A History of Greek Owned Shipping

A HISTORY OF GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING

MARITIME HISTORYSeries Editor: Lewis R.Fischer

A History of Finnish ShippingYrjö Kaukiainen

A HISTORY OF GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING

The making of an international trampfleet, 1830 to the present day

Gelina Harlaftis

London and New York

First published 1996by Routledge

11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection ofthousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

Simultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge

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© 1996 Gelina Harlaftis

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprintedor reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic,

mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafterinvented, including photocopying and recording, or in anyinformation storage or retrieval system, without permission

in writing from the publishers.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data.A catalogue record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-99332-2 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-00018-1 (Print Edition)

To my father,Basil Harlaftis,who taught me

to loveand respect

the Sea

CONTENTS

List of tables viii

List of figures xii

List of plates xv

Acknowledgements xv

Introduction xix

Part I The nineteenth century

1 TRADE AND SHIPPING OF THE EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN AND THE BLACK SEA IN THENINETEENTH CENTURY

2

2 GREEK COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME NETWORKS:THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830s–1860s

38

3 GREEK MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL NETWORKS:THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870s–1900s

71

4 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914 107

5 VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 147

Part II The twentieth century

6 GREEK MARITIME ‘EXPANSION’, 1914–39 183

7 LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GREEK-OWNED FLEETIN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

224

8 THE TROUBLED 1940s: SETTING THE BASIS FOR THE‘LEAP FORWARD’

243

9 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND GREEK-OWNEDSHIPPING IN THE SECOND HALF OF THETWENTIETH CENTURY

264

10 THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK OF THEGREEKS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

288

Appendices 304

Notes 460

Select bibliography 488

Index 498

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TABLES

1.1 The main ports of the Mediterranean and northern Europe 81.2 The growth of the Black Sea grain trade 121.3 Destinations of wheat exported from Odessa in 1838 171.4 Grain exports from Egypt 181.5 Egyptian cotton exported by Greek-owned firms 201.6 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea 221.7 Destination of Russian wheat exports 251.8 Tonnage of Greek-owned ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea 271.9 Return of Greek-owned ships reported as British in 1842 301.10 Main liner steamship companies covering the sea-routes of the

eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, 1860–1910 34

1.11 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to the ports ofEngland, 1860–1910

35

1.12 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to Marseilles 362.1 Vessels entered for loading at the port of Liverpool from the ports of

the eastern Mediterranean 40

2.2 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea at the ports of England

42

2.3 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea at the port of Marseilles

44

2.4 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports toMarseilles by the five principal merchant houses in 1840

45

2.5 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports toMarseilles by the five principal Greek merchant houses in 1850

46

2.6 Exports of the commercial houses of Odessa to Great Britain, 1841–5

48

2.7 Exports from Taganrog distinguishing Greek merchant houses,1851–2

49

2.8 Greeks as consuls in various port-cities, 1830s–1860s 562.9 List of Greek members of the Baltic Exchange, 1886 582.10 Greek merchants as shipowners, 1830–60 612.11 Ship arrivals at Marseilles and the ports of England 633.1 River fleet of the Rumanian Danube and Prouthos in 1895 and 1900 733.2 Origin of shipowners of the riverboats of the Rumanian Danube in

1900 74

3.3 Corp of pilots of the Danube in 1901 75

3.4 The ten biggest owners of riverboats on the Danube in 1895 753.5 Tonnage of ships leaving the Danube 773.6 List of the principal Greek exporters in the Azov, in 1886 803.7 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Azov Sea, Taganrog,

Kertch, Berdiansk, Mariupol 81

3.8 Exports of the commercial houses at Nicolaieff 843.9 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol

and Theodosia 84

3.10 List of principal exporters in Novorossisk 873.11 Tonnage of ships clearing the eastern ports of the Black Sea, Batum,

Poti and Novorossisk 87

3.12 Tonnage of ships clearing the south-western ports of the Black Sea,Varna and Burghaz

88

3.13 Tonnage of ships clearing Constantinople 903.14 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern

Mediterranean at the port of Marseilles 93

3.15 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the easternMediterranean at the ports of England

94

3.16 The Vagliano fleet 963.17 The fleet of the Embiricos family 983.18 Greek steamships owned or financed by members of the Ionian

network 102

4.1 Growth of the Greek-owned shipping fleet, 1835–1914 1104.2 Shipbuilding in Greece, 1843–58 1194.3 The voyages on which sail and steam were competitive for bulk

cargo 122

4.4 Steamships owned by members of the Chiot and Ionian networks,1860–85

126

4.5 Greek shipping offices in London 1304.6 Age structure of new acquisitions of Greek steamships, 1895–1910 1334.7 Steam tonnage as percentage of total tonnage of the main maritime

nations, 1880–1910 135

4.8 Investing groups of the Greek-owned steamship fleet, Syros andPiraeus ship registries, 1880–1910

136

4.9 Numbers of shareholders on Greek steamships registered in Syrosand Piraeus, 1880–1910

138

4.10 Ship finance from the Bank of Athens for the total Greek fleet, 1900–14

138

4.11 Number of ships owned by Greek shipping companies 1394.12 Masters as shipowners in Greek-owned shipping, 1879 1444.13 Owners of Syros and Piraeus steamships by occupational categories,

1880–1910 146

5.1 The voyages of Odysseas, 1837–41 1495.2 The voyages of Anastassia, 1881–98 152

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5.3 The voyages of Theofania, 1873–6 1585.4 Voyages of ss Calliope Nicolopulo, 1880–1 1625.5 Voyages of ss Demetrius S.Schilizzis, 1895–1902 1635.6 Voyages of ss Leonidas, 1905–7 1665.7 Voyages of ss Andriana, 1906 1675.8 Average number and duration of voyages per year 1725.9 The profits of the voyages of Andriana, 1906–9 1725.10 Greek seamen, 1839–1910 1735.11 Composition of crew in an ocean-going Greek cargo sailing vessel of

about 250 NRT 174

5.12 Composition of crew in an ocean-going Greek cargo steamshipvessel of about 2,000 GRT in 1910

175

5.13 Mean wages for able-bodied seamen on sailing vessels in selectedports

179

5.14 Monthly wages for Greek and Norwegian ABs for deep-sea-goingvessels

180

6.1 Ships larger than 2,000 GRT as percentage of total national fleets in1914

186

6.2 Taxes and profits of shipping during the First World War, 1915–19 1876.3 Top twelve merchant fleets, 1914–37 1896.4 Greek-owned fleet, 1919–38 1926.5 Ownership structure of the Rethymnis and Kulukundis ships 2006.6 Single-ship companies and the Greek fleet 2216.7 Single-ship companies in the various national fleets, 1931–2 2227.1 Greek seamen in the interwar period 2257.2 Composition of seamen on cargo ships 2267.3 Composition of crew in ocean-going Norwegian and Greek cargo

vessels in 1925 227

7.4 Seamen on board Greek flag steamships in 1910 and 1930 accordingto places of origin

232

7.5 Greek seamen’s wages on deep-sea-going vessel 2387.6 Wages for able-bodied seamen on steamships on Greek, Norwegian,

British, German, Dutch, Spanish and Japanese fleets 241

8.1 Standard national rates of pay for ABs, Britain and Greece, 1933–65 2508.2 Distribution of the 100 Liberty ships in 1947 2548.3 The Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1938–62 2598.4 Structure of the Liberian and Panamanian fleets 2619.1 Development of world seaborne dry cargo and oil trade, 1948–89 2669.2 World seaborne trade of main bulk commodities 2699.3 Development of world fleet, 1948–93 2729.4 Tanker fleets by the seven oil companies 2759.5 Greek-owned fleet according to type of ship 2789.6 The ten biggest fleets, 1939–63 2829.7 The ten biggest fleets, 1973–93 285

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10.1 The Greek maritime network, 1914–90 28910.2 Main headquarters of Greek-owned shipping firms, 1914–90 29110.3 Origins of the main Greek shipowning families, 1914, 1938, 1958

and 1975 294

10.4 Places of origin of Greek seamen, 1930, 1959 and 1980 29610.5 Real ownership of the principal cargo carrying fleets in 1992 299

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FIGURES

1.1 Main islands of origin of twentieth-century shipowners (Map) 31.2 The main Black Sea ports (Map) 71.3 Maritime geography of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean

and the Black Sea (Map) 10

1.4 Arrivals at Marseilles from eastern Mediterranean ports 101.5 Arrivals at British ports from eastern Mediterranean ports 101.6 Tonnage of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean 131.7 Tonnage of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean 131.8 Maritime geography of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean

and the Black Sea(Map) 13

1.9 Growth of Egyptian cotton exports 201.10 Percentage of Greeks in the bulk trade from eastern Mediterranean to

French and British ports 21

1.11 Greek ships in British ports 211.12 Growth of Black Sea grain trade 221.13 Growth of Black Sea shipping (departures) 261.14 Greek-owned shipping in Black Sea (departures) 321.15 Percentage of Greek-owned shipping of total Black Sea shipping

(departures) 32

2.1 The Chiot commercial and maritime network, 1830s–1860s (Map) 402.2 The network of Ralli Brothers, 1830s–1860s (Map) 532.3 Ports for orders 603.1 The Ionian commercial and maritime network, 1870s–1900s (Map) 723.2 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners.

Southern Russia shipowners and merchants (Map) 104

3.3 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners.Shipowners and merchants of the Danube (Map)

104

3.4 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners.Merchants, bankers and shipowners of Constantinople (Map)

105

4.1 Growth of Greek-owned fleet, 1835–1914 1084.2 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1835–75 1164.3 Freight rates of tallow, Odessa-England 1174.4 Freight rates of wheat, Odessa-England 1174.5 Registration of Greek-owned ships 1194.6 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1876–1914 1244.7 Freight rates of coal and wheat 126

4.8 Tramp shipping freight rates, 1866–1913 1264.9 Headquarters of steamship firms 1314.10 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1900–14 1344.11 From sail to steam, 1875–1914 1356.1 Position of ships lost in the First World War 1846.2 Tramp shipping freights, 1910–36 1856.3 Percentage of ships lost during the First World War 1866.4 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1919–39 1886.5 Geographical activity of Greek ships 6.6 Tramp dry-cargo fleets, 1936 1926.7 Arrivals at the River Plate 1926.8 Growth rates in Greek and world fleets 1946.9 Growth rates in Norwegian and world fleets 1946.10 Growth rates in British and world fleets 1946.11 Tonnage represented by London Greek offices according to the

islands of origin of the shipowners 196

6.12 London Greek shipping offices 1986.13 London Greek shipping office Rethymnis and Kulukundis 2006.14 Tramp freight index 2167.1 Comparative data of wages of ABs 2418.1 Position of ships lost in the Second World War 2448.2 Percentage of ships lost during the Second World War 2458.3 Growth of the merchant fleet under the Greek flag 2538.4 Growth of the Greek-owned merchant fleet 2608.5 Percentage of distribution of flags in the Greek fleet 2629.1 Growth of top fleets, 1949–93 2659.2 World sea-trade in the 1920s (Map) 2669.3 World sea-trade in the 1980s (Map) 2669.4 Major sea-routes of oil, 1958 (Map) 2699.5 Major sea-routes of oil, 1984 (Map) 2699.6 World trade, 1948–89 2699.7 Iron ore: seaborne trade, 1980s (Map) 2729.8 Coal: seaborne trade, 1980s (Map) 2729.9 Grain: seaborne trade, 1980s (Map) 2729.10 World trade, 1948–74 2779.11 World fleet, 1950–74 2789.12 Tramp freights, 1948–74 2789.13 World trade, 1974–89 2789.14 World fleet, 1974–93 2789.15 Freight indices, 1975–90 2789.16 Greek-owned fleet: types of ship 2799.17 Greek-owned fleet, 1949–93 2859.18 Real ownership of world fleet by leading maritime nations 28610.1 Greek maritime network, 1914 (Map) 293

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10.2 Greek maritime network, 1990 (Map) 293

xiv

PLATES

(between pp. 200 and 201)

1 Commercial and maritime networks, nineteenth century 2 The traditionals, Ithaca and Andros: Stathatos and Embiricos 3 The traditionals, Kassos: Kulukundis 4 The traditionals, Cephalonia: Lykiardopulo and Co 5 The traditionals, Myconos: Dracopoulos 6 The traditionals, Chios: Livanos 7 Post-Second World War shipowners: the Onassis Group 8 Post-Second World War shipowners: the Eletson Corporation 9 Post-Second World War shipowners: Tsakos Shipping & Trading 10 Post-Second World War shipowners: Sarlis Container Services 11 Post-Second World War shipowners: Costamare Shipping 12 Greek seamen, nineteenth century 13 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1900s–1940s 14 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1950s 15 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1960s–1970s 16 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1980s–1990s

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book would never have been written without Professor Lewis R.(Skip)Fischer. Professor Fischer entrusted me with writing this book at a turning pointin my career and his academic guidance, hard-working example and friendshiphave proved invaluable along the way. Professor Fischer has been the drivingforce and inspiration behind the organisation of maritime history on aninternational basis, and I thank him from this position for giving me the chanceto find my ‘place’ in maritime history. It was of course Professor Peter N.Davieswho first introduced me to the international circle of maritime historians and Iwould like to thank him again for his long-standing support since my student years.I would also like to thank David M.Williams who introduced me to the complex‘world ’ international historical associations, committees and editorial boards.His work, advice and friendship combined with a marvellous sense of humourhave made me realise that it is not only Scots who are interesting on that northernisland. Finally, I would like to thank all my colleagues in the InternationalMaritime Economic History Association from whose knowledge I have benefitedduring our meetings and conferences.

If it was an Anglo-Canadian triumvirate that navigated me throughinternational waters, it was a Greek triumvirate that oriented me to find my wayamong the islands and reefs of my home waters. Professor Spiros Asdrahas,Professor Vassilis Panayotopulos and Philipos Iliou are the three historians towhom history in Greece and a large number of young academics owe a greatdeal. They have established in the past decade one of the most respected andscholarly historical journals in Greece, Historica, and I thank them forsupporting and promoting my work at the early and difficult stages of my career.I also thank Professor Christos Hadziiossif for providing valuable information,especially regarding the importance of Sémaphore de Marseilles; my trip to Francetook place only after the discussion I had with him.

I have profited a lot from discussions with Dr Helen Thanopulou, mycolleague at the Department of Maritime Studies at the University of Piraeus,who has convinced me along with her students that learning maritime economicsis an ever-lasting, exciting and continuous adventure. Her friendship, her helpand comments on various parts of the book, and particularly at times when Ineeded them most, have proved an invaluable source of strength along the way. Iwould also like to thank John Theotokas, PhD candidate at the Department ofMaritime Studies, who gave me data from his own research regarding the Piraeusshipping companies today and for proving to be such a reliable fellow-worker forthe past three years.

I am grateful to the family of Admiral Anastassios Zografos, through whom Iwas able to discover the extremely valuable archive of Captain AnastassiosSyrmas. Captain Syrmas worked as a master of sailing vessels and steamers ofbig Greek-owned shipping firms from the 1860s to the 1910s. A well-respectedfamily man, the captain was literate and very pedantic in his work. Hebequeathed to his sons and grandsons a treasure of a maritime archive: logbooksand accounting books, professional and personal correspondence, an

autobiography and numerous receipts from suppliers, bills of lading and charter-parties. Admiral Anastassios Zografos collected systematically and thus savedall the ‘useless papers’ of his maternal grandfather. I thank him, his wife Maniaand his daughter Maria for their warmth and hospitality during the many monthsI spent in their house.

I am also grateful to the President of the Aegean Maritime Museum, MrGeorge Dracopoulos, who generously gave me access not only to the museum’sarchives but also to those of his family. Mr Dracopoulos is a unique example of aGreek shipowner who not only loves maritime history but also has shown it innumerous ways. Apart from establishing the Aegean Maritime Museum on hishome-island in Myconos, he is the only Greek shipowner to have establishedship museums: the cargo sailing ship, Evangelistria, and the cable ship, Thalis oMilissios. I would like to thank him very much for supporting me in all aspectsof my research.

I would also like to thank Mr Elias M.Kulukundis for giving me the importantlogbook of Anastassia and for information regarding his family history. MrManos Haritatos, the founder and director of the Hellenic Literary and HistoricalArchival Association, has also provided me with important information andarchival material. I have benefited from discussions with Mr Nicos Vlassopulos,who has also given me archival material from his own work. Dr DemetriosPolemis has kindly allowed me to micro film the Archangelos registry booksfrom the Kairios Library in Andros. Dr Jesus Valdaliso kindly gave me UKstatistical abstracts.

For the photos included in this book I would particularly like to thank thePresident of the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee Mr John Ad.Hadjipateras, Mr Elias M.Kulukundis, Dr Demetrios Polemis, Mr GeorgeFoustanos, Mr Dimitri Paizis, Mr Vassilis Kertsikoff, Captain VassilisConstantacopulos, Captain Panayiotis Tsakos, Mr Michael Sarlis, the AegeanMaritime Museum and, of course, Admiral Anastassios Zografos. I would alsolike to thank the President of the Masters’ Union Captain Yannis Tsouras, the ex-President of the Pensioned Masters’ Union Captain George Abouselam, as wellas Captain George Petrolekas, Captain Nicos Vranas, Captain Ioannis Madianos,and Second Mate Nicos Fournarakis. My special thanks go to Dr David Jenkinsand the National Museum of Wales for the photos of Master Elias Kulukundis,Daphne and Eugenie Livanos. I have also used photos from the books ofTimotheos Catsiyannis, Pandias Stephen Rallis, M.D.Sturdza, DictionnaireHistorique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et deConstantinople, the World Biographical Dictionary of Athens Ekdotiki, fromManolis Kulukundis’ Ships Loved and Painted, and Voyages on my Father’sShips and Others, Efthimios Gourgouris’ Galaxidi in the Times of the SailingVessels, Peter Evans’ Ari, Gerassimos Kolaitis’ The Chronicle of Ithaca from thejournal Eikones of 14 October 1994 and the journal Status of January 1994.

The Board of Directors and Librarian of the Hellenic Maritime Museum inPiraeus have also been very helpful in giving access and information on various

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bibliographic references. Eftichia Liata, the Director, and the staff of the ex-Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, and Zissimos Synodinosof the Historical Archive of the National Bank of Greece, have been extremelyhelpful not only in providing access to the microfilm reading/printing machinesbut also in other ways. The students of the Department of Maritime Studies at theUniversity of Piraeus Athina Syrimi, Stephania Kollia, Katerina Vourkatioti andVaso Resiti helped me process the vast data I had to handle.

But my greatest thanks go to my husband, Dimitri Chryssis. It is only throughhis total support, love and patience that I had the peace of mind and time to work.I enjoyed writing this book. ‘Travelling’ on Greek ships and ‘meeting’ Greekmerchants and shipowners from Taganrog, Braila and Marseilles to London, NewYork and Buenos Aires proved an exciting experience. I only regret the time ittook from fully enjoying little Cressida’s early years.

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INTRODUCTION

Proudly as always, the ship will set sailfor Madras, Algeria and Singapore;

in an office bent over some nautical mapsI’ll make calculations in ledger books.

‘Mal de depart’The Collected Poems of Nikos Kavadias,

transl. Gail Holst-Warhaft(Amsterdam, Adolf M.Hakkert, 1987)

This book follows the development of Greek-owned merchant shipping ininternational waters from the formation of the Greek state in 1830 to the present.In 1894 Greeks owned 1 per cent of the world fleet and had the thirteenth biggestmerchant marine; 100 years later they owned the largest fleet, with 16 per cent ofworld tonnage. This study examines Greek international networks, their access tocommercial and maritime markets and their share of sea transport. Itdistinguishes the cargoes carried in the last 160 years, the routes followed, theinterests served and the organisational and structural patterns. The aim is todistinguish continuity from change over the past two centuries; to establish themain contours of the development of the fleet; and to raise important questionsabout why the Greek merchant marine was so successful.This study is mainly concerned with the activities of Greeks outside theboundaries of the modern state. Greek maritime history cannot be conceived asanything less than the history of the actions of Greeks dispersed in various ports,following the patterns of international trade. As the wellknown Greek historian,Nicos Svoronos, put it, ‘Greek history cannot be understood as the history of theGreek state but as the history of the Greek people.’1 The merchant fleet ownedby Greeks was based on commercial and maritime networks consolidated in theMediterranean and northern Europe after the 1830s. It became an international‘tramp’ fleet engaged in the cross-trades carrying bulky, cheap cargoes andmeeting the demand for transport in an increasingly integrated internationaleconomy. In the nineteenth century the main offices of Greek commercial and

shipping enterprises were found in Odessa, Taganrog, Braila, Galatz,Constantinople, Smyrna, Syros, Cephalonia, Piraeus, Alexandria, Trieste,Livorno, Marseilles and London; their ships flew the Ionian, British, Russian,Moldavian, Wallachian, Egyptian, French, Italian, Ottoman and Greek flags, aswell as those of Malta, Jerusalem and Samos. In the twentieth century the headoffices of shipping companies with Greek interests were found in Piraeus,London, New York, Montreal, Buenos Aires, Monte Carlo, Paris and Zurich, andGreeks used the flags of the US, Egypt, Greece, Britain, Panama, Liberia,Canada, Cyprus, the Isle of Man, Vanuatu, Bermuda, Honduras, Costa Rica,Lebanon, Malta, Bangladesh, the Cayman Islands, the Marshall Islands, SaintVincent, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, the Bahamas and Hong Kong. In the last twocenturies the choice of flag used by ships under Greek control has been highlyopportunistic—hence the term ‘Greek-owned’ rather than ‘Greek’. Thisdistinction is more than semantic: members of nineteenth– and twentieth-centurycommercial and shipowning communities who lived all their lives abroad andwere Russian, British, Italian or American subjects retained their ‘Greekness’,which was pivotal for their success and preserved by tight kinship and socialcircles. The successful progress of Greek-owned shipping was partly based onthe fact that this identity guaranteed access to the informal ‘club’ of Greekmerchants and shipowners abroad.

The book follows a chronological division and is divided into two parts: thefirst, comprising Chapters 1–5, covers the period from 1830 to the First WorldWar, while the second (Chapters 6–10) examines the interwar and postwar eras.The first chapter discusses the organisation of maritime trade from the easternMediterranean and Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe.Moreover, it examines the emergence of a new division in international transport—liner versus tramp shipping —indicating Greek specialisation in the latter. Italso looks at the origin of bulk cargoes and aggregate Greek participation in thetrade and shipping of the eastern Mediterranean. Chapters 2 and 3 refer moreanalytically to the formation, organisation and structure of the ‘pan-Mediterranean Greek commercial and maritime networks that carried the areastrade and shipping. Two phases are distinguished: Chapter 2 covers the ‘Chiot’phase from the 1830s to the 1860s, while Chapter 3 examines the ‘Ionian’ erafrom the 1870s to the First World War. Both chapters examine in detail thestructure, organisation and business methods of the members of each network.The fourth chapter deals with the growth of the fleet and its relation to the Greekstate. The growth is analysed in detail for sailing ships as well as during thetransition from sail to steam in the three decades before 1914. Ownershippatterns and methods of finance are also treated. At the turn of the century theold structure based on Black Sea trade was transformed into a specialisedmaritime network based on a Piraeus-London axis, around which the edifice ofGreek shipping was built during this century. The final chapter of the first partlooks at Greek shipping from the inside through seven case studies from the1830s to the 1910s, derived from logbooks and other papers. Using the valuable

xx

archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, various forms of interpersonal relationsare analysed.

The second part of the book covers the period from the First World War to thepresent day. Chapter 6 deals with the era from 1914 to the Second World War.The activities of Greek ships during the First World War are analysed, as is theimportance of the conflict in the expansion and internationalisation of Greekshipping. During the interwar period the Greeks, taking advantage of the declineof the British fleet, were able to capture an important segment of tramp shippingand to establish themselves on the Atlantic. In the 1930s, contrary to contractionselsewhere due to the world shipping crisis, Greeks bought at rock bottom pricesships disposed of by others and doubled the number of their shipping offices inLondon. Chapter 7 examines labour relations during the first half of the twentiethcentury. The transition from sail to steam, the industrialisation of the workplaceand the internationalisation of the fleet brought important changes. The hierarchyon Greek steamers is analysed, taking into consideration the importance placedat least until the late 1930s on the master’s co-ownership of the vessel. Thepercentage of single-ship companies in the Greek fleet was higher than in anyother during this period. Meanwhile, Greek seamen organised highly politicisedunions, among which the communist trend was easily recognisable. In the 1930s,basic demands for a unified payroll, eight-hour day, and a specified victuallingscale were voted by the Greek Parliament but only implemented during the1940s, when the Greek Seamen’s Movement reached its peak. Chapter 8discusses the main issues in the extremely important 1940s. The principal routessailed by Greek ships during the Second World World war are presented indetail. The Second World War generated not only large profits for the Greeksbut also unprecedented opportunities. The final decline of British hegemony wasparalleled by the rise of the US, traditionally a weak maritime power. Since theywere unable (or unwilling) to operate a dominant fleet, the Americans invented aUS-controlled flag-of-convenience fleet. For various reasons, Greeks were ableto profit more than other traditional maritime nations from this innovation;during the 1940s and 1950s the flag-of-convenience fleet was owned mainly byGreeks and Americans. Coupled with the inexpensive purchase of a largenumber of war-built Liberty ships and an aggressive entrance into tankers, Greekswere able to expand their fleet more or less continuously. The 1940s and 1950swere also marked by a transfer of operations from the eastern Mediterranean toLondon and New York. This created several problems with the Greek state,particularly during the 1940s.

Chapters 9 and 10 focus on the postwar years.2 Chapter 9 deals with theinternational division of world maritime transport. Two periods are distinguished.The first covers the late 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, when the Greeks weremainly carriers of bulk tramp cargoes for the US and European nations. Themain routes and cargoes are briefly analysed; the Atlantic remained the maincentre. The second period spans the late 1960s to the present day and witnessed amove that transformed the Pacific and Indian Oceans into the main centres of world

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sea routes. Likewise, during the 1960s Greek alliances changed and they becamemainly carriers for Japan, south Asia and the socialist and developing countries.The Greek flag also followed this trend: flags of convenience featured in the1940s and 1950s, only to be replaced by the Greek flag in the late 1960s. The1980s was a decade of crises and readjustments, which the Greeks survived betterthan most maritime nations. The last chapter deals with the organisation andstructure of Greek-owned shipping firms and the main operational centres of thefleet in the twentieth century. The organisation and structure of Greek firmsretained many characteristics of the nineteenth century. The main islands oforigin for shipowners remained the same as at the turn of the century: Andros,Chios, Cephalonia and Ithaca. Kinship and common origins continued to playimportant roles in manning not only the shipping offices but also the vessels.Branches of the shipping offices were established in London and New York in the1940s and 1950s. From the late 1960s, however, Piraeus started to challenge andtoday more than two-thirds of the fleet is operated from there; London forms thesecond operational centre, while New York has almost totally lost its importancefor the Greek-owned fleet. The emergence of Piraeus brought significanttransformations in the ranks of the shipowners. The importance of the traditionalclass of shipowners who lived and were brought up abroad diminished, and thenew blood that entered the business in the 1960s displaced many of the Chiots,Andriots and Cephalonians from the list of leading shipowners by the 1980s.Within the last twenty years Piraeus has been transformed from a provincial to aninternational centre.

Most of the data in this book come from primary materials not used before inGreek maritime history. The statistical sources were vast: more than 40,000entries of ships containing detailed information were processed by computer. Inorder to analyse nineteenth-century eastern Mediterranean trade, British consularreports for twenty-five ports over a seventy-year period were examined. To tracethe destination of Greek-owned ships clearing eastern Mediterranean ports,details on tonnage, captains, crews, destinations, ports of origin, cargoes,merchants and agents involved were required. Through the French journal,Sémaphore de Marseilles, valuable daily information was unearthed on arrivalsfrom all eastern Mediterranean ports for every decade from 1840 to 1910. Thesame was done for London from another extremely valuable source, the LondonCustoms Bills of Entry. Data from both sources yielded about 12,000 entries.

One of the most vexing problems was the lack of detailed nineteenthcenturystatistics on Greek shipping. Some years of the extremely rare Greek shipregisters of Archangelos (a company that operated for more than ten years) wereprocessed, involving about 10,000 entries. Due to the lack of official statistics onGreek-owned shipping offices and the ships they owned, all information wasderived from selections from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping every five years from1880 to 1939. This task involved about 8,000 ships, including name, date ofbuild, tonnage, shipowner and shipping offices.

xxii

For the interwar period further data came from consular reports of the BritishDepartment of Overseas Trade, a monthly Greek journal published by the GreekMinistry of Shipping (Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou) and the fortnightly Greekshipping journal Naftika Chronika. For the postwar period the statistics werebased on annual Greek shipping directories published by the Piraeus-based firmSkoularikos since 1958. These had the further advantage that they containinformation on all Greek-owned firms and ships that would otherwise have beenunrecognisable; these were the Greek-owned ships and firms under flags ofconvenience, or ‘open registries’ as they are now called. Processing data for1958, 1975 and 1990 involved a final 10,000 entries.

Despite these efforts, the complete history of Greek shipping remainsunattainable at this point. What I have attempted here is more modest: to providean international framework into which to place the development of the Greekfleet; to advance a preliminary interpetation for the reasons behind its rise; and toraise some important questions that will, I hope, stimulate further research.Despite the importance of the material on the actions of Greeks abroad preservedfor us by ‘foreigners’, it is only after Greeks are able systematically to collectand preserve private and public maritime archives domestically that the fullmaritime history of the Greeks will start to be written by the ‘hands on deck’rather than by those ‘in the office’.

xxiii

Part I

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1TRADE AND SHIPPING OF THE EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN AND THE BLACK SEA

IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Three centuries after the fifteenth-century destruction of the Byzantine Empire,Greeks once again became important in the maritime and commercial affairs ofthe eastern Mediterranean. In the interim, the Genoese, Venetians and Raguzansin the sixteenth century, the Dutch and English in the seventeenth, and theFrench and English in the eighteenth controlled the trade and shipping of theAegean, Ionian and Adriatic seas.1 In the ‘most hospitable sea of the globe’, theAegean archipelago was part of the commercial and maritime empires of theGenoese and Venetians.2 Throughout the fifteenth century the Italians tookadvantage of the Ottomans’ naval weakness and concentration on the Balkans toestablish themselves on strategic islands. Their commerce had an importantimpact on subsequent developments. The island of Chios, home of the mostimportant eighteenth–,nineteenth–and twentieth-century Greek merchants andshipowners, was a Genoese colony for more than two centuries; even after it wasconquered by the Turks in 1566 it was granted special privileges and a highdegree of autonomy. The islands of Syros and Andros, as well as the otherCycladic islands that formed the core of nineteenth-century Greek shipping, wereruled by Venice for three centuries before coming under the Ottomans in thesixteenth century. Andros was conquered in 1566 and Syros in 1537.

Their large Greek Catholic populations combined with their seafaringtraditions provided them with special privileges within the Ottoman Empire andprotection from the western powers that lasted until the nineteenth century.3 Theother area with a long maritime tradition was the Ionian islands, part of theVenetian maritime empire from the fourteenth to the late eighteenth century. Theactivities of Ionian merchants and shipowners who established themselvesthroughout the Black Sea in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries provedfundamental to the development of nineteenth-and twentieth-century Greek-owned shipping.

Extensive piracy by both Muslims and Christians plagued the Aegean from thefourteenth century and caused great suffering to Greeks. The Porte allowed and

instigated Turkish pirates in order to extend its sphere of influence whileSicilian, Italian, Catalonian, Genoese and French pirates, along with the Order ofthe Knights of Saint John of Rhodes, raided ships, cargoes and local populationswith the ultimate goal of blocking Turkish expansion.4

Although Greek maritime activities from the fifteenth to the eighteenthcenturies remain a topic that still needs investigation, there is enough evidence toshow that the people of the Aegean archipelago and the Ionian sea manned,operated and built ships for all the nations that sailed their seas. The Greeks builttheir own small coastal craft and carried on trade between the numerous islandsin the Aegean and Ionian seas. Islands that remained prosperous from thefourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, such as Chios, Crete and the Ionianislands, owned a significant number of ships which they used to carry cargoes tothe large regional urban centre, Constantinople. Wars, pirates and lack of navalprotection destroyed any attempts to establish a significant merchant marine.Instead, Greeks built ships for Venetians, manned the Ottoman imperial fleet andthe ships of Barbary corsairs (the famous Barbary corsair and eventual Turkish

Figure 1.1 Main islands of origin of twentieth-century shipowners

THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND BLACK SEA 3

admiral, Kayr al Din Barbarossa, was a renegade Greek from the island ofLesbos) or became small-scale pirates. The Greek pirates from Sfakia (southernCrete) or Mani (southern Peloponnese) were noted for their atrocities.5 Greekprivateers appeared in the eighteenth century during the Russo– Turkish Warwhen the Russians granted protection to the small-scale pirates from Sfakia, Maniand the Aegean islands of Spetses, Hydra and Psara. The poverty and thebarrenness of most of these islands meant that piracy was a welcome part of ashadow economy that used illegal transactions ultimately to invest in legalenterprises, such as shipbuilding. Greek and western pirates had close relationsand even protection from local merchants and Turkish officials and sold stolencargoes cheaply. Some Cycladic islands, such as Milos, Kimolos and Myconos,owed their prosperity to special relations with the pirates.6

It seems that piracy and privateering were the first methods to accumulatesubstantial amounts of capital in the eighteenth century with which to engage inlegal commercial and maritime activities. A striking example is Ioannis Varvakis,a privateer from Psara, who in the 1770s invested his profits in the first Psariotthree-masted sailing ship. In 1774 Varvakis, who was wanted by the Ottomans,emigrated to Russia, where he managed to obtain fishing concessions in theCaspian Sea from his base in Astrahan. When Varvakis moved to Taganrog in1815 he was extremely rich, perhaps the first successful Greek merchant insouthern Russia.7

This chapter analyses the nineteenth-century commercial and maritimeactivities in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea and specifies the Greekrole. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals briefly withdevelopments in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century internationalenvironment that determined the nature of maritime commerce in the area; itfurther traces the movement of Greeks into Mediterranean ports. The secondsection looks at the main trade routes and cargoes hauled from the easternMediterranean and Black Sea. Finally, the last section examines the ships thatcarried this trade. Greek participation is traced at both the ports of origin and alsothe ports of destination; the arrival of goods and ships from all Black Sea andeastern Mediterranean ports in the two main recipient areas of western Europe,Marseilles and the British ports, is studied at the beginning of every decade.

THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE AND THE DIASPORAOF THE GREEKS IN THE MAIN MEDITERRANEAN

PORTS

By the end of the seventeenth century it was evident that not only the Venetiansbut also the Turks were declining in the eastern Mediterranean. The eighteenthcentury saw competition among the European powers for a share of the OttomanEmpire: the Habsburgs and Russians advanced by land and the English andFrench by sea. The eastward expansion was to be to a great advantage to theGreeks. The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed tremendous economic

4 THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

growth in western Europe.8 England and France competed for colonial andcommercial hegemony around the globe, but especially in Europe. It has beenestimated, for example, that in about 1800 40 per cent of British exports offinished manufactures and 84 per cent of British exports of all other goods weredirected to Europe; at the same time, 70 per cent of Frances foreign commercetook place with other Europeans. While English trade surpassed the French in thenorthern Europe, France was predominant in central Europe and the easternMediterranean.9

Although Europe had been trading with the Ottoman Empire since thesixteenth century, it was really in the eighteenth century that a commercial surgeoccurred. Trade between Europe and the Ottoman Empire increased by bothoverland routes and the sea. The first commercial agreements were made withFrance and contained many provisions that were advantageous to Europeans.Most important were regulations concerning extra-territoriality that gave foreignconsuls jurisdiction over their citizens.10 None the less, European merchantsallowed to trade with the Ottomans faced great obstacles. Added to the Turks’great hostility to foreigners was the Europeans’ complete lack of knowledge ofthe Ottoman language, customs and methods of trading. The Greeks proved to bejust the intermediaries required. Towards the end of the eighteenth century,however, the middle men became independent merchants and shipowners withtheir own entrepreneurial networks.

Among the Christian populations in the Ottoman Empire, Greeks played themost important roles in government and trade by the eighteenth century. Greekbecame the language of commerce in the Balkans to such an extent that the term‘Greco’ (or ‘Görög’ in Hungarian) came to mean ‘merchant’ in severallanguages.11 The leading role of the Greeks in handling Ottoman externalcommerce characterises the second half of the century. The conquests ofOttoman lands by the Habsburg and Russian empires were followed by policiesthat ultimately favoured Greek merchants. Both countries needed to expand theircommercial and maritime activities; having no subjects willing or able to carryout such activities, they adopted preferential policies to attract foreigners.Political, economic and religious freedom were guaranteed to newcomers atTrieste at the beginning of the eighteenth century, while the treaty of Passarowitz(1718) secured a century’ peace in south-eastern Europe, during which trade andnavigation thrived. Special concessions were provided to Greek immigrants, whowere the best-known merchants of the Levant.12 The Greek community in Triesteensured Austrian prosperity, as well as close economic relations with Smyrna,Constantinople and Alexandria through trade and shipping.

Much more massive was Greek immigration to southern Russia. Until theeighteenth century the Ottomans viewed the Black Sea as a mare nostrum andrestricted navigation to Turkish subjects. The scene changed completely after theRussian victory in the Russo-Turkish War of the 1770s. The treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774), its Explanatory Convention (1779), and the Treaty ofCommerce (1783) not only established Russian dominance on the northern coast


of the Black Sea but also secured a long-desired direct sea route to southern andwestern Europe. Another fifty years were needed, however, to secure the right offree navigation for ships of all nations. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828–9 endedwith another Russian victory, codified in the Treaty of Adrianople whichprovided Russia with absolute freedom of trade in the Ottoman dominions andguaranteed all peaceful nations complete freedom of navigation. This virtuallyinternationalised the Straits and Black Sea, although the treaty made no suchexplicit statement.

When the Russians pushed into the Black Sea there was virtually nocommerce in the area. Since the vast new area was almost totally unpopulatedand the fertile soil uncultivated, the first concern of the Russian government wasto stimulate population growth by attracting immigrants using land, agriculturalequipment, and even building materials as inducements. In addition toencouraging native Russians to move to the new territories, new settlers wereattracted from the Aegean archipelago and other parts of the Ottoman Empire.The encouragement of Greek settlements in southern Russia coincided with theestablishment of a Russian protectorate over the Ionian islands. As a result, agreat number of Greeks migrated to southern Russia from the Aegean and Ionianislands. The Greek revolt in the 1770s (which was supported by the Russians);the eventual Russo-Turkish war; the Greek war of independence (1821–9); andthe second Russo-Turkish War of the nineteenth century (1877–8) stimulatedcontinuous waves of Greek immigrants, not only to southern Russia but also tothat part of Rumania under Russian protection. The economic prosperity of theBlack Sea ports encouraged immigration that lasted until the end of the century.The incentives to live there were so great that the population of ‘New Russia’increased from 163,000 in 1782 to 3.4 million in 1856.13

The Greek population in Russia before 1914 was estimated at about 600,000,of which 115,000 lived along the northern Black Sea coast from Odessa toTheodosia; 160,000 on the shores of the Sea of Azov; and 270,000 along theeastern coast of the Black Sea from Novorossisk to Batum.14 The Greek elementwas also very important on the south-east shores of the Black Sea, whichcontinued to belong to the Ottomans. Throughout the nineteenth century a largenumber of Greek immigrants to Russia came from this area. In 1872, the entirepopulation of the province of Trebizond was reported to be 938,000, one-seventhof whom were Greek.15 The south-western shores of the Black Sea, which untilthe 1870s formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, were characterised bya constant population movement which has made it impossible to calculate theexact number of residents in the numerous Greek communities. The pro-RussianChristian population of this area was the first to experience Ottoman retributionafter the Russo-Turkish Wars of 1828–9 and 1877–8. The Greeks along the coastfrom the Bosporus to Kustendjie (Constanza), in contrast to those from thesouthern shores who engaged more in landborne commerce, were known fortheir seafaring and carried a large part of the Black Sea coasting trade.


If the Austrians and Russians promoted colonisation policies to attract a largenumber of Greek merchants and seafarers to their new lands, the Britishpromoted their penetration by supporting Ionian and Greek merchants. Theprincipal wheat suppliers to Britain prior to the Crimean War had been Russiaand Prussia. Seeking alternative supplies, the British pursued closer ties with theOttomans and tried to stimulate grain production in the DanubianPrincipalities.16 Between 80 and 90 per cent of the Greeks who engaged incommercial activities on the Danube in the nineteenth century were Britishsubjects, emigrants from the Ionian islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca. The mainDanubian outlet to the sea was at Sulina; the main river ports were Braila, 113miles upriver, and Galatz, 93 miles from Sulina. According to the 1860 census,Galatz had a population of 36,000, Braila some 26,000, and Sulina 3,000.17

There were 14,000 Greeks in the United Rumanian Principalities in 1865, most ofwhom resided in these three ports. If these figures are correct, approximately one-fifth of the population in the main Danubian ports was Greek.

The Greek presence was evident not only in Black Sea ports but also in all themain eastern Mediterranean harbours: Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria andof course Syros and Piraeus, the five main regional ports in the last third of thenineteenth century (see Table 1.1). Constantinople, which was by far the mostimportant, contained the largest concentration of Greeks (17 per cent of thepopulace of 852,000).18 Smyrna, one of the busiest ports of the easternMediterranean in the eighteenth century, held fourth place in the last third of thenineteenth century; in 1850 it was home to 60,000 Greeks out of a total

Figure 1.2 The main Black Sea ports


population of 125,000.19 Alexandria (and Cairo) came next with a rising Greekcommunity that in the midnineteenth century numbered approximately 36,000;20

by 1907 there were 63,000 Greek citizens living in Egypt.21

The Greek presence also extended to the main western Mediterranean ports:Marseilles, Genoa, Livorno, Naples and Trieste. Although we do not have exactfigure for the precise number of Greeks in each port, we do have names ofmerchants and shipowners and enough evidence to indicate prosperous merchantcommunities in all.22 Table 1.1 gives us further information on the main ports ofnorthern Europe. In 1900 London dominated, followed by Hamburg, Antwerp,Rotterdam and Liverpool. The Greek commercial and maritime communities ofLondon and Liverpool were very important, as the next chapter will show, butthey remain to be studied; research on the other ports for which we haveevidence of Greek commercial activity is non-existent. It is evident that theGreeks spread around the Mediterranean and northern Europe following the mainmaritime routes.

MARITIME TRADE

The cargoes carried by sea between the eastern Mediterranean/Black Sea and thewestern Mediterranean/northern Europe can be divided into general and bulk.General cargo consists mainly of expensive goods of limited volume, while bulkcargoes are usually cheap goods that occupy a sizeable

Table 1.1 The main ports of the Mediterranean and northern Europe (in 000 NRT)

Port 1870 1880 1890 1900 1905

A.WesternMediterraneanMarseilles 2,159 3,634 4,887 6,163 7,824Genoa 1,362 1,884 3,371 4,812 6,422Livorno 875 1,203 1,416 1,840 2,307Napoli 716 1,818 2,421 3,336 4,698Trieste 889 1,111 1,471 2,165 3,002B.EasternMediterraneanConstantinople

5,090 6,054 9,996 9,821 14,786

Alexandria 1,199 1,142 1,632 2,376 3,591Smyrna 630 1,040 1,405 1,578 2,334Syros 746 833 1,039 839 1,240Piraeus 235 1,158 2,070 2,188 2,845C.Black Sea


Port 1870 1880 1890 1900 1905

Ports ofSouthern

2,502 2,585 6,259 6,016 9,199

RussiaPorts ofDanube

601 658 1,539 1,252 1,756

D.NorthernEuropeLondon 9,437Hamburg 7,765Antwerp 6,872Rotterdam 6,223Liverpool 6,152Sources: R.Folin, ‘Ports et Navigation en Méditerranée Essai Statistique 1870–1905’, in

Navigations Méditerranéennes au XIXe Siècle, vol. 1, Cahier no. 9, Institut desRecherches Méditerranéennes, Université de Provence, 1987; ‘Annual Reportsfrom British Consuls in Russian, Turkish, Rumanian and Bulgarian Ports onTrade and Navigation’, British Parliamentary Papers vol. LXVI (1871), volsLXXXIV–XCI (1881), vols LXXXIV–LXXXVIII (1891), vols XCI–XCVI(1900); Angeliki Pardali-Lainou, The Evolution of the Port of Piraeus and itsInfluence in the Economic Development of the Wider Piraeus Area from 1835to 1985’, PhD thesis, Panteion University of Political and Social Sciences,Athens, 1990, table 4.9, p. 145. For the ports of the Black Sea, see Table 1.6

space. Figure 1.3 shows in detail the maritime geography of general cargo fromthe ports of the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. It is evident that shipswith general cargo left almost exclusively from Constantinople, Smyrna, Patras,Zante, Cephalonia, Syria and Alexandria. Four groups of goods are distinguished:foodstuffs (currants, other dried fruit, fresh fruit, wine, spices and sweets);textiles (carpets, silk, rags and embroideries); pharmaceuticals and dyes(liquorice roots, scammony, opium, yellow berries, madder roots, indigo, etc.);and miscellaneous goods (tobacco, cigarettes, jewellery, perfumes, sponges,valonia, etc.).

Figures 1.4 and 1.5 indicate arrivals at Marseilles and English ports from theeastern Mediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing between general and bulkcargoes. Up to the 1870s vessels carrying general cargo comprised about 40per cent of tonnage entering Marseilles, whereas after the 1880s this percentagerose to around 60 per cent. From 1880 to 1910 bulk cargoes constituted 40 percent of the total volume arriving at Marseilles. According to Figure 1.5, bulkcargoes, consisting mainly of grains (wheat, maize, barley, oats, sesame), cotton,wool, cotton seed, linseed, rapeseed, tallow and sugar, accounted for around 80per cent of tonnage entering English ports, particularly after 1870.

Figures 1.6 and 1.7 support statistically the information furnished by Figures1.3 and 1.8, which show that the Black Sea was the main supplier of bulk


cargoes, while the eastern Mediterranean was the main shipper of general goods.North-eastern harbours include Constantinople, the ports of Greece, and the

Figure 1.3 Maritime geography of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean and theBlack Sea (nineteenth century)


anchorages of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor, while south-eastern include theports of Syria, Palestine, Egypt and Cyprus. Figure 1.6, however, shows thedecline after 1880 of Constantinople and Smyrna, and the Black Sea seems tobecome the main supplier of general goods for Marseilles. This is partlyfictitious, owing to the fact that steamers called first at Smyrna and Constantinopleto load general cargoes and then at Batum, Trebizond or Varna before returningto Marseilles; the statistics are calculated according to final port of call.

Bulk trades are the most important for shipowners, since ‘what really matteredto the shipowner was weight and volume, not value. What created the demandfor shipping was mass, not price.’ For this reason, ‘a ton of coal worth a fewshillings and a ton of silk fabrics worth a few thousand pounds are more or lessthe same to the shipowner; it costs no more to transport the one than the other’.23

Grain was by far the most important bulk cargo, and it increased exponentiallyduring the nineteenth century, especially from the Black Sea region. The growthof the grain trade was the result, on the demand side, of increasing disincentivesfor western European farmers to produce enough grain to meet the rapidlyincreasing demand of the industrial populations, and on the supply side by theagricultural and commercial development of southern Russia, Rumania and

Figure 1.4 Arrival at Marseilles from eastern Mediterranean ports

source: Appendix 1.16


Bulgaria. After 1830 western European imports from the Black Sea accelerated.In 1846–7 an unprecedented harvest in the Black Sea coincided both with a totalcrop failure in western Europe and with the introduction of free trade in Britain.Black Sea grain exports to western Europe increased continuously throughout thecentury: the two million imperial quarters exported in 1837 became twelvemillion in 1871 and more than fifty million by 1906 (see Table 1.2).

From the 1820s to the 1850s the organisation of Mediterranean cerealcommerce was characterised by the ‘deposit trade’.24 Grain from the Black Seawas not delivered directly to the ultimate purchaser. Instead, it was shipped toLivorno, Genoa, Trieste and Marseilles, the main deposit ports, where it waitedfor purchasers. Table 1.3 indicates the importance of this trade and particularlyof Livorno as the main ‘deposit port’. In 1838

Table 1.2 The growth of the Black Sea grain trade (in imperial quarters)

Year Southern Russia* Danube Bulgaria

18301831 854,760

Figure 1.5 Arrivals at British ports from eastern Mediterranean ports

source: Appendix 1.32



1832 1,217,6911833 448,2261834 95,4911835 513,7201836 1,096,1281837 1,427,867 479,0001838 1,733,938 530,0001839 2,018,230 671,0001840 1,269,877 744,6051841 1,051,4431842 1,235,4121843 1,414,082 861,6171844 1,841,977 1,028,6391845 2,032,120 971,3931846 2,430,740 984,306

Figure 1.6 Tonnage of general cargo from the eastern Mediterranean

sources: Appendices 1.16 and 1.32



1847 4,103,222 1,836,6471848 2,170,435 930,8121849 1,631,517 1,015,9911850 1,734,813 793,9201851 1,554,114 1,591,5001852 3,357,802 1,682,5771853 4,843,5061854 655,8541855 89,8131856 2,298,2601857 2,339,8631858 3,182,11418591860 3,009,1751861 3,649,674

Figure 1.7 Tonnage of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean

Sources: Appendix 1.16 and 1.32



1862 3,066,091

Figure 1.8 Maritime geography of bulk cargo from the eastern Mediterranean and theBlack Sea (nineteenth century)



1863 2,579,5441864 3,299,43918651866 4,866,3091867 6,509,31518681869 4,567,4791870 8,187,1291871 8,453,010 3,624,1441872 6,906,971 3,205,0711873 4,539,071 3,412,6961874 6,321,991 3,514,7201875 6,906,838 3,177,5351876 6,401,371 4,893,7271877 1,993,226 816,2611878 13,525,825 4,582,8631879 10,331,740 4,851,7481880 5,007,281 4,138,9591881 5,294,5831882 6,386,0741883 10,381,274 5,432,7841884 9,950,479 4,211,338 421,1801885 13,734,678 5,627,665 584,2841886 10,390,601 5,697,3321887 15,647,291 7,632,732 1,060,6801888 24,680,960 8,541,270 1,792,7201889 21,410,519 9,990,853 2,397,8321890 20,506,192 9,839,782 2,146,9201891 17,023,473 9,067,961 2,029,1441892 9,711,717 9,087,934 2,074,6721893 23,185,814 13,864,499 3,138,4481894 33,269,875 11,061,830 2,208,6721895 30,773,797 10,214,807 2,056,1721896 24,665,684 13,358,968 (794,298)**1897 23,190,364 9,563,883 (406,401)**1898 21,137,224 10,355,788 (420,568)**



1899 16,129,604 6,121,754 (312,274)**1900 15,981,800 9,042,163 (253,197)**1901 12,585,7671902 28,047,471 17,363,3921903 36,811,570 14,528,5691904 35,389,011 8,838,1031905 36,584,781 11,674,6261906 33,716,704 16,086,1251907 30,597,169 15,364,1351908 22,946,031 9,410,8641909 40,663,0861910 47,478,254Sources: Southern Russia: M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the

Black Sea and its Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley, University of California,1938, appendix F; Danube, 1837–40: Foreign Office (FO) 359/1; Danube,1843–52: P.Cernovodeanu B. Marinescu, ‘British Trade in the Danubian Portsof Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1857’, Journal of European EconomicHistory, vol. 8, no. 3, winter 1979, pp. 707–42. Remainder: BritishParliamentary Papers, 1856–1911, Annual Reports from the British Consuls inRussian, Turkish, Rumanian and Bulgarian ports on trade and navigation

Notes:* Includes exports of wheat, rye, barley and oats. From 1885 the figures weregiven in puds and have been converted into chetwerts: 1 cwt wheat =10 puds, 1cwt rye = 9 puds, 1 cwt barley=8 puds, 1 cwt oats=6 puds. Chetwerts have beenconverted into imperial quarters: 1 chetwert=5.77 bushels, 8 bushels=1 imperialquarter. ** Figures for Varna

Table 1.3 Destinations of wheat exported from Odessa in 1838

Places of destination Quarters % total exports

Livorno 446,842 45Genoa 177,099 18Marseilles 93,758 10England 82,453 8Trieste 58,326 6Malta 44,486 4Constantinople 30,455 3Holland 28,914 3Belgium 16,909 2Gibraltar 4,348Ionian Islands 3,829


Places of destination Quarters % total exports

Greece 2,215Austria 1,230Total exports from Odessa 990,864Source: Patricia Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal

of European Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 45–68. The data are fromArchivio di Stato di Firenze (ASF), Affari Esteri, Filza 2528, 29 February 1839

45 per cent of Odessa’s total exports were directed to Livorno, from where theywere re-shipped to England, France and Spain.25

The trading method that made Livorno the ‘English port’ in the Mediterraneanwas due to various measures imposed by the main consuming countries thatrendered direct imports impossible. In order to protect local producers England,the first industrial nation, established ‘Corn Laws’ under which grain importswere prohibited except when local production was inadequate. This practice wasfollowed by most of northern Europe. Increased industrial production, however,led to a gradual inability to feed the growing urban populations. The ultimaterefinement to the Corn Laws was the ‘sliding scale’, introduced in 1828 by theEnglish and imitated by Sweden (1830), France (1832), Belgium (1834) andHolland (1835). This was a system of variable tariffs designed to attract onlyenough foreign grain to keep local prices from varying outside certain limits, toassure consumers ‘reasonable prices’ and to protect producers from ruinouscompetition. Still, uncertainty rendered deposits in the main westernMediterranean ports necessary.26

The deposit trade to which Livorno owed much of its prosperity began to bereplaced by direct exports in the 1850s for several reasons. First, Britainabolished the sliding scale in 1846, followed by Belgium, Holland, Sweden,Sardinia and the Papal States in the 1850s, by France in 1861 and the GermanZollverein in 1864. Second, an age of more liberal trading was introduced withthe abolition of the British Navigation Laws in 1849.27 Finally, the introductionof steam and the telegraph revolu

Table 1.4 Grain exports from Egypt (in quarters)

1863 % total 1867 % total

Beans 331,955 30 377,355 37Wheat 540,792 50 502,677 50Maize 94,240 9 43,648 4Barley 71,858 7 77,810 7Lentils 40,300 4 27,820 3Total 1,079,145 1,029,310To Britain 465,660 43To France 613,485 57


1863 % total 1867 % total

Source: ‘Report by Mr Consul Stanley on the Trade and Commerce of Alexandria for theYear 1867’, British Parliamentary Papers, vol. LIX, 1868–9

tionised communications and led to a total reorganisation of trade from the BlackSea to northern Europe.

The second most important area for cereal exports was the south-easternMediterranean, with Egypt as the main source. Table 1.4 shows that about onemillion quarters of cereals were exported from Egypt in 1863 and 1867, almosthalf of which were directed to Britain and more than half to France.

In the eighteenth century the Levant supplied the cotton, wool and silk neededby the flourishing textile industries; these were carried mainly by French andEnglish ships from Salonica, Smyrna, Syria, Cyprus and Egypt. Although therise of American production in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuriesdiminished its importance, cotton continued to be the second most importantcargo from the eastern Mediterranean throughout the nineteenth century. Egyptremained the most important supplier and Britain the largest purchaser. By 1860Egypt was the sixth most important exporter to Britain, which absorbed 65 percent of the crop.28 The American Civil War (1861–5) provided a short-termincentive for Egyptian cotton producers, and between 1864 and 1866 thecultivation of grain was abandoned almost completely for cotton.29 The UScontinued to be by far the biggest cotton exporter (in 1867, 2,500,000 bales whenonly 238,060 bales of cotton were exported from Egypt), but it was still far fromits pre-civil war levels (4,700,000 bales in 1860).30 The continuous growth ofEgyptian cotton exports is shown in Figure 1.9.

Despite the fact that Greek shipowners were involved in both general and bulkcargoes, their specialisation was decidedly in the latter. Figure 1.10 shows thatfrom 1860 to 1910 more than half the tonnage carrying bulk cargoes to Marseillesfrom the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea was chartered by Greekmerchants or carried by Greek-flag vessels. Similarly, Greek participation in thebulk trades from the region to England from 1860 to 1880 was about 50 per cent;after 1880, however, there was a significant decrease. At the same time, asFigure 1.11 indicates, there was a five-fold increase in the departure of Greekships from British ports between 1870 and 1890 and a ten-fold increase from1890 to 1914. The solution to this apparent contradiction lies in changes intrading patterns. Until the 1880s Greek ships carried grain from the Black Sea toBritain and brought back coal. But after 1890 Greek vessels brought grain toports like Antwerp, Rotterdam, Le Havre or Dunkirk, before sailing to Britishports in ballast to load coal for the Mediterranean (for the change of thedestination of Black Sea grain, see also Table 1.7). This shift can be seen clearlyfrom the actual logbooks of the first Greek steamships (see Chapter 5). Thetremendous increase in Greek clearances from British ports in the 1890–1914period reflects increased participation in the British coal export trade.


Evidence from the producing countries supports the evidence in Figures 1.10and 1.11 that Greeks kept carrying bulk commodities to and from the easternMediterranean right up to the First World War. Chapters 2 and 3 analyseextensively the participation of Greek merchants and shipowners in the BlackSea trade. Table 1.5 indicates their involvement from the south-easternMediterranean: on the eve of the First World War Greeks in Egypt controlled 24per cent of total cotton exports.

Table 1.5 Egyptian cotton exported by Greek-owned firms

Years Bales exported byGreeks

% Total

1911–12 210,448 22 964,3011913–14 229,148 24 970,263Source: Alexander Kitroeff, ‘The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937. A Communal Response

to Change’, DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1983, appendix VI

SHIPPING

The great upsurge in trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea wasparalleled by an unprecedented increase in shipping in these areas; shippingclearly followed demand for carrying capacity. The last section of this chapter

Figure 1.9 Growth of Egyptian cotton exports. Source: Appendix 1.17


examines the shipping that served the region, Greek participation, and the mainchanges in Mediterranean shipping with the introduction of steam.

Since the Greeks were involved mostly in bulk trades, which dominatedexports from the Black Sea, it is useful to analyse shipping from this area inmore detail. Table 1.6 indicates the tremendous increase of tonnage clearingBlack Sea ports. The 228,000 tons in 1831 increased to almost twelve milliontons by 1910. The correlation between the grain trade and shipping from thisregion is indicated in Figures 1.12 and 1.13.

To handle the statistics I have distinguished three major port groupings thatconstituted the main bulk cargo exporters. The first is the south Russian BlackSea ports, which can be further divided into three major groups: the first consistsof Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol and Theodosia on the northern coast; thesecond group includes the Azov ports of Taganrog, Berdiansk, Mariupol, Kertchand Rostov-on-Don; and the third is the Caucasus ports of Novorossisk, Poti andBatum (see Figure 1.2). Apart from the south Russian ports, the other two majorgroupings include the south-western harbours of Varna and Burghaz and theDanubian ports of Galatz, Braila and Sulina (see Figure 1.2).

Figure 1.10 Percentage of Greeks in the bulk trade from eastern Mediterranean to Frenchand Brtitish ports

Sources: Appendices 1.16 and 1.32


More than 2.5 million tons departed from the ports of Odessa, Nicolaieff,Sevastopol and Theodosia in the mid-1890s, when sixty years before the figurewas about 200,000 tons.31 About 100,000 tons departed from the ports of theAzov Sea in 1841, a figure that increased ten-fold to more than 1,000,000 tons bythe end of the century. The tonnage clearing the eastern ports of the Black Sea,Batum, Poti and Novorossisk, saw a tremendous increase within twenty-fiveyears: from about 80,000 tons in 1872 it became about 2.5 million in themid-1890s. Three hundred thousand tons of shipping departed from Danubianports in 1847, while in 1902 the

Table 1.6 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea (in NRT)

Year Southern Russia Danube Bulgaria Total

18301831 227,560 227,5601832 311,536 311,5361833 254,414 254,4141834 166,754 166,7541835 181,604 181,6041836 294,246 294,2461837 382,828 382,8281838 444,278 444,278

Figure 1.11 Greek ships in British ports. Source: Appendix 1.33



1839 499,416 499,4161840 375,004 375,0041841 316,700 316,7001842 334,818 334,8181843 353,920 353,9201844 505,020 505,0201845 541,720 541,7201846 600,646 600,6461847 1,025,282 298,975 1,324,2571848 581,932 185,607 767,5391849 459,226 310,413 769,6391850 459,626 220,591 680,2171851 452,024 300,465 752,4891852 805,430 356,724 1,162,1541853 1,091,276 334,577 1,425,8531854 381,980 111,559 493,5391855 87,334 329,896 417,2301856 841,362 334,063 1,175,425

Figure 1.12 Growth of Black Sea grain trade. Source: Table 1.2



1857 873,632 272,063 1,145,6951858 924,144 331,055 1,255,1991859 1,014,014 369,039 1,383,0531860 1,051,292 515,772 1,567,0641861 1,002,354 450,770 1,453,1241862 976,890 450,018 1,426,9081863 769,190 519,332 1,288,5221864 769,190 585,894 1,355,0841865 1,007,454 442,229 1,449,6831866 113,920 427,449 541,3691867 1,436,790 394,020 1,830,8101868 1,385,648 641,122 2,026,7701869 1,206,546 676,960 1,883,5061870 1,901,728 600,790 2,502,5181871 1,959,648 549,720 2,509,3681872 1,551,976 498,290 2,050,2661873 1,400,546 533,659 1,934,2051874 1,666,828 514,519 2,181,3471875 1,803,720 521,735 2,325,4551876 1,657,362 748,363 2,405,7251877 458,976 184,417 643,3931878 3,542,230 700,163 4,242,3931879 3,117,364 797,554 3,914,9181880 1,927,348 658,063 2,585,4111881 793,4541882 903,0631883 2,536,024 831,4861884 2,734,620 697,686 202,482 3,634,7881885 3,172,096 895,8241886 3,014,902 950,567 336,515 4,301,9841887 3,716,106 1,203,6831888 4,670,446 1,332,907 375,672 6,379,0251889 4,413,078 1,473,345 365,612 6,252,0351890 4,261,198 1,539,445 45,818 6,258,8261891 3,876,080 1,512,030 513,750 5,901,860



1892 2,942,518 1,427,0871893 4,591,216 1,893,5061894 6,189,142 1,619,703 638,979 8,447,8241895 5,981,268 1,554,698 7,345 8,270,5051896 5,607,304 1,770,544 815,972 8,193,8201897 5,262,230 1,397,9171898 4,876,001 1,476,1191899 4,649,942 1,070,367 782,141 6,502,4501900 4,203,055 1,252,509 560,445 6,016,0091901 4,203,055 1,830,002 880,469 6,913,5261902 5,866,229 2,302,980 625,355 8,794,5641903 6,847,374 2,042,994 1,786,580 10,676,9481904 6,901,634 1,447,054 1,683,993 10,032,6811905 6,099,743 1,756,243 1,342,832 9,198,8181906 5,873,963 2,275,812 1,300,003 9,449,7781907 5,645,787 2,205,061 1,535,934 9,386,7821908 5,162,340 1,607,627 1,258,983 8,028,9501909 6,848,448 1,474,933 1,592,320 9,915,7011910 7,424,379 2,274,493 2,022,318 11,721,190Sources: As for Table 1.2

figure became almost 2.5 million tons. And the amount of tonnage that left theBulgarian ports Varna and Burghaz in 1886 more than doubled in ten years.Together with the growth of shipping went improvements in port and shippingfacilities. Harbours were constructed and dredged, and obstructions barring theentrances of rivers and straits were removed, thus greatly improving thenavigability of the Black Sea.

At the other end of the trade, the main recipient countries of the Black seagrain exports and ships were France and England, followed by Germany,Holland and Italy. Table 1.7 gives us detailed data of the destination of

Table 1.7 Destination of Russian wheat exports

% of total Russian an exports

Years To Britain To France To Holland To Italy To Germany

1861–5 48 19 0 9 91866–70 57 20 0 6 61871–5 45 19 2 7 81876–80 34 22 3 5 161881–5 37 12 8 6 16


% of total Russian an exports

Years To Britain To France To Holland To Italy To Germany

1886–90 42 11 7 13 71891–5 28 16 8 15 61896–1900 18 18 15 20 71901–5 19 13 18 23 61906–10 20 12 21 18 71911–13 15 15 21 24 6Source: M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its

Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley, University of California, 1938, p. 246Note: * These figures include all Russian ports. An average of more than two-thirds of

the country’s total wheat exports came from the southern Black Sea ports

wheat exports from the Russian ports. We notice that from 1860 to 1890 anaverage of 44 per cent of wheat exports from Russia were destined for GreatBritain and for the same period an average of 17 per cent of the total wheatexports from Russia were destined for France. After 1890 we notice a decline inthe exports of Russian wheat to Britain and an increase of the Russian wheatexports to Holland, Italy and Germany. Exports to France remained more or lessthe same up to the eve of the First World War.

Figure 1.13 Growth of Black Sea shipping (departures). Source: Table 1.6


Greek seamen and merchants played a pivotal role in the development ofBlack Sea trade and the growth of the areas exports. Table 1.8 indicates acontinuous growth of Greek-owned shipping from the Black Sea. At this point Ithink it is important to examine in more detail what is meant by the term ‘Greek-owned’ at this particular period. This term has been used to refer not only toships under the Greek flag but also those that were Greek-owned but usedalternative flags. The issue of flags of convenience has proved a difficult problemfor Greek historians. The importance of Greek shipping in the Levantine tradehas long been obscured by the fact that almost all Greeks until the 1820s weretechnically Turkish citizens. Even after the independent Greek state was foundedin 1830, its population was approximately 800,000, while 2.5 million otherGreeks remained in the unredeemed provinces.32

In most European archives before (and after) the formation of the Greek statethere are references to ‘Ottoman’ or ‘Ottoman and Greek’ ships. Although theTurks had a limited coasting trade of small ships, the bulk of the ‘Ottoman’ or‘Ottoman and Greek’ ships were in fact Greek-owned.33 To complicate mattersfurther, between 1801 and 1830 Greek ships mainly used the Russian flag. Intheir desire to secure carriers for their commerce, the Russians by the Treaty ofKutchuk Kainartzi in the 1770s allowed Greeks to do so. The Ionian flag wasalso Greek since it belonged to the United State of Ionian Islands, a Britishprotectorate from 1815 to 1864, when it was united with Greece. Consequently,before the formation of the Greek state, all the ships reported as Ottoman, Greek,Ionian or Russian in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean, were in factGreek.

The frequent change of flag by Ionian shipowners under British protectionirritated the British consul at Constantinople who wrote to his opposite numberat Odessa in 1821:

The opinion of the British and Ionian governments, has been so decidedlyexpressed against permission being given to Ionian vessels which haveabandoned their nationality, to resume the Ionian flag, that I do notconceive you should be warranted in attending to the applications, for thatpurpose, which have lately been made to you. The subjects of the IonianStates must be taught that their flag is too respectable to be converted intoa mere matter of occasional convenience.34

Table 1.8 Tonnage of Greek-owned* ships clearing the ports of the Black Sea (in NRT)

Year Southern Russia Danube Bulgaria

1830 7,0811831 49,7881832 40,2611833 48,3001834 29,334



1835 38,90118361837 42,7641838 43,51618391840 38,1711841 96,3901842 52,3471843 95,9691844 126,6861845 166,1571846 200,8601847 234,157 171,0171848 153,0411849 136,0881850 69,7411851 219,8591852 361,2671853 127,41418541855 203,885 **1856 163,636 **1857 184,591 106,763 **1858 90,610 111,170**1859 132,056 118,696**1865 202,7721866 175,75418671868 38,7291871 158,3321872 195,6261873 135,2641874 123,7831875 128,3741876 145,4591877 37,6171878 147,1151879 193,552 231,2561880 194,828



1881 163,3101882 173,358 138,7141883 122,3081884 113,8091885 151,5431886 135,600 21,0601887 155,0811888 300,175 163,827 98,6091889 206,6321890 246,585 132,7511891 279,950 244,168 128,8301892 275,5661893 436,249 312,2911894 318,600 215,9181895 461,892 352,178 184,5581896 438,749 318,522 115,4421897 184,170 80,853 **1898 213,443 **1899 469,328 167,964 **1900 537,349 256,128 **1901 324,965 **1902 633,107 471,208 **1903 561,927** 267,671 **1904 404,516** 229,005 **1905 404,208 ** 196,260 **1906 507,959 ** 127,438 **1907 494,687 ** 152,300**1908 395,699 ** 155,060**1909 752,712 309,482 ** 166,494 **1910 359,060 ** 166,401 **19111912 558,311**Source: See Table 1.2Notes: *Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it

includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottoman flags. ** Greek flag only


After the formation of the Greek state, a number of Greek-owned ships continuedto use the Ottoman, Ionian and Russian flags. In presenting the shipping statisticsof the Black Sea ports, in this and the following chapters, I treat as Greek theships under Greek, Ottoman, Ionian and Russian flags until the Crimean War.After the Crimean War I exclude Russian ships, although some Greeks continuedto use the Russian flag. The establishment of a number of Russian state steamnavigation companies meant that Russian ships no longer counted as Greek-owned and it becomes impossible to distinguish those that actually were Greek.

Lloyd’s Register provides us with convincing evidence that most Ottomanships of more than 100 NRT were Greek. Vessel names are often a good guide:it is difficult to believe that a ship named Panaghia (Holy Virgin), Ayios Nikolas(St Nicolas), or Ayio Yorghi (St George) belonged to a non-Greek Ottomansubject.35 The British consuls at various Black Sea ports provide abundantevidence that Ottoman ships in the Black Sea (which formed a very lowpercentage after the Crimean War) were Greek. The evidence provided bySémaphore de Marseilles from 1840 to 1910 shows that all ships under theOttoman flag that arrived at Marseilles were Greek-owned.

There is also sufficient evidence to support the argument that a significantpercentage of British ships mentioned in the shipping statistics by the Britishconsuls were Greek-owned. There are indications like the one presented inTable 1.9, that Greek-owned ships were counted as ‘British’. In sending hisreport for 1842 the consul sent a catalogue of all ‘British’ ships that carried thetrade with Taganrog. This particular catalogue contained the names of themasters of the ships from which we find that 53 per cent of the tonnageconsidered as British is actually Greek-owned.

The use of various flags, especially after the formation of the modern Greekstate, was to a large extent a matter of convenience. A change of

Table 1.9 Return of Greek-owned ships reported as British in 1842

Name of master NRT % (A)

A.Greek (Ionian) 3,138 53Catergarachi P. 128Cuppa Sp. 164Dandria Cosm. 210Dendrino A. 300Divari Sp. 100Inglessi Ger. 126Inglessi G. 201Manzavino S. 136Michaliziano L. 117Mussuri C. 135Palieso P. 200


Name of master NRT % (A)

Rossolimo C. 26Rossolimo Her. 152Rossolimo L. 155Travlo Ger. 130Vergotti G. 153Vergotti Sp. 133Vergotti Sp. 133Vlassopulo Eust. 179Vlassopulo G. 260B.British 2,821 47C.Total Taganrog 5,959 100Source: Foreign Office (FO) 359/1

flag depended not only upon politics but also on economics—especially taxation—a phenomenon that continues to influence the use of twentieth century flags ofconvenience, such as Liberia or Panama. British consul Zohrab, in his report onthe Trade of Berdiansk for 1872, noted that considerable increase of vesselsunder the Russian flag must not be attributed to any increase in Russianshipping, ‘but arises out of the number of Greek vessels which have to escape theheavy dues now imposed on Greek shipping in French ports [and] passed underthe Russian flag’.36 In 1873, vice-consul Wrench reported that ‘the Russian flagis represented at Constantinople by a large number of Greek vessels that haveobtained the privilege of hoisting Russian colours’.37 From the 1860s onward,however, most Greek merchants trading not already protected under othernationalities took Greek registration; by the 1890s, most Greeks, whether athome or abroad, flew the Greek flag.

Figure 1.14, on the one hand, indicates in real numbers the rise of Greek-owned shipping from the Black Sea. Greek-owned shipping from all three areas,South Russia, the Danube and Bulgaria, shows the same upward trend. Wenotice an important rise in the 1840s and 1850s, a decrease and stagnation in the1860s and 1870s, and an impressive rise from the 1880s to 1910. The decline in1877–8 and in 1896–7 is owed to the Russo-Turkish and Greco-Turkish wars,respectively. Figure 1.15, on the other hand, pictures the relative participation ofGreek-owned shipping in the points of departure. Contrary to Figure 1.14, whichindicates an upward trend of Greek-owned shipping, Figure 1.15 depicts adownward trend of the participation of Greek-owned shipping in total Black Seashipping. More specifically, from 60 per cent of the deep-sea-going Danubianshipping in the 1850s, the Greeks handled around 30 per cent of the Danubiandeep-sea-going shipping in the first decade of the twentieth century. From 50 percent of South Russias shipping that they handled in 1850, they handled only 10 percent in the 1900s.


The main reasons for the relative decline of Greek-owned shipping in theBlack Sea lie in the structural changes in world and Mediterranean shipping afterthe 1860s. The massive introduction of steam in the Mediterranean after the1860s brought a significant change in the organisation of the sea-trade. This isthe division of the shipping market as it exists to the present day: the divisionbetween liner and tramp shipping. The type of cargo, the type of ship and thearea it trades determines the market in which a ship works. In this way at the lastthird of the nineteenth century until the First World War, liner steamships tendedto call at a large number of ports of the eastern Mediterranean and to carrygeneral cargoes and passengers, whereas during the same period tramp steamersand sailing ships tended to call at one port and to carry bulk cargoes directly toports of western Europe. In this way it is evident that the percentage of tonnageof ships carrying general cargoes is overestimated together with the operators ofthe liner steamship companies in the total trade of the area.

The introduction of steamships and their evident advantages over sailing shipsinduced most European nations into a wild competition for the control of the seasinto establishing steamship companies on state subsidies. These subsidies weregiven mostly in the form of mail subventions by their states. The steamshipcompanies of a certain nationality that carried the mail of particular countrieswith which they traded for free, enjoyed particular advantages with taxexemptions with these countries; their obligation was to serve a particular route acertain number of times per week or month. Britain, France, Germany, Italy,

Figure 1.14 Greek-owned shipping in Black Sea (departures). Source: Table 1.8


Austria, Holland, Denmark, Russia, even Greece, established such steamshipcompanies which competed in cargo and passenger transportation in theMediterranean.38

Table 1.10 furnishes us with information regarding the main steam linercompanies that serviced eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea routes. Steam madepossible what was impossible for sail: regularly scheduled sailings. In this way,the P&O, Cunard, Leyland, Burns and MacIver, Moss, Papayanni, Prince,Johnson and Westcott and Laurence steamship companies traded regularlybetween the eastern Mediterranean/Black Sea and Britain, each ship calling atthree to twelve ports per voyage. The same happened with the FrenchMessageries Maritimes, Fraissinet, Paquet, Transantlantique and Franco-Belgesteamship companies that traded between the eastern Mediterranean and Frenchports, and with the rest of the German, Dutch, Danish, Austrian, Italian andRussian steam companies.

The ships of these liner companies usually loaded most of their cargo in oneport and complemented small amounts or passengers from other ports. Theamount of tonnage counted in the ports’ shipping statistics, however, involvesthe whole ship, exaggerating the importance of the steamships of a certainnationality in the trade of a particular port. For example, the 1,381–ton steamerPalmyra, belonging to the Burns Steamship Company, called at Genoa, Naples,

Figure 1.15 Percentage of Greek-owned shipping of total Black Sea shipping(departures). Sources: Table 1.6 and 1.8


Trieste, Patras, Corfu, Palermo, Valencia, Lisbon and Gibraltar in January1880.39 At Patras it may have loaded ‘3 packages of sweetmeat’ when at thesame time a Greek sailing ship of 380 tons may have brought from the Black Seathe grain the local mills needed. The aggregate shipping statistics wrote,however, the arrival of 1,381 British tons and 380 Greek tons; it is evident thatthe introduction of liners blurred the picture as to the real carriers of the trade ofthe area.

