Cav. The strengthof the 515th FSB was about half theassigned strength of other support bat-talions, but given the supply push con-cept in place, the 515th was set to ex-ecute CSS for the brigade.

After we occupied the brigade’s For-ward Operating Base (FOB) Falcon inBaghdad, we realized the push concepthad to be tailored to accommodate theenvironment in the 5th BCT’s AO. TheFSB staff provided excellent leadershipand implemented a plan to account forthe battalion’s lack of personnel. TheFSB staff prioritized the work and ex-ecuted the duties efficiently and effec-tively by stressing to the FSB Soldiersthe importance and relevance of themission at hand. The line battalionshelped by providing tremendous sup-port from their own crews—by not leav-ing all the maintenance work up to theFSB mechanics.

Local Iraqis were hired to augment themaintenance teams, working on tires,changing tracks and doing other lesscomplex maintenance tasks. This freedthe mechanics to focus on high-skill

tasks.Headquarters and Headquarters

Company (HHC), 5th BCT. To accom-plish the mission of a maneuver brigadeheadquarters, the Div Arty underwent adrastic transformation of its own to be-come HHC, 5th BCT. Almost everystaff section had to adjust to fulfill therequirements of a maneuver mission asthe MTOE for a Div Arty staff is abouthalf that of a legacy maneuver BCT.Every leader and Soldier had to be op-timized for the deployment.

• Intelligence—A traditional Div ArtyS2 section supports counterstrike mis-sions and requires five Soldiers. Thewider scope of BCT intelligence opera-tions necessitated 15 additional person-nel. The S2 created the subsections ofHUMINT (S2x), detainee operations(brigade interrogation facility, or BIF),analysis and control team (ACT), jointcoordination cell (JCC), weapons intel-ligence and forensics team (WIT), plansand current operations to meet the de-mands of intelligence-driven operationsin Iraq. Analysts already working in thebrigade S2 shop adjusted the IPB togain counterinsurgency intelligence.

The formation of a robust S2x/target-ing cell was essential in a full-spectrumfight. The S2x cell was the liaison withUS and MultiNational Force (MNF)Special Operations Forces (SOF) and“other” government agencies. The inte-gration of the JFEC targeting officerinto the S2x cell ensured that actionableintelligence entered the D3A targetingcycle quickly.

Detainee operations also were part ofthe S2x cell and provided the S2 with athorough exploitation of evidence, in-terrogations and witness statements,providing closure or requiring follow-on targeting.

Target # % EndStartZoneProjectCategory Unit Est # Empl

Figure 4: Examples of the 5th BCT’s CMO Projects. This is a weekly spreadsheet tracking the sewage and solid waste CMO projects insupport of LOO “3. Reestablish Essential Services.”

A

A

A

A

Status

Sewage/Solid Waste

Sewage/Solid Waste

Sewage/Solid Waste

Sewage/Solid Waste

1-21 FA

1-7 CAV

1-21 FA

5 BCT

DCT0324

AX5097

AX5092

AX5202

Repair concrete masonry, remove trashand debris, re-landscape rock gardens

with grass and flowers.

Remove trash in Al Furat and Al Jihad:893, 895, 897, 889, 887, 881, 885, 891.

Build public restrooms forAl Saidiyah Market.

Emplace 600 concrete reinforced binsfor trash.

26 Apr 04

3 May 04

5 May 04

5 May 04

25 Jun 04

16 Jun 04

30 Jun 04

26 Jul 04

10

200

20

200

$22,250

$72,500

$23,900

$480,000

Grid

MB 416736

MB 325815

MB 40087780

ThroughoutAO

Zone 40

Zone 36, 5S

Zone 41

ThroughoutAO

Cost

90%

90%

75%

30%


The brigade acquiredadditional intelligenceassets that were essen-tial in fighting a coun-terinsurgency. B Com-pany of the 101st Mili-tary Intelligence (MI)Battalion, part ofthe1st Infantry Divi-sion (Mechanized),provided our ACT forintelligence analysis,signals intelligencesection (Prophet) andHUMINT section withthree tactical HUMINTteams (THTs).