Tables 1.11 and 1.12 indicate the main routes the liner companies followedfrom the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea to Marseilles and the ports ofEngland. We distinguish five main groups of the routes of these ships accordingto the geographical area they covered. The first covered the ports of the south-eastern Mediterranean. The 1,356–ton Egyptian, for example, owned byLeyland, called at Alexandria, Alexandretta,

Table 1.10 Main liner steamship companies covering the sea-routes of the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea, 1860–1910

A.BRITISHPeninsular & Oriental Steamships & CoCunard Steamship & CoLeyland P. & CoBurns & MacIverMoss & CoPapayanni & CoPrince LineJohnson Wm & CoWestcott & LaurenceB.FRENCHCompagnie FraissinetMessageries MaritimesCompagnie PaquetCompagnie TransantlantiqueLigne Franco-BelgeC.GERMANDeutche-Levante-LinieFreitas & CoD.AUSTRIANLloyd-AustriacoE.ITALIANFlorio e RubatinoE.DANISHDanoise Ferenede Damps Kids


G.DUTCHHollandaise Navigation a VapeurH.RUSSIANRussian Steamship CompanyI.OTTOMAN EMPIRECourtgi Steamship (Greek-owned)Hadji-Daout-Farkouh (Greek-owned)Sources: London Customs Bills of Entry, 1860–1910; Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1860–

1910; Sp. Gorgorinis, Shipping Law, vol. 2, Athens, National Printing House,1906, p. 441

Beirut, Larnaca, Malta and Malaga, loading most of its cargo at Alexandriabefore returning to England.40 The second covered the ports of the north-easternMediterranean. The 1,221–ton Arcadia of the Papayanni Steamship Company,loaded in Constantinople and Rodosto the bulk of its cargo, and called at Syra,Smyrna and Malta before returning at the port of Liverpool.41 In these early daysthe distinction in the cargoes carried by liner and tramp companies was still notvery clear. For example, the Papayanni steamer Ararat (1,305 tons) called atConstantinople and Sulina,

Table 1.11 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to the ports of England, 1860–1910

A. (covering south-eastern Mediterranean)1. Beirut-Alexandretta-Alexandria-Malta-Gibraltar2. Alexandria-Beirut-Latakia-Alexandretta-Mersyne—Accra—CaifFa—Jaffa3. Alexandria—Larnaca—Patras—Cephalonia4. Patras-Cephalonia, Alexandria-Beirut-Jaffa5. Patras-Mersyne-Alexandretta-Jaffa-Accra6. Corfu—Patras—AlexandriaB. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean)1. Constantinople—Salonica—Syros—Smyrna—Malta2. Constantinople—Smyrna—Syros—Patras—Zante3. Piraeus-Syros-Salonica-Gallipoli-ConstantinopleC. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean including the Black Sea)—after 18901. Batum-Trebizond-Kerrassund-Samsoun-Constantinople-Cavalla-Smyrna-Syros2. Syros—Odessa—Constantinople—Smyrna3. Braila-Galatz-Constantinople-SyrosD. (covering all eastern Mediterranean)1. Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros-Alexandria-MaltaE. (covering all eastern Mediterranean including Black Sea)—after 18901. Batum—Trebizond—Galatz—Constantinople— Salonica—Smyrna—Syros—Larnaca—Lattakia—Beirut


2. Odessa-Constantinople-Alexandria-SyriaSource: London Customs Bills of Entry, 1860–1910

from where it returned to Liverpool carrying 6,000 quarters of maize from Sulinaand wool and general cargo from Constantinople.42 Towards the end of thecentury, however, the distinction between these two trades had become clear. Assteam technology developed and enabled ships to sail longer routes—after 1880to Marseilles and after 1890 to the ports of England—the Black Sea ports wereincluded on the north-eastern Mediterranean liner routes forming the third, fourthand fifth categories of sea routes.

Figure 1.4 shows a decrease of the total tonnage of ships carrying bulk cargoesand arriving at Marseilles after the 1860s. The frequent calls at many ports ofliners increased their relative importance in the shipping statistics when therelative importance of bulk cargo shipping was diminished. In the same way thedecreasing role of the Greeks in Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean shipping inFigure 1.15 is partly fictitious; all evidence indicates that the Greeks remainedthe main operators of bulk cargoes and shipping from and to that area up to1914.

All the previous analysis has supported the argument of a steady and

Table 1.12 Main sea-routes of liner steamship companies to Marseilles

A. (covering south-eastern Mediterranean)1. Alexandria-Smyrna-Metelino-Syros-Patras2. coast of Syria-Smyrna3. Alexandria-Jaffa-Caiflfa-Beirut, Larnaca-Mersyne—Smyrna—Calamata—CatacoloB. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean)1. Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros2. Constantinople-Piraeus3. Constantinople-Rodosto-Salonica-Smyrna-Syros—PiraeusC. (covering north-eastern Mediterranean including the Black Sea) — after 18801. Batum-Poti-Mariupol-Samsoun-Constantinople2. Batum-Terbizond-Kerasund-Samsoun-Constantinople-Syros-Smyrna3. Danube-Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros4. Galatz-Sulina-Constantinople-Salonica5. Odessa-Constantinople-Piraeus6. Odessa-Burghaz-Constantinople-Smyrna-Syros Odessa-Constantinople-Smyrna-Chios-Piraeus7. Poti-Trebizond-Constantinople-Smyrna8. Berdiansk-Batum-Trebizond-Samsoun-ConstantinopleD. (covering all eastern Mediterranean)1. Constantinople-Levant


2. Alexandria-Port Said-Jaffa-Beirut-Larnaca-Latakia-Alexandretta-Myrsine-Limassol-SmyrnaSalonica-PiraeusSource: Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1860–1910

even rising participation of the Greeks in the trade (and particularly bulk trade)and shipping from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea during thesecond half of the nineteenth century. This chapter has examined thedevelopment and organisation of the sea-trade from the eastern Mediterraneanand the Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe. It hasfurther focused on the participation of Greeks in this trade throughout thenineteenth century to the eve of the First World War. Greek participation wastraced to both destinations and origins: arrivals of goods and ships were studiedat the beginning of every decade from all Black Sea and eastern Mediterraneanports to the two main recipient areas of western Europe, Marseilles and the mainports of England.

The orientation of the Greek merchants and shipowners in the transportationof bulk cargoes proved fundamental for the process of the Greek-owned fleet inthe twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, Greeks had alreadyestablished the basis for their specialisation: an international tramp fleet carryingbulk cargoes.


2GREEK COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME

NETWORKS: THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE,1830s-1860s

European seaborne trade has traditionally been connected with the establishmentof foreign merchants in major ports like Antwerp, Amsterdam, London, Seville,Marseilles, Livorno, Venice or Trieste, where the terms ‘merchant community’and ‘community of foreign merchants’ were often synonymous.1 The foreignmerchant communities were characterised by solidarity, mutual aid, kinship anda desire to preserve their culture. These tendencies were even more conspicuous‘among large ethnic formations of eastern origin, which stood out against thepurely European western background’, namely Jews, Armenians and Greeks.2During the French Wars (1793–1815) a wave of merchant emigrants, includingHuguenots and Dutch Jews, swept England. A new surge followed from the1820s to the 1840s in which German Jews and Orthodox Greeks, who ‘had asimilar international commercial outlook’ as well as ‘sufficient capital, credit orconnections, and adequate commercial experience’ came to Britain. Moreover,‘they shared a sectarian outlook that interlocked families in chains ofpartnerships and marriages’.3

As already indicated, in the century before 1914 eastern Mediterranean andBlack Sea commerce was organised largely by an entrepreneurial network ofGreek merchants dispersed among the main Mediterranean and Black Sea ports.This tight commercial web, which originally started in the Ottoman Empire atthe beginning of the nineteenth century, by the 1830s had assumed a pan-Mediterranean character.4 A limited number of Greek mercantile and shippingfamilies wove its pattern after a successful fight against western Europeancompetition.

The development of Greek-owned shipping in the nineteenth century wasfounded on the networks of these Greek diaspora merchant communities. Alongwith the commercial web that stretched across the Mediterranean and northernEurope, a maritime network was created that opened the way to the transitionfrom sail to steam. Moreover, the organisation, structure and trading methods ofthe Greek diaspora merchant/shipowners who prospered in the last century havebeen imitated by the shipowners of this one. 5

In the next pages I will examine the traces that the Greek merchant/shipowners left while establishing both their own network and Greek-ownedshipping. An attempt is made to locate merchants, cargoes and ships involved at

the various termini of the trade, particularly in the Black Sea, Marseilles, andEnglish ports. The aim is not to provide an integrated analysis of theentrepreneurial network of the Greek merchant communities but to identify theways in which their activities influenced the growth of Greek-owned shipping inthe nineteenth century. To that end, two phases of the Greek entrepreneurialnetwork are identified: the ‘Chiot’ and the ‘Ionian’. The merchant/shipownersfrom the island of Chios who prospered between the 1830s and the 1860sfounded the former, only to be succeeded by the merchant/shipowners from theIonian islands, who formed the Ionian network from the 1870s to the beginningof the twentieth century. The Ionians successfully made the transition from sailto steam and from merchanting to shipowning. This chapter will deal with theChiot phase, while the next will examine the Ionian phase.

THE CHIOT NETWORK, 1830s–1860s

The Chiot network was formed by members of about sixty Greek families(Appendix 2.1). Although almost half were not from the island of Chios, mostwere either related to the Chiots by marriage (see Appendix 2.2) or started theircareers in Chiot offices and had their support. None the less, the Chiot familieswere the largest and richest. The trade involved mainly bulk cargoes, such asgrain, wool, cotton, linseed and tallow, from the eastern Mediterranean andparticularly the Black Sea to western and northern Europe; manufactured goods,especially thread and textiles, were carried on return voyages from westernEurope to the eastern Mediterranean. The main nodes of the network wereEngland and the Black Sea, with a chain of branch offices throughout theMediterranean: in Marseilles, Livorno and Trieste; in the cotton markets ofAlexandria and Cairo; in the maritime centre of the Aegean archipelago, Syros;and in the two financial markets of the eastern Mediterranean, Constantinopleand Smyrna. Vital to the networks success was its ability to penetrate not onlythe main markets of the recipient western European countries, particularlyEngland, but also the difficult and unexploited hinterland of the Black Sea.

Most Greek merchants went to England in the late 1810s or during the Greekrevolution in the 1820s. These traders came mostly from Chios, especially afterthe slaughter of the islands population in 1822. In the 1850s there were fifty-eightGreek merchant houses in England, concentrated in London, Manchester andLiverpool, including almost all the families of the network (see Figure 2.1).Information gathered from the Liverpool Journal of Commerce indicates that inthe 1850s Greek merchants largely controlled Liverpool’s trade with the easternMediterranean.6 More specifically, Schilizzi, Papayanni and Tymbas handled 41per cent of the tonnage that entered Liverpool in 1850 from Alexandria, Beirut,Constantinople, Galatz, Braila, Mariupol and Odessa. St. P.Schilizzi & Co, thelargest operator of both Greek and English brokers (Table 2.1), was the Liverpoolbranch of Ralli Brothers (see Figure 2.2). Papayanni, a merchant and shipowner,was known as the carrier of Chiot merchants. Unfortunately, except for three or

THE ‘CHIOT’ PHASE, 1830S–1860S 39

four years, the Liverpool Journal of Commerce does not provide such detailedinformation as appears in Table 2.1.7

None the less, the London Customs Bills of Entry, which provide data on allships entering the most important British ports from abroad, give extensiveinformation about the activities of the Chiot network in England. Table 2.2indicates that in 1850, 31 per cent, and in 1860, 57 per cent of all tonnageentering British ports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea washandled by Greek merchants. The Greeks in England were not only involved inbulk cargoes but also in this period handled most of the general trade fromAlexandria, Constantinople and Smyrna. Moreover, as the Bills of Entry attest, in1860 Ralli, Rodocan achi, Spartali, Fachiri Pana, Cremidi, Franghiadi, Gerussi,Geralopulo, Georgacopulo and Cucussi handled almost exclusively the curranttrade from Patras.8 It is difficult to identify the amount of tonnage each merchantoperated, since often as many as ten to twelve Greek merchants chartered asingle ship for general

Table 2.1 Vessels entered for loading at the port of Liverpool from the ports of the easternMediterranean (Alexandria, Beirut, Braila, Constantinople, Corfu, Galatz, Malta, Mariupol,Odessa, Patras, Salonica, Smyrna and Syros)

1850 1853

Chartered or owned by Ships Tons Ships Tons

Greek

Figure 2.1 The Chiot commercial and maritime network, 1830s–1860s. Number offamilies at the port-cities of the network


1850 1853

Chartered or owned by Ships Tons Ships Tons

Cassaveti Brothers 1 270Cavafy & Co 1 221Frangopulo 1 95Gianacopulo 9 2,654Mavrogordato 4 608Papayanni 26 3,944 9 1,944Schilizzi 52 8,229 14 2,344Spartali & Lascaridi 3 733Tymbas 9 1,403 2 650A.Total 87 13,576 44 9,519OtherBahr, Behrend 18 3,559 5 1,477Burns & Mac’iver 12 9,461Dixon 7 2,780Lamport & Holt 14 4,171 16 4,341Nichols & Maunder 10 2,907 4 886Pothonier 8 2,887Preston & Watson 26 4,676 12 2,511Various 16 4,392 12,157B. Total 84 19,705 64 36,500Total (A)+(B) 171 33,281 108 46,019Greek participation(A)/[(A)+(B)] 41% 21%Source: Liverpool Journal of Commerce, 1850, 1853

and bulk cargoes. The Bills of Entry report in detail every single quantitydestined for each particular merchant, but to measure the importance of eachmerchant according to the amount and kind of cargo is beyond the scope of thisstudy. Still, it is clear that Ralli, Rodocanachi, Schilizzi, Cassavetti, lonides andSpartali were the biggest merchants trading with the eastern Mediterranean andBlack Sea during this period, and most of the commerce involved Liverpool.

Marseilles was the other main recipient in western Europe of cargoes sent byGreek merchants in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. Tables 2.3–2.5 arebased on information in the leading French commercial and shipping journal,Sémaphore de Marseilles, which began in 1827 and contains systematicinformation on ship arrivals (and departures), including


Table 2.2 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterraneanand the Black Sea at the ports of England

1850 1860

Merchant Tons Merchant Tons

Argenti Argenti NegroponteArmero Agelasto NicolopuloCassavetti Avierino NomicoCavafy Callimassioti PezaliChiriaco Carajahnaki PaleologoChristaki Cassavetti PanaCortazzi Cavafy PapayanniGeralopulo Corgalegno Potouslonides Couvelas RalliOmero Cremidi RodocanachiPapayanni Cucussi ScaramangaPetrocochino Cuppa SchilizziPsicha Delta SpartaliProios Dumas TambacoRalli Bros Eumorphopulo VaglianoRalli C. Eustratiadi XenosRalli P.T. Fachiri ZiffoRodocanachi Frangopulo ZiziniaSchilizzi Franghiadi ZarifiSechiari GalattiSevastopulo GeorgacopuloSofiano GeorgalaSotirichos GeralopuloSpartali GerussiTamvaco GiannacopuloTymbas HajopuloZarifi HomereZiffo lonidesZizinia LascaridiGalatti MelasA. Total Greeks 42,306 176,126B. Total British 135,727 308,860(A)/(B) 31% 57%Sources: Appendices 1.18 and 1.19


the port and date of departure, the name of the ship and captain, tonnage,cargo, consignor and consignee, and broker. While it contains a small percentageof errors (like different information for the same ship), it does on the wholeprovide extremely valuable statistics that can give a picture of the port‘sactivities and firms. Unfortunately, it is not always possible to differentiatebetween a charterer and a shipowner. For example, the journal may print lenavire a M.Dromocaiti but the merchandise could be on his own account, forM.Dromocaiti, à ordre or pour divers. Still, it appears from the data that Greekmerchants in Marseilles handled more than one-third of all commerce andshipping entering from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea between 1830and 1860 (Table 2.3).

Members of twenty-one families of the network had branch offices inMarseilles, whose Greek merchant and shipping community thrived until the endof the century. The Rodocanachi firm by far outstripped the rest, receiving in1840 the amazing number of forty-eight ships loaded exclusively with grain fromOdessa, Berdiansk, Taganrog, Braila and Galatz (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). ZiziniaBrothers were the next largest, importing cotton, wheat, maize, linseed andbarley from Alexandria, followed by Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti, the branchoffice of the Ralli Brothers of London, who imported mainly wheat and linseedfrom Odessa and Taganrog. Argenti was the fourth largest firm, importingwheat, maize and linseed from Galatz and Braila, while Dromocaiti was the fifthlargest, handling cotton, linseed, hides and colonial goods from Constantinopleand Smyrna. Ten years later, Zizinia Brothers, Dromocaiti and Rodocanachiwere still in the top five, while Petrocochino & Agelasto, a small firm found inthe 1835 list (see Table 2.3) had worked its way up to fifth. But the mostimportant newcomer was Zarifi who, according to the information in Table 2.5,had become the second largest importing firm. By 1860 trade from the easternMediterranean more than tripled and the Greeks followed the trend. Spartali wasthe main Greek importer, followed by Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti, Rodocanachi,Melas Brothers and Papudoff (Table 2.3).

Greek expansion and consolidation in the eastern Mediterranean and BlackSea trade from the 1830s to the 1850s took place after wild competition withwestern and Levantine merchants. The Greek take-over of the Levant trade didnot bother the English as much as it did the French, and especially theMarseillaise merchants who had traditionally carried Levantine commerce sincethe eighteenth century.9 By 1850 there was an evident contraction of theoperations of Marseilles firms: only two chartered more than ten vessels. Despitesteady exports of French textiles, eventually the Greeks proved the bestpromoters of Manchester and Liverpool textiles in the Levant to the detriment ofFrench producers, merchants and shipowners. Tables 2.4 and 2.5 show the typesof cargo the main Greek merchants at Marseilles imported. The informationclearly demonstrates that by the 1840s and 1850s the main Greek merchantsspecialised almost exclusively in the trade and transport of bulk cargoes from theeastern Mediterranean and Black Sea.


At the other end of the trading system, Odessa was the main grain export port.According to the Journal d’Odessa (28 January 1847) the firm of TheodoreRodocanachi (brother of Emmanuel in Odessa and George in Livorno) was thelargest in the city, handling goods valued at nearly 3.5 million rubles (a millionlarger than its closest competitor) and accounting

Table 2.3 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterraneanand the Black Sea at the port of Marseilles

1835 1840 1850 1860

Merchant Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons

Agelasto 2 227 4 817 16 3,608Ambrosi 1 228 – – – –Ambanopoulo 5 1,355Apalyras – – – – 8 1,649 – –Argenti & Co – – 12 2,174 – – – –Argenti & Sechiari – – – – – – 13 2,596Baltazzi Bros 3 433 – – 5 1,439 8 2,052Bati G. – – 1 122 – – – –Caracoussi – – – – – – 4 1,303Carissi & Vrissachi – – – – – – 2 215Christodulo – – – – 4 1041 – –Dromocaiti 7 1,190 7 1,424 18 3,648 9 1,723Janoti – – – – 1 280 – –Katsikoyani – – – – 1 370 – –Lazaridi – – – – – – 1 246Marulla Bros – – – – 1 118 – –Mavro & Co – – – – 9 2,169 – –Mavro & Basilio – – – – – – 5 1,121Melas Bros – – – – – – 29 6,156Mavrogordato 7 1,185 11 2,137 – – 2 454Microulaci &Mavrocordato

– – – – – – 2 498

Monopulos – – – – – – 1 277Papudoff – – – – 6 1,663 19 4,592Pascalis – – – – – – 2 409Petrocochino 2 318 2 276 5 886 – –Petrocochino &Agelasto

2 353 – – 13 2,255 10 2,165

Ralli & Scaramaga – – – – – — 4 1,203Ralli & Vlasto – – – – – – 3 1,162Ralli & Caramanya – – – – – – – 450


1835 1840 1850 1860

Merchant Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons

Ralli & Negroponte – – – – – – 1 277Ralli, Schilizzi, &Argenti Co

3 503 19 3,789 13 1,648 46 9,962

Rodocanachi & Co – – 48 11,952 14 2,553 38 9,835Satzilli – – – – – – 4 1,447Scaramanga – – – – – – 2 535Sechiari 6 1,202Sechiari & Argenti& Co

2 294 12 2,393 – –

Spartali – – – – – – 61 12,353Spartali & Lascaridi – – – – 5 575 – –Tamvaco,Microulachi &Mavrogordato

– – – – – – 2 325

Vlasto & Co – – 5 1,102 2 468 – –Zarifi & Zafiropulo – – – – – – 13 3,645Zarifi Bros – – – – 20 4,685 – –Zizinia Bros 7 1,269 29 6,211 28 6,610 7 1,648A.Total Greek 31 5,251 139 29,936 169 35,267 316 72,814B.Total Marseilles – 16,809 – 91,380 – 84,696 – 232,249(A)/B) 31% 32% 42% 31%Sources: Appendices 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4

Table 2.4 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea ports to Marseillesby the five principal merchant houses in 1840

Merchant Origin Merchandise

Rodocanachi & Co Braila 2,518 quilots (Moldavian) wheatGalatz 10,000 kilos (Turkish) wheatConstantinople 49,498 (Turkish) wheatOdessa 38,202 chetwerts wheatBerdiansk 13,936 chetwerts wheatTaganrog 5,134 chetwerts wheatSmyrna 420 casks olive oil

Zizinia Bros Alexandria 253,359 ardeps grainAlexandria 4,539 bales cottonBraila 424 quilots wheat



Galatz 613 quilots wheatConstantinople 13,703 kilos mais

Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Constantinople 15,409 kilos wheatOdessa 8,299 chetwerts wheatTaganrog 11,547 chetwerts wheatGalatz 8,420 kilos wheatConstantinople 9,070 kilos maisSalonica 322 bales wool, 9 bales silk

Argenti & Co Galatz 3,478 quilots wheatGalatz 55,000 kilos wheatBraila 18,500 kilos wheat

Dromocaiti Smyrna 152 bales silk1,642 bales cotton1,107 bales wool153 hides

Constantinople 81,000 kilos wheatOdessa 759 chetwerts linseed

Source: Compiled data from Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1840

for a tenth of Odessa’s overseas commerce. According to the same list, JohnRalli owned the fifth largest commercial house in the city, handling 5.2 per centof overseas trade.10 The Rodocanachi firm exported mainly wheat and linseed toEngland and Marseilles (Tables 2.4–2.6), whereas the importance of the Rallis inEngland made them by far the largest exporters to Britain of tallow and woolfrom Odessa and Taganrog (Tables 2.6 and 2.7). In any case, it is evident that theChiot network controlled almost 40 per cent of the export trade from Odessa toBritain in the mid-1840s. The network extended to the Sea of Azov where thefirm Ralli and Scaramanga (a branch of Ralli Brothers of London), Rodocanachi,Papudoff and Avierino exported more than half the grain and almost all thetallow and wool to Britain (Table 2.7). The other Greek merchants operatingfrom the ports of the Azov and the Danube prospered during the Ionian phase

Table 2.5 Imports from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea ports to Marseilles bythe five principal Greek merchant houses in 1850


Zizinia Bros Alexandria 3,374 bales cotton4,053 ardeps wheat4,759 ardeps sesame

Constantinople 70,000 ocques sesame610 bales cotton



Caiffa 17,000 kilos wheatSalonica 3,020 kilos sesame

22 sacks linseed350 bales wool

Orphano 19,200 ocques sesame100 bales cotton

Smyrna 3,184 casks olive-oilGalatz 2,519 quilots wheatBraila 1,673 quilots wheat

8,400 kilos wheatOdessa 17,530 chetwerts wheatTaganrog 1,500 chetwerts wheat

Zarifi Odessa 15,390 chetwerts wheatTheodosia 950 chetwerts wheatBraila 681 quilots wheatGalatz 2,9 16 quilots wheatVarna 2,400 kilos wheatCaiffa 12,600 kilos wheatConstantinople 10,673 kilos wheat

Dromocaiti Smyrna 19,280 kilos sesame4,219 bales cotton2,550 parcels dried fruit

Jaffa 8,887 ardeps sesameAlexandretta 720 bales cottonEnos 916 bales wool

60 bales cottonRodocanachi & Co Odessa 4,640 chetwerts wheat

3,000 chetwerts linseed395 tons linseed1,187 bales wool2,700 hides

Taganrog 2,110 chetwerts linseed2,250 chetwerts wheat282 bales wool

Berdiansk 1,630 chetwerts wheatBraila 150 quilots wheat

Petrocochino & Agelasto Tarsous 585,066 ocques sesame88,000 ocques linseed42 bales wool



183 bales cottonOdessa 4,055 chetwerts wheatBerdiansk 6,574 chetwerts wheatCyprus 201 bales cotton

Source: Compiled data from Sémaphore de Marseilles, 1850

Table 2.6 Exports of the commercial houses of Odessa to Great Britain, 1841–5

Merchants 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845

A.Exports of wheat and linseed (chetwerts)*Rodocanachi

7,460 38,431 17,302 23,694 42,881

Ralli 17,646 25,071 13,445 27,123 15,544Papudoff 8,410 5,800 2,350 12,405 11,688Sevastopulo 2,827Mavro 4,410 4,385Total Greek 33,516 76,539 37,482 63,222 70,113TotalOdessa

159,858 295,424 109,421 182,940 181,903

Participation of Greeks

21% 26% 34% 35% 38%

B.Exports of tallo and wool (poods)*Ralli 143,014 224,484 84,689 68,139 35,715Rodocanachi

– 6,232 17,387 15,210 8,975

Papudoff 4,173 – 1,327 – 859Scliri 350Total Greek 147,187 230,716 103,403 83,349 45,549TotalOdessa

371,254 611,582 357,934 460,736 264,036

Participation of Greeks

40% 38% 29% 18% 17%

Source: Compiled from data in Foreign Office (FO) 359/1Note: * An approximate weight equivalence is 1 chetwert=5.77 bushels (8 bushels=1

imperial quarter, 4 imperial quarters=1 ton); 1 pood=36 lbs

from the 1870s to the turn of the century. Thirty members of the Chiot networkwere established in Odessa and Taganrog (see Figure 2.1).


The Danubian Principalities for centuries provided grain almost exclusively toConstantinople and began to supply other markets only after the Treaty ofAdrianople in 1829. Ionian merchants began to become established at Danubianports immediately thereafter under British protection and members of the Chiotnetwork penetrated the market gradually between 1829 and 1856. Pandia Argentiand F.Sechiari were among the first few Chiots to settle and were the largestexporters of grain to the Argenti firm in Marseilles (Tables 2.3–2.5).11 Membersof the Ralli, Vouros and Melas families, as well as an agent of the firm of Xenosin England, settled in Braila to provide cargoes for the branch offices inMarseilles and England. According to the Sémaphore de Marseilles, one-quarterto onethird of the ships and tonnage chartered by Greek merchants arriving inMarseilles from the Black Sea originated in Danubian ports.

The contraction of the imports of Rodocanachi and Ralli, Schilizzi andArgenti in Marseilles in 1850 (Table 2.3), combined with increased grain

Table 2.7 Exports from Taganrog distinguishing Greek merchant houses, 1851–2

Wheat and linseed (chetwerts) Tallow and wool (poods)

Merchant houses 1851 1852 1851 1852

A. The ‘Chiots’ 174,019 368,500 170,761 173,000Ralli & Scaramanga 119,980 260,500 170,761 173,000Rodocanachi Figli 26,176 76,500 – –Aless. Avierino Figli 13,011 24,500 – –Papudoff & Lascharachi 14,852 7,000 – –B. The ‘Ionians’ 70,423 171,995Mariolakis 24,835 79,620Maris Vaglianos 27,130 54,435Aless. Focas 13,428 20,640G. Dallaporta 5,030 10,000Const. Mussuri 7,300C. Total Greeks(A+B) 244,442 540,495 170,761 173,000Total Taganrog 306,912 646,410 197,938 202,420Participation of Greeks inthe total exports of Taganrog

80% 84% 86% 85%

Source: Compiled from data in Foreign Office (FO) 359/1

exports of both Rodocanachi and Ralli from Odessa and Taganrog to GreatBritain (Tables 2.6 and 2.7), signalled a major transformation in theMediterranean grain trade in the 1840s. Until then grain was shipped to the maindeposit ports of Livorno, Genoa, Trieste and Marseilles to be re-shipped asnecessary to Britain and northern Europe. But Britain’s new free trade policypromoted direct commerce and bypassed intermediate Mediterranean ports.


Livorno, by its status as port franc, had been the first recipient of wheat cargoesfrom the Black Sea; in the 1820s and 1830s wheat was re-shipped mainly toEngland and ships came back to Livorno full of textiles. Indeed, Livorno becameone of the main outlets for English industry in the 1820s and 1830s. In addition,a large part of English textiles arrived at Alexandria via Livorno in 1820 and1830.12 A large part of this trade was in Chiot hands. Patricia Herlihy reports that‘in 1839, a few large commercial houses, no more than eight to ten in number,had dominated Livorno’s overseas trade, and these houses were all foreign,Greek and Jewish’.13 The Greek merchants were Rodocanachi, among the firstGreek merchants of Livorno, Sevastopulo (also President of the Chamber ofCommerce of Livorno in 1850), Mavrogordato and Papudoff, related to theRodocanachi and Sevastopulo families by marriage. We find also ConstantineTossizza, brother of Michael Tossizza, the wealthy merchant of Alexandria.

From Trieste, the main transit port of the Habsburg Empire, the Greeks wereable to channel grain to Austria and Germany and to provide the Levant withindustrial goods. The majority of the merchants from the Chiot network arrivedin Trieste in the 1820s, where we find members of the Ameros, Galati,Petrocochino, Ralli, Rodocanachi, Scaramanga, Sevastopulo, Vlasto and otherChiot families (see Appendix 2.1).14 Trieste also became home for a number ofinsurance companies formed by Greeks.15

In Alexandria, Greek merchants had special relations with the government.Until 1829 Muhammed Ali sold cotton in Europe on his own account usingGreeks with strong connections as intermediaries. To overcome his financialdifficulties, from 1829 he sold the greatest part of the harvest to the big merchanthouses, most of which were Greek. Michael Tossizza, Etienne Zizinia andD’Anastassy were the most important merchants in Egypt.16 Eleven othermembers of the Chiot network also traded from the city About 10–15 per cent oftotal tonnage arriving in Marseilles in 1840 and 1850 came from Alexandria.

The amount of actual trade from Constantinople, Smyrna and Syros toMarseilles and Liverpool in 1850 amounted to less than 15 per cent of the totaltonnage chartered by Greek merchants. Yet these three cities had a particular roleto play in the network beyond actual trade: they were the three corners fromwhere the network started and expanded, the bases without which the networkcould not have been built. They were the seedbeds of the merchants who eventuallywent abroad, the centres where they were educated and served theirapprenticeships. Constantinople and Smyrna were cities where all bankingservices, including lending and arbitrage, were available. Constantinople andSyros were maritime centres providing seamen, ships, shipbuilding, repairs,maintenance, sales and purchase, chartering, insurance and, most important,market information. Constantinople contained the largest urban Greek populationin the eastern Mediterranean and was the areas biggest commercial, banking andmaritime centre. The firms of Zarifi, Zafiropulo, Lascharidi, Ralli and Schilizzi,found in Appendix 2.1 as the main Chiot firms in Constantinople, represent but afragment of the reality and do not really reflect the importance of this eastern


capital to the network. It is reported that in 1868, of the 1,100 persons involvedin trade, banking, manufacturing and services in Constantinople, 348 wereGreeks; of this number, 133 Greeks were traders.17

Smyrna was the main trading centre for the Marseilles merchants in theeighteenth century and those of Trieste in the early nineteenth. At the beginningof the nineteenth century Chiots controlled the retail trade in cloth, linen and silkin Smyrna, with correspondents in Vienna, Trieste, Livorno, Genoa, Marseilles,Paris and Amsterdam.18 In fact, there were 500 Chiot mercantile housesoperating in Smyrna at the end of the eighteenth century.19 The firms of Baltazzi,Homere, Schilizzi and Ralli (Appendix 2.1) represent only a few of the Chiotfamilies in the city.

Syros was the main maritime centre of the young Greek state. Its developmentwas almost entirely connected with the Chiot network. It is thus not surprising tofind that in 1845 fifteen of the twenty most prominent merchants were membersof families in the Chiot network. Apart from handling the islands commerce, themerchants financed the development of the Greek-flag fleet, more than half ofwhich was built in shipyards on Syros by Chiot shipwrights between 1843 and1858.20 Maritime loans either for shipbuilding or operations were important forthe Chiot merchants of Syros, who also sold maritime intelligence, insurance andchartering. Syros’ prosperity and decline followed that of the Chiot network; itlasted one generation—by the 1870s Piraeus had started to replace it.

The circuitous path of the Greeks around the Mediterranean and northernEurope established many prosperous merchant communities that in the mid-nineteenth century controlled the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea trades.But it is not the increase in the number of interconnected commercialestablishments that made the network work, but rather the elaboration of acommon commercial strategy which relied first on the organisational structure ofthe firms and second on the methods of trading.21

ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRMS

The usual structure of a Greek merchant house in some ways resembled amodern multinational firm. One office fulfilled the function of a mothercompany while the others acted as branches. The partners divided the direc tionof the various divisions while the role of the central house, which determined the‘nationality’ of the firm, was given to the most capable. All directors appearedequal to third parties and all had signing authority. A variant occurred when thebranches were legally independent but shared profits. But in either, themultinational character of these companies often created legal complications.Yet this multinationality and this complexity have been the bases in this centuryfrom which Greek shipping companies have avoided taxes in all countries. At atime when the post was the only means of communication, family control was aprime characteristic of the network. Kinship and common place of origin impliedtrust and facilitated entrance into the ‘club’.22


Even more than with other Greeks, the power of the Chiot families derivedfrom the discipline dictated by the hierarchy and cohesion of the family.Intermarriage was extensive: Chiots married their uncles, aunts, cousins—evenfirst cousins, contrary to the laws of the Greek Orthodox church—to keepbusiness within the family. Each family sought to mix with equals, and becausethe circles were so limited, competition for appropriate matches began early.Intermarriage made the family even more powerful.23 Appendix 2.2 provides arough sketch of the various families and is constructed solely to provide someidea of Chiot relationships. The families depicted were related by first-degreekinship—marriages of the merchants or their siblings, parents, and siblings oftheir parents. An attempt has been made to limit these to the era between the1820s and 1860s. All twenty-eight Chiot families were closely related byintermarriage.24

The Rallis were the largest and most influential family not only within theGreek community in England but also in the entire network. The Ralli Brotherswere the most senior, the wealthiest, and the most imperious of the Greek houses.Its founder and pater familias was Sir Pandia, who was also considered thetitular head of the Greek community in London. For every occasion, the restwaited for the pronouncement of ‘Zeus’ so they could follow his example.25

There were sixty-six members (siblings and first and second cousins) of the Rallifamily active during this period who married within the twenty-four familiesreported in Appendix 2.1. The Rodocanachis, the most important family in theBlack Sea ports, were the second most numerous, followed by Schilizzi,Scaramanga, Negroponte and Sevastopulo. The other non-Chiot families in thenetwork worked the same way. Imitation and internal competition were two ofthe first rules of the network.

It will be useful to have a more detailed account of the operations of a Chiotand non-Chiot firm to see how the Greeks functioned. We shall examine here thenetwork of the Ralli firm based in England and that of Mavros based in Odessa.In 1818, when John and Stratis Ralli went to London from Livorno, their brotherAvgustis was already established in Marseilles. In 1823 the firm of Ralli &Petrocochino was founded and in 1824 the other younger brother, Pandia, joinedthe others in London. Pandia, the main ‘brain’ of the firm, remained in London,Stratis went to Manchester, John to Odessa in 1827 and Tomazis toConstantinople. The various branches of the firm are shown in Figure 2.2: RalliBrothers in London; E.Ralli, first in Syra and then in Manchester; St. P.Schilizzi& Co in Liverpool; Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti in Marseilles; Tomazi Ralli & Coin Constantinople and Trebizond until the early 1850s and thereafter replaced bySt. P.Schilizzi and Co; Ralli Brothers in Odessa; Ralli & Scaramanga inTaganrong; St. Scaramanga in Rostov-on-Don; Ralli & Agelasto in Tauris; andPetros Pandia Ralli in Resht (Iran). The Rallis covered the main Mediterraneanports, while in those where they did not have branches they had connections viaother relatives. They were thus always consignors and consignees. From Odessaand the Azov they shipped tallow, linseed and grain and from Trebizond, Resht,


Tauris and Constantinople colonial goods. The return cargoes were Manchestertextiles.

Ralli Brothers widened their commercial horizons and successfully entered thecotton trade from Calcutta, Bombay and New York where they opened branchoffices in 1851, 1861 and 1871, respectively. In the 1850s the Rallis employed 4,000 clerks and 15,000 workmen. As Stanley Chapman notes, together with theRodocanachis, these two leading Greek firms ‘most probably had the largestorganisations and capitals of any merchants operating in London. OnlyRothschilds were substantially richer’ and they were ‘financiers rather thanmerchants’. The death of John Ralli in the late 1850s and of Pandia in 1863 ledto the total reorganisation of the firm. The Levant trade was abandoned byclosing down the branches in Trebizond, Constantinople, Resht and Tauris, whilethe Russian grain trade was handed over to the Scaramanga family. The new manin charge, Stephen Ralli, turned instead to the much more lucrative Indian andAmerican trades.26

In the early 1820s Stephanos Mavros from the Cyclades established in Odessaa small but successful firm. One of his major disadvantages was the lack of alarge commercial family, a ‘handicap’ he partially overcame by marryingEuphrosyne Basiliou, a member of a prosperous mercantile family in Vienna andLeipzig. One of them, Michael Basiliou, married a Chiot (Sevastopulo); thesewere the parents of Euphrosyne. By his marriage Mavros thus became a memberof a Chiot clan and acquired mercantile connections. He expanded his firm byappointing as directors of the branch offices his wifes brothers or brothers-in-law.

Figure 2.2 The network of Ralli Brothers, 1830s–1860s


Soon the Mavros merchant house of Odessa had branches in Taganrog (directedby George Melas, his wifes brother-in-law), Livorno (by Dimitrios Basiliou, hiswifes brother, and Ilias Panas, his wifes brother-in-law), Marseilles (byAlexander Basiliou, his wifes brother), and London (by Basil and Leon Melas,his wifes nephews). The Crimean War and the death of the old directors led to asubsequent restructuring. Basil and Leon Melas in 1854 formed their ownindependent firm based in London. By marrying their sister Euphrosyne in 1850to the important Marseilles merchant, Andreas Vagliano, they entered the‘Ionian’ network and continued their activities successfully. Basil Melasremained in London, Leon and Constantine went to Marseilles in 1857, and theyoungest brother, Michael, went to Galatz.27 The second generation of directorsin both Ralli Brothers and the Mavros firm reorganised their houses to meet newdemands and hence were able to continue operations in the last third of thenineteenth century. The majority of firms collapsed, however, and the Chiotnetwork declined after the late 1850s.

Apprenticeship and commercial education started at a very young age for themale members of mercantile families. Their main education was in foreignlanguages and the family business, where they learned advanced commercialtechniques, such as bills of exchange and double-entry bookkeeping. AsDemetrius Vikelas remembered:

[Since I was 13–14 years old] my fathers main concern was mycommercial education. The time that I was not busy learning twolanguages, I passed in his office copying commercial correspondence. Atthe same time the partner of my father taught me double entrybookkeeping, and I kept some of the books of the company under hisguidance and supervision.28

Recruitments and choice of partners were made from the most able of thenumerous relatives and was dictated by the older members of the family. AsVikelas wrote:

I had just become 17 years old [when I left from Constantinople to Londonon 16 May 1852].… [Melas Bros] hired me in their office and were willingto teach me all about commerce…. It was after [some years] that I realizedhow grateful I should have been to my grandfather who dictated to myuncles, and they accepted without objection, his wish of my employment attheir office. Really, the system of mutual aid among relatives and of familycollaboration was very much in effect then, more than today, and it wasbecause of this [system] that the Greek merchant houses, and especially theChiot ones, prospered to that extent.29

Greeks in the various diaspora merchant communities did not mix with localpopulations and generally socialised with each other; in fact they often lived


together in compact neighbourhoods. They clung to their Greek identities andusually did not look upon the host city as a permanent home. In many cases,however, they adopted the nationality of the country in which they resided toenjoy the privileges of the local merchants. The main Greek merchants inOdessa, for example, took Russian citizenship after a very simple procedure. Asthe British consul in Odessa revealed in 1850:

In reply to your despatch of the 5th of February which reached me onlytwo days back, I hasten to state first that any foreigner may become aRussian subject at any time and in the course of a few hours, by a simpleformality, and that he will be encountered by the Russian law as such inevery way and without distinction from a native. Of the merchants ofTaganrog named by you, Ralli & Scaramanga is a firm acting as agents andfor account of Ralli & Scaramanga of Odessa who are inscribed in theGuild as Russian subjects; the same with B.Melas who acts for S.Mavro ofOdessa, a Russian subject.30

Many members of the Greek networks took out Austrian, French and Britishcitizenship. In order to acquire higher social distinction and political protectionthe most prominent members of each merchant community in the various portsbecame consuls of Greece or other nations, as is clear from Table 2.8. Ultimately,

it is the common economic origin, the characteristic business strategy andthe organisation of these commercial houses more than the ethnic origin ofthe merchants that characterise them as Greek and that distinguish themfrom their competitors. The citizenship of the merchants is connected withthe advantages that it can bring to the commercial house, that is, more orless opportunistic.31

METHODS OF TRADING

The second important leg of the Chiot commercial strategy was its methods oftrading: first, penetration into the markets of both producers and consumers and,second, a particular method of organising shipping and trade.32 Both weredesigned to cut costs and control markets.

An essential element in Greek commercial strategy was to purchase goodsdirectly from producers in the eastern Meditrranean and Black Sea, whichpermitted them to buy cheaply and to avoid intermediaries. Wheat from Odessa,for example, was sold at the time of delivery either from the warehouses where itwas held or inland from the farms and at bazaars. Grain sold from thewarehouses usually belonged to landlords who could afford to hold stocks andwas more readily available but more expensive, while grain from small peasantswas bought inland and was cheaper. A system of local agents in the hinterlandwas established to provide regular


Table 2.8 Greeks as consuls in various port-cities, 1830s–1860s

City Name General consul of

London Pandia Ralli GreeceMarseilles George Zizinia Greece

Paul Rodocanachi TuscanyLivorno Const. Tossizza GreeceAlexandria Michael Tossizza Greece

Etienne Zizinia BelgiumD’Anastassy Sweden

Odessa John Ralli United StatesTh. Rodocananchi TuscanyPandia Zizinia Greece

Taganrog C.N. Mavrogordato GreeceRostov-on-Don C.N. Mavrogordato GreeceSources: Christos Hadziiossif, ‘La Colonie Grecque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat

de troisieme cycle, Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), Ecole Pratique desHautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980; Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History 1794–1914, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1986; Herlihy, ‘GreekMerchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukranian Studies,vols 3–4, 1979–80, pp. 399–420; Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port ofLivorno, 1794–1865’, The Journal of European Economic History, no. 5, pp.45–68

shipments of export produce. Usury was a means to control the producers.Extensive lending by local agents of Greek merchants induced the peasants topre-sell their harvest at reduced prices. An internal network in the hinterland ofeach port thus worked in parallel with the external network.33 Azov and Danubetrade was less organised than that in Odessa and there was even more scope forbuying inland, providing even larger profits for exporters.

The lands around the Black Sea and in the Ottoman Empire where the Greeksmoved were highly underdeveloped. Knowledge of local languages and customsmade access to local markets easier for them than for merchants of othernationalities. Besides, the Black Sea region, which supplied the bulk of trade forthe network, was very primitive by European standards, especially before theCrimean War. To emphasise the hostile environment the ancient Greeks called itexactly the opposite, Euxine, which means ‘hospitable’. Most of Europes greatrives—the Danube, Dniester, Dnieper, Bug and Don—flow into it. Hundreds ofmiles of swamps covered the coasts, which had almost no natural harbours. TheBlack Sea was noted for its strong currents, sudden gales and thick fogs. Therivers from the Danube to the Azov froze for up to three months during thewinter, and sudden frosts were common. Malaria and cholera were also seriousthreats. Ships passing through Constantinople had to be quarantined inRussian ports, which became a major source of delay. Most ports had poorly


constructed harbours (if they had any at all) and in many cases ships had to loadin the roads.

The streets of the cities were unpaved and there were repeated complaintsabout the impossibility of crossing certain streets on foot because of mud inspring and autumn. In most ports there were no banking or insurance facilitiesand communications were difficult. The mails presented particular problems forforeign merchants and shipowners. As late as 1877 Consul Barrow at Kertchirritably described a Russian postman as:

a man who can neither read nor write, but still delivers the Russian lettersmost correctly; but English letters, and any characters not Russian, areshown to any passer-by who wishes to inspect them, and an ill-intentionedperson by giving a few copecs to the postilion, may appropriate any letterhe wishes on merely stating that it is addressed to him.34

At the other end of the trade network, goods—particularly tallow, linseed andgrain—found their way to the British market through the Baltic Exchange. Thename originally referred to trade with the countries bordering the Baltic Sea andit remained synonymous with overseas trade, despite the widening of thegeographic origins of cargoes.35 In the course of the nineteenth century the Balticbecame London’s central freight market, the main place to exchange informationabout ships and cargoes. The Baltic Coffee House was established in 1823 toclose ranks against unwanted speculators and it had 300 subscribers. An 1845description noted that:

It is a long narrow apartment, having no peculiar characteristic beyond aslight effluvia from the samples exhibited, and the dingy appearance of theplace, besmeared with ink from the pens of the juveniles, or clerks inattendance for principals who are not buyers, and who, from the age oftwelve upwards, may be seen either marking the prices paid in theircatalogues, or designing figures, after the antique, upon the deal tablesappropriated to their use. The sales occupy about a couple of hours.36

In 1854 Pandia Ralli became a member of the twenty-member BalticCoffee House committee, which made the rules and decided variousissues.37 In 1857, after the Crimean War, the Baltic Coffee House wasreorganised as The Baltic Company Ltd; two of its twelve directors wereM.E.Rodocanachi and Antonio Ralli, and thirty-seven shareholders wereGreek.38 By 1886, 7 per cent of the 1,384 members were Greek, largelyfrom the Chiot network (see Table 2.9).

Access to the Baltic Exchange, the main British (and ultimately world) freightmarket was extremely important for Greeks. Fortunately, Greek membershipserved everyone’s interests. From a British perspective, large


Table 2.9 List of Greek members of the Baltic Exchange, 1886

A.Greeks

Agelasto John M. Potous DemetriusAgelasto Stephen A. Ralli Ambrose J.Argenti George A. Ralli Ambrose J.C.Argenti Leonidas Ralli Demetrius T.Basilio Aristides J. Ralli Emmanuel J.Boyazoglu Nicolo Ralli John A.Caralli Nicholas M. Ralli Lucas E.Caralli Paul J. Ralli Pandia P.Cavafy George J. Ralli Stephen A.Ceffala George Rodocanachi Emmanuel M.Constantinidi Alexander Rodocanachi John T.Constantinidi Demetrius S. Rodocanachi Michel E.Constantinidi Sophocles Rodocanachi Michel M.Corgialegno Marin Rodocanachi Pandia P.

Rodocanachi Peter P.Coronio Theodorie J. Scaramanga Emmanuel G.Cuppa Leonidas J. Scaramanga George E.Damala Emanuel M. Scaramanga John P.Eumorphopulos Aristides G. Schilizzi Demetrius G.Eumorphopulos George Schilizzi Demetrius S.Franghiadi Stephen E. Schilizzi JohnFrangopulo James S. Schilizzi John S.Galatti Constantine S. Schilizzi Michael G.Galatti Nicholas C. Schilizzi Theodore E.Garofallo John A. Sclavo Panaghi C.Gregoropulo George Sechiari PandeliIonides Alexander A. Sechiari ParasquevaIonides Constantine A. Sevastopulo Demetrius S.Ionides Luke A. Sevastopulo George M.Katinakis Demetrius M. Sgouta Stuliano L.Kessissoglu John Sinanides AlexanderLambrinudi Leonidas Spartali Demetrius M.Lenos Panaghioti D. Spartali Eustratius M.Margariti Antony J. Theologo SophoclesMavrogordato Michael E. Tzocanaki Demetrius A.Mavrogordato Michael G. Vagliano Alexander A.Mavrogordato Nicholas A. Vagliano AlcibiadesMavrogordato Pandely A. Vagliano Panaghi


A.Greeks

Mavrojani Alexander Vlasto Alexander A.Nicolopulo John D. Zarifi John M.Nomico Pericles Zarifi MichaelPaspatti Philip Zarifi Theodore M.Peroglou Dr Nicholas Ziffo George S.Petrocochino Alexander P. Ziffo Miltiades L.Petrocochino Demetrius Zigomala John C.Petrocochino Eustratius E. Zizinia DemetriusPetrocochino John A. Zula Speridion S.Petrocochino Pandia E. A Greeks 97 7%Pitzipios Michael D.Pitzipios Stephen D. B.Others 1,287Polychroniadi Speridion Total 1,384Source: Baltic Exchange, List of Members, 1886

scale corn imports meant that a merchant had to trust his money to foreignerswhose scruples were not always known. Having the foreigners in the club,however, solved much of the problem. Eventually, ‘the wily Greek and thealmost wilier Hebrew, the cute Yank and the German with spec tacles on both outerand inner eyes’ were members, ‘together with some of the shrewdest Britons,metropolitan and provincial’.39 The main foreign houses in Britain were ownedby Germans, Jews, Greeks and Americans. The Greeks promoted trade witheastern Europe and the Middle East.40 Greek firms cheaply and regularlyimported the goods Britons needed, while exporting and promoting Britain’sindustrial goods. In fact, one of the great achievements of the Greeks in Englandrested on the fact that they succeeded in finding new markets for textiles in a partof the world where the British presence was weak. Exports of cotton goods to theOttoman dominions increased from 9.5 million yards in 1820 to 194 millionyards by 1850 and to 670 million yards in 1870, a fifth of total export sales.41

From the Greek perspective entry into the worlds largest freight market ensureddirect access to the buyers and sellers of cargoes, ships and transport services.From the mid-1850s, the faces, firms, cargoes, ships, routes and networks allchanged, but what remained permanent was the presence of Greek shipowners inthe Baltics membership rolls. The establishment of Greek merchants on theExchange in the mid-nineteenth century was crucial to the continued growth ofGreek-owned shipping.

But it was the efficient combination of trade and shipping that initially madethe merchants of the Chiot network so successful. Greek merchants relied onpermanent agents in foreign ports, always members of the same family, toreceive and dispatch the cargoes. They thus handled the trade at both endswithout third-party involvement, always buying and selling on their own


accounts. This ensured a personal presence in local and foreign markets. Forexample, John Ralli in Odessa might load a cargo of wheat in one of his own or achartered ship. He would then post the bills of lading and a sample of the cargoto his brother Pandia in London. Pandia Ralli might then sell the merchandisethrough the Baltic Exchange to another party, even though the ship had not yetarrived in Britain. The third party might even sell the wheat to a fourth. In thisway the cargo could change hands three or four times while still afloat and theperson delivering it might not be Pandia Ralli but a French firm in Dunkirk.

Because the ultimate purchaser was not known to the master of the vesselcarrying the cargo, he had to touch at a ‘port for orders’ to learn his ultimatedestination. In the Mediterranean such ports included Constantinople, Malta andGibraltar, and in northern Europe they were most often Falmouth and Cork (seeFigure 2.3). This ‘cargo trade’ facilitated the growth of the eastern Mediterraneangrain trade and its origin is probably with the merchants of the Chiot network.42

Such trade in its more specialised form was later carried by tramp vessels and tothis day forms the basis of Greek shipping; over time, however, the ‘ports fororders’ have been replaced by the wireless, telex and, more recently, faxmachines.

Shipping was vitally important in the function of the network. In the Black Seaarea where there was no general trade, inward cargoes were difficult to get.Greek merchants were able to overcome this difficulty to a certain extent bycarrying British textiles and other manufactured goods to the larger cities, such

Figure 2.3 Ports for orders. Cargo trade from the eastern Mediterranean and the BlackSea, nineteenth century


as Constantinople or Smyrna, and then sailing the last leg of the trip in ballast.The merchants of the Chiot network were also shipowners. Table 2.10 shows theextent to which fifteen of the fifty network families invested in shipping. Thefirst part of the Table is based on data from the Sémaphore de Marseilles andownership is estimated from available information.43

Zizinia Brothers seem to have invested extensively in shipping; from 1835 to1850 they were the owners of nine sailing ships. In 1840 alone they owned eightvessels of 1,916 tons. Dromocaiti was the next largest shipowner, owning fivecraft in 1840; he traded his goods almost exclusively using his own ships.Papudoff, Petrocochino and Agelasto, Rodocanachi, Ralli, Schilizzi, Argenti andZarifi owned one to three ships each. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping furnished thedata in the second part of Table 2.10; unfortunately it is not available before1860. By 1860 the

Table 2.10 Greek merchants as shipowners, 1830–60

Merchant Name of ship Tons Date of information

FranceZizinia Bros Jeune Menandre 246 1835, 1840

Jeune Cleanthe 126 1835, 1840, 1850Penelope 260 1835, 1840Cleopatre 196 1835, 1840, 1850Fanny 251 1840Nouvelle Adeline 190 1840Leonidas 300 1840Themistocle 347 1840Cleanthe 326 1850

Dromocaiti Nicolas-et-Aristide 189 1835, 1840, 1850Aristide 168 1835Laurent-et-Fanny 195 1840, 1850Aspasie-et-Hennette 138 1840, 1850Nicolas-et-Heracles 199 1840, 1850Perle 138 1840

Papudoff Constantinos 347 1850Pandias 416 1850Catingo 150 1850

Petrocochino &Agelasto

Pegasus 198 1835

Chariklia 155 1835, 1840, 1850Rodocanachi Rodocanachi 350 1840Ralli, Schilizzi &Argenti

Jeune-Fanny 94 1835


Merchant Name of ship Tons Date of information

Lycurgue 314 1840Argenti & Co St. Nicol 277 1840

Achille 220 1840Zariffi Alexandros 231 1850EnglandJ.Schilizzi Medea 199 1860

Pantoleon 449 1860Sea Nymph 246 1860Senator 318 1860Evangeline 374 1860Gough Bg 211 1860Michigan (steam) 846 1860

L. Melas Aphroezza (steam) 133 1860P.T.Ralli Francisco 500 1860Spartali Demetrius 418 1860Papayanni Agia Sofia (steam) 977 1860

Arcadia (steam) 1,164 1860Omonia (steam) 464 1860Thessalia (steam) 1,169 1860

Xenos Kanaris (steam) 927 1860Asia (steam) 1,093 1860Coletis (steam) 318 1860Olympius (steam) 280 1860Bozzaris (steam) 659 1860Modern Greece(steam)

753 1860

Petrobeys (steam) 262 1860Scotia (steam) 1,196 1860Smyrna (steam) 322 1860Zaimis (steam) 259 1860

Sources: For the years 1835–50, data are from Sémaphore de Marseilles, and for 1860data are from the list of owners and shipowners, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping,1860

introduction of steam is evident. According to Lloyd’s Register, the Schilizzifirm based in London owned six sailing vessels ‘and one steamer in 1860;Schilizzi was the main carrier for the Ralli Brothers. Melas, P.T.Ralli andSpartali also owned single ships while Papayanni owned four steamships andXenos had an extraordinary fleet of ten steamers. It is interesting to note that almostall fifteen Greek families in Table 2.10 used French and English masters on those


ships they owned and operated under French or English flags. The choice of flagor the nationality of the master depended on the western European ports in whichthe Greeks were established. The Greek merchants in the Chiot network were notlarge-scale shipowners. While they owned some vessels, for the most part theychartered the ships that carried their cargoes.

THE CHIOT NETWORK AND GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING

The overall influence of the Chiot network in the growth of Greek-ownedshipping was vital in three ways. First, it organised the trade and providedcargoes for a Greek-flag fleet. Second, the commercial network helped toestablish a shipping network that stretched from the Black Sea across theMediterranean to northern Europe; this shipping network also generated theinfrastructure for the growth of Greek-owned shipping during the nineteenthcentury. Third, and most important, it opened access to London, the leadingmaritime centre of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The first influence of the Chiot network on the growth of Greek shipping wasthat its members chartered Greek-flag sailing vessels to carry their cargoes. TheSémaphore de Marseilles provides ample evidence of this connection. Between1840 and 1860 the arrivals of Greek-flag ships more than tripled. According toTable 2.11, 37 per cent of the ships chartered by Greek firms in Marseilles in1840, 47 per cent in 1850 and 60 per cent in 1860 flew the Greek flag. In thisway, more than half of all the Greek-flag ships arriving at Marseilles werechartered by members of the Chiot network. On the other hand, it is evident thatin the same period the Greek merchants in England used almost no Greek-flagships; only 3 per cent of the vessels in 1850 and 1 per cent in 1860 were Greek-flag craft. The Chiot network in England used the ships owned by its ownmembers that sailed under the British flag. For the most part, this meant vesselsowned by Xenos, Papayanni, Spartali and Schilizzi.

The needs of the commercial network determined the pattern of trade routesand infrastructure for Greek shipping throughout the Mediterranean, Black Sea,northern Europe and Great Britain. Greek shipowners and captains in everyBlack Sea port where cargo was sought were bound to find compatriots whomthey could trust and with whom they could

Table 2.11 Ship arrivals at Marseilles and the ports of England

Year (A) Total (B) Allshipscharteredby Greeks

% (B)/(A) (C Greekflag ships

% (C)/(A) (D) Greekflag shipscharteredby Greeks

% (D)/(B)

Arrivals at Marseilles1840 91,380 29,636 32 16,857 18 10,035 371850 84,696 35,267 42 24,256 29 16,444 47


Year (A) Total (B) Allshipscharteredby Greeks

% (B)/(A) (C Greekflag ships

% (C)/(A) (D) Greekflag shipscharteredby Greeks

% (D)/(B)

1860 237,085 72,814 31 53,988 22 43,380 60Arrivals at the ports of England1850 135,727 42,306 31 4,271 3 2,254 51860 308,860 176,126 57 2,933 1 1,143 1Sources: Appendices 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.18 and 1.19

communicate. Similarly, a network of Greek shipping agencies was establishedin all the main Mediterranean and north European ports. The presence ofnumerous Greek ships and seamen became a source of wealth for numeroussmall entrepreneurs in the Greek communities in every port that supplied,equipped and repaired the Greek ships. For example, in various private shippingarchives we can find receipts from Greek shops abroad that provided ancillaryservices. There are also receipts from special ‘agent-translators’ who dealt with allthe bureaucratic procedures masters had to face when entering a port. This meantthat an illiterate master, or one who could not speak the language of the port, couldload, repair and equip his ship without any insurmountable problems.

The third most important impact of the Chiot network on the development ofGreek shipping was that it opened the way to London, the world’s primarymaritime centre. The first important step, as we have seen, was to gain entry tothe Baltic Exchange. The second was to get access to the actual shipping marketand consequently to new technology, especially to steam. The merchants of theChiot network never really invested in steamers on a massive scale with twoexceptions, both non-Chiots. The first large-scale buyers of steamships wereStephanos Xenos and Basil Papayanni.

Stefanos Xenos was in every respect a pioneer in Greek shipowning in themid-nineteenth century. A multi-talented risk-taker, Xenos managed to amass afleet of ten steamers (Table 2.10) within an incredibly short time, dazzling all hiscontemporaries, only to lose it five years later.44 His ideas were those of atwentieth-century shipowner: he purchased his steamers with loans from Britishfinancial institutions, contrary to his contemporaries who never borrowed from‘foreigners’. When he ran into financial difficulties he did not turn to Greekhouses because:

I could not attempt to enter into arrangements with any of the Greekhouses because, in doing so, I should be obliged to give details concerningmy business—I should be obliged to tell how I had purchased my fleet,who were the capitalists concerned, and who were my partners…. Anyother Greek house on learning that I had out acceptances for so manythousand pounds for the value of the steamers, would have told their


correspondents to have nothing to do [with me]. …[Besides] I shall opentheir eyes; and the result will be that, being exporters and importersthemselves on a large scale, having all the means, they will try thebusiness, and will go themselves in the shipowning—as already MessrsSpartali and Co have begun at Liverpool —the Greeks unfortunatelyfollowing each other in a transaction.45

Xenos was prescient, but his plans suffered from a series of practical problems.First, he tried to implement them too early, when long-term finance for shippurchases was not yet fully developed in London. Second, he was inexperiencedin shipping and totally misunderstood its cyclical nature. Third, he entered theGreek commercial community as an outsider (although he was brother-in-law tothe rich Ionnides) and lacked the necessary kinship links on which the othercommercial houses relied. And last, but not least, because of his politicalconvictions and provocative lifestyle he lost the support of his fellow Greekmerchants in London exactly when he needed it most.

None the less, he left us a book entitled Depredations; or Overend, Gurneyand Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which hepublished at his own expense several years after the collapse of his firm. In thebook he provides a valuable account of the rise and decline of his firm, Greekand Oriental Steam Navigation, and its relations with the rest of the Greekcommercial community as well with the British financial firm, Overend, Gurneyand Co. For the half-dozen years that he operated, Xenos’ steamers carried thenames of heroes of the Greek revolution. Yet they sailed under the British flagswith English masters and crews.

Basil Papayanni’s shipping company, on the other hand, survived into thetwentieth century. In the early 1840s George was the first of the three Papayannibrothers to arrive in Liverpool, where he soon established a successfulcommercial house. A few years later he was joined by his two brothers, of whomBasil proved to be the most dynamic.46 The firms success rested on its earlyinvestments in steamers, which it employed on a regular line between the Levantand Liverpool, and successfully continued its activities throughout the nineteenthcentury as the owner of a large steam fleet.47 A detailed account of BasilPapayanni’s activities in Liverpool is given satirically in Fairplay, the leadingBritish shipping journal:

Though Don is a Spanish title, the people of Spain do not hold thecopyright of the same…now you are introduced to a Grecian Don —DonBasilio, the shipowner…. The Levant trade has invariably been chieflycarried on by Greek houses, and the one in question [the Papayanni firm]is, perhaps, the oldest now in existence, as it must already have seen itsforty-fifth birthday. The firm formed a line of steamers to run betweenLiverpool and the Levant, and seem always to have had a good hold on thetrade, though of course competitors soon came into the field. Being


merchants as well as shipowners, they had a large connection in themanufacturing towns, principally among their own countrymen and theArmenians. These foreigners naturally preferred those who could speaktheir languages to call upon them for freights, and the firm thereforeadopted the principle of having both a Greek and Armenian representativein their branch offices. …For many years there have been four lines ofsteamers in the Liverpool and Levant trade—viz., the Mighty I’s, the Earlof Margate’s Don Basilio ‘s and another of less importance—the first threeuntil recently working together as a conference…., and the latter beingknown as the opposition.48 …When his was one of the three conferencelines to the Levant the other two couldn’t make out how it was that theshippers preferred supporting his line so unanimously, as, nevertheless,was the case. Some shippers would positively keep their goods back forDon Basilios steamers, which fact was anything but a pleasant one for theother lines to contemplate. The rates of freight were the same by the threelines, so that there was no inducement in that respect. Basilio was certainlya Greek and friendly with the Armenians, but surely that was not asufficient reason for their keeping their goods from the other lines…. Nowit must be remembered that our friend has always been a generous man,and it came to light that he had been making the shippers a present equal tohalf-a-crown a ton on all the goods they shipped by his steamers. This actof generosity was not appreciated by the other lines as much as it was bythe shippers, and a little coolness between Don Basilio and his co-workers….

Don Basilio is one of those men who never predict without being sure—in other words, he is always wise after an event…. He is streets behindSocrates in this respect. Like many other men, he looks a knowingindividual, and his manner of talking and habit of biting the words beforethey get out of his mouth suggest that he knows a great deal more than heis allowed to say. He has his peculiarities, like all men, it is not long sincethat he boasted about his dress not costing him ten pounds a year, but,judging by appearances, there was no occasion for him to mention the fact,so that, for a wonder, he wasted words. Don Basilio deserves the credit ofbeing a clever man. He is shrewd, full of tact and ability, and though wellon in years, is as energetic as many a man twenty years his junior. Whatis more, perhaps, he is popular in most quarters, though there are somemen of business who think he looks too much after his own interests. Whodoesn’t? He pays his servants liberally and treats them unlike most masters;the consequence is that you seldom see a fresh face in his office. As aninstance, I think it is correct to say that his manager has been with him forover a quarter of a century and is as faithful to his chief now as in the daysof his youth….

In treating his servants well, Don Basilio receives in return from them acheerful service, which added to his own ability and character, have made


the line under his management a very successful one. If all the Greeks werelike Basilio, and business remained at a standstill in this country muchlonger, we might [soon go out of business]. But then there are bandits inAthens itself; and has not Edmond About written that in Greece thebrigands are the only men who never lie?49

We do not include either Xenos or Papayanni in the Greek-owned merchant fleetdespite their strong Greek connections because they ran their steamships mainlywith English crews. The Papayanni line was one of the four main Britishsteamship lines that traded to the Black Sea. The influence of Papayanni on thegrowth and transformation of the Greek merchant fleet was highly importantbecause of his knowledge of the British maritime market. There is evidence thathe served as an intermediary between English and Greeks parties in the firstpurchases of steamers and collaborated closely with other Greek shipowners.Papayanni worked only for independent Greek shipowners but also facilitated thesteamship purchases of the state-controlled Greek Steamship Company.50

Papayanni’s role was also attested to by contemporaries. Captain AnastassiosSyrmas, who will feature in Chapter 5, served as master on a vessel for whichPapayanni had been the middle man:

[In 1868 the Cosmas Bros] transferred me as second mate to another shipthey owned, called Comna, that was loading cargoes from Piraeus toLiverpool, from Piraeus I sailed with the said ship as second mate toLiverpool, there at the exhortation of the Master of the ship Cosma Cosmasand at the request of Captain George Kivotos I accepted to go as Master atNewport of England to take over at the order and authorization of Kivotosa ship that he had bought through Papayanni for his brother-in-law MrD.Matsis of Syros.51

Similarly, there is evidence of a business collaboration in a letter written on 12September 1875 from Panaghi Vagliano to Basil Papayanni.

The bearer of this letter is Mr Anastassios Syrmas who has served asMaster for a number of years, and because he has worked for our firm, andbecause we know him as an honest and reliable man and he comes at yourfirm for employment we send you this recommendation letter by which wefully recommend him to you to take him under your protection and we donot doubt that he can please you in any position that you employ him.Please accept in advance our thanks and our regards.52

It seems that throughout the 1860s and 1870s the Papayanni shipping firm servedas the main source of information about the British maritime market for Greeks.In the 1880s a number of prominent Greek merchants of the Ionian network, ledby the Vagliano Brothers, invested in steamers. The Vagliano Brothers


established the first and largest Greek shipping office in London that flourishedfrom the 1860s into this century as a chartering, insurance, sales and purchaseshipping broker, as well as a shipping bank. This shipping office, the main linkbetween Greek sailing shipowners and the London maritime market, proved ofprime importance in the transition from sail to steam in Greek shipping: throughthis office the first massive purchases of steamers took place.

THE TRANSITION FROM THE CHIOT TO THE IONIANNETWORK

There was a distinct decrease in the commercial activities of the merchants of theChiot network after the 1860s. Adjusting to the new international developmentsin world trade, in the last third of the nineteenth century the Greek commercialand maritime network of the diaspora communities passed into a new Ionianphase, which was more maritime than commercial. At least three factors led tothe withdrawal of many merchants of the Chiot network after the late 1850s:major changes in the Black Sea trade, technological revolutions, and internalfactors that diverted Chiot firms into other directions.

After the Crimean War a series of socio-economic changes took place insouthern Russia and the Danubian Principalities that brought about a neweconomic order. Social reforms in Russia, the most important of which was theemancipation of serfs in 1861, had the immediate effect of raising labour costsand increasing the number of small property owners. Large estate owners whofound it difficult to adjust to a ‘free market’ sold their properties. The newpurchasers were mostly Jews; in the area of Odessa they bought about 75 per centof the land put on the market.53 Commercial reforms that enabled foreignmerchants to enjoy the same privileges as locals deprived the Greeks of animportant comparative advantage gained through taking out Russian citizenship.Odessa stopped being a free port in 1857 and thus lost its prime importance forimports. In addition, a series of bad harvests in the Odessa hinterland in the late1850s brought slimmer profit margins to grain exports. Competition from otherproduction regions, such as Rumania, America and India, added to thediminishing returns of the old exporting mercantile houses.

The big Greek merchant houses of Odessa were thus gradually replaced by agreat number of Jewish brokers, speculators, agents, commissioners who wereprepared to accept slimmer profits, as well as by some large Jewish firms thatspecialised in grain exports on a world-wide basis, like Louis Dreyfus of Parisand M.Neufeld of Berlin.54 Moreover, the Azov and Caucasus ports werebecoming developed through massive infrastructure projects. The result was thatOdessa became less dominant. Indeed, in the last third of the century exportsfrom the neighbouring city of Nicolaieff and the ports of the Azov and Caucasussurpassed those of Odessa. Also, grain exports from the Danube increasedincredibly and formed almost half of the exports of the Black Sea region. TheCrimean War actually proved a major source of prosperity for a number of


newcomers in both the Azov and Danube trades. One of the best known casesinvolved the Vagliano Brothers, the leading company in the Ionian network,based in the Azov. There remained a small number of families from the Chiotnetwork that continued their commercial activities from the newly developedareas of southern Russia, Nicolaieff and the ports of the Azov Sea incollaboration with the Ionians.

The second group of factors that contributed to the transition from the Chiot tothe Ionian network derived from the technological revolution in world maritimetransport and communications: the introduction of steamers and the telegraph.The control of Black Sea trade that the Greeks enjoyed until the Crimean Warwas based on exclusive market information that enabled speculation on cargoesthat took two or three months to reach Britain. Telegraphic and railwaycommunications were installed in the whole of southern Russia in the 1860s and1870s. The introduction of steam in the Black Sea trade after the Crimean Warfurther facilitated access to western European markets. These economic changesopened the trade to smaller merchants, and facilitated the knowledge andultimately the unification of world markets.

The third group of factors that helped to bring about the withdrawal of a largenumber of Chiot merchants were internal. First, the first generation of leadingfigures in Chiot commerce, like the Ralli and Rodoconachi, died in the late1850s and 1860s. Second, many of the sons and grandsons found it moreprofitable to invest in real estate in Odessa, Marseilles or London and to becomerentiers, or ‘gentlemen of means’. Third, some Chiots invested in the stockexchange and were ruined in the financial crisis of 1858–9. The large number ofChiot names in the membership list of the Baltic Exchange for 1886 suggeststhat shipbrokerage became the main activity of many of the descendants of theChiot merchants in London. They probably only followed the trend of the timesin the world’s biggest maritime centre. In the last third of the nineteenth centurymany of the sons of London merchants who were also involved in shippingfollowed the new profession of the nineteenth century: shipbroking.55 We mustnot forget that shipownership had also been a new profession in the previouscentury. As Ralph Davis informs us, ‘only when the Industrial Revolution waschanging the scale of English commerce did shipowning become an occupationin its own right; the London shipowner, so described in the directory, does notappear until 1815’.56

Before concluding this chapter, it is worth noting that the co-existence ofshipping and trading was not unique to the Greeks in the nineteenth century. InNorway, for example, ‘most men who provided the investment capital for theshipping industry were in fact merchants, and most used the vessels that theypurchased to carry goods on their own accounts to traditional Norwegian marketsin the Baltic, North Sea and Mediterranean in the mid–1860s’.57 In the Anglo-Australian trade in the 1840s Brooks, a merchant and shipowner in London,owned a fleet of sailing vessels trading on his own account.58 Research on theshipping industry of Atlantic Canada has also shown that the combination of


merchanting and shipowning was prevalent in shipping there.59 Like manymembers of the Chiot network, Canadian merchants and shipowners, instead ofinvesting in steam and specialising in shipowning, diverted funds to land-basedinvestments; in this way the Canadian fleet declined.

The organisation and structure of shipping firms based on kinship andcommon origin is also not a unique Greek feature. In Atlantic Canada, the majorHalifax shipowners, who were also the towns major merchants, formed ‘amercantile elite with interlocking family and business connec tions. Of thetwenty-nine major owners before mid-[nineteenth] century, fifteen weremembers of six families’60 And, ‘the merchant family remained the dominantform of [ship]ownership in the major ports of the Maritimes until the end of thenineteenth century’.61 Equally, family and common port of origin played animportant role in the structure of Norwegian shipping until the beginning of thetwentieth century.62 What is probably unique in Greek shipping is that thesecharacteristics continued to be prevalent throughout the current century.


3GREEK MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL

NETWORKS THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870s–1900s

By the 1870s the dwindling of the Chiot network and its replacement by Ionianshipowners and merchants was evident. The archival material presents us withnew names, new shipowners and merchants, the largest number of whom camefrom the Ionian islands. The Ionian network lasted from the 1870s to thebeginning of the 1900s and covered the transitional period not only from sail tosteam but also from a combined profession to specialisation. By the beginning ofthe twentieth century the final exodus from commercial activities and aspecialisation in shipowning was evident. The most successful shipowningfamilies of the twentieth century were directly linked with the Ionian network.

Three main characteristics differentiated the Ionian from the Chiot network.Most members of the Ionian network were of maritime origin; most wereshipowners who combined this with commerce when possible. Second, theIonian merchant/shipowners in the last third of the nineteenth century becameeven more specialised than the Chiots in the carriage of specific bulk cargoes,like grain and coal. Third, the large number of branches in the Mediterraneanwas diminished, and members of the Ionian network were concentrated in theBlack Sea ports, Constantinople, Marseilles and London.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first will analyse the structureand development of the shipowners and merchants of the Ionian network; thesecond their organisation and business methods; and the last their influence onthe transition from sail to steam in the Greek-owned fleet.

THE IONIAN NETWORK

The Ionian network comprised about 140 families, half of which were Ionian.Although there were Greeks from other islands and areas that were part of thenetwork (as was the case with the Chiots), we call it ‘Ionian’ since it was mainlyIonian families—and more specifically Cephalonians and Ithacans—that werethe most powerful members. Figure 3.1 shows clearly the establishment of thenetwork along the Black Sea and in the western European ports. The bulk of thefamilies were in the Danubian ports of Braila, Galatz and Sulina: their membersformed at least seventy-five shipowning and commercial companies as well as

shipping agencies. While there were numerous small shipping companies (seeAppendix 3.3), we will concentrate on the main ones.

Besides the Danube, the Ionian network was also strong in the cities ofsouthern Russia. Three geographic groups may be distinguished: the mostpopular comprised the ports of the Sea of Azov, where thirty families were foundin Taganrog, Rostov-on-Don, Berdiansk, Yeisk and Kertch. The second includedNicolaieff and Odessa (ten families), while the last comprised Caucasus ports,Novorossisk and Batum, with six families (see Figure 3.1 and Appendix 3.1).

The third area of concentration (another ten families) was the largest economiccentre of the eastern Mediterranean, Constantinople. The newly emerging port ofPiraeus, used as a fuelling and supply station at the end of the nineteenthcentury, also attracted ever-increasing numbers of network families. In westernEurope, the branch offices of twenty-seven families were concentrated inMarseilles and thirty-six in London. In the rest of this section we will analyse thestructure and the development of the merchant/shipowners of the Ionian networkin each of the areas in which they worked and prospered.

The Danubian Principalities received a great number of Ionians after theCrimean War, particularly from the islands of Cephalonia and Ithaca. TheseIonians adjusted to conditions on the Danube and created a closed shipping andcommercial network, which they controlled for most of the nineteenth century. ThePrincipalities, which gained their independence as Rumania in 1878, were thesecond largest grain exporter after Russia, exporting 30–40 per cent of total grain

Figure 3.1 The Ionian commercial and maritime network, 1870s–1900s. Number offamilies at the port-cities of the network

72 THE ‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870S–1900S

exports from the Black Sea during the period 1830–1914 (see Table 1.2). Majortransformations took place after the Crimean War which accelerated the area’sparticipation in international trade and shipping. The European Commission ofthe Danube was formed in 1857 by Austro-Hungary, Prussia, the OttomanEmpire, Great Britain, France, Sardinia, Italy and Russia. Its purpose was topolice and regulate navigation and implement badly needed engineering works tomake the river accessible to larger vessels. After a vessel entered the riversmouth at Sulina, navigation presented many difficulties because of varying waterdepth, the narrowness of the channel, and the many curves, all of whichcontributed to groundings and collisions. The problem persisted even after thedeepening of the channel by the Commission.

The great navigational difficulties that the Danube presented to foreignmasters were not limited to natural obstacles. Before the establishment of theEuropean Commission, pilots, lightermen and others charged non-Greeksexorbitant sums of money in order to ‘save’ them. Mr Jackson, Acting BritishVice-Consul at Sulina, rather aggressively reported that:

[Before the Crimean War] British shipping and that of all the other flags ofnorthern Europe were of course considered fair prizes by this piratical set[pilots, lightermen, ship chandlers, port officials] and pillaged accordinglythe lightermen even frequently withholding a portion of their cargoes…andit was the Greek and Turkish vessels which stood any chance ofmoderately fair play, as they knew the tricks of their countrymen, werebetter acquainted with the intricacies of the navigation of the river, couldspeak the language of the country, and in case of necessity, were known tobe as ready to defend their interest, knife in hand, as their compatriots wereto prejudice them.1

Sulina, despite being merely a transit port, proved to be one of the most importantports in the Black Sea. The bar at Sulina, and navigational difficulties thereafter,forced large vessels to load there, while their cargoes were sent down fromGalatz and Braila, mostly in iron lighters called schleps. The volume of cargoeslightered in relation to the total volume of cargoes carried by sea-going vesselsbetween 1882 and 1902 was 6–13 percent.2

The nature of the Danubian grain trade meant that Ionians had to

Table 3.1 River fleet of the Rumanian Danube and Prouthos in 1895 and 1900

1895 1900

Schleps Tugs Schleps Tugs

No Carryingcapacity(in tons)

No Horsepower


No Horsepower

A. Total flee

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 73

1895 1900

Schleps Tugs Schleps Tugs


No Horsepower


No Horsepower

455 354,217 88 4,043 502 413,579 77 16,296B. Greek-owned fleet306 254,315 46 2,230 271 198,760 31 5,226(B)/(A) Participation of Greek-owned fleet67% 72% 52% 55% 54% 48% 40% 32%Source: Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks on the River-traffic of the Lower Danube,

Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975. The statistics are based onL’Annuaire du Danube, 1894–5 and 1902–3.

combine merchanting and shipowning to succeed. As Table 3.1 indicates theIonians owned 72 per cent of the total carrying capacity of the schleps, and 55 percent of the steam tugs on the Danube in 1895. The Ionian element was nowhereas prominent as on the Rumanian Danube. As Table 3.2 clearly shows, the term‘Ionian’ was here virtually synonymous with ‘Cephalonian’ and ‘Ithacan’.Despite a decrease of their participation in schleps in 1900 (Table 3.2), even in1901 83 per cent of the pilots on the river were Greek (Table 3.3). They virtuallycontrolled the traffic of the Danube. ‘The “River”,’ wrote Spyridon Fokas, ‘hadfor the Greeks the same value that the cultivated “land” had for the Rumanianfarmer.’3

Most of the owners of the schleps were prominent grain merchants, owners ofsea-going vessels, shipping agents and industrialists. The Greeks were engagedin a wide range of activities in the area. But after 1895,

Table 3.2 Origin of shipowners of the riverboats of the Rumanian Danube in 1900

Place of origin Number ofshipowners

% Number ofschleps

% Number of tugs %

A. Ionians 114 58 233 86 28 90Cephalonians 93 47 159 59 20 64Ithacans 21 11 74 27 8 26B. Others 81 42 38 14 3 10Total 195 100 271 100 31 100Source: See Table 3.1


Table 3.3 Corp of pilots of the Danube in 1901

Nationality Number

Greek 73 83Rumanian 7 8Other 8 9Total 88 100Source: See Table 3.1

largely for political reasons, they started leaving and moved to Piraeus andLondon, from where they continued as prominent shipowners in the twentiethcentury. The ten biggest owners of schleps on the Danube were StathatosBrothers, Stathatos Othon, Theophilatos Brothers, Theophilatos Jean & Sons,Chryssoveloni Brothers, Kouklelis & Michaelides, A.P. Maroulis, A.Embiricos,X.Karuso, G.A.Karavias (see Table 3.4). These ten owned 36 per cent of theschleps and 43 per cent of the carrying capacity of the Greek-owned river fleet.

The Ionians competed with the British for Danubian trade. In 1885 Fairplayreported on their monopolistic tendencies:

Table 3.4 The ten biggest owners of riverboats on the Danube in 1895

Shipown Number ofschleps

Carryingcapacity (intons*)

Tugs

No HP Origin

1. StathatosBros

22 20,775 3 165 Ithaca

2.TheofilatosBros

15 15,172 2 160 Ithaca

3. StathatosOthon

13 14,100 3 170 Ithaca

4.TheofilatosJ.

13 13,525 2 160 Ithaca

5.Chryssoveloni Bros

14 11,475 3 200 Chios

6. Kouklelis&Michaelides

9 7,800 1 50 Cephalonia

7. MaroulisA.P.


8. KaraviasA.G.

6 6,480 1 70 Santorini


Shipown Number ofschleps

Carryingcapacity (intons*)

Tugs

No HP Origin

9. KarousoX.


10. Karavias 5 5,725 2 115 SantoriniA. Tenbiggestowners

110 109,152

B. TotalGreek fleet

306 254,315

(B)/(A) 36% 43%Source: Appendix 3.3Note: * S.Fokas states that in the original statistics the volume of the boats is given in

Braila kilos (= kilo Braila), which are equivalent to ½ of a ton, when 1 ton = 1,000 kilos. In this way, 1 ton=2 Braila kilos

How shipowners are protected (?) by their agents at Sulina…will appear from

the following remarkable document, which we publish for the benefit ofshipowners trading to the Sulina mouth of the Danube. Through the operation ofthis arrangement, the cost of loading grain cargoes at Sulina has been greatlyincreased. The measure of this increase can be guessed at when it is added thatthe stevedoring charge on grain exceeds three times what it is in the adjoining Portof Odessa:

CONTRACT…. Between the undersigned Messrs. Stathatos Brothers, Watsonand Youell, Foscolo and Largologo, K.Wright, Giaccomo and Pilarino,G.Juglessi, E.Loria, Agent to Mendl’s Commercial House; N.Zifa, Agent toSechiari Brothers’ Commercial House; S.Draculi, G.Marato, S.Carvuni, and theStevedores’ Company, which is composed of Giovanni Narulli, DionisioCanulli, Pietro Callinico, G.Dorisa, Athanasio Tambisigo, Constantin Narulli,Andrea Austriaco Buro, it is agreed as much as follows:

1. The above-mentioned parties create an Association whose object it willbe to undertake the loading of any steamer that is to take cargo in this portof Sulina.

2. The members of the Association, instead of working separately, willwork for the general benefit of the whole Association, and in conformitywith the following tariff established in one accord.

3. For steamers loading in the port at the rate of one penny per quarterfrom the 1st of May, N.S., to the 31st of August, N.S., but at the rate of onepenny and a farthing per quarter from the 1st of September, N.S., till the31st of April, N.S., for the whole of the cargo, according to the Bill of


Lading. For filling bags, an extra pay of five pounds sterling per every onethousand bags during the months of May, June, July and August, and of sixpounds sterling per thousand bags during the other eight months of theyear. For each day’s work in the Roads an extra of three pounds sterling,and of four pounds sterling for the winter months.

4. On the completion of the loading of each steamer, an orderly accountwill be made out, and the expenses being deducted the profit accrued fromit must go at once into the cash-box of the Association, accompanied by acopy of the account, signed by the captain of the steamer….

9. The profits which the business will bring to the Association will bedivided amongst its members as follows: Stathatos Bros will take 11½percent; Watson and Youell 11½ per cent; H.Wright, 11½ per cent;Foscolo and Largologo, 11½ per cent; Giacommo and

Table 3.5 Tonnage of ships leaving the Danube (in NRT)

Year Greek-owned* British Total

1847 171,017 22,614 298,975–1855 203,885** 329,8961856 163,636** 25,957 334,0631857 106,763** 23,419 272,0631858 111,170** 35,497 331,0551859 118,696** 52,736 369,0391865 202,772 64,155 442,2291866 175,754 82,679 427,4191871 158,332 178,858 549,7201872 195,626 148,089 498,2901873 135,264 217,152 533,6591874 123,783 216,845 514,5191875 128,374 259,750 521,7351876 145,459 452,414 748,3631877 37,617 119,702 184,4171878 147,115 417,796 700,1631879 231,256 412,706 797,5541880 194,828 332,258 658,0631881 163,130 498,994 793,4541882 138,714 608,443 903,0631883 122,308 549,942 831,4861884 113,809 448,990 697,6861885 151,543 584,525 895,8241886 135,600 623,470 950,567



1887 155,081 796,360 ,203,6831888 163,827 947,533 ,332,9071889 206,632 1,000,773 ,473,3451890 246,585 983,862 ,539,4451891 244,168 990,935 ,512,0301892 275,566 866,758 ,427,0871893 312,291 1,287,762 1,893,5061894 318,600 1,034,097 1,619,7031895 352,178 906,043 1,554,6981896 318,522 1,097,737 1,770,5441897 80,853** 854,585 1,397,9171898 213,443** 694,773 1,476,1191899 167,964** 446,170 1,070,3671900 256,128** 458,921 1,252,5091901 324,965** 804,304 1,830,0021902 471,208** 1,109,328 2,302,9801903 561,927** 759,605 2,042,9941904 404,516** 498,477 1,447,0541905 404,208** 705,240 1,756,2431906 507,959** 982,611 2,275,8121907 494,687** 1,014,869 2,205,0611908 395,699** 647,863 1,607,6271909 309,482** 548,235 1,474,9331910 359,060** 1,039,493 2,274,493–1912 558,311** 548,217 1,786,713Average participation1841–50 57% 8% 100%1851–60 43% 8% 100%1861–70 43% 17% 100%1871–80 26% 48% 100%1881–90 15% 66% 100%1891–1900

17% 58% 100%

1901–12 22% 43% 100%Sources: See Table 1.2


Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags;after 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian (until 1864) and Ottomanflags. ** Greek flag only

Pilarino 10 per cent; E.Loria, 7 per cent; Nicola Ziffa, 7 percent; SpiroDraculi, 3 percent; G.Juglessi, 5 per cent; G.Marato, 1 percent; S.Carvuni 1percent; the Stevedores’ Company 20 per cent….

11. The Association appoints and recognises as its cashier and secretaryMr G.Juglessi….

13. The Association will not acknowledge any other expenses for eachsteamer, except the pay of the labourers employed in the loading, aremuneration to the captain of 10 per cent, upon the whole amount of theaccount, and fifty francs to the foreman….

17. All partners in general bind themselves to persecute, by all meansthey can dispose of, any stranger who does not belong to the Association,as also any new stevedore who might attempt to do business same as theAssociation.

18. If by chance it might be discovered that any of the partners protects astranger, or a new stevedore, he will be subjected to a fine of 1,000 francs;besides, in case of a relapse he will lose all the money which up to thattime he will have deposited as a guarantee [consisting of 2,500 francs]….

33. The Association leaves to Mr S.Draculi the right to do shipchandlering only for the Scandinavian steamers, which are not sought afterby the Association.4

The involvement of the Greek-owned fleet in the carriage of deep-sea trade fromthe Danube is indicated in Table 3.5. Before the 1860s about half of all tonnageleaving the Danube was Greek-owned, but in the 1870s, due to competition fromBritish steamers, this percentage declined to a quarter. The worst decline was inthe 1880s and 1890s, the period of the transition from sail to steam in the Greekfleet; this was also the peak of British participation in Danubian trade. In the firstdecade of the twentieth century, the Greek share again increased, while theBritish declined.

The Greek decline in Danubian trade, as well as a similar trend in Black Seacommerce (see Chapter 1), is somewhat misleading because of the large numberof liners that made repeated calls at the various ports. In fact, the actual amountof Greek tonnage leaving the river more than doubled between 1871 and 1895and quadrupled by 1912. The biggest owners of schleps (see Table 3.4), whowere also owners of deep-sea sailing ships, gradually bought steamers beginningin the 1880s (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and Appendices 4.9–4.14).

Greek maritime activities on the Danube provided experience for the transitionfrom merchant/shipowner to shipowner. It was in Sulina, Galatz and Braila that


the new profession of ‘shipping agent’ emerged. The European Commission ofthe Danube forced every vessel trading on the river to provide official papersshowing its registered tons, cargoes and crew, and to pay port, entrance andcargo dues. Since all the paper work needed to be done in French, English orItalian, a new breed of shipping agents emerged who gradually expanded theiractivities in chartering and shipowning.

The second area that attracted the members of the Ionian network was the Seaof Azov, an area ‘inherited’ from the Chiot network. A significant number of theremaining Chiot families were integrated within the Ionian network here,especially by intermarriage with the most powerful Ionian family, the Vaglianosfrom Cephalonia (see Appendix 3.2). The ports of the Azov were the mostimportant export district of southern Russia after the Crimean War, providing 40–50 per cent of total southern Russian exports and competing in importance withthe ports of Odessa and Nicolaieff.5 The dominant export, especially after theCrimean War, was grain; imports formed a comparatively unimportant part oftotal trade. Greek wines, oil, dried fruit and tobacco were the principal articlesalways available for sale.

Taganrog, the foremost port on the Azov, developed slowly during most of thenineteenth century, but in the 1880s and 1890s the astonishing growth of itsneighbouring port, Rostov-on-Don, prevented a larger and more spectaculardevelopment. The shallow waters of the Azov, the navigational difficulties andinadequacies of its ports, the long delays caused by the required quarantine forall the ports at Kertch, and the bar across the Kertch Straits at Yenikale allcontributed to higher freight and insurance rates and consequently to slowergrowth than in Odessa before the Crimean War. Thereafter, the quarantine atKertch was abolished, the narrow channel

Table 3.6 List of the principal Greek exporters in the Azov, in 1886

Ports Exporters

Taganrog M.Vagliano*Scaramanga, Manousir & CoJ.A.ScaramangaScanavi & ScaramangaDiamantidis & SonsD.A.NegroponteG.StagnoS.J.B.MavP.PapageorgacopulosA.D.MussuriA.CrendiropuloC.BeltzoN.Papastamatiadi


Ports Exporters

F.SvoronoRostov-on-Don E.N.Mavrogordato

N.A.ScanaviP.PetrocochinoJ.E.ScaramangaZiffo BrothersS.SevastopuloG.L.Ziffo & CoGeorge Livas

Berdiansk G.CuppaH.CuppaCuri BrosN.Ambanopoulo

Source: ‘Report by Consul Wagstaff on the Navigation and Trade at the Ports of the Seaof Azov for the Year 1886’, British Parliamentary Papers, vols. LXXXV-LXXXVI, Russia, p. 535

Note: *Also in Rostov-on-Don

was widened and eventually dredged to give twenty-four feet of water across thebar and to open the Azov to large steamers. In the late 1860s and 1870s, arailway connection was constructed, and banks were established.

Still, there were numerous difficulties to be faced on the Azov. Taganrog,which provided two-thirds of all exports, was so situated that all vessels had toload in the roads, thirty miles from the town (and in the case of large steamers,some fifty miles away). Before the introduction of steam tugs in the 1870s, thiscaused many difficulties for masters and crews, who were obliged to travel toTaganrog on boats, sometimes travelling two or even three nights. The men oftenhad to remain in an open boat for

Table 3.7 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of the Azov Sea, Taganrog, Kertch,Berdiansk, Mariupol (in NRT)


1841 55,628 5,141 101,5731842 48,740 14,749 129,5411843 50,535 14,806 115,2071844 77,536 21,447 166,5501845 75,343 24,955 146,4361846 73,016 26,358 143,0621847 111,806 63,736 307,4101848 71,383 42,676 145,165



1849 55,103 14,687 96,58518501851 148,180 35,626 268,2841852 285,065 115,773 621,429—1857 97,803 47,821 238,5601858 90,610 42,026 223,5181859 132,056 66,107 351,057—1876 117,654 110,101 354,052—1879 132,946 132,946 411,42918801881 101,764 156,840 322,4331882 140,824 387,265 594,865—1888 204,285 700,879 1,081,314—1891 161,487 450,942 768,06518921893 265,527 522,901 966,3931894 266,144 744,526 1,183,6501895 240,963 777,331 1,210,3271896 263,033 612,667 1,100,1701897 87,411* 587,530 1,208,8191898 258,395* 525,858 976,2161899 317,104*1900 348,684* 402,406 1,076,7381901 357,640*1902 367,559* 403,779 1,094,8521903 494,826* 497,875 1,332,119—1907 313,408* 385,126 964,9261908 340,875* 428,307 963,0201909 599, 729 671,161 1,599,318Average participation1841–50 46% 17% 100%1851–60 44% 18% 100%1861–70 – –



1871–80 33% 32% 100%1881–90 22% 62% 100%1891–1900 26% 54% 100%1901–9 42% 40% 100%Sources: See Table 1.2Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it


days while the master settled his business. Consul Carruthers, however, foundthat this inconvenience had positive aspects, since’ [shipmasters and crews] areconfined more strictly to their duties instead of wandering about the town…andthus preventing them running into mischief’.6 At Mariupol vessels had to anchorat a distance of six miles, and at Berdiansk and Kertch five miles, so trans-shipment losses were high. All cargoes had to be transferred to lighters and thentransferred to the vessel; when crossing the bar of the Kertch Straits, a portion ofthe cargo had to be trans-shipped a third time. The losses incurred wereestimated at 1 per cent of the value of each outward cargo from the Azov.7 Manycases of theft were also reported.

The Greeks, as on the Danube, controlled the trade of the Azov during theentire century. The similarities of the two not only gave them expertise but alsothe possibility of establishing a ‘rotation’ system between the two areas. In 1851–2, they handled 80–90 per cent of the exports and more than half for the periodafter 1880 (see Chapter 1). It is not surprising, therefore, that a large share oftonnage leaving the Azov was Greek-owned. Before the 1870s almost half of thetonnage clearing Azov ports was Greek-owned. In the 1870s, despite the rise ofBritish shipping, Greeks still controlled one-third of all tonnage clearing theAzov (Table 3.7). As was the case on the Danube, in the 1880s and 1890s theirparticipation decreased to a quarter, due to the rise of British vessels, but theGreeks again controlled more than one-third in the first decade of the twentiethcentury.

The port that was most important to the Chiot network was Odessa. After itsdecline the Greek merchant houses there were partially replaced by a greatnumber of Jewish brokers, speculators, merchants, agents, and firms, such asLouis Dreyfus of Paris and M.Neufeld of Berlin.8 After the Crimean WarNicolaieff became the fastest growing port in the area and attracted a smallnumber of Greek families. The Chiots, Rodocanachi and Sevastopulo; theCephalonians, Lykiardopulo, Caridia and Dandria; and the Mavros allestablished themselves in Nicolaieff (see Table 3.8). By 1882 these merchantswere responsible for half of the exports of the city.

Yet the decrease of the Greek role in this area is evident from Table 3.9.Before the 1870s Greek-owned ships carried one-third of exports, a share thatplummeted to 2–4 per cent after 1870. The same pattern observed in the Danube


and on the Azov was also found here: British participation in the trade peaked inthe 1880s and 1890s. In the first decade of the twentieth century there was asubstantial decrease in British shipping and a small increase in Greek. Data fromthe Sémaphore de Marseilles and the London Customs Bills of Entry indicatethat the Greek merchants that continued to trade in the region chartered ships ofvarious nationalities— and very seldom Greek craft. Moreover, the last third ofthe nineteenth

Table 3.8 Exports of the commercial houses at Nicolaieff

Commercial house Quantity (chetwerts)

A.GREEK 705,438A.Z.Caridia 255,739Mavro fils & co 220,361Th.P.Rodocanac 88,027G.Lykiardopulo 42,216Lykiardopulo Bros 38,332E.Sevastopulo 33,964N.S.Serbos 13,882Dandria Bros 12,917B.OTHERS 734,692C.TOTAL 1,440,130Participation of Greek merchants in total exports: 49%Source: British Parliamentary Papers, vols. LXXIII–LXXIV, 1883, Russia, Report by

Vice Consul Wagstaff on the trade and commerce of Nicolaieff for the year1882

century marked a period of economic decline for the port that had once been the‘queen’ of Black Sea commerce.9 Rather than fight a losing battle, the Ioniansopted instead for the most dynamic areas of the period, the Danube, Azov andthe Caucasus coast.

The growing commercial importance of ports in the eastern Black Sea

Table 3.9 Tonnage of ships clearing the ports of Odessa, Nicolaieff, Sevastopol andTheodosia (in NRT)


1830 7,081 23,070 232,0081831 49,788 13,398 112,0981832 40,261 12,189 146,4911833 48,300 23,783 157,7361834 29,334 12,039 73,1861835 38,901 19,001 98,020



18361837 42,764 28,342 189,4761838 43,516 37,038 192,27918391840 38,171 52,559 175,4911841 40,762 31,673 130,3911842 36,607 44,929 141,2831843 45,434 45,483 201,3251844 49,150 47,372 247,6731845 90,814 33,848 297,9801846 127,844 54,370 351,7381847 122,351 67,621 434,0101848 81,658 81,403 277,6101849 80,985 60,800 238,7791850 69,741 37,932 223,0751851 71,679 38,834 203,8421852 76,202 71,823 337,3251853 127,414 62,126 487,357

1857 85,788 49,822 246,704

1872 26,178 323,073 678,412

1875 20,863 232,049 864,924

1879 60,606 788,898 1,413,4751880 49,738 475,542 991,70418811882 32,534 678, 41 1,284,0941883 14,294 1,127,504 1,571,33418841885 37,801 1,139,264 1,781,67518861887 42,081 1,566,348 2,183,3761888 32,759 1,622,550 2,340,3121889 32,096 1,291,040 2,039,8801890 28,408 1,227,400 1,960,3891891 39,288 1,186,357 1,997,047



1892 53,870 825,170 1,484,9141893 47,734 1,339,030 2,099,6761894 59,599 1,971,681 2,741,6271895 99,348 1,608,693 2,547,5961896 55,771** 1,374,772 2,375,8281897 37,983** 1,580,355 2,436,3181898

1901 134,052** 916,919 1,993,4191902 195,548** 1,156,517 2,433,713Average participation1830–40 25% 16% 100%1841–50 29% 20% 100%1851–60 22% 17% 100%1861–70 – –1871–80 4% 46% 100%1881–90 2% 66% 100%1891–1900 3% 63% 100%1901–2 7% 47% 100%Sources: See Table 1.2Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it


in the 1880s and 1890s was spectacular. From nothing in the 1880s, by 1900they accounted for 38 per cent of the tonnage leaving all southern Russian ports.The development of these ports enabled exports of the rich mineral resources ofthe Caucasus. The desire of the Russian government to develop this part of thecountry was realised with the construction of basic infrastructure: ports, quaysand the opening of the Trans-Caucasian railway in 1883.

The first port to achieve some importance was Poti. But this was short-lived,for it soon lost its predominance because of unsafe port conditions and theacquisition of Batum from the Turks in 1878. In the 1880s and 1890sNovorossisk became the main outlet of the northern Caucasus, exporting grain,petroleum and cement. The steady growth of this new port caused a considerablereduction in the amount shipped from Taganrog. In winter, when the Azov wasfrozen, Novorossisk was accessible to shipping and grain held in Rostov-on-Doncould leave from there.

Batum drew the government’s particular attention by rapidly constructing amaritime infrastructure and becoming the most important port in theTranscaucasus. Its importance lay in the fact that it had the safest harbour alongthe coast from Kertch to Sinope. Its growth was almost exclusively due to the


increasing export of petroleum from Baku. The annual production of petroleumincreased from 500,000 barrels in 1873 to 3–4 million barrels in the early1880s.10 Illuminating, heating and lubricating oils occupied the largest part of thetrade. By 1892 kerosene was exported to India, China, Japan and other easternports, thus giving Greek ships entry onto these routes. Greek exporters were alsoimportant in this part of the Black Sea. In Novorossisk, the British Consulreported that in 1888 three out of the eight principal exporters were Greek:Scaramanga, Vagliano and Sevastopulo (see Table 3.10).

The most important Greek oil exporters and shipowners trading at Batum wereSiderides and Arvanitides. These two were established in

Table 3.10 List of principal exporters in Novorossisk

Greek Other

J.Scaramanga L.DreyfusVagliano J.Dreyfus BrosSevastopulo Waller Bros

YeamesCheruttiLampe & Muller

Source: Information supplied by Mr Thomas Sterne at Novorossisk included in theReport of Consul-General Th. Sandwith on the trade and shipping of Odessaand the rest of South Russian ports for the year 1888, British ParliamentaryPapers, vols LXXX–LXXXI, 1889, Russia, p. 294

Table 3.11 Tonnage of ships clearing the eastern ports of the Black Sea, Batum, Poti,Novorossisk (in NRT)


1872 3,132 3,830 85,8381873 4,696 7,511 107,858–1876 9,546 8,458 65,938–1887 42,814 173,707 667,4631888 63,131 240,848 592,3691889 90,820 322,149 725,3251890 75,586 591,326 1,149,1761891 79,175 406,634 920,4981892 19,145 479,367 1,179,3041893 122,988 685,393 2,082,9421894



1895 121,581 854,734 2,237,8721896 119,945 754,566 2,292,8461897 58,776** 639,363 1,267,5901899 76,135** 825,618 1,453,6051900 117,955** 839,579 1,524,559Average participation1871–80 7% 8% 100%1881–90 9% 42% 100%1891–1900 6% 42% 100%Sources: See Table 1.2Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it


Constantinople, from where they financed a large number of Greek purchases ofsteamships. Chrussaki, who appears as a shipowner in the 1890 Lloyd’s Register,owned one of the three factories in the Caucasus making licorice, most of whichwas shipped from Batum to the US.11 Greek shipping participated in 6–10 percent of total tonnage clearing the eastern ports in the 1880s and 1890s, while theBritish controlled about 40 per cent (see Table 3.11). After the 1880s, Batumwas included in a large number of lines that called at the main ports of the north-eastern Mediterranean. These were owned by big steamship companies thatusually carried general cargo, and their presence thus blurs the picture as to theshare of bulk cargoes carried from the port by Greeks*

We cannot close an examination of the Ionian presence in the Black Seawithout referring to the south-western ports. Bulgaria became an autonomousprincipality in 1878 and was united with eastern Rumelia, becoming anindependent state in 1885. Thereafter its trade increased substantially. Thewealth of this area depended almost entirely on cereals;

Table 3.12 Tonnage of ships clearing the south-western ports of the Black Sea, Varna andBurghaz (in NRT)


1868 38,729 15,422 202,482–1886 21,060 49,100 336,515–1888 98,609 36,035 375,672–1890 132,751 69,933 458,1831891 128,830 105,232 513,750



–1894 215,918 178,001 638,9791895 184,558 171,450 734,5391896 115,442 230,955 815,972–1899 37,685** 133,984 782,1411900 48,544* 77,744 560,4451901 87,992* 148,159 880,469–1903 257,671* 269,296 1,786,5801904 229,005* 273,994 1,639,4681905 196,260* 210,764 1,342,8321906 127,438* 194,060 1,300,0031907 152,300* 221,109 1,535,9341908 155,060* 171,944 1,258,9831909 166,494* 204,973 1,592,3201910 166,401* 202,834 2,022,318Average participation1881–90 16% 13% 100%1891–1900 18% 22% 100%1901–10 12% 14% 100%Sources: See table 1.2Notes: * Up to 1855 it includes Greek, Ionian, Russian and Ottoman flags; after 1855 it


Anchialo salt was the only other significant product. Grain exports increasedabout seven-fold within ten years, from 3 per cent of total Black Sea grainexports in 1885 to 7 per cent by 1894 (Table 1.6). Imports consisted largely ofcolonial and manufactured goods.

In the 1880s a sixth of the total tonnage clearing Varna and Burghaz wasGreek-owned. This increased to 25 per cent in the 1890s, enabling Greekshipowners to maintain a lead over the British (Table 3.12). When a substantialpart of the Greek-flag fleet left the region in the first decade of the twentiethcentury, average Greek participation decreased to 15 per cent. Although we havelittle evidence on members of the Ionian network in the Bulgarian ports, we doknow that some trade was carried by members of the network. Steamers of theCourtgi Company, based in Constantinople and using the Ottoman flag, carriedthe mails and some cargo between Constantinople, Burghaz, Varna andKustendjie. The Vaglianos reportedly loaded grain in Varna and Burghaz in1885.12


It is also very little known that the Greeks along the coast from Bosporus toKustendjie (Constanza), renowned for their seafaring tradition, owned sailingvessels that carried the coastal trade of the Black Sea. Lloyd’s Register ofShipping in 1895 revealed this side of Greek-owned shipping along the south-western coast of the Black Sea. Agathoupoli, Vassiliko, Sozopoli and Anchialohad a combined fleet of thirty sailing vessels of about 20,000 NRT in 1890. Thelocal merchants handling grain exports were apparently also Greek.13

Constantinople comes after the Black Sea ports as the next most importantnexus of the network. Of the ten companies in Constantinople that belonged tothe Ionian network, two categories can be distinguished: the shipping agent/shipowners and the merchant/bankers. In the first category belong Foscolo,Mango, Valsamachi, Evangelatos, Dandria, Destounis, Courtgis and Michalinos,and in the second, Zarifis, Arvanitides and Siderides. Constantinople remained anecessary stop for ships entering and leaving the Black Sea in order for mastersto get instructions from their offices, money, coal and other supplies. A newprofession, the shipping agent, flourished in Constantinople and the mostsuccessful also became shipowners. The heavy Greek involvement in the BlackSea and eastern Mediterranean meant that they carried 12–19 per cent of themaritime commerce of this great port during the 1870s and early 1880s. Therewas a decrease in the 1890s to 7–8 per cent, and then a doubling of Greekparticipation in the first decade of the twentieth century (see Table 3.13).

The second category that we distinguish in Constantinople comprised threefamilies: the Zarifis, merchants and bankers, and the Siderides and Arvanitides,merchants who imported oil from Batum. All three through their mercantileactivities were also shipowners and ultimately financiers to a significant numberof Greek sailing shipowners we will analyse in the last section of this chapter.

Marseilles and London constituted the two main ends of the Ionian network inwestern Europe. The position of Greek merchants and shipowners in Marseillesremained steady until the eve of the First World War. Figure 1.3 clearly showsthat Greek merchants and shipowners handled more than half of the city’s bulktrade from the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea between 1870 and 1910. In1870, Greeks were responsible for 60 per cent and in 1880, 56 per cent, of the bulkmaritime commerce. There was a decrease to 34 per cent in 1890, but by 1900the Greeks had almost recovered their position (48 per cent). By 1910, however,Greeks had captured 59 per cent of the commerce. There were twenty-eightGreek

Table 3.13 Tonnage of ships clearing Constantinople (in NRT)

Year Greek % British Total

1873 445 12 1,245.3 3,576.41874 482.1 13 1,466.6 3,825.31875 775.8 19 1,350.7 4,1371876 507.1 12 1,852.1 4,380.2


Year Greek % British Total

1877 275.8 15 687 1,851.71878 102.3 6 467.9 1,806.2–1881 530 11 2,578 5,010.11882 691.4 12 3,170.9 5,857.41885 3,649.21887 4,907.2 6,465.71888 6,903.5 8,6891890 6,349.1 9,996.51891 5,620.9 9,346.21892 4,342.4 7,899.31893 877.2 8 6,481.8 11,081.21894 927 7 8,363.2 12,681.31895 1,001.5 8 7,738.5 12,257.91896 1,012.1 9 6,999.4 11,835.31897 435.4 4 6,505.1 10,867.41898 1,176.8 5,518.31899 1,236.3 14 4,256.6 9,033.51900 1,535.7 16 4,343.9 9,821.11901 1,714 5,640.81902 2,023.6 7,476.31903 2,525.6 15 8,096.4 16,3401904 2,354.1 7,291.31905 2,595 6,796.6Source: R.Folin, ‘Ports et Navigation en Mediterranée. Essai Statistique 1870–1905’,

Navigations Méditerranéennes au XIXe siècle, vol. 1, Cahier no 9. Institut deRecherches Méditerranéennes, Université de Provence, 1987

families in Marseilles, one-third of whom were Ionian: Vagliano, Couppa,Cicellis, Corgialegno, Pana, Romano, Miliotti, Dellaporta and Lazarachi (seeFigure 3.1 and Appendix 3.1). Table 3.14 shows in detail the main merchant/shipowners in the city.14

A comparison between Tables 2.3 and 3.14 shows clearly the transformation ofthe network at Marseilles. The indisputable masters of the 1870s and 1880s werethe Vaglianos, who replaced the Rallis as the leaders of the network. The mainGreek merchants of the previous period—Ralli, Schilizzi and Argenti, ZiziniaBrothers and Dromocaiti—disappeared from the scene and were replaced byScaramanga (who inherited part of the south Russian trade from the Rallis) andSpartali, both of whom first appeared as minor merchants in the 1860s. The onlyChiot firm that remained strong was Rodocanachi. In 1870 there was still a


mixture of the two networks, but after 1880 very few of the old Chiot merchantsremained active. The transformation of seaborne trade with the advent of steammeant that by 1900 consignees were no longer mentioned in either theSémaphore de Marseilles or the London Customs Bills of Entry. This makes itdifficult to carry the analysis past this date.

English ports were the other recipients of grain from the Black Sea and ofcotton from the south-eastern Mediterranean. There were thirty-six Greekfamilies in London (see Figure 3.1), of which only one, the Vaglianos, had ashipping office for more than thirty years when, at the end of the 1890s,S.G.Embiricos and Michalinos opened offices. The Vagliano shipping office inthe last third of the nineteenth century kept the monopoly among the network notonly as the main Black Sea merchant house but also as the main shipping officefor sales and purchase, chartering and financing. London, however, was the oneplace where the traces of the old Chiot network were left: the long list of Chiotswho were members of the Baltic Exchange suggests that an important number ofthe descendants of the Chiot network became the shipbrokers and shippingagents that served the Ionian network. There were also a number of families thattraded from London, as Table 3.15 and Appendix 3.1 indicate. The Chiotfamilies that traded with the Black Sea, however, were almost exclusivelyRodocanachi, Scaramanga and Sevastopulo, while other merchants in the tradeincluded Spartali, Mavro and Valieri. The remainder of the Chiots and Ionianstraded general and bulk cargoes from Alexandria and Constantinople, andcurrants from Patras.

ORGANISATION AND BUSINESS METHODS

As was the case with the previous network, the Ionians devised a commonbusiness strategy which relied on organisational structure and business methods.The first part had to do with organisation. The same principles which wereprevalent in the Chiot network applied to the Ionians. Kinship and commonisland of origin were again used to keep the ‘club’ closed. Appendix 3.2 providesa rough sketch of first-degree relations of the most powerful families. Thirty ofthe 120 families of the network were related. Of these the Vaglianos proved themost important and were related to fifteen other network families. The Vaglianosin a way linked the two networks together. Andreas Vagliano, established inMarseilles, married a sister of the Melas family and in turn saw seven of his ninechildren married to prominent merchant families. Four of his children marriedinto the three prominent Chiot families of Ralli, Negroponte and Petrocochino,and four into the main Azov and Marseilles merchants and shipowners, Couppa,


Table 3.14 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterraneanat the port of Marseilles (in NRT)

Merchant/shipowner

1870 1880 1890 1900 1910

Ship Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons Tons Tons

Vagliano 131 32,297 92 31,157 25 10,492Scaramanga

81 25,093 44 19,103 12 13,403

Couppa – – 45 17,474 15 8,425 No information onindividual merchants

Zouros – – – – 18 7,784Spartali 74 27,207 12 3,927 – –Miliotti 66 21,574 – – – –Rodocanachi

49 14,808 30 15,678 9 5,289

MelasBros

38 10,448 – – – –

Ambanopoulo

36 9,455 25 8,739 – –

Nicolopulo

– – 12 8,539 – –

Caramano 7 7,962 7 1,670 – –Corgalegno

23 5,266 – – –

Basily &Valieri

22 6,700 17 7,020 3 1,027

Zarifi &Zafiropulo

17 3,733 3 1,405 4 2,177

Vuccina – – 11 3,521 – –Serbos 14 3,685 7 3,124 – _Lazarachi 11 3,514 – – – –Sechiari 11 3,160 – – – _Salvago 8 2,789 – – – –Mavrocordato

6 2,019 – – – –

Sevastopulo

2 480 3 651 10 2,443

Microulachi

2 380 1 235 20 7,378

Forvariousmerchants

13 4,191 12 14,053 – –


Merchant/shipowner

1870 1880 1890 1900 1910

Ship Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons Tons Tons

TotalGreek

603 203,185 344 145,917 161 78,739 205,575 203,675

TotalMarseilles

1,503 592,582 990 653,507 766 698,588 601,724 878,927

% Greek 44 34 33 23 21 11 34 23Sources: Appendices 1.5–1.9

Mussuri, Ambanopoulo and Zarifi. The Vaglianos were also related to otherprominent Cephalonian shipping families, such as Rossolimo, Lykiardopulo,Destouni, Yannoulatos, Phocas, Frangopulo and Cambitsi. As each network hadits own particularities stemming from the different traditions of each island, theIonian network did not prize kinship and marriage as highly as the Chiots, nordid it consider blood relations more important than common island of origin. Forthe Cephalonian or Ithacan, to be a compatriot was the same as being a relative;in this way, for Azov and Danube shipowners and merchants access to the clubwas provided by common island of origin.

The first main characteristic of the Ionian network that differentiated

Table 3.15 Greek merchant/shipowners handling the trade from the eastern Mediterraneanat the ports oF Englan

1870 1890 1900

A.Ionian A.Ionian A.IonianVagliano Vagliano Vagliano

Frangopulo FrangopuloB.ChiotsArgenti B.Chiots B.ChiotsAgelasto Avierino Paspatti Ralli Bros Scaramanga

RodocanachiNicolopulo Rodocanachi C.Others

SchilizziPaspatti Sevastoptdo Sevastopulo Eliadi BulgaridesSechian Sechiar JoannouRalli Scaramanga ProtopazziRodocanachi C.Others VouvalisSchilizzi CassavettiScanavi CasdagliScaramanga Eliadi

Eumorphopulo


1870 1890 1900

C.Others EugenidesCavafy GeorgiadiCassavetti GeorgacopuloCosti Ionides IonidesCristodulo MacrisEustratiadi MavroGeorgala MicrulachiGeralopulo Papaziannilonides PetridesMaximo ProtopazziMavro RigopuloMavrojanni SpiropuloMelas TamvacoMoschoudi TezicogluNotara Bros ValieriPaleologo VouvalisPsicha ZarifiScrini Bros ZanettoTheologo ZecchiniTambacoValieriVafeaZarifiCremidiGerussiGeorgacopuloPaparritorSpiropuloA.Greeks 231,330 tons 154,968 tons 27,667 tonsB.Total ports of England 518,439 tons 1,205,547 tons 724,011 tons(A)/(B) 45% 13% 4%Sources: Appendices 1.20, 1.22 and 1.23

them from the Chiots was that most members were of a maritime origin andcommerce was a supplementary rather than a primary activity. A more detailedaccount of the activities of an Ionian and a non-Ionian firm, in this case theVaglianos and the Embiricos, will give further insight into this and related points.

Contrary to the Rallis, the most powerful family in the Chiot network, theVaglianos, started as typical Greek sailing shipowners did in the late eighteenth


or the beginning of the nineteenth century: from the start, merchanting was fullycombined with shipowning. Indeed, one of the first forms of a Greek tradingcompany was a sailing vessel and its crew. In many cases, the shipowner wasalso the master; together with the crew and members of his family and friends,he raised a sermagia (capital) and bought a cargo. The vessel would call at a foreignport and sell, buy or barter goods which would in turn be sold in other markets.The profits or losses from such an endeavour would be shared with the peoplewho had originally contributed to the sermagia (see Chapter 4).

The eldest brother, Maris Vagliano, left his native Cephalonia in the early1820s as a seaman on an Ionian sailing ship and disembarked at Taganrog.15

Shortly thereafter he was able to buy more sailing vessels and to carry grain onhis own account between Constantinople and the Azov. In the late 1830s andearly 1840s he was joined by his two younger brothers, Panaghi and Andreas.Data on the purchases of Ionian ships and their registration in Constantinople, orfrom the licences that the British Consul in Constantinople gave Ionian ships,indicate that the Vagliano Brothers were owners of a number of sailing shipsbefore the 1860s. According to Table 3.16, the Vaglianos purchased eighteenships between 1822 and 1830, nine between 1844 and 1850, and twenty morebetween 1851 and 1860.16 They were also among the three most importantexporters of grain and linseed in Taganrog in 1851 and 1852 (see Table 2.7).During the Crimean War the Vaglianos carried illegal grain exports from theAzov to Constantinople, earning extraordinary profits.

In 1858 Panaghi Vagliano was sent to England to open a branch in London torepresent not only his own interests but also those of Theophilatos and Milas,Danubian grain merchants.17 He gained access to the Baltic Exchange fairlyeasily, perhaps with the aid of the Rallis or other Greek merchants in England. Inthe 1860s Panaghi went a step further than his contemporaries, establishing thefirst shipping office in London which dealt exclusively with Greek shipping.This office, which served as a model for other London offices in the twentiethcentury, was for forty years the main link between Greek shipping and theLondon maritime market. Thus, the Vagliano Brothers became wealthy andfamous by working as shipping agents for their compatriots. But it is alsosignificant that throughout their entrepreneurial lives the Vaglianos owned andoperated the largest Greek-owned fleet (see Table 3.16). From 1870 to 1905 theVaglianos continually possessed between

Table 3.16The Vagliano fleet

Sailing ships Steamships Total

Year Ships NRT Ships NRT Ships NRT

1822–30 18 181844–50 9 91851–60 20 – – – 20 –




1870 17 3,520 – – 17 3,5201874 19 4,251 – – 19 4,2511879 13 2,928 – – 13 2,9281885 9 2,625 7 7,144 16 9,7691890 9 2,625 7 6,746 16 9,3711895 5 2,161 16 12,293 21 14,4541905 11 17,582 11 17,582Sources: For the years 1822 to 1860, data are from FO/195, where the selection has been

done according to the surname of the master of the ship; data on 1870, 1874and 1879 from Archangelos register of shipping; data for the steamships of theyears 1885–1905 from Table 4.4 and Appendices 4.9–4.12, and for the sailingships from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1885–95

thirteen and twenty-one vessels, accounting for more than 10 per cent of theGreek fleet in each year.

The Vagliano office also functioned as a shipping bank, which provedfundamental for the transition from sail to steam for many shipowners. It grantedloans at 7–8 per cent interest for the purchase of steamers if the borrowerprovided half the necessary amount in cash and put up the ship as collateral.18

Because the loans from the Vagliano office were 1 per cent higher than theofficial rate of the Bank of England, it has been estimated that its profit fromeach client was about 14 per cent of the amount of the loan.19 This kind of loan—mortgaging—was illegal under Greek law before 1910, so that loans from Greekor foreign banks for such purchases were out of the question. The number ofthose who purchased steamships through the Vaglianos was large and will befurther discussed in the last section of this chapter.

The other important shipowning family that emerged from the Ionian network,but which came from Andros, were the Embiricos.20 The Embiricos became themost powerful family of the first three decades of the twentieth century. Onereason for its success was the activities of the numerous male members of thefamily in the nineteenth century. The family’s patriarch, Leonar dos Embiricos,was born to a Chiot father in Andros in 1765. By the turn of the nineteenthcentury he had seven sons, Anthony, Nicholas, Mathew, John, George, Michaeland Constantine, who all worked as masters and shipowners. But it wasLeonardos’ twenty-five grandsons who got involved in the Ionian network bybecoming shipowners and grain merchants on the Danube in the last half of thenineteenth century, and his 127 great-grandsons who were involved in shippingin the first third of the twentieth century, that made the family name. TheEmbiricos daughters also helped, marrying into other important Andriotshipowning families, such as the Goulandris, Cambanis, Maris and Coulouthros.The Embiricos descendants are still active shipowners in London today.


The most important branches of the family came from Leonardos’ last threesons, George, Michael and Constantine. The first shipping and commercial houseof the Embiricos family was established in the last third of the century byConstantines sons. The most important of the five brothers were Leonidas,Alcibiades and Epaminondas in Braila, of whom Alcibiades proved particularlysignificant. The Embiricos in Braila invested heavily in shipping, and one ofMichael’s grandsons, Stamatios Embiricos after working at his uncles’ office inBraila, in 1896 opened the first Andriot office in England, S.G.Embiricos Ltd.Georges grandsons, Leonidas, Michael and Maris, also after working in Braila, in1908 founded the liner passenger company, National Steam Navigation ofGreece, and in 1916 Byron Steamship Ltd, while the other brother, Antonios,established in London the highly successful Anglo-Hellenic and Anglo-Ioniancompanies.21 The Embiricos fleet was already important by the 1870s. By 1914,they were the largest shipowning family in Greece, owning thirty steamships ofabout 100,000 GRT. This was 13 per cent of the entire Greek fleet (seeTable 3.17).

Apart from shipping, the Embiricos family was heavily involved in Greekeconomic and political life in the first third of the twentieth century. In 1894 oneof Constantines sons, Epaminondas, founded the Bank of Athens

Table 3.17 The fleet of the Embiricos family



1870 5 1,509 – – 5 1,5091874 6 1,544 – – 6 1,5441879 6 1,693 – – 6 1,6931890 6 2,554 2 3,539 8 6,0931895 6 2,330 4 5,718 10 8,0481900 1 144 9 14,519 10 14,6631905 – – 13 23,311 13 23,3111910 – – 22 39,671 22 39,671

(GRT) (GRT)1914 – 30 92,522 30 92,522Sources: Appendices 4.9–4.14, Archangelos register of shipping 1870, 1874, 1879 and

Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1890–1905

which, as we will see in the next section, provided finance for the transition fromsail to steam. Moreover, Epaminondas Embiricos, an MP for a number of years,became Minister of Shipping (1908–9) and was largely responsible for theShipping Law that legalised mortgages in 1910 (see Chapter 4). In the same way,a number of descendants of the Embiricos family continued active participationin the political life of the country during the First World War and the interwar


period, making along the way a number of investments in the Greek economy.The sons of Epaminondas Embiricos established the Bank Stringos-Embiricos inPiraeus in the interwar period, sat on the board of the National Bank of Greece,and were elected as MPs. The sons of Andreas George Embiricos, Leonidas,Michael and Maris, established the insurance companies Ethniki Zoi and KaliPisti during the interwar period, as well as the Bank of National Economy in1918. They were also the main shareholders of the most important shipbuilding/repair yard, Vassiliades Engine Works. Leonidas Embiricos, who was aconsultant on the supply and distribution of food in the temporary Thessalonikigovernment and Minister of Food Supplies in the Venizelos government in 1917–18, undertook to provide privately the supplies needed by the Greek army.Leonidas Embiricos—the father of the well-known Greek poet, AndreasEmbiricos—was the driving force behind the shipping and investment activitiesof the three brothers. The maritime historian of Andros, Dimitrios Polemis,called him ‘an entrepreneur par excellence’.22 Another grandson of GeorgeEmbiricos, George Miltiades Embiricos, came from Rumania in 1909 to found aginning/shelling company in Levadia. In order not to leave the supplies of theGreek army out of the family business, he became Minister of Food Supplies inthe Krokidas government in 1922 and in the Gonatas government in 1923. In thisway the tentacles of the Ionian network affected not only the evolution of theGreek fleet but also the economic and political life of the country.

The second part of Ionian entrepreneurial strategy involved business methods:first, penetration into both producing and consuming markets and second, anemphasis on shipping that never ignored trade. We have already discussed thepenetration of the Greeks into the hinterland of each Black Sea port using thesystem of local agents to provide regular shipments of export products,especially grain. But at the other end of the trade, grain found its way to thenorthern European markets via the Baltic Exchange. As indicated in Table 2.9,by 1886 ninety-seven Greeks were already members of the Exchange,comprising 7 per cent of total membership. Fairplay, one of the most prominentBritish shipping journals, contains frequent sneering and pejorative reports onthese ‘invaders’, always implying an inherent proclivity for fraud and a completelack of culture and ethics. These were, admittedly, characteristics shared bymany Greeks and were not entirely created by British prejudice:

These Easterners were always wily people, not even given to trusting eachother…. Whatever may have been the case 2,000 years ago, the Greeks ofthat period have no parallel in their descendants of to-day. The world of artis open to all and the purse of buyers of works of art is inexhaustible; butthere are no Greek poets, no Greek sculptors, no Greek painters, to profitby a demand to which there is practically no limit. On the contrary, themodern Greek of means buys works of art, but does not produce them, andhe thinks his own country the best country in the world to live out of. Heamasses money in all countries in which he finds the natives softer than


himself, and he spends his money like an open-handed prince—but not inAthens. He prefers the Baltic Coffee House to the Acropolis, with theParthenon thrown in; and a deal in wheat is more in his line than a lectureby Socrates. For all this he is not to be blamed; but why make him a hero,and invest him with all the invisible virtues under the sun because 2,000years ago Greece could and did produce sculptors who never have been,and never will be rivalled, and won battles against numerical odds asBritons are doing every day all over the world?23

Greek penetration into the City of London Marine Insurance Company did not domuch to improve this public image:

The meeting of the shareholders in the City of London Marine InsuranceCompany, to which we called attention last week, has been held at theCannon-street Hotel, and has resulted in the dismissal of the underwriter MrWright…. The Company has lost money; everyone knows that;…theunfortunate underwriter who took his Director’s risk, has been kicked out;a successor, who will probably advise the countrymen of Pericles to taketheir risks elsewhere, has been appointed; and order reigns once more inGreece. For to read the names on the directorate of the Company onemight fancy oneself in the Archipelago once. Agelasto, Canevaro,Scaramanga! Heaven and Earth! What could a poor English underwriterhope to do with this lot? Do men make money out of Greeks? They may,for all we know to the contrary, but we never knew anyone that did…. Weused to read a great deal in our youth of the famous Greek Phalanx. It wasthe habit of that warlike body to charge its enemies. We have changed allthat. It is the habit of the modern Greek Phalanx to charge its friends, andthe devastation it creates in their ranks is equal to the most fabulousperformance of the bygone warriors.24

All these unfriendly remarks of course reflected British fear that ‘We hear agreat deal about foreign competition in trade, and of the danger of losing oursupremacy, but the British humbug, like the ancient Greek sculptor, standsunrivalled and alone, and may defy the whole world to match him.’

These words were written in Fairplay in 1897, on the eve of the century thatwitnessed the decline of British supremacy. Today, almost 100 years later, theysound even more ironic since the statistics show that modern Greek ‘humbugs’retain supremacy over their British counterparts, while the ancient Greeksculptors stand where they always had. Neither British bias nor the prejudice ofFairplay stopped all reporters from being fair. Another Fairplay reporter found,to his amazement, that impartiality was not unknown in the Greek vocabulary25

And some of the same Greeks that had built their bad reputation tried hard torestore it:


The members of the Baltic are always sarcastic on transactions in whichGreeks and Jews are mixed up together, those two accomplished sections oftraders being always on the alert when brought face to face in business.The latest excitement of the kind has arisen out of the followingcircumstances. During the great freight advance towards the close of lastyear, a Greek firm, Messrs. Foscolo, Mango & Co., chartered their s.s.Marietta Ralli at 20s., to Messrs. Neufeld & Co. who are Jews, to load inNovember from Yenitchesk, in the Azov, with 16 running lay-days. Itappears that 8,000 chetwerts were shipped in about the first five or sixdays, and that during the remainder of the time no more cargo was sent,although, it was alleged by the captain and owners of the steamer, theweather was good and the sea open, that is sufficiently free from ice toleave the navigation unimpeded. This, it was stated, was proved by theshippers having loaded and despatched other steamers. The captain, whowas seemingly of the opinion that Messrs. Neufeld wished to avoid loadinghis vessel because of the high freight at which she was chartered,protested, and on the fifteenth day, as the story goes, ‘hooked it’ to savebeing icebound, and proceeded to Odessa to fill up. The owners of thesteamer then made another contract with Messrs. Neufeld to complete theloading at Odessa at about 10s. 6d. freight. Both the parcels were forLisbon, and when the steamer arrived at that port demurrage was incurred,but the receivers declined to pay it, on account, they said, of rain and badweather having interfered with the discharge…. Before making thecontract to fill up at Odessa the owners of the boat and Messrs. Neufeldagreed that all matters in dispute should be referred to arbitration, and thisbrings us to the interesting development which has proved so attractive atheme on the Baltic. Messrs. Neufeld, the Jews, nominated as theirarbitrator a Greek merchant and shipper, Mr Eumorphopulos; and seeingthat the Jews had fixed on a Greek, Messrs. Foscolo, Mango & Co.hastened to follow suit, and nominated the well-known Greek shipownerand shipper, Mr Vagliano, to represent them. Before going into the prosand cons of the affairs these two gentlemen agreed on a third Greek, MrP.P.Rodocanachi to act as umpire. Thus was constituted what the Balticerscall an ‘amateur Greek tribunal’—composed of three of the sharpestbusinessmen in the Room—with a Greek firm and a Jew firm as the partiesto the arbitration…. After two days’ sitting the award was given against theGreek steamer on the question of dead freight, but in her favour in respectof the demurrage at Lisbon. What is felt on the Baltic is that Messrs. Neufeldshowed great confidence in nominating a Greek as their arbitrator, and thatthe ‘amateur Greek tribunal’ distinguished itself greatly by its absoluteimpartiality unmoved in the slightest degree by the double temptation towhich it was subjected. A further opinion entertained in the Room is that agrand example is herein afforded to arbitrators connected with the CornTrade Association, whose awards are by no means always so satisfactory


to the Greeks and Jews as the decision now referred to has been. It shouldbe added that although the three Greek gentlemen sat on the case for twodays their charge was only fifteen guineas, half paid by the shipowners andhalf by the merchants.

Shipping was vitally important in the function of the network. Cargo trade, asanalysed in the previous chapter, continued in the same way, only the cargoesnow were almost exclusively grain and coal. The nature of Black Sea, Azov andDanube trade virtually mandated vessel ownership. Tables 3.16 and 3.18 indicateclearly that all prominent members of the network were heavily involved inshipowning. Their involvement with steamers was vital for the survival of theIonians. At all times the question of shipping was vitally important for the graintrade. In an area where inward cargoes were difficult to obtain, lack of shippingwas an acute problem. The advantages of steamers soon became evident. Around1880, steamers took twenty days to sail from England to Odessa and twenty-twodays to the Sea of Azov, whereas sailing ships took an average of seventy-fivedays for either journey.26 Moreover, grain was a cargo which could easilydeteriorate on the voyage and suffered badly from damp; shorter voyagesdiminished the chances of the damage. It was evident that purchasing steamshipswas the sine qua non to remain competitive in business and to keep their share ofthe trade. The biggest merchant/shipowners of the Azov, the Vaglianos, and theircounterparts on the Danube, the Theofilatos, were pioneers in steam. The restonly followed a path that was already open. Members of the network in 1879owned eighty-seven vessels of about 22,000 NRT, which constituted 9 per cent ofthe total Greek-owned fleet (see Appendix 3.4). Ionian merchant/shipownersmade their final transition from merchanting to shipowning only after theyacquired steamers. As Appendices 4.10 and 4.11 and Table 3.18 indicate, themain members of the Ionian network purchased the majority of steamers in theGreek-owned fleet: in 1895 74 per cent, and in 1900 61 per cent, of total steamtonnage in the fleet belonged to them.

Table 3.18 Greek steamships owned or financed by members of the Ionian network

Ionian network Total Greek fleet

Year Shipowners NRT GRT Total NRT Total GRT %

1890 24 37,002 – 55,883 – 66%1895 37 66,693 90,708 74%1900 33 87,165 – 142,091 – 61%1905 72 182,950 – 259,239 – 71%1910 83 220,216 – 375,770 – 59%1914 97 – 463,643 – 822,906 56%Sources: Appendices 4.9–4.14


THE IONIAN NETWORK AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY GREEK SHIPOWNERS

This last section will deal with the influence of the Ionian network on thedevelopment of the Greek fleet in the twentieth century. Network members in theBlack Sea trade were particularly important in the transition from sail to steam inthe Greek fleet from the 1880s to 1910s. In fact, their acts defined the structureof the Greek shipowning in the twentieth century.

One of the main problems faced by the owners of sail in the late 1870s was thelack of sufficient capital to invest in steam. The largest amount of capital for thetransition came from the members of the Ionian network, especially during thefirst stages in the 1880s and 1890s, as we will discuss in more detail in the nextchapter. A significant number of the masters employed on these ships were part-owners; many times when the steamers became too old they bought them andbecame shipowners themselves. In this way in the first fifteen years of thetwentieth century there was a massive entry of small-scale shipowners, a largenumber of whom were financed by members of the Ionian network.

It is useful to examine the geographic origin of the masters who were financedby the members of the Ionian network to invest in steam. Almost all came fromCephalonia, Ithaca, Andros, Chios and Kassos. The fact that Greek merchant/shipowners, whether in Constantinople, Taganrog, London or Marseilles,financed individuals from these five particular islands is proof not only of theirmaritime traditions but also of the cohesion and common business strategy of theIonian network. There were other prominent maritime centres, like Galaxidi orSpetses, for example, whose sailing shipowners were not financed by the Ioniannetwork and whose fleets eventually disappeared.

Figure 3.2 presents the shipowners financed by the members of the Ioniannetwork in southern Russia. The powerful Vagliano Brothers financed fourteenshipowners from Cephalonia, Chios, Andros and Syros, as well as one from thesmall Aegean island of Leros. We must not forget that the Vaglianos wererelated to the Chiots by marriage. Sifneos Brothers from Lesbos financed thefuture shipowner Hadjilias. The Chiots Sevastopulos, Scaramangas andNegroponte provided capital to the Cephalonians, Vergottis and Metaxas, theAndriot N.Embiricos, and the Chiot Saliari Brothers. It is interesting to note thatthe successful Chiot shipowners of the twentieth century were not on the wholefinanced by the remaining members of the old Chiot network. In fact, themembers of the Chiot network were not in any way related to the Chiotshipowners of the twentieth century.

The shipowners that members of the Ionian network on the Danube financedwere exclusively compatriots or relatives (see Figure 3.3). This was the casebecause the big Danube riverboat owners and merchants were themselvesheavily involved in the ownership of deep-sea shipping. When Theofilatos,Stathatos and Embiricos transferred their activities to Piraeus and London at theturn of the century, they continued their entrepreneurial activities as shipowners.


It is not clear whether the Theofilatos financed the Stathatos but we do know thatthey were related and that the Stathatos worked in the Theofilatos business onthe Danube before starting their own. Dracoulis Brothers initially worked at theTheofilatos and Stathatos enterprises before starting their own and in partnershipwith their relatives, the Gratsos, bought a number of deep–sea vessels before1914. Vlassopulos worked as master on the Draculis’ steamships before openinghis own office with his brothers.

The Embiricos family, coming from Andros, presented the only outstandingexample of successful nonz–Ionian shipowners and merchants on the Danube.The Embiricos, apart from financing or recruiting into shipowning mostmembers of their large family, also recruited all their related families fromAndros, the Goulandris, Cambanis, Kidoniefs, Maris and Coulouthros. Thisfurther strengthened the Embiricos’ claim to being the most powerfulshipowning family of the first third of the twentieth century.

Figure 3.4 presents the shipowners that the merchant/shipowners ofConstantinople financed. Siderides and Arvanitides, as we have alreadymentioned, imported oil from Batum, while the Zarifis, grain merchants inOdessa, the Danube and later Marseilles, became among the biggest bankers inConstantinople.27 Spyridon and Xenophon Siderides, Constantinople Greekswith Russian citizenship, established themselves as representatives andmerchants of Russian petroleum in Constantinople. Siderides Brothers owned anumber of steamers during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century (seeAppendices 4.11–4.14). The beneficiaries of their involvement in shipping were

Figure 3.2 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Southern Russiashipowners and merchants


a number of Chiot masters, some of whom eventually became among the biggesttwentieth-century shipowners: Livanos, Carras, Pateras, Hadjipateras andLemos. The choice of Chiot masters was not accidental; and Siderides’ wife,Theofano, was a Chiot. Probably out of gratitude, Stavros Livanos, one of the fivebiggest Greek shipowners of the mid-twentieth century, named his shippingcompany Theofano.

Cosmas Arvanitides also appears as a big shipowner in Constantinople in thefirst fifteen years of the twentieth century. An importer of illuminating oils whocombined commerce and shipping together with Siderides, he financed theKassian masters Rethymnis and Pneumaticos, who eventually became majorshipowners. Arvanitides continued as co-owner of the Rethymnis’, Pneumaticos’and Yannaghas’ ships during the interwar period. Leonidas Zarifis, an extremelysuccessful banker in Constantinople, was also a shipowner during the period andfinanced the masters A.Palios and Diakakis. The Constantinople merchant/financier/shipowners followed the pattern of the rest of the network in financingmainly masters from the islands of Cephalonia, Chios and Kassos.

Table 3.19 presents aggregate data on all members of the Ionian network whoeventually became shipowners in addition to those they financed. This showsthat two-thirds of all Greek steamships from 1890 to 1914 were owned orfinanced by the Ionian network. It is evident that the transition from sail to steamin the Greek fleet was almost entirely defined by the acts and preferences ofmembers of this Greek maritime network.

Figure 3.3 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Shipowners andmerchants of the Danube


Figure 3.4 The Ionian network and twentieth-century Greek shipowners. Merchants,bankers and shipowners of Constantinople


4SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

Thus far we have traced the trade routes of Greek ships and the activities ofGreek shipowners and merchants abroad. This chapter will deal with the growthof the Greek-flag fleet and the main domestic maritime centres. After theformation of the independent Greek state in 1830, a new era began for themerchant marine. Within twenty years Greeks were able not only to reconstructtheir pre-revolutionary fleet but also to expand to unprecedented numbers ofships and tonnage.1 Indeed, the uninterrupted development of shipping andcommerce throughout the nineteenth century was one of the most impressiveachievements of the Greek economy Yet there was very little relation betweenthese two sectors, since Greek foreign commerce occupied very little space inGreek ships.2

The Greek fleet sailed in international waters and comprised mainly medium-sized vessels carrying bulk cargoes from the eastern to the westernMediterranean and northern Europe along the lines of the Chiot and Ioniancommercial and maritime networks. How did this unique fleet, that for the mostpart flew the Greek flag, develop?

The evolution of the Greek fleet is clearly portrayed in Figure 4.1. The steadygrowth is obvious. From about 60,000 NRT in 1835, the fleet expanded toalmost 600,000 NRT on the eve of the First World War, a ten-fold increase inlittle more than seventy years. To analyse this process in detail we can divide thisperiod into two sections. The first, comprising the years to 1875, was almostentirely the preserve of the sailing vessel. Apart from two four-year crises (1848–52 and 1859–63) this era was characterised by continuous growth. The fourdecades up to 1914, however, were much different. For starters, they weremarked by the long international shipping crisis from 1875 to 1885, characterisedby a sharp drop in freight rates (see Figures 4.3, 4.4 and 4.8). While part of thistremendous decrease was a reflection of falling transport costs due to the massiveintroduction of steam in international shipping, it is indisputable that at least someof it was due as well to the international economic crisis.3

From the beginning of the 1890s there was an impressive increase in the Greekfleet that continued up to 1914. It is during this second period that the transitionfrom sail to steam took place. Since Greek shipping worked in the internationalarena, it was subject to all the freight rate fluctuations of the industry. There was

a clear relation between investment in the Greek fleet and freight rates (compareFigures 4.1, 4.3 and 4.8). One historian —not taking into consideration thecyclical nature of freight rates—has argued that ‘in 1849 the bad economiccondition of the deep-sea-going Greek merchant marine…marks the beginningof its decline’.4 Others talk of small vessels and a reliance on the outdatedtechnology of the sailing vessel.5 Indeed, some display dismay that even in 1875—at the apex of the ‘golden age’—96 per cent of the Greek fleet was in sail.Greece is compared with Britain, the world’s leading industrial and maritimenation, and not with Norway, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Canada or even the US.Others go even further in misunderstanding the trends and see in the last third ofthe nineteenth century a continuous decline in long-distance deepsea Greekshipping and a ‘specialisation’ in coastal shipping, when in fact it is evident thatexactly the opposite happened.6 It is an almost complete lack of statistics andmisinterpretation of those that exist, combined with a dearth of comparativeanalysis, that has produced such misguided arguments. This chapter provides anew interpretation of the existing statistics and introduces a new set based onLloyd’s Register and the books of the Archangelos shipping registry. The aim isto show what is clearly evident from Figure 4.1: that the Greek fleet underwent acontinuous rise in the nineteenth century, and that the transition from sail tosteam not only did not come late but was contemporary with most maritime

Figure 4.1 Growth of Greek-owned fleet, 1835–1914. Source: Table 4.1

108 SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

nations. This chapter has three parts. The first discusses the sail fleet from 1830sto the 1870s; the second deals with the shift from sail to steam from the 1880s tothe 1910s; and the third examines the patterns of ownership and finance in thesail and steam eras.

THE ERA OF THE SAILING VESSELS (1830s–1870s)

Before we proceed to analyse the Greek sailing fleet it is important to discuss thestatistics on which Table 4.1 is based and on the problem of tonnagemeasurement in the nineteenth century. There are two problems with thestatistics on the nineteenth-century Greek fleet: the first concerns the lack ofreliable official statistical series and the second the comparability of the statisticaldata stemming from changes in various laws concerning the tonnagemeasurements of Greek ships.

The first problem stems from the fact that the existing national statistics aresporadic and the gaps have to be covered using secondary data; especially for theperiod 1830 to 1880, some aggregate statistics can be found but no detailedinformation about the shipowners, ships, places of registration, and the like. Infact, it seems that between the 1830s and 1880s the Greek sailing fleet wascovered substantially by the Bureau Veritas and by the Registro Italiano. SinceGreek sailing vessels were insured by Italian and French companies, bothregistries wanted to include as much information about them as possible. Yetneither provided systematic aggregate statistics; fortunately, we can use datafrom the reliable Greek journal Pandora, which utilised statistics from theMinistry of Shipping for the period 1834–66. Pandora stopped publishingshipping statistics in the latter year because, as it explained, ‘after the ousting [ofKing Otto], the port authority officials were replaced as well. The officers wereeither fired, or continuously transferred, or replaced by incompetents, or by onesshowing minimum desire for work, or they sent no information or veryincomplete statistics’.7

The data we have for the 1870s are presented for the first time and are derivedfrom the archival material in the Archangelos shipping register, the first Hellenicregister that started on 1 January 1870. The driving force behind it was itsDirector, Ioannis Skaltsounis, who in 1854 had established in Cephalonia thesuccessful insurance company Archangelos. This latter company was replaced bya much bigger public firm which, according to its statute of incorporation, wasauthorised as a marine insurance company, shipping bank and register for Greekships. Its directors were quite an impressive group, including importantcontemporaries like Markos Renieris (the Director of the Greek National Bank),Leon Melas, Constantine Dossios, Tryfon Moutsopulos, Nicholaos Meletopulos,Athanassios Zografos, Theodoros Retsinas and Ioannis Christofidis. In hisinaugural speech on 24 December 1869, Skaltsounis reported that as aninsurance company Archangelos had made 17,728 insurance contracts.8 Since1854 he had gathered much information on Greek ships, and over the next


decade and a half the company was able to produce at least a dozen uniqueregister books. Following the format of the Bureau Veritas, they provideddetailed descriptions of all Greek ships, as well as their owners and masters. Thecompany recruited an international network of agents to gather information.According to the 1879 book, it had agents in Alexandria, Ancona, Andros,Antwerp, Braila, Bristol, Cephalonia, Chios, Constantinople, Corfu, Cumes,Cyprus, Falmouth, Galatz, Galaxidi, Geneva, Giurgevo, Hydra, Ismail, Livorno,London, Malta, Marseilles, Messina, Naples, Nea Mitzela, Newcastle, Newport,Odessa, Patras, Palermo, Questown, Riposto, Salonica, Santorini, Skiathos,Scopelos, Smyrna, Spetses, Sulina, Syros, Taganrog, Trieste, Venice and Zante.The company eventually went bankrupt at the beginning of the 1880s, partlybecause it had not properly calculated the risks and partly because of theshipping crisis and the decline of sail after 1875.9 Still, for the first time we haveenough detailed information on all Greek ships, their owners, masters, date andplace of build, tonnage, type of ship, place of registration (whether in Greece orabroad) to analyse the structure of the fleet.10

We lack solid statistics for the 1860s and 1880s, but for some years I havebeen able to use data from the rare 1926 publication, Greek Merchant Shipping,which presents an impressive body of statistics.11 Its two authors —shippinganalysts for years on leading Athenian and Piraeus journals– state that theirsources are ‘official statistics’, but unfortunately they do not specify which ones.This is a problem with many twentieth-century Greek maritime historians: forexample, K.Antonopulos, a prolific writer who gives detailed statistics of theGreek sail and steam fleets, never mentions his sources. From the 1890s onwardsthe statistics of Lloyd’s Register of Shipping are used. Although there isreference to a number of Greek steamships since the 1860s, Lloyd’s Registerpresents us with complete data of all Greek-owned steamships only from 1890,while its data on sailing ships are unfortunately incomplete. To analyse thestructure of the Greek-owned fleet not only for this chapter but also forChapter 6, Greek agent/owners have been selected from the ‘World List ofOwners and Shipowners of Lloyds’ at five-year intervals from 1890 to 1940.

As is evident, nineteenth-century shipping statistics leave much to be desired.There is still a need to collect and analyse annual data from the Bureau Veritasfrom the 1830s to the First World War, in combination with Lloyd’s and theRegistro Italiano, as well as the existing registries of the Port Authorities and theArchangelos registries, to obtain a fully

Table 4.1 Growth of the Greek-owned shipping fleet, 1835–1914 (B’ Class*, converted intoMoorsom net registered tons **)


Year Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons

1835 760 57,858 760 57,8581838 1,046 62,128 1,046 62,128




1839 1,070 62,929 1,070 62,9291840 1,018 77,704 1,018 77,704—1843 949 95,455 949 95,4551844 1,014 102,042 1,014 102,0421845 1,114 112,182 1,114 112,182—1848 1,456 185,573 1,456 185,573—1850 1,482 193,542 1,482 193,5421851 1,437 179,847 1,437 179,8471852 1,375 177,883 1,375 177,8831853 1,329 174,063 1,326 174,063—1855 1,525 206,236 1,525 206,236—1858 1,254 188,321 1,254 188,321—1860 1,212 183,508 4 1,535 ,216 185,0431861 1,330 177,388 4 1,535 ,334 178,9231862 1,153 173,687 4 1,535 1,157 175,2221863 1,425 184,297 4 1,535 1,429 185,8321864 1,230 189,412 4 1,535 1,234 190,9471865 1,661 209,843 6 2,196 1,667 212,0391866 1,355 215,611 11 5,240 1,366 220,851—1868 1,450 220,569 11 5,240 1,461 225,809—1870 1,484 268,375 27 8,230 1,511 276,6051874 1,518 271,927 20 5,971 1,538 277,8981875 1,565 279,682 25 8,096 1,590 287,7781876 1,567 291,278 24 6,925 1,591 298,2031879 1,256 231,478 41 9,617 1,297 241,095—1883 1,318 203,816 50 24,161 1,368 227,977—1887 1,423 203,533 82 39,774 1,505 243,307




1888 1,834 194,984 98 32,325 1,932 227,3091889 1,859 200,842 82 40,589 1,941 241,4311890 1,838 204,031 97 44,684 1,935 248,7151891 1,816 192,430 105 54,987 1,921 247,4171892 1,834 211,035 162 76,996 1,996 288,0311893 1,121 245,035 96 80,113 1,217 325,148—

Sailing ships Steamships TotalYear Ships Tons Ships Tons Ships Tons1895 1,059 246,196 125 89,907 1,184 336,1031900 – 183,677 191 143,436 – 327,113

1902 910 175,999 186 181,531 1,096 357,5301903 1,030 145,032 199 205,996 1,229 351,0281904 212 223,0201905 1,095 145,631 214 221,112 1,309 366,7431906 — — 231 236,322 – –1907 1,135 147,402 255 266,915 1,390 414,3171908 282 304,6681909 980 126,093 287 304,430 1,267 430,5231910 298 312,7981911 322 349,5811912 760 101,459 346 407,137 1,106 508,5961913 788 101,671 365 423,

413***1,153 525,084

1914 780 100,000 407 492,516***

1,187 592,516

Source: Appendix 4.1Notes: * B’Class from 1835 to 1858 included all sailing ships above 30 tons, from 1858

to the 1890s above 60 tons, and from then onwards above 100 tons. When noevidence is given about the B’ Class ships from Appendix 4.1, it has beencalculated from the existing evidence, that 32 per cent or the total number and90 per cent of the total tonnage of ships belong to the B’ Class. ** From 1838to 1869 the data from Appendix 4.1 has been multiplied by 0.78; from 1870 to1878 by 0.97. *** Data from Appendix 4.1 give us only gross tonnage forthese particular years and we have converted it to net tons: 1 net ton isapproximately 60 per cent of a gross ton


reliable time series on Greek shipping.12 Appendix 4.1 presents the results fromthe various existing primary and secondary sources that it is possible to obtain atthis stage. The data from this Table, however, were further modified inTable 4.1 in order to represent the real trend of nineteenth-century deep-seashipping. These were what Greek law classified as B’ Class ships. From theexisting evidence these ships comprised an average of 32 per cent of the totalnumber of ships and 90 per cent of total tonnage. But the main contribution ofTable 4.1 is the conversion of tonnage into Moorsom tons for the data before1878.

The main problem with nineteenth century shipping statistics is theincompatibility between different periods. The difficulty stems from changes inmethods of tonnage measurement. Tonnage measurement has a complicatedhistory but it has always being indispensable to estimate a vessels size andcarrying capacity. The method of measurement has also been of great importancesince it was used globally to calculate freights, port dues, pilotage, towage andquarantine charges, as well as insurance premiums and taxes. In England andFrance it was traditional to measure volume in cargo tons, or so-calleddeadweight tons, according to the wine barrels used in the Bordeaux wine tradecalled ‘tonneau’. The term derives from ‘tun’, denoting a large barrel used in thewine trade and derived from the French tonnerre, or ‘thunder’, named for therumbling it produced when rolled. The problem for tonnage measurement with aweight unit lies in the fact that weights differ for varying cargoes. For example, aship fully loaded with cotton does not carry all the weight it can because cottontakes a lot of space and is very light. On the other hand, a ship that carries iron mightbe half empty and still carry all the weight it can. These are the loadingcoefficients that all experienced masters know about. In this way, because theweight of the cargo varied but the volume of the ship was permanent, volumerather than weight was chosen as a measurement unit. Tonnage measurement inthe first third of the nineteenth century was based on the so-called Builders OldMeasurement (BOM) rule voted by the British Parliament as follows in 1773:

[(coef.) keel length]×breadth×[(coef. debth)]/94The idea was that if the ship were a parallelogram, the volume would bemeasured by the product of the length, breadth and depth, and would beexpressed in tons of 100 cubic feet by dividing by 100. However, the vesselbeing rounded towards the keel and sharpened at the ends, its sides are notparallel and consequently it has a volume considerably less than the aboveproduct. The rule of BOM was an attempt to estimate the space of the vessel bythe product of length, breadth and depth modified by some coefficients and adivisor intended to deduct a fraction of the result obtained to allow for suchrounding off.13 This rule remained valid in Britain, with some modifications in1836, until 1854. The introduction of steam rendered the old type ofmeasurement obsolete and a new method was needed. When this was developed,the result of the works of a committee presided over by Admiral Moorsom, it setthe basis for what we call today gross and net registered tonnage. It set the ton as


a unit equal to 100 cubic feet or 2.83 cubic metres. The new method was basedon more accurate measurements of the ship by dividing it and calculating variousparts of it at a time. Within the next thirty-five years all nations adopted this typeof measurement.

The necessity of having a tonnage for all Greek ships was recognised by theGreek state from its very inception when the government decided to adopt theFrench Law with the Royal Decree of 17 November 1833. The French hadadopted the rule of BOM since 1794 to provide their ships with the same rulesthat prevailed in the larger British fleet. But when the British made somemodifications in 1836 it meant that a British ship of 80 tons was equivalent to aFrench ship of 100 tons. To maintain their competitiveness and not pay higherdues than the British, the French diminished this difference to 3 per cent with anew law in 1838. The Greek government, however, continued to use the oldsystem until 1867, despite continuous protests from shipowners, masters,merchants and insurers, who claimed that Greek merchant ships were penalisedcompared to their foreign counterparts by outmoded measurement practices.14

Finally, in 1867 Greece adopted the 1838 French law. While this was better,the Greek ton continued to be 3 per cent higher than the Moorsom ton until 12February 1878, when Greece embraced the] ton as defined in the ConstantinopleConference of 1873.15 If these problems are ignored, any analysis will yieldtotally erroneous results, since from 1833 to 1867 the Greek ton was 22 per centbigger than the Moorsom ton and from 1867 to 1878 3 per cent bigger.16 InTable 4.1, tonnage from 1833 to 1869 (Appendix 4.1) has been multiplied by 0.78, and from 1870 to 1875 by 0.97, to provide rough comparability.