The ACT had to havea strong analyticalleader for accurate andtimely interpretationof information. Ini-tially the amount of information enter-ing the brigade daily exceeded the ca-pacity to assimilate it. Over time, theanalysts in the ACT developed methodsof processing the large volumes of dis-parate information into a coherent threatassessment.

The contemporary operating environ-ment (COE) was the framework withinwhich we templated the threat groups.For example, the threats in the battal-ions’ AOs were templated on a matrixby insurgent leaders, known organiza-tions, exact locations, etc., and then theactivities for each were annotated. Theseactivities included, but were not limitedto, providing insurgent financing, sui-cide bombers, mortar/missile crews,other attackers, kidnappers, safe houses,anti-Coalition Force intelligence, andcaches of weapons and munitions aswell as manufacturing improvised ex-plosive devices (IEDs) or vehicle-borneIEDs (VBIEDs). The 5th BCT updatedthe activities of threats on a map of itsAO every 72 hours to assess the changesin the threat locations and levels ofactivity.

Using a COE template ensured doctri-nal consistency and portability to otherunits. This became especially impor-tant when we dealt with adjacent unitsfrom different services or establishedlinks between threat groups that werecommon to several AOs.

• Other Staff Sections—Other sec-tions faced similar challenges. The S5section began with one officer. Lessonslearned from the pre-deployment sitesurveys showed the BCT S5 neededadditional personnel to support CMO

purchasing and paying agents forprojects. Shortly after arriving in Iraq,the scope of CMO expanded signifi-cantly. The S5 shop added five addi-tional troops: one officer, one NCO,and three Soldiers, for a total of eightpersonnel.

The engineer section needed a sub-stantial overhaul as well. The 8th Engi-neer Battalion provided B Company,combat engineers, to the 5th BCT. Thecompany had to be augmented to ex-ecute traditional combat engineer taskswith the amount of construction andconstruction management ongoing inAl Rashid as well as address the district’ssewer, water, electrical and solid wasteproblems. With no direct support (DS)engineer battalion, the brigade had tooptimize B/8 EN’s combat power.

An engineer’s headquarters elementand assault and obstacle platoons be-came brigade assets. The assault andobstacle platoons were dedicated to im-proving force protection on FOB Fal-con. The 1st and 2d platoons wereOPCON to 1-7 and 1-8 Cav, respec-tively. This task organization mitigatedthe lack of a doctrinal engineer battal-ion per BCT.

In addition, the 5th BCT aggressivelypursued and acquired additional engi-neer assets from the 411th and 458thEngineer Battalions to be OPCON tothe BCT when it executed operationswith massive mobility (OperationHardball) and countermobility (Opera-tion Thunderstruck) in Al Rashid. Theseoperations were designed to provideforce protection for the Coalition Forcesand deny freedom of movement to the

insurgents. These as-sets came from the 36thEngineer Group sup-porting the 1st Cav.

Training. The train-up for OIF II includedeverything from FAreadiness training toBCT lethal combatoperations to stabilitytasks. The Div Arty’smission-essential tasklist (METL) changedto a maneuver bri-gade’s METL. The5th Brigade focusedon training the unitsand staff to fight acounterinsurgencyacross the spectrum ofoperations.

Pre-DeploymentTraining. The brigade headquartersexecuted a comprehensive training planconsisting of individual readiness train-ing (IRT), small arms on ranges, con-voy live-fire exercises (LFXs), reflex-ive fire tables, rotations in the militaryoperations in urban terrain (MOUT)shoot house and platoon/company/bat-talion situational training exercises(STXs). In addition, the brigade de-ployed to both the National TrainingCenter (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California,and the Joint Readiness Training Cen-ter (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana, fortraining.

The 5th BCT also was responsible fortraining 1-21 FA, 68th Chemical Com-pany and HHC. 1-7 and 1-8 Cav ex-ecuted training with their former bri-gades.