The sequence of legal changes has led to many problems in explaining thegrowth of the Greek fleet. For instance, the data in the Archangelos register andthe statistics presented by A.N.Vernadakis in his book About the Trade of Greeceindicate different trends for the 1870s (see Appendices 4.2 and 4.3). On the onehand, Vernadakis depicted 1870 as the peak year for the Greek sailing fleet andclaimed that it declined by almost 45 per cent by 1872; despite a slight increasein 1875, the sailing fleet remained at much lower levels than five years earlier.On the other hand, data derived from Archangelos suggest a continuous rise to apeak in 1876. Why are there such discrepancies between the two sources? SinceVernadakis’ figures are probably from official sources, what happened between1870 and 1872 to explain this enormous contraction of the Greek-flag sailingfleet in only two years? Part of the answer must lie in the time-lag forimplementing the 1867 measurement law, which meant that by 1870 theVernadakis figures inflated the deep-sea Greek fleet by 19 per cent. But some ofthe difference must be a result of a change of flag. As the British consuls atBerdiansk and Constantinople reported, in 1872 and 1873 a large number ofGreek vessels hoisted the Russian flag to avoid the heavy dues imposed on Greekshipping in French ports (see Chapter 1). Indeed, as the Archangelos registerreveals, the proportion of the Greek-owned fleet sailing under foreign flagsjumped from 5 per cent in 1870 to 15 per cent in 1874.


Table 4.1 converts into Moorsom tons the Figures from the Archangelosregisters for the 1870s. Since it only began operating in 1870, it is probable thatArchangelos did not include all Greek ships in that decade. It is also likely thatthe upward trend in the Archangelos figures for 1870–6 was a function of thefact that it was continually updated to include ships omitted in previous years; asa result, it was probably better at charting its own evolution rather than that ofthe Greek fleet. None the less, the enormous decrease shown by Vernadakisduring an era of high freight rates and general shipping prosperity in the easternMediterranean leads to the conclusion that, despite its problems, the Archangelosfigures at least reflect the real trend. Now we come to a further complication, thequestion of flags. Table 4.1 depicts mainly the Greek-flag rather than the Greek-owned fleet. But evidence from Chapter 1, Appendix 4.4 and Table 4.4 implythat there were a large number of Greek-owned vessels that used other flags. ByGreek-owned I mean a vessel owned by a Greek and manned mainly by a Greekcrew.17 This definition certainly has practical consequences. First, from 1835 to1864 the Ionian fleet is excluded since these islands were under Britishjurisdiction. Also, a large number of Aegean islands, such as Chios, Kassos,Samos, Castelorizo, Lemnos and Leros, which became part of Greece in the earlytwentieth century, along with numerous ports along the Mediterranean and BlackSea coasts of Asia Minor, owned significant tonnage yet flew the Ottoman flag(see Appendix 4.5). Further evidence from Archangelos and Lloyd’s Registeralso reveals that Greeks used the Russian and Moldavian flags. In short, toprovide a meaningful time series on the growth of the Greek fleet requires acombination of various Greek and foreign registries.

As if these problems were not enough there is a further complication in thelate nineteenth century concerning gross and net tonnage (GRT). The grossregistered tonnage of a ship is a measure of the internal volume of all enclosedspaces and is equal to the tonnage below the upper deck of the ship. Netregistered tonnage (NRT) is the residual tonnage after the deduction of spacesfor crew accommodation, navigation and propulsion. The exclusion of engineand fuel rooms renders net tonnage more compatible with sailing ships and thus Ihave used net tonnage. Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, in its pre-1914 aggregatestatistics, provides net tonnage for sailing ships and gross and net tonnage forsteamships. In order to give a country’s total tonnage, however, it adds sailingship net tonnage to the gross tonnage of steamers.18 The use of secondarysources in various Greek statistics should be used with care in order not toconfuse the two since the ratio of a net ton to a gross ton is roughly 0.6.

Figure 4.2 depicts clearly the ascendancy of sail in the Greek fleet prior to1875. From 1835 to 1875 there is an upward trend with peaks in 1848, 1855 and1875 and two three-year interruptions of troughs (1850–3 and 1859–62). Thistrend was the result of freight rates that reached unprecedented levels in 1847and 1853. Bad harvests from 1845 to 1848 in western Europe necessitated largeimports of grain from the Black Sea; the abolition of the Corn Laws in Britain in1846 and the Navigation Laws in 1849, followed by the other western European


countries, further facilitated the increase of grain exports from the Black Sea. Asa response to the increased demand, freight rates shot up for three years (seeFigure 4.3), only to plummet in 1849 causing a crisis for the Greek fleet, whichwas entirely dependent on this trade. As a result of the high freight ratesthe Greeks had built too many ships at high prices, which they could notamortise when freight rates returned to ‘normal’. This over-investment in timesof prosperity leads to an oversupply of ships, brings the freight rates down andleads to a crisis typical in tramp shipping over the last 150 years.19

Tramping is entirely dependent on exogenous demand and thrives on thecyclical fluctuations of freight rates. Apart from the better western Europeanharvests after 1848, the shipping crisis was deepened by the European economicand commercial crisis of 1847–8 that was felt in the Greek shipping market in1849.20 The result was a series of fraudulent sinkings and similar acts by Greekmasters.21 Such actions brought bankruptcy to most Syros insurance companies,which could not cope with such an abnormal number of wrecks. The internationalcharacter of Greek shipping and its heavy involvement with Marseilles trade hadrepercussions felt outside the Greek kingdom. The French Minister of Commercesent a letter to the Marseilles Chamber of Commerce warning French insurers ofthe risks involved in insuring Greek ships and cargoes.22 Under such pressure theGreek government passed a law in November 1851 ‘concerning shipping loanbooks’ by which each Greek ship was obliged to carry a book (libretto) in whichevery single loan concerning the ship was to be included. With this book it was

Figure 4.2 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1835–75. Source: Table 4.1


hoped that insurers could have a much clearer view of the financial burdens andthus act accordingly.

The Crimean War caused freight rates to rise to extremely high levels onceagain (Figures 4.3 and 4.4) and their decline after the war brought anothercontraction of the Greek fleet from 1859 to 1862. This crisis was reinforced byanother European financial crisis in 1857–8 which hit Britain especially hard andled to a panic on the British Stock Exchange in April and May 1859. Moreover,it was exacerbated by a series of poor harvests in the Black Sea region until thebeginning of the 1860s.23 This crisis hit a number of Chiot merchants, who wentbankrupt with a concomitant effect on the availability of credit to all merchantsin the network. Despite a contraction from 1859 to 1862, the fleet quicklyresumed its strength and expanded until the mid-1870s. In fact, if we look at thefreight rates in Figure 4.4, we notice that from 1855 to 1874 freight rates variedmildly between thirty-seven and twenty-eight shillings per ton of wheat. Duringthe same time there was a continuous increase in grain exports from the Danubeand southern Russia in which Greek merchants played an important role. Andjust when the exports of grain had reached a remarkable level in the early 1870sand freight rates seemed to have stabilised, increased competition and lowergrain prices, in combination with the effect of lower transport costs induced by

Figure 4.3 Freight rates of tallow, Odessa-England

Source: Harvey, 1938, p. 187


steam, brought an abrupt decrease of freight rates. Between 1874 and 1885freights dropped by two-thirds.

The connections of the Greek sailing shipowners and masters based in Greecewith the Chiot and Ionian networks determined the path of the Greek sailing shipfleet. We can distinguish three main maritime areas which constituted the homeof Greek shipping. The first is the Aegean islands, the second the mainland andthe third the Ionian islands. Figure 4.5, which divides the maritime areas ofGreece into these categories, shows clearly the predominance of the Aegean fleetthroughout the nineteenth century.

The indisputable centre of the Aegean islands, and the main maritime andcommercial capital of the small Greek state for the first fifty years of itsexistence, was the island of Syros. Ermoupolis, its capital, was built by Chiotrefugees in 1822. Chios, one of the most prosperous Aegean islands in the OttomanEmpire, was destroyed in 1822 by the Turks in retaliation for the beginning ofthe Greek Revolution in 1821. Syros, due to the protection granted by Franceduring the decade of the revolution and its advantageous position in the centre ofthe Aegean, became Greece ‘s bigge port.24 In 1870 it was still the third biggestport in the eastern Mediterranean (see Table 1.1), after Constantinople andAlexandria. Syros was the first shipbuilding centre of the Greek fleet. In

Figure 4.4 Freight rates of wheat, Odessa-England

Source: C.Knick Harley, 1989


Table 4.2 we can see that during the period 1843–58 52 per cent of all tonnagebuilt in Greece came from Syros, followed by Spetses (17 per cent) and Galaxidi(7 per cent). In 1879 there was an even higher concentration in the sameshipbuilding centres: during this year 64 per cent of the ships built in Greece camefrom Syros. We notice the ascendancy of Galaxidi, renowned for its fine largeships, to second position. Spetses was still a substantial

Table 4.2 Shipbuilding in Greece, 1843–58

Placebuilt

Deep-sea-going Coastal Totalships

Totaltons

% total

Brigs Gollettes Gabaras Other* Various**

A. 1843–58Syros 524 123 7 126 129 909 134,

31852

Spetses 225 – 2 26 390 643 44,337 17

Figure 4.5 Registration of Greek-owned ships

Source: Appendix 4.4


Placebuilt

Deep-sea-going Coastal Totalships

Totaltons

% total

Brigs Gollettes Gabaras Other* Various**

Galaxidi

62 28 – 58 14 162 17,982 7

Scopelos

52 22 1 8 69 152 11,981 5

Other***

167 102 109 180 1,229 1,720 47,053 18

Total 3,586 255,671

100

B. 1879 (including above 50 tons)Syros 337 123 33 46 539 104,

92164

Galaxidi

77 7 3 9 96 20,772 12

Spetses 56 2 – 11 69 12,726 8Kassos 43 2 4 3 52 9,720 6Other****

41 113 15,800 10

Total*****

869 163,939

100

Sources: For the period 1843–58 see Constantine Papathanasopoulos, Greek MerchantMarine, (1833–1856). Development and Re-adjustment, Athens, CulturalFoundation of the National Bank of Greece, 1983, p. 96–7; data from Pandora,vol. 9, 1858–9, pp. 517–18. For 1879 see Appendix 4.6

Notes: * Other: bombarda, sakoleva, mystika and vratsera. ** Various: trechandiri,tserniki, perama, caique, trata and lemvos. For more on Greek types of ship seeKostas Damianidis, ‘Vernacular Boats and Boatbuilding in Greece’, PhDthesis, University of St Andrews, Scotland, 1989; and Damianidis and TassosLeontidis, Greek Wooden Sailing Boats of the 20th Century, Crete, Museum ofCretan Ethnology, Gavrielides Editions, 1992. ***Other: Hydra, Piraeus,Poros, Koronis, Mykonos, Santorini, Andros, Milos, Skiathos, Chalkis,Amaliapolis, Kymi, Messolonghi, Patras, Pylos, Calamata. **** SeeAppendix 4.6. ***** Total: It does not include the Greek-owned ships builtabroad, see Appendix 4.6

shipbuilding place despite its proportional decline. Interestingly, we find Kassosreplacing Skopelos as the fourth most important island for ship-building. It isevident that throughout the sailing ship period the brig was the main type ofdeep-sea vessel followed by the gollettes and gabaras. Gabaras (barques) werebig ships and thus appear more frequently in 1879 than earlier. The other typesof ship were usually built to be less than 100 tons. The archival material shows


that after the 1850s deep-sea-going vessels were rarely below 100 tons (seeAppendix 4.5).

In the Archangelos register we can examine other features of the fleet that wehave not been able to trace before the 1870s. It seems that the Greeks alwayspurchased a percentage of their ships secondhand from abroad. This percentagemust have been at its highest in the 1870s because of the transition from sail tosteam, especially in western Europe, when secondhand sales of sailing ships atreduced prices increased. According to the data available in 1879 (seeAppendix 4.6), 17 per cent of the Greek-owned fleet was built abroad, in westernEurope (11 percent), the Ottoman Empire (4 percent) and the countries of theBlack Sea (2 percent). Apart from being the largest shipbuilding site for Greeksailing ships Syros was also the main maritime market for the Greek fleet. TheGreek master who arrived at Syros not only found experienced shipbuilders andmaterials to build or repair his ship but also market information, seamen,brokers, insurance and shipping loans.25 Its large populations of Chiot merchantsensured its position as an important base in the Chiot network. The Chiot andother merchants established on the island made short-term credit available forcommerce and shipping (see Appendix 4.7). Despite the existence of aninsurance market it seems that Greek masters preferred the insurance companiesof Constantinople, Odessa or Trieste, usually owned by Greeks of the Chiotnetwork.26

The second and third most important Aegean islands in 1855 were still theislands of Spetses and Hydra, which constituted the traditional maritime islandsof the pre-revolutionary years. If we consider, however, that in 1821 they held 71per cent of Greeces tonnage, the fall in their share of merchant shipping wasdramatic.27

The second biggest maritime area of Greece pictured in Figure 4.5 was themainland. This area mainly consisted of two ports, Galaxidi and Piraeus, bothinvolved with deep-sea vessels. Piraeus in 1855 was still very little developedand represented only 5 per cent of total Greek tonnage. Galaxidi in 1855 owned 8per cent of the total fleet and was a flourishing maritime community throughoutthe nineteenth century. Nevertheless, Galaxidi stands out in Greek maritimehistory because it disappeared from the shipping scene in the twentieth centurydue to its failure to invest in steam.28 The inability to invest in steam wasprobably caused by the lack of Galaxidiot merchants in the Black Sea and theabsence of any kinship relations with the Ionian network. The other ports on themainland, Kranidi, Patras, Kymi, Chalkis and so on, were all involved in coastalshipping.

The third maritime area of Greece, and the real competitors to the Aegeanislands, was the Ionian islands. Although they only became part of Greece in1864, it has been estimated that they had approximately 40,000 tons in 1854 andaccounted for 12 per cent of the total Greek-owned fleet.29 The islands of Zante,Cephalonia and Ithaca owned the bulk of the deepsea vessels, whereas Corfu wasinvolved into coastal shipping. As we have already discussed Ionians prospered


in the grain trade and its transport from the Danube and the Azov. Moreover,they pioneered the transition from sail to steam. The low percentages of Ionianshipping that appear in Figure 4.5 for 1895 and 1914 are misleading. Figure 4.5presents evidence of where the vessels were registered and not to whom theybelonged. But if we look at the origin of the steamship owners from 1890 to1914 as they appear in Appendices 4.9–4.14, we can see that the Ionians presentthe most important group of shipowners in the last decade of the nineteenthcentury. Comparing the years 1855 and 1879, we notice that in about twenty-fiveyears the importance of the Aegean fleet diminished while it retained itsimportance by keeping 60 per cent of total Greek tonnage; we also notice anincrease of the mainland and an increase of the Ionian islands (seeAppendix 4.4). In 1879 we have evidence of Greek-owned ships registered in theOttoman Empire, and the islands of Chios, Kassos, Samos, Castelorizo, Lemnos,Leros and Mytilene which eventually became part of Greece, held 4 per cent outof the total of 11 per cent found registered in the neighbouring country.

After 1875 the decline of the Greek sailing fleet started due to the abruptdecrease of freight rates and the prolonged shipping crisis from 1877 to 1884.The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–8 further aggravated the problems and in the1880s, the decade when the British steamship fleet surpassed its sailing ship fleet(see Table 4.7), the Greek merchants of the Ionian network made their firststeamship purchases. Although the introduction of steam into Mediterraneanmaritime transports was evident from the 1840s, its massive penetration into theeastern Mediterranean and Black Sea really only began in the 1870s. Sailingvessels, however, continued to operate for another thirty to forty years, despitethe great competition they encountered from the new iron beasts. As C.KnickHarley has written, ‘The new technology did not emerge as decisively superioras some in the history of science seem to suggest, but rather overtook the old in aprocess of continuing improvement.’30 One of the main advantages of the sailingvessels was that they had lower costs on longer voyages, while steamers had anadvantage on shorter routes. Because the steamships had to devote a large part oftheir cargo capacity to carrying fuel, the final triumph of steam came whentechnological improvements reduced coal consumption in the marine steamengine. The result was that the costs of steamers were reduced more quickly thanthose of the sailing ships.31 Table 4.3 shows a calculation of the routes fromBritain on which sailing ships and steamers were competitive.

Table 4.3 The voyages on which sail and steam were competitive for bulk cargo

Date (approximate) Voyage Distance

1855 –Northern Europe 500 miles1865 –Mediterranean up to 3,000 miles1870 –North Atlantic 3,000 miles

–Calcutta 8,200 via Canal; 11,200 viaCape


Date (approximate) Voyage Distance

1895 –West coast of America 13,500 to San FranciscoSource: C.Knick Harley, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping, 1850–1913’, in Lewis

R. Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds.), Change and Adaptation in MaritimeHistory. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St Johns, NF,Maritime History Group, 1985, Table 1

It is evident that sailing ships remained competitive with steamers in the

longer routes until the end of the century. In the 1870s sail was still competitivein the Atlantic grain trade of about 3,000 miles, so we can safely assume it wasequally competitive in the Black Sea grain trade. Despite the fact that the finalreplacement of sail by steam in the Mediterranean took place in the 1880s, anumber of 200–300 ton wooden vessels continued working until the 1890s. Themain reasons were that sailing ships continued to carry cheap bulk cargoes at lowrates and were still preferred, especially when freight rates were low. It was onlywhen freight rates became so low that they could not cope that sail was drivenout of business.

The traditional maritime nations continued building large sailing shipsthroughout the last third of the nineteenth century, but now mainly of steel andutilising the new steam technology for the handling of gear. Although the Britishhad already replaced wooden sailing vessels with iron ones by 1860, othercountries continued to build wooden vessels. For example, the shipyards ofAtlantic Canada continued to do so until the 1880s and beyond.32 On the otherside of the ocean, Norwegians continued building wooden vessels until the1890s. The concentration of Norwegians on a few bulk trades rendered theircheap sailing vessels efficient and gave them a comparative advantage.33 Theproductivity of steam increased the productivity of the sailing vessels in the long-haul trades. Although the first blow to the sailing vessels was the opening of theSuez Canal, the final one was the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, since itshortened the route around South America by 5,000 to 7,000 miles.

INVESTMENTS IN NEW TECHNOLOGY: THE ERA OFSTEAMSHIPS, 1880s–1910s

The second period in the evolution of the Greek-owned merchant fleet occurredbetween about 1880 and the First World War and was marked by the successfultransition from sail to steam. As Figure 4.6 indicates, after a rather stagnantperiod in the 1880s, there was a clear upward trend to 1914. This section willanalyse the structural and qualitative changes that underlay this expansion.

While the transition from sail to steam in the Greek-owned deep-sea merchantmarine started in the 1880s, steam was first introduced in the Greek fleet with theestablishment of the Greek Steamship Company (GSC) in 1856. Following the


trends of the other European nations the Greek state, together with the NationalBank and a small group of diaspora merchants, established the GSC withsubsidies to cover the needs of coastal transportation in 1856. Britain was thefirst to provide subsidies to new steamship companies in the form of mailsubventions, a practice that continued until the First World War.

The GSC experiment, for various complex reasons, proved a total commercialand economic failure, and after an almost forty-year life the company was woundup in the 1890s.34 Its establishment had very little effect on the ultimatetransition. Indeed, the factors that led to the formation of the GSC were completelydifferent from those that prevailed in the rest of the fleet, 90 per cent of whichwas engaged in deep-sea trade. The GSC fleet, according to Lloyd’s Register ofShipping, in 1865 consisted of six steamships of 2,653 NRT, and constituted 1per cent of the total Greek fleet (see Appendix 4.1).

The first massive purchases of steam were not consummated by the owners ofsailing vessels within Greece but by the merchants and shipowners from abroad.As we have already seen, prominent members of the Chiot network weresteamship owners from the 1850s but we do not consider their fleet as ‘Greek-owned’ because it not only flew the British flag but also used British crews. Thedecline of the Chiot network in the 1860s led to a contraction in their steamownership by 1870, with the exception of Papayanni, who continued to prosperthroughout the nineteenth century (see Table 4.4). The first purchasers of Greek-

Figure 4.6 Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1876–1914. Source: Table 4.1


owned steamships were prominent members of the Ionian network: the VaglianoBrothers, Stathatos and Theofilatos, Stathopulos, Embiricos, Cicellis, Foscoloand Mango, Nicolopulo, as well as the descendants of the Chiot network whowere integrated with the Ionians, like Rodocanachi and Scaramanga. From 1880to 1885 they acquired twenty steamships of 17,446 NRT, almost allnewbuildings. In fact, we have a contemporary account of the purchase of one ofthese early ships.

In June 1880 the Nicolopulos, established in Galatz (Demetrius Nicolopulo)and Marseilles (his son Ioannis), ordered a new steamship at the British yard ofBartram Haswell in Sunderland. The man they sent to supervise construction wasthe future master, Captain Anastassios Syrmas, whose valuable testimony wehave from his correspondence with the Nicolopulos. Captain Syrmas, apart fromhis correspondence, also left us with a rich archive of logs, ships’ accounts,letters and other documents (Syrmas is discussed in detail in Chapter 5). Fromthis correspondence we know that this particular shipyard was chosen becausethe Vagliano Brothers had already ordered a steamship from there. Captain Syrmasreports that in July 1880 the Vaglianos had ordered another new steamer that was‘255 feet long, 35 wide and 6 feet high, about 2,100 NRT and was going to cost£21,000’.35 The Vaglianos were Nicolopulos’ formal agents, handling thepayments and formally supervising construction. Half the payment for theNicolopulos ship was given at its completion and the other half in London (insterling) during the next six months without interest on a guarantee by theVaglianos.

Captain Syrmas reported each week to the Vaglianos in London and to theNicolopulos in Marseilles and Galatz on the progress of building. The steamship,named Calliope Nicolopulo, took five months to finish, and had a GRT of 1,550tons and an NRT of 1,004 tons. Her building cost £9,750 and she was registeredat Lloyd’s as 100 A1. Calliope Nicolo pulo, Captain A.Syrmas, with an Englishchief engineer, a Greek crew and a charter arranged by the Vaglianos, sailed fromSunderland on 10 November 1880 to Constantinople at nine miles per hour. Shewas registered at Syros on 22 December 1880.

During his five-month stay Captain Syrmas received several letters frommerchants or shipowners inquiring about the cost of steamships, methods ofpayment and the time required. More specifically, as Syrmas reported to theNicolopulos, the Stathopulos from Naples asked permission from the Vaglianosto build a similar steamer as that being built in Sunderland.36 The Syros-basedMatheos Calvocoressis in July 1880 asked Syrmas about secondhand steamerprices, and in August the sailing shipowners Cosmas Brothers and G.Kulukundis based in Syros inquired about building a 1,200–1,500 tonsteamship.37

The stabilisation of freight rates at the end of the 1880s and their consequentpeak at the turn of the century due to the Boer War, not only in the main bulkcargoes but also in all tramp trades (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8), led to massive


purchases of steamships in the 1890s and the first decade of the twentiethcentury. Two phases can be distinguished in the

Table 4.4 Steamships owned by members of the Chiot and Ionian networks, 1860–85

Shipowner Name of ship Tons Built Registered

1860A. Chiot1. Melas L. Aphroezza 133 1857 London2. Papayanni Agia Sofia 1,437 1857 Liverpool

Arcadia 798 1855 LiverpoolOmonia 464 1858 LiverpoolThessalia 1,169 1855 Liverpool

3. Xenos S. Kanaris 927 1858 LondonAsia 1,093 1858 LondonColettis 216 1856 LondonOlympius 280 1860 LondonBozzaris 659 1858 LondonModern Greece 753 1859 LondonPetrobeys 562 1860 London

Figure 4.7 Freight rates of coal and wheat

Source: C.Knick Harley, 1989



Scotia 1,196 1857 LondonSmyrna 322 1859 LondonZaimis 259 1860 London

4. Spartali Demetrius 418 1856 London5. Schilizzi Michigan 856 London1870A.Chiot1. Spartali Spartan 1,200 1868 London

Toscoff 1,199 1868 LondonDemetrius 419 1856 London

2. Papayanni Agia Sofia 977 1856 LiverpoolArcadia 1,164 1855 LiverpoolMacedonia 1,686 1867 LiverpoolThessalia 1,169 1855 Liverpool

B.Ionian1. Vagliano Cephalonia 114 1865 Braila1880

Figure 4.8 Tramp shipping freight rates, 1866–1913

Sources: Fischer and Nordvik, 1986; Isserlis, 1938



A. Chiot1. Spartali Demetrius 418 1856 London

Spartan 1,200 1868 London2. Papayanni Agia Sofia 977 1856 Liverpool

Arcadia 1,164 1855 LiverpoolMacedonia 1,686 1867 LiverpoolThessalia 1,169 1855 LiverpoolArarat 1,305 1871 LiverpoolLaconia 1,295 1856 LiverpoolLord Clive 2,206 1871 LiverpoolLord Glough 2,370 1879 LiverpoolOrontes 538 – LiverpoolRoumelia 1,418 1877 Liverpool

3. Rodocanachi Theodore R. 246 1869 Odessa

B.Ionian

1. Lambrinidi Lambrinidi E. 1,869 1869 Galatz2. Theofilatos Ithaca 698 1873 Cephalonia3. Theofilatos & Icarius 45 1877 IthacaStathatos Mentor 34 1878 Ithaca

Parthenon 853 1877 Ithaca4. Vagliano Mari Vagliano 948 1880 London

Vagliano Bros 1,087 1878 London5. Stathopulo Cephalonia 766 1878 Naples1885A.Chio1. Papayanni Agia Sofia 1,437 1856 Liverpool

Arcadia 1,164 1855 LiverpoolMacedonia 1,686 1867 LiverpoolThessalia 1,169 1855 LiverpoolArarat 1,305 1871 LiverpoolLaconia 1,295 1856 LiverpoolLord Clive 2,206 1871 LiverpoolLord Glough 2,370 1879 LiverpoolOrontes 538 – LiverpoolRoumelia 1,418 1877 Liverpool



2. Rodocanachi Theodore R. 246 1879 OdessaEugenie R. 353 1878 OdessaVera 532 1881 Odessa

3. Scaramanga Chios 1,106 1884 SyrosB.Ionian1. Cicellis Livanthos 449 1869 Marseilles

Lixuri 860 1880 Marseilles2. Stathopulo Lesbos 845 1879 Naples

Zakynthos 973 1882 Naples3. Foscolo Mathilda 111 1883 Constantinople& Mango4. Embiricos Constantinos 1,109 1884 Andros

Embiricos 991 1873 Andros5. Nicolopulo Calliope

Nicolopulo 1,004 1880 Syros6. Stathatos Andriana Stath. 1,068 1884 Ithaca

Antonios Stath. 976 1883 Ithaca7. Theofilatos Stathatos & Icarius 45 1877 IthacaMentor 34 1878 Ithaca

Parthenon 853 1877 Ithaca8. Vagliano Mari Vagliano 948 1880 London

Vagliano Bros 1,087 1878 LondonAdelphi Cuppa 890 1880 LondonAndrea Vagliano 1045 1880 LondonNich. Vagliano 1,101 1883 LondonP.A.Vagliano 962 1880 LondonSpyr. Vagliano 1,111 1883 London

Sources: Selected data, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1885

transition from sail to steam. The first one lasted roughly from the mid–1880s tothe late 1890s, and the other for fifteen years from 1900 to the beginning of the FirstWorld War. The first phase was characterised by the domination of members ofthe Ionian network and the emergence of the shipping agents and shipowners ofConstantinople. As is evident from Table 4.4 and Appendices 4.9 and 4.10, themerchants and shipowners of Rumania, southern Russia, Marseilles and Londonwere the main steamship owners up to about 1895, when 52 per cent of the totaltonnage of Greek-owned steamers belonged to them. These first steamshipowners bought primarily newbuildings; according to Table 4.6, 36 per cent ofsteam tonnage bought between 1890 and 1895 were 0–5 years old (cf. alsoTable 4.4). The members of the Ionian network who invested in steam gradually


abandoned their other commercial activities and specialised in shipowning.Knowledge of trade, abundance of capital and connections with Londoneventually made them among the most successful shipowners of the first third ofthe twentieth century.

The other distinctive feature of this first phase was the rising importance of anew breed of shipowners and shipping agents situated in Constantinople. Apartfrom being the main port and financial centre, Constantinople was also the mainmaritime centre of the eastern Mediterranean. An important port of call, it had alarge number of shipping agents and shipowners who could find information,charter, insure and finance ships. Between 1890 and 1895 there emerged anumber of successful new Greek shipowners who by 1895 owned 22 per cent ofthe total tonnage of Greek-owned steamers. Foscolo & Mango, Michalinos andP.M.Courtgi were among the most prominent (see Appendices 4.9 and 4.10).

The second phase of the transition was characterised by the decline of theIonian network and the establishment of a new order in Greek shipping: theconsolidation of the new steam shipowners in the new maritime centres fromwhere they continued their activities throughout the twentieth century, Piraeusand London. There was a distinct transfer of the operational activities of someIonian shipowners to Piraeus and a massive entrance into steam of medium andsmall shipowners from Greece. The transfer of the operational centres from theBlack Sea and Constantinople to Piraeus and London is clearly shown inFigure 4.9. In a two-decade period, the operation of steamships from the BlackSea dropped dramatically from 33 per cent in 1895 to 12 per cent in 1914; theequivalent percentage from Constantinople dropped from 25 per cent in 1895 to22 per cent in 1900 to 13 per cent in 1914. In contrast, steam tonnage operatingfrom Greece rose from 24 per cent in 1895 to 41 per cent in 1900 and 63 per centin 1914. At the other side of the Greek-controlled maritime network, thepercentage of Greek-owned steam tonnage with headquarters in London,Marseilles and other European ports varied between 10 and 20 per cent.

Table 4.5 Greek shipping offices in London

Shippingoffice/representing

1900 1905 1910 1914*

1 Ships NRT % Ships NRT Ships NRT Ships GRT %

A.IonianIslands 9 13,764 43 3 4,982 4 7,833 29 79,424

34VaglianoBros

4 6,231 1 1,220

Mango& Doresa

5 7,533 2 3,762



1900 1905 1910 1914*


DoresaC.

4 7,833 7 19,757

Lykiardopulo &Co

7 14,440

A.Frangopulo

7 23,652

Theofilatos D.J.

1 622

Vergottis – – 3 8,978Ambatiello Bros

4 11,975

Figure 4.9 Headquarters of steamship firms

Sources: Appendices 4.10–4.14.



1900 1905 1910 1914*


B.Andros 4 6,780 21 8 14,108 19 33,927 28 90,90640

S.G.Embiricos

4 6,780 5 9,095 6 11,573 11 34,891

C.L.Embiricos

– – 3 5,013 3 5,013 4 10,892

A.A.Embiricos

10 17,341 13 45,123

C.Chios 5 8,416 27 9 16,511 20 35,534 21 57,50125

Michalinos

4 6,581 4 7,398 14 23,787 10 22,329

Scaramanga Bros

1 1,835 3 5,926 4 7,642 8 24,241

Sechiari 2 3,187 2 4,105 3 10,931D. Other 2 2,839 9 1 1,476 11 17,861 1 2,323 1Mango& Co

– – 4 6,495

Galbraith&

Pembroke 2

2,839 1 1,476 2 2,839

Wigham&

Richardson

5 8,527 1 2,323

Total 20 31,799 100 21 37,077 54 95,155 79 230,154100

Sources: Appendices 4.16–4.19

New developments in international shipping and trade meant thatspecialisation in shipowning no longer meant dependency on a particular tradebut rather attachment to a large international centre. Thus, on the one hand,A.A.Embiricos and Embiricos Brothers from the Danube and MichalinosAmbatiellos and Mango from Constantinople moved to London, whileD.J.Theofilatos transferred to Rotterdam and London. On the other hand, thecompanies of Othon A.Stathatos, Dionyssios A.Stathatos, ConstantineA.Stathatos, A.N.Theofilatos, N.D.Lykiardopulos, Dracoulis Brothers, G.M.Embiricos and N.G.Kyriakides from the Danube, along with Yannoulatos fromConstantinople moved the headquarters of their firms to Piraeus.

While until 1895 Vagliano Brothers was the only shipping office in London,by 1900 there were five and in 1914 a dozen Greek shipping offices operatingthere (see Table 4.5). In 1900 there were four shipping firms with headquarters in


London and one shipping agency while in 1914 there were six firms withheadquarters in Britain and seven shipping agencies. In 1900 the shipping firms/agencies in England owned or represented 22 per cent of the tonnage of theGreek fleet, while in 1914 the London offices represented or owned 28 per cent(see Appendices 4.16–4.19). It is thus evident that on the eve of the First WorldWar Piraeus and London were already the main maritime centres from whichGreek shipowners grew and expanded their business throughout the twentiethcentury.

The expansion of the Piraeus shipping market was due to the massive entranceof many small sailing shipowners after 1905 through co-ownerships. Theseventy-two shipping companies situated in Piraeus in 1905 became 125 in 1910and 156 in 1914 (Appendices 4.12–4.14). The steamship tonnage acquired duringthe decade 1900–10 more than doubled that acquired in the 1890s (seeTable 4.6). One of the main reasons for this was that the high freight rates at theturn of the century were followed by a period of relatively low rates which alsomeant low prices for ships (see Figure 4.10). It was during this period that manyof the prominent twentieth-century shipowners from Kassos and Chios boughttheir first steamships. The limited capital of these small owners meant that theage structure of the steamers deteriorated, particularly after 1905. Between 1900and 1905 30 per cent of the tonnage acquired consisted of newbuildings whilethe equivalent percentage between 1905 and 1910 was 16 per cent. Moreover, 40per cent of the newly acquired Greek steamship tonnage between 1905 and 1910was between fifteen and twenty-five years of age. Equally the average age of newacquisitions during the period 1890–1910 doubled (see Table 4.6).

Table 4.6 Age structure of new acquisitions of Greek steamships, 1895–1910

1890–5 1895–1900 1900–5 1905–10

Years Ships NRT Ships NRT Ships NRT Ships NRT

0–5 28 25,275 14 17,968 28 47,265 18 31,5545–10 14 10,850 14 17,025 13 20,325 14 21,81310–15 29 18,953 11 12,809 32 40,564 24 24,13115–20 11 5,489 18 15,766 7 8,504 42 55,62020–5 6 3,589 8 6,326 21 16,019 25 22,39425> 16 5,706 10 5,181 24 11,123 83 43,898Not found 5 5,587 23 22,303Total 104 69,862 80 80,662 148 166,103 206 199,410Average date built 1882 1885 1889 1886(8–13 yrs) (10–15 yrs) (11–16yrs) (19–24 yrs)Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1905, 1914

The final transition from sail to steam in the Greek fleet took place in 1902–3when steam tonnage surpassed sail (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.11). It has often


been written that the Greeks replaced their sailing vessels with steamers very late.A lack of any comparison with other maritime nations has led to this belief.Table 4.7, however, shows the transition from sail to steam in the leading fifteenmaritime nations. In 1880 no traditional maritime nation had more steam thansail tonnage, and as late as 1880 73 per cent of the British fleet still consisted ofsailing ships. From 1880 to 1890 steam in Great Britain, Germany, Spain andBelgium surpassed sail; from 1890 to 1900 Italy, Holland and Denmark joinedthe club; and it was from 1900 to 1910 that steam took over in the US, Norway,Sweden, Russia and Greece. In fact by 1910, 69 per cent of the Greek fleet wassteam, while in the US only 56 per cent was and in Norway only 59 per cent.Greeces transition thus took place well within the period that all maritimenations replaced their sailing tonnage with steam.

PATTERNS OF OWNERSHIP AND FINANCE

To investigate the exact patterns by which the transition was financed, the shipregistries of the main maritime centres of Greece need to be studied. These arescattered in the port authorities of the ports and islands of Greece and containdetailed information about ownership and partnerships of every ship. The factthat many Greek merchant/shipowners, whether in Taganrog, Braila,Constantinople, Marseilles or London registered their vessels either in their

Figure 4.10 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1900–14



island of origin or in Syros, the main Greek maritime centre, makes thisinformation particularly valuable. For the purpose of this analysis, we

Table 4.7 Steam tonnage as percentage of total tonnage of the main maritime nations,1880–1910

1880 1890 1900 1910

Britain 27% 63% 79% 91%USA 14 30 40 56Germany 11 62 71 84Norway 2 10 35 59Canada 5 7 19 34France 20 61 60 64Italy 5 24 60 63Sweden 9 26 50 76Spain 18 60 83 91Russia 15 26 50 76Holland 12 46 76 89Denmark 14 38 69 85Greece 3 16 48 69Finland 3 10 15 22

Figure 4.11 From sail to steam, 1875–1914. Source: Table 4.1


1880 1890 1900 1910

Belgium 55 94 97 98Source: Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘Maritime Transport and the Integration

of the North Atlantic Economy, 1850–1914’, in Wolfram Fischer, R.MarvinMcInnis and Jurgen Schneider (eds), The Emergence of a World Economy1500–1914, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986, table IV

have examined the registries of the island of Syros and the port of Piraeus forthe period 1880–1910, a total of 188 ships of about 190,000 NRT, representing35 per cent of all steamships and 37 per cent of the total tonnage purchased byGreeks during this period. The Syros registries in Hermoupolis containinformation for the whole period, while the Piraeus registries only start in1900.38 As Table 4.8 indicates, the capital for the transition from sail to steam inthe Greek fleet came first from the members of the Ionian network in southRussia, the Danube and Constantinople, second from the Bank of Athens whichwas directly connected to the Ionian network, third from the bankers andmerchants from the island of Syros, and fourth by their own or other sources. Inthis way the south Russian, Danubian and Constantinople merchant/shipowner/bankers were responsible for one-third of the tonnage of steamships registered atthese two ports between 1880 and 1910. This group of investors, the members ofthe Ionian network, were the first owners of steamships in the 1880s and 1890s;as Table 4.9 indicates the ships registered during these two decades at Syros andPiraeus were mostly owned by them individually. There was a significantnumber of Greek masters, however, employed on these ships who became part-owners of the vessels on which they served; many times when the steamshipsbecame sufficiently old they bought them with other members of their family asco-owners. In this way, after 1900 large joint-partnerships appeared, a sign of theentrance of the older sailing shipowners into steam.

Table 4.8 Investing groups of the Greek-owned steamship fleet, Syros and Piraeus shipregistries, 1880–1910

Investing groups Ships NRT %

Merchant/shipowners ofSouth Russia

13 11,880 6

Merchant/shipowners of theDanube

10 18,100 10

Merchant/bankers ofConstantinople

38 31,260 17

Bank of Athens 22 30,837 16Merchant/bankers of Syros

63 59,980 32


Investing groups Ships NRT %

Self-finance 34 28,516 15Other 8 8,607 4(A) Total numberof steamships inSyros andPiraeusRegistries

188 189,180 100

(B) Totalacquisitions ofthe Greeksteamship fleet1880–1910

538 516,037

(A)/(B) 35% 37%Sources: Port Authority of Syros, Ship Registries 1880–1910; Port Authority of Piraeus,

Ship Registries 1900–10; Table 4.6Note: * Owners of more than 50 per cent of the vessel

The Bank of Athens constitutes the next important source of capital for the

Greek steamship. It was established in 1894 by a group of investors who broughtcapital from abroad—Ep. Embiricos, Al.Lambrinudis, A.Kallergis,M.Iordanopulos and N.Triantafillidis—and by 1939 had become the second mostimportant commercial bank in Greece. A.Lambrinudis was appointed as the firstpresident; he came from Chios/Smyrna and had been manager of the branchoffices of Ralli Brothers in India; A.Kallergis from Constantinople was GeneralManager. The Bank opened branch offices abroad in London, Constantinople,Smyrna, Alexandria, Smyrna and Khartoum. It was established with 10 milliondrachmas nominal capital and 2 million real capital. In 1904, the banker/shipowner Leonidas Zarifis from Constantinople joined the board, and in 1907D.Eugenides.39 The Bank financed 16 per cent of the newly acquired tonnage onthe Syros and Piraeus registries for the period 1880–1910 (Table 4.8), and onethird of total acquisitions in the entire Greek-owned fleet for the period 1900–10according to Table 4.10. It appears as owner of these vessels, and the ‘real ‘owners as the mana companies.

Most of the ships were bought by the Bank during the period 1906–10, aperiod of both low freight rates and low ship prices. Buying secondhand vesselsduring periods of low freight rates became an instrumental business strategy ofthe Greeks in the twentieth century. It was the knowledge of the shippingbusiness by the board of directors that led them to conclude such successfultransactions. The newly purchased ships within one or two years were allpurchased by co-ownerships of small Greek shipowners.


Table 4.9 Numbers of shareholders on Greek steamships registered in Syros and Piraeus,1880–1910

1880–9 1890–9 1900–10

Shareholders Ships NRT Ships NRT Ships NRT

1 9 6,295 31 20,823 58 63,9922 2 1,261 4 2,170 18 20,6143–5 _ _ 6 5,628 29 31,6016–10 – – 3 3,935 3 1,78211–20 – – – – 9 12,30821–30 – – – – 5 6,68931–4 – – – – 3 4,76741–50 – – – – – –51–60 – _ – – – –61–70 – – – – 1 1,702No data – – – – 7 5,613Sources: See Table 4.8

Table 4.10 Ship finance from the Bank of Athens for the total Greek fleet, 1900–14

Dates Number of ship Tons

1900* 2 2,1701900–5* 3 3,3881905–10* 23 33,351A.Total steamshipsfinanced by the Bank ofAthens 1900–10*

28 38,809

B.Total steamshipsfinanced by the Bank ofAthens**

50 (122,000)***

C.Total acquisitions of s/sinGreek fleet, 1900–10 365,513% (A)/(B) 11%% (B)/(C) 33%Sources: Appendix 4.15. The figures from Hadziiosif are from the Archives of the Bank

of Athens and are found in Christos Hadziiosif, The Aged Moon. Industry inthe Greek Economy, 1830–1940, Athens, Themelio, 1993, p. 62, in Greek

Notes: * figures from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. ** Figures from Hadziiosif. ***Authors estimates


Apart from the capital provided by members of the Ionian network establishedabroad and shipping finance provided by the Bank of Athens, 32 per cent of totalsteam tonnage registered at Syros and Piraeus was purchased by the merchant/bankers of Syros which, until its replacement by Piraeus at the end of the century,was the main Greek maritime centre. Its large Chiot population, and theestablishment of members of the powerful families of the Chiot network, gave itthe financial potential and expertise to finance ships. The Syros merchant/bankers financed steamers mainly in the second phase of the transition from sailto steam during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century. Such merchant/bankers were the descendants of the important families from the Chiot network,Avgerinos, Negroponte and Mavrogordatos, as well as the local factorsTsiropinas, Calvocoressis, Gangos, Pangalos, Ladopulos, Vafiadakis, Karellasand others. The Syros merchants also financed Chiots, Andriots and Kassiots, ofwhom the shipowning families Kulukundis, Andreadis, Los, Pithis and Vattiswent on to greater fame.

The first steamship companies that appeared in the 1880s were firms ownedby the big merchant/shipowners of the Ionian network and held several shipseach. Table 4.11 indicates the number of companies and ships as they appearedin Lloyd’s Register of Shipping in 1885, when 70 per cent of the steamshipowners owned two to ten steamships and only 30 per cent were single-shipcompanies, suggesting that it was the large capitalists

Table 4.11 Number of ships owned by Greek shipping companies

Number of ships (size group) Number of companies % total of companies in each sizegroup

18855–10 1 102–5 6 601 3 30Total 10 100189515–20 1 210–15 1 25–10 6 122–5 14 271 30 57Total 52 100191415–20 1 010–15 – 05–10 14 62–5 62 24


Number of ships (size group) Number of companies % total of companies in each sizegroup

1 179 70Total 256 100Sources: Processed data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1885, 1895, 1914

who bought steamers in that period. Ten years later, only 43 per cent of the totalnumber of companies owned two to ten ships, while the number of single-shipcompanies had risen to 57 per cent. The expansion of single-ship companies inthe 1890s can also be seen in other European fleets, such as the Spanish or theBritish. In the decade 1900–10, however, the drop in freight rates and thecontraction of the market forced single-ship companies in the Spanish and Britishsteamship fleets to go out of business, to merge, or to become absorbed bybigger companies.40 In the Greek steamship fleet, however, this did not happen:by 1914 the percentage of single-ship companies rose to 69 per cent. As we havealready indicated it was during this time the Greeks applied on a massive scaleone of the golden rules of their twentieth-century success, ‘buy when everybodyelse sells’.

Despite the importance of the Chiot and Ionian merchant/shipowners situatedabroad in forming the backbone of a Greek-controlled international network, theflesh came from the shipowners on the Greek-populated islands of the Aegeanand the Ionian seas. These were the men who carried out the maritime activitiesof the network. Joint ownership characterised nineteenth-century Greek sailingship ownership. This pattern had long been common in many countries; one caneasily compare the joint ownership practices of the Greeks, British, Norwegians,French or Spanish.41 Similarly, co-ownerships with strong local island or kinshipties and merchant family networks were not unique to Greek shipping in thenineteenth century. The system of co-ownership ‘continued to operate in Spainand Scandinavia throughout the 1860s and 1870s and also, contrary to previouslyheld beliefs, in the coastal traffic and tramp shipping of England’.42 Equally,family or common port of origin played an important role in the structure of theNorwegian and Atlantic Canada shipping firms until the beginning of the twentiethcentury.43 As was the case with the members of the nineteenth-century Greekcommercial and maritime networks, merchants constituted the main sailingshipowners in most maritime nations during the same period. This was the case atBergen, Norway, in the mid-1860s and in Atlantic Canada in the nineteenthcentury (see Chapter 2). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that a largepart of the shareholders of the first steamship companies in Bilbao, Marseilles orLiverpool were also merchants.44

Shipping absorbed a large portion of human and financial resources of manyGreek island communities and was frequently the main economic activity. Thenumber of shares in a Greek ship was not set by law but was usually betweentwo and twenty-four.45 Each share could be sold independently by its owner


without the consent of other shareholders, providing in this way great flexibility.Joint-ownership constituted a particular type of enterprise; indeed, according tothe modern Greek Private Legal Code, it is not a company but a method ofcombined ship operation. It is considered a sui generis type of company that isnot subject to rights or obligations itself (although the owners are) and themanager represents the joint-shipowners and not the joint-shipownership.Following the French, Greek commercial law provided limited liability for theshipowner(s) from the deeds of the manager/master. The shipowner(s) wasdischarged of any further liability by surrendering the ship and the freights tocreditors, and even the liability of the co-owner/master was limited to the valueof his participation in the ship.46

Traditionally, the partners were related, or at least came from the same island.Three reasons explain shipowning partnerships in Greece: insuffi-cient capital tobuild a ship; the necessity to spread the risk involved; and the need for an outletfor residual capital where several vessels are controlled. There are differentinterpretations of the relative importance of these factors in explaining thepersistence of joint ownership in Greek ships throughout the nineteenth andtwentieth centuries.47

There were three types of investor in Greek shipping. The first type was theseamen themselves, mainly masters whose job it was to sail and administer aship; the second was their relatives, or other co-islanders, who had smallamounts of capital with no other outlet; and the third was the big merchantcapitalists who saw shipping as a profitable venture and a necessary supplementto their business. For the first two types of investor, a lack of capital seems tohave been the main reason for joint-ownership —although the risk of the seaswas severe. But for the third type of investor, ships had the dual advantage ofproviding them with control over several ships while still spreading the risk. InGreek shipping concentration of ownership led to the separation andspecialisation of merchant and shipowner in the last third of the nineteenthcentury; the merchants who invested in many joint-ownerships disappeared orbecame shipowners themselves. The first two types of investor remained,however, and the lack of capital led to the continuation of substantial joint-ownerships that formed single-ship companies. Unfortunately, little research hasbeen done on the patterns of ownership of the sailing ships that would givedetailed information about the investors.

In order to examine the transformations in the nineteenth-century patterns ofownership, as well as in the functions of the shipping companies, we willdistinguish three periods: the first spans the first third of the century until theformation of the Greek state, the second covers the second third of the centuryuntil the 1860s, and the third the last third of the century.

The main characteristics of Greek-owned sailing ships in the first third of thenineteenth century was the combination of trade and transport. The sailing vesselof this period was also a merchant trader and in this way it comprised twofunctions: commercial and maritime. The master, whose role was vital to the


success of both tasks, managed the vessel and usually was also the main owner.The tendency for the Greek ship to act as a merchant trader as well meant that itsprofits came not only from freights but also from commerce. The beginning of acommercial voyage started with the raising of capital (sermagia) to purchase acargo. This might be raised from a small or large group and enabled the master tohave something to sell on the voyage. Either way, it was the accumulated capitalinvested in the cargo for the duration of a specific voyage, and it was differentfrom the investment in the shares of the vessel that lasted irrespective of thenumber of voyages. The investor/creditor did not receive interest but rather ashare in the profits of the expedition.49

Sermagia was collected from a wide variety of capitalists. Half of the amount,however, was usually collected from the ships shareholders and the other halffrom an extensive kinship circle. For example, during a period of eight years inthe late eighteenth century, forty-nine individuals (mainly compatriots, friendsand relatives) gave 411 times sermagia in the ten ships in which the merchant/shipowner Hadjipanagiotis was a joint-owner.50 The loss of the ship usuallymeant that the sermagia investors and the shareholders lost their money.Although marine insurance was not obligatory by Greek law, the masters of deep-sea vessels who contracted maritime loans had to insure their ships; the largestnumber of Greek vessels were insured by firms in Constantinople, Trieste andOdessa. In most cases, however, insurance only partially covered the value ofship or cargo.51

During the second third of the nineteenth century, the most importantdifference from the previous period was that the sailing ship was no longer amerchant trader but usually only a carrier. Representative samples of charter-parties and other data indicate that extremely few masters carried cargoes ontheir own account during this period. Sermagia as a method of finance continuedto be used only in coastal shipping to the end of the century. The combination ofmerchanting and shipowning continued in the small coastal ships, in many casesforming the basis for further expansion. An interesting example of thecontinuation of such practices is given in the autobiography of the founder of oneof the twentieth-century Chiot shipowning families, Constantine I.Hadjipateras.As late as 1879, from January to December, Hadjipateras, with the 120–tonsailing vessel Evangelistria, worked on his own account carrying and sellinglumber and coal from wood in the Aegean. He continued working with thisparticular ship, mainly on his own, until 1885, when it was wrecked. With hisbrothers he bought in 1886 another sailing vessel, the 220-ton Dimitrios, andworked on freight thereafter. Three years later, he sold it and bought the 450-tonvessel Kyvernitis, sailing it until 1897 when the Hadjipateras brothers bought a 1,150-ton sailing ship ‘built in Europe’ which they named Constantinos. Inaddition to Constantinos, in 1900 they bought the sailing ship Petros (750 tons)and in 1901 Taxiarchis (850 tons). The first steamship the Hadjipateras familyacquired together with the families of Lemos and Pateras was the thirteen-year-old Marietta Ralli in 1905.52


The other method of finance used extensively in shipping was shortterm loanswith interest. Shipping loans at the beginning of the journey were almost anintegral part of shipping. The master needed money to prepare the ship for thenext journey and in most cases had to borrow to supplement the cash available:the ship always needed small repairs, new equipment and foodstuffs. AsAppendix 4.7 indicates, these loans were usually contracted for a few monthsand the interest was high, in the 1840s varying between 2 and 2.5 per cent permonth (24–30 per cent per year).53 The high interest rates were justified by thehigh-risk nature of shipping. The loans were not guaranteed by mortgages andthe loss of the ship took with it all contracted loans. Appendix 4.7 presents theresult of a random sample of loans from the archive of the notary Andreas Davidduring the summer 1846 where it is evident that loans on shipping were giveneither for shipbuilding or as a working capital.54 Joint partnerships continued andmasters were the appointed managers, but now the rule was that they are not themain joint co-owners of the ship. It is indicative of this trend for that in twenty-five of the fifty-two ships owned on Andros in 1857, the master appeared neitheras shareholder or part-owner.55

The formation of the Greek state brought more formalised relations betweenthe shipowners and the master. Contracts from the local notary regulated therelations between ownership and management, that is the shareholders (in Greeknautical argot, parcinevelo) and the master. There are plenty of such contracts innotarial archives on the various islands. A typical contract in 1838 gives us aclear idea of the obligations of the master towards the shipowning group. CaptainFrancesco Fakis from Andros built a brig in Syros and took as partners for one-quarter of the ship a medical doctor, Georgiadis Syngros, and DemetriosKondylis, to whom he promised the following: one-quarter of the profits and aclear account of all income and expenditures; the equivalent of the share of anAB; and up to 1,536 kilos of grain. In addition, the master promised to employ ascribe chosen by the partners; to consult his partners on all business decisions;not to carry out trade on his own account; and not to leave as master without theconsent of the partners.56 Joint-partnerships continued to the same degree andmasters were the appointed managers, but now the rule was that they were notthe main co-owners. In the last third of the century the growth of the fleet and itsconcentration in international waters further altered the structure of shipowning.Management became even more detached from ownership. Data from theArchangelos ship registers indicate that in 1879 less than one-third (only 27 percent) of all ships above fifty tons had masters as owners (see Table 4.12); even inthe small coastal ships below fifty tons only 55 per cent of the masters were alsoowners. The 1870s marked both


Table 4.12 Masters as shipowners in Greek-owned shipping, 1879

Masters = Shipowners Total fleet

Port Ships % total fleet Tons % total fleet Ships Tons

Andros 1,546 41 3,784Cephalonia 2,885 28 10,260Chios 2,545 33 7,679Galaxidi 4,297 33 13,175Milos 3,009 56 5,340Piraeus 5,471 30 18,119Santorini 1,733 32 5,386Skiathos 1,991 38 5,162Spetses 3,417 26 12,933Syra 29,743 31 94,477Zante 3,288 20 15,986Other 15,994 23 68,838Total 796 38 75,919 29 2,033 261,139Ships >50 tons 390 30 65,291 27 1,259 241,358Ships <50 tons 406 52 10,878 55 774 19,781Source: Archangelos register of shipping, 1879

the growth and the decline of the Greek sailing ship fleet; almost at the sametime that the fleet peaked in 1875, it started a decline from which it neverrecovered. Greek deep-sea sailing vessels continued to operate to a limiteddegree up to the Great War. The future lay with the new technology, steam.Sailing ship masters and investors had to find ways to enter this capital-intensivemarket. Demetrios Polemis, a shipowner and historian of Andros shipping,correctly notes that ‘The sailing ships did not make the steamships. Howeverstrange this may sound, the fact remains that the capital for the purchase of thesteamships did not come from the sailing ship owners.’57

One of the main problems of the Greek fleet in obtaining finance lay in theprohibition of maritime mortgages under the Greek legal system. Neither thestate nor the main financial institution, the National Bank of Greece, pursuedpolicies to help an earlier transition from sail to steam. The direct involvement ofboth was confined to the creation of the Greek Steamship Company to carry thecoastal passenger and cargo trade, although the state did establish the institutionalframework for shipping and developed the maritime infrastructure by buildingquays, ports and lighthouses. Other than that, however, it did nothing to securean effec tive instrument for ship loans. Not until after the transition to steam hadoccurred did the government enact a ship mortgage law. From the late 1880s to1910 there were heated debates about revising the legal framework to facilitateshipping finance.58 One of the most important concerned mortgages. The only


type of maritime finance permitted under Greek law was the shipping loan or the‘loan of necessity written on the libretto of the ship. Under this system the sailingfleet flourished and few saw any reason before the introduction of the steamer toamend the law. But the purchase of steamships was quite different than sailingvessels. The sailing ship, a relatively inexpensive asset, needed only small short-term financing, which under the current system could be obtained at high interestrates. Expensive steamers, on the other hand, needed large loans at low interestrates. Mortgages, which limited the creditors risks, reduced the necessary interestrates.59

Taking into consideration the contraction of the sailing fleet and the need topromote investment in steam, the Greek Parliament voted a mortgage law on 12July 1890, an act drafted by Ilias Potamianos to introduce maritime mortgages. Thelaw, however, required a royal decree that never came. The main problem wasthat the law contained a contradiction by allowing the co-existence of the loans ofnecessity and maritime mortgages. The lawmakers passed another such law on17 April 1910 that formally introduced maritime mortgages. This twenty-yeardelay in passing such an important piece of legislation presents a conundrum.Although the subject needs further research, I believe that it had to do with theeconomic interests of the merchants and bankers of Syros and their strongpolitical supporters in the government. Syros was the main Greek maritimecentre of the age of sail, and the main financiers of sailing vessels were itsprosperous merchant/bankers. In 1890, when the first law was passed, 80 per centof the Greek fleet was still propelled by sail; ten years later, it was still 56 percent. The Syros merchant/bankers thrived on the high interest rates of short-termmaritime loans. It may have been that there was a conscious attempt by thisgroup to prolong the survival of sail in the Greek fleet and to delay the entranceof steam. As Table 4.8 indicates, this powerful group financed one-third of thesteamers registered in Syros and Piraeus but only after the turn of the centuryThe law that introduced ship mortgages was finally passed after one of its mostprominent supporters, Epaminondas Embiricos, became Minister of Shipping. Toa great extent, the expansion of the interwar Greek fleet was based on the legalframework provided by this law.

The lack of mortgages meant that until 1910 bankers and merchants whowanted to invest in shipping had to buy the ships in their own names. This is whyalmost half of the steamship owners on the Syros and Piraeus registers in 1910were bankers and merchants (see Table 4.13). Similarly, fifty-eight newlypurchased steamships during the period 1900–10 were owned by individuals(Table 4.9). Both these numbers, however, disguised more than they revealed.They are fictitious because banks were counted as individual owners. Usuallybanks, shortly after a purchase, sold parts of their ships to joint-partnerships. Thereis also confusion as to who is considered a ‘banker’ or a ‘merchant’; there arecases when the same person declares for one ship that he is a merchant and foranother that he is a banker. ‘Mariners’ appear to have purchased 16 per cent ofsteam tonnage; they were usually sailing shipowners or steamship masters


purchasing steamers for the first time. It is interesting to note, though, thatnowhere in the Syros registries does the term ‘shipowner’ appear, although itdoes turn up in the Piraeus records in the early years of the twentieth century,

Table 4.13 Owners of Syros and Piraeus steamships by occupational categories, 1880–1910

Occupation Ships NRT % total

Merchants 65 53,387 28Bankers/Banks 27 34,531 18Mariner 31 31,093 17Shipowner 17 21,367 11Joint-stock companies 19 13,415 7Other 29 35,387 19Total 188 189,180 100Sources: Port Authorities of Syros and Piraeus, Ship Registries 1880–1910

usually attached to previous masters of steamships who were already owners orco-owners of at least one steamer or individuals who entered shipping directlywith steamships. The ‘other’ category that owned the last 20 per cent of thePiraeus and Syros steamships in the period 1880–1910 includes owners whohave not declared any profession on the registries.

Although the transition to steam, particularly in the last two decades of thenineteenth century, was mainly due to merchant family networks outside theboundaries of the small Greek state, the patterns of ownership and financecontinued previous practices. Co-ownerships or joint-partnerships amongmembers of the island communities of the Aegean and Ionian seas providedimpetus for the growth of the steam fleet in the early twentieth century.


5VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN

This chapter is written through the eyes of merchant seamen, in so far as we cansee what they did from logs, account books, correspondence and otherdocuments. In this way Greek shipping can be viewed from the inside throughthe voyages of three sailing vessels and four steamships. The aim is to reveal thedaily lives of the men, as well as the operation of the ships and the workingrelationships. Moreover, it is an attempt to reconcile the view of the Greekmaritime historian, Captain Tassos Tzamtzis, who has written ‘that seamen donot write and those that write about the sea are not seamen’.1

Through the voyages and activities of the seven ships examined, which sailedfrom the 1830s to the 1910s, it is easy to distinguish the history of Greekshipping as presented in the previous four chapters. It can be argued that these shipswere not necessarily typical of a fleet composed of an average of 1,300 deep-seaGreek-owned vessels in any year during the period under examination, and moreso since the selection of sailing ships and steamers was restricted by theavailability of accessible archival material. All ships, however, came from typicalmaritime islands, such as Ithaca, Syros and Andros, and belonged to some of thetypical shipowning families, like Kulukundis and Embiricos, who are still activein modern Greek shipping. The three sailing ships were all partly owned bymasters situated in Greece who commanded the ships themselves, while the foursteamers belonged to members of the Ionian network residing on the Danube andin Constantinople and Marseilles, as most of the early steam owners were, andwere commanded by waged masters. Based on the information provided,important conclusions can be drawn about the operation and management of theships and the organisation and conduct of voyages during the nineteenth century.

ON BOARD

The voyages of the three sailing vessels tell similar, yet different, stories. Thetales are similar because all are about wooden ships, loading and unloadingcargoes, hoisting and furling sails, confronting violent winds and rough seas, andcalculating latitudes and longitudes. Yet they are different because each shiprepresents a different era. Odysseas worked in the late 1830s when Greek vesselswere limited to the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea. The story of Odysseas

is about traditional navigational methods adopted centuries ago, but it alsoillustrates an important transitional period in which vessels earned income bothon their own account and as a carrier. Anastassia worked almost half a century laterin the 1880s and 1890s and gives us a picture of sail in the modern era. The craftused steam tugs to pass through the Dardanelles and the Sea of Azov, itexpanded its activities to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe, and itworked only for freights. Moreover, it tells the story of the decline of sail, and itsgradual replacement by steam at the end of the century. Theofania workedalmost exclusively in the Atlantic and was one of the forerunners of theinternationalisation of the Greek fleet that fully took place during the First WorldWar. During the 1870s there is evidence of a number of Greek vessels in theAtlantic. Contrary to steamers, for which we have been able to trace a largecollection of logs, accounts books and other documents, we do not have anyfinancial statements to show the administration or profitability of these threesailing vessels.

Odysseas was a 204–ton brigantine registered in Ithaca which flew the Ionianflag and was owned by an Ithacan master, Antonis Petalas-Maratos. There is anextant log covering the period 1837–41, when the ship carried grain and olive oilbetween the Ionian islands and the Black Sea. Odysseas gives us valuableinformation on merchant sailing vessels in the eastern Mediterranean and BlackSea in the first half of the nineteenth century.2

According to the log, at the end of 1837 Odysseas arrived from the Black Sealoaded with grain and sold it in Corfu. This was its last trip for the year; next itsailed to its home island, Ithaca, for the three winter months, a pattern that wasrepeated for the next three years. In the 1830s there were still no lighthouses inthe Aegean and Ionian Seas, where the many islands, peninsulas and reefsrendered night travel dangerous. For this reason, Odysseas sailed only during theday, spending the hours of darkness in harbours or protected bays; in fact its onlyrecorded night travel in the Aegean was when there was a full moon. Otherwise,night passages took place only in the Black Sea. The brigantine often facedenormous difficulties passing through the Dardanelles because of the adversecurrents and winds. Many times when the seas were rough at the bottom of theAegean sailing ships gathered outside the straits. When ‘we moored betweenGiaourkioi and Troada,’ the master wrote,’ there were in front of us and behindus moored fifty-three ships of various nations’. In March 1839 Odysseas tookseventeen days from the entrance of the Dardanelles to Constantinople; when therewas no wind the ship was moved by ropes tied to the shore and pulled. Althoughthere were steam tugs in the Dardanelles and Bosporus, they must have beenvery expensive to use.

At the time the logbook was written the master and owner of Odysseas,Antonis Petalas-Maratos, was fifiy-two years-old, and had probably spent atleast forty years at sea. Captain Antonis did not know how to write very well,and made many spelling mistakes, but he was extremely observant and recordedmany details during his voyages. He did not know how to find precise longitudes


and latitudes, but his navigational skills were excellent and he recognised everywind, star and shore on his route. In fact navigation through the Ionian andAegean Seas was made by sighting landmarks on the coasts, while deep-seanavigation outside the view of coasts took place only from Bosporus to theCrimean peninsula for two or three days, during which time masters had tocalculate their positions in other ways. Captain Antonis, like most Greekmasters, did not like to travel to ports that he or members of his crew had notvisited. Despite the more widespread usage of maps, this attitude persisted wellinto the steam era. Although he knew his routes well, before entering the BlackSea he agreed to sail with other ships—in counserva, as he wrote—to make certainthat he did not make any miscalculations: ’[From Yenikoy on 9 March 1838] …all the ships went to the shallow waters and there was north wind and all thetwenty-eight ships moored…. We stayed there until midnight and then there wassome south wind and…we also put up our sails.’ Because sailing ships hadlimited storage space for food and water, the master made sure to approach portsto spend the night where he could ‘make water [sic]’. The straits andConstantinople were regular sources of food; the master made sure that there wasalways wine and raki on board, as well as a variety of food.

During the period under examination, Captain Antonis carried grain on hisown account from the Black Sea to Zakynthos and Corfu and as freight on charterby olive oil merchants from Lefkas and Paxoi. In 1838, the ship made threeround trips to the Black Sea, two of which were in ballast outward, with returncargoes of grain to Zakynthos and Corfu. On the third trip barrels of olive oilwere loaded by merchants in Paxoi and Lefkas and two supercargoes(sofrocarico) sailed to sell the cargo in Kertch. On 17 March 1838 in Odessa, hewrote in his giornale (log) that ‘at 10 o’clock two servants of Mr Serafim cameand we gave them 10 thousand kolonata (Spanish dollars)’, the value of the grainto be loaded. It took him seven days to load and on 12 April 1838 the shiparrived in Zakynthos, where the master wrote that ‘I gave mostra [a sample] ofgrain to my racomandatario [shipping agent] Panayotakis Liontaritis’ in order tosell the cargo (see Table 5.1).

In 1839 the ship left Ithaca in search of a charter and went to Kertch, where itwas time-chartered for six months by the Russian government which was tryingto establish itself in the newly acquired Caucasus. On 23 June Captain Antoniscopied in the log a report he had sent to the local authorities: ‘the undersignedAntonios Petalas-Maratos Master of

Table 5.1 The voyages of Odysseas, 1837–4

Voyages/Dates Cargo Charterer

1837Black Sea-Corfu 1838 Grain

VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN 149


Laid up for winter monthsDecember 1837-February1838Zakynthos—Odessa—Zakynthos February 1838-April 1838

Grain, fish Own account Papudoff

Zakynthos-Eupatoria-Zakynthos May 1838-July1838

Grain Own account

Ithaca-Kertch July 1838-August 1838

Olive oil Merchants from Paxoi

Kertch-Corfii September1938–November 1838

Grain Own account

1839Laid up for winter monthsNovember 1838-February1839Ithaca-Kertch February1839-March 1839

Ballast

Kertch—Circassian coastApril 1839-September 1839

Horses, armaments,provisions

Time-chartered by Russiangovernment

Taganrog—IthacaSeptember 1839-October1839

Grain Own account

1840Laid up for winter monthsNovember 1839-March1840Paxoi—Lefkas—KertchApril 1840-August 1840

Olive oil Merchants from Lefkas andPaxoi

Taganrogo–Corfu July1840-November 1840

Grain Own account

1841Laid up for winter monthsNovember 1840-March1841Lefkas-Kertch March 1841-April 1841

Olive oil Merchants from Lefkas

Taganrog—ZakynthosApril 1841-July 1841

grain Own account

Source: John S. Vlassopulos, Odysseas. A Ship from Ithaca, 1837–1841, Athens,Melissa, 1992


the Ionian merchant vessel Odysseas 204 tons was chartered by the RussianRoyal Authorities on 15 April 1839 in Kertch from Mayor Panfiloff for 102 lastsfor 35 rubles…prepaid every month’. But on 6 September he curtailed hiscollaboration with the Russians to prepare for the return voyage and the winterback in Ithaca.

Odysseas, which retained many of the eighteenth–and early nineteenthcenturycharacteristics of eastern Mediterranean merchant vessels, was armed with twoguns, sixteen rifles, six bayonets, two swords, four pistols and fourspazzacoverte. With the extinction of piracy and the establishment of peace inthe eastern Mediterranean after the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, the armamentshad become obsolete and were never used except once or twice for signals. Afterthe establishment of lighthouses, the widespread use of steam and the increaseddemand for longer deep-sea routes to the western Mediterranean and northernEurope, the navigation methods of sailing ships changed. These shifts are clearwhen comparing Odysseas to Anastassia, which sailed forty years later in thesame geographic area.

The first entry in Anastassias log reads as follows: ‘Undertaking the commandof the Greek brig, called Anastassia, of 162.85 tons, registered at the RegistryBooks of the Port of Syros with the number 337, owned by MessrsN.Stathopulos and G.Kulukundis, ready to sail and chartered by Mr M.Vaglianoto receive a whole cargo of wheat from Sevastopol or Nicolaieff’3 Half the shipbelonged to N.Stathopulos, who was probably a merchant from Lesbos, while theother half was the property of George E.Kulukundis, a master from the island ofKassos. In fact Kulukundis was probably owner of the vessel along with hisbrothers John, Nicholas, Basil, Anthony, Martis and Constantine.4 In 1881 and1882 Constantine Kulukundis was the master, while George’s son, EliasG.Kulukundis, was second mate. Elias took command of the vessel in October1882 and continued in this capacity for ten years, when he handed it over toA.Mavrantonis, a relative. In 1893, according to the log, Elias appears as theowner of the other half of the vessel, purchased from Stathopulos.5 In 1893 and1894, Elias’ brother, John G.Kulukundis, commanded the ship, while from 1894to 1897 it was sailed by A.Mavrandonis. From 1897–8 until it was eventuallysold, Anastassia was commanded by Elias G. Kulukundis. During the wholeperiod members of the family served as second or third mates. Anastassias log isextremely valuable because it covers the voyages of a sailing ship from 1881 to1898, a period characterised both by the full activity of the sailing ships and theirreplacement by steamers, as well as because it was a typical, family-owned andoperated sailing vessel and because it sailed the typical routes carrying the mostlikely cargoes of the time, chartered repeatedly by members of Greek commercialand maritime networks.

From 1881 to 1883 Anastassia worked on the Black Sea-northern Europeroute carrying grain from Sevastopol and Varna and returning with cargoes ofcoal from Cardiff and Swansea to Syros and Smyrna. As we have already seen,after the repeal of the British Navigation Laws in 1849 a significant number of


Greek sailing ships sailed between British and eastern Mediterranean ports withcoal and grain. Apart from the London Customs Bills of Entry, other evidence ofGreek involvement can be found in variety

Table 5.2 The voyages of Anastassia, 1881-98


1882Sevastopol-Rotterdam October 1881-March 1882 Rye VaglianoSwansea—Syros March 1882-August 1882 CoalNea Effessos-Passages September 1882-December 1882

Grain Kassinieris (Smyrna)

1883Passages—Swansea December 1882-January1883

Ore

Swansea-Varna February 1883-March 1883 Coal NikolaidesVarna—Cardiff April 1883-August 1883 Grain Petrocockinos ZarifisCardiff— Smyrna September 1883-December1883

Coal

1884Dedeagach-Naples December 1883-February1884

Grain Vagliano

Laid up in Constantinople* March 1884-July1884Yeisk-Marseilles August 1884-November 1884 Grain Ambanopoulo1885Laid up in Syros December 1884-February 1885Nicolaieff—Venice March 1885-May 1885 Grain Morfrugo & Co (Trieste)Venice—Cephalonia—Patras June 1885-July1885

Lumber

Laid up in Constantinople July 1885-September1885Burghaz-Marseilles September 1885-February1886

Grain Vagliano

1886Laid up in Syros March 1886-June 1886Rhodes-Odessa June 1886-October 1886 Gypse OubleNicolaieff-Trieste October 1886-December 1886 Grain Mavros1887Trieste—Nauplion—Piraeus January 1887-March 1887

Lumber

Odessa-Venice April 1887-June 1887 Grain



Venice-Corfu-Patras-Lavrion July 1887–September 1887 LumberTemriuk-Ancona November 1887–February 1888 Grain Dreyfus1888Taganrog-Marseilles April 1888–August 1888 Grain VaglianoBurghaz-Marseilles September 1888–November 1888 Grain NikolaidesLaid up in Syros December 1888–January 18891889Santorini-Trieste January 1889–March 1889 MineralTrieste-Piraeus-Lavrion April 1889–June 1889 LumberKassos-Odessa June 1889–August 1889 GypseBatum-Alexandria August 1889–November 1889 Oil1890Salonica-Genova December 1890–April 1890 OatsTaganrog-Constantinople May 1890–September 1890 GrainGalatz-Cette September 1890–January 1891 Grain Wechsler1891Laid up in Syros and Constantinople February 1891–March1891Taganrog-Savonna April 1891–June 1891 GrainLaid up in Kassos June 1891–August 1891Burghaz-Marseilles September 1891–December 1891 Grain Svoronos1892Laid up in Constantinople December 1891–March 1892Galatz-Genoa March 1892–June 1892 LumberRepair in Syros July 1892–September 1892Taganrog-Catania October 1893–February 1894 Grain Mussuri

1893Laid up in Syros March 1893-May 1893Laid up in Constantinople May 1893-August 1893Taganrog-Patras September 1893-December 1893 Grain Falieros1894Zakynthos-Cette December 1893-April 1894 Grain



Port-St-Louis du R.-Porto Lago April 1894-June1894

Lime

Laid up in Constantinople July 1894Batum-Constantinople August 1894-December1894

Oil

1895Batum—Alexandria December 1894-March 1895 OilBatum-Alexandria April 1895-June 1895 OilBatum-Alexandria August 1895-December 1895 Oil1896Kassos-Alexandria December 1895-April 1896 GypseRepair in Syros-Laid up in Constantinople April1896-May 1896Batum-Constantinople June 1896-October 1896 Oil Kazigra & SideridisPorts of Marmara—Marseilles October 1896-February 1897

Grain

1897Marseilles—Syros—Poti February 1897-November 1897 (In Syros from April1897September 1897 because of the Greco-Turkish War)

French tiles

Batum-Constantinople November 1897-January1898

Oil

1898Ports of Marmara-Naples February 1898-June1898

Grain

Odessa-Jaffa August 1898-October 1898 LumberSource: Logbook of Anastassia, Private Collection of Elias M.KulukundisNote: * Recorded only when ship is laid up more than one month

of documents, such as the following testimonial written on 24 July 1856 inCardiff, signed by the Austrian Vice-Consul, J.K.Smith, in Cardiff and the GreekConsul, A.K.lonides, in London: ‘We the undersigned hereby certify that the SanSpyridione of Greece D.Catchoulis Master with 18 persons on board and boundfor Athens with a cargo of coals sailed from Cardiff on or about the twentiethday of December 1855.’6

Additional evidence is found in the personal correspondence of the masters.For example, George P.Dracopoulos of Myconos, master of the sailing shipPhiladelphos, in a letter to his wife from Glasgow on 18 August 1877 where hewas loading coal reveals that he had travelled on board a Greek sailing vessel toBritain in 1853 and had not since managed to return:


We came here yesterday and from tomorrow we will start unloading thecargo, here at the same place we will load the coal and I hope to God not totake more than 12 days, I will ask for a charter to Marseilles and if I do notfind I will try for Italy or Malta…. Here, we have not had any summer oursails have rotted from the rain. … The freight rates of the coals were neverworse than now, I came to England after 24 years but I managed to do thisvoyage.7

Although Captain Dracopoulos was right to say that freight rates for coal were attheir lowest level in years, little did he know that the worst was yet to come.Tramp shipping freight rates tumbled from the mid-1870s to the mid-1880s,when they were finally stabilised (Figures 4.7 and 4.8).

The shipping crisis hit Anastassia in 1884 and the ship was laid-up inConstantinople from March to July: ‘Due to slack times in charters we were heldup in Constantinople and fired the crew we stayed there around 110 days, until20 July 1884 on which day we were able, with the agreement of the owners ofthe ship, to charter it to carry a cargo of wheat that belongs to MessrsAmbanopoulo and Co in Yeisk.’8 Apart from grain, coal and oil, the ship carriedlumber, non-ferrous minerals and even tiles from Marseilles. The ship worked oncharter, and the charterers included a large number of important Black Seamerchants apart from Ambanopoulo, such as Vagliano, Petrocockinos, Zarifis,Mavros, Svoronos, Mussuri, Siderides and Nicolaides, along with Dreyfus,Wechsler, Falieros, Kassinieris of Smyrna, Morfrugo & Co of Trieste and Oubleof Rhodes (see Table 5.2).

In 1886 the vessel was again laid-up in Syros from March to June. From 1884to 1898, when it was sold, Anastassia traded mainly between the Black Sea andthe western Mediterranean; that is from Yeisk, Nicolaieff, Burghaz, Odessa,Temriuk, Taganrog, Batum, and Galatz to Naples, Venice, Ancona, Trieste,Genoa, Savonna, Catania, Marseilles and Cette. The exception to this east—westtrade was a north—south route which holds a special interest. From 1894 to1898, the year she was sold, Anastassia undertook consecutive voyages betweenBatum and Alexandria with oil from Baku. The oil trade was in fact one of thelast refuges of deep-sea sailing, providing a new lease of life in European watersup to the First World War. Norwegian and Greek sailing shipowners were amongthe first independent European oil carriers. Oil transport was none the less riskybecause leakage from the barrels could lead to the loss of between 5 and 12 percent of the cargo. Although on land this was just another messy problem, in theconfined space of a cargo-hold the vapours could turn the ship into a ‘floatingbomb’.9

Trading in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean was very different to thatin the time of Odysseas. Anastassia sailed day and night as a result of theconstruction of lighthouses in the eastern Mediterranean, while the Dardanelles—and the Straits of Yeni Kale in the Azov Sea—were negotiated with the help ofsteam tugs: ‘[In July 1886, when we reached the entrance of the Dardanelles],


with the help of a steam tug we went through the Straits up to Kallipoli…. Wesaw both lights of Bosporus.’10 Equally, the difficulties of navigating on theDanube were diminished with the help of steam tugs, which as we saw inChapter 3, belonged largely to Greeks:

On 16 March at 1 p.m. we arrived fortunately at Sulina and obtained ourfree pratique [visa] where that same day the steam tug Penelope of MrTheofilatos towed us together with other ships and we reached Galatz…. Onthe 18th of the same month we received orders and we took the ship to theloading point.

Anastassia also sailed all year, and spent a good deal of time confronting badwinter weather:

On the 1st January 1884 in latitude 37 25’ and longitude 18 35’ …the windbecame a tempest and the sea became wild…although we were heavingwith only the two foresails we still could not have peace or security. Thesea was coming violently on deck and a huge wave washed off everythingon its way…. The ship was tossed about on the stormy sea in such a waythat the cargo was gradually moved to the lee side and because of thatreason it keeled over about one and a half feet, so that her left side was almostconstantly under the waves…. We continued sailing with the speed of 9miles per hour.11

Anastassias logbook tells the same story as Figure 1.11: that Greek steamersreplaced Greek sailing ships on the routes from the Mediterranean to northernEurope from the mid-1880s. Until 1883 Anastassia traded between the Black Seaand northern Europe; after 1884, however Anastassias activities did not gobeyond Gibraltar.

All the members of the Kulukundis family that commanded the ship must havehad quite good schooling because their handwriting is very good and there are nospelling mistakes, in contrast to A.Mavrandonis, whose spelling is quite poor.Latitudes and longitudes are given systematically and the names of foreign portsare all given in correct Greek translation or transliteration, while voyagedescriptions are always detailed. What is astonishing, however, is that during theeighteen years of voyages only one accident and one desertion were reported andno troubles from seamen or any illnesses were discussed.

The logbook of Anastassia ends in 1898 and we lose track of the ship but notof its owners. Anastassia was sold in 1898, the same year the Kulukundis familybought its first steamship. Manolis Kulukundis, one of the leading twentieth-century Greek shipowners and son of the master of Anastassia, EliasG.Kulukundis, reports: ‘I was born in 1898 the same month when my fatherpurchased his first steamship, the Alexios Gangos, and sold the last family brig,the Anastassia.’12


If Anastassia worked during the decline of sail, Theofania sailed in the 1870sduring its heyday and on completely different trade routes. Theofania was a 232–ton brig owned by its master, Anargyros B.Comnas from the island of Spetses.According to data in the Archangelos ship registries of 1870, A.B.Comnasappears as the owner and master. The ship sailed under the Greek flag, was builtin 1865, and was registered in Spetses in 1867. The log, which gives us details ofthe ship’s voyages, covers the period 1873–6, was ‘counted and stamped’ by theGeneral Consulate of Greece in London, and ‘contains forty-six pages…to beused as the logbook of the brig Theofania’.13 The importance of Theofania liesin the fact that it reveals a reluctant but nevertheless systematic penetration ofGreek sailing ships into the Atlantic in the 1870s. The first Greek-flag ship toreach an American port is reported to have been the 300-ton brig Alexandros,which arrived at Boston on 14 August 1835 with a cargo of wine, olive oil andsultanas.14

After the 1870s, however, we have a series of reports from various sources ofa number of Greek vessels trading in the Atlantic. Captain Anastassios Syrmas,for example, in his autobiography writes that:

I commanded the [sailing] ship Comna from the month of November 1870,for four years and eight months continuously working in voyages betweenAsia Minor and Europe and my last trip with the said ship was from Syrosto Taganrog (during the month of May 1874), Dunkirk, Cardiff, SierraLeone, from Sierra Leone to Sherbro (Africa in North Latitude 8) where Imet my brother Theodoros as Master on the ship of Dimitrios Koukoudakisfrom Hydra. From Sherbro we loaded a cargo of oil palm for Hamburg inGermany, from Hamburg I went at the river Thyne of England and fromthere to Corfu where we delivered cargo, from there I brought the ship toSyros and I delivered her to the owners in good condition and the voyagewas profitable while I made all this round during thirteen months and 10days.15

It is evident that the ‘Mediterranean captain, Anastassios Syrmas, made one tripin the Atlantic, from Africa to northern Europe, while his brother CaptainTheodoros Syrmas seems to have continued to trade on Atlantic routes.

In March 1876 Captain Anastassios was jobless in Marseilles when hereceived news from West Africa that Theodoros had gone to work in Rio deJaneiro. Anastassios decided to join him; while trying to find a passage to Rio, hereported on another Greek ship trading with Brazil: ‘During that time there wasin Marseilles a ship from Andros belonging to Goulandris brothers, for Rio deJaneiro, and I asked the Master, Achilles Goulandris, to take me as apassenger.’16

Reports of Andriot ships trading in the Atlantic during the last third of thenineteenth century are also provided by the maritime historian of Andros,Demetrios Polemis, who notes that Matheos Embiricos’ sailing ship Lord Byron


sailed repeatedly to Philadelphia and other US ports between 1867 and 1871.Leonidas M.Embiricos on the brig Alcibiades travelled to North and SouthAmerica and to the Indian Ocean in the 1880s, while the Athenian press reportedin September 1898 that the Andriot sailing ship Goulandris arrived in Syros fromAmerica.17

Sailing ships from Ithaca seem also to have travelled in the Atlantic since the1830s, while it is reported that ships from Kassos in the last third of thenineteenth century sailed in both the Atlantic and Pacific.18 Data are very scarceand most often come from oral history. What is extremely interesting is evidence,from both Greek and foreign sources, of Ithacan seamen serving on foreign shipsto Australia.19 Indeed, an interesting if unstudied topic is the number of Greekseafarers manning foreign ships, dispersed around various world ports during thenineteenth century.20

The signs of the internationalisation of the Greek fleet in the twentieth centuryand its expansion to all oceans were already clear in the last third of thenineteenth century. Theofania was one of these pioneer Greek ships that pavedthe way for Greek penetration of the Atlantic routes. As Table 5.3 indicates,almost all Theofania’s voyages took place between West Africa and Europe, orbetween North America and Europe. In 1873 the ship made four passages, fromSwansea to Philadelphia and back, from Britain to Sierra Leone, and from WestAfrica to Marseilles.21 Upon arrival at Swansea on 27 July:

the cook Vasilios Ydraios from Spetses and the seaman ConstantinosMichalbeis from Psara with a debt the first of three and a half poundssterling and the second of six pounds sterling escaped stealing from theMaster’s cabin various clothes and from the fo’castle a shirt and a coat ofthe seaman Constantine Coutouris from Chios, they took their clothes andthe oilskins of the scribe.

The loss of two seamen meant that the master had to hire whomever he couldfind at Swansea; in fact, one of the foreign seamen engaged was Italian, whocaused serious problems later on. On the way to Marseilles

Table 5.3 The Voyages of Theofania, 1873-6

Voyages Dates

1873Swansea-Philadelphia February 1873-May 1873Philadelphia-Great Yarmouth June 1873-August 1873Great Yarmouth-West Africa August 1873-November 18731874Sierra Leone-Marseilles December 1873-March 1874Marseilles-West Africa April 1874-May 1874


Voyages Dates

West Africa-Marseilles June 1874-September 1874Marseilles-Dunkirk October 1874-January 18751875Dunkirk—Demerara February 1875-May 1875Demerara-Liverpool July 1875-August 1875Liverpool-West Africa October 1875-February 18761876West Africa-Falmouth-Havre March 1876-September 1876Source: Logbook of Theofania, Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum

from West Africa, the ship experienced harsh weather conditions and was oftenin danger, especially on 14 February 1874 in the open sea of the Bay of Biscay:

There was a west/south-west wind, extremely rough, so that at 2 a.m. weleft the ship with the lower topsail and the foresail, the sea had becomeunbearable and we bore away the ship towards east/north-east wind. At 3a.m. the deck was all flooded and the ship almost sank; then we broke thesmall boat with the hatchets and threw it in the sea and we broke two bigbarrels full of water in order to lighten up the ship; we wanted to throw thebig boat too but we were afraid that we might do worse damage on theship…we wanted to empty some of the cargo but we could not because ofthe restless waves that came from astern and flooded the deck. The shipbegan to spring a leak. We were in latitude 37 23′N and longitude 15 25′E.The tempest lasted 36 hours.

A week after this storm, leaving Gibraltar, Theofania encountered anothertempest that shifted the cargo and ‘tilted [the ship] two beams on the right handside’. Next day when near Malaga, when the wind was calm, ‘we opened thehatches’ and straightened the ship. The trip from Sierra Leone to Marseilles tookeighty-three days.

In 1874, Theofania made three passages, one from Marseilles to Guinea andback and one from Sfax to Dunkirk. On the way from Sfax to Dunkirk Theofaniasaved the crew of a Neapolitan barque from Bona loaded with ore. In 1875 shemade another three passages, one from Swansea to Demerara, another back toLiverpool, and a third from Liverpool to Brass 0in West Africa. This last tripproved fatal for the master, Anargyros Comnas. According to the log:

Today [Monday 1/3/1876] the whole crew became sick except for theMaster and one seaman. We brought immediately the doctor and withvarious medicines everybody started getting better apart from one. [OnFriday] the Master got sick from a headache and a pain in the breast, and


the doctor came immediately and gave him medicine but he felt no relief.[On Saturday] he was not able to talk, the doctor kept coming every twohours but it was impossible to make him talk, so despite all medical care itwas impossible to save his life, so that at 9 p.m. he gave up his spirit to theeternal monasteries giving inconsolable grief to his son who was on boardand to the whole crew.

Thus, Captain Anargyros Comnas from Spetses was buried in a small village onthe West African coast and the Governor nominated Nicholas Comnas, his son,as master. A few days after the old master died the authority of the new master waschallenged by a ‘foreign’ member of the crew:

The master said to the Italian seaman Giovanni Krispo who was not ill topull [the boat], the seaman replied that it is breakfast time and he does notdo anything, then the master went in front of him and grabbed his hand andhe told him that when I order you, you should listen, do you hear, so goand pull the boat, the seaman then took out a knife (that fortunately had nopoint) and gave the Master two stabs in his intimate parts with no successand a third one to his knee that hurt him a bit, and he jumped to the smallboat that was next to the ship and cut the two ropes and went ashore andabandoned the boat and damaged it a bit, nobody could stop him becausewe were all sick. Then the master put the flag at half mast and the scribe ofthe nearby steamship came on board and took the Master to the steamshipin order to narrate everything; the Master of the steamship told to theMaster whether he wants him to put him to jail in Bona but the Master saidno, but to keep him in the steamship until the ship is ready to sail and tobring him on the ship because he can find no seamen here.

The ship, under the command of Nicholas Comnas, continued to Gabon and thento Falmouth, where it received orders to go to Havre to unload. This is where thelog ends. At the end, however, an attachment tells us that D.Episcopulos, a Greekmerchant/shipowner in Britain, purchased Theofania and changed her name toPhoenix.

Captain Anastassios Syrmas was master of a brig similar to Theofania in themid-1870s before he managed to become master of a steamship in 1880. Hecommanded all the four steamers we are going to examine. It is from hisunpublished autobiography, the logbooks, books of expenses and correspondenceall written in his own hand that we can follow so closely the activities of some ofthe first Greek-owned steamships. His writings and the careful collection of hisprofessional and personal papers indicate a highly honest, knowledgeable andpedantic man who spent sixty of his eighty-two years at sea. It is illuminating tochart his path to command since Captain Syrmas provides a typical example ofthe generation of waged masters who moved from sail to steam.


Captain Syrmas was born in 1842 on the island of Hydra, the son of a bosun‘who was washed overboard’ in 1847 and the grandson of a master. He went toschool until the age of nine and at ten signed on as a ships boy on the sailing shipon which his uncle was bosun (later master). He remained under his uncle’sprotection until 1864, serving under him as seaman, bosun, scribe and second mate.At the age of twenty-four, after a months classes on Syros, he passed the examswhich permitted him to become a master. It seems that he had repeatedly visitedMarseilles and Britain because after he became a master and left his uncles vessel,he was immediately asked in 1867 to take a ship to Marseilles and to commandanother one on a voyage to Newport in England. Although he had limited formaleducation, his handwriting was clear and he made few spelling or grammaticalmistakes. He knew Italian, in which he received and replied to telegrams fromhis owners; he also learned to read and write English well during a five-monthstay in Sunderland in the 1880s.22

Captain Syrmas served as a master of sailing ships owned by the Cosmasbrothers from 1867 to 1875, during which time he made voyages to and from themain Mediterranean ports, as well as northern European harbours such asRotterdam, Liverpool, Newport and Cardiff, and West African ports. Theshipping crisis that began in the mid-1870s left him unemployed from 1875 to1877, during which time he tried unsuccessfully to find work on steamers. Hewent to Marseilles to look for his brother Theodoros, also a master. Not hearingany news he went via Paris to London, to the only Greek shipping office,Vagliano Brothers. He asked Panaghi Vagliano for a job but Vagliano, nothaving one, sent him with a recommendation to another large shipowner, BasilPapayanni in Liverpool. Papayanni also had nothing to offer so Syrmas asked fora position as an AB, which he got. In this way, Captain Anastassios Syrmas atthe age of thirty-five became an AB on Papayanni‘s Arcadia for a Liverpool–Malta– Syros-Smyrna-Constantinople-Liverpool voyage at a monthly wage of£3.5. His experience was so traumatic that after his return to Liverpool he askedPapayanni for a ticket home:

I suffered a lot from the seamen during the voyage; they even hit me forsomething I did not do as it was later proven… I thought that I struggled invain and that I lost my time on the English steamship, since I saw andlearned that it is impossible for a foreigner to live with the English if hedoes not follow their ways, and forget every sacred thing, so I decided toreturn to the Homeland.

In Greece, however, Syrmas did not find a suitable job and he returned toMarseilles to find a ship for Rio de Janeiro, where he had learned his brotherwas. Captain Syrmas reached Rio de Janeiro on the Dutch golette Reprise on 17June 1876, where he found his brother employed as an officer on a 1,000-tonsailing vessel belonging to the Greek consul, Othon Leonardo, and trading alongthe Brazilian coast. Both brothers returned to Greece in September 1876 and


Captain Anastassios Syrmas, ‘much to his sorrow’, returned to the command of asailing ship belonging to his previous employers, the Cosma brothers, foranother three years. In 1880 he resigned ‘because this is no job for me anymoreto live with all my sacrifices’. That same year his luck changed and ‘HolyProvidence that protects me always because I could not live anymore in that job’found him an exciting new job that proved a turning point in his career and madehim a steamship master. Captain Syrmas was to supervise the building of a newsteamer ordered by the Chiot merchant/shipowners Nicolopulo Brothers in theshipyard of Bartram Haswell and Co in Sunderland and then to command thatsame ship.

His employment on Calliope brought him luck in his personal life as well. InOctober 1881 he carried as passengers from Braila to ConstantinopleD.I.Polemis, a member of the well-known Andros shipping family, and his twodaughters; eight months later, on 21 July 1882, the forty-two-year-old captainwas married to twenty-two-year-old Anna Polemis. The couple made Androstheir home and hence Anastassios Syrmas became an ‘adopted’ Andriot.23

Captain Syrmas commanded Calliope Nicolopulo for Nicolopulo & Son ofMarseilles and Braila from 1880 to 1883, when the shipping crisis again left himjobless for almost three years; he served briefly on Scaramanga of O.Condostavlos of Andros in 1886. Subsequently, he worked for seventeen yearsfor Foscolo & Mango of Constantinople on their ships, Thiresia (1887–92),Marietta Ralli (1892–5), and Demetrius S. Schilizzis (1895– 1904); for ten yearsfor A.Embiricos of Braila, on Leonidas (1904–6), Andriana (1906–10) andKatina (1911–13); and spent his last working year on Styliani Bebi (1913–14) forK.Bebis and Sons of Bulgaria. He retired in 1914 and died ten years later.24

We are going to follow some of Captain Syrmas’ voyages on CalliopeNicolopulo, Demetrius S.Schilizzis, Leonidas and Andriana. Our information onCalliope Nicolopulo is based on a letterbook of Captain Syrmas that covers theyears 1881–2; the letterbook contains mainly copies of his professionalcorrespondence with the Nicolopulos. Calliope Nicolopulo (1,004

Table 5.4 Voyages of ss Calliope Nicolopulo, 1880–1

Voyages/Dates Cargo

1880Sunderland-Syros November 1880–December 1880

[Register of ship]

1881Sulina-Dunkirk December 1880–February1881

Maize

Newport-Odessa March 1881 CoalBraila-Stettin April 1881–May 1881 GrainRiga-Newport May 1881 LumberNewport-Marseilles June 1881 Coal


Voyages/Dates Cargo

Sulina-Hull August 1881–September 1881 GrainCardiff-Marseilles September 1881–October 1881

Coal

Sources: Professional correspondence of Captain Anastassios Syrmas with NicolopuloBros, letter books 1880–1, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, PrivateCollection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos

NRT) made her maiden voyage on 10 November 1880 with a Greek crew andEnglish first and third engineers. ‘We left today from Sunderland. …We cameout of the port well until we regulated the compasses… We sail at about 9 milesper hour. The engine burns about 10.5 tons per day and night,’ wrote CaptainSyrmas in his letter to D.Nicolopulo that same day. The ship and its cargo ofcoal arrived at Syros on 20 December 1880, where it was registered and thensailed for Constantinople, where it received orders for Sulina. FromConstantinople on 31 December 1880 Captain Syrmas sent a letter to PanaghiVagliano in London:

My owner Mr Demetrius Nicolopulo told me to write to you about thebehaviour of the steamship Calliope Nicolopulo at sea…. The ship is wellbuilt because despite the storms at sea from our voyage from England it didnot leak at all…. It steers well when loaded but it suffers from the seabecause it seems that it carries more cargo than it should according to theproportions of the shipbuilder.

In 1881, when we have evidence of its whereabouts, Calliope made sevenvoyages from Braila, Sulina and Odessa with grain to Dunkirk, Stettin and Hull,with return cargoes of coal from Newport and Cardiff for Marseilles (seeTable 5.4); once, in May, she carried lumber from Riga to Newport.

Table 5.5 Voyages of ss Demetrius S.Schilizzis, 1895–1902

Voyages/Dates Cargo

1895Nicolaieff-Genoa October 1895–November 1895 GrainOdessa-Genoa November 1895–December 1895 Grain1896Smyrna-Hull January 1896–February 1896Cardiff-Rio de Janeiro February 1896–March 1896 CoalBuenos Aires-Bahia BlancaDettford-Antwerp April 1896–June 1896 Animals, paperLaid up in Constantinople July 1896–August 1896Yeisk-Southampton August 1896–October 1896 Grain


Voyages/Dates Cargo

1900Braila-Rotterdam July 1900–August 1900 GrainCardiff-Piraeus August 1900–September 1900 CoalTaganrog-Marseilles September 1900–October 1900 GrainConstantinople-Alexandria October 1900–November 1900Braila-Galatz-Rotterdam November 1900–December 1900 GrainSunderland-Piraeus December 1900–January 1901 Coal1901Varna-Gijon February 1901–March 1901 GrainCardiff-Alexandria March 1901–April 1901 CoalAchtary-Marseilles May 1901–June 1901 GrainSulina-Greenock June 1901–July 1901 GrainCardiff-Piraeus-Zarzis July 1901–August 1901 CoalBenghazi-Hull September 1901 GrainCardiff-Alexandria September 1901–October 1901 CoalAlexandria-Greenock November 1901–December 1901 GrainGlasgow-Alexandria December 1901 Coal

1902Alexandria-Hull January 1902 GrainCardiff-Constantinople January 1902–February 1902

Coal

Constantinople–Bristol March 1902Bristol-Constantinople April 1902 CoalGalatz–Antwerp May 1902–June 1902 RyeCardiff-Venice June 1902–July 1902 CoalMariupol–Bristol July 1902–August 1902 GrainTaganrog-Yeisk-Mariupol-FalmouthSeptember 1902–October 1902

Grain

Cardiff–Constantinople November 1902 CoalVarna-Burghaz-Constanza-NaplesGenoaDecember 1902

Grain

Sources: Books of expenses of ss Demetrius Schilizzis, 28/9/1895–19/10/1896, 8/5/1900–13/3/1903; rough logbook of ss Demetrius Schilizzis, 7/6/1904, Archive ofCaptain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral AnastassiosZografos


The method of trading remained the same as in the sailing ship era of the Chiotcommercial and maritime network (see Chapter 2), calling at Constantinople,Malta, Gibraltar and Falmouth for orders and sending samples of grain to agentsin the Baltic. On 7 September 1881 Captain Syrmas arrived at Falmouth fororders and on 12 September, still at Falmouth, sent a letter to D.Nicolopulo: ‘Itelegraphed to Messrs Alatini Brothers in London. The same day I sent a sampleof our cargo to London that was found in excellent condition…. Today, at 3:30p.m. I received orders to proceed with Calliope to Hull.’

The Nicolopulos were typical merchants who became steamship owners. Themain force in the company, and the main recipient of Syrmas’ letters, wasDemetrius Nicolopulo, who was in Marseilles, while his son, Ioannis, wasestablished in Braila. Their agents in Constantinople were Foscolo & Mango,while in London the Vagliano Brothers provided charters from northern Europe.When Syrmas arrived at Stettin on 9 May 1881 he wrote to D.Nicolopulo that ‘Ireceived your telegram as follows: “Telegraph state of grain follow Vaglianoinstructions for all steamship affairs”. Today unloading started and the cargo iswell and cold. Only part of the middle hold is hot and spoiled.’

Syrmas continued commanding Calliope Nicolopulo until May 1883 when ‘Iwas fired by the owners…without any hard feelings, they gave me arecommendation letter for my three years service accompanied with 40 Turkishlira.’25

Syrmas remained jobless for about three years, but from then until 1914, whenhe retired, he worked non-stop as a steamship master. In 1887 he was hired byFoscolo & Mango, with whom he remained for the next seventeen years until thecompany was dissolved. We can trace some of the voyages of the third steamshipthat Syrmas commanded for Foscolo & Mango, the Demetrius S.Schilizzis, fromtwo books and two rough logs. Demetrius S.Schilizzis was a 1,277-NRTsteamship built in 1893. Apart from one trip to Rio de Janeiro in 1896, all tookplace between the Mediterranean, Black Sea and northern European. From thefour years that we have voyage data, Demetrius S.Schilizzis served a wide rangeof ports. On westbound voyages she carried grain almost exclusively from Braila,Galatz, Varna, Burghaz, Constanza, Taganrog, Achtary, Mariupol and Yeisk, andthe north African ports of Alexandria and Benghazi, to Rotterdam, Antwerp,Greenock, Hull, Bristol, Marseilles, Naples and Genoa. On east– bound voyagesshe carried coal from Cardiff, Sunderland and Glasgow to Piraeus, Alexandriaand Venice (see Table 5.5).

Demetrius S.Schilizzis was sold in June 1904 to the Marseilles company, LaSociete de Navigation a vapeur, and renamed Sainte-Helene. Syrmas learned thenews in Constantinople and wrote in the logbook:

On Thursday 9 June I received by the owners of the ship 1,500 FrenchFrancs for the expenses of this voyage and at 4:30 p.m. I was ordered by theowner Mr Albert Dajer to leave Constantinople. Speed of the ship 9 milesper hour. We passed through the Straits of Dardanelles, the Straits of


Tenedos, on 11 June we moored in Andros to put ashore the Captainsluggage…. On 14 June we passed by the island of Malta…. At 10.p.m. weentered the port of Sfax.

After Sfax, Syrmas took the ship to Marseilles for its new owners. From July toDecember 1904 Captain Syrmas probably went home to Andros where he washired by the most powerful mercantile and shipowning family of the island, theEmbiricos. The first Embiricos ship he commanded was the 1,750–NRT Leonidas,built in 1896 and owned by Alcibiades Embiricos of Braila; Alcibiades’ agent inLondon was C.L.Embiricos. On 1 December 1904 in Piraeus, Captain Syrmaswrote in Leonidas log that ‘I undertook the command of the steamship Leonidasas a waged master with a monthly wage of 400 golden French Francs.’26

Leonidas logbook is the first example of an official log written by Syrmas,who gives a detailed and systematic account of each voyage, referring one afterthe other to all the capes, islands or shores that he passes, the nautical milescovered, his position at sea, and the speed of the ship (usually eight

Table 5.6 Voyages of ss Leonidas, 1905–7


1905Taganrog-London March 1905–April1905

Grain

Cardiff-Naples June 1905–July 1905 CoalTaganrog-Amsterdam August 1905–September 1905

Grain

Cardiff-Torre Annunziato September1905–October 1905

Coal

Taganrog-Marseilles October 1905–November 1905

Grain Sifneo, Kamillo, Fredebeck,Diamantides

1906Novorossisk-Burghaz-AntwerpDecember 1905–February 1906

Grain

Cardiff-Genoa February 1906–March1906

Coal

Taganrog-London April 1906–May1906

Grain Svoronos & Sons

Cardiff-Naples May 1906 CoalYeisk-Achtary-Liverpool June 1906–July 1906

Grain L.Dreyfus

Cardiff-Savonna August 1906 CoalGalatz-Rotterdam September 1906–October 1906

Grain



Cardiff-Savonna October 1906–November 1906

Coal

Braila-Antwerp December 1906 Grain1907Cardiff-Venice January 1907–February 1907

Coal

Source: Logbook of ss Leonidas

or nine knots per hour). In 1905 and 1906, the ship exclusively carried grain fromTaganrog, Yeisk, Achtary, Novorossisk, Galatz, Braila and Burghaz to London,Liverpool, Amsterdam and Rotterdam on westward passages, and coal fromCardiff to Marseilles, Naples, Torre Annunziato, Genoa and Savonna oneastward legs (Table 5.6).

In 1906, Captain Syrmas was transferred from the twelve-year-old Leonidas tothe new Andriana (1,867 NRT). He went to Sunderland to receive the ship andhad his son, Theodoros, as second mate. He was apparently pleased by thistransfer and on 8 August wrote to Alcibiades Embiricos:

Table 5.7 Voyages of ss Andriana, 1906–10


1906Newcastle-Marseilles July 1906–August 1906 CoalAchtary-Bremerhaven August 1906–September 1906 Grain Louis DreyfusCardiff-Naples September 1906–October 1906 CoalBraila-Antwerp November 1906–January 1907 Grain1907Cardiff-Livorno January 1907–February 1907 CoalCardiff-Venice February 1907–April 1907 CoalBerdiansk-Bremen April 1907–June 1907 Grain Russian exportersCardiff-Livorno June 1907–July 1907 CoalBraila-Antwerp July 1907–September 1907 GrainCardifF-Genoa September 1907–November 1907 CoalCardiff-Naples November 1907–December 1907 Coal1908Cardiff-Genoa December 1907–January 1908 CoalCardiff-Genoa February 1908–March 1908 CoalBraila-Galatz-Rotterdam April 1908–May 1908 GrainCardiff-Naples May 1908–June 1908 CoalBraila-Rotterdam June 1908–August 1908 GrainCardiff-Genoa August 1908–September 1908 Coal



Cardiff-Livorno October 1908 CoalCardiff-Spezzia November 1908 CoalCardiff-Brindisi December 1908–January 1909 Coal1909Cardiff-Naples January 1909–February 1909 CoalCardiff-Venice March 1909 Coal

Taganrog-Rotterdam April1909–May 1909

Grain

Cardiff-Genoa June 1909–July 1909

Coal

Taganrog-Emden July1909–September 1909

Grain

Cardiff-Spezzia October1909–November 1909

Coal

Braila-RotterdamDecember 1909–January1910

Grain

1910Cardiff-Naples January1910–February 1910

Coal

Sources: Professional correspondence of Syrmas with the Embiricos in the letterbook, 19/7/1906–4/3/1909, logbook of ss Andriana, 5/3/1908–12/7/1909, and book ofexpenses of Andriana, 5/6/1906–5/2/1910 in the Archive of CaptainAnastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos

I received your letter of 6 of this month and I answer you that everythingon s/s Andriana is fine and it is not short of anything—even a pin—without flattery she is beautiful, powerful and quick enough, her normalspeed reached 9 knots with consumption of about 21 tons of British coaland we estimate with the first engineer of the ship that with a normal speedof 9 knots she will consume around 19 tons of the usual Cardiff coal. I amvery pleased with the behaviour of the ship at sea, and of all the divisionsof the holds of the ship that give great flexibility in receiving all kinds ofcargoes, and I wish she has a good luck.

On her first voyage to the Azov, however, Andriana had her first minor accident(see Table 5.7). On 10 September 1906 Captain Syrmas sent the followingtelegram to the Embiricos companies in Braila and London: ‘Andriana sailing


from Achtary grounded on bank 35 miles off Achtary. Jettisoned 60 tons bunkersand 70 tons cargo. Aground 6.5 hours. Passed Yenikale bar yesterday. Lloyd’ssurveyed bottom. No damage. Engines small damage. Sailing today. Bound oneport river Weser. Coaling Zongouldak.’27 According to Table 5.7 the voyagepattern of Andriana was almost identical to Leonidas, the only difference beingthat Andriana made a larger number of round-trips from Cardiff to Genoa,Livorno, Naples, Spezzia and Venice with coal and returned to Wales in ballast.As with Leonidas, Andriana carried grain from the Danube and Azov, as well asthe Bulgarian ports of Varna and Burghaz, but the destinations were not Britishbut rather Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Emden and Bremen. The importantactivity of Greek steamships in British ports in the 1900s, as shown inFigure 1.11, was to carry coal to the Mediterranean coaling stations.

The routine of Andriana’s voyages between the Black Sea and northernEurope was interrupted briefly on 30 October 1908 by an event that led toCaptain Syrmas receiving a medal from the Italian government. Andriana wasoff the north-western coast of Spain bound for Cardiff when she met an Italiansteamship:

in a dangerous situation and distinguishing it from its red lights weapproached and we asked them if they need help and they told us that theysink because of waters at the same time we saw them bringing down thelife-boats. After half an hour we saved five people from a semi-sunk life-boat…. The rest of the crew that was on board the sinking ship wereshouting continuously for help to save them and we replied three timeswith the steam-whistle as a sign that we are going to salvage them holdingour ship [in the same position] as much as we could. In this way we stayedfor eight hours. At seven o’clock in the morning we verified that the shipwas Italian from Genoa called Prudenzia and they were shouting to savethem because they did not have another life-boat. Because of this we tookdown our big life-boat with four men, the second mate, the donkeyman, aseaman and an Italian of the already saved five, who on their own willfollowed my orders and went at the side of the sinking ship and they tookthe other 11 and brought them back on board safely…. From the 21 crewof the Italian ship we saved 16 that were disembarked in Cardiff.

ORGANISATION AND PROFITABILITY OF VOYAGES

The voyages of the seven ships examined were determined by the charterscontracted between the shipowners and the shippers; all voyages have beencalculated from the time that the ship loaded to the time it unloaded. AsAlcibiades Embiricos dictated to Captain Syrmas, ‘every voyage will startfrom the day of departure from the port of unloading and will finish theday before [the day of departure from the port of unloading]’.28 The


specifications for each voyage were included in the charter party, whichwas in a standardised printed form in Italian, French or Greek in theMediterranean trade since the early nineteenth century.29 Samples ofcharter parties of the last third of the century were found in the archive ofCaptain Alexander Arvaniti from Galaxidi, who was probably co-ownerwith Captain D. Katzulis of the brig Aghios Panteleimon in the 1870s. Bythat time charter parties were handled by special shipping agent/translatorscalled courtiers maritimes in French, mediatori in Italian and mesites inGreek.

In Marseilles in August 1873, D.Katzulis contracted the following chartepartie:

CE JOUR Trente Août MIL HUIT CENT SOIXANTE et treize PARL’ENTREMISE DE NOUS F.Parran COURTIER MARITIME PRES LABOURSE DE CETTE VILLE DE Marseilles, LE CAPITAINE D.KatzuliCOMMANDANT LE Brick grec APPELE Aio Pendaleimon en RegistreItalien 100.1.1 DE cent quarante tonneaux de Jauge grecqueACTUELLEMENT ANCRE en ce port LE DIT CAPITAINE A NOLISEET FRETE A Messieurs P & E. Rodocanachi Negociants de cette villeSON DIT NAVIRE pour aller directement à Galatz ou à Ibraile suivant lesordres qu’zil recevra à Galatz par Messieurs Ergastiriari et Platis d’Ibrailaaux quels le dit capitaine écrira dès son arrivée a Galatz, et c’est pourrecevoir dans un de ces points son plein et entier chargement de blé, letransporter et conduire directement a Livourne ou dans les quarante huitheures de son arrivée lui sera dit s’il doit débarquer dans ce port ou biensuivre son voyage pour Marseilles… LE PRESENT AFFRETEMENT ESTFAIT ET CONVENU AU PRIX DE cinq franc par chaque cent soixantelibres30

A few months later Captain Alexander Arvanitis took command of the ship andentered into another charter, a contratto di noleggio, in Constantinople on 28April 1874. It seems that Captain Arvanitis worked well in 1874, because wehave another charter party, navlosymfonitikon in Greek, signed in Constantinopleon 1 October 1874 with the merchant Andreas Vagliano for a voyage for‘Berdianska where in 24 hours, she should be ordered to load there in Mariupol,Yeisk or Taganrog’, from where she was to sail:

for Zakynthos, where she will be ordered to unload there, or in one of theIonian islands, or to continue in a safe Italian or French port to Marseillesincluded, taking second orders in Malta or Messina in 48 hours…. Forfreight rate of the present voyage the two parts have agreed for 3 francsand seven eighths if she is loaded in Taganrog …for every cargo of grainaccording to the measure of Marseilles.31


After signing the contract and loading grain in the Azov or on the Danube, Greekvessels always stopped in Constantinople for documents, supplies, watering’ andorders from shipping agents; this pause was a necessary part of the voyage,whether in sail or steam. The difference between the two was that sailing vesselstook much more time in the straits and in Constantinople. During the age of sail,ships seeking charters waited in Constantinople. If they did not find one,frequently they sailed for the producing areas: ‘[After waiting in vain for charterin Constantinople we left for the Azov]…. Sailing under various winds in the seaof Azov, we reached Taganrog on the 28th April and we got out to the town thesame day. On the 30th April we were chartered by the Vaglianos to carry awhole cargo of wheat from Taganrog for a Mediterranean port.’32 In the islands of origin or residence for the shipowners, like Syros for Anastassiaor Andros in the case of Leonidas and Andriana, there were stops for manning,which gave the crew an opportunity to see their family for a short period oftime.33 While Syros was the main maritime centre for repairs for sailing shipslike Anastassia, the steamers that Captain Syrmas commanded were all repairedin Britain. While for many sailing vessels Syros was a necessary stop on the wayto or from the western Mediterranean, not only for crewing and repairs but alsofor loans or chartering, by the last third of the century westward-bound steamersfrom Constantinople stopped not in Syros but at Piraeus for coaling.Subsequently, they stopped at Zakynthos, Messina, Malta, Gibraltar or Falmouthfor orders from the shipowner. The efficiency and extent of the Greek maritimenetwork was quite astonishing: at all Italian and French Mediterranean ports, aswell as in northern Europe, there were agents who could handle everything themaster might need.

The average sailing ship was able to make about three voyages per year, whilethe average steamer could make eight. Similarly, voyage duration on a sailingvessel was around four months compared to six weeks on steamers. Apart fromOdysseas, which sailed in the eastern Mediterranean, and Theofania, whichoperated mainly in the Atlantic, the remaining ships worked more or less on thesame routes, from the Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northernEurope (see Table 5.8).

The fact that Greek sailing ships and the steamers that replaced themcontinued to travel the same routes until 1914 suggests that they were profitable.The intriguing question is ‘how profitable?’ The amounts that the Greekshipowners earned, whether recently or 100 years ago, are known to have beenhigh, but the precise levels have never been known. Anything written on thesubject is based on assumptions and generalisations. Two


Table 5.8 Average number and duration of voyages per year

Name of ship Sample numberof voyages

Averagenumber ofvoyages peryear

Averageduration ofvoyages year(months)

Laid-up time(months)

A. Sailing shipsOdysseas 9 2.3 3.9 3Anastassia 45 2.7 3.9 1.3Theofania 11 3.3 3.6B. SteamshipsCalliope N. 8 8 1.5Demetrius Sch. 25 8.3 1.4 –Leonidas 15 8 1.5 –Andriana 28 7.7 1.6Sources: See Tables 5.1–5.7

Table 5.9 The profits of the voyages of Andriana, 1906–9 (in pounds sterling)

Year Number ofvoyages

AEstimated* value ofship

BEstimated** totalrevenues

C Voyageexpenses

B-C Netprofit

B-C/A %profit

1906 4 27,600 5,981 1,789 4,192 151907 7 27,600 11,348 2,278 9,070 331908 9 27,600 12,972 2,763 10,209 371909 7 27,600 9,796 2,814 6,982 25Sources: Book of expenses of Andriana, 5/6/1906–5/2/1910; logbook of Andriana, 5/3/

1908–12/7/1909Notes: * We have calculated the price of Andriana using the price of £6 per deadweight

ton given by ‘Angiers Brothers Steam Shipping Report 1906’, Fairplay, 3January 1907. The deadweight tonnage of Andriana is estimated at 4,600 tons.** From evidence given in the logbook and book of expenses we assume thatAndriana carried an average of 4,600 tons of coal and 5,000 tons of grain inevery charter, using the freight rates of coal (London– Mediterranean) and ofwheat (Odessa–London) in C.Knick Harley, ‘Coal Exports and BritishShipping, 1850–1913’, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 26, 1989, pp.311–38

factors explain this situation: first, the lack of publicly available shipping dataand, second, the secrecy of the profession. It is sheer luck that we have hadaccess to expense books of the various steamers examined.34 Only Andriana,however, had enough archival material to enable the creation of Table 5.9.


Andriana was bought new in 1906 for about £27,600, and in the first fouryears of its life yielded an average of 28 per cent net on the original investment.In other words, within this time it was fully amortised. Considering that theseyears were characterised by low freight rates, we can understand why the Greeksteamship fleet continued to grow to 1914 and after. The profitability of theGreek-owned fleet in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cannot, of course, bederived solely from the example of Andriana. This topic belongs to anotherchapter of Greek maritime economic history that remains to be written.

MASTERS AND SEAMEN

The number of seamen manning deep-sea vessels from the 1830s to 1914 rangedbetween 10,000 and 20,000 seamen annually, while the number on coastal craftfluctuated between 5,000 and 15,000 (see Table 5.10). Some official statistics onthe number of seamen for the period 1839–75 are in the journal Pandora andA.N.Vernadakis’ book, About the Trade in Greece. Unfortunately, for the nextforty-five years there are no government statistics. Table 5.10 therefore has beenestimated by assuming an average of nine seamen per sailing ship, a numberdeduced from evidence for Greek-

Table 5.10 Greek seamen, 1839–1910

Deep-sea-going vessels* All Greek vessels

Year Number ofsailingships*

Number ofsteam ships*

Estimatednumber ofseamen

Number ofships

Seamen**

1839 1,070 _ 9,630 3,345 13,6791840 1,019 – 9,170 3,184 18,9581843 949 – 8,541 3,169 19,0051845 1,114 – 10,026 3,584 15,0001851 1,437 _ 12,933 4,327 27,5661852 1,375 – 12,357 4,230 27,3721853 1,329 – 11,889 4,153 26,0321855 1,525 – 13,725 5,063 30,0001860 1,212 _ 10,908 4,073 23,8421862 1,153 – 10,377 4,338 23,8491864 1,230 – 11,070 4,528 24,9491866 1,355 4 12,299 5,512 30,7001868 1,450 11 13,336 5,422 31,2991870 1,484 27 14,058 5,833 38,0801874 1,518 20 14,182 5,202 25,8381875 1,565 25 14,7351876 1,567 24 14,727


Deep-sea-going vessels* All Greek vessels

Year Number ofsailingships*

Number ofsteam ships*

Estimatednumber ofseamen

Number ofships

Seamen**

1879 1,256 41 12,3701883 1,318 50 13,1621887 1,423 82 14,9391888 1,834 98 19,1521889 1,859 82 18,8631890 1,838 97 19,0641891 1,816 105 19,0741892 1,834 162 20,7181903 1,030 199 14,4441905 1,095 214 15,4191907 1,135 255 16,8451909 980 287 16,2821912 760 346 15,8361913 788 365 16,5821914 780 407 17,602Sources: Table 4.1 and Appendix 4.1Notes: * Estimated number of seamen on sailing ships over 60 tons, nine; estimated

number of seamen on steamships over 100 tons, twenty-six. ** Includesfishermen

flag ships in the London Customs Bills of Entry and the French Sémaphore deMarseilles. The average crew on steamers was assumed to be twenty-five, basedupon data from the nautologia (crew lists) in the archives of the AegeanMaritime Museum for the period 1908–14. These are similar to a remarkable setof British records known as the ‘Agreements and Accounts of Crew’. The Greekdocuments not only contain information on crew,

Table 5.11 Composition of crew in an oceangoing Greek cargo sailing vessel of about 250NRT

Capacity Number

Master 1First mate 1Carpenter 1Bosun 1ABs 4–6Total 8–10


Capacity Number

Sources: Processed data of number of crews on Greek-fla sailing vessels; LondonCustoms Bills of Entry and Sémaphore de Marseilles 1860, 1870, 1880 and1890

including name, age, place of birth, wages, place and time of joining, place andtime of discharge, and contributions to the Seamen’s Pension Fund (NAT), butalso provide a wealth of detail about the vessels and their voyages. Thenautologia were kept by the NAT to keep track of Greek seamen and to calculatetheir contributions to the fund.

The crew of a deep-sea Greek cargo sailing vessel of about 250 NRT consistedof the master, mate, carpenter, bosun and four to six seamen, making a totalnumber of eight to ten people (see Table 5.11). Ocean-going cargo steamersaround 1914 carried crews of twenty-three to twenty-eight, about one-quarter ofwhom were officers, including the master, mates and engineers, while theremainder were ratings, such as the bosun, carpenter, ABs, firemen, coaltrimmers, steward, cook and deckboys (see Table 5.12).

Much of the good operation of a ship depended upon the master. As EricSager has correctly observed, there is no parallel to the master on land. At sea he‘was employer and employee, wage-earner and business agent, working man andtrustee of capital in his industry,35 The professional correspondence of CaptainAnastassios Syrmas with Alcibiades Embiricos and his associates gives us aninsight into the relations between waged masters and shipowners. Captain Syrmascommunicated with his owners by mail and telegraph. Whenever he reached aport, his first duty was to send a telegram reporting his safe arrival. He thenwrote letters every two days, reporting on the progress of loading or unloading,accompanied with excerpts from one of the logs, depending on what theshipowner asked for.

The master’s education was based mainly on experience on board. Until theend of the nineteenth century the qualifications to become a master in Greecewere determined by the 1836 royal decree ‘about policing the merchant marine’and its amendments. Article 14 stated that to become a master of a B’ classmerchant vessel, a man had to be twenty-two years of age, have at least fouryears’ experience at sea, and pass the state exams

Table 5.12 Composition of crew in an oceangoing Greek cargo steamship vessel of about2,000 GRT in 1910

Capacity Number

Master 1Second mate 1Third mate 1Carpenter 1


Capacity Number

Bosun 1ABs 4–6Deck boys 2First engineer 1Second engineer 1Third engineer 1Engine boy 1Firemen 4–6Coal trimmers 1–2Cook 1Steward 1Assistant steward 1Total 23–8Sources: Crew lists 1910, Aegean Maritime Museum

organised by a committee of masters in Athens, which were usually taken after acouple of months’ training with navigation masters in Syros, Nauplion orHydra.36

But nothing could replace experience, and the best teachers were often theolder seamen. Most masters were basically self-taught, which was also more orless true of their abilities in foreign languages as well. For example, CaptainSyrmas knew Italian (the basic tool in the Mediterranean), could communicate inFrench, and learned good English during the five months he spent supervisingthe construction of Calliope. In fact, during the time that Syrmas was jobless inthe mid–1880s, he translated a book from the English examination for a steamengineer because:

From my own experience I saw the need, that every master or second mateof a steamship should have some knowledge of the engine as it happens inEngland…. Motivated hence by the eagerness to promote our Marine, thathas no such books, I attempted with my own weak forces to translate thisbooklet…that describes clearly and briefly all about the engine.

The majority of masters who commanded deep-sea sailing vessels were co-owners to some extent. A large number of the masters on Greek-owned steamersin the last third of the nineteenth century, however, worked for wages and didnot participate in ownership. This shift occurred because the largest number ofsteamships belonged to the large merchant/shipowners of the Ionian commercialand maritime network and were either newbuildings or just a few years old,which made them too expensive for masters. Given the ownership of these ships,it is also not surprising that the ‘aristocracy’ of waged masters came


overwhelmingly from Cephalonia and Ithaca. According to the Chiot shipowner,Andreas Lemos:

The Cephalonian and Ithacan masters and other officers were the bestamong their colleagues from the Aegean islands…. They had bettereducation and knew English which was the language of the internationalsea-trade…. They were preferred from the big shipping and commercialHouses—and especially from the Ionian ones—and were remuneratedhighest of all…. The Cephalonian masters constituted the aristocracy of theprofession…. After the mooring of the ship and during the loading andunloading time they stayed in the best hotels and lived a luxurious life.While their Chiot, for example, colleagues stayed in their vessels that as arule belonged partly to them, and they supervised the various port activitiestaking even part in them, because their ship was on credit and everypossible economy had to be made.37

The masters were in most cases well-respected family men on their homeislands, men of dignity and independent spirit. Such a man was CaptainAnastassios Syrmas, whose fame in Andros as a just man outlived him.38 In July1909, the sixty-seven-year old Syrmas wrote to his boss, Alcibiades Embiricos,the following, in response to pressure to lower Andriana’ victualling expenses to1,000 francs per month:

I also received your letter of 23/6 and I was sorry to see your writings. I amnot selfish and my duty to my superiors I know because it is not the firsttime that I have served as an employee. The bosses have the right to makecomments on the operation of the steamship because these help the Masterto do his duty, but not to tell him off because the Masters are not slaves butthe representatives of the shipowners…. Concerning the victuallingexpenses in the 23rd voyage, these are 1810.70 francs for 54 days, whichmeans that for 30 days they are 1005.90 per month…. You see that all theyare writing are false accusations…. Of course I owe my job to you but,with all due respect, your nephews are not worthy even to look at mypicture, I mean Messrs Peraki and Leonidas [employees in theC.L.Embiricos office in London]. I am sorry, Sir, to upset you but thesegentlemen have exhausted my patience.

For the ten years he worked for the Embiricos, Captain Syrmas did not have anybreak from the sea, but a few months after writing the above letter he asked ‘tohave little time to rest’. He was told that this could not be done unless he left hisjob. Captain Syrmas answered that ‘Since it is not possible [to have a little timeto rest and] I do not wish to retire from the command of your steamship, henceplease communicate to the Management that I will not leave my position untilthe time comes to be replaced by my son as you write to me.’39 It is quite


possible that Captain Syrmas remained with the Embiricos for longer than hewished because of his son, Theodoros. In fact, it seems that the Embiricos used hisrecruitment of his son to lower his wages and to control him:

Thank you for your good will towards me, I wrote today to my sonTheodoros that you give him the position of second mate with me inAndriana, in our next approach to Andros, concerning the wage 140 francsI believe he accepts and I also accept the wage of 350 francs, concerningthe wages of the others I will announce it to them in time and I will write toyou.40

In the year 1909, however, freight rates touched bottom. This may have been oneof the reasons that Embiricos decided to lower the wages not only of the master(from 400 to 350 francs) and second mate (from 170 to 140 francs) but also ofthe whole crew.41

The nineteenth-century system, inherited from the sailing ship era, wherebythe crews of Greek ships were either relatives or had common island originscontinued in steam in the early twentieth century. From the logs of Odysseas,Anastassia and Theofania we have evidence of high-ranking officers who weresons, cousins or uncles of the master. Detailed evidence on the origin of theentire crew, however, exists for Leonidas and Andriana and verifies that mostcame from the island of Andros (see also Chapter 7). Captain Syrmas, as alreadymentioned, was an ‘adopted’ Andriot. In 1907, when Andriana had a crew oftwenty-eight, the third mate was Syrmas’ son, Theodoros, and the fourthengineer his other son, Demetrius; apart from a British first engineer, almost allthe rest of the crew came from Andros. In fact, investigation on a sample ofsteamships from their crew lists in 1910 has revealed that 71 per cent of the crewof Andriot steamships came from Andros. The equivalent percentage forsteamships from Cephalonia and Ithaca was 50 per cent and for the Chiot ones60 per cent.42Common island of origin contributed to the peaceful labourrelations on board which proved a great advantage to Greek shipping. It is quiteastonishing that in all logs practically no desertions were recorded; of course, thefact that in most cases the seamen’s salaries were paid to their families ratherthan directly to them might also have contributed.

It seems that contrary to the common belief of contemporaries and maritimehistorians, Greek seamen were not paid significantly worse than their Europeancounterparts. Table 5.13 gives the wages of an able seaman (AB) on the brigsAghios Panteleimon and Phoenix from Galaxidi, which in 1875 traded betweenthe Black Sea and Marseilles, compared with the


Table 5.13 Mean wages for able-bodied seamen on sailing vessels in selected ports(sterling/month)

Port 1875

[Greek ports] [2.14]*Tonsberg 2.54Dunkirk 2.62Gothenburg 2.78Copenhagen 2.98London 3.05Antwerp 3.39Hamburg 3.52Rotterdam 3.53Sources: Appendix 5.1; Efthimios Gourgouris, Galaxidi at the Times of Sailing Vessels,

2nd vol., Athens, 1983, p. 597; Lewis R.Fischer, Around the Rim: Seamen’sWages in North Sea Ports, 1863–1900’, in L.R.Fischer, Harald Hamre, PoulHolm and Jaap R.Bruijn (eds), The North Sea. Twelve Essays on Social Historyof Maritime Labour, Stavanger, Association of North sea Societies, 1992

Note: * Evidence from the crew of two sailing ships

mean wages of colleagues in the main northern European ports. Making theassumption that both vessels were typical vessel, we see that the AB on theGreek vessels had a wage of £2.14 per month, whereas colleagues in theNorwegian port of Tonsberg or the French port of Dunkirk had only 16 per centmore, in London 30 per cent more and in Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburgabout 37 per cent more.43 Similarly, Table 5.14 gives the wages of Greek andNorwegian ABs and proves that on the eve of the First World War they werevery similar (see also Appendix 5.1). Considering the enormous differences thatexisted in the last third of the nineteenth century in the standard of livingbetween Greece and northern Europe, the differences in the ABs’ wages weresmall. Moreover, all the early Greek steamships, and certainly all those on whichCaptain Syrmas served, had British first engineers because of a shortage amongGreek officers. The wages of first engineers were always the same as the mastersand I doubt that British engineers would have preferred Greek steamships werewages not up to British standards. This is at the end of the nineteenth centurywhen the integration of the world shipping market had taken place and certainlywhen the European shipping market conformed—for once—with the definition ofneo-classical economies that a market is a geographic area in which the prices ofa product tend to become unified.

But as Marcus Rediker has pointed out, seamen’s wages were composed notonly of the actual monetary remuneration but also of the so-called social wagecomprising the small illegal trading he was able to do, living


Table 5.14 Monthly wages for Greek and Norwegian ABs for deep-sea-going vessels (inFrench francs)

Year Greek Norwegian***

1905 60* 651907 70* 701908 65* 781909 65* 741914 65** 77Sources: Lewis R.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘From Namsos to Halden: Myths and

Realities in the History of Norwegian Seamen’s Wages, 1850–1914’, Scandinavian Economic History Review, vol. 35, no. 1, 1987, pp. 41–66; Appendix 6.1;books of crew wages of Andriana and Leonidas, Private Collection of AdmiralAnastassios Zografos; crew lists 1910, Aegean Maritime Museum

Notes: * Average wages of ABs of two steamships. ** Average wages of ABs of ahundred steamships. *** We have calculated 1.4 French francs=1 Norwegiankroner

quarters on board, and food.44 That seamen added to their wages with small-scale smuggling was (and is) a common practice. Proof of such practices on theships examined here can be found in the logbook of Leonidas, where two Greekseamen tried to smuggle into Britain twenty-four tons of tobacco and were caughtby British authorities.43

There is little evidence on the living conditions on the seven ships we haveinvestigated. The only direct information is given by Captain Syrmas, who wroteto the sailing ship master, N.Gioni of Hydra, whom he had hired as a secondmate on Calliope in 1880: ‘It is a fine ship and in your cabin you will have abathroom, and you are going to be taken care of well, there will be, however,bugs.’46 Although there is no other information on quarters, there is ampleevidence on the quality and quantity of food from the expense books andletterbooks. It has often been said by seamen as a joke that the cook is the mostimportant man on board. In the limited space available food was a highlyimportant part of daily life, and more often than not a permanent source ofcomplaint. Captain Syrmas seemed to purchase good supplies for his crew. InMarch 1905, for example, in Taganrog he bought fifty pairs of chicken, two pigs,700 eggs, beans, fresh meat, caviar, salt, vegetables, fresh fruit, flour, fresh breadand ships biscuits (galette). In August 1906 he bought twenty-eight chickens,250 eggs, ten loaves of bread, thirty watermelons and twenty-five smoked fish atYeni-Kale, while in Antwerp he bought meat and eggs; in Genoa, potatoes,onions, rice, and parmesan cheese; and in Naples, fresh meat, bread, pasta, oliveoil, olives, beans, onions, fruit, eggs, preserved tomatoes, lemons, fish andvegetables. Alcohol was not prohibited on Greek ships, since alcoholism was notan issue among Greek seamen. Thus, Captain Syrmas bought wine inConstantinople, beer in Antwerp and ‘Jamaica rum’ in Britain.47 Of course, notall seamen were lucky enough to have Syrmas as a master, but he was probably


not unique. Syrmas had lived on ship food since he was nine years old, andhaving as a measure of comparison the food he ate on Greek sailing ships, hefound the food and living conditions he had to put up with on the Dutch sailingship Reprise in 1876 on his passage from Marseilles to Rio Janeiro unacceptable:

After six days I fell sick from distress and I suffered extremely fromheadache so much that I never remember to have suffered so in my life… Isuffered because of the place they had given me to sleep and secondlybecause of the lack of food appropriate for us for the way we live in ourships, although they all ate on the same table with the master and thesecond mate. Every day, however, they ate preserved meat, veal and pork,potatoes, salted vegetables, very little breakfast only tea in the morning….The Dutch have a habit of drinking tea and coffee without sugar (only onSunday) and I suppose this for the sake of economy, because I saw and Iwas surprised for the economy they do in everything, it is almoststinginess, may be it seems to me because their way of living is socalculated in everything, because we, it seems, do not know yet what ispoverty, and they live in poverty although they are great nations.48

But of course good quality food on board costs more and thus Syrmas receivedletters from the Embiricos throughout 1908 asking him to limit the expenses forwages and victualling. But Captain Syrmas answered:

Concerning the wages [and victualling] expenses of Andriana that arebigger than in your other steamships… I have written to you already. ….Every ship has a separate book and every Master a differentadministration, therefore my colleagues of the other steamships shouldlook at their other expenses and not only to lower the wages and thevictualling of the crew.49

Economy of operation is still something shipping managers expect of mastersand is often a matter of continuous dispute between office and ‘bridge’. But thequality and cost of food, or the level of wages, are not under the jurisdiction ofthe Greek master of the 1990s. Still, it is quite astonishing to see how similarvessel operations and management were in 1914 compared to today. CaptainSyrmas, who commanded a wind-driven 250–ton wooden vessel in 1864 and a 2,000–ton steam-powered steel cargo vessel in 1914, would not find command of a25,000–ton diesel-powered ship very different. Moreover, he could still be hiredby, and would be able to argue with, an Embiricos—in this case Alcibiades’grand-nephews, who to this day operate ships from London.


Part II

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

6GREEK MARITIME ‘EXPANSION’, 1914–

39

The First World War confirmed the internationalisation of the Greek fleet, andthe interwar period consolidated this position. Despite the transition from sail tosteam at the turn of the century, the spatial activity of Greek ships remainedcentred on the Mediterranean, Black Sea and northern Europe. While a number ofships operated in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, this was exceptional. The FirstWorld War had a subversive impact on Greek shipping by limiting traditionalmarkets while providing opportunities to transfer to the Atlantic from a base inLondon.

The interwar years were transitional in the international division of labour inmaritime transport, and changes that occurred then prevailed until after theSecond World War. One of the main characteristics of these years was a distinctdecline in British hegemony and the rise of the subsidised American liner fleet. Asignificant portion of the tramp trades were taken over by the Greeks, Japaneseand Norwegians. The Greeks in particular were able to dominate on a number ofbulk dry cargo routes. This chapter investigates the factors that led to thesedevelopments, focusing on the importance of the Greek shipping offices inLondon and their key role during the interwar years. There are four parts. Thefirst deals with the Greek fleet during the First World War, and the second withthe interwar period, distinguishing the sea lanes Greek ships traversed and theway they survived the international shipping crisis of the 1930s. The third andfourth parts trace the reasons for the rise of Greek shipping through anexamination of the structure, function and interrelation of the Greek shippingoffices in London with those in Greece.

THE GREEK FLEET DURING THE FIRST WORLDWAR

The Great War started in August 1914 and ended officially in November 1918.Greece remained neutral until 1917, when it entered the war. The war marked thepath for Greek shipping in two ways: first, it opened opportunities for newmarkets and new routes; second, it generated unprecedented profits for a largenumber of shipowners.

Before the outbreak of the First World War most of the Greek merchant fleetcarried bulk cargoes, especially grain, coal, cotton, wool and lumber, betweenthe eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and the western Mediterranean andnorthern Europe. The closing of the Dardanelles in the autumn of 1914 meant theloss of Black Sea markets. Yet the war increased demand for maritime transport;Greek ships were chartered by the Allies and sent to all parts of the globe. Theywere particularly active in the Atlantic grain trade and European commerce,transporting coal from England to the Mediterranean and returning to Englandand France with phosphates and iron ore for the war industries. There was thus adistinct shift of Greek ships into the Atlantic and northern seas. Figure 6.1indicates the areas where Greek ships were lost during the First World War;these are indicative of the routes the Greek merchant fleet sailed. Figure 6.1shows that 26 percent of Greek ships were lost on the Atlantic, 12 per cent on theNorth Sea and only 31 percent in the Mediterranean.

The strong demand for sea transport during the war led to an impressiveincrease in freight rates which made shipping extremely profitable, particularlyfor neutrals. Yet despite its neutrality Greece faced a number of difficulties. Thedivision of its population between the Venizelists, supporters of the Entente, andthe royalists, faithful to the Germanophile King Constantine II, led to the landingof Anglo-French troops in the country and the embargo of Athens/Piraeus. Sincethe Greek shipping offices in Piraeus were obliged to work through the British

Figure 6.1 Position of ships lost in the First World War. Source: Appendix 6.1

184 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

legation in Athens, I was able to find a rich collection of telegrams from theEmbiricos, Stathatos, Michalinos, Lykiardopulo, Pantaleon and other shippingoffices in Foreign Office (FO) 286/602 at the Public Record Office in London.These messages indicate a much larger Greek participation in the Indian Oceanthan is evident in Figure 6.1.

As Figure 6.2 indicates, the years 1915–19 had the highest freight rates in aquarter-century. In addition, the Greek merchant fleet had the advantage thatdeep-sea vessels were particularly in demand; by that time a full 47 per cent ofGreek ships were larger than 2,000 GRT, the highest percentage among theEuropean Allies, apart from Britain and France (see Table 6.1). In fact theaverage size of Greek ships sunk during the First World War was 2,493 GRT(Appendix 6.1). As a result, in 1914–15 Greek shipowners earned about £8million in net profits (about 200 million francs) at a time when the value of themerchant fleet was only about £4.5 million.1

Apart from high profits, the freight rates brought a large amount of money byenabling Greeks to sell a substantial portion of their fleet at good prices. Shipprices usually follow fluctuations in freight rates (cf. Figures

Figure 6.2 Tramp shipping freights, 1910–36. Source: Appendix 6.3

GREEK MARITIME EXPANSION, 1914–39 185

Table 6.1 Ships larger than 2,000 GRT as percentage of total national fleets in 1914

Country % GRT

Greece 47Netherlands 33Spain 30Italy 27Norway 11Denmark 11Sweden 9Source: A.Andreades, Les Effets Economiques et Sociales de la Guerre en Grèce, Paris,

1928, p. 107

6.2 and 6.4). During the war the Greeks sold almost 30 per cent of theirprewar tonnage, 114 steamships of 259,617 GRT, to ‘foreigners’.2 Another 41per cent of prewar tonnage, or 147 ships of 366,408 GRT (see Appendix 6.1),was lost due to the war. In fact during the first two years of the war, when theGreeks were neutral, 35 per cent of their wartime losses occurred, while the yearthey entered the war (1917), 51 percent of all their losses took place (seeFigure 6.3). By the end of the war the Greeks had lost 626,025 GRT or 70 percent of prewar tonnage. This percentage was the highest among Europeanmaritime nations: Britain lost 9,031,828 GRT (43 per cent of its fleet); France,700,000 GRT (33 per cent); Norway, about 1,000,000 GRT (40 per cent); Italy,

Figure 6.3 Percentage of ships lost during the First World War



862,000 GRT (52 per cent); and the US, about 530,000 GRT (10 per cent of itsprewar fleet).3

During the war years, Greek shipowners earned an estimated £30 million fromfreights, sales and indemnities, of which half were net profits (see Table 6.2).The Greek state, in an attempt both to secure some proportion of excess warprofits at a time of desperate need and to assure the rehabilitation of the lostfleet, in 1917 passed Law 1043/1917 ‘on taxing exceptional profits’. This lawimposed two new taxes, one of 21.5 per cent on exceptional war profits andanother of 22 per cent on the difference between the price of a ship purchasedbefore the war and the amount of its war indemnity or sale. Both were imposedretroactively to the beginning of the war. The second tax, shown in column (A)−(B) in Table 6.2 and amounting to £3.5 million, was to be returned to theshipowners if within two years of the end of the war they had built or bought avessel to replace the one lost or sold.4 The tax on exceptional war profits wasannulled in 1918 and replaced with a tax exemption for profits earned by shipsunder the Greek flag.

The attempt to avoid taxes, and the common belief that postwar economicreconstruction would bring long-term high freight rates, led many shipowners tohasten to buy ships at high prices. As a result, between 1919 and 1922 the Greekmerchant fleet almost doubled (see Table 6.4). After 1920, however, there was alarge and continuous fall in freight rates (Figures 6.2 and 6.14). Although theinterwar period began with high hopes, the prevailing international climatesignificantly limited world sea trade. The

Table 6.2 Taxes and profits of shipping during the First World War, 1915–19 (in poundssterling)*

Year (A) Incomefrom sales orindemnity

(B) Initialvalue of ships

(A)−(B)Surplusprofits

Final tax onsurplus profits

Estimatedtotal profits(freights salesor indemnity)

1915 2,715,901 1,587,787 1,128,114 178,735 (4,000,000)1916 5,744,491 1,773,983 3,970,508 862,871 (8,800,000)1917 11,471,562 3,384,590 8,086,972 1,863,495 (7,480,000)1918 3,537,005 1,102,894 2,434,111 504,647 (6,000,000)1919 548,167 132,791 415,376 98,858 (4,000,000)Total 24,017,126 7,982,045 16,035,081 3,508,606 (30,280,000)Sources: D.G.Papamihalopulos, The State and the Merchant Marine, Athens, 1925, p. 88;

Michel Lheritier, La Grèce, Paris, F.Rieder, 1921, p. 93, for the estimatednumbers in brackets

Note: * We have calculated 1 pound sterling=25 French francs

Black Sea grain trade was reduced substantially as a result of the RussianRevolution and the division of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At the same time,China and India underwent deep economic crises and ceased to provide large


markets for consumption. Meanwhile, virtually all countries were adoptingprotectionist policies. Together with the abrupt fall of the freight rates, there wasa sharp drop in the prices of ships after 1920 (see Figure 6.4). The Greekshipowners who expected a continuation of high freight rates, as well as thosewho wanted to take advantage of the £3.5 million tax concession, spent about£12.1 million during 1919 and 1920 for ships whose value decreased by two-thirds in 1921. This bankrupted a number of Greek shipowners, the mostnotorious example being Nicolas Ambatielos.

On 17 July 1919, the Cephalonian shipowner, Nicholas Ambatielos, entered intoa contract with the British government for the purchase of nine steamships at a totalprice of £2,275,000.5 These ships were under construction in British dockyardsat Hong Kong and Shanghai. Delivery, according to Ambatielos, was to be madeon dates fixed by the parties. Not one of the ships, however, was delivered on thepromised date. At the time of the actual deliveries, the freight market had fallenconsiderably in comparison with the charges prevailing when the ships had beenpromised. As a result, Ambatielos was unable to realise the profit of £1 millionwhich he had reckoned to make simply by sailing from the ports of constructionto Europe. He did indeed make a net profit of £100,000 per ship with the firsttwo ships, which were delivered after only comparatively short delays. The rest

Figure 6.4 Purchasing value of a 7,500 DWT cargo ship, 1919–39



of the ships were delivered three to six months late, which proved disastrous forAmbatielos. The tremendous plunge in the freight market in 1920 (seeFigure 6.2) deprived him of the profit he would have earned had delivery beenmade at the times agreed. Hence, in November 1920, he was unable to meet theobligations provided in the contract and the British Ministry of Shipping and itssuccessor, the Board of Trade, refused to deliver the last two ships. Finally, theBritish government seized the first seven as well. Ambatielos claimed arbitrationand asked for damages. Mr Justice Hill, sitting in the English Admiralty Court,pronounced judgement on 15 January 1923, deciding that since no actualdelivery dates were found in the 1919 contract, Ambatielos was not entitled todamages. The Greek shipowner was, of course, ruined financially.6 With theoutstanding exception of this unfortunate story, however, the bulk of Greekshipowners re-entered the industry on a much smaller scale during the 1920s andmore dramatically in the 1930s when ship prices were extremely low.

THE GREEK FLEET DURING THE INTERWARPERIOD

Despite the fact that during the First World War 40 per cent of the Greek fleetwas engaged in trade outside the Mediterranean, when world commerce resumedits normal pace in the early 1920s, 80 per cent of the Greek fleet was againengaged in Black Sea and Mediterranean commerce (Figure 6.5). Theinternationalisation of the fleet, however, was not reversed and ten years later theshift to global routes was evident. By 1936 there was a significant change: theMediterranean and Black Sea accounted for only 44 per cent of entrances, while30 per cent occurred in northern Europe and 27 per cent in the Atlantic, Pacificand Indian Oceans.

From 1914 to 1938 the Greek merchant fleet soared from thirteenth to ninthplace among the largest national merchant marines, accounting for 3 per cent ofworld tonnage (see Table 6.3). More importantly, however, Greece now ownedthe second largest dry-cargo tramp fleet; its 16 per cent share trailed only Britain(39 per cent) and was ahead of Japan (11 per cent) and Norway (8 per cent, seeFigure 6.6). Although we have no equivalent data with which to isolate thesituation immediately prior to the First World War, we can safely assume that theshares of the dry-cargo tramp shipping market enjoyed by Greece, Norway andJapan came largely at the expense of the declining British tramp fleet. Moreover,these three newcomers also sustained the most dynamic shipping industries afterthe Second World War.7

Table 6.3 Top twelve merchant fleets, 1914–37 (ships above 100 GRT, in million GRT)

1914 1937

Country 1914 % 1921 1925 1930 1937 %

Britain 21.0 43 22.0 22.2 23.4 20.6 31


1914 1937

Country 1914 % 1921 1925 1930 1937 %

Germany 5.5 11 0.7 3.0 4.2 3.9 6USA 5.4 11 17.0 15.4 14.0 12.4 18Norway 2.5 5 2.5 2.7 3.7 4.3 6France 2.3 5 3.6 3.5 3.5 2.8 4Japan 1.7 4 3.3 3.9 4.3 4.5 7Italy 1.7 3 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.2 5Holland 1.5 3 2.2 2.6 3.1 2.6 4Sweden 1.1 2 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5 2Austro-Hungary

1.0 2 – – – – –

Russia/USSR

1.0 2 0.4 0.3 0.5 1.3 2

Spain 0.9 2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1Greece 0.8 2 0.6 0.9 1.4 1.9 3

Figure 6.5 Geographical activity of Greek ships



1914 1937

Country 1914 % 1921 1925 1930 1937 %

World 49.1 95 62.0 64.6 68.6 66.7 90Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 30, using statistics of Lloyd’s Register

of Shipping, 1937/8

In 1919 and 1920, freight rates remained at record levels because of a shortageof ships due to war losses. The British shipbuilding project for standard shipswas not yet complete and the disposal of the intact German fleet to the Allies didnot begin until 1921. Thus, both freight rates and ship prices stayed abnormallyhigh until late 1920. Following a sharp plunge, they then stabilised at muchlower levels between 1922 and 1929 (see Figure 6.14). Although the Tokyoearthquake and the 1925 British general strike led to short-term surges, marginswere always fairly tight in the 1920s.

One of the most frequented new itineraries for Greek ships was betweenBritain and Argentina. This particular route provides the clearest example of theloss by the British tramp fleet of a significant long-distance market to theGreeks. Figure 6.7 indicates the arrivals of Greek ships at the River Plate. In the1920s the involvement of the Greek fleet increased from nothing to a million nettons and, after coming to a complete standstill in 1930, it rose to 12 per cent oftotal arrivals in Argentinian ports. This accounted for a presence of 1.5 milliontons, making the Greek flag the second biggest visitor to the River Plate after theBritish. By the late 1920s the British fleet had fully recovered its prewarimportance in the Argentinian trade. The year 1929, however, marked thebeginning of a decline in its share, which dropped by about 1.5 million tons inthe course of the next decade, thereby decreasing the British fleet‘s importance inthe Argentinian trade by a full 10 per cent (see Appendix 6.6).8

The problem in dealing with aggregate tonnage statistics from various ports isthat it is impossible to separate the different trades involved. For example, thereis no way to distinguish liners from tramps. Nevertheless, from the reports of theBritish Commercial Secretaries in Buenos Aires, we know that the proportion oftramps to liners sailing the British flag was much bigger than for othernationalities. Moreover, Stanley Sturmey has calculated that in 1937 there was adecrease of 1.5 million tons in the British tramp fleet. This fleet was mainlyengaged in the coal trade, and Argentina was the terminus for one of its mostimportant long-distance routes.9 Thus, it is not unreasonable to assume that thedecline in the British share of Argentinian carriage was mainly due to a fall in itsshare of the tramp trade. This happened at a time when freight rates were at theirnadir. Even so, as the Commercial Secretary of the British Embassy in BuenosAires noted in 1932, ‘Greek vessels continue, however, to obtain an increasingproportion of these freights, and appear to be able to make ends meet whentonnage under other flags finds it impossible to do so.’


Indeed, the most extraordinary characteristic of the Greek fleet in the interwarperiod was its expansion during the world shipping crisis of

Table 6.4 Greek-owned fleet 1919–38

Dry cargo

Year Ships GRT % total Ships Total GRT

1914 – – 475 893,6501919 – – 282 430,2371920 – – 335 494,2691921 – – 440 685,0001922 – – 418 737,4501923 280 690,000 90.5 432 762,3531924 305 730,000 88.1 437 828,6351925 330 820,000 89.8 467 912,6091926 335 840,000 90.3 472 929,6191927 347 905,000 81.4 504 1,111,0521928 387 1,088,722 87 528 1,256,9651929 401 1,118,275 82.8 547 1,350,1571930 429 1,293,913 91.5 559 1,413,020

Figure 6.6 Tramp dry-cargo fleets, 1936. Source: Appendix 6.7


Dry cargo

Year Ships GRT % total Ships Total GRT

1931 436 1,333,156 89.6 575 1,487,6231932 429 1,323,967 92.5 558 1,430,4181933 467 1,501,000 95.5 565 1,572,1591934 501 1,666,658 95 600 1,755,2231935 520 1,749,915 99.5 600 1,758,7311936 509 1,722,867 96 605 1,793,6591937 615 1,894,6311938 638 1,889,269Source: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1937, pp. 278, 313

the 1930s. After losing more than two-thirds of its tonnage by 1919, the Greekfleet surpassed its prewar level by 1925 and continued to increase. These highgrowth rates were sustained throughout most of the 1930s; by 1938 the 638Greek ships totalled 1.9 million GRT, over 96 per cent of which was in cargoships (Table 6.4). Figures 6.8, 6.9 and 6.10 compare the growth of the Greek,Norwegian and British merchant fleets with the world fleet. Figure 6.8 shows thatfor the entire interwar period the growth rate of the Greek fleet was substantiallyabove the world average. In the 1920s annual growth exceeded 10 per cent for

Figure 6.7 Arrivals at the River Plate. Source: Appendix 6.6


all but three years, while in the 1930s it varied between 5 and 10 per cent per yearexcept for 1931 and 1933. What is really surprising, however, is that although bothNorwegian and British shipping tracked the low to negative world growth ratesduring the worst. years of the slump, between 1932 and 1935 the Greek fleetgrew rapidly in all but one year. This response to the world shipping crisis is aphenomenon that a Greek maritime economist has called ‘anticyclicalinvestment behaviour’ by which Greek shipowners made purchases when thefreight market was at its nadir and ships were cheap.10 While this anticyclicalbehaviour is no Greek invention, what is unique about the Greeks is that theypractise it far more than any of their competitors. They buy ships not only toreplace old tonnage or to serve a particular trade but also as speculative assets,buying cheap and selling dear. This habit, which has continued to the present day,makes the Greeks dominant in the London sale-and-purchase market and hascontributed to the expansion of the fleet since the beginning of this century. Butit was first identified as a strategic maritime policy of Greek companies duringthe shipping crisis of the 1930s. Pursuing this practice, the Greek shippingoffices in London were able to exploit the crisis in the British fleet. Theirstrength lay in their knowledge of—and connections to—the London maritimemarket on the one hand, and on the structure of the Greek fleet —based onkinship, common island origin and single-ship ownership—on the other.

Figure 6.8 Growth rates in Greek and world fleets

Source: Processed data, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 30


THE LONDON SHIPPING OFFICES

As indicated in Chapter 4, by 1914 the eleven Greek shipping offices in Londonhandled about 230,000 GRT, accounting for 28 per cent of the fleet. Mosttonnage was managed by offices owned by shipowners from Cephalonia andAndros (see Figure 6.11). By 1938, seventeen offices handled almost 1,000,000GRT, or 48 per cent of the fleet. The new force was the offices of the shipownersfrom the small island of Kassos. Indeed, a single company, Rethymnis andKulukundis (R&K), which accounted for four-fifths of Kassian tonnage,represented mainly Chiots. Thus, although shipowners from Cephalonia andAndros established a few additional offices, the Chiot owners were the dynamicforce in the Greek fleet, either with their own firms or under R&K.

The categorisation of the London offices by island of origin is vital tounderstand the way Greeks functioned. A London office not only represented theinterests of Greek companies but also took shares in practically every shipadministered. Thus, rather than being simply shipping agents or brokers, theLondon offices formed a group of companies with fragmented ownership. Inwhat amounted to a reliance upon trust, a Chiot preferred a fellow-islander torepresent his interests, as did a Cephalonian or an Andriot; offices like R&K,which represented the interests of shipowners from other islands, were theexception rather than the rule. It was perceived that a compatriot from the same

Figure 6.9 Growth rates in Norwegian and world fleets



island—or better still, from the same village or the same family—would handlehis interests better than a ‘foreigner’. Islands were small independent entitieswith tightly knit communities and in Greek shipping this was reflected in thecooperative character of the London offices.