• Five Phases of Training—Phase Ibegan with division leader training forplatoon sergeants and above in Septem-ber 2003.

Phase II consisted of individual train-ing from 15 October to 14 November2003. Train-the-trainers gave briefingson country orientation, anti-terrorism/force protection, rules of engagement(ROE), unexploded ordnance (UXO)and IEDs. The Div Arty conducted IRTin nuclear, biological and chemical(NBC); first aid; land navigation; com-bat lifesaving; and weapons qualifica-tion.

In many cases, Soldiers would fillroles unrelated to their military occupa-tional specialties (MOS), which in-creased the requirement for thoroughtraining. One example of this is trainingcooks in detainee operations so they

A 5th BCT civil affairs team chief leads a bidders’ conference for CMO projects.


could run the 5th BCT interrogationfacility.

Phase III focused on unit collectivecompetencies. The Div Arty staff trainedas a maneuver brigade staff in the NTC’sleader training program (LTP) in No-vember 2003, and all units conductedcollective LFXs in early January 2004.Units trained on troop-leading proce-dures (TLP), convoy live fires, tacticalroad marches, evaluation and treatmentof casualties, and calls for medicalevacuations (MEDEVACs).

Phase IV consisted of unit collectivecompetencies in warfighting tasks,counterinsurgency operations and sta-bility operations. 1-21 FA trained fromthe squad to the battalion levels, andHHB Div Arty trained from the squadto brigade levels.

Training included the integration ofdisparate unit types. Both 1-21 FA andthe 68th Chemical Company transi-tioned to motorized infantry units whileretaining their unique specialties. 1-21FA retained the readiness to fire Armytactical missile system (ATACMS) mis-sions by fielding the M270A1 MLRSlauncher, and the 68th Chemical Com-pany maintained proficiency in hazard-ous response team (HRT) operations insupport of MNC-I.

In Phase V, the 5th BCT participatedin a division-wide mission readinessexercise (MRX) at Fort Hood from 11through 17 December 2003. This exer-cise was the capstone training event—the first time the brigade simulated op-erations with 1-7 and 1-8 Cav. TheMRX trained the brigade staff in plan-ning, operations and the disseminationof information.

The exercise simulated demonstrationsand protests, IED detections, mortarattacks, VBIEDs, the transition to of-fensive operations and local nationalassassinations. The battle staff devel-oped battle-tracking techniques thatproved essential in Iraq.

The brigade staff worked with thenewly attached civil affairs (CA), psy-chological operations (PSYOP) and MIunits for the first time during the MRX.Working with these critical elementsbefore deploying helped build the staffinto a capable maneuver headquarters.The ECC coordinated the actions ofPSYOP and CA under the brigade’s IOplan.

Future MRX training should includeadditional tasks. Troop management atthe brigade level became increasinglyimportant in Iraq because many bri-

gades had units at several differentFOBs. Troop-to-task issues were a con-stant challenge. Units needed to man-age tasks that ranged from regular com-bat patrols to CMO. Troop manage-ment training should be stressed duringpre-deployment training.

At the MRX, the brigade staff learnedhow to setup and operate many of thedigital battle-tracking systems not pre-viously part of the Div Arty headquar-ters. The staff had to learn how to usethe maneuver control system-light(MCS-L) and the experimental com-mand post of the future (CPOF). Digitalbattle tracking became extremely im-portant, and the MRX was a good op-portunity to gain proficiency.

The S6 had to remote most digitalsystems from vehicles into a hardenedbuilding. He consolidated the equip-ment from four expando-vans into oneshelter that served as the nexus for tele-phone, radio and networks. It was im-portant to replicate the conditions at theFOB in Baghdad as closely as possible.The staff overcame many of the limita-tions of the MCS and all-source analy-sis system-light (ASAS-L) and devel-oped solutions to address the need forbattlefield information where these sys-tems failed to provide the functionalitypromised.