The Greek shipping offices in London operated their own ships as well asthose of other companies based in Greece. They were first and foremost agenciesof shipowning companies established in Greece to avoid taxes otherwise payablein Britain. In Lloyd’s Register these offices were mentioned not in the List ofOwners and Shipowners but rather by the provision of alternative addresses citedas ‘London agencies’ in small italics beneath the details for a Greek owner. Despitethe indication that many companies were based in Piraeus or elsewhere inGreece, the London agencies were in fact usually the owners of a number of thecompanies they represented.

Figure 6.12 depicts the structure of these London offices operating ships fortheir own Greek firms or other Greek companies. In most cases, the Londonoffices and the companies represented had shares in each other’s ships. Thepurchase of a ship for a client usually required the latter to advance half theamount, with the other half secured by the London office or other collaboratingBritish companies. Moreover, the London offices handled sales and purchases ofused ships, provided chartering through the Baltic Exchange, and took care ofinsurance and fuel. A number of shipowners, by handing over half the purchase

Figure 6.10 Growth rates in British and world fleets



price of a ship, thereby had their ship chartered, insured and fuelled, leaving themto provide only crews and maintenance. This system apparently reducedoverheads sufficiently to cover the payments on borrowed capital andcommissions. According to the shipowner Nicholas B.Metaxas, before the FirstWorld War ‘the offices’ profits earned from each client is estimated at anaverage of 14 per cent on the amount of the loan’.11 By 1931 this percentage ofprofits was sustained. The Greek Committee for the Merchant Marine reportedthat ‘these commissions surpassed £1,000 per ship annually. In this way, acargo ship worth £10,000, with a mortgage on half of its value, gives to thelender-administrator £1,500 annually. This means that there was 30 per centinterest rate on capital-loans.’12

Greek shipping companies collaborated with a number of British firms thatprovided finance or brokerage services. Such enterprises usually employedexperienced Greeks. The most famous of these employees were EvangelosAmbatielos and Angelo Lusi who, after working for R.Wigham-Richardson foryears, each opened his own shipping office. Wigham-Richardson providedfinance for the Michalinos office, while Lambert Bros extended loans to a largenumber of Greek owners through R&K.13

A closer analysis of the workings of R&K will shed further light on theactivities of the Greek offices.14 The R&K office was situated at Holland House,Bury Street, London EC3. Established in 1921 by Manolis Kulukundis, a memberof an old shipowning family, and his cousin, Captain Minas Rethymnis, by 1938

Figure 6.11 Tonnage represented by London Greek offices according to the islands oforigin of the shipowners. Source: Appendices 4.19 and 6.10


it operated fifty ships of 230,000 GRT—12 per cent of the entire Greek fleet.R&K in that same year represented twelve Greek shipping companies fromPiraeus. Figure 6.13 depicts its structure. Of the fifty ships it handled, thirty-fourwere under the four companies of Kulukundis and Rethymnis while theremainder belonged to other Greek firms. From the Piraeus ship registries I wasable to trace the ownership of twenty R&K ships (see Table 6.5). Four membersof the Rethymnis family and eight of the Kulukundis clan owned an average of42 per cent of the ships concerned. Wives and sisters at least nominally owned asignificant portion, while the rest were owned by other Kassiots or Chiots. Thecollaboration with the Chiots began just three years after R&K’s founding,winning the trust of large numbers of Chiots contributed enormously to itssuccess.15 As we can see from Figure 6.13, seven of the companies representedby R&K were from Chios (predominantly single-shipowners), while another twocame from the Aegean islands of Leros (Roussos) and Samos (Inglessis). TheChiots also owned shares in most of Kulukundis’ own ships. Two companiesrepresented by R&K accounted for almost half the tonnage and belonged to theKulukundis family; both appeared in Lloyd’s Register as Greek-based, althoughin fact they were operated from London.16 The third company that was important

Figure 6.12 London Greek shipping offices


for R&K was Kassos Steam Navigation, in which the Rethymnis family held 40per cent of the shares. Kassos was formed with Rethymnis’ cousin MichaelPneumaticos, and his brother-in-law Stathis Yannaghas. By 1938 the companyhad seven ships and its Syros office was staffed by two employees, who kept thebooks of all seven, and provided crews preferably from Kassos and Syros.17

R&K’s growth relied on its knowledge of the London secondhand market andits successful exploitation of opportunities. In fact, it was Lord Inchcape whogave R&K its first deal. At the beginning of 1921 Inchcape, on behalf of theInter-Allied Commission in Britain, began to dispose of the German ships seizedas reparations. R&K bought a 6,000-GRT long-bridge cargo ship for E.Hadjiliasat the bargain price of £17,000 (at the beginning of 1920, it would have costtriple the amount, see Appendix 6.4).18 Manolis Kulukundis reportedly spent hisweekends photographing these ships for clients. Eventually R&K bought anothernine ex-German vessels for Chiot owners, thus establishing the offices reputationamong this group.19 Between 1922 and 1925 R&K purchased at least fortysecondhand ships.20 Its assured financing came from Greek shipowners andsubsequently from Lambert Brothers. R&K’s collaboration with this British firmproved extremely important, since British banks were not inclined to financepurchases of older ships. In 1937, for example, only 8 per cent of British, 11 percent of Japanese and 16 per cent of Norwegian craft were older than twenty-fiveyears, while 45 per cent of Greek ships were at least this old, the highestpercentage among the twelve leading maritime countries. Similarly, only 6 percent of the Greek-owned fleet was newer than fifteen years, while 49 per centwas between fifteen and twenty-five years old.21

R&K’s major success was its massive purchases between 1932 and 1934 ofthe First World War standard ships. This time it was Lord Kylsant who ‘helped’the leading Greek tramp brokers after the shipping crisis caused the collapse ofhis own maritime empire. His Royal Mail Group, which controlled a largenumber of British companies, represented nearly 15 per cent of the entire Britishfleet. Its 2.6 million GRT was liquidated in 1930.22 Kylsant had bought seventy-seven of the government’s standard wartime ships in 1919 and put them up forsale in the early 1930s, further depressing already low ship prices.23 If R&Kconsidered it a success to purchase a ship for £17,000 in 1922, ten years later itpurchased ships of a similar age for £4,500–7,500 (Table 6.5). In the end, R&Kbought at least twelve ships from the Kylsant-controlled Elder Dempster, Union-Castle and Pacific Steam Navigation companies.

The early 1930s also marked the appearance of the first successful twentieth-century Greek liner company, Hellenic Lines, founded by PericlesKallimanopulos. This firm, which was able to participate in various conferences,survived for more than fifty years before perishing with its founder in the1980s.24 This raises the question of why Greeks did not enter liner


Table 6.5 Ownership structure of the Rethymnis and Kulukundis ships

Kulukundisfamily

Rethymnisfamily

Nameship Built Bought Price (pounds) ( % ownership in the 100 shares)

1. Aeas 1915 1934 11,000 0

Figure 6.13 London Greek shipping office Rethymnis and Kulukundis


Kulukundisfamily

Rethymnisfamily

Nameship Built Bought Price (pounds) ( % ownership in the 100 shares)

2. Akti 1920 1924 343. Atlanticos 1919 1934 704. Delphoi 1915 1934 9,750 305. Kyriakoula 1918 1934 306. Marietta 1913 1935 10,000 107. Marpessa 1919 1934 108. Mount Athos 1913 1932 4,550 409. Mount Dirfys 1924 1937 9,157 5610. MountHelicon

1918 1935 80

11. Mount Ida 1918 1933 6,125 4012. MountKassion

1918 1937 6,410 71

13. MountMykale

1907 1937 8,500 35

14. MountOlympus

1920 1932 7,300 42

15. MountParnassus

1921 67

16. MountParnes

1917 1933 4,550 45

17. MountPentelikon

1917 1934 99

18. Mount Pera 1918 1933 5,500 1519. MountPindus

1920 1937 7,320 72

20. MountRhodope

1919 1934 7,500 0

Ownership participation of R&K in 20 of the operated ships: 42%Sources: Greek Ministry of Shipping, Ship Registries, Port Authorities of Piraeus, books

1–10

shipping in any great numbers. The most important, if tentative, answer wouldstress the lack of a significant national industrial market, the dominance of largewestern European and American liner companies, and a dearth of adequatedomestic infrastructure. These three factors are not meant to be all-encompassingnor do they necessary apply to all nations, since today ‘small’ countries likeIsrael and Taiwan operate some of the worlds largest container lines.25

The international shipping crisis also hit Greek shipping. In 1932, 118 ships,or 27 per cent of all cargo vessels, were laid-up.26 In 1933 a number were sold to


Italian scrapyards for £1,800–2,000 each, but this was insufficient to cover theamount owed to Lambert Brothers, the main lender to R&K clients.27 ManolisKulukundis negotiated an extension of the loans, on the grounds that this wouldincrease the likelihood of repayment. R&K then launched a massive sale andpurchase programme based on the principle of ‘scrap and build’, a methodalready practised by several European governments. In this way it was able torenew its fleet as well as to bring more Greek shipowners into the Londonmarket. Indeed, a number of Chiot owners at this time bought their first shipsince the end of the First World War. Between 1932 and 1934 R&K made thirty-eight deals in London’s secondhand market.28 Each new ship was designated bythe preface Mount, followed by the name of a Greek mountain; by 1938 R&Koperated twenty-seven of these ships.29 R&K’s response to the crisis served as anexample to the other Greek offices in London, and Greek owners thus survivedby expanding rather than decreasing their fleets.30

On the one hand, then, successful negotiations with their lenders gave Greekowners the opportunity to renew and expand their fleets. On the other, Greekshipping offices in London further protected their interests and those of theshipowners they represented by contributing to the formation of the TrampShipping Administration Committee (TSAC) in Britain in 1935. In aninternational move towards protectionism, various European governmentsresponded to the crisis by introducing operating subsidies for tramps: Germanyand Holland did so in 1933, France in 1934 and Britain in 1935 through theBritish Shipping (Assistance) Act.31 Greek shipowners, unable to get suchsubsidies from their government, took advantage of the fact that they controlledthe second most important world tramp fleet to protect themselves by initiatingin 1935 through their London offices— according to Manuel Kulukundis—theMinimum Rate Scheme (MRS). This was an agreement among the shipowners ofvarious European countries to set minimum freight rates in international trampshipping, as well as to avoid further price deterioration by proscribing voyages inballast by unfixed vessels in administered trades.32 According to ManuelKulukundis:

On the 14th of January of 1935 an historic meeting took place between theBritish and the Greek Tramp Shipowners which resulted in the establishment of the Minimum Rate Scheme. The Scheme, devised andproposed by the Greeks, was adopted by the British and within a week theNorwegians and Dutch adhered too as did a little later the French andItalians. It became operative on the 15th of March 1935 and aninternational Committee was formed to administer it.33

The TSAC, with international support, successfully supervised the operation ofthe MRS until 1939. At the same time, the London Greeks decided to form acorporate entity to advise the Union of Greek Shipowners on the scheme; thus in


1935 the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, which has remained animportant policy-maker to this day, was formed.34

Plate 1 Commercial and maritime networks, nineteenth century


Plate 2 The traditionals, Ithaca and Andros: Stathatos and Embiricos


Plate 3 The traditionals, Kassos: Kulukundis


indeed increased considerably after 1935 (see Figure 6.14). Apart from the

Plate 4 The traditionals, Cephalonia: Lykiardopulo


The MRS helped to avoid further deterioration in tramp freight rates, which

positive influence of the MRS, the profits of the London offices remained high

Plate 5 The traditionals, Myconos: Dracopoulos


Plate 6 The traditionals, Chios: Livanos


Plate 7 Post-Second World War shipowners: the Onassis Group


Plate 8 Post-Second World War shipowners: the Eletson Corporation


high profits induced the opening of more Greek shipping offices. Where in 1929

Plate 9 Post-Second World War shipowners: Tsakos Shipping & Trading


although prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles proved extremely profitable. TheEthiopian War of 1934–5 and the sales of Greek ships to Germany, whichduring the second half of the 1930s because of the Spanish Civil War, the Italo-

Plate 10 Post-Second World War shipowners: Sarlis Container Services


Plate 11 Post-Second World War shipowners: Costamare Shipping


Plate 12 Greek seamen, nineteenth century


Britain was the nation most directly affected by the expansion of the Greekmerchant fleet, which consisted almost entirely of tramp cargo ships. British

Plate 13 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1900s–1940s


there were thirteen such offices, by 1939 there were seventeen (see Appendices 6.9 and 6.10).

shipowners tried to weaken the Greeks by lobbying underwriters to stop issuing

Plate 14 Greek seamen, twentieth century, 1950s


policies or at least to raise substantially insurance premiums for their ageingships in the late 1920s and 1930s. That they had some success is not surprising,since many British shipowners were underwriting members of Lloyd’s. Theconfrontation started in the Argentinia where the Greeks were graduallydisplacing the British. The year 1925 was dismal for shipowners in general, butespecially for tramp owners. The Commercial Secretary of the British Embassyin Buenos Aires reported that ‘the depressed condition of the market resulted inmany steamers laying up in the river, and at one time some thirty Greek vesselsalone were tied up at Villa Constitucion for several months’.35

After a short upheaval in 1926, freights fell again in 1927, which was whenLloyd’s underwriters took a hard line. According to Manuel Kulukundis:

During September 1927, Bunge, the big Merchant House of grain inArgentina started negotiations with Lloyd’s for the renovation of the coverinsurance of the cargoes transported from Plate to Europe. The insurersoffered Bunge a big discount on premiums if they accepted in excludingGreek ships from carrying their cargoes. Bunge accepted under thecondition that some Greek shipowners were included and gave Lloyd’s alist of some Greek offices in London that represented around 60 ships; thatwas the famous ‘approved’ list…. Since that was disastrous for the Greekmerchant fleet…. I asked immediately for an interview from the Lloyd’s

Figure 6.14 Tramp freight index. Source: Appendix 6.3


Committee and the leader of the cargo underwriters. I asked for theabolishment of the ‘approved’ list of the Greek ships and we agreed on aspecific additional premium which all Greek ships would pay, even thenewly built ones.36

In broking this compromise, Kulukundis ensured a common approach towardsall Greek shipowners, including his present and future clients. Although someshipowners on the ‘approved list’ protested, the agreement guaranteed the fairtreatment of all Greek shipping and removed an obstacle to future expansion.Apparently R&K had the appropriate information about Lloyd’s plans, since itwash eavily involved in the Argentinian trade.37

Ten years later, as Kulukundis writes, Lloyd’s underwriters struck again:

On the pretext that most of the Greek Tramp ships were old, they revivedthe demand of extra premium on the insurance of the cargoes carried byGreek vessels, even though we had solved the problem, by agreeing, yearsbefore, to a scale of extra premiums, for all the ships, even the new ones.Our insurance brokers advised us of the trouble that was brewing.Justification for this demand was the argument that the Greek ships hadcaused losses to the Underwriters, on the River Plate cover, but they werenot giving us figures to support it! There was no loss of Greek shipscarrying Plate cargoes in that period. We sought a meeting with Lloyd’s todiscuss with the Underwriters and Mr A.Luzi, the vice-president of ourCommittee, and myself, met with Sir Eustace Pulbrook and otherunderwriters.

The result was that ‘Sir Eustace promised that the Underwriters wouldreconsider their position.’ Thereafter the subject remained dormant and Greekowners never paid extra premiums. The close connections of the Greek shippingoffices to the British market proved fundamental in the protection andcontinuation of the fleet’s activities in particular trades.

It is evident that the successful Greek competition generated sharp reactions inBritain. To many, the foreigners were guilty of using British infra-structure(chartering, finance, and insurance companies) to develop at their expense.British rhetoric against the Greek shipping industry in the House of Commonssometimes became inflammatory:

Let’s come to the Greeks, now. When two Greeks meet, they becomepartners, buy a ship and turn it into a family residence. A load of wives andchildren work on the ship under conditions which according to Britishseamen’s standards are unacceptable. When they multiply through birthsthey buy another ship and move there the part of the family that issuperabundant. And we allow them to approach our ports! They are able towork with costs and under conditions which enable them to compete with


us and decrease freight rates to very low levels and seize our commercefrom our hands.38

Disregarding the ethnocentricity, the speaker did make a few valid points. Familyties, which characterised not only ownership but also manning, were important;Greek ships, which in 1938 averaged twenty-seven years, were old; and labourrelations were pivotal to low running costs. But what he missed was theimportance of the fact that half of Greek ships were managed by single-shipcompanies.

SHIPPING COMPANIES IN GREECE

During the interwar period two main ownership characteristics provided strengthand flexibility to the activities of the London offices. These were the family/island ties that linked them with the shipping companies situated in Greece andthe nature of the single-ship companies. The Greek shipping company of theinterwar years was based upon a cooperative form of organisation, initiallystemming from family/kinship ties, and later extending to local island co-ownerships. The basic factors of production were recruited primarily from thefamily; when these became insufficient, they were drawn from the extendedfamily and later from the same island

Table 6.6 Single-ship companies and the Greek fleet

Total fleet Single-ship fleet

Year Companies Ships GRT Companies % Ships % GRT %

1914 256 454 822,906 139 54 139 31 254,570 311938 308 671 1,796,635 210 68 210 31 606,608 34Sources: Appendices 4.14 and 6.11

population. Local historians always refer with great pride to the opening of anisland’s first London office, regarding it as only natural that this office would workfor the prosperity of the whole shipping community. Indeed, the Greek fleet in theinterwar period was characterised by the collaborative character of the relationsbetween each London office and the shipping companies it represented. Theunity based on island/kinship ties was sufficiently tight to generate, in effect, asingle entrepreneurial group. In this way, single-ship owners and other smallinvestors concentrated their activities around the island’s biggest owners, whowere able to open an office in London. And if many of the founders of theseLondon offices became successful shipowners, so did many of their clients. Inthe interwar era it was the London office which made it attractive to compatriots,relatives and friends to purchase ships and then operated the vessels in their bestinterests. The fact that such people trusted their life’s savings to a rich


compatriot’s London office rested on a relationship that went beyond the purelyeconomic and was shaped by social and personal relations.39

Most interwar shipowners who came from the ranks of the officers of themerchant marine started as single-shipowners. As Table 6.6 shows, in 1914 54per cent of the Greek shipping companies were single-ship entities, operatingone-third of all ships and tonnage. In fact, the entrance of a significant number ofnew shipowners in the 1930s increased these proportions. As Table 6.7 indicates,in 1931 Greece had the highest percentage of single-ship companies, followed byDenmark and Holland while on the eve of the Second World War this percentagewas slightly smaller at 68 per cent. Single-ship companies contributed to Greekcompetitiveness and ultimately to the consolidation of its hold on a significantportion of international tramp shipping. This was largely due to the fact thatbetween 1924 and 1934 crew wages decreased by 40 per cent and the number ofcrew members by 30 per cent (see the next chapter). The high elasticity of Greekwages lay in the particular characteristics of Greek companies, especially single-ships firms.

Single-ship companies were distinguished by two important characteristics thatgave them the ability to decrease costs during the crisis. First, the

Table 6.7 Single-ship companies in the various national fleets, 1931–2

Country (A) Total number ofcompanie

(B) Single-shipcompanies

(A)/(B) %

Greece 281 207 74Denmark 269 188 70Holland 428 282 66Germany 612 399 65Japan 643 407 63Italy 836 529 63Sweden 578 356 62Spain 359 219 61Norway 867 529 61France 565 319 56USA 1,016 542 53Great Britain 2,800 1,472 53Sources: Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910– 1939. The Co-

existence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University ofMacedonia, 1991, table 23; data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1931–2,and Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, October 1932, p. 938

presence of so many owners on board as masters or chief engineers enabled themto keep costs under control and to keep up maintenance. Moreover, profitmaximisation was not always the main point; survival even at a loss was not anunusual goal in these troubled times.


Not all single-ships were represented by the London offices. In fact, accordingto Lloyd’s Register, in 1935 only fifty, comprising 22 per cent of the number and27 per cent of the tonnage of all single-ships, were represented by Londonoffices. Most of the sales and purchases of such craft, however, went throughthese offices. The activities of single-ships took place largely in theMediterranean, where they accounted for 85 per cent of the activities of the fleetin 1926 and 42 per cent in 1938. Despite the internationalisation of Greekshipping in the 1930s, Athens, Piraeus, Syros and Chios were still importantoperational centres throughout the interwar period. Moreover, despite theimportance of the London shipping offices/agencies and the fact that theyrepresented 45 per cent of the fleet, according to Lloyd’s 96 per cent of the totaltonnage was owned by firms based in Greece. This was a time during which theGreek flag was used to the greatest extent; the famous mortgage law of 1910, incombination with minimal taxes, ensured this. The London offices proved vitalfor the optimal utilisation of this law, alleviating the tightness of credit byproviding finance from their own or British sources.

During the interwar period the Greek merchant marine rose to become thesecond most important fleet in world tramping. One set of reasons for thisinvolved the activities of the Greek shipping offices in London. The Londonoffices were able not only to survive the world economic and shipping crisis butalso to manipulate it to the advantage of the entire Greek fleet by making timelypurchases. They assisted the British tramp shipowners in setting up the TrampShipping Administration Committee in order to ameliorate freight rates, a movewhich safeguarded their own interests as well. They were able by means ofpersonal negotiations to diminish British competition in the form of the Londonunderwriters and to unite under the Greek Cooperation Committee, a body thatenabled them to confront all future competitors. In this chapter we located asecond set of important factors that contributed to the success of Greek shippingduring this period by investigating the interrelation of the Greek shipping officesbased in London with those in Greece. On the one hand, the shipowners based inGreece had direct access through the London offices to international freightmarkets, finance, purchasing opportunities, and generally to the experience,organisation and connections of these offices. The London offices, on the otherhand, relied on the Greek shipowners’ technical experience in maintaining andrunning the ships and on their ability to survive hard times.


7LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GREEK-

OWNED FLEET IN THE INTERWARPERIOD

The ability of shipowners to survive the interwar crisis was to a large extent afunction of labour relations on board and ashore. The interwar period provedtransitional for Greek maritime labour relations. The internationalisation of thefleet had a direct impact by disrupting some long-standing traditions. For thefirst time Greek seamen were not able to visit home regularly. The traditionalBlack Sea-Mediterranean-northern Europe route gave crews an opportunity tovisit their home islands, even if only for a few hours, while the shipowners had achance to make necessary crew changes. This change threatened the survival ofthe traditional crew structure under which most people on board were eitherrelated or came from the same island. The rise of trade unionism and the gradualalienation of employers and officers vis-à-vis the ratings also exacerbated thesituation.

Industrial relations in shipping, however, cannot be considered as merely theinteraction between factors of production or the history of a particular tradeunion. The deep-sea merchant vessel constitutes a unique working environmentthat bears no relation to work ashore. Labour relations in shipping can only beexamined in an international framework, taking into consideration the socialorigins of the various actors, their economic and political behaviour, and theinstitutional structure of their country of origin.

This chapter examines the labour relations of Greek seamen during theinterwar years and the extent to which these have contributed to success in theinternational arena. There are three parts. The first examines the overall structureof Greek maritime labour based on available statistical evidence. The seconddeals with the seamen on board, examining their organisation, working andliving conditions and relations while at sea. Finally, the third section looks at thelabour relations of Greek seamen ashore, their organisation of trade unions, andthe way this development was connected to the domestic and internationalenvironment.

Table 7.1 Greek seamen in the interwar period

Year (A) Total number ofseamen

(B) Unemployed(average)

% (B)/(A)

1924 1,8651925 1,4551926 14,000 1,400 1019271928 16,459 2,173 131929 18,800* 1,800 101930 18,711 2,000 111931 18,500 2,500 141932 18,500 3,000 1619331934193519361937 18,500 744 4Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1938, p. 665; EEN, 1930, pp. 291–6;

EEN, 1931, pp. 284–90, pp. 1168–9; EEN, 1938, pp. 663–7Note: * Estimations of the Ministry of Shipping

THE GREEK SEAMEN

The number of Greek seamen working on all types of ships increased during the1920s (see Table 7.1). From 15,000 in the pre-First World War years, it reachedalmost 19,000 in 1929 and remained at that level throughout the 1930s. Theunemployment rate in these two decades indicates the trouble seamen faced: fromthe mid- to late 1920s, unemployment ranged between 10 per cent and 13 percent, while in the 1930s it reached an unprecedented height of 16 per cent. Bythe late 1930s, however, things returned to normal and unemployment amongGreek seamen dropped to 4 per cent.

The structure of Greek seafaring labour in 1910 and 1930 is indicated inTable 7.2, based on crew lists for 183 cargo steamships in the former and a 1930census of 429 cargo ships for the latter. These provided details on 4,500 and 10,000 seamen, respectively. Data on both years reveal that one-quarter of the crewwere officers, while the remaining three-quarters were ratings. In both casesmore than half were seamen and firemen, the majority of whom were less thanthirty years of age. This implied that employment at sea for the ratings was not alifetime profession.1 But the opposite was true for skilled personnel, such asdonkeymen, bosuns and carpenters, most of whom were over thirty-five years ofage, and for officers, who generally were over thirty. The average age of mastersin both samples was forty years. Table 7.2 is also most revealing regarding

LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 225

working conditions on Greek ships, especially compared to five years earlier. In1925 the official review of the Ministry of Shipping, Epitheorisi EmporikouNaftikou (EEN), published statistical data which enables us to compare crewcomposition on Greek and Norwegian ocean-going cargo ships (Table 7.3).2According to this data, the mean number of seamen on Greek ocean-goingvessels was twenty-eight, while on Norwegian ships it was thirty-six. If we look,however, at the evidence provided by Table 7.2, we see that in 1930 the averagenumber of a crew on a Greek cargo vessel was nineteen.

Reduced manning translated into extra hours of work for the crew, since shiftsand work had to be carried out regardless of the number of crew. The averagenumber of ABs and firemen on Greek ships was four, which meant that eachAB’s shift at the rudder or firemans in the boiler room was six hours. Moreover,the AB and fireman also had to work another six to eight hours on deck or in theengine room to maintain the often aged ship. The result was that the daily hoursof work for these men averaged

Table 7.2 Composition of seamen on cargo ships*

1910** 1930

Capacity Number % total Number % total

A. Officers 1,136 26 2,060 26Masters andMates

493 980

Engineers 578 903Cadet mates 35 65Cadet engineers 30 112B. Ratings 3,209 74 5,975 74Wirelessoperators

– 236

Bosuns 178 328Chief firemen 188 307Carpenters 36 100Firemen 865 1,681ABs 1,064 1,716Deck boys 65 277Greasers – 45Coal trimmers 302 535Stewards 323 451Cooks 188 299Total 4,345 100 8,035 100Sources: Crew Lists 1910, Aegean Maritime Museum; Census of seamen on the 30th

December 1930, Ministry of Shipping, Department of Merchant Marine,published in Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1931, pp. 1164–207.


1910** 1930

Capacity Number % total Number % totalNotes: * Passenger ships are excluded. ** Composition of Greek seamen on board 183

Greek cargo steamships above 1,000 GRT

Table 7.3 Composition of crew in ocean-going Norwegian and Greek cargo vessels in1925

Capacity Norwegian vessel: numberof seamen

Greek vessel: number ofseamen

Master 1 1Second mate 1 1Third mate 1 1Wireless operator 1 1Carpenter 1 1Bosun 1 1ABs 9 5Deck boys 2 1First engineer 1 1Second engineer 1 1Third engineer 1 1Greasers – 1Engine boy 1 –Firemen 9 6Coal trimmers 2 3Victualler 1 –Cook 1 1Assistant cook 1 –Steward 1 1Total 36 27Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1925, based on data from Scandinavian

Shipping Gazette, 22 May 1925 in ‘The U.S.A Seamen’s Wages in Comparisonto the Danish and Norwegian Ones’; EEN, 1925 in ‘Crews in Greeksteamships’

twelve to fourteen. It should be noted that Norwegian ABs and firemen workedhalf the hours of their Greek colleagues: three- to four-hour shifts for about thesame wage in the mid-1920s (see Table 7.3 and Figure 7.1). Table 7.2 alsoreveals that in 1930 half the Greek vessels had no wireless operators. The meagrenumbers of greasers and carpenters suggests that in most cases their tasks were


an extra duty for the ABs and firemen. One-third of the Greek ships did not havea cook, meaning this work was carried out by the steward assisted by deck boys.The lack of bosuns and donkeymen on one-quarter of the ships implied extrawork for the mates and second engineers. Moreover, the number of masters,mates and engineers suggests that, in 1930, 90 per cent of the vessels had nosecond mates or third engineers; again, this meant additional work on top of thetwelve-hour shifts for the rest of the officers. On Greek ships, it would appearthat officers worked as long as the ratings.

Reduced manning, entailing long hours and harsh working conditions for theentire crew, combined with decreasing wages in the first half of the 1930s,resulted in a sharp reduction in operating costs for Greek ships, which were thusable to compete successfully on international routes, often at the expense ofother European fleets, especially the British. But how were shipowners able toreduce the number and wages of their crew and why did the Greek crews tolerateit? The reasons lie beyond economics and go to the essence of Greek maritimeorganisation: to the base of the kinship or common island of origin of Greekcrews and hence their personal relations with the shipowner or master of the ship.

ON BOARD

Work at sea is much different to work on land. Seamen toil in small malecommunities of twenty or thirty on each ship and are obliged to live for months,or even years, in a narrow space. Moreover, each has specific tasks to performunder a hierarchical and often dictatorial regime. Work at sea also means notonly separation from family and friends but also isolation from the ordinaryworld. Life on board is a chain of restrictions: restricted space, restricted freedom,restricted movement, restricted choice of friends, entertainment andnourishment. Only the view of the sea is unrestricted.

In addition, work on board could be extremely dangerous. ‘Huge waves, tonsof sea were crushing on deck,’ wrote the Ithacan captain, Spiros Ferendinos, in1929 after a trip to the South Seas,

and various objects on board were snatched away like baubles. We set theship to storm staysail, as an indicated measure of defense although this didnot mean that we were saved from the obvious danger. Our position wasdesperate, and was made more desperate by the fact that our wireless couldnot get in touch with any station.3

The average age of Greek-owned deep-sea steamers in the 1930s was twenty-eight years. The advanced age of the vessels entailed a continuous fight againstrust and cockroaches. It also meant confronting the shiny eyes of rats inside theventilators. The problem of rats, which enter the ship from port sewers byfollowing the easy path of the ropes with which the vessel is tied to the pier, stillpersists. The size of the problem is shown from the ‘Regulation of work on board


Greek cargo vessels of 800 GRT and over’ (Royal Decree 6/12/39) according towhich (Article 23), ‘the Ship Master is responsible for following the timeintervals at which rat extermination must take place according to sanitarystipulations and the orders of Health Service’. On many ships pet cats were usedto alleviate the problem.

Seamen shared a common social life within a very limited space.Accommodation was elementary and the frugality of the sailing ship eracontinued. Ratings still slept in the focsle, a practice inherited from sailing ships.Abrupt climatic changes, from icy blasts to scorching heat, and the lack ofheating or cooling, often made work a torment. As Captain George Abouselamremembers:

The Gulf of Bengal, a true furnace [with temperature over 48 Celsius] wasscalding everything…from the ship’s iron-plates to our bodies tortured byinsomnia…. Looking at the thick black smoke, I was thinking of the peopledown there in the stokwall-hell, these heroic firemen that were feeding theboilers’ furnaces with plenty of coal so that the steam keeps up.4

A vessel’s production requires change of location. Its purpose is thetransportation of goods from one place to another and the division of labour isestablished to serve this purpose. The crew composition of a 2,000-GRT deep-sea cargo vessel consists of three groups of workers: deck, engine, and generalservices personnel. Deck personnel in the interwar years comprised a master,chief mate, second mate, one to three cadet mates, bosun, carpenter, four to sixseamen, and one or two deck boys. The engine crew comprised a chief, secondand third engineer, one to three cadet engineers, one donkeyman, one or twogreasers, four to six firemen and one or two coal trimmers. General personneloften consisted of a wireless operator, cook, assistant cook, steward and assistantsteward. Excluding cadet officers, the usual crew was around twenty-eight tothirty-four people.

As we have already indicated in Chapter 5, the profession of master cannot becompared to any land-based occupation. A master is both employer andemployee, paid by a company but also acting as its agent, a worker yetsimultaneously the owner’s trustee. Although the shipowner owns the means ofproduction, he actually has limited control over his property. The captain isresponsible for the management, safety and productivity of the vessel and crew.The captain is in charge of proper navigation, timely and safe transport of goods,discipline, victualling and medical care of the crew, hygiene and the generalorder of the vessel.5

The extent of his responsibility implies that he must enjoy the completeconfidence of the owner. Therefore, in Greece the rule was that captains haddirect ties, financial or otherwise, with the vessel or the shipowner. They eitherowned a share of the vessel, were the shipowner’s relatives, or originated fromthe shipowner’s home island. Such ties, of course, were not exclusively Greek. Co-


ownership, kinship or common origin, especially in the case of small companies,were common features between masters and shipowners in the seventeenth- andeighteenth-century British merchant marine or nineteenth-century Scandinavianfleet.6 The peculiarity of Greek shipping was that this type of relation persistedduring the interwar and postwar eras.7 Almost half of Greek ships in the 1920sand 1930s were operated by single-ship companies and in most cases the masterswere co-owners or even the sole owner of the ship.

The first and second mates were often related to the captain or came from thesame island. The chief mate was the master’s closest working associate andpotential replacement. He supervised deck and kitchen duties, inspected thevessel daily and attended to the mooring, loading and unloading of cargo andprovisions and supplies. The other mates assisted the chief mate.

The bosun or lostromo (from the Italian nostromo) was the chief petty officer,essentially an experienced AB. He was under the command of the chief mate andsupervised the maintenance of the vessel, its mooring equipment, pulleys, wires,ropes and lifeboats, and handled much of the primary discipline. The carpenter wasalso a junior officer who assisted or substituted for the bosun. His name camefrom the days of wood when a carpenter’s ability was essential for safety. As insailing ships, the carpenter was concerned with keeping an iron or steel shipwatertight and performed all carpentry required on board.

The seamen were under the command of the bosun and the carpenter. Theyserved four- to six-hour shifts at the rudder and the rest of the time cleaned,maintained, loaded and unloaded the ship. Daily they had to battle with years ofrust and continuously had to chip or paint the ship en route or in port. The icycold of northern European ports or the unbearable heat of the tropics often madethese tasks terribly difficult.

The penetration into the maritime sector of industrial capital in the form ofsteam had been completed by all important shipping nations by 1914. Theindustrialisation of maritime transport led to considerable changes in thestructure and organisation of ships. The engine crew became the new industrialproletariat, and it was no accident that the first seamen to strike were firemen andengineers. The head of the engine crew was the chief engineer, responsible for theengines and the men who worked with them. Until the turn of the century, due tothe lack of marine engineering schools in Greece, a significant percentage ofchief engineers on Greek ships were British. By the eve of the First World Warthere were trained Greek engineers, often related to, or from the same island as,the master or shipowner. The second engineer was the assistant to the chief andallocated shifts and general work. The third engineer and cadets assisted him.

The dokoumanis (from the English ‘donkeyman’) or chief fireman wasaccountable to the second engineer and responsible for the work and disciplineof the firemen, the driving forces of the vessel. According to the official workregulation of the time, there had to be six of these working four-hour shiftsduring which they fed tons of coal to the furnaces.8 The rest of time they spentchipping rust in the engine room. The harsh and monotonous work of the


fireman, which resembled factory work more than any other task on board,encouraged the firemen to be militant. The coal trimmer carried the coal to beshovelled by firemen, while the greaser or oiler was responsible for greasing theengine and all other auxiliary work in the engine room. The general servicepersonnel, under the orders of the chief mate, consisted of the wireless operator(marconi), steward (stouart), and the cook, one of the most important members ofthe crew for the good humour of those on board.

Apart from dividing the crew into deck, engine and general servicespersonnel, the hierarchy also separated them into officers and ratings. The firstcategory comprises all officers, including cadets, while the rest of the crewbelong to the ratings. A strict social hierarchy existed, promoting discipline andassuring rewards. Social discrimination was reinforced by the separation inaccommodations; indeed, this was guaranteed by the structure of the vessel.ABs, OSs and firemen, lowest in the hierarchy, slept together, in the foc’sle, wherecrew accommodation had been provided in sailing vessels. This is the worstplace to rest on a ship, especially in rough seas. The junior officers, including thebosun, donkeyman and carpenter, slept in the poop, less affected by rough seasbut the point at which engine noise was loudest. The best part of the vessel wasamidships, where in a superstructure below the bridge slept the officers andwireless operator. The dining room for the officers was also there, while the restof the crew dined separately below the main deck, usually in a room at thehatchway of the hold.9

But such working conditions on board were not unique to Greek seamen; theywere shared by tars in most other ships as well. A British rating working in anover forty-year-old 5,000-dwt tanker in 1934 described his working place as a‘steel workhouse’. The foc’sle accommodated nine seamen, along withcockroaches, bugs, flies and rats, in a space little bigger than the single cabinsthat were the norm in the 1950s.

A coal bogey belched out smoke, the stink a conglomeration of smells,coal fumes, hot oil, foul air, human sweat and urine…. A drunk got up, andused a bucket near my head. The bucket was for washing up plates andmugs, but also for sluicing down the lavatory and bathing in.10

The great difference on board Greek ships, even compared to new British vessels,was not so much the quality of the ships as the quality of labour relations. Wageswere not the only determining factor in such relations, any more than thecommon working space and accommodation were the only links between crewmembers. In interwar Greek shipping ‘wage relations appeared simultaneouslyas economic and social relations, as relations between men, not as payment forservices and things’.11

Kinship and common island of origin, at the centre of these relations, werefurther strengthened by local traditions and the lack of formal maritime educationin Greece. As shown in Table 7.4, in both 1910 and 1930 almost two-thirds of


Greek crews came from the islands, mainly the Cyclades, Chios and Cephalonia,the centres most important in the

Table 7.4 Seamen on board Greek flag steamships in 1910 and 1930 according to places oforigin

1910 1930

Place oforigin

All seamen % Deck officers andengineers %

Bosuns, ABs,boys %

Donkeymen,firemen, greasersheavers %

A.Islands

2,484 57 1,646 66 1,951 67 1,969 66

Cyclades

852 852 622 905

Chios 415 415 688 555Cephalonia

486 236 296 247

Others* 731 143 345 262B.Attica

386 9 311 12 234 8 350 12

C. RestofGreece

748 17 377 15 513 18 376 13

D.Abroad**

727 17 165 7 214 7 256 9

Total 4,345 100 2,499 100 2,912 100 2,951 100Source: See table 7.1Notes: * Includes Astipalea, Aegina, Amorgos, Corfu, Evoia, Ikaria, Ios, Ithaca,

Karpathos, Kassos, Kasterlorizo, Kea, Kimolos, Kithira, Kithnos, Kriti,Lefkas, Leros, Milos, Lesbos, Myconos, Psara, Naxos, Paxoi, Poros, Samos,Santorini, Serifos, Sifnos, Simi, Skiathos, Skiros, Skopelos, Tinos. ** Thenumber of seamen from ‘abroad’ in 1910 includes a large number of islands,apart from Chios, that belonged to the Ottoman dominion and became part ofthe Greek state after the Balkan wars

nineteenth century. The region of Attica, with its large urban population, camenext, supplying one-tenth of the seaman, while another tenth came from abroad.Greeks from Asia Minor and other parts of the Ottoman dominion comprised thelargest part of this last group. As evidence from the 1910 crew lists proves, theyformed a more important part of the seafaring labour force before the Great War.The ‘rest of Greece’ category covered seafarers mainly from the Peloponneseand Galaxidi.

The fact that most seamen came from maritime centres in three specific areasof Greece had a prodigious impact on the development of Greek shipping. Firstof all, according to samples of crew lists of Greek steamships in 1910, a


considerable number of vessels were manned by crews originating not merelyfrom the same island but often from the same village. On steamships owned inCephalonia and Ithaca almost 50 per cent of the crew came from the same island,while 60 per cent on Chiot steamers came from Chios. Andriot seamen almostexclusively manned Andriot ships; 71 per cent of the men on steamships in oursample investigated came from Andros.12 Family relations, a commonphenomenon among officers, extended also to the ratings. The bosun was notnormally a relative of the captain, but the AB or deck boy might well have beenhis son, nephew or cousin. When ss Margarita sank on 8 October 1925 in themid-Atlantic, thirty-six men, most from Metaxata in Cephalonia, went down withher.13.

Common origin also functioned as a safety valve in the maritime labourmarket. When a master from Chios, for example, was left without a fireman or anAB, he would look for an unemployed Chiot in Piraeus, Rotterdam or BuenosAires, depending on where the ship was. Chiot society was small, and theseafarers’ villages limited, making it easy for masters and engineers to know thereputation of some 1,200 sailors (see Table 7.4). Besides, news of a sailor’sdeeds on board soon reached his family and village circles. Isolation from landand lack of professional or social mobility created a particular culture, a nauticalmentality shared only by members of this specific social group. Language—animportant testimony of the existence of a particular social class or group—holdsa special place among seamen. Learning nautical jargon is part of a seaman’seducation, a necessary tool for his work. Greek seamen, as do seamen around theworld, shared (and still share) a unique idiomatic language that mixes Greektechnical terms with hellenised Spanish, Italian and English words, inheritedfrom the dominant maritime empires of the last five centuries.14 Despite classdiscrimination, the master and AB spoke the same idiom, belonged to the samesocial group, and shared the same environment and dangers.

Work on board had a collective character which under certain circumstances,promoted productivity that could not be explained merely by financial rewards.In half the Greek ships during the interwar period, the employer/master/shipowner was not to be found in his safe house in Chios, Cephalonia, Athensand London but rather on the ships bridge. Unwritten maritime ethics demandedthat the sailor work as much as required. Besides, the absence of formal maritimetraining up to the 1930s turned ABs, firemen, bosuns and donkeymen intopractical shipping instructors. ‘In those tough years of misery, there were seamenon board that were irreproachable trainers,’ wrote Captain George Abouselam.

I learned a great deal about our work from the bosun from Lagadas, thingsthat one does not find written in any book…. But I can’t forget also thedonkeyman from Santorini. He taught me all about the stockwall, theboilers, the furnaces, the steam, the engine and the machinery. His lectureroom was the hatchway of hold no 5, where we used to have dinner.15


The rise of a deck boy to the position of master, or a dokoumanis to engineer,was fairly common. The hope to rise in the hierarchy, perhaps even to become ashipowner, was not utopian on early steamers. Yet over time a stricter division oftasks and greater specialisation led to more defined class barriers between thecrew. Indeed, class consciousness among Greek seamen was already strong inthe interwar years:

[In Melbourne, Australia] I was painting from the deck with a spear-brushthe left side of the boat, when I heard the cabin boy telling me that the crewwent on strike. I stopped immediately and, carrying the pot with the paintand the brush, headed hastily to the ladder … I heard the bosuns voice.‘Where do you think you are going, George, why did you stop?’ ‘But weare on strike, aren’t we?’ I replied. ‘Listen George, you go back to your work,we, the ratings, are on strike, not the officers and you are a cadet mate,tomorrow an officer, you have nothing to do with the ratings, do you getme?’ I did not understand what he meant then, but I know now. That bosunfrom Lagadas gave me my first lessons in trade unionism.16

MARITIME LABOUR ASHORE

The First World War had a dramatic effect on the organisation of seamen intotrade unions all over the world. The reduction in the number of vessels due to warlosses resulted in unemployment for thousands of seamen for a number of yearsand a remarkable level of rank-and-file militancy. The long maritime crisis in theearly 1920s, combined with the lengthy shipping crisis of 1929–34, led tosuccessive strikes and widespread radical, often communist, leadership.17

Militancy among seamen extended from the aged British tramp ships to the giantluxury liners of the Hamburg-America line. ‘Who can be surprised by the factthat the rooms of the firemen and stewards on the large luxury liners are breedinggrounds for desperate anarchic and bolshevik ideas!’ wrote Siegfried Heckscherin the 1910s.18 Such communist control could in the 1920s be observed not onlyin most European societies, where communism had begun to constitute apolitical force, but also in solidly capitalist societies, such as Australia, wherepolitical communism was utterly ineffective, and especially in European coloniesand other countries of what later was to be called the ‘third world’.19

Greek seamen proved no exception to the rule and the Greek seamen’smovement bears many similarities to the rest of the world. Syndicalism during theinterwar period played a fundamental role in the development of both socialismin Greece and the ‘social breach’ of the 1940s that led to civil war from 1945 to1949. The first strike among Greek seamen was the firemen’s strike of March1910.20 The First Panhellenic Socialist Congress was held on 4 November 1918at the offices of the Union of the Merchant Marine Engineers at Trumba ofPiraeus.21


The organisation of seamen took place in the second decade of the twentiethcentury. The Union of the Firemen ‘Ayios Spyridon’, the Panhellenic Union ofthe Merchant Marine Engineers and the Panhellenic Union of the MerchantMarine Masters were founded around 1910. The Panhellenic League ofMerchant Marine Stewards and the Panhellenic Union of Marine Cooks werefounded in 1913. The Panhellenic League of Wireless Officers was founded in1917.22 The dispersion of seamen’s syndicalism into numerous other unions wasalso characteristic of other European countries. The Italians first set the exampleof unifying all seamen, from master to ordinary seaman, into the FederazioneItaliana dei Lavoratori del Mare in 1911. On the basis of this model thePanhellenic Seamen’s Federation (PNO) was created in 1920, its members beingthe aforementioned trade unions. PNO adhered to the Greek GeneralConfederation of Labour (GSEE), founded in 1918, and to the InternationalTransport Federation (ITF). Following the GSEE’s call for strikes, seamenparticipated actively in strikes from 1922 to 1924. At the same time, disputesbetween reformers and communists inside both PNO and GSEE led to theweakening and eventual disintegration of GSEE, with left-wingers creating analternative federation that in the case of seamen was called the Seamen’s Unionof Greece (NEE).

During the long shipping crisis between 1929 and 1934, freight rates reachedrock bottom (see Figure 6.14), while marine unemployment peaked (Table 7.1).PNO, supported by NEE, called for a strike. In 1932, more than 3,000 seamenparticipated in a ‘starvation march’ from Piraeus to the Ministry of Shipping indowntown Athens. Strikers demanded unemployment allowances, free food andresidence, and of course work. The Venizelos government agreed to theirdemands concerning free food and accommodation and asked shipowners toconsider unemployed seamen when changing their crews.23

But of course strikes were not limited to the shore but simultaneously tookplace at sea. The Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou from 1925 referred constantlyto the ‘indiscipline which overruns the Greek cargo steamships after the warresulting to the discredit of the Greek flag at the various ports of the world’.Seamen were divided into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. The good were the ‘professionalseamen, prudent family men with no intention of creating trouble’. The bad werethose described as ‘criminal elements, in trouble with the Greek authorities who,embedded with the well-known communist ideas, gradually ceased all relationswith their own families and their country and became instruments and victims ofswindlers, shrewd procurers, in dens of whose they live’.24

The main way for the crew to protest actively was to stop work. The principalreasons for continual daily friction were working time, victualling and wages.These issues were also the cause of disputes between captain and crew since atleast the eighteenth century.25 The eight-hour working day was introduced by theTreaty of Versailles and was immediately applied in land-based industry. Inshipping it was only voted almost two decades later, in 1936, at the FourthMaritime Conference, fifteen years after its introduction by France at the First


Maritime Conference in 1920. The deep maritime crises of the 1920s and 1930shad a conciliatory effect on some European seamen’s unions, such as the British,which were threatened by massive lay-off. The application of an eight-hourworking day to shipping had substantial economic consequences, since seamenwere not asking for a reduction in hours but for remuneration for overtime. Whena ship sailed from Sulina to Rotterdam, a voyage of about twenty days, it did notstop sailing on Sundays or holidays. The fireman still had to shovel coal and thesailor had to steer. Legal recognition of the eight-hour working day and of basicholidays meant an increase in seamen’s income and a consequent rise in thevessel’s costs. Implementation of the eight-hour day in Greek shipping tookplace only in the 1940s when Greek seamen’s unions were more militant andexercised their power.

Organised crews during the interwar period could, however, support demandsfor overtime pay in various ways. Towards the end of the 1920s, CaptainA.S.Ferendinos’ ship was loading grain on a Saturday afternoon in Argentinawhen the harbour master ordered him to move his ship to give priority to anEnglish cargo vessel which was to load a pressing cargo that night. The crewrefused to assist, alleging they could not work so late. Ferendinos was not able tofind other workers at that time, so the Argentinian authorities levied a £250 fine.The crew had made its demand for overtime pay clear to the shipowner. The lackof a commonly accepted list of holidays could prove equally costly, ‘since atpresent our seamen celebrate with religious devotion all the saints of the Greekorthodox calendar, some of them entirely obscure’.26

The victualling scale was also a permanent source of protest throughout theinterwar era. In Greek shipping, the master was responsible for the provision andquality of the food, while in Norwegian shipping there was a victualler withthese duties. The problem of holding the master responsible for alimentation wasthat it all depended on his conscience. Crew victualling was a cost for theshipowner; when the master was also a co-owner, he had a strong interest inreducing such costs to their lowest possible levels. If he were not a co-owner hereceived a sum of money for crew victualling which he used at his discretion.

Every day, as soon as we would get to the hold, before we started to eat[the donkeyman from Santorini] would turn to me and ask me in aconfidential way, ‘Say George, when you become a master, will youcheat?’ ‘No,’ says I, ‘Master Giakoumis I will not cheat, why should I? Iam going to become a captain, not a thief.’ I could see a bitter smile at hisworn out face. Who knows what he had been through, after so many yearson board wooden and steel boats.27

The lack of refrigeration and abrupt climatic changes made the preservation offresh food impossible during voyages lasting two or three months. Keepinglivestock on board, to be slaughtered during the voyage, was common. ‘One ofmy tasks when I was cadet mate,’ remembers Captain George Abouselam, ‘was


to feed and water the calves, oxen and sheep residing at the hatchway, a task Ihad to perform with exceptional care and attention.’28

During the interwar period the Greek shipping offices in London tried tointroduce salted and preserved meat (salado), a basic nourishment for northernEuropean crews, into the menu of the Greek crews, which reacted in variousways. ‘Once,’ Captain S.Ferendinos wrote:

fifteen whole days after our departure and near the equator, a seaman askedvery seriously for eggplants imam [eggplants cooked with fresh tomatoesand onions]. Minor strikes break out often on board because the crew asksfor a specific dish that needs ingredients known to be missing from theships storeroom and therefore cannot be provided.29

Although Law 4005 of February 1929, provided for a unified and defined menuon all merchant vessels, the unions and shipowners did not agree on an officialmenu until 1948. It has often been written by syndicalists that on many Greekships the ‘official ’menu contained, for lunch and dinner, olives, lard and beansoup.30

The absence of a unified payroll also caused numerous disputes. During the1920s all European countries and the US established systems to regulate wagesthrough collective agreements between unions and shipowners. Despite the factthe wage of a Greek AB throughout the 1920s remained stable at £7, this had notalways been the case (Table 7.5). The preamble to the law for a unified payrollcontained the following:

The extent of damage inflicted to seamen by the free operation of the lawof supply and demand during times of economic crisis can be easilyunderstood. The regulation of wages under such circumstances during thepast has led to a wage mosaic, the result of moral pressure exercised by theshipowners who replaced high-waged seamen by lower-wage ones ifavailable ones were found in the next port, and by the seamen for a rise inwages when they knew the shipowners could not find any replacement atthe next port.31

The 1924 wages (Table 7.5) are unofficial, and were submitted by Greekshipowners operating from England to the Greek Consulate in Cardiff. Moreover,these wage quotations do not provide for overtime pay or indemnities. Still,according to the Direction of Merchant Marine, they were ‘valid in practice’.32

The 1933 reduction of wages by 40 percent took place with the consent of theconservative PNO but not of the communist NEE, which fought to invalidatethem. These ‘wages of starvation’, as they were called by communist leaders,finally became the first collective agreement between the PNO and theshipowners. Wage cuts also took place in most other European fleets during the1930s, but this was of small consolation to Greek seamen. Although this wage


scale continued until 1937, improvements in freight markets provoked newstrikes that resulted in certain

Table 7.5 Greek seamen’s wages on deep-sea-going vessels (in pounds sterling)

Capacity/Year

1914 1924 1932 1933 1937

Master 18.0.0 20.0.0 16.0.0 22.10.0Chief mate 8.0.0 15.0.0 13.0.0 10.10.0 18.0.0Second mate 6.0.0 12.0.0 10.0.0 8.0.0 15.0.0Chiefengineer

18.0.0 20.0.0 18.0.0 20.0.0

Secondengineer

10.0.0 15.0.0 14.0.0 16.0.0

Thirdengineer

6.8.0 12.0.0 12.0.0 13.0.0

Fourthengineer

9.10.0

Wirelessoperator A′

11.0.0 12.0.0 13.10.0

Wirelessoperator B′

10.0.0 12.10.0

Bosun 4.0.0 9.0.0 6.10.0 5.0.0 8.0.0Carpenter 9.0.0 6.0.0 5.0.0 8.0.0AB 3.4.0 7.0.0 5.10.0 4.0.0 7.0.0Donkeyman 4.8.0 9.0.0 7.0.0 5.0.0 8.10.0Fireman 4.0.0 7.10.0 6.0.0 4.10.0 7.10.0Greaser 9.0.0Heaver 2.16.0 6.10.0 4.0.0 3.10.0 6.4.0Deck boy 4.0.0 2.10.0 2.0.0 4.14.0Cook 4.8.0 9.0.0 7.0.0 6.0.0 9.0.0Steward 4.0.0 9.0.0 6.10.0 5.0.0 8.0.0Officers’steward

5.0.0 3.10.0 2.10.0 5.4.0

Sources: 1) ‘Crew Wages on Greek Ships’, Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1925,for 1914 and 1924 wages. 2) ‘By Which a Unified Payroll for CargoSteamships is Stipulated’, Circular of the Direction of Merchant Marine, rec.no. 23013/50 and 23014/51 of 19 August 1932, in EEN, 1932, pp. 751–8. 3)‘Agreeement on Wages on Board Cargo Steamships Between the GreekShipowners’ Union and the Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation, 26 April 1933’,Circular of the Direction of Merchant Marine, rec. no. 10518, in EEN, 1933,pp. 544–55. 4) Sub-Ministry of Shipping, Shipping Direction, Research andStatistical Department, Bulletin of Laws, Decrees, Circulars, etc. of theAdministration of Merchant Marine for the Year 1937, Adiens, EthnikoTypografio 1937: ‘Agreement on Wages on Board Cargo Steamships Between


Capacity/Year

1914 1924 1932 1933 1937

the Greek Shipowners’ Union and the Panhellenic Professional Union ofMerchant Marine Masters’ 16 September 1937; ‘On the Wages of Engineersand Wireless Operators of Cargo Steamships’, rec. no. 2564, 25 January 1937,Ministry of Shipping, Dept C; ‘On Contractual Wages of Ratings of CargoSteamships’, rec. no. 32195, 13 September 1937, Ministry of Shipping, Dept C

informal increases before a new collective agreement was finally signed. As thePNO’s newspaper, Naftergati kos Agon, wrote on 19 September 1948

Shipowners always claim to be facing a crisis and they always allege thatfreight rates have fallen, and that the Greek ship is in a disadvantageousposition in comparison to the other fleets…. It is also a fact that wheneverGreek ships work at a profit—often huge —seamen never asked for a risein their salary on the basis that the ships make such profits.

Still, despite the reductions, Greek wages at sea were better than those ashore inthe 1930s. Seamen also profited from the fact that they were paid in sterlingrather than drachma. In 1931 a fireman received a monthly wage of £6 (2,250drachmas; exchange parity was £1=375 drachmas); five years later, despite awage reduction to £4, his wages in drachmas were still 2,184 (the exchangeparity then was £1=546 drachmas); and in 1937, when his wages rose to £7, hereceived around 4,000 drachmas. At the same time the wages of a textile workerranged between 1,500 and 2,250 drachmas per month.33

All the main problems for the seamen had their origin in the almost completelack of legal protection of seafaring. This led to their organisation and activedemand of the amelioration of their working conditions throughout this period. Asa port official ascertained in the 1920s:

The Greek legislator of 1911 did not approve of the system of wagecontract, perhaps because he did not consider seamen capable tocomprehend and sign the constantly changing contracts of work on board….[Only 15 years later] the legislator of today has before him a seaman whois socially progressed, is represented and more than sufficiently protectedby trade unions and who has been raising demands at the expense ofshipowners…. The consciousness of the seamen has changed after the war.34

Until the 1920s Greek seamen hired to serve on merchant vessels did not signwork contracts defining their tasks and rights. The master could hire and firecrew members at his discretion. Thus, if a seaman and a master had a dispute, thelatter could—without any legal consequences— discharge the former at the firstport. If this were abroad, the seaman had to pay for the trip back to Greece orlive on his savings until he could secure employment. The prospect of months


without work made many seamen victims of local crimps. The maritime labourmarket in the largest Greek port, Piraeus, was in the hands of these ‘shrewdprocurers’ or bordinadori (boardinghouse keepers). Exploitation of seafarers inthe various ports of the world was as old as the profession.35 In Greece the mainmustering centres were located in the islands; according to Table 7.3 two-thirdsof the ratings originated from there. In this way the important ports of Chios,Syros, Andros and Cephalonia were the main labour markets. Exploitation bycrimps was limited in these ports due to the closed character of the communitiesand their long maritime traditions. But for the remaining one-third of seamen andfiremen, who did not originate from the traditional maritime areas, things weredifferent. During periods of high unemployment the seamen from non-traditionalmaritime areas often became victims of crimps of their own free will. Accordingto Captain George Abouselam:

With the exception of the Master, all of us had been recruited in Piraeusthat had at the time a large number of unemployed colleagues due to thecrisis in shipping markets. As I found out, some of the ratings had beenobliged to pay a ‘senseless rodent’ at Truba [of Piraeus] three or fourpound sovereigns in order to be mustered. … [After we sailed from Piraeusto Danzig where we loaded coal] …we unloaded coal at Livorno in Italy,and from there, in absence of freight, we laid the ship up in Abelakia offthe island of Salamis. We were fired on that same day while many of crew,experienced seamen with families to support, had not even had the time toearn enough to make up for what they had spent in order to get recruited atthose difficult years. We had been on board only two and a half months.36

The lack of legal protection for seafarers extended to wages, crew composition,and hours of work, all depending on the discretion of the master. There were nodiplomas to attest to competence; the school for masters in Hydra was foundedonly in 1930. The interwar period was fundamental for the institutionalisation ofprotection for seamen in the context of a general trend urged by the InternationalLabour Organisation (ILO). As soon as the ILO was formed, the CommissionParitaire Maritime was created to study and internationalise various maritimelabour issues. To facilitate the codification of an international statute for seamen,which would help to make their rights and duties better known, the 1920International Conference of Labour at Geneva recommended that all ILOmembers (including Greece) proceed to a concrete codification of nationallabour legislation.37 Five assemblies took place from 1920 to 1939, in whichGreeks participated. The issues dealt with included hours of work, crewcomposition, age limits, indemnities and insurance.

The ‘indiscipline of crews on deep-sea-going cargo vessels’, seamen’s strikesin Piraeus and Athens and the activities of international labour organisations ledto a series of laws to protect basic rights for seamen in the late 1920s and early1930s. On 15 April 1927, the Direction of Merchant Marine of the Ministry of


Shipping established the Oikos Naftou (House of Seaman) to provide food,shelter and health care for temporarily unemployed Greek seamen abroad. In1936 the state Bureau of Work at Sea (GENE) was established to provideemployment and protection to out-of-work seamen. Law 4005 ‘on the menu ofmerchant cargo vessels’ was voted in 1929; Law 5231 ‘on the composition ofmerchant ships’ crews’ in 1931; Law 6202 ‘on the protection of unemployed sea-workers and their families’ in 1933; and Law 6209 ‘on a unified payroll of sea-workers’ in 1934. These laws, however, did not actually apply until almost tenyears after they were voted, and this under the pressure from seamen’s unionsduring the Second World War.

The establishment of Greek ships in a large portion of the interwar trampshipping market was due to their international competitiveness, which of

Table 7.6 Wages for able-bodied seamen on steamships on Greek, Norwegian, British,German, Dutch, Spanish and Japanese fleets (in pounds sterling)

Country 1914 1924 1925 1927 1928 1934

Greece 3.4.0 7.0.0 7.0.0 7.0.0 7.0.0 4.0.0

Figure 7.1 Comparitive data of wages of ABs

Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1931,1934


Country 1914 1924 1925 1927 1928 1934

Norway 3.9.11 5.18.1 7.6.3 8.10.3 8.14.4 7.4.9Britain 5.5.0 10.0.0 9.0.0 9.0.0 9.0.0 8.2.0Germany 3.13.5 4.6.9 4.7.3 4.17.7 5.12.6 8.5.8Holland 3.12.8 8.13.6 8.5.7 8.4.9 8.5.6 10.16.3Spain 4.13.3 3.13.8Japan 4.6.3 2.5.0Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1925, p. 67; EEN, 1927, pp. 22–3; EEN,

1931, p. 948; EEN, 1934, p. 64

course rested on the reduction of costs. The elasticity of wages and manningscales in Greek shipping can be explained partly by poor labour organisation andpartly by the lack of an institutional framework to protect seamen’s rights.Greece, however, was not the only country to reduce wages during the early1930s. Figure 7.1 shows comparative data for ABs in the Greek, Norwegian,Spanish, Japanese, Dutch, German and British fleets in 1928 and 1934.According to Table 7.6, in 1914 the Greek wages were almost the same as theDutch and German, in the 1920s were higher than the German, Spanish andJapanese, and in 1934, despite their great reduction, Greek wages were stillhigher than the Spanish and Japanese. In all seven fleets, there was a sharpdecrease between 1928 and 1934 in all but the German and Dutch.

But the success of the Greeks was not only due to their being able to reducecosts but also because they maintained productivity at the same time. Thereasons they could do so reflect the particular labour relations on Greek shipswhich, despite an increase in trade unionism, continued to a large extent to bebuilt on close relations between crew, masters and shipowners, based on kinshipand common origins.


8THE TROUBLED 1940s: SETTING THEBASIS FOR THE ‘LEAP FORWARD’1

The 1940s proved extremely important in the development of twentieth-centuryGreek-owned shipping. The Second World War and subsequent changes in themaritime division of labour brought unprecedented opportunities to those Greekshipowners who were able to exploit them. The shift of world economic andmaritime hegemony from Britain to the US after 1945 ushered in a new era inworld shipping. ‘Flags of convenience’, as they were called then, or ‘openregistries’ as they are more tactfully called today, became the key manifestationof postwar American shipping policy, guaranteeing low-cost, American-controlled shipping. This left space for traditional European nations, such asGreece and Norway, to engage in cross-trading or to transport goods betweenthird countries under various flags of convenience.

Greek shipowners, in order to avoid their confinement in Greece as during theFirst World War, and to administer their vessels better, at the outbreak of theconflict left for London—but more important, for New York, where they wereable to enjoy the advantages of being resident in a country that became the mainpostwar economic power. Their involvement in the oil trade through connectionswith the major oil companies, the adoption of flags of convenience, and thereplacement of their pre-Second World War fleet with the new Liberties set thestage for their expansion after 1945.

The first part of this chapter examines the activities of the Greeks during theSecond World War and the problems that arose in their relations with the state;the second part looks at the purchase of the Liberties; and the third at theinvolvement of Greeks with flags of convenience.

THE ‘TROUBLED 1940s’

At the outbreak of the Second World War, the Greek merchant fleet ranked ninthin the world in terms of gross tonnage, comprising 607 ships of 1.8 million GRT.Among the nine largest fleets, three belonged to the Axis powers, which madethe Greeks particularly important to the Allies. By the end of the war the Greekmerchant navy had lost about 1.3 million GRT, or 72 per cent of its total fleet, ahigher percentage than was lost in the First World War; even the British onlylost 63 percent. The bulk of the Greek fleet was engaged in the most dangerous

Atlantic and North Sea trades and to a lesser degree in the Mediterranean, Pacificand Indian Oceans (Figure 8.1). Fully 57 per cent of Greek losses occurredbefore 1942 (Figure 8.2).

The ‘troubled 1940s’, as they are often called, were characterised by thealienation of shipowners from Greece and a breach in their relations with theGreek state. Indeed, state intervention during the Second World War has longbeen used by shipowners as a rationale for their subsequent adoption of non-Greek flags. Yet during the 1940s most—if not all—of Greeces leadingshipowners left the country for London and New York and began on a massivescale to use flags of convenience. This temporary exodus, which continued in the1950s, triggered postwar Greek shipping policy and gave shipowners anargument they use to this day. Postwar Greek maritime policy has been based onthe principle of epanapatrismos (repatriation) and rests on two broad principles—non-intervention by the state and tax liberalisation—to wean Greek-ownedvessels back to the domestic register. Whenever the state makes any move thatresembles intervention, however, shipowners always draw parallels with the1940s.2

The series of controversies during the war concerned the Anglo-Greekagreement, restricted accounts in England, taxation and Greek seamen. The firstto arise was over the Anglo-Greek Agreement, which formed the basis for theAllied requisition of the Greek fleet. After the occupation, the Tsouderos

Figure 8.1 Position of ships lost in the Second World War. Source: Appendix 8.1

244 THE TROUBLED 1940S

government based in Crete requisitioned all Greek ships under a special decree(LD 3009/1941). After signing the Anglo-Greek agreement on May 1941, the stateformally time-chartered all Greek ships above 4,000 dwt to Britain.3

Between 1939 and the German occupation in April 1941, the Greeksattempted to negotiate an agreement with Britain that would allow shipowners tocharter ships privately. In order to secure neutral tonnage and to prevent inter-Allied competition, Britain formed the Neutral Tonnage Policy Committee of theMinistry of Economic Warfare in 1939. In a meeting of the War Cabinet on 4September, it was noted that ‘the main sources of neutral tonnage are Norway(which is specially important as regards tankers) and Greece’.4

Since shipowners had made enormous profits in the First World War bychartering ships privately, the Allies proceeded to charter requisitioned fleets atfixed rates; consequently, profits in the Second World War were lower. This‘loss’ gave the Greek shipowners cause to protest and to accuse the Greekgovernment of ‘selling out’ to the British. This accusation was thoroughlyunjustified: the Greek fleet was treated similarly to the Norwegian, under theAnglo-Norwegian agreement of 11 March 1940.5 And the British fleet wasadministered in exactly the same way.

Another controversy concerned the revenues received by the Greekgovernment from shipping. The largest share came from the operation of twenty-seven newly built ships which had been requisitioned.6 Through an agreementwith the Allies, the Greek government was allowed to operate them in the privatemarket, for which it received $7 per ton carried. Since the standard freight ratepayable to the owners of requisitioned ships was $3.50 per ton, the governmentmade a sizeable profit.7 The owners of these twenty-seven ships—the most

Figure 8.2 Percentage of ships lost during the Second World War


THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 245

prominent Greek shipowners, as it happened —considered this agreement highlyunjust and after the war complained loudly about their ‘exploitation’.8

Revenues from shipping were the main source of finance for the Greekgovernment-in-exile; two-thirds of its expenses were covered by income frommarine transport. The income received by the state during the war totalledbetween £6 and £7 million, but shipowners claimed that the state had actuallycollected more than £12 million.9 At the end of the war, the owners received frominsurance and freight income about £50 million.10 It seems unreasonable to speakof exploitation when a mere quarter of the revenues were paid in taxation,especially during wartime.

It is possible to provide an additional perspective by comparing the earningsthe Norwegian government received from its requisitioned fleet under a similaragreement. The Norwegians formed an organisation called ‘The NorwegianShipping and Trade Mission’, better known by its telegraphic address as‘Nortraship’. Nortraship was a state organisation with offices in London and NewYork, established to administer the Norwegian merchant marine. The Norwegiangovernment relied on Nortraship for financial resources and it ‘proved to be themost valuable asset the Norwegian government had during the war. The profitsgenerated made the government-in-exile economically independent’11 Theincome the Norwegian government received from shipping was £40 million (819million Norwegian kroner).12 The Norwegian merchant fleet totalled four millionGRT at the outbreak of the Second World War. Greece owned two million grosstons and its government received £7 million. On a per ton basis, the Norwegiangovernment derived almost three times as much revenue than did Greece.

The second controversy between the Greek government and its shipownersconcerned the restricted accounts established to receive shipping revenues inLondon. In order to regulate its relationship with the shipowners, the governmentgave the administration of the requisitioned ships to the twenty-three Greekshipping offices in London, which were to act as nominees under its control. Itsubsequently formed the Greek Shipping Committee in London (ENEL),consisting of the Greek ambassador and two shipowners, who were given powerto decide on all administrative matters concerning the requisitioned ships.According to Article 8b of the Anglo-Greek agreement all insurance andrevenues from the ships chartered to the Allies were to be deposited in restrictedtrust accounts held by the Greek government. The existence of these accounts, arestriction imposed principally by the British, was interpreted by the shipownersas an attempt by the Greek government to sequester funds that were rightfullytheirs. This restriction, combined with the fact that the shipowners had completecontrol of the administration of the requisitioned ships, generated a series ofproblems which culminated in the famous ‘Vergottis case’.

The Vergottis case arose from the loss in July 1942 of the Greek ship Emmy,which belonged to A.Vergottis. Vergottis Ltd, acting as his agents (as well asagents for the Greek government), received a sum of £79,200 from theinsurance, which was paid into a restricted account in its name in trust to the


Greek government. Subsequently, Vergottis Ltd applied to ENEL for permissionto transfer this sum to A.Vergottis. Although ENEL refused consent, VergottisLtd in fact transferred the funds. The Greek government responded by takingVergottis Ltd to court. In March 1945, Judge Atkinson decided in favour ofVergottis, rightly basing his decision on Clause 8 of the Anglo-GreekAgreement. It appeared that the clause had been drafted to overcome difficultiescreated by the occupation of Greece; if so, the only people who should have beenaffected were Greek shipowners living in Greece and not those resident inBritain, as was A.Vergottis.

The attitude of the shipowners toward the restricted accounts and the Vergottiscase was clearly expressed in the Report of the Greek Shipowners’ Union in1946:

It is true that these restrictions were imposed in order to conform to theprinciples of international law and the exchange policy of the Britishpolicy, but on these grounds the Greek government aspired to give to theseformal restrictions another form incompatible with any logic or legal rightsof the shipowners…. We have heard from some state officials that shippingcapital should not be given to the shipowners to whom it by nature and bylaw belongs but that it should be subject to some other administration inwhich the state would be the main decision-maker…. Typical of thegovernments reasoning is the fact that the Greek state took into the Britishcourt a Greek shipowner (Vergottis) who received the insurance indemnitywhich belonged to him while it was restricted by the Greek government.The result of this trial was the vindication of the shipowner and theignominious loss of Greeces prestige. As this event demonstrates, theGreek state has been reduced to a ridiculous position by certain officialswho insist on appropriating foreign assets, contrary to any law.13

The British Public Record Office contains an interesting file on the Vergottiscase, which clearly shows that the decision to ask for a writ was the choice ofBritain, which exerted considerable pressure. This can be seen in a letter fromEustace Roskill at the Ministry of War Transport to Rowe-Dutton at the Treasuryon 26 June 1945:

the fact that [there is the Greek shipowners’] money in the restrictedaccounts does not, however, enable the Bank of England on behalf of theTreasury to exercise any control over those moneys…unless the personentitled (and a fortiori ceases to be an enemy), the Bank of England can notprevent the money being transferred by the nominee to the shipowner. Theonly way in which the transfer of such money can be stopped is by theGreek government establishing a claim of right to the money. We hadalways assumed (quite wrongly as it turned out in the ultimate result) thatthe Greek government would have tied a control of the total loss moneys


up as a matter of contract between their nominees and themselves…. TheGreek government have singly failed to exercise any proper control overGreek shipowners or their London representatives who in main are personsultimately financially interested in ships. If we had not sought to force theGreek government by telling them, that we held them responsible for abreach of the Agreement, to bring the Vergottis case. … These moneyscould therefore become free at a time long before that which anyDepartment had contemplated as the proper time for allowing the moneysto become available to the Greek shipowners concerned.14

British interests were ultimately served by delaying the case in the courts forabout two years and by discouraging other shipowners from taking any insurancemoney during this period. Since Greece was within the British ‘sphere ofinfluence’, the Greek government had no choice but to pressure the London-based owners to accept British terms, thereby bringing upon itself a great deal ofhostility.15 The ‘Vergottis case’ has since been used as the prime example ofunfair state intervention in shipping.

Taxation was the third area of dispute between the Greek government and theshipowners during the 1940s. The annual income from taxation for the pre-1940years (an average of about £22,000) equalled 0.003 per cent of the earnings fromshipping.16 In 1939 the government imposed a new temporary tax (LD 2075/1939) which brought large revenues by taxing a ship’s excess value, defined asthe difference between the purchase price of the ship and the value theshipowner received from its sale or insurance settlement.17 Taxation on excessvalue was transformed by LD 2288/1940, according to which the tax imposedwas to be deposited in special accounts in Greek banks, to be returned to theshipowner in three years if he were to replace the ship. The controversy over thisissue continued, and various legislative decrees were issued, but none satisfiedboth sides. The final law on this subject was LD 545/1945, which placed a 30per cent restriction on indemnities received from insurance, which could be usedfor the replacement of lost tonnage for up to seven years. There were, however,extremely few cases of ships bought from this restricted account and very fewshipowners who actually deposited the legal amount from the insurance. The lawessentially proved useless and, with LD 2149/1952, shipowners who had not metthis obligation were able to deposit 5 to 35 per cent of the initial amount bypaying NAT (Seamen’s Pension Fund) or the Fund for Maritime Education.18

During the time the original law was in force (between January of 1940 andMarch of 1941), the government earned £964,377, an enormous amountcompared to the minuscule revenue collected in previous years. The tax collectedunder this law (and its modifications) totalled £1,218,765.

The promulgation of a 1948 law (LD 567/1948) ‘concerning the taxation ofthe profits of motor ships’ created another point of acute controversy between thestate and the shipowners.19 According to this bill, a 50 per cent tax was imposedupon presumed rather than real shipping profits. The new tax, which was


calculated on existing freight rates and tonnage owned by each shippingcompany, was made retroactive to January 1947. The state’s motivation was clear:to obtain a share of the obviously high profits being earned in shipping. Thisjustification was well stated in 1949 by G.Drosopulos, then the MP for theCyclades:

We do not believe that there could be anyone who would support the ideathat in such a national struggle…justice would permit a certain number ofcitizens to evade any contribution to their country, having as onlyjustification that their individual economic development would be hinderedor delayed.20

As the government doubtless expected, the law elicited strong protests fromshipowners. As a result, the act was never implemented as originally drafted,although a modified version with substantially reduced taxes due for 1947–9 wasenacted.

Another law that caused a good deal of friction between the shipowners and thestate for about a decade was a bill ‘concerning the taxation of the wealthy (LD889/1949).21 This legislation required all Greek citizens to declare their foreignassets with the intent of eventual repatriation. According to this law a special tax,amounting to 15 million drachmas, was imposed on Greek-flag shipping, whilean additional levy of 40 million drachmas was assessed for vessels operatingunder foreign flags. The shipowners accepted the tax on Greek-registered vessels,but refused to pay for ships sailing under foreign flags. A lawsuit initiated by theshipowners over this bill dragged on for many years. This act was theculmination of attempts by the state to exert some degree of influence over itsshipping industry. Unfortunately for the state, the most visible result of thepolicy was the departure of 80 per cent of its shipowners to London andNew York; most had no apparent intention of returning. The great irony was thatthe acts or omissions of Greek maritime policy had little to do with the exodusduring these two decades. The ‘repatriation’ of the Greek shipowners in thefollowing decades, either by adopting the Greek flag or opening shipping officesin Piraeus, depended more on developments abroad than at home.22

The activities of Greek seamen in the 1940s represented the fourth cause ofconcern for both the government and the shipowners. A series of strikes at thebeginning of the 1930s eventually led to an organised seamen’s movementduring the war, which in turn resulted in substantial pay increases. Indeed, Greekcrew members were better paid than their British counterparts from some time inthe 1940s until 1956 (see Table 8.1). In 1933 the pay of an AB in the Greek fleetwas half the pay of a British AB; by 1939 this gap was reduced to one-third. Butbetween 1943 and 1951 the monthly pay of a Greek AB was £28 when thestandard British rate was only £24. In 1951 the Greek seaman was still betterpaid, but by 1956 British pay had reached Greek levels. From then until 1965British pay grew more rapidly than Greek remuneration.


Table 8.1 Standard national rates of pay for ABs, Britain and Greece, selected years,1933–65 (monthly wages in pounds sterling)

Year Britain Greece Year Britain Greece

1933 8.10 4.00 1952 24.00 n/a1934 8.10 4.00 1954 25.50 n/a1937 9.00 7.00 1955 27.50 32.001938 9.63 n/a 1956 29.50 32.001939 12.63 7.00 1957 31.50 35.001940 15.63 n/a 1958 33.25 35.001941 17.63 n/a 1960 35.75 35.001942 22.63 n/a 1961 37.14 38.001943 24.00 28.00 1962 39.53 38.001947 20.00 28.00 1964 39.53 40.001951 22.00 30.00 1965 40.68 40.00Sources: Great Britain, Chamber of Shipping, Annual Report, 1958–9 and 1967–8;

Greece, Ministry of Shipping, Acts, Decrees and Collective AgreementsRegarding Greek Seamen, Athens, 1951, 1954, 1956, 1961 and 1964;Table 7.5; John Holevas, The Greek Merchant Marine in Figures, Piraeus1971, table 3

Notes: Britain: 1939 includes £3 war bonus; 1940 includes £5 war bonus; 1941 includes£5 war bonus and £2 differential pay; 1942 includes £10 war bonus and £2differential pay; 1943 includes £10 war bonus (differential pay merged in basicrate); 1947–65 excludes efficient service’ pay after five years’ service (1947–56, £4; 1957–60, £4.25; 1961–5, £4.50); 1955–65, excludes bonus for ABcertificate (1955–60, £5; 1961–5, £1); 1961–5, excludes compensation forweekends at sea (1961, £1.75; 1962, £1.86; 1964, £1.98; 1965, £12.20).Greece: 1939, excludes war bonus (varied between 45 and 300 per cent ofmonthly wage); 1943 includes £17 war bonus; 1951 excludes Korean warbonus (varied between 100 and 200 per cent of monthly wage

According to Alexander Kitroeff’s analysis of the Greek seamen’s movement,

one of the most crucial strikes, involving 1,500 seamen on vessels berthed inBritish ports, occurred in December 1940. While the three-week stoppageyielded no immediate results, it did lead to a collective agreement in August1941 between the shipowners and seamen in England. This contract providedwage increases approved of by the official seamen’s union (PNO, or PanhellenicSeamen’s Federation) and NEE (Greek Seamen’s Union), the more powerfulleftist union based at Marseilles from 1936 and New York from 1940. In March1943, the leadership decided to abolish NEE and to replace it with the Cardiff-based Federation of Greek Maritime Unions (OENO). OENO set two mainobjectives, one economic and the other political. In September 1943, it achievedsuccess on the first: ‘The collective agreement signed in 1943, introducing suchbasic amenities as bedding, a vastly improved victualling scale, and of course,the eight-hour working day, was hailed by the seamen as a great victory.’23


At the same time, it was no secret that politically the majority of OENO’sleadership was composed of communists or their sympathisers. Shipowners hadto live with unheard-of situations on their ships:

Eugene Eugenides lived then at the famous Plaza Hotel at Buenos Aires.Every morning his Argentinian driver brought him in a shiny limousine tothe vessel exactly at eight o’clock in the morning…. Wearing a black coat,and a grey hat Eden-like…he walked slowly astern. Passing outside thecrews dining room he halted, looking at the picture of Joseph Stalin, whowas very close to the heart of many of the crew. Eugenides lookedcarefully at Joseph for exactly five seconds, shook his head, let a groan ofdisapproval from his mouth, and continued his slow walk astern.24

OENO regarded the war primarily as a struggle against fascism and thereforeencouraged its members to keep overseas shipping routes open and to disregardall possible dangers; the union’s slogan was ‘keep the ships moving’. Itsdetermination, along with broad support from the crews, enabled it to present astrong front to the shipowners. The increased importance of overseas transportand the general labour shortage meant that both the Greek and Britishgovernments adopted restrained attitudes towards OENO. This ‘friendly’ posturetowards seamen during the 1940s was, of course, another reason for disputebetween the shipowners and the state.

One has to remember that war did not end for Greece in 1945 but continuedinternally until 1949. It was thus only at the beginning of the 1950s that thegovernment solved the problems that Greek seamen posed to shipowners byproscribing OENO and controlling PNO. New collective agreements in 1951 (thefirst after the agreement of 1943 between the shipowners and PNO) and 1954specified decreased wages for certain skilled workers, diminished overtime pay,and reduced the number of crew. At the same time, the pacts increased thenumber of years a seaman had to serve to be entitled to a pension from ten tofifteen. Moreover, beginning in 1951, another series of royal decrees on topicssuch as crew composition ensured that no organisation like the more militantOENO could everrise again. Seamen’s militancy during the 1940s, however,required implementation of the 1930s legislation on Greek ships. Furthermore,the replacement of the aged First World War-built steamers by three- or four-year-old diesel Liberties meant better working conditions on board.

THE LIBERTIES

The heavy losses suffered by the Allies in the first two years of the war meantthat the safe carriage of goods by sea became of primary importance. Between1941 and 1945 the US and Canada launched the most massive shipbuildingprogramme the world had ever known to meet the demand for maritime transportduring the war. Over these four years, about 3,000 so-called ‘Liberty ships,


averaging 10,000 dwt (7,371 GRT), were built in the US alone.25 By adoptingassembly-line techniques from the Detroit automobile industry, Americansrevolutionised shipbuilding. The idea was to build standard vessels in largenumbers by prefabricating sections on sites near shipyards, while the hull itselfwas being assembled on the berth. The programme also introduced welding toshipbuilding. Previously, rivets had been used to join the metal plates out ofwhich the hull was constructed; welding was considered unsafe and henceunsuitable. The fact that the Liberties depended on welding was regarded withsuspicion by most shipowners and not without reason: some of the first Libertieseventually split in half. Nevertheless, welding techniques improved considerablyduring the war and Liberty ships survived for the next twenty-five years.Welding allowed lighter and stronger hulls that could be assembled quickly. TheGreeks continued to purchase Liberties throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.The peak year for Liberty ownership was 1963 when the Cuban blockadeencouraged high freight rates. The decline of the Liberties that started in 1964was completed by 1974. In 1966 there were still 722 Liberties operating onworld trade routes, of which 603 were Greek-owned.26

In 1946 the Greek merchant marine was at its nadir, having lost more than 70per cent of tonnage during the war (see Figure 8.3). In 1939 the fleet comprised1.8 million GRT; by 1946 only a half million GRT was still afloat. In October1945, Manolis Kulukundis, a highly respected shipowner, wrote that ‘we dependon Liberties for the replacement of our sunken ships’.27 The Ships Sales Act, bywhich American ships could be sold to foreign purchasers, was passed byCongress in March 1946. In July the United States Maritime Committee, whichwas responsible for the sales, decided to sell ships on credit to Alliedgovernments or to individual shipowners on state guarantee. The shipownerswho possessed capital in American banks bought Liberties for cash andregistered them under the Panamanian flag. The majority of the shipowners,however, did not have sufficient dollars, since capital from chartering andinsurance was mostly in sterling. Because of currency controls, the ability toconvert sterling into dollars was limited; for most shipowners, it was impossibleto purchase Liberty ships.28 Faced with this dilemma, Greek owners requestedstate guarantees, which would enable them to buy Liberties on credit. On 9 April1946, the Greek government guaranteed the purchase of 100 Liberties on behalfof its shipowners.

The war may have led to a decline in Greek tonnage, but in one important wayit benefited shipowners: in 1945 they found themselves with £47.5 million incash from insurance payments and freight revenues.29 This money, supplementedby the loan guarantees mentioned above, enabled them to buy 100 Liberty shipsat the extremely low price of £16.5 million, a third of their original price (theGreek owners are listed in Table 8.2). Of this amount only about £4.1 million, or25 per cent, was paid in cash, with the remaining £12.1 million in credit from theAmericans backed by Greek government guarantees. The loan from the US wasto be paid off within seventeen years at an interest rate of only 3.5 per cent.


The purchase of the 100 Liberties was followed by the purchase of seven 16,500-dwt T2 tankers. As with the Liberties, these came from the US. TheAmerican government decided to dispose of tankers on the same favourable termsas the Liberties. Seven of the tankers were allotted to Greece, which resulted in amajor internecine conflict among Greek shipowners to control this offer. Sincethe shipowners could not decide how to divide this tonnage, Aristotle Onassissuggested that he would buy the tankers for cash and contribute part of theprofits to the NAT (Seamen’s Pension Fund) and other institutions for publicbenefit. His offer brought an immediate reaction from the rest of the shipowners:the seven tankers were bought for cash by N.Lykiardopulos, S.Andreades,S.Livanos, G. Nicolaou, P.Goulandris & Sons, M.Nomikos and ChandrisBrothers.30

Aristotle Onassis, who had not participated in the purchase of the 100Liberties, responded to his colleagues’ actions by focusing publicity on them. Ina highly revealing article, written in 1947 but not published until 1953, hecalculated that in 1947 alone these 100 ships generated incomes of £9 millionand net profits of £2.8 million. That same year, the shipowners were thus able tobuy another 277 ships (see Table 8.3), which they put under flags of convenienceand which yielded equally sizeable incomes. Criticising the tax evasions of theshipowners and their minimal contribution to the Greek state, Onassis wrote:

Figure 8.3 Growth of the merchant fleet under the Greek flag. Source: Table 8.3


I ask what did the Greek nation receive in taxes or foreign exchange?Nothing, while the English and the Norwegians took almost everything. Asif this was not enough, the Greek nation presents us with a gift of 100Liberties, valued today at $70 million and with an income of 35 milliondollars annually. During the period of spring 1947 to spring 1948 the totalincome of the 377 ships [owned by the Greeks] is more than $100 million.You owe everything, all, to the nation, which owes you nothing andmoreover has treated you with scandalous favour…. It is no exaggerationor jest on my part when I say that the 100 ships were given as a presentfrom the Greek people, and let me make this clear: the average advancepayment for the purchase of one of the 100 Liberties was, as you know,$150,000 and £14,000 guarantee. Anybody could pre-charter for at leastone year continuous trips with coal cargo for $9.5 to $11.0 per ton. Thismeans that under the worst conditions, the income of $1,400 daily minus$150 for depreciation and $50 for reparations and others would still leaveus with $1,200 net revenue per day. That is, the $420,000 in revenuesduring the first eleven and a half months, minus $70,000 for delays andunforeseen payments, leaves $350,000. We receive advance payment for 3/4 of these revenues with a time-charter and a second mortgage, whichmeans that we have $262,500 in cash the day after we deliver the ship. If wesubtract the $150,000 we paid as

Table 8.2 Distribution of the 100 Liberty ships in 1947

Shipowner Name of ship* Registered

1) Anastassiou-Fafalios

Othon Chios

Psara Chios2) Andreades S. Alexandros Koryzis Chios

Georgios F.Andreadis Chios3) Carras I.C. Navarchos

KountouriotisChios

4) Carras I.M. Fotini Piraeus5) Chandris Bros Eugenia Chandris Piraeus6) Coumantaros P. Panayotis

CoumantarosPiraeus

Stavros Coumantaros Piraeus7) Dambassis D. Eleni D. Andros8) Drakoulis E. Asteris Ithaca9) Efstathiou N. Michalakis Piraeus10) Embiricos Michael Krios Andros11) Embiricos Maris Petalioi Andros12) Epiphaniades T. Georgios Panoras Pireaus



Kechrea VolosKonistra Piraeus

13) Goulandris J.Bros Evanthia AndrosIoannis P.Goulandris Andros

14) Goulandris P. &Sons

Chryssi Andros

15) Gratsos Bros Georgios D.Gratsos IthacaKastor IthacaAudrey IthacaTriton Ithaca

16) Hadjilias-Manthos Sounion Piraeus17) Hadjipateras N. &A.

Agios Nicolaos Pireaus

18) Hadjipateras N. &A.

K.Hadjipateras Piraeus

19) Inglessis D.Sons Samos Samos20) Kallimanopulos P. Grigorios K. III Piraeus(‘Hellenic Lines’) Hellenic Beach Piraeus

Hellenic Star PiraeusHellenic Wave PiraeusHellenic Sky Piraeus

21) Karavias A. Panayia Kathariotissa Ithaca22) Kondylis N. Anna Kondyli Andros23) Kulukundis M. Vasilios E.Kulukundis Piraeus

Ioannis G.Kulukundis SyrosCaptain Farmakides PiraeusMaria G.Kulukundis Piraeus

(40%J.Theodoracopulos)

Megalochari Zakynthos

NicolaosG.Kulukundis

Syros

(50% I.Kairis) Nicolaos Kairis Andros(60% Scarvelis K.) Mount Athos Piraeus

Santorini PiraeusStathis J.Yanaghas Syros

(Georgopulos 20%,Karellas 24%)

Syros Syros

24) Livanos Stavros(‘Theofano’)

AktiAliakmon

PiraeusPiraeus

Aliki Piraeus



Alfios PiraeusAxios PiraeusAtalanti Piraeus


Evros PiraeusKyma PiraeusMeandros PiraeusNedon PiraeusNestos PiraeusPinios Piraeus

25) Lemos C.M. Michael Piraeus26) Lemos G. Ellas Chios27) LemosPanagiotis

Kostis Lemos Chios

28) Lemos S.A. Antonis Chios29) Livanos J.,G.P.

Panayotis Chios

30) Los Bros-Pezas

Igor Chios

Kostis Los Chios31) Markessinis P. Evrymedon Piraeus32) MavrofilipasBros

Mariam Pireaus

33) Michalinos K. Kostas Michalos PiraeusLeonidasMichalos

Pireaus

34) Moatsos G. Kriti Chania, Crete35) NiarchosStavros

CaptainI.Mataragas

Piraeus

CaptainK.Papazoglou

Piraeus

36) Nicolaou G. NicolaouGeorgios

Piraeus

Nicolaou Zografia Piraeus37) Nomikos E. Loula Nomikos Piraeus38) Nomikos M. Petros Nomikos Piraeus39) Pantaleon Bros Demosthenes Piraeus



40) Papadakis A. Virginia Piraeus41) Pateras D.A. Anastasios

PaterasChios

42) PaterasCharalambos

Nicholas Piraeus

43) Pateras N., G.& D.

Konstantis Piraeus

44) Pateras N.Sons Nicolaos Pateras Chios45) Pateras P.D. Kalliopi Chios46) Pateras V. &Livanos S.

Dirphys Piraeus

47) Stathatos D. Eleni Stathatou IthacaEptanisos IthacaMaria Stathatou Ithaca

48) Teryazos T. Leontios Piraeus49) Vassiliades V. Aeroporos

VassiliadesChios

50) Vergottis G. Demosthenes CephaloniaThemistocles CephaloniaPericles Cephalonia

51) VlassopulosBros

StylianosVlassopulos

Ithaca

52) Rethymnis-Pneumaticos

Themoni Syros

(‘Kassos’ S.A.) Hadiotis SyrosHelatros Syros

53) ‘MarathonS.A.

Ameriki Piraeus

54) ‘EmborikiEfoplistiki’

Era Piraeus

Olga Piraeus55) ‘Galaxias’ Richard D.Lions PireausSources: Archives of the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee,

London; A.I.Tzamtzis, The Liberties and the Greeks, Athens,Hestia, 1984, pp. 267–86

Note: * The names of the ships have been translated from their Greeknames as they were registered at the time of their delivery, and inthis way there might be some discrepancies in the spelling of theirnames found in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping

an advance payment for the purchase, we are left with a net profit of $112,500. In other words, with the signature of all the Greek women and


children dressed in rags, and without paying one penny we are left with asurplus of $112,500.31

It is worth noting that Onassis’ polemical article was targeted at the traditionalshipowners, a group which included his father-in-law, Stavros Livanos.32

Although the state guarantee for the Liberties was supposedly given to helpmedium and small shipowners, if we compare Appendix 6.11, which lists theGreek Shipping Offices in London in 1937–8, and the allo cation of the Libertiesten years later (Table 8.2), we find that more than half the Liberties were boughtby the most powerful Greek firms. These shipping companies, already foreign-based, were able to use the inexpensive Liberties at a time of particularly highfreight rates to expand their businesses internationally and to detach themselvesmore than ever from the Greek state. One of the results was that the impressiverate of increase in Greek-owned vessels under flags of convenience and theexpansion of London and New York-based Greek firms was not matched by asimilar increase of the Greek-flag fleet and the Piraeus shipping market. Indeed,the fleet stagnated and only reached pre-Second World War levels twelve yearslater (Figure 8.4).

The purchase of the Liberties proved to be fundamental for the subsequentdevelopment of the Greek-owned fleet. The Korean war in the early 1950sescalated freights again and generated extraordinary profits for Greekshipowners. This ‘golden’ period is still remembered in Greek shipowningcircles as the era when ‘one journey made two ships’. In this way Greekshipowners became among the best customers of European, American andJapanese shipyards in the 1950s.

FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE

‘Flagging out’ from traditional registers to flags of convenience has been a majorfeature of post-Second World War international shipping. Flags of convenienceare registers which provide low taxes and lax conditions of employment andoperation.33 The first important flag of convenience was the Panamanian, whichwas initially used as a flag of convenience in 1922 to carry alcoholic beveragesduring American prohibition. Panama’s subservient position to the US throughAmerican control of the Canal made it an ideal locale, since US owners had noreason to fear that a change of government would affect their interests. Duringthe Second World War, the Panamanian flag proved of great use; by switchingtonnage to the Panamanian flag, American ships maintained their neutrality afterthe US entered the war. In 1948 US oil interests assisted in establishing another flagof convenience in Liberia. There were striking parallels between Panama


Table 8.3 The Greek-owned merchant fleet, 1938–62 (in GRT)

Year Greek % Liberian % Panamanian % Total Greek-owned*

1938 1,889,2691939 1,780,6661946 501,5931947 1,204,4441948 1,286,1611949 1,301,512 50 52,016 2 1,025,726 40 2,591,8551950 1,264,977 43 133,655 5 1,147,680 39 2,929,5841951 1,238,868 34 396,116 11 1,668,025 46 3,641,7821952 1,175,986 29 696,212 17 1,769,687 44 4,029,6631953 1,139,609 24 1,309,620 28 1,847,601 39 4,738,3221954 1,242,075 21 2,397,896 40 1,756,413 30 5,944,6171955 1,270,221 18 3,236,550 47 1,729,236 25 6,905,7061956 1,444,904 17 4,678,244 55 1,722,549 20 8,533,3601957 1,575,899 15 6,414,910 61 1,903,253 18 10,542,9981958 2,274,925 19 7,224,562 61 1,805,054 15 11,899,3831959 3,892,392 31 6,366,303 51 1,691,779 14 12,456,1591960 5,574,621 46 4,773,032 39 1,247,642 10 12,200,7641961 6,519,185 49 4,903,567 37 732,789 6 13,212,8441962 7,008,726 53 4,753,619 36 616,552 5 13,299,617Sources: Naftika Chronika, 1 January 1974Note: * Includes Greek, Panamanian, Liberian and other flags

and Liberia. Both were small countries formed with American assistance andremaining under effective American control.34 The adoption of cheap flags byvarious small developing countries directly dependent on either American orEuropean interests became a characteristic feature of the second half of thetwentieth century. There has been an ever-increasing number of countries thathave ‘opened’ their registries; in addition to Panama, Liberia and Honduras (theinfamous ‘PanHoLib’ flags), Costa Rica, Bermuda, the Isle of Man, Cyprus,Vanuatu, Lebanon, Malta, Bangladesh, the Marshal Islands, Saint Vincent, theCayman Islands, the Bahamas and Hong Kong, among others, have establishedsuch registries.

The use of foreign flags has of course been common for Greeks since thenineteenth century. Indeed, the interwar years were the only period when theGreek flag was widely employed. None the less, the Panamanian flag had beenused by a few Greek companies since 1933 and the 1940s marked a decisive turnaway from the Greek flag to other registries. In 1946 what was left of the Greek-owned fleet still sailed entirely under the Greek flag. By 1949, however, 50 percent of the fleet was on foreign registers (Table 8.3 and Figure 8.4). Thewidespread adoption of foreign flags during this decade was perhaps the most


important characteristic of the postwar development of the Greek merchantmarine. The percentage of Greek-owned tonnage actually operating on domesticregistry decreased continuously until 1958, while the percentage of craft sailingunder flags of convenience increased until 1957, when it reached 87 per cent ofthe total.

Although the shipowners generally attribute their use of non-Greek flags after1945 to hostile domestic maritime policy, political instability, and the power ofGreek unions, the main reasons for their behaviour in fact appear to be external.The American government explicitly supported the growing use of flags ofconvenience in the immediate postwar era through its financial institutions; mostGreek shipowners who bought ships on credit from American banks were‘urged’ to sail under flags of convenience. The high labour costs at home, whichkept US ships from being competitive, and the need to retain control over a largepart of the world’s merchant fleet for strategic and political reasons, led USmaritime policymakers to support the flags of convenience. The adoption of suchflags by US-controlled oil companies and independent owners meant thatpowerful lobbies were established to ensure their continued existence.35 Duringthe second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, 80 to 90 per cent of the Liberian fleetand 45 per cent of the Panamanian fleet were operated by Greeks (Table 8.4).

The adoption of flags of convenience was not without hurdles. The firstproblems, which arose with the first postwar depression in the freight market

Figure 8.4 Growth of the Greek-owned merchant fleet. Source: Table 8.3


Table 8.4 Structure of the Liberian and Panamanian fleets (in 000 GRT)

Liberian Panamanian

Year (1) Greek-owned

(2) Total (1)/(2) % (3) Greek-owned

(4) Total (3)/(4) %

1949 50 50 100 1,025 3,020 341950 136 240 57 1,148 3360 341951 396 590 67 1,668 3,610 461952 696 900 77 1,770 3,740 471953 1,310 1,430 92 1,848 3,910 471954 2,378 2,380 100 1,756 4,090 431955 3,236 4,000 81 1,729 3,920 441956 4,687 5,580 84 1,722 3,920 441957 6,415 7,470 86 1,903 4,130 461958 7,225 10,080 72 1,805 4,260 421959 6,366 11,940 53 1,692 4,580 37Sources: Compiled from Naftika Chronika, 1958–75; and United Nations, Statistical

Yearbook, 1965, 1970 and 1977

from 1948 to 1950, stimulated organised opposition to flags of convenience,especially Panamanian. Many old and sub-standard ships had been registeredunder the Panamanian flag after the war, which led to low safety standards andpoor working conditions on these vessels. Thus, when competition became moreintense during the freight depression, some shipowners and seamen’s unionsattempted to put an end to flags of convenience. In 1948, the InternationalTransport Workers Federation (ITF) threatened to boycott ships that sailed underthe Panamanian and Honduran flags. The boycott, which never actuallymaterialised, received world-wide publicity and support from several Europeanmaritime nations, with the result that some safety regulations were imposed uponthe Panamanian government.36 This led to the gradual abandonment of thePanamanian flag (see Table 8.4 and Figure 8.5); in 1949 40 per cent of the Greek-owned fleet was under the Panamanian flag, while by 1958 this had declined to15 per cent. The adoption of the Liberian flag is evident from Figure 8.5: from 3per cent in 1949, the Greek-owned fleet on Liberian registry increased to 65 percent in 1958. The Liberian flag continues to be the major flag of conveniencetoday.

But it was the second big post-Second World War freight rate crisis at the endof the 1950s, combined with the first international boycott against flags ofconvenience in December 1958, that led to a ‘return’ to the Greek flag(Figure 8.4). In 1958 freight rates reached their lowest point in the postwar eraand a large number of vessels were laid-up. The cause of the crisis was not onlylower demand but also a surplus of tonnage, largely attributable to the over-ordering of new tonnage by Greek shipowners. The boycott by the ITF in 1958


against flags of convenience took place mainly in the ports of the US, the UKand northern Europe. The polemic against flags of convenience was encouragedby the British, Norwegians, Dutch and others, in order to diminish competitionfrom the Greeks, who controlled more than half the flag-of-convenience fleet atthe time. The Greek flag proved a safe refuge in those difficult times and itstonnage increased steadily after 1958 (Figure 8.4).37

Part of the success of the Greek shipowners in the immediate postwar yearswas based on their decision to make the US, the world’s leading economic power(but a weak maritime power), their main trading partners, as they had done on asmaller scale with Great Britain in an earlier period. This was the advantage ofthe cross-traders and of tramp owners: by serving international trade rather thanthe needs of a particular nation, they were able to adjust to changes in theinternational environment. For their part, Greek tramp owners served the USwell: the Americans needed a low-cost tramp fleet that they could control,something they achieved with the Greeks through credit and flags ofconvenience. The fact, however, that Greece was the only traditional maritimeEuropean nation to take such extensive advantage of flags of convenience duringthe postwar period may be attributed not only to the choices made by USpolicymakers but also to the internal structures of the country. Great Britain and

Figure 8.5 Percentage of distribution of flags in the Greek fleet Source: Table 8.3


Norway did not rely to a similar extent on flags of convenience; the reasons maylie first with the powerful labour unions in their countries that prohibited the useof such flags and second with financial incentives by their governments. Theeconomic and political structures of Greece meant that successive governmentswere able to weaken the Greek seamen unions’ power after 1951, but unable toprovide financial support to the ever-growing merchant fleet. In this manner, theuse of flags of convenience by the Greek-owned merchant fleet was ensured.Apart from financial support, the US provided access to major oil companies andentrance into the tanker market, as we shall see in the next chapter. Moreover,the purchase of the Liberties provided the basis for the development of a Greek-owned dry-bulk fleet and subsequent entrance into the bulk carrier market.


9INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE ANDGREEK-OWNED SHIPPING IN THE

SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETHCENTURY

The second half of the twentieth century was an era in which the Greek-ownedfleet rose to the apex of world shipping in terms of tonnage. After continuousgrowth during the 1950s and 1960s, the Greek-owned fleet after 1970 was largerthan the Japanese, Norwegian, British or American fleets (see Figure 9.1). TheGreeks in the postwar period constituted the worlds biggest group of trampshipping operators, managing an international fleet under various flags andcarrying dry and liquid bulk cargoes for third countries. During the 1940s and1950s the Greeks sailed their ships under flags of convenience, carried cargoesfor the US and the northern Europeans and were involved mainly in the Atlanticand European sea routes. Developments in world sea transport led themsubsequently to change trading partners and routes. In the 1960s and 1970s theyincreasingly carried cargoes for developing and socialist countries and Japan,increasingly operated under the Greek flag, and sailed more in the Indian andPacific Oceans. In the 1980s their trading partners and routes remained more orless the same but they began again to ‘flag-out’ from Greece in favour of more‘open’ registries. The 1990s have witnessed a reluctant ‘return’ to the Greek flagand a small increase in the fleet. This chapter will investigate developments inworld trade from the 1950s to 1990s, the world division of maritime transport,and the growth and role of the Greeks internationally.

Demand for shipping has always been dependent on trade; analysis of thepattern of maritime trade is therefore essential to understand the development ofshipping in the second half of the twentieth century. We will first discuss thegeographic pattern of world seaborne trade and the main cargoes involved.Throughout the postwar era the principal sea routes remained unchanged but thewhole pattern of world trade changed. The growth and ascendancy of the USeconomy combined with the reconstruction of Europe meant that the Atlanticcontinued to be the busiest maritime route in the 1940s and 1950s (seeFigure 9.2). The remarkable growth of Japan, however, combined with thegrowing economies of less-developed and socialist countries until the 1970s andthe new South Asian ‘tigers’ thereafter, resulted in a shift away from the Atlanticto the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the second half of the century (seeFigure 9.3).

From 1945 to 1973 the world economy experienced almost uninterruptedeconomic and commercial growth. The volume of seaborne trade between theend of the Second World War and 1973 expanded more than six-fold, from 490million metric tons in 1948 to 3,210 million metric tons in 1973 (see Table 9.1).After 1974, however, maritime commerce was characterised by lower and oftennegative growth. International trade grew only about 20 per cent in fifteen years,from 3,250 million metric tons in 1974 to 3,940 million metric tons in 1989.Seaborne trade can be divided into two major categories, oil and dry cargo.About 60 per cent of the large increase between 1948 and 1973 was caused by analmost nine-fold increase in oil shipments, from 210 million metric tons to 1,860million metric tons, or from 43 per cent of total seaborne trade in 1948 to 57 percent by 1973 (Table 9.1 and Figure 9.6).

In 1973, however, a steep rise in oil prices by OPEC triggered severe recessionin western economies and a decrease in the seaborne oil trade. The main oilexporting countries were in the Middle East and the principal sea routes for oilradiated from the Persian Gulf to Japan, Europe

Figure 9.1 Growth of top fleets, 1949–93. Sources: Appendices 9.1 and 9.2


Table 9.1 Development of world seaborne dry cargo and oil trade, 1948–89 (in 000,000metric tons)

1 2 % (3)

Year Dry cargo Oil (2)/(3) Total

1948 280 210 43 4901949 291 219 43 5101950 300 225 43 5251951 360 255 41 6151952 350 285 45 6351953 360 295 45 6551954 390 320 45 7101955 450 350 44 8001956 490 390 44 8801957 510 420 45 9301958 480 440 48 920

Figure 9.2 World sea-trade in the 1920s

266 INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND SHIPPING

1 2 % (3)


1959 490 480 49 9701960 540 540 50 1,0801961 570 580 51 1,1501962 600 650 52 1,2501963 640 710 53 1,3501964 720 790 52 1,5101965 780 860 52 1,6401966 830 940 53 1,7701967 860 1,010 54 1,8701968 930 1,130 55 2,0601969 990 1,260 56 2,2501970 1,110 1,420 56 2,530

Figure 9.3 World sea-trade in the 1980sWorld sea-trade in the 1980s


1 2 % (3)


1971 1,120 1,520 58 2,6401972 1,190 1,650 58 2,8401973 1,350 1,860 58 3,2101974 1,440 1,810 56 3,2501975 1,373 1,652 55 3,0251976 1,471 1,838 56 3,3091977 1,515 1,898 56 3,4131978 1,602 1,949 55 3,5511979 1,731 2,038 54 3,7691980 1,833 1,871 51 3,7041981 1,866 1,693 48 3,5591982 1,793 1,480 45 3,2731983 1,770 1,461 45 3,2311984 1,912 1,498 44 3,4101985 1,923 1,459 43 3,3821986 1,945 1,514 44 3,4591987 1,987 1,518 43 3,5051988 2,119 1,616 43 3,7351989 2,212 1,728 44 3,940Source: OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, various years

and the US. The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956, and again between 1967and 1975, diverted maritime commerce around the Cape of Good Hope (Figures9.4 and 9.5). Such a change of itinerary increased the demand for oil transport inton-miles, since the length of the routes to Europe and the US almost doubledwith the canals closure (London-Bombay via Suez: 6,260 nautical miles; London-Bombay via Cape of Good Hope: 10,700 nautical miles).

Until 1960, seven oil companies—known as the ‘seven sisters’: the AmericanChevron, Esso, Gulf, Mobil and Texaco, the British BP and the Dutch Shell—dominated world production, distribution and sales. In 1960 five producingcountries—Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela —formed theOrganisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in an attempt to preventthe powerful oil companies from depressing prices. In 1973, however, OPEC hada more dramatic effect, as oil prices more than doubled, decreasing oils share ofinternational trade from 58 per cent in 1973 to 44 per cent in 1989.

If almost half international seaborne trade is composed of oil shipments, theother half is composed of dry cargo. There are five main bulk dry-cargocommodities which, during the entire period, accounted for more than 40 percentof total dry-cargo sea trade: iron ore, coal, grain, bauxite/alumina and phosphates


(Table 9.2). The remainder of the dry cargoes consist of a host of minor bulkcommodities and manufactured goods. The minor bulk commodities, whichconstitute about one-third of dry cargoes, include steel products, pig and scrapiron, fertilisers (especially sulphur and potash), non-grain agriculturalcommodities (soya beans, rice, and sugar), and products like coke and cement.Finished and semi-finished manufactured goods constitute the rest of the dry-cargo market and as a rule are carried by liners. All the other bulk cargoes arecarried by tramps and bulk carriers. Greek concentration on tramp shipping willfocus the analysis mainly on dry-bulk cargoes.

Iron ore is the single largest dry bulk cargo, representing approximately 20 percent of the total dry-cargo market in the 1960s and 1970s and

Table 9.2 World seaborne trade of main bulk commodities (in 000 metric tons)

(1)Iron ore

(2)Grain

(3)Coal

(4)Bauxite/Alumina

(5)Phosphates

(6)Total1+2+3+4+5

(7)Total drycargo

%(6)/(7)

1960 101 46 46 17 18 228 540 421961 98 57 48 17 19 239 570 421962 102 53 53 18 20 246 600 411963 107 59 64 17 22 269 640 421964 134 71 60 19 24 308 720 431965 152 70 59 21 25 327 780 421966 153 76 61 23 27 340 830 41

Figure 9.4 Major sea-routes of oil, 1958


(1)Iron ore

(2)Grain

(3)Coal

(4)Bauxite/Alumina

(5)Phosphates

(6)Total1+2+3+4+5

(7)Total drycargo

%(6)/(7)

1967 164 68 67 25 28 352 860 411968 188 65 73 26 32 384 930 411969 214 60 83 30 32 419 990 421970 247 73 101 34 33 488 1,125 431971 250 76 94 35 35 490 1,140 431972 247 89 96 35 38 505 1,216 421973 298 139 104 38 43 622 1,346 461974 1,4401975 292 137 127 41 38 635 1,373 461976 294 146 127 42 37 646 1,471 441977 276 147 132 46 44 645 1,515 431978 278 169 127 46 47 667 1,602 421979 327 182 159 46 48 762 1,731 441980 314 198 188 48 48 796 1,833 431981 303 206 210 45 42 806 1,866 431982 273 200 208 38 40 759 1,793 421983 257 199 197 36 43 732 1,770 411984 306 207 232 44 44 833 1,912 44

Figure 9.5 Major sea-routes of oil, 1984


(1)Iron ore

(2)Grain

(3)Coal

(4)Bauxite/Alumina

(5)Phosphates

(6)Total1+2+3+4+5

(7)Total drycargo

%(6)/(7)

1985 321 181 272 40 43 857 1,923 451986 311 165 276 41 41 834 1,945 431987 319 186 283 45 42 875 1,987 441988 348 196 304 48 44 940 2,119 441989 362 192 321 49 41 965 2,212 44Source: See Table 9.1

16 per cent in the 1980s. The seaborne iron ore trade is dominated by twoexporters, Brazil and Australia, which control about 60 per cent of the market,while the two principal import regions are Europe and Asia (see Figure 9.7).1The latter includes Japan and, from the 1970s, the Newly IndustrialisedCountries (NICs), South Korea and Taiwan. Coal, used to produce steel and togenerate power, is the second most important dry-bulk cargo and the mostrapidly increasing in the wake of the oil shocks of the 1970s (see Table 9.2). Thethree principal sources of supply for coal are Australia, the US and South Africa,while the main importing regions are Europe, Japan and, in the last two decades,the NICs (Figure 9.8).

Figure 9.6 World trade, 1948–89. Source: Table 9.1


Although grain ranks last among the three principal seaborne dry-bulk trades,it is considered the principal dynamo in world shipping markets. This is because,unlike the other commodities, the grain trade fluctuates according to harveststhat depend on weather and soil conditions, and political manipulations. The US,Canada, Argentina and Australia constitute the four main exporting countries,while the former Soviet Union, Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan are the mainimporting countries (Figure 9.9).

International trends regarding volume, type of cargoes and patterns ofinternational trade are reflected in the developments of transport services duringthe postwar period. We can distinguish two major shipping markets: tankers anddry cargo. The spectacular growth of oil shipments led to an equivalent increasein the demand for tankers. The rise in the share of tankers in the world fleet isevident since the war: from 20 per cent in

Table 9.3 Development of world fleet, 1948–93 (ships of 100 GRT and over, in 000,000GRT)

Year Oil tankers Ore and dry bulkcarriers

Other types Total*

1950 17.1 21 64.5 79 81.61951 18.4 22 65.8 78 84.21952 20 23 67 77 871953 22 24 68.1 76 90.11954 24.6 26 69.5 74 94.1

Figure 9.7 Iron ore: seaborne trade, 1980s



Other types Total*

1955 26.5 27 70.6 73 97.11956 28.2 28 73.6 72 101.81957 29.8 28 77 72 106.81958 33.4 29 81.2 71 114.61959 37.7 31 83.7 69 121.41960 41.5 32 88.3 68 129.81961 43.8 32 92.1 68 135.91962 45.3 32 94.7 68 1401963 47.1 32 98.8 68 145.91964 50.6 33 16.7 11 85.7 56 1531965 55 34 18.8 12 86.6 54 160.41966 60.2 35 23.3 14 87.6 51 171.11967 64.2 35 29.1 16 88.8 49 182.11968 69.2 36 34.9 18 90.1 46 194.21969 77.4 37 41.8 20 92.5 44 211.71970 86.1 38 46.7 20 94.7 42 227.51971 96.1 39 53.8 22 97.3 39 247.21972 105.1 39 63.5 24 99.7 37 268.31973 115.4 40 72.6 25 101.9 35 289.91974 129.5 42 79.4 25 102.4 33 311.3

Figure 9.8 Coal: seaborne trade, 1980s



Other types Total*

1975 150.1 44 85.5 25 106.6 31 342.21976 168.2 45 91.7 25 112.1 30 3721977 174.1 44 100.9 26 118.6 30 393.61978 175 43 106.5 26 124.4 31 4061979 174.2 42 108.3 26 130.5 32 4131980 175 42 109.6 26 135.3 32 419.91981 171.7 41 113.1 27 136 32 420.81982 166.8 39 119.3 28 138.6 33 424.71983 157.3 37 124.4 30 140.9 33 422.61984 147.5 35 128.3 31 142.9 34 418.71985 138.4 33 134 32 143.9 35 416.31986 128.4 32 132.9 33 143.6 35 404.91987 127.7 32 131 32 144.8 36 403.51988 127.8 32 129.6 32 146 36 403.41989 129.6 32 129.5 31 151.4 37 410.51990 134.8 32 133.2 31 155.6 37 423.61993 125.8 27 125.5 27 217.8 46 469.1Sources: See Table 9.1 and N.E.Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping

Co-operation Committee, 12 March 1993

Figure 9.9 Grain: seaborne trade, 1980s



Other types Total*

Note: * For the years 1950–9 the Great Lakes fleets of Canada and the United States andthe United States reserve fleet are excluded; for the rest of the years they areincluded

1948 to 32 per cent in 1960 and 45 per cent in 1975 (see Table 9.3). From 1975,when tanker tonnage peaked, there has been a distinct decrease in their share ofthe world fleet; in 1990 tankers in relative terms had resumed the level of 1960at about 32 per cent. The results of the oil shocks of the 1970s were reflected inthe composition of the world fleet.

Although the oil industry was highly oligopolistic, the same was not true forthe tanker market. Throughout the postwar era the seven oil companies ownedabout one-third of the world tanker fleet (Table 9.4). To meet their needs beyondthat capacity they time-chartered tankers from independent shipowners. Thelonger routes via the Cape of Good Hope (Figures 9.4 and 9.5) and the increasingvolumes favoured larger vessels, which lowered the cost per ton. Between the1950s and 1970s maximum tanker sizes grew spectacularly, from 30,000 dwt inthe 1940s to 100,000 dwt in the 1950s, 200,000 dwt in the 1960s, and 500,000dwt in the 1970s.

Despite the impressive increase in tankers, the dry-cargo fleet comprised morethan two-thirds of the world fleet for most of the postwar period (Table 9.3). InChapter 1 we mentioned that the variety of cargoes, specialisation of ships, andgeographic patterns of maritime trade created two further subdivisions in the dry-cargo market in the last third of the nineteenth century: tramp and liner shipping.Tramp shipping involves the transport of bulk commodities on an irregular basisaccording to demand, while liners engage in the transport of goods on regularschedules over particular routes. About a quarter of the total dry-cargo market iscarried by liners while the rest is served by tramps.2 Since Greek shipowners arealmost exclusively in the latter sector, we will focus on this form of shipping.

The main revolution in postwar dry-bulk shipping was the introduction of bulkcarriers. Traditionally, bulk cargoes have been carried by the classic all-purposetramp ship, represented by the Liberty ship in the first two postwar decades. Theincreasing needs of industrialised nations—and

Table 9.4 Tanker fleets by the seven oil companies (000,000 dwt)

Company 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982

BP 6 6 5 5 4Chevron 7 8 9 9 8Exxon 14 16 18 18 17Gulf 2 3 4 4 3Mobil 4 6 6 5 5Shell 12 14 15 15 13


Company 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982

Texaco 6 7 7 6 6Total 51 60 64 62 56Sources: Mike Ratcliffe, A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyd’s of London Press,

1985, p. 161; OECD, Maritime Tmmport, Paris, 1990

particularly of Japan and Europe—for large quantities on a more or less regularbasis of the above-mentioned five bulk commodities led to the creation of thebulk carrier. The economies of scale which applied to tankers also applied tobulk carriers, but their growth in size was less spectacular as a result of the lackof port facilities and large quantities of cargo. Most bulk carriers are of amaximum size of 75,000 dwt (this is also the maximum permitted dimensionsfor passage through the Panama Canal, the so-called Panamax size). The increaseof the share of the bulk carriers in the world fleet was spectacular: it reached 20percent in 1970 and more than 30 per cent in the 1980s (Table 9.3). In the 1980sin particular the total tonnage of bulk carriers reached and even surpassedtankers. The bulk carrier market has similarities with the tanker market. Whilethe market for bulk cargoes is highly oligopolistic, the bulk carrier marketremained competitive, since shippers partly own vessels but mainly charter themfrom independent owners.3

The bulk carrier took away from the all-purpose tramps a large portion of thecargoes they traditionally carried. In the early 1960s the classic tramp carried allbulk cargoes, but from the late 1960s to the present it has been restricted to thetransport of the minor cargoes like sugar, pig iron, ferrous scrap, fertilisers,timber or cement. The change of cargo mix for multipurpose cargo ships, a largeproportion of which was owned by Greeks in the 1960s and 1970s, affected thetrade routes. The main trading partners of the Greek-owned dry-cargo vesselsshifted from the US and Europe to Japan and the socialist and developingcountries.4

To facilitate further analysis, we will divide the postwar years into two sub-periods: the period from 1945 to the oil shock of 1973 and the period from 1974to the present.5 Figures 9.10–9.12 indicate the relation between the demand forthe transport of oil and dry-cargo shipments, the supply of such services, andfreight rate fluctuations from 1948 to 1974. As Figures 9.10 and 9.11 indicatethere was an impressive and continuous growth of the world fleet, as well as ofworld trade, during the 1950s and 1960s. Freight rates in the 1950s had twopeaks, one during the Korean war in 1951 and the other with the closure of theSuez Canal in 1956; in the 1960s, however, the upward trend was continuousuntil 1973.6

The period from 1974 until the late 1980s was characterised by a successionof crises (Figures 9.13–9.15). The oil crisis of 1973 resulted in a short-termdecrease in the dry-cargo and oil trades with no immediate decrease in the totalworld fleet but with a continuous decline in tanker tonnage after 1976. Freight


rates, which plummeted from 1974, show renewed strength after 1977 andpeaked in 1979–80, only to start downward in the 1980s, with the worst periodsin 1982–3 and 1985–6. Developments on the demand side in the 1980s weredisappointing, particularly in the oil trade, while the dry-cargo trade (and hencethe dry-bulk fleet) showed a better overall performance. This long period ofcrisis, however, ultimately resulted in a decrease of the world fleet in themid-1980s. The shipping world obviously welcomed the revival of markets inthe late 1980s.

Figure 9.16 shows the composition of the Greek-owned fleet by ship type andFigure 9.17 the development of the fleet under the Greek and other flags. AsFigure 9.16 indicates, tankers constituted almost half of Greek-owned ships fromthe 1950s to the mid-1970s. The continuous increase of tankers stopped in 1976,from which date their relative share declined steadily to reach one-third by 1993.The importance of bulk carriers in the Greek-owned fleet grew, reflecting thebetter state of that market in the 1970s and 1980s (see Table 9.5).7

Part of the success of the Greeks in the postwar period lies in their massiveentry into the tanker market in the late 1940s and 1950s. The first peopleresponsible for this were Aristotle Onassis and Stavros Niarchos; they borrowedNorwegian expertise and international conditions did the rest. The mainindependent tanker owners of the interwar period were the Norwegians. AsStanley Sturmey reports, it was when Norwegians bought a few dozen tankersfrom Anglo-Saxon Oil on time-charters in the late 1920s that the Norwegian



tanker fleet flourished and became the largest independent tanker fleet by theSecond World War.8 Onassis and Niarchos also purchased tankers on time-charters from American oil companies in the 1940s and 1950s; in fact theyfurther improved on the method by

Table 9.5 Greek-owned fleet according to type of ship (in 000,000 GRT)

Year (1)Oiltankers

%(1)/(4)

(2)Ore anddry bulkcarriers

%(2)/(4)

(3)Othertypes

(4)Total

1958 5.5 49 – 5.7 11.21959 5.7 46 – 6.7 12.41960 5.2 43 – 7 12.21962 4.5 34 – 8.8 13.31963 5.3 35 – 9.7 151964 6.5 39 – 10 16.51965 8.2 44 – 10.4 18.61966 8.3 42 – 11.4 19.71967 9.4 43 – 12.4 21.81968 10.5 44 4.2 18 9.2 23.91969 12.7 47 5.5 20 8.7 26.9

Figure 9.11 World fleet, 1950–74. Source: Table 9.3


Year (1)Oiltankers

%(1)/(4)


%(2)/(4)

(3)Othertypes

(4)Total

1970 14.7 48 7.2 23 9 30.91971 15.9 47 8.4 25 9.8 34.11972 18.2 47 10.4 27 10.4 391973 19.7 46 12.1 28 10.8 42.61974 21.8 48 13 29 10.6 45.41975 23.1 48 14.2 29 11 48.31976 23.6 47 15.2 30 11.8 50.61977 23.2 45 16.9 32 12 52.11978 21.3 41 18 34 13.2 52.51979 21.3 40 18.8 36 12.8 52.91980 21.9 41 19.2 36 12.5 53.61981 22.1 41 19.7 36 12.5 54.31982 21.6 40 20.4 38 11.4 53.41983 21.5 38 22.5 40 12.1 56.11984 20.2 38 24.1 45 9.3 53.61985* 19.2 41 22.9 49 4.8 46.9

Figure 9.12 Tramp freights, 1948–74. Source: British Chamber of Shipping, 1977


Year (1)Oiltankers

%(1)/(4)


%(2)/(4)

(3)Othertypes

(4)Total

1986 20.6 46 21.2 47 3.3 45.11987 21 44 22.7 44 3.8 47.51988 20.9 44 22.9 44 4.2 481989 21.1 46 21.9 46 2.5 45.51990 21.6 46 22.6 46 2.4 46.61993 18 32 22.7 32 56.9Sources: Processed data from Naftika Chronika, Annual Statistics, 1958–90;

N.E.Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping Co-operationCommittee, 12 March 1993

Note: *Data before 1985 include all merchant and passenger ships above 100 GRT. After1985 they include bulk carriers, tankers, combination carriers and cargo shipsof 1,000 GRT and above

ordering a standard series of vessels at one shipyard, thus reducing costs andguaranteeing employment in the war-torn shipyards of Germany and England.Their entrance into tankers was facilitated by the postwar Norwegian foreignexchange crisis; because of foreign currency reserve short-ages, Norway bannedthe import of ships from late 1948 until 1951.9 Norwegian shipowners were thus



unable to benefit from the trade boom induced by the Korean war. The gap wasimmediately filled not only by Onassis and Niarchos but also by other Greekshipowners who followed their example. Moreover, European shipyards wereincreasingly replaced by low-cost Japanese yards, which also cut costs.

The other successful Greek strategy regarding ship types in the immediatepostwar era was the purchase of the ‘blessed ships’, the Liberties, whichprovided the core of the dry-cargo fleet for more than twenty years. Theintroduction of the bulk carrier in the mid-1960s found Greek entrepreneursready to enter this market as well. Indeed, within a decade they comprised a thirdof the Greek-owned fleet. In fact, the problems encountered by tankers in the late1970s and 1980s convinced a large number of Greek shipowners to diversify intobulk carriers; since then tankers and bulk carriers have been rather equallydistributed in the Greek-owned fleet.

Who were the owners of the world fleet in the last fifty years and what werethe main changes that occurred in the maritime division of labour during thisperiod?10 In 1948 the tonnage owned by the US had almost tripled compared to1939 due to the massive shipbuilding projects of the First World War. Half of themostly new fleet became the US Maritime Administration Reserve Fleet kept forstrategic reasons, while the rest was sold to the Allies and to American citizens.In the same year the British fleet found itself with almost the same tonnage as ithad before the war, while the Japanese and German fleets, the third and fifthbiggest before the war, had been almost completely decimated (see Table 9.6).

Figure 9.14 World fleet, 1974–93. Source: Table 9.3


Norway, from fourth position before the war, rose to third in 1948. It was by1963, however, that the new state of things became evident: in that year the US,the UK and Norway occupied the first three positions while Japan had climbed tofifth. The new rising ‘force’ of the flags of convenience were represented byLiberia in fourth place; the main owners of this fleet were the Greeks, whichmeant that the Greek-owned fleet was in reality the third largest in the world.

The group of the ten biggest fleets had changed significantly by 1973. Duringthis period the flags of convenience increased their share to about 23 per cent, analmost four-fold gain. The Greek-owned, Japanese and Norwegian fleets werethe most dynamic, while Britain and the US declined significantly in relativeterms. The ten biggest fleets—apart from Liberia and USSR—belonged todeveloped nations and represented more than two-thirds of world tonnage duringthis period; the developing nations’ share of

Table 9.6 The ten biggest fleets, 1939–63 (in 000,000 GRT)

Country 1939 %world fleet

1948 %world fleet

1963 %world fleet

GreatBritain

17.9 26 18.0 22 21.6 15

USA* 11.4 17 29.2* 36 23.1 16Japan 5.6 8 – – 10.0 7

Figure 9.15 Freight indices, 1975–90. Source: OECD, Maritime Transport, 1990



1948 %world fleet

1963 %world fleet

Norway 4.8 7 4.3 5 3.7 9Germany 4.5 6 – – – –Italy 3.4 5 2.1 3 5.6 4Holland 3.0 4 2.7 3 5.2 4France 2.9 4 2.8 3 5.2 4Greece 1.8 3 – – 7.0 5(Greek-owned)

– – (15.0) (10)

Sweden 1.6 2 2 3 – –Panama 2.7 3 – –USSR 2.1 3 5.4 4Canada 2.0 2 – –Liberia 11.4 8Total offirst ten

56.9 83 67.9 84 108.3 74

World fleet 68.5 100 80.3 100 145.9 100

Figure 9.16 Greek-owned fleet: types of ship. Source: Table 9.5



1948 %world fleet

1963 %world fleet

Sources: Helen Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping. Changes in theInternational Division of Labour in Shipping. The Case of the Greek MerchantFleet, Athens, Papazissis, 1994, tables A.2.I, A.2.II, B.2.VI and B.2.VII

Note: *Including the Great Lakes and the US reserve fleet

the world fleet in 1973 was 7 percent, while the socialist countries’ share was 8per cent.

The Greek-flag fleet, for reasons explained in the previous chapter, remainedat very low levels in the 1950s, while its rise was induced by the internationalboycott against flags of convenience in 1958. The gradual shift of the maincharterers of the Greek dry-cargo fleet since the 1960s to the socialist anddeveloping countries contributed to the increase of the Greek flag since thesestates promoted national flags (Figure 9.17). The prolongation of the crisisresulted in the 1980s to an international trend of flagging-out, which was alsofollowed by the Greeks. The beginning of the 1990s marked a return to homeregistries.

The period from the first oil shock until the market revival in about 1987 wascharacterised by further significant changes. There was a definite decrease in thefleets of all the traditional maritime nations, a trend that was especiallynoticeable in the top ten fleets, which declined from 75 per cent of world tonnageto less than 65 per cent (Table 9.7). The period also experienced an impressiveincrease in flags of convenience, from 23 per cent of tonnage in 1973 to 31 percent by 1991, as well as an increasing share for the fleets of the developingcountries (7 per cent in 1973 to 22 per cent in 1991). The crisis of the 1970s and1980s signalled the death knell for the British fleet, which dropped out of the topten in the 1980s, while the US-owned fleet also showed a steady decrease(Figures 9.1 and 9.18). In 1989 the British fleet was smaller than South Koreas,while the Peoples Republic of China joined the elite levels of world shipping.The rise of the developing countries was due largely to the south Asian NICswhich together with China formed a group of new maritime countries thatbrought hints of a new era in world shipping.11

The crisis again led an increasing number of traditional maritime nations toresort to cheaper flags. Figures 9.1 and 9.18 indicate the decline of the nationalflags and the adoption of others by the top four maritime nations during the1980s. Data on the beneficial ownership of the open registries —with theexception of the Greek-owned fleet as indicated in Figure 9.1 —are notcontinuous. Figure 9.18 indicates that until 1973 the open registries’ fleetsbelonged essentially to Greek and American shipowners, while in the 1980s itwas shared with the Japanese and Norwegians and other traditional maritimecountries.12 Figure 9.18, however, shows the main owners from OECD countriesto be Greeks, Japanese, Americans and Norwegians, while the ascent of Hong


Kong and other developing countries in the use of these flags should not beneglected (see Table 10.5).13

The Norwegian fleet, which plummeted after 1976, started increasing

Table 9.7 The ten biggest fleets, 1973–93 (in 000,000 GRT)


1983 %world fleet

1992 %world fleet

Liberia 49.9 17 67.6 16 55.2 12Japan 36.8 13 40.8 10 25.4 6GreatBritain

30.2 10 19.1 4 – –

Norway 23.6 8 19.2 5 22.6 5Greece 19.3 7 37.5 9 24.5 6(Greek-owned)

(42.6) (15) (56.1) (13) (56.9) (12)

USSR 17.4 6 24.5 6 26.4** 6USA* 14.9 5 19.4 5 18.2 4Panama 9.6 3 34.7 8 49.6 11Italy 8.9 3 10 2 –France 8.3 3 10 2 – –Bahamas – – 20 5

Figure 9.17 Greek-owned fleet, 1949–93. Source: Appendix 9.1



1983 %world fleet

1992 %world fleet

China – – 2 13.9 3Cyprus – – 1 20.4 5A. Total oftop ten

218.8 75 282.8 67 276.2 62

B. Worldfleet (A)/(B)

289.9 100 422.6 100 444.3 100

Sources: See Table 9.6 and Mikelis, ‘Greek Controlled Shipping’, Greek ShippingCooperation Committee, 12 March 1993

Notes: *Including Great Lakes and Reserve Fleet. **Data for 1991; data for 1992 notavailable

again after 1987 due to the establishment of NIS (Norwegian InternationalRegister). The Greek-owned and Japanese-owned fleets, despite a small decreasein absolute and relative terms in the 1980s, remained in first and second

Figure 9.18 Real ownership of world fleet by leading maritime nations Source:Appendix 9.3


positions, respectively. Greece in fact was the only leading European maritimenation to have survived the crisis without much loss. Actually, in 1993 the Greek-owned fleet surpassed its 1983 peak, and for the first time in its historycomprised more than 100 million dwt (see Table 10.5).


10THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME

NETWORK OF THE GREEKS IN THETWENTIETH CENTURY

Why would Greeks, members of a small European country of fewer than tenmillion people, own the world’s largest fleet? And why would a fleet sailingunder various flags and carrying cargoes for many nations be identified as‘Greek-owned’? What does being Greek have to do with the operation of suchmultinational shipping enterprises? The answer to these questions has beenhinted at throughout the book: the same reasons that led us to identify theinternational commercial and maritime networks of the Greeks in the nineteenthcentury apply to twentieth-century Greek shipping. These lie within a certaincommon business strategy practised by Greek shipowners, whether in NewYork, London or Piraeus, that allow us to identify an international Greek maritimenetwork. This chapter analyses this network by investigating its structure,organisation and entrepreneurial methods.

In the first half of the twentieth century, there were about 250 firms withshipping offices, mainly in Greece and London. Before the Great War,Constantinople constituted an important nexus of the network but disappearedthereafter due mainly to the Greco-Turkish War that lasted up to 1922. Thenumber of branches in other ports was very small; the numerous shipping officesof the lonian network in south Russia disappeared and those in Galatz diminishedto two, while there was only one office in Alexandria and one in Rotterdam. Forthe first time, shipping offices appeared outside Europe and the Mediterranean inthe late 1930s: one in Buenos Aires (belonging to Onassis) and one in Shanghai(Yannoulatos). In 1914, 62 per cent of the tonnage was held by Greek shippingfirms with headquarters in Piraeus, while 9 per cent was controlled from Londonand 14 per cent from Constantinople (see Table 10.2). In 1914, the amount oftonnage represented by Greek shipping agencies in London was 28 per cent. By1938, after the establishment of Greek-owned ships on the Atlantic, theseventeen London shipping agencies represented 45 per cent of Greek-ownedtonnage, but the headquarters of these firms, which owned 96 per cent of thefleet, were in Greece (see Table 10.2).

Table 10.1 The Greek maritime network, 1914–90

Number of shipping offices/agencies

Port/City 1914 1938 1958 1975 1990

A. Western EuropePIRAEUS/GREECE 155 283 58 652 815LONDON 13 17 105 177 150Antwerp – – 1 – –Arlesheim (Switzerland) – – – – 1Barcelona – – 1 – 1Clarence (Switzerland) – – – – 1Genoa – 1 3 – 1Fribourg – – – – 1Geneva – – 3 1 –Hamburg – – 1 3 4Lausanne – – 1 1 1Lisbon – – 1 – 1Madrid – – 2 – –Marseilles 4 – 4 1 –Monte Carlo – – 2 3 –Paris – 2 4 3 –Ravenna – – – – 1Rome – – – – 1Rotterdam 1 1 – – –Stockholm – – 2 – –San Vitale – – – – 1Vigo – – – – 1Trieste 1 – – 1 1B. Eastern Mediterranean and Black SeaCONSTANTINOPLE/ SMYRNA 47 2 – – –SOUTH RUSSIA 27 – – – –Galatz/Braila 8 7 – – –Alexandria – 6 2 –Beyrouth – – 1 1 1Cairo – – – – 1Limassol – – – – 13Nicosia – – – – 1C. North and South AmericaNEW YORK – – 138 88 40Baltimore – – 1 – –Buenos Aires – 1 1 1 1

INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK 289


Port/City 1914 1938 1958 1975 1990

Cleveland – – – 1 –Connecticut – – – – 2Halifax – – 1 – –Hamilton – – – 1 –Houston – – 1 1 –Jackonsville – – – 1 –Los Angeles – – – 1 1Miami – – 1 – 1


Port/City 1914 1938 1958 1975 1990

Montreal – – 12 3 1Monte Video – – – – 1New Orleans – – 1 1 1New Jersey – – – – 4Rio deJaneiro

– – – – 1

SanFrancisco

– – 1 – 1

Savannah – – – – 1D. OtherAjman – – – – 1Hong Kong – – 1 – –Johannesburg

– – 1 – –

Manila – – 1 1 1Melbourne – – – 1 –Port Sudan – – 1 – –Sharjah – – – – –Singapore – – – – 1Tokyo – – – 2 2Total 256 320 352 857 1,057Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1913/14, 1937/38; Skoularikos Shipping

Directory, 1958, 1975, 1990


The second half of the twentieth century was characterised by confusion overthe amount of Greek ownership and the location of the headquarters of Greek-owned firms. The difficulty stemmed from the extensive adoption of flags ofconvenience and the fact that many Greek-owned shipping firms had two ormore agencies in different cities. The purchase of a new ship by a Greek shippingmanagement firm meant the creation of a new Liberian, Panamanian orHonduran company which had to be operated by an agent situated, for example,in London. The agent, who was actually the shipowner, appeared as therepresentative of the managing company in Piraeus or New York. Conversely,the supposed managing company of various Liberian, Panamanian or othercompanies in Piraeus appeared as the delegate of the managing company inLondon or New York. This organisational scheme was geared towards theavoidance of taxes and various other claims, as well as the minimalisation oflegal problems.

After the First World War Greek-owned shipping firms continued to usePiraeus and London as their main centres, but numerous others were added as thenetwork expanded from Europe and the Mediterranean, as depicted in Tables10.1 and 10.2. The former shows the number of shipping offices/agencies in eachcity, while the latter illustrates the headquarters of the various firms in thenetwork. ‘Shipping firm’ is here defined as ‘the

Table 10.2 Main headquarters of Greek-owned shipping firms, 1914–90 (percentage ofship tonnage)

Mainheadquarters

1914 1938 1958 1975 1990

Piraeus**

62% 96% 18% 34% 66%

London 9% (28 %)* 1% (45 %)* 45% 39% 22%Constantinople

14% – – – –

NewYork

– – 37% 18% 7%

Other***

15% 3% – 9% 5%

Sources: For the years 1914 and 1938, see Appendices 4.11 and 6.11; for the years 1958and 1975, see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From SeparateDevelopment to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993,appendix I; for 1990, see loannis Theotokas, ‘The Greek-owned ShippingCompanies of Piraeus. Organizational and Managerial Methods, 1970–1990’,PhD thesis, Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus,forthcoming

Notes: *Tonnage represented by the London Greek agencies. **The centre of theactivities of the various companies in 1914 and 1938 was found not only inPiraeus but also in Syros, Andros or Chios. For the purpose of the analysis,


however, we have put them all under Piraeus. ***For 1914 it includesRumania, South Russia, Marseilles and Rotterdam; for 1938 inclusdes Genoa,Paris, Alexandria, Buenos Aires, Rumania and Trieste; for 1975 includesMonte Carlo, Zurich and Montreal; for 1990 includes Zurich and Monte Carlo

decision-making body which engages in the provision and sale of maritimeservices’.1 Each such firm had its headquarters in one of the nodes of the networkand branches in one or more of the others. The headquarters of each firm issynonymous with the operational or decision centres in which decisions weremade and in which the shipowner resided most of the year.2 If in 1938 thenumber of Greek shipping offices in Piraeus, London and other cities numberedaround 320 (Table 10.1), in 1958 they exceeded 350, by 1975 they topped 800,and in 1990 more than 1,000 (see Figure 10.2).3

After the Second World War Greek-owned offices were established in almostall the main ports of Europe, North and South America, Southeast Asia andSouth Africa. In the first two postwar decades, London and New York werehome to the largest number of offices, followed by Piraeus. From the 1960sonwards, however, the number of offices in Piraeus rose speo tacularly to over600 in 1975 and more than 800 in 1990. The largest number of shipping firmswas always found in Piraeus because the port concentrated all the small andsingle-ship companies. Table 10.2 indicates the operational centres of the variousfirms. In 1958, 45 per cent of the fleet was operated from London and 37 percent from New York. The adoption of flags of convenience, the rapid increase oftankers, and the close relations of Greek shipowners with the US in theimmediate postwar era made the American city the second most importantoperating centre after London. The volume of tonnage with headquarters inPiraeus dropped dramatically, from 96 per cent in 1938 to 18 per cent twentyyears later, for reasons explained in Chapter 8. From the mid–1960s onwards,Piraeus started slowly but steadily to resume its prewar importance as the mainoperational centre of the Greek-owned fleet; from 18 per cent in 1958, thetonnage operated from Piraeus rose to 34 per cent in 1975 and 66 per cent by1990.4 In the last decade of the twentieth century the Greek-owned fleet had thesame operational centres (Piraeus and London) as at its beginning (cf. Figures10.1 and 10.2).

The structure of Greek-owned shipping firms has been heavily based onfamily and common island ties. The management, as well as all the branch offices,was in the hands of members of the same family or co-islanders. The mainsource of shipowners from the 1910s to the 1960s were the Aegean islands andparticularly Andros, Chios, Kassos, and the lonian islands of Cephalonia andIthaca. Table 10.3 depicts the number of families (not firms) that came from eachisland and the amount of tonnage they owned.5 There were about 100 families


from the Aegean and lonian islands, a large proportion of whom came fromsailing ship owners in the nineteenth century and who were the main shipowningfamilies of the Greek-owned fleet until the last third of this century. In 1914 Androsand Cephalonia provided the main shipowning families, due mainly to theEmbiricos family from Andros and to the descendants of the lonian network fromCephalonia and Ithaca. After the 1930s the Chiots proved the most dynamicshipowners and in both 1938 and 1958 owned almost one-third of the Greek-owned fleet. The Aegean and lonian islands were the main places of origin ofGreece’s shipowners for the first two-thirds of the twentieth century; theyconstituted about 75 per cent of the shipowning families and about 80 per cent ofthe total fleet from 1914 to 1958.

The spectacular increase of the fleet in the post-Second World War era wasmarked by the entrance of a large number of new companies, particularly sincethe 1960s. These new firms brought a certain ‘class’ division to the ranks of theshipowners: ‘traditional’ versus ‘non-traditional’ shipowners. In order todifferentiate between these two groups I define as traditional shipowners thosewho after the Second World War were at least second generation shipowners—those who inherited their firms from their fathers. Non-traditional shipowners arethose whose fathers were not shipowners and who entered shipowning afterbeing involved in another profession.6 The largest number of the branch officesin London and New York belonged to traditional owners, whereas Piraeus wasthe centre of most of the non-traditionalists.7

Figure 10.1 Greek maritime network, 1914. Number of shipping firms/agencies in thevarious port-cities


The attitude and practices of the traditional shipowning families in thetwentieth century resembled those of the nineteenth century. Intermarriages wereused extensively to keep the business within the closed circles. Respect fortradition continued to be very important and beliefs were passed on carefiilly tonew generations. Each firm was run by one man, who controlled the greatest partof ownership and decision-making; occasionally a firm was

Table 10.3 Origins of the main Greek shipowning families, 1914, 1938, 1958, 1975 (in000 GRT)

1914 1938 1958 1975

Place oforigin

Numberoffamilies

GRT Numberoffamilies



GRT

A.Aegeanislands

74 416 113 1,309 83 6,908 124 22,589

Andros 16 151 46 341 14 2,085 12 5,530Chios 18 114 32 577 27 3,051 56 12,903Kassos 8 18 10 227 12 1,096 11 1,729Other* 32 133 25 164 30 676 45 2,427B.lonianislands

26 205 21 212 19 833 17 1,357

Figure 10.2 Greek maritime network, 1990. Number of shipping firms/agencies in thevarious port-cities


1914 1938 1958 1975

Place oforigin

Numberoffamilies




GRT

Cephalonia

20 152 14 169 14 715 11 889

Ithaca 6 53 7 43 5 118 6 468C Crete – – – – 2 29 9 1,352D.Peloponnese

3 8 4 34 7 1,182 11 3,856

E. RestofGreece

43 115 87 191 82 843 257 6,677

F.Abroad

12 79 7 51 6 989 18 5,153

Total ofshipowningfamilies

158 823 232 1,797 199 10,784 436 40,984

Total ofshipping firms

256 308 198 765

Sources: See Appendices 4.14, 6.11 and 10.1; Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners andGreece. From Separate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975London, Athlone, 1993

Note *Includes Amorgos, Euboia, Hydra, Kea, Kithyra, Leros, Lesbos, Psara, Samos,Santorini, Sifnos, Spetses, Skiathos, Syros

run by a group from the same family, usually brothers. The most closed circle ofall was the so-called ‘London Greeks’, and particularly the Chiots. Morespecifically, those from Oinoussai continued almost identical practices to thenineteenth-century Chiots. Marriages between members of the same family, forexample in the Lemos family, continue to the present. Even more impressive isthat Greeks who were born and have lived all their lives in England speak Greekwith the particular island accent, follow the local customs, and return to getmarried or to be buried. Many Chiots, Kassians, Cephalonians and Andriots whowere born and raised abroad come back to Piraeus to run the family shippingagency Others may not speak good Greek—especially those brought up in the US—but still are aware of the family’s traditions and work in the family firmsabroad. Males


Table 10.4 Places of origin of Greek seamen, 1930, 1959, 1980

Placeoforigin

1930 %total

1959 %total

1980 %total

A.Islands*

5,347 66 31,638 49 21,558 36

B. Attica 895 11 11,550 18 14,371 24C.Peloponnese

n/a 2,548 4 6,760 12

D. Rest ofGreece**

1,793 23 18,453 29 16,845 28

Total 8,035 100 64,179 100 59,534 100Sources: For 1930 see Table 7.4; for 1961, K.Antonopulos, ‘Results of the Census’,

Naftika Chronika, January 1961; for 1980, Census of Seamen, 31 May 1980,Ministry of Shipping, Direction of Maritime Labour

Notes: *Includes lonian Islands, Cyclades, Dodecanese, Lesbos, Samos, Chios and Crete.**Includes Greeks from the Ottoman Empire

are still brought up within closed circles where discussions are always aboutshipping. To this day apprenticeship starts at an early age and the young heirs aresent on board for at least a few months every summer.8 Many who do not attenduniversities are sent to maritime academies in Greece, England or the US.

Kinship and island ties were not limited to the manning of the offices but alsoextended to the ships. Traditional shipowners tended to employ seamen fromtheir islands of origin, and retained the officers for long periods of time. It is thusnot surprising to find that before the Second World War two-thirds of the seamencame from the islands and that from 1945 to the late 1960s half did (seeTable 10.4). The most maritime islands were of course Chios, Andros,Cephalonia and Ithaca; most of their employed population were seamen.9 Thegrowth of the fleet and the relative decline of traditional shipowners after the1970s decreased the relative number of seamen from the islands. By 1980 36 percent of Greek seamen came from the islands, while the main new sources ofseamen, as with the new shipowners, were the Peloponese and the Athens/Piraeus area.

The new blood in Greek shipowning after 1945 were non-traditionalshipowners, who in 1958 formed half of the Greek-owned shipping firms yetowned only about 30 per cent of total tonnage. By 1975 non-traditional shippingfirms accounted for three-quarters of the number of firms and about half thetonnage.10 The importance of the older firms was diminished, a fact clearlyreflected in their departure from the list of largest owners. The biggestshipowners of the 1950s—Stavros Niarchos, the sons of Petros Goulandris,Aristotle Onassis, Kulukundis, the sons of N.J.Goulandris, George S.Livanos,Costas M.Lemos and Chandris Brothers—remained near the top until the 1970s.Apart from Onassis and Niarchos, who were non-traditionalists but related to the


Livanos family by marriage, were all traditional shipowners. At the list of the topten of 1990, only George S.Livanos remained, while another two (S.Polemis andG.P.Livanos) came from traditional families. All the others were non-traditionalshipowners: Hadjiioannou, Latsis, Martinos, Tavoulareas, Frangistas,Kallimanopulos and Papachristides.11

Those that entered the business after the mid-1960s were the so-called‘Piraeus Greeks’ because, in contrast to the London Greeks, they operated fromPiraeus. In fact, within twenty years Piraeus grew from a parochial port to aworld-class maritime centre operating the world’s largest fleet. During the Greekdictatorship from 1967 to 1974, Laws 89/67 and 375/68 provided a tax-free andhighly advantageous institutional environment for shipping agencies in Piraeus,similar to that of the City of London, which attracted not only new men from theshipping industry but also a large number of local businessmen. Half the tonnageowned by postwar non-traditional firms belonged to former masters, firstengineers or employees of established shipping firms; a significant number ofthese came from the five most important maritime islands. The other half,however, belonged to a large number of new shipowners from the Athens/Piraeus area, from the Peloponnese and from the island of Crete. Their formerprofessions were highly diverse: industrialists, civil engineers, doctors, lawyers,and so on.12

Investing in ships was looked upon as a highly lucrative business andexpectations of quick and easy profits were similar to what one would expectfrom stock speculators. The organisation and structure of the new shipping firmsclosely followed the pattern of the traditional shipowners. The typical Piraeusshipping firm was an agency of various Panamanian, Liberian or other ‘foreign’companies, and other branch offices were opened in London or elsewhere.Family members or close friends were recruited to man the offices. Moreover,the most capable officers were kept more or less permanently and a number ofthem eventually became members of the chartering and operational departmentsashore.

In this way kinship, island and ethnic ties ensured the cohesion of theinternational Greek maritime network. The unofficial but exclusive club of thesecosmopolitan entrepreneurs clung to its Greek character; ‘Greekness’, beyondany cultural or patriotic aspirations, was extremely important for their economicsurvival. It provided access to all the expertise of shipping: market information,chartering, sales and purchase, shipbuilding, repairing, scrapping, financing,insurance and P&I clubs. It also provided consultancy from older and wisermembers and information about the activities of the most successful members ofthe group. Imitation proved an extremely usefiil ‘rule-of-thumb’.

Apart from common organisational and structural patterns, the second mostimportant part of the business strategy of the Greek maritime network had to dowith entrepreneurial methods. Before I proceed to analyse these methods,however, I must refer briefly to some tactics certain Greek ship-owners haveadopted which have given the whole group a certain unwholesome reputation.


These include the exploitation of various political crises and a disregard of inter-governmental agreements. The ‘tradition of ignoring blockades, a practicecontinued to the present day, started in the previous century. Early in thenineteenth century, the Greeks broke the French blockade during the Napoleonicwars; this led to an important increase in the fleets of some of the Aegean islandslike Hydra and Spetses. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Vagliano Brothersmade their fortune by exporting grain from Russia during the Crimean War,despite the blockade by the Great Powers. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877–8,similar actions were repeated. The British consul in Odessa in 1877 reported thatthe ‘loading of five Greek vessels and their safe arrival at Constantinople wasfreely commented upon and severely criticized by the Russian press. It was evenrumoured that the wheat was destined for the Turkish troops in Bulgaria.’13

For the Greeks, shipping transcends both borders and alliances. During theFirst World War, when Greece was neutral until 1917, Greek shipowners sold 30per cent of their prewar tonnage to foreigners, many of whom were Germans, atvery high prices. Greek shipowners transported weapons and other materialsduring the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s for both sides. During the Korean Warthe leading shipowner, Stavros Livanos, was accused by the Americans ofcarrying cargoes for both South and North Korea. When China was embargoedby the Americans during the 1950s, Greek ships continued to carry its trade;China became one of the main charterers of Greek dry-cargo ships throughoutthe 1960s. When Cuba was embargoed by the US at the beginning of the 1960s,Greeks invented the Cypriot flag under which to carry sugar between Cuba andthe USSR. They did the same during the Vietnam War in the late 1960s.Vardinoyannis, a leading shipowner of the last thirty years, started its successfulcareer by breaking the British blockade of Rhodesia in 1965. It is clear that profithas no political alliances and Greeks operate an international fleet par excellence.

The age of the Greek-owned fleet has been referred to as its weak point.According to Table 10.5 the average age of the Greek-owned fleet in 1992 wastwenty-one years old, only one year older than the American-owned fleet andtwo years older than the Norwegian fleet. Insurance companies and P&I clubshave tended to charge higher premiums because they consider the age of a shipas a factor contributing to marine casualties. It has however been widelyaccepted by the shipping community that 80 per cent of shipping casualties orincidents are caused by human error and not by the age of a ship. Good operationand good maintenance combined with the good relations between the shipownerand crews have more than compensated this particular ‘disadvantage’ in the caseof the Greek-owned fleet. Greeks are accused by their competitors of maritimefraud and higher loss ratios than other fleets. Piracy and maritime fraud are as oldas the ships and in any big fleet there have always been ‘pirates’ and the Greekshave had their share.14 But a fleet which has been important for over 150


Table 10.5 Real ownership of the principal cargo carrying fleets in 1992 (in million dwt)

Nationality Tonnage Age

Greece 100.6 21Japan 90.2 9USA 59.1 20Norway 54.1 19Hong Kong (British) 31.6 14China 27.5 16UK 23.6 17Russia 19.2 16Korea (South) 18.2 14Germany 16.9 15Denmark 12.8 14Sweden 12.2 24China (Taiwan) 11.9 14Italy 11.7 20India 10.9 14Brazil 9.9 22Singapore 8.7 16Iran 8.3 20Turkey 7.5 22France 7.0 16Cyprus 6.3 19Ukraine 5.7 16Netherlands 5.2 13Spain 5.1 19Pnilippines 4.7 20Indonesia 4.2 21Source: Lloyds Statistical Tables, December 1992

years and shipping companies that have operated throughout this period havecertainly not achieved success by such methods. Concerning the loss ratios,numbers and statistics alone do not always take into consideration qualitativefactors. The biggest tramp fleet in the world carries all types of cargoes, in manycases things that no one else will transport. Whether old or new, Greek shipssuffer more than those of many other countries since they serve all kinds ofdifficult ports in underdeveloped areas, where loading and unloading oftendamages the hull. Operating tramps and working freelance can exact a toll, afterall.