• Training FA Readiness—During itstransition to a maneuver brigade head-quarters, the Div Arty also had to trainFA combat readiness. The trainingschedule for Div Arty units was rigor-ous. The Div Arty executed Paladin andMLRS tables in support of the brigades’rotations to NTC in the months beforedeploying. 1-21 FA completed M270A1new equipment training (NET) and cer-tified 12 crews.

The Div Arty staff continued to re-source and equip the artillery battalionsfor gunnery, firing range, IO and radartraining—all of the tasks from the DivArty METL. During this time, the adapt-ability of the Red Team Field Artil-lerymen truly was tested, and they roseto the challenge.

• Joint Operations and OperationalFires and Effects Training—In retro-spect, the brigade would have benefitedfrom training in conducting joint opera-tions and providing fires and effects fortargets that had operational- and strate-gic-level consequences, both of whichbecame central aspects of full-spectrumoperations in Al Rashid.

The brigade assumed control of 2/24Marines immediately after the national

elections. This was a capstone changein our task organization, making us joint,and came on the heels of a near-year-long working relationship with the 24thMarine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) op-erating in the north part of the BabilProvince that is just south of Baghdad.It helped that we had worked so closelytogether.

Likewise, training to execute opera-tional fires and effects at the brigadelevel should be part of future trainingexercises. The 5th BCT routinely ex-ecuted operational fires in support ofthe International Zone (IZ) by denyinginsurgent groups the ability to fire long-range rockets—typically the 122-mmrocket with a range out to 27 kilome-ters—at operational and strategic tar-gets, such as the US Embassy and theCenter of Iraqi Government.

At any given time, the BCT com-manded or controlled joint assets foroperational level fires and effects tosupport the counterrocket mission.These included the Shadow, ArmedPredator, or Hunter unmanned aerialvehicles (UAVs); MNC-I long-rangesurveillance detachment (LRSD) teams;EA-6B Prowler electronic attack sup-port; Scathe View (C-130 with a ther-mal intelligence, surveillance and re-connaissance platform); national mea-surements and signals intelligence(MASINT); a joint surveillance and tar-get attack radar system (JSTARS) withits moving target identification (MTI);AC-130 Spectre Gunships; sea/air/land(SEAL) sniper teams; Army attack avia-tion; and organic artillery.

Leadership. In November 2003, theDiv Arty staff participated in the LTP atthe NTC. The two-week program wascentral to the transformation of the DivArty staff into a maneuver brigade staff.

The program focused on the militarydecision-making process (MDMP) inmaneuver brigade planning for full-spectrum operations. The staff trainedon planning tactical operations usingthe abbreviated MDMP and battle drillsadopted from its maneuver brethren.

The LTP observers helped the staffmembers change their thought processesfrom creating FA support plans (FASPs)to creating full maneuver operationsorders (OPORDs). The observers alsohoned the staff’s understanding of TLP.

LTP dramatically improved the op-erations of the BCT tactical operationscenter (TOC) through training vignettesin planning traffic control points (TCPs),cordons and searches, and cordons and


attacks/raids; integrating air-groundoperations; and transitioning to offen-sive operations. In addition, selectedstaff members attended cultural train-ing in Jordan and city-management/essential services training with the Cityof Austin in Texas.

This leadership and other specializedtraining contributed significantly to thebrigade’s ability to command and con-trol up to nine subordinate units thatwere the equivalents of battalion taskforces, ranging from Iraqi Commandosto US Marines.

Additional leadership requirementswere manning and operating Army sup-port teams (ASTs). These 5th BCT ASTswere imbedded in Iraqi units for theduration of the deployment. The ASTprovided the Iraqi forces leadershiptraining and support. In all, more than50 5th BCT personnel served on ASTs.

Materiel. The brigade S4 shop had todevelop a support plan for the newlyformed brigade. In order to evaluate thelogistical needs of the brigade, the S4shop had to rebuild the Div Arty’s lo-gistical database from scratch. Invento-ries of the new battalions’ equipmentwere compiled, to include the numberof on-hand items, such as weapons andhigh-mobility multipurpose wheeled ve-hicles (HMMWVs). Until early Janu-ary 2004, the Div Arty had to tracklogistics for all of the FA battalions aswell.

Once this database was compiled, theS4 could evaluate the logistical needs

of each unit and work to correct defi-ciencies. At the height of the inventoryload, the S4 tracked one armor, oneMLRS and three cannon battalions; onecavalry squadron; one each chemical,signal, MI and engineer company; theprovisional FSB and HHC 5th BCT.

The S4 and S3 sections relied on flex-ibility, innovative thinking and coop-eration to overcome challenges result-ing from the unit’s unusual task organi-zation. Because the 515th FSB did nothave an official unit identification code(UIC), it was difficult to acquire ammu-nition to support weapons zeroing, quali-fication and training. Many Soldiersreceived new weapons and needed tozero and qualify them before deploy-ing.

The brigade headquarters workedaround the lack of a UIC by consolidat-ing ammunition from all the subordi-nate units under one brigade allocationand tasking one unit to run a rangeattended by all units in the brigade. Thissystem required careful resource man-agement to ensure there was plenty ofammunition available.

The Div Arty’s transformation to aBCT was a tremendous challenge and avaluable learning experience. The re-quirement to train for full-spectrummaneuver operations in a rapidly chang-ing environment and embrace new meth-ods of operations, all while retainingthe ability to support the division withartillery fires, truly tested the adaptabil-ity and agility of Red Team Field

Artilleryman.Although the road to success as ma-

neuver was a tough one, the Red Teamproved the Army can count on FieldArtillerymen to thrive in that role.

Colonel Stephen R. Lanza commands the1st Cavalry Division Artillery (Div Arty) atFort Hood, Texas; he trained the Div Arty asthe division’s 5th Brigade Combat Team(BCT) and deployed it to Operation IraqiFreedom (OIF) II from January 2004 to March2005. In his previous assignment, he wasthe Team Chief for the Strategic ConceptsGroup of the Army Staff at the Pentagon.

Major Robert L. Menti is the 1st CavalryDivision Artillery S3. Also in 1st Cav Div Arty,he was the S3 for the 1st Battalion, 21stField Artillery (Multiple-Launch Rocket Sys-tem) and Aviation Brigade Fire SupportOfficer. He deployed to OIF II as the 1-21 FAS3 and later served as the 5th BCT S3.

Captain Luis M. Alvarez is the S2 of the 1stCav Div Arty and deployed to OIF as the S2of the 5th BCT. Also in the 1st Cav, he wasthe G2 Targeting Officer and the S2 for 4-7Cav. He is a graduate of the US Army Coun-terintelligence Course, Fort Huachuca, NewMexico.

First Lieutenant Michael R. Dalton is a Fir-ing Platoon Leader in 2-82 FA, Steel Dragons,in the 1st Cavalry Division. During OIF II, hewas the 5th BCT S1. He is a 2003 graduateof the US Military Academy at West Point.

The Department of Defense (DoD)announces the start of health carecoverage under TRICARE ReserveSelect (TRS) for eligible ReserveComponent (RC) service membersand their family members.

TRS coverage is available to RCmembers who were called or or-dered to active duty under Title 10 insupport of a contingency operationon or after September 11, 2001. TheRC member and his RC unit mustagree the member will remain inTRICARE Reserve Select for one ormore whole years to be eligible.

TRS coverage must be purchased.TRS members pay a monthly pre-

mium for health care coverage. Themonthly premiums for calendar year2005 are $75 for TRS member-onlycoverage and $233 for TRS memberand family coverage.

TRS offers comprehensive health carecoverage similar to TRICARE Stan-dard and TRICARE Extra. TRS mem-bers can make an appointment with anyTRICARE authorized provider or hos-pital (TRICARE network or non-net-work) or at a military treatment facility(MTF) on a space-available

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