The successful operation of the Greek fleet and the maintenance of itsinternational competitiveness throughout this century lies on a series of


entrepreneurial practices that, together with the organisation of their shippingfirms, form their maritime business strategy. The first is to achieve access to themain world maritime markets, London and New York; the second, to specialisein bulk cargoes; the third, to have direct access to the purchasers of transportservices; the fourth, a particular pattern of sales and purchases; and the fifth, tocontinue the high productivity of Greek crews.

The practice of establishing Greek shipowners in London was already 100years old by the mid-twentieth century. Greek membership in the worlds biggestfreight market, the Baltic Exchange, goes back to the 1850s. In 1886 there wereninety-seven Greek members of the Baltic, or 7 per cent of the membership; by1993, there were 263 representatives of Greek companies (18 per cent of thetotal). The Greeks had long-standing connections with all other facets of Britishmaritime infrastructure: insurance companies, financial institutions, P&I clubsand all the other services ancillary to shipping. In fact, the establishment ofGreek shipping companies in the City of London has provided such an importantsource of income for the British maritime infrastructure that any attempts to taxthem have always been resisted.15

In the immediate post-1945 era New York aspired to surpass London andbecome itself the world’s main maritime market. Indeed, it had many advantages,including the fact that five of the main oil companies were established there andthat American shipyards had launched such massive shipbuilding programmes inthe 1940s that there was a large amount of tonnage available. Moreover, thepostwar reconstruction of Europe made America the world’s biggest exporterand purchaser of transport services. A significant number of Europeanshipowners who fled to New York during the war stayed there and openedshipping offices. The Greeks in particular, with the adoption of flags ofconvenience and their entry into the tanker market, were able to borrow fromAmerican financial institutions for purchases of both secondhand and newvessels. Various conflicts with the American government in the 1950s, however,led many Greeks to move their operations back to Europe.16 The final blow toNew York as a maritime centre was the American taxman; shipping companiesbased in the US were taxed according to a law promulgated in the early 1960s. NewYork never recovered its short-lived prominence in the maritime field.

The second factor that has contributed to the spectacular success of the Greekswas the kind of transport services they offered and the type of cargoes theycarried: in other words, their specialisation in tramp shipping and bulk cargoes.Greeks developed this tradition in the nineteenth century by forming commercialand maritime networks to carry the bulk trades from the eastern Mediterraneanand Black Sea to the western Mediterranean and northern Europe. Trampshipping provided the flexibility to carry any country’s cargoes and not to bedependent on the economic health of a particular nation, as fleets like the Britishwere. In this way, when the First World War presented the opportunity theGreeks moved into the Atlantic and in the interwar period became the secondmost important tramp-shipping fleet (see Chapter 7). In the post-1945 era, they


transferred their activities from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceansaccording to existing demand (see Chapter 9). In this way, the same shipowningfamily that had carried grain from the Black Sea to Marseilles, London andAntwerp in the early twentieth century, hauled grain from Buenos Aires toLondon in the interwar period, and from Australia, the US and Argentina toChina and India in the post-Second World War years. Involvement in trampshipping also enabled the Greeks to adjust to new demands in internationalmarkets, whether this involved new types of cargoes or ships. For example, whenthere was increased demand for oil, Greeks bought the appropriate ships to carryit; when there was increased demand for the five main bulk cargoes (Chapter 9),Greeks bought bulk carriers to transport them.

The involvement of Greeks in the oil trade reminds us of the connections ofGreek shipowners with American oil companies and brings to the fore their thirdentrepreneurial method—exercised by others as well in the postwar period—direct access to the purchasers of transport services, bypassing the Baltic andother freight markets. Apart from American oil companies, Greeks are alsoknown to have direct connections with some of the worlds main commercial andindustrial houses. The socialist countries were also among their main clients;chartering in these cases took place through direct negotiations with theappropriate governments. China, for example, is reported to have time-charteredthe largest number of Greek dry-cargo vessels in the 1960s to cover its needs forimports of grain and fertilisers. The USSR chartered Greek ships in the early1960s to carry sugar from Cuba and even maintained an appropriate charteringoffice called Transmed in Piraeus. The other socialist countries that alsomaintained offices in the Greek port were Rumania (Navolmar), Poland(Polfracht), and Bulgaria (Bulfracht).17

The other main factor in the successful business strategy of the Greeks is asystematic method of sales and purchases. This can be described simply as ‘buywhen everybody sells, and sell when everybody buys’. This has been describedas the ‘anticyclical method of the Greek shipowners’ who, following this goldenrule, buy when freight rates and ship prices are low and sell when they arehigh.18 This method started during the transition from sail to steam (seeChapter 4). As indicated in Chapter 6, the method became clearer in the 1930s’crisis when the Greek-owned fleet, unlike the merchant marines of othertraditional maritime nations, exhibited a positive rate of growth. The methodcontinued during the post-1945 period when medium and small shipownersfollowed the methods (and the instinct) of their big and most successfulcolleagues. In fact, there are many small shipowners who use shipping exactly asa stock exchange, entering the market when prices of ships are low and leavingwhen prices rise. The other side of this method involves the kind of ships theybuy. Greeks are known to be major purchasers of secondhand vessels that theykeep in good repair and operate as long as possible. In fact, purchasing second-hand vessels has been the backbone for a large segment of Greek shipowners.19


It was the two World Wars of the first half of the twentieth century that gavethem the basis for ‘the great leap forward’: in the 1930s they bought the fifteen-year-old Standard B steamships built during, or immediately after, the FirstWorld War, and in the 1940s they bought the two- to five-year-old Liberties.Apart from these big purchases, which brought huge profits to their owners, theGreeks kept buying secondhand vessels during the entire post-1945 era. Thispractice is one of the factors that kept capital costs low and hence contributed tointernational competitiveness. There are fbur economic factors that determine thecompetitiveness of a fleet: its specialisation and adaptation to internationaldemand; level of technology and efficiency; fixed costs; and variable costs(essentially labour).20

The last—and by no means least important—factor concerns the efficiencywith which this secondhand tonnage is operated to keep fixed and variable costslow. We have discussed in Chapter 7 how this was related to the structure andorganisation of Greek seamen as well as to their relation to the shipowners andshipping offices ashore. Although this kind of relationship has graduallydeteriorated and the ‘good old seamen’ are getting lost, there is still the beliefamong officers and shipowners, whether in Piraeus, London or New York, that‘Greek seamen are the best in the world’. And it is this way of thinking, closelyrelated to Greek seafaring traditions and inherited by young officers from theolder generation, that has led to a productivity that cannot only be measured innumbers. As recently as 1980 almost 40 per cent of Greek seamen came from theislands and two-thirds of the crews on Greek-owned vessels were Greek. Onboard Greek-owned vessels with such crews, daily maintenance is of primaryimportance. Loading is carried out to the maximum and loading and unloadingare done with maximum care under the close supervision of the officers. Noeconometric models can measure the quality of work by seamen who maintainand operate assets worth millions of dollars.

The success of Greek shipowners and the myth of Greek tycoons have led toparoxysms of pride in a nation that has developed an inferiority complex bycomparing its poor modern face with its glorious past. On the eve of thetwentieth century a British reporter from Fairplay wrote that ‘these Easternswere always wily people, not even given to trusting each other…. Whatever mayhave been the case 2,000 years ago, the Greeks of that period have no parallel intheir descendants of today.’21 The fact that the Greek-owned fleet has maintainedits position in international shipping in the second half of this century hasprovided reasons for a number of maritime economists and historians to thinkthat this parallel can be drawn. In this way, more often than not, moderneconomic analyses of twentieth-century Greek maritime activities begin with theTrojan War or with the triremes of the 5th century BC.

The success of the Greeks in the maritime field of course has its metaphysicalexplanations and many a time ‘the Greek postwar shipping miracle’ is justifiedby the ‘maritime nature’ of the Greek race or by the fact that ‘the sea is in theblood of the Greek’. The success of twentieth-century Greek shipowners,


however, is usually attributed to the ‘entrepreneurial genius of the Greekpeople’, best described by Master Mariner Byron Michaelides, who worked for atleast half a century on the deck and at the desk:

The famous genius at sea is something beyond any rules of logic orrationalisation. It is something like what Zorba, the hero of Kazantzakis,says: ‘“I cannot explain it with words, so I will explain it with dancing.” Itis sailing against the mainstream; it is the exploitation of certainopportunities in critical periods of shipping. It is to buy when others sell, tosail when others lay up, to order newbuildings when the others do not evendream of it. It is the deep belief of the Greek that the sea “becomes ill butshe never dies ”.’22


APPENDICES

Appendix 1.1 Main Greek importers at Marseilles from the ports of the easternMediterranean and Black Sea, 1835

Merchant Ships Tons Greek tons as % of total Marseilles

A.Greek 31 5,251 31Baltazzi Bros 3 433Dromocaiti 7 1,190Mavrocordato & Co 7 1,185Petrocochino 2 318Petrocochino & Agelasto 2 353Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Co 3 503Zizinia Bros 7 1,269B.Other 11,558C.Total Marseilles 16,809Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1835


Various flags Greek flag

Merchant Ships Tons % Tons % of various flags

A.Greek 139 29,636 32 10,035 34Agelasto 2 227Ambrosi 1 228Argenti & Co 12 2,174Bati G. 1 122Dromocaiti 7 1,424Mavrocordato & Co 11 2,137Petrocochino 2 276Ralli, Schilizzi& Argenti Co 19 3,789



Rodocanachi & Co 48 11,652Sechiari & Argenti Co 2 294Vlasto & Co 5 1,102Zizinia Bros 29 6,211


Merchant Ships Tons % of Tons various flags

B.Other 61,744Greek flag ships chartered by foreignmerchants

6,822

C.Total Marseilles 91,380Total Greek flag ships 16,857 18Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1840




A. Greek 169 35,267 42 16,444 47Agelasto 4 817Apalyras 8 1,649Baltazzi Bros 5 1,439Christodulo 4 1,041Dromocaiti 18 3,648Janoti 1 280Katsikoyani 1 370Marulla Bros 1 118Mavro & Co 9 2,169Papudoff 6 1,663Petrocochino 5 886Petrocochino & Agelasto 13 2,255Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti Co 13 1,648Rodocanachi & Co 14 2,553Sechiari & Argenti 12 2,393Spartali & Lascaridi 5 575Vlasto & Co 2 468Zarifi Bros 20 4,685

APPENDICES 305



Zizinia Bros 28 6,610B.Other 49,429Greek flag ships chartered byforeign merchants 7,812C.Total Marseilles 84,696Total Greek flag ships 24,256 29Source: Semaphore de Marseilles,

1850

306 APPENDICES




A.Greek 316 72,814 31 43,380 60

Ambanopoulo 5 1,355

Agelasto 16 3,608

Argenti & Sechiari 13 2,596

Baltazzi 8 2,052

Caracoussi 4 1,303

Carissi & Vrissachi 2 215

Dromocaiti 9 1,723

Lazaridi 1 246

Mavro & Basilio 5 1,121

Mavrocordato 2 454

Melas Bros 29 6,156

Microulachi & Mavrocordato 2 498

Monopulos 1 277

Papudoff 19 4,592

Pascalis 2 409

Petrocochino & Agelasto 10 2,165

Ralli & Scaramanga 4 1,203

Ralli & Vlasto 3 1,162

Ralli & Caramanya 1 450

Ralli & Negroponte 1 277

Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti 46 9,962Rodocanachi 38 9,835Satzilli 4 1,447Scaramanga 2 535Sechiari 6 1,202Spartali 61 12,353Tamvaco, Microulachi &Mavrocordato 2 325Zarifi & Zafiropulo 13 3,645Zizinia 7 1,648

APPENDICES 307



A.Greek 316 72,814 31 43,380 60

Ambanopoulo 5 1,355

Agelasto 16 3,608

Argenti & Sechiari 13 2,596

Baltazzi 8 2,052

Caracoussi 4 1,303

Carissi & Vrissachi 2 215

Dromocaiti 9 1,723

Lazaridi 1 246

Mavro & Basilio 5 1,121

Mavrocordato 2 454

Melas Bros 29 6,156

Microulachi & Mavrocordato 2 498

Monopulos 1 277

Papudoff 19 4,592

Pascalis 2 409

Petrocochino & Agelasto 10 2,165

Ralli & Scaramanga 4 1,203

Ralli & Vlasto 3 1,162

Ralli & Caramanya 1 450

Ralli & Negroponte 1 277

B.Other 159,435Greek flag ships charteredby foreign merchants 10,608C.Total Marseilles 780 232,249Total Greek flag ships 53,988 23Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1860

308 APPENDICES




A.Greek 680 203,185 34 167,502 82Agelasto 1 206Ambanopoulo 36 9,455Anarghiro 5 1,935Basily-Valieri 22 6,700Caramano 7 7,962Corgialeeno 23 5,266Cristodulo 3 1,032Dellaporta 6 1,127Dimitracopulo 1 310Fenerli 1 145Geralopulo 1 186Ghioni 3 556Lazarachi 11 3,514Mavrocordato 6 2,019Melas Bros 38 10,448Microulaki 2 380Miliotti 66 21,574Mitrelly 3 669Modiano 5 1,135Nardelli 1 270Nicolaidi 2 500Pana 7 1,405Petrocochino 2 851Piti 1 260Prassacachi 5 1,150Rodocanachi 49 14,808Romano J. 6 1,297Salvago 8 2,789Scaramanga 81 25,093Sechiari 11 3,160Serbos 14 3,685Sevastopulo 2 480Sidericoudi 3 1,648Spartali 74 27,207Tamvaco, Micrulachi &

APPENDICES 309



Mavrocordato 7 2,549Theocarides 1 206Vagliano 131 32,297Vassiliou 1 272Vuccina 3 542Xenophontides 1 173Zaffiropulo & Zarifi 17 3,733For various Greek merchants 13 4,191B.Other 823 389,397Greek flag ships charteredby other merchants 20,610C. Total Marseilles 1,503 592,582Total Greek flag ships 188,112 32Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1870



Merchant Ships Tons % % of Tons various flags

A.Greek 344 145,917 22 109,159 83Ambanopoulo 25 8,739Caramano 7 1,670Couppa 45 17,474Darras & Zizinia 2 416Micrulachi 1 235Nicolopulo 12 8,539Rodocanachi 30 15,678Scaramanga 44 19,103Sechiari 15 8,101Serbos 7 3,124Sevastopulo 3 651Sidericoudi 4 688Spartali 12 3,927Vagliano 92 31,157Valieri 17 7,020

310 APPENDICES


Merchant Ships Tons % % of Tons various flags

Vassiliades 2 406Vuccina 11 3,521Zafiropulo & Zarifi 3 1,415For various Greek merchants 12 14,053B. Other 646 507,590Greek flag ships chartered byforeign merchants

18,052

C. Total Marseilles Total Greekflag ships

990 653,507 127,211 20

Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1880




A. Greek 161 78,739 11 42,557 54Ambanopoulo 13 8,085Caramano 22 9,327Couppa 15 8,425Zouros 10 3,208Manolopulo 2 145Micrulachi 20 7,378Piti 1 254Rodocanachi 9 5,289Scaramanga 12 13,403Sevastopulo 10 2,443Stamos 3 589Vuccina 4 1,921Vagliano 25 10,492


Merchant Ships Tons % Tons %of various flags

Valieri 3 1,027Zarifi & Zafiropulo 4 2,177Zouros 8 4,576B.Other 605 630,282Greek flag ships chartered

APPENDICES 311


Merchant Ships Tons % Tons %of various flags

by foreign merchants 61,668C.Total Marseilles 766 709,021Total Greek flag ships 104,225 15Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1890

Appendix 1.8 Greek ships at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and BlackSea, 1900

Nationality Ships Greek as % of totalMarseilles

Tons Greek as % of totalMarseilles

A.Greek 236 49 205,575 34B.Other 245 396,149C.Total Marseilles 481 601,724Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1900

Appendix 1.9 Greek ships at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and BlackSea, 1910

Nationality Ships Greek as % of totalMarreilles

Tons Greek as % of totalMarseilles

A.Greek 144 30 203,675 23B.Other 333 675,152C.Total Marseilles 477 878,827Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1910

Appendix 1.10 Arrivals at Marseilles from ports of the eastern Mediterranean and BlackSea, distinguishing between general and bulk cargoes, 1860

Port (A) General(tons)

(B) Bulk (tons) (C) Bulk(Greek)

% (Q/(B) Total (tons)

Alexandria 35,679 23,607 1,405 6 59,286Berdiansk – 9,636 3,466 36 9,636Beirut 12,748 4,592 – – 17,340Braila – 21,068 12,702 60 21,068


(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)

% (C)/(B) Total (tons)

Caiffa – 375 – – 375Calamata 843 – – – 843Crete 118 – – – 118Cavala 720 – – _ 720

312 APPENDICES


(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Constantinople

36,768 5,786 – – 42,554

Enos – 485 485 100 485Eupatoria – 1,233 – – 1,233Galatz – 12,589 6,718 53 12,589Ismail – 727 511 70 727Jaffa – 656 445 68 656Kherson 926 – – – 926Kiparissi 510 – – – 510Larnaca – 266 – – 266Maratonisi 131 – – – 131Mariupol – 5,504 3,155 57 5,504Nauplion 197 – – – 197Odessa 1,246 16,018 10,819 68 17,264Orfano – 429 246 57 429Piraeus 215 – – – 215Rhodes – 105 – – 105Salonica 465 1,402 373 27 1,867Samsoun – 195 – – 195Skiathos – 492 – – 492Smyrna 6,829 1,435 594 41 8,264Syros 426 250 250 100 676Taganrog – 20,985 15,210 72 20,985Tarsous – 2,551 1,424 56 2,551Theodosia – 134 – – 134Varna – 2,590 2,590 100 2,590Volo 596 222 – – 818Total 98,417 133,832 60,393 45 232,249Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1860





Alexandria 123,076 11,695 2,511 21 134,771Alexandretta 913 316 – – 1,229Berdiansk – 20,732 13,817 67 20,732Braila – 32,556 26,645 82 32,556

APPENDICES 313




Burghaz – 3,337 3,337 100 3,337Caifta – 405 – – 405Calamata 217 – – – 217Cephalonia – 436 436 100 436Constantinople

73,182 7,845 2,779 35 81,027

Corfu – 148 148 100 148




Galatz – 19,561 17,083 87 19,561Genitchek – 205 205 100 205Ismail – 210 210 100 210Jaffa 537 306 158 52 843Janatochi – 420 420 100 420Kalamata 306 – – – 306Kertch 149 – – – 149Larnaca – 1,618 1,286 79 1,618Mariupol – 25,496 15,302 60 25,496Mersina 361 3,245 3,245 100 3,606Nicolaieff – 12,638 8,947 71 12,638Odessa – 118,202 32,913 28 118,202Port Said 14,171 899 – – 15,070Poti – 1,049 – – 1,049Rodosto – 446 – – 446Salonica 2,126 2,965 – – 5,091Samos 273 – – – 273Samsoun – 450 450 100 450Scamandre – 150 150 100 150Selefkia – 222 222 100 222Smyrna 3,579 6,137 3,442 56 9,716Sulina – 4,357 2,335 54 4,357Taganrog – 86,867 78,914 91 86,867Theodosia – 469 – – 469Varna – 785 785 100 785Volo – 239 239 100 239

314 APPENDICES




Yeisk – 7,172 6,862 96 7,172Zante 700 1,414 954 67 2,114Total 219,590 372,992 223,795 60 592,582Source: Semaphore de Afarseilles, 1870



(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Alexandria 88,568 12,348 100,916Batum 5,396 – – – 5,396Berdiansk – 26,565 26,565 100 26,565Beirut 564 – – – 564Braila 8,861 42,434 20,964 49 51,295Burghaz – 915 915 100 915Calamata 2,688 – – – 2,688Cephalonia 680 – – – 680Cyprus 530 – – – 530Constantinople

68,852 1,163 – – 70,015

Constanza 1,272 776 327 42 2,048Eupatoria – 2,371 2,371 100 2,371Galatz – 8,503 8,503 100 8,503


(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Gaza – 250 1 – 250Genitchek – 3,563 3,563 100 3,563Jaffa 5,253 – – – 5,253Katacolo 2,482 – – 2,482Kertch – 833 363 44 833Kumi 337 – – – 337Kyrenia 367 – – – 367Piraeus 920 – – – 920Leonidio (Gr.) 199 – – – 199Larnaca 2,790 – – – 2,790Mariupol – 9,776 5,979 61 9,776Mersina 1,405 1,412 892 63 2,817

APPENDICES 315


(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Neokari (Gr.) 146 – – – 146Nicolaieff – 47,249 27,510 58 47,249Odessa 125,300 33,358 5,346 16 158,658Patras 2,680 – – – 2,680Poti 17,205 187 – – 17,392Pyrgos (Gr.) 151 – – – 151Salonica – 1,054 396 38 1,054Samos 1,017 – – – 1,017Samsoun – 599 599 100 599Santa Maura 59 – – – 59Santorini 94 – – – 94Sevastopol – 11,816 7,491 63 11,816Smyrna 33,615 1,512 1,512 100 35,127Sulina 2,236 9,929 6,333 64 12,165Taganrog – 50,559 40,717 81 50,559Theodosia – 3,024 1,055 35 3,024Trebizond 556 – – – 556Varna – 2,042 – – 2,042Yeisk – 3,221 3,221 100 3,221Zante 3,825 – – – 3,825Other – – – – 2,482Total 378,048 275,459 164,622 60 653,507Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1880





Anchialo – 1,982 580 29 1,982Alexandretta 1,747 1,152 281 24 2,899Alexandria 58,374 11,396 69,770Berdiansk 7,726 21,383 21,383 100 29,109Batum 63,194 4,368 67,562Beirut 1,576 1,576Braila 38,182 22,238 2,592 12 60,420

316 APPENDICES




Burghaz 1,630 3,833 3,833 100 5,463Calamata 7,620 – – – 7,620Catacolo 6,007 – – – 6,007Cavalla – 882 882 100 882Cephalonia 195 – – – 195Constantinople

42,518 3,681 280 8 46,199

Constanza – 2,198 2,198 100Coroni 193 – – – 193Cyprus 830 220 – – 1,050Dedeagh – 2,970 2,506 84 2,970Eghion 450 – – – 450Galatz 1,743 – – – 1,743Jaffa 2,632 2,878 – – 5,510Karadash – 308 308 100 308Kuluk – 281 281 100 281Kumi 948 – – – 948Larnaca – 1,908 – – 1,908Piraeus 4,498 – – – 4,498Mariupol – 18,321 9,774 53 18,321Mersina 2,689 12,870 8,987 70 15,559Nicolaieff – 14,704 – – 14,704Novorossisk 5,849 15,842 1,202 8 21,691Odessa 66,518 76,234 – – 142,752Patras 2,377 – – – 2,377Piraeus 34,601 1,151 – – 35,752Poti 4,914 7,243 4,655 64 12,157Prevesa 161 – – – 161Rodosto – 982 982 100 982Salonica 3,679 5,128 705 14 8,807Samos 4,221 – – – 4,221Samsoun 1,400 2,244 2,244 100 3,644Sayada (Ott.) 360 – – – 360Sevastopol – 16,005 – – 16,005Selefkia – 1,265 1,265 100 1,265Skiatho 165 – – – 165Smyrna 1,361 – – – 1,361Sulina – 9,360 2,162 23 9,360

APPENDICES 317




Taganrog – 62,177 42,412 68 62,177Theodosia – 1,202 – – 1,202Varna 1,470 7,561 2,416 32 9,031Yeisk – 5,226 5,226 100 5,226Total 369,828 339,193 116,971 34 709,021Source: Stmaphore de Marseilles, 1890



(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Achtary 348 348 100 348Alexandria 53,840 3,187 2,059 65 57,027Baltchick – 885 885 100 885Batum 59,971 – – – 59,971Berdiansk – 16,084 3,153 20 16,084Beirut 127,344 – – – 127,344Braila 24,590 11,199 4,133 37 35,789Burghaz 300 – – – 300Caiffa 2,433 – – – 2,433Chio – 376 376 100 376Constantinople

17,021 1,896 – – 18,917

Corfii 504 – – – 504Eupatoria 3,825 10,894 5,377 49 14,719Galatz – 3,561 – – 3,561Jaffa 3,182 – – – 3,182Kertch – 5,737 4,387 76 5,737Kuluc – 1,013 1,013 100 1,013Kumi 2,176 – – – 2,176Larnaca – 1,112 – – 1,112Limassol 330 – – – 330Mariupol – 11,184 7,093 63 11,184Mersina 1,947 1,366 1,366 100 3,313Nicolaieff – 46,164 22,360 48 46,164Novorossisk 35,466 12,141 5,572 46 47,607Odessa 27,947 35,477 5,221 15 63,424

318 APPENDICES


(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Parga 187 – – – 187Piraeus 4,206 – – – 4,206Poti 1,130 7,296 4,099 56 8,426Rethymno 311 – – – 311Rodosto – 254 254 100 254Salonica 782 332 332 100 1,114Samos 1,468 – – – 1,468Smyrna – 717 717 100 717Sulina 3,707 – – 3,707Taganrog – 33,071 30,441 92 33,071Theodosia 6,111 3,973 2,773 70 10,084Varna 1,330 – – – 1,330Volo 679 340 340 100 1,019Yeisk – 3,008 3,008 100 3,008Cyprus 300 – – – 300Zongouldak 3,434 5,588 – – 9,022Total 384,521 217,203 105,307 48 601,724Source: Simaphore de Marseilles, 1900



(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Alexandria 7,218 3,594 3,594 100 10,812Baltchick – 864 864 100 864Batum 80,883 – – – 80,883Berdiansk 66,240 58,559 39,947 68 124,799Beirut 113,064 – – – 113,064Braila 54,278 33,820 17,686 52 88,098Caiffa 891 – – – 891Constantinople

14,660 1,780 – – 16,440

Constanza 14,546 3,192 3,192 100 20,650Corfii 439 – – – 439Cyprus 300 – – – 300Eupatoria 3,321 5,002 3,548 71 8,323Galatz 7,150 _ – – 7,150

APPENDICES 319


(B) Bulk(tons)

(C) Bulk(Greek)


Jaffa 30,969 – – – 30,969Kertch – 1,069 1,069 100 1,069Kuluc – 297 297 100 297Kumi 263 – – – 263Piraeus 819 _ – – 819Mariupol 23,328 17,099 73 23,328NicolaiefF 25,251 65,446 11,304 17 90,697Novorossisk 60,558 6,047 6,047 100 66,605Odessa 54,088 18,103 3,380 19 72,191Piraeus 6,105 – – – 6,105Port Said 3,377 – – – 3,377Poti – 2,242 2,242 100 2,242Prevesa 161 – – – 161Rethymno 183 – – – 183Salonica 4,668 1,099 – – 5,767Smyrna 9,942 1,088 1,088 100 11,030Stratoni (Gr.) – 3,768 3,768 100 3,768Sulina – 6,990 5,527 79 6,990Taganrog – 62,089 58,239 94 62,089Theodosia 1,391 10,913 5,607 51 12,304Varna 3,239 – – – 3,239Samos 1,938 – – – 1,938Yeisk – 3,595 1,509 42 3,595Total 565,942 312,885 186,007 59 878,827Source: Semaphore de Marseilles, 1910

Appendix 1.16 Arrivals of ships at the port of Marseilles from the ports of the easternMediterranean and Black Sea, distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes

Port General cargo % Bulk cargo % Greek* bulk Greek as % of bulk

1860Black Sea 2,172 2 90,589 67 55,171 56North-eastern 47,818 49 10,072 7 1,948 19South-eastern 48,427 49 33,171 25 3,274 10Total 98,417 42 133,832 58 60,393 45

Port Generalcargo

% Bulk cargo % Greek* bulk Greek as % ofbulk

1870

320 APPENDICES

Port Generalcargo

% Bulk cargo % Greek* bulk Greek as % ofbulk

Black Sea 149 – 334,086 90 207,595 62North-eastern 80,383 37 20,200 5 8,568 43South-eastern 139,058 63 18,706 5 7,422 40Total 219,590 37 372,992 63 223,795 601880Black Sea 162,251 43 257,720 93 161,676 59North-eastern 117,725 31 3,729 1 2,054 55South-eastern 98,072 26 14,010 6 892 6Total 378,048 60 275,459 40 164,622 601890Black Sea 192,626 52 292,121 86 100,494 34North-eastern 109,354 30 14,997 4 1,867 12South-eastern 67,848 18 32,075 11 12,363 39Total 369,828 52 339,193 48 116,971 341900Black Sea 167,811 44 205,725 95 97,965 48North-eastern 23,128 6 5,813 3 3,917 67South-eastern 189,376 49 5,665 2 3,425 60Total 384,521 64 217,203 36 105,307 481910Black Sea 370,945 66 300,395 96 176,396 59North-eastern 39,478 7 5,128 2 2,249 44South-eastern 155,519 28 7,362 2 7,362 100Total 565,942 64 312,885 36 186,007 59Source: Appendices 1.10–1.15Note: * Ships chartered by Greek merchants and/or carried Greek flag

ships

Appendix 1.17 Growth of Egyptian cotton exports (000,000 qantars)

Year Volume Year Volume

1860 0.5 1877 2.41861 0.6 1878 2.61862 0.7 1879 1.71863 1.2 1880 3.01864 1.7 1881 2.51865 2.0 1882 2.81866 1.3 1883 2.11867 1.3 1884 2.6

APPENDICES 321


1868 1.2 1885 3.51869 1.3 1886 2.81870 1.3 1887 2.81871 2.0 1888 3.01872 2.1 1889 2.81873 2.0 1890 3.21874 2.6 1891 4.01875 2.2 1892 4.71876 3.0 1893 5.1


1894 5.0 1905 6.41895 4.8 1906 6.01896 5.2 1907 7.01897 5.8 1908 6.91898 6.4 1909 6.81899 5.6 1910 5.01900 6.5 1911 7.51901 5.4 1912 7.41902 5.5 1913 7.41903 5.9 1914 7.41904 6.1Source: Alan R.Richards, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Egypt, 1798–1882’, in Huri

Islamoglu-Inan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire andthe World Economy,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1990, table 9.5

Appendix 1.18 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea in 1850

Merchant/Shipowner Tons** (various flags) % (A)/(B) Tons (Greek flag)

A.GREEK* 42,306 31 4,271ArgentiCassavettiProiosSpartaliZiziniaGalattiRalli C. & SonsAmerolonides

322 APPENDICES

Merchant/Shipowner Tons** (various flags) % (A)/(B) Tons (Greek flag)

TymbasChiriacoCortazziRodocanachiGeralopuloOmeroSechiariPapayanniPetrocochinoRalli P.T.Ralli BrosSchilizziTamvakoSevastopuloSotirichosPsichaChristakiZarifi

Merchant/Shipowner Tons** (variousflags)

% (A)/(B) Tons (Greekflag)

CavafyZiffoSofianoB.Total arrivals toEngland fromeasternMediterranean

135,727 31 4,271

Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1850Note: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in

most cases two to twelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** Itincludes all Greek flag ships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchantschartered all, major or minor space

Appendix 1.19 Main Greek importers at the ports of England from the ports of the EasternMediterranean and the Black Sea in 1860


Merchant/Shipowner Ships Tons** % (A)/(B) Ships Tons

A.GREEK* 226 176,126 57 10 2,933Argenti

APPENDICES 323



AgelastoAvierinoCalimassiotiCarajhanachiCassavettiCavafyCorgialegnoCouvelasCremidiCucussiCuppaDeltaDumasEumorphopuloEustratiadiFachiriFrangopuloFranghiadiGalattiGeorgacopuloGeorgalaGeralopuloGerussi


Merchant/Shipowner

Ships Tons** % (A)/(B) Ships Tons

GiannacopuloHajopuloHomerolonidesLascaridiMelasNegroponteNicolopuloNomico

324 APPENDICES


Merchant/Shipowner


PezaliPaleologoPanaPapayanniPotousRalliRodocanachiScaramangaSchilizziSpartaliTambacoVaglianoXenosZiffoZiziniaZarifiB.Totalarrivals toEnglandjrom easternMediterranean

775 308,860 57 10 2,933

Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1860 Notes: * We cannot distinguishtonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in most cases two totwelve Greek merchants chartered the same vessel. ** It includes all Greek flagships and all other flag ships in which Greek merchants chartered all, major orminor space




GREEK* 1,086 231,330 45 5 1,274ArgentiAgelastoAvierinoCassavettiCavafy

APPENDICES 325



CostiCristoduloCremidiEustratiadiGerussi


Merchant/Shipowner


GeorgalaGeralopuloGeorgacopulolonidesMaximoMavroMavrojanniMelasMoschoudiNotara BrosNicolopuloPaspattiPaleologoPsichaSevastopuloSechiariSpiropuloScrini BrosTheologoRalliRodocanachiSchilizziScanaviScaramangaSpartaliTamvacoValieri

326 APPENDICES


Merchant/Shipowner


VafeaVaglianoZarifiB.Totalarrivalsto Englandjrom easternMediterranean

873 518,479 45 1,274

Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1870Notes * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in





A.GREEK* 136 93,131 15 27 15,622AnagnostopuloAthanassiouBurlumi & CoCalliraCanelopulo


Merchant/Shipowner


CassabogluCassavetti &CoCondostavloCremmidiSonsFrangopuloGavas

APPENDICES 327


Merchant/Shipowner


GeorgacopuloGeorgiadesGerussi A.M.GregoriadesC.loannides A.& CoLambrinidiMarinosMavro & Valieri & CoMavrocordatoMessinesiPanagopuloPapparitor &CoPaspattiPetrides D.N.PittasPolychroniadesProtopazzi &CoPsaraRodocanachi Sons & CoScaramangaSechiariSevastopuloD.S.SpartaliSpiropulo G.StamosTamvaco &C. VaglianoBrosVourlarisZarifi Bros

328 APPENDICES


Merchant/Shipowner


B.Totalarrivals toEnglandfrom easternMediterranean

780 628,735 15 27 15,622

Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1880Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in




Merchant/Shipowner


A.GREEK* 113 154,968 13 20 21,611CassavettiCasdagliEliadiEumorphopuloEugenidesFrangopuloGeorgiadiGeorgacopuloIonidesMacrisMavroMicrulachiPaspattiPapazianniPetridesProtopazziRalli BrosRodocanachiRigopulo

APPENDICES 329


Merchant/Shipowner


ScnilizziSevastopuloSechiariScaramangaSpiropuloTamvacoTezicoglouVaglianoVafieriVouvalisZarifiZanettoZecchiniB. Totalarrivals toEnglandfrom easternMediterranean

1,018 1,214,898 13 20 21,611

Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1890Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in




Merchant/Shipoumer


A. GREEK 20 27,667 4 6 8,000BulgaridesEliadiEmbiricosFrangopuloJoannouPetridisProtopazziScaramanga

330 APPENDICES


Merchant/Shipoumer


RodocanachiVaglianoVouvalisB. Totalarrivals toEnglandfrom easternMediterranean

498 724,011 4 6 8,000

Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1900Notes: * We cannot distinguish tonnage chartered by each Greek merchant, because in


Appendix 1.24 Greek flag ships at the ports of England from the ports of the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea in 1910

Flag Ships Tons % (A)/(B)

A.GREEK 32 47,747 6B.Total arrivalsto Englandfrom easternMediterranean 501 852,497Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1910

Appendix 1.25 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoesin 1850

Port of origin (A) Generaltons

(B) Bulk tons (C) BulkGreek

% (C)/(B) (D) Total tons

Black SeaBerdiansk 826 – 272 826Braila – 649 369 649Galatz 444 875 317 1,319Kertch – 3,168 941 3,168Odessa 20,506 4,254 20,506Taganrog 6,051 1,575 6,051Varna 343 343

APPENDICES 331




North-easternConstantinople

6,547 6,205 1,166 12,752

Cephalonia 2,256 170 – 2,426Corfu 127 127 127 254Missolonghi – 178 – 178Patras 8,154 – 158 8,154Preveza – 160 – 160Smyrna 10,538 – 653 10,538Volo – 208 – 208Zante 2,988 – – 2,988South-easternAlexandria – 62,397 23,709 62,397Alexandretta 260 250 – 510Caiffa – 644 644 644Jaffa – 1,520 285 1,520Tarsus – 136 136 136Total 32,140 103,587 34,334 33 135,727Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1850

Appendix 1.26 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea, distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoesin 1860

Port oforigin (A) Generaltons



Black SeaBerdiansk – 4,630 – 4,630Eupatoria – 1,471 – 1,471Galatz 160 2,441 601 2,601Braila 186 12,934 1,810 13,120Mariupol – 2,046 451 2,046Odessa 6,415 32,024 10,677 38,439Sevastopol 338 – – 338Sulina 448 19,014 5,303 19,462Taganrog – 22,709 7,153 22,709Theodosia _ 1,113 – 1,113Varna – 378 – 378North-easternAthens – 153 – 153

332 APPENDICES




Candia 216 329 – 545Cavala 260 216 – 476Cephalonia 743 552 – 1,295Constantinople

12,930 28,477 18,543 41,407

Corfu 1,123 – – 1,123Patras 14,835 – – 14,835Salonica 1,927 671 – 2,598Smyrna 16,264 549 – 16,813Syros 288 – –Zante 2,201 – – 2,201




South-easternAlexandretta 2,343 – 738 2,343Alexandria 54,516 61,536 48,956 116,052Beirut 418 1,930 1,930 2,348Jaffa 76 76 76Total 115,687 193,173 96,238 50 308,860Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1860





Black SeaBerdiansk – 2,769 – 2,769Galatz – 5,094 1,176 5,094Kertch 474 – – 474Mariupol – 4,668 330 4,668Nicolaieff – 6,650 545 6,650Odessa – 76,488 21,163 76,488Poti 1,074 – – 1,074Sulina – 40,353 4,705 40,353Taganrog 1,514 35,953 5,218 37,467Theodosia 260 – – 260

APPENDICES 333




North-easternCalamata 182 – – 182Catacolo 1,061 – – 1,061Cavala 162 – – 162Cephalonia 3,638 – – 3,638Chesme 254 – – 254Constantinople*

212 28,665 26,407 28,877

Corfu 2,787 9,267 7,077 12,054Gallipoli 2,841 – – 2,841Lemnos 238 – – 238Mytilene 112 – – 112Nauplia 493 – – 493Patras 18,631 – – 18,631Pireaus 93 1,416 1,416 1,509Rhodes 168 – – 168Rodosto 349 – – 349Salonica – 287 – 287Smyrna 16,002 430 – 16,432Syros 5,559 21,152 19,947 26,711Vostizza 1,656 – – 1,656Zante 3,790 – – 3,790South-easternAlexandria 46,133 175,668 116,554 221,801



% (C)/(B) (D) Totaltons

Beirut 520 – – 520Gazza 307 – – 307Larnaca 538 – – 538Lattakia – 571 – 571Total 109,048 409,431 204,538 50 518,479Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1870Notes: * Although it appears that ships from Constantinople mainly carried bulk careoes,

they carried a large variety of general cargo. I have calculated, however, thatthe largest amount of the space of the ship was taken up with bulk cargoes. Forexample Dalmatian of Bibby, (1,599 NRT) that came from Constantinople,Smyrna and Alexandria carried 2,218 qrs Indian corn, 3,844 bales of cotton,661 bales of wool and a large variety of small amounts of general cargo: wastesilk, opium, fruit, caviar, dyewood, rags, yellow berries, sweetmeats, raisins,

334 APPENDICES




valonia, sultanas, emery stone, shumac, gum, paste, dates, onions and olive oil.When the largest amount of space is taken up with bulk cargoes I classify theship under the bulk cargo category





Black SeaBerdiansk – 1,690 485 1,690Braila 955 4,008 1,750 4,963Galatz 872 11,220 668 12,092Kertch – 1,338 529 1,338Mariupol – 2,118 728 2,118Nicolaieff – 13,268 3,782 13,268Odessa 632 56,970 7,799 57,602Poti 753 – – 753Sevastopol – 5,500 3,002 5,500Sulina – 52,102 2,269 52,102Taganrog – 33,672 8,964 33,672VariousBlack Seaports

– 8,108 – 8,108

North-easternCatacolo 3,938 – – 3,938Cephalonia 1,334 – – 1,334Constantinople

18,173 10,548 1,193 28,721

Corfu 661 – – 661Gallipoli 1,000 242 – 1,242Greece 1,875 – – 1,875Gythion – 161 – 161Patras 15,961 153 – 16,114Piraeus 284 – – 284Rodosto 714 – – 714Salonica 991 – – 991Samos 638 – – 638Smyrna 22,099 765 765 22,864Vostizza 4,969 – – 4,969

APPENDICES 335


(B) Bulk tons (Q BulkGreek

% (C)/(B) D Total tons

Zante 2,334 2,334Various NEMediterranean ports*

46,016 7,607 – 53,623

South-easternAlexandria 11,609 235,226 7,948 246,835Beirut 341 – – 341Cyprus – 4,172 550 4,172Port Said _ 2,254 _ 2,254Rhodes 276 – – 276Various SEMediterranean ports

940 40,248 1,345 41,188

Total 137,365 491,370 41,777 8 628,735Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1880 Notes: * The Bills of Entry refer to

a group of port-cities in the equivalent areas





Black SeaAzov – 874 – 874Batum 5,102 86,531 12,189 91,633Berdiansk 8,027 1,393 _ 9,420Braila 1,887 38,360 2,953 40,247Galatz 829 7,949 7,949 8,778Ismail – 2,482 – 2,482Kertch _ 6,598 _ 6,598Mariupol – 16,071 – 16,071Nicolaieff – 26,583 6,290 26,583Novorossisk 7,482 56,039 _ 63,521Odessa 11,485 198,504 16,774 209,989Poti 6,160 10,759 – 16,919Samsoun _ 1,553 _ 1,533Sevastopol – 22,368 1,177 22,368Sulina – 90,767 1,811 90,767

336 APPENDICES




Taganrog – 113,626 19,024 113,626Theodosia _ 1,184 _ 1,184Trebizond – 1,139 – 1,139Varna – 4,752 – 4,752Yeisk – 5,706 – 5,706North-eastern*Catacolo 4,043 – – 4,043Constantinople

3,556 16,557 16,557 20,113

Greece 2,299 – – 2,299Marathonisi 175 – – 175




Naxos 1,154 1,154Gallipoli 146 – – 146Patras 14,639 – – 14,639Rodosto 784 _ _ 784Salonica 2,205 _ _ 2,205Smyrna 6,950 50,056 8,241 57,006Syra 2,693 16,781 16,781 19,474Vostizza 5,855 _ _ 5,855Zante 3,697 – – 3,697South-eastern*Accra – 3,053 – 3,053Alexandria 3,398 283,096 4,263 286,494Beirut – 838 – 838Cyprus 2,721 – – 2,721Gaza 908 _ _ 908Latakia 1,415 – – 1,415Mediterranean

12,897 30,729 – 43,626

Mersine – 1,820 – 1,820Port Said – 8,223 – 8,223Total 110,507 1,104,391 114,009 11 1,214,898Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1890

APPENDICES 337




Notes: * Apart from the major ports, like Constantinople, Smyrna and Alexandria thetonnaee shown as departing from the other minor ports does not usuallyrepresent the amount of cargo loaded. That is true, for example, for ships thatare shown to come from Syros; in all cases they come to the island after havingloaded cargoes at Constantinople or Odessa




(D) Total tons % (C)/(B)

Black SeaBatum 80,180 11,056 – 91,236Braila – 3,453 – 3,453Galatz 4,388 – – 4,388Mariupol – 6,689 – 6,689Nicolaieff 1,182 4,253 – 5,435Novorossisk 25,870 37,522 1,017 63,392Odessa 9,107 96,208 1,501 105,315Samsoun – 1,136 – 1,136Sulina 2,603 30,977 2,976 33,580North-easternCatacolo 780 _ _ 780Constantinople

4,453 7,664 – 12,117

Marathonisi 221 – – 221Patras 8,312 1,152 _ 9,464Piraeus 126 _ _ 126Salonica 964 _ _ 964Smyrna 8,215 47,558 10,259 55,773

Port of origin (A)General tons

(B)Bulk tons

(C)Bulk Greek

(D)Total tons

(%)(C)/(B)

Susa 1,341 – – 1,341Syros 5,302 3,722 9,024Volo 2,427 – 2,427Vostizza 2,636 2,636South-easternAlexandria 28,830 264,980 1,017 293,810Beirut 7,019 3,307 10,326

338 APPENDICES


(B)Bulk tons

(C)Bulk Greek

(D)Total tons

(%)(C)/(B)

Jaffa 1,916 1,916Larnaca 919 – – 919Lattakia – 1,114 – 1,114Limassol – 3,993 – 3,993Syria 2,436 2,436Total 194,884 529,127 16,770 724,011 3Source: London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 1900



(B)Bulk tons

(C)Bulk Greek

(D)Total tons

%(C)/(B)

Black SeaBatum 62,143 – – 62,143Berdiansk – 6,416 1,378 6,416Braila 2,464 22,211 4,372 24,675Galatz – 13,126 4,359 13,126Kherson – 1,803 1,803 1,803Mariupol – 15,114 5,390 15,114Nicolaieff 2,285 104,360 3,311 106,645Novorossisk 2,072 53,398 3,068 55,470Odessa – 88,883 1,469 88,883Poti – 1,344 – 1,344Sulina 1,407 16,635 3,140 18,042Taganrog – 15,203 1,612 15,203Theodosia 14,173 3,342 14,173North-easternCalamata 2,598 – – 2,598Catacolo 3,704 – – 3,704Constantinople 3,980 20,302 24,282Corfu 91 5,360 – 5,451Paros 416 364 – 780Patras 15,898 1,337 – 17,235Piraeus – 5,442 2,449 5,442Salonica – 4,947 1,525 4,947Smyrna 19,438 38,309 6,673 57,747Syros 5,833 3,999 9,832

APPENDICES 339

(A) (B) (C) (D) %

Port of origin General tons Bulk tons Bulk Greek Total tons (C)/(D)

South-easternAlexandria 46,815 197,478 244,293Beirut 10,524 – 10,524Cyprus 1,394 7,944 9,338Faro – 2,257 2,257Jaffa 12,142 9,551 21,693Larnaca 1,402 – 1,402Limassol 4,865 – 4,865Mersyna – 3,070 3,070Total 199,471 653,026 43,891 852,497 7Source: London Customs Bills ofEntry, Bill A, 1910

Appendix 1.32 Arrivals of ships at the ports of England from the ports of the easternMediterranean and the Black Sea distinguishing ships carrying general and bulk cargoes1860-1910

Port General cargo % Bulk cargo % Greek* bulk % total bulk

1860Black Sea 7,547 7 98,760 51 25,995 26North-eastern 50,787 44 30,947 16 18,543 60South-eastern 57,353 50 63,466 33 51,700 81Total 115,687 37 193,173 63 96,238 501870Black Sea 2,848 3 171,975 42 33,137 19North-eastern 48,702 45 61,217 15 54,847 90South-eastern 57,498 53 176,239 43 116,554 66Total 109,048 21 409,431 79 204,538 501880Black Sea 3,212 2 189,994 40 29,976 15North-eastern 120,987 88 19,476 2 1,958 10South-eastern 13,166 9 281,900 58 9,843 3Total 137,365 22 491,370 78 41,777 81890Black Sea 40,972 37 685,289 63 68,167 10North-eastern 48,196 44 83,394 8 41,579 50South-eastern 21,339 19 327,759 30 4,263 1Total 110,507 9 1,104,391 91 114,009 111900Black Sea 123,330 63 191,294 36 5,494 3

340 APPENDICES

Port General cargo % Bulk cargo % Greek* bulk % total bulk

North-eastern 32,350 17 62,523 12 10,259 16South-eastern 39,204 20 275,310 52 1,017 –Total 194,884 27 529,127 73 16,770 31910Black Sea 70,371 35 352,666 54 33,244 10North-eastern 51,958 26 80,060 12 10,647 13South-eastern 77,142 39 220,300 34 – –Total 199,471 23 653,026 77 43,891 7Sources: Appendices 1.26-1.1

Appendix 1.33 Departures of Greek ships from British ports (in NRT)

Date Sailing ships Steamships Total

1867 8,800 8,8001868 6,421 – 6,4211869 9,564 – 9,5641870 21,160 – 21,1601871 9,434 – 9,4341872 23,429 241 23,6701873 67,490 – 67,4901874 26,994 3,303 30,2971875 39,237 5,658 44,8951876 49,327 2,605 51,9321877 61,722 3,421 65,1431878 21,309 6,763 28,0721879 16,330 5,850 22,1801880 19,630 13,608 33,2381881 42,205 25,988 68,1931882 31,963 48,831 80,7941883 20,853 48,300 69,1531884 15,404 77,232 92,6361885 7,925 78,021 85,9461886 7,349 71,124 78,4731887 3,203 71,409 74,6121888 4,582 66,109 70,6911889 3,797 72,315 76,1121890 7,011 101,774 108,7851891 4,394 130,455 134,849

APPENDICES 341

Date Sailing ships Steamships Total

1892 6,694 141,973 148,6671893 2,956 99,607 102,5631894 4,583 126,446 131,0291895 7,676 119,179 126,8551896 2,348 120,586 122,9341897 1,139 170,325 171,4641898 1,579 112,755 114,3341899 517 178,368 178,8851900 1,301 246,133 247,4341901 3,410 256,589 259,9991902 734 358,609 359,3431903 – 330,621 330,6211904 – 349,539 349,5391905 – 308,197 308,1971906 – 401,589 401,5891907 – 481,065 481,0651908 – 533,169 533,1691909 – 510,963 510,9631910 – 445,526 445,5261911 – 567,366 567,3661912 – 870,728 870,7281913 – 1,090,289 1,090,2891914 – 1,240,126 1,240,126Source: Statistical abstracts for Britain, various years

Appendix 2.1 The Chiot network, 1830s-1860s

ENGLAND (London, Manchester, Liverpool)A.Chiots1. Agelasto2. Argentis3. Amero4. Avierino5. Baltazzi6. Calvocoressi7. Chryssoveloni8. Condostavlo9. Galatti10. Frangiadi11. Damala

342 APPENDICES

12. Mavrogordato13. Negreponte14. Nicolopulo15. Paspatis16. Petrocochino17. Ralli18. Rodocanachi19. Salvago20. Scanavi21. Schilizzi (Skilizzi)22. Sekiari23. Sevastopulo24. Scaramanga25. Vlasto26. Vouro27. Ziffo28. Zizinia29. ZygomalaB.Others30. Cavafy (Smyrna)31. Cremidi32. Cucussi33. Eumorphopulo34. Frangopoulo (Ceph.)35. Giannacopulo36. Georgacopulo37. Georgiadi38. Gerussi39. Homere (Smyrna)40. Papudoff Qannina)41. Spartali42. Zarifi (Constantinople)43. Zafiropulo (Jannina)44. Cassaveti (Thessaly)45. Fachiri46. Georgala47. Geralopulos48. lonides (Asia Minor)49. Lascharidi (Ceph.)50. Melas (Jannina)

APPENDICES 343

51. Nomico52. Pana (Ceph.)53. Papayanni (Smyrna)54. Potous55. Psicha56. Tambakos57. Tymbas58. Xenos (Smyrna)MARSEILLESA.Chiots1. Agelasto2. Baltazzi3. Argenti4. Dromocaiti5. Mavrogordato6. Negroponte7. Petrocochino8. Ralli9. Rodocanachi10. Schilizzi11. Scaramanga12. Sechiari13. Spartali14. Zizinia15. VlastoB.Other16. Basilio17. Mavro18. Melas19. Papudoff20. Zarifi21. ZafiropuloLIVORNOA.Chiots1. Mavrogordato2. Rodocanachi3. SevastoptdoB. Others4. Pana

344 APPENDICES

5. Papudoff6. TossizzaTRIESTEA.Chiots1. Agelastos2. Ameros3. Avgerinos4. Basiliou5. Homere6. Galatti7. Mavrogordato8. Negreponte9. Petrocochino10. Ralli11. Rodocanachi12. Scaramanga

13. Sevastopulo14. Vlasto15. Vouros16. ZiffoB. Others17. Karavias18. KaridiasALEXANDRIAA. Chiots

1. Avierino2. Cassavetti3. Cavafy4. Mavrogordato5. Negroponte6. Proio7. Salvago8. Scaramanga9. Sevastopulo10. Vouro11. Zaccali12. ZiziniaB. Others13. D’Anastassy

APPENDICES 345

14. Stavronachi15. Tossizza16. Yoannides17. Riga Giro18. Braggioti

20. PopolaniCONSTANTINOPLEA. Chiots1. Ralli2. Schilizzi3. Zafiropulo4. ZarifiB. Others5. Lascaridi6. MelasSMYRNAA. Chiots1. Baltazzi2. Homere3. Schilizzi4. RalliSYROSA. Chiots1. Cassavetti2. Damala3. Franghiadi4. Galatti5. Mavrocordato6. Petrocochino7. Ralli8. Rodocanachi9. Salvago10. Vlasto11. VouroBLACK SEA: ODESSAA. Chiots1. Mavrogordato2. Negroponte3. Ralli

346 APPENDICES

4. Rodocanachi5. Scanavi6. Sevastoptdo7. Zizinia5. Ofl&ro8. Lascharachi9. Mavro10. Melas11. Papudoff12. Scliri13. ZarifiBLACK SEA: AZOVA. Chiots14. Avierino15. Ralli16. Salvago17. Sevastopulo18. Scaramanga19. SpartaliB. Others20. LascaridiBLACK SEA: DANUBEA. Chiots22. Argenti23. Chryssoveloni24. Nicolopulo25. Negroponte26. Ralli27. Sechiari28. VouroB. Others29. Pana30. XenosSources: For the merchants in England the followine sources have been used: The

Liverpool Journal of Commerce, 1850, 1853; Lloyd’s List 1830, 1850;Shipping and Mercantile Gazette, 1840–60; London Customs Bills of Entry,1840–60; Stephanos Xenos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, andthe Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869; andB.Tsimpidaros, The Greeks in Englandy Athens, Alkaios, 1974, in Greek. ForMarseilles, Semaphore de Marseilles, 1830–60. For

APPENDICES 347

Alexandria, Christos Hadziiossif, ‘La Colonie Grecqe en Egypte, (1833—1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Universite de Paris—Sorbonne, (Paris IV),Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980. For Trieste, Olga Katsiardi—Hering, The Greek Community in Trieste (1751–1830), 2 vols, Athens,University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, table 16, selected namesof merchants from this table. For the Black Sea, Gelina Harlaftis, ‘The Role ofthe Greeks in the Black Sea’, in Lewis R. Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik (eds),Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International Maritime EconomicHistory, Yorkshire, Lofthouse Publications, 1990. For Syros, V.Kardassis,Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857), Athens: CulturalFoundation of the National Bank, 1987. For Livorno, Patricia Herlihy, ’RussianWheat and the Port of Livorno’, Journal of Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp.45-68. For the Danube, Stephanos Xenos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurneyand Co, and the Greek and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869and Paul Cernovodeanu, ‘L’ Activite des Maisons de Commerce et des Negociantsloniens du Bas-Danube durant l’Intervalle 1829–1853’, EconomiesMéditerranéennes. Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe–XIXe Siècles,Athens, Centre of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of ScientificResearch, 1985, 91-106

Appendix 2.2 Kinship (first degree) of the Chiot group, 1820s–1860s

Family name Place of origin Related to the families

A.Chiots1. Agelasto Chios 1. Ralli

2. Rodocanachi3. Negroponte

2. Argenti Chios 1. Ionides2. Ralli3. Rodocanachi4. Schilizzi

3. Avierino Chios 1. Negroponte2. Ralli3. Sevastopulo

4. Baltazzi Chios 1. Homere2. Mavrogordato3. Negroponte4. Petrocochino5. Scanavi6. Sevastopulo

5. Calvocoressi Chios 1. Chryssoveloni2. Petrocochino

348 APPENDICES


3. Ralli4. Rodocanachi5. Scanavi6. Schilizzi7. Sekiari

6. Chryssoveloni Chios 1. Calvocoressi2. Lascharaki3. Nicolopulo4. Paspati5. Sekiari

7. Condostavlo Chios 1. Ralli2. Rodocanachi3. Sevastopulo

8. Dromokaiti Chios –9. Damala Chios 1. Petrocochino

2. Ralli10. Galatti Chios 1. Ralli

2. Rodocanachi


3. Scanavi11. Mavrogordato Chios 1. Baltazzi

2. Negroponte3. Ralli4. Rodocanachi5. Scanavi6. Schilizzi7. Sevastopulo8. Zizinia

12. Negroponte Chios 1. Agelasto2. Avierino3. Baltazzi4. Frangiadi5. Mavrogordato6. Ralli7. Rodocanachi8. Scanavi

APPENDICES 349


9. Schilizzi10. Sevastopulo11. Synodino12. Zarifi13. Zizinia

13. Paspati Chios 1. Chryssoveloni2. Ralli3. Rodocanachi4. Schilizzi5. Vouro

14. Petrocochino Chios 1. Baltazzi2. Calvocoressi3. Damala4. Ralli5. Rodocanachi6. Scanavi

15. Ralli Chio 1. Agelasto2. Argenti3. Avierino4. Calvocoressi5. Condostavlo6. Damala7. Frangiadi8. Frangopulo9. Galati10. Homere11. Mavrogoradato12. Negroponte13. Paspati14. Petrocochino15. Rodocanachi16. Salvago17. Scaramanga18. Schilizzi19. Sekiari20. Sevastopulo

350 APPENDICES


21. Spartali22. Vlasto23. Ziffo24. Zizinia

16. Rodocanachi Chios 1. Agelasto2. Argenti3. Condostavlo4. Calvocoressi5. Galati6. Eumorphopulo7. Mavrogordato8. Negreponte9. Papudoff10. Paspati11. Petrocochino12. Ralli13. Salvago14. Scanavi15. Scaramanga16. Schilizzi17. Sekiari18. Sevastopulo19. Synodino20. Vlasto21. Zizinia

17. Salvago Chios 1. Ralli2. Rodocanachi

18. Scanavi Chios 1. Baltazzi2. Calvocoressi3. Galati4. lonides5. Mavrogordato6. Negroponte7. Petrocochino8. Rodocanachi9. Sevastopulo10. Schilizzi11. Zizinia

19. Scaramanga Chios 1. Eumorphopulo

APPENDICES 351


2. Ralli3. Rodocanachi

20. Sekiari Chios 1. Calvocoressi2. Chryssoveloni3. Ralli4. Rodocanachi5. Schilizzi6. Zizinia

21. Sevastopulo Chios 1. Avierino2. Baltazzi3. Condostavlo5. Mavrogordato6. Negroponte


7. Papudoff8. Scanavi9. Ralli10. Rodocanachi

22. Schilizzi Chios 1. Argenti2. Calvocoressi3. Homere4. Mavrogordato5. Negroponte6. Paspati7. Ralli8. Rodocanachi9. Scanavi10. Sekiari11. Vouro12. Zygomala

23. Synodino Chios 1. Negroponte2. Rodocanachi

24. Vlasto Chios 1. Ralli2. Rodocanachi

25. Vouro Chios 1. Paspati2. Schilizzi

352 APPENDICES


3. Zarifi26. Ziffo Chios 1. Ralli27. Zizinia Chios 1. Mavrogordato

2. Negroponte3. Scanavi4. Sekiari5. Ralli6. Rodocanachi

28. Zygomala Chios 1. SchilizziB.Others29. Basiliou Epirus 1. Mavros

2. Melas30. Cassaveti Thessaly 1. lonides31. Eumorphopulo 1. Rodocanachi

2. Scaramanga32. Frangiadi 1. Ralli

2. Negroponte33. Frangopulo 1. Ralli34. Homere Smyrna 1. Baltazzi

2. Ralli3. Sevastopulo4. Schilizzi

35. lonides Asia Minor 1. Argenti2. Cassavetti3. Lascharidi4. Scanavi5. Xenos


6. Zafiropulo36. Lascharaki – 1. Chryssoveloni37. Laskaridi – 1. Ionides

2. Xenos38. Melas Epirus 1. Basiliou

2. Mavros39. Mavros – 1. Basiliou

2. Melas

APPENDICES 353


40. Papayanni Smyrna –41. Papudoff Jannina 1. Rodocanachi

2. Sevastopulo42. Spartali Chios 1. Ralli43. Xenos Smyrna 1. lonides

2. Lascharidi44. Zarifi Constantinople 1. Vouro

2. Zafiropulo45. Zafiropulo Constantinople 1. Ionides

2. ZarifiSources: M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles

de Grèce, d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris, 1983. B.Tsimpidaros, TheGreeks in England, Athens, Alkaios, 1974

Appendix 3.1 The lonian network, 1870s–1900s

DANUBEA. Ionians1. Antyppa Bros2. Aravandinos M.3. Ardavanis M.4. Athanassoulis P., N.M.5. Avgerinos6. Barbatis7. Barounos P.D.8. Curcumellis9. Dernikou Bros10. Drakoulis Bros11. Frangopulos A.P.12. Kakoulatos G.13. Kallinikou Bros14. Kamoulis I.15. Katsigeras P.N.16. Karadinos G.17. Karouso X., P.18. Kavadias Bros19. Kontaras A.20. Kouklelis and Michaelides21. Koukles22. Kourvisianou A.

354 APPENDICES

23. Koutava Bros

24. Kyriakides N.G.25. Lekos26. Levidis G.27. Lykiardopulos Bros28. Manesis K.L.29. Maniatis Bros30. Maratos A.31. Markopulos R.32. Maroulis A.P.33. Mataragas D.34. Melissaratou Bros35. Monarchides36. Morakis N.37. Paraschakis D.38. Petalas I.39. Pierrou Bros40. Podimatopulos41. Portolos42. Simatos P.43. Soulariotis N.44. Stathatos Bros45. Stathatos Othon46. Telemachos Bros47. Tetenes O.48. Theofilatos Bros49. Theofilatos I. & Bros50. Theofilatos & Stathatos51. Theologos52. Troianos Bros53. Tzanatos G.54. Vaglianos P.55. Valeriano Bros56. Valsamos S.D.57. Vlassopulos D.E., N.P.B.Chiots58. Compethecras

APPENDICES 355

59. Cryssoveloni Bros60. Nicolopulos61. Negreponte O.62. Syngros63. VouroC. Others64. Embiricos (Andros)65. Karavias A.G.66. Karavias E. (Santorini)67. Mavridis68. Melas (Jannina)69. Milas70. Nikas E.71. Poulopulos (Peloponnese)72. Platis (Santorini)73. Moskoff74. Sarantopulos75. Sigalas N. (Santorini)

AZOVA. Ionians1. Couppa Bros2. Focas3. Mussuri4. Svoronos5. Synodinos6. Theofanis7. Travlos8. Valsamakis9. Vagliano BrosB. Chiots10. Mavrogordato11. Negreponte D.12. Petrocochino P.13. Scanavi14. Scaramanga Bros15. Sevastopulos16. Ziffo Bros

356 APPENDICES

17. Ziffo G.I. & CoC. Others18. Ambanopoulos N. (Myconos)19. Axiotis P.A.20. Beltsos K.21. Crendiropulos A.22. Diamantidis & Sons23. Kouri Bros24. Livas G.25. Mavros S.26. Papageorgacopoulso P.27. Papastamatiades N.28. Roussos G. (Leros)29. Sifneo Bros (Lesbos)30. Tarlas M.NICOLAIEFFA. Ionians1. Dandria Bros2. Karidias A.Z.3. Lykiardopulo Bros4. Lykiardopulo G.5. Troiannos D.B. Others6. Mavros Sons & Co7. Rodocanachi Th. P.8. Servos N.S.9. Sevastopulo10. Sklavos BrosODESSAA. Ionians1. InglessiB. Chiots2. Rodocanachi Th.

NOVOROSSISK

A. Ionians1. VaglianoB. Chiots

APPENDICES 357

NOVOROSSISK

2. Scaramanea3. SevastopuloBATUMA. Others1. Arvanitides2. Siderides S.3. ChrussakiCONSTANTINOPLEA. Ionians1. Destounis2. Foscolo & Mango3. Foscolo & Valsamachi4. Evangelatos5. Dandria BrosB. Others6. Arvanitides7. Courtzis (Lesbos)8. Michalinos (Chios)9. Siderides10. ZarifiMARSEILLESA. Ionians1. Ambanopoulo2. Dellaporta3. Vagliano Bros4. Couppa Bros5. Cicellis6. Corgialleno7. Lazarachi8. Miliotti9. Pana10. RomanoB. Chiots11. Mavrocordato12. Nicolopulo13. Rodocanachi14. Salvago15. Scaramanga16. Sechiari

358 APPENDICES

NOVOROSSISK

C. Others17. Spartali18. Anarghiro19. Basiliou20. Caramano G.P.21. Melas Bros22. Micrulachi23. Valieri

24. Vuccina25. Zarifi26. Zafiropulo27. Zouros D.N.NAPLES1. StathopuloLONDONA. Ionians1. Dandria Bros2. Vagliano Bros3. FrangopuloB. Chiots4. Michalinos5. Paspatti6. Ralli bros7. Rodocanachi8. Schilizzi9. Sevastopulo10. Sechiari11. ScaramangaC.Others12. Bulgarides13. Cassavetti14. Casdagli15. Eliadi16. Eumorphopulo17. Embiricos18. Eugenides

APPENDICES 359

19. Georgiadi20. Georgacopulo21. lonides22. Macris23. Mavro24. Micrulachi25. Papazianni26. Petrides27. Protopazzi28. Rigopulo29. Spiropulo30. Tamvaco31. Tezicoglu32. Valieri33. Vouvalis34. Zarifi35. Zanetto36. ZecchiniSources: British Parliamentary Papers, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, London Customs

Bills of Entry, Sémaphore de Marseilles, various years; Appendix 3.3 includingowners of boats above 1,000 tons; Andreas G.Lemos, Modern Greek Seamen,Athens, Tsikopoulos, 1971; M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique etGenealogiqtie des Grandes Familles de Grèece, dAlbanie et deConstantinople, Paris 1983

Appendix 3.2 Kinship (first degree) of the Ionian group (1870s–1900s)


A. Ionians1. Barbatis Cephalonia 1. Markopulo2. Cambitsis Cephalonia 2. Vagliano3. Cicellis Cephalonia 1. Saliaris Bros4. Couppa Cephalonia 1. Inglessi

2. Vagliano5. Curcumelli Cephalonia 1. Scaramanga6. Destouni Cephalonia 1. Yannoulatos7. Doresa Cephalonia 1. Markopulo8. Frangopulo Cephalonia 1. Vagliano9. Inglessi Cephalonia 1. Couppa

2. Synodinos

360 APPENDICES


3. Valsamakis10. Kallinicos Cephalonia 1. Stathatos11. Mussuri Cephalonia 1. Vagliano

2. Synodinos12. Rossolimo Cephalonia 1. Vagliano13. Lykiardopulo Cephalonia 1. Vagliano14. Phocas Cephalonia 1. Vagliano15. Pierro Cephalonia 1. Vagliano

2. Synodinos16. Stathatos Ithaca 1. Kallinicos

2. Negroponte3. Theofilatos

17. Theofilatos Ithaca 1. Kallinicos2. Stathatos

18. Synodinos Cephalonia 1. Mussuri19. Vagliano Cephalonia 1. Ambanopoulo

2. Couppa3. Frangopulo4. Mela5. Mavro6. Negroponte7. Petrocochino8. Ralli9. Zarifi10. Inglessi11. Mussuri12. Rossolimo13. Lykiardopulo14. Destouni15. Yannoulatos16. Phocas17. Zafiropulo18. Cambitsis

20. Yannoulatos Cephalonia 1. Destouni2. Vagliano

APPENDICES 361

Family name place of origin Related to the families

B. Chiots1. Chryssoveloni Chios 1. Nicolopulo2. Negroponte Chios 1. Sevastopulo

2. Schilizzi3. Stathatos4. Vagliano5. Zarifi

3. Nicolopulo Chios 1. Chryssoveloni2. Zarifi

4. Petrocochino Chios 1. Vagliano5. Rodocanachi Chios 1. Sevastopulo

2. Scaramanga3. Zarifi

6. Saliari Bros Chios 1. Cicellis7. Scaramanga Chios 1. Curcumelli

2. Rodocanachi3. Pierro

8. Sevastopulo Chios 1. Negreponte2. Rodocanachi

9. Sechiari Chios 1. Schilizzi2. Zarifi

10. Schilizzi Chios 1. Neereponte2. Secniari3. Vouro

11. Vouro Chios 1. Schilizzi2. Zarifi

C. Others1. Ambanopoulo Myconos 1. Vagliano2. Mavro – 1. Mela

2. Vagliano3. Mela Jannina 1. Mavro

2. Vagliano4. Zarifi Constantinople 1. Negroponte

2. Nicolopulo3. Rodocanachi4. Sekiari5. Vagliano6. Vouro

5. Zafiropulo Constantinople 1. Vagliano

362 APPENDICES

Family name place of origin Related to the families

2. ZarifiSource: As for Appendix 3.1

Appendix 3.3 Greek-owned riverboats of the Rumanian Danube and Prouthos in 1895

Shipowner Schleps number Canying capacity intons*

Tugs number HP

Akatos Dem. 1 500Ambatiellos A. 1 215Ambatiellos S. 1 390Anninos S. 1 140Antypas I. 1 1,150Aravantinos &Ardavanis M.

1 1,250

Argitis P. 1 150Arsenis A. 1 48Athanasoulis P. 1 250Athanasoulis N.M. 3 940 1 25Avgerinos M. 1 125Avgerinos & Kottis 2 1,900Avgerinos F.G. &Barounos P.D.

3 3,600

Chryssoveloni Bros 14 11,475 3 200Demetriades L. 1 500Dernikou Bros 1 1,175Dimisianos L. 1 900 1 22Demetriou I. 1 190Diomos Pericles 1 370Drakoulis K.G. &Drakoulis A.K.

2 2,500

Drakoulis Bros 1 615Embiricos A. 6 4,690 2 60Embiricos I. 1 1,000Fokas A. 1 500Fostinis G. 1 100Fostinis I. 1 250Franeopulos F. 7 4,825 2 150Gardelis & Marketos 1 740

APPENDICES 363

Shipowner Schleps number Canying capacity intons*

Tugs number HP

Gazis Elias 1 135Gazis Marinos 2 740Kagelaris N. 3 2,750Kakoulatos G. 3 2,080Kakousis N. 1 950Kalamatas G. 1 125Kaloudis & Diomos 3 58Kalimanis P. 1 190Kallinikos A.D. 2 1,125Kallinikos D. 2 2,750Kallinikos Bros 6 6,500 1 35Kamoulis I. 2 1,300Karademas I. 1 225Karadinos G. 1 1,350Karavias A.G. 6 6,480 1 70Karavias 5 5,725 2 115Karouso P. 2 2,125Karouso X. 6 6,375 2 190Katsigeras P.N. 2 2,145Kelaiditis I 3 2,875Kokolis P. 1 475

Shipowner Schleps number Carrying capacity intons*

Tugs number HP

Konidaris G. 1 190Konstantinidis G. 1 600Kontaras A. 2 1,450Kountouris Gr. 1 750Kouklelis Bros &Michaelides

9 7,800 1 50

Kountouris A. 1 520Kouratos I. &Kourvisianou A.

3 4,185

Koutava Bros 5 2,075Lachanas A. 1 25Lekos 3 1,950

364 APPENDICES

Shipowner Schleps number Carrying capacity intons*

Tugs number HP

Linardatos E. 1 225Lykiardopulos M. 1 700Makris Bros 4 885Makris P. & Makris S. 1 590Manesis K.L. 2 1,225 1 70Maniatis Bros 4 2,440Maratos N. 3 1,685Maroulis A.P. 7 7,725 1 40Maroulis R & MaroulisV.

1 515 1 15

Maskas C. 1 175Mataragas D. 1 1,250Matsoukis G. 1 900Melissaratou Bros 2 1,925Messaris D.K. 2 2,175Monarchides &Curcumellis

1 1,100

Morakis N. 2 2,240Mylonas I. 1 875Negreponte O. 3 1,565Neofytos B. 1 400Neofytos B. &Pagoidatos F.G.

2 50

Neofytos B. &Stefanidgis P.

1 600

Simatos P. 2 2,800Nikas E. 1 1,050Oikonomou E. 1 1,000Pagoulatos G. 1 1,000Panas P.A. 1 900Paraschakis D. 3 2,325Petalas I. 3 3,530Pierratos I. 1 135Pierrou Bros 5 4,950 1 40Pipinos Kyr. 1 600Pipinos Const. 1 400Platis P.K. 6 3,180 1 45Poulopulos D. 1 3,600Sarantopulos G. 3 2,050

APPENDICES 365

Shipowner Schleps number Carryingcapacity intons*

Tugs number HP

Simatos P. &Antippas S.

1 450

Skoutarakos D. 2 380Soulariotis N. 5 4,700 2 92Stathatos Bros 22 20,775 3 165Stathatos O. 13 14,100 3 170Stathatos O. &Kaliinikos P.

1 1,050

Stefanitsis P. 1 1,048 1 35Stratiotis N. 1 900Synodinos N. 1 100Tetenes O. 1 225Theofilatos J &Sons

13 13,525 2 160

TheofilatosBros

15 15,172 2 160

Theofilatos S.K. 1 800Theologos M.& Travlos Th.

1 140

Tsouchlos &Tzanatos G.

1 1,100

ValerianouBros &FrangopulosA.P.

2 1,425

Vagliano Ath. 1 500VaglianoPanaghis

1 140

Valsamos S.D. 2 1,950Vandoros L. &Varnalis G.

3 815

VlassopulosD.E.

2 5,000 3 120

VlassopulosN.P.

1 775

Zafiratos 2 580 1 30TOTAL 297 248,745

366 APPENDICES

Shipowner Schleps number Carryingcapacity intons*

Tugs number HP

Source: Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Loiuer Danube,Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975, processed data from table on pp.378–89. Thestatistics are based on L’Annuaire du Danube, 1902–3

Notes: * S.G.Fokas states that in the orieinal statistics the volume of the boats is given inBraila kilos (=kile Braila), that are equivalent to half a ton, when 1 ton=1,000kilos. In this way, 1 ton=two Braila kilos

Appendix 3.4 Greek-owned deep-sea-going fleet of the Ionian network, 1879

Shipowner Number of ships Type Net tons Registered

Ambanopoulos 3 wind 956 MyconosAmbatiellos E. 1 ″ 334 CephaloniaAntippas D.N. 1 ″ 179 SyrosArdavanis M. 1 ″ 233 CephaloniaKakoulatos & Vlassopulos 1 ″ 270 CephaloniaKallimasias K. 1 ″ 94 IthacaKaradinos Ch. 3 ″ 530 ZanteKarouso 2 ″ 726 ConstantinopleChrussakis M. 3 ″ 520 SyrosEmbiricos E.L. 1 ″ 504 Andros


Embiricos I. 1 ″ 294 SyrosEmbiricos M. & Sons 1 ″ 309 SyrosEmbiricos N. ″ 350 SyrosEmbiricos A. 1 ″ 118 AndrosEmbiricos C. 1 ″ 133 AndrosFoca G. 1 ″ 120 GalatzFocas G. & Mussuri 1 ″ 341 SyrosFocas A.N. 1 ″ 162 SyrosFrangopulos N. 1 ″ 320 CephaloniaInglessis A. & G. 5 ″ 1,081Yannoulatos D. 1 ″ 283 ZanteMaratos Th. 1 ″ 198 IthacaMarcopulos A. 1 ″ 222 CephaloniaMaroulis P.A. 1 ″ 93 SyrosMonarchidis 4 ″ 739 Syros

APPENDICES 367


Mussuri A. & G. 5 ″ 999 Ceph./PiraeusNegreponte O. 1 steam 95 SyrosNicolaides 1 wind 125 ConstantinopleNicolopulos 1 ″ 157 SyrosPierros D. 1 ″ 196 IthacaPlatis G.M. 1 ″ 96 SantoriniPetrocockino 1 ″ 266 SyrosRodocanaki J. 1 ″ 223 SyrosScaramangas J. 1 ″ 217 SyrosSclavos M. 1 ″ 327 CephaloniaSevastopulos 4 ″ 1,168 Syros

ZanteSvoronos 4 ″ 914 Ceph./ZanteStathatos Th. 1 steam 102 PiraeusStathatos & 5 steam 922 IthacaTheofilatosTheofilatos Bros 2 steam 1,280 Braila

1 wind 540 BrailaTheofilatos G. 1 steam 760 SyrosVaglianos 13 wind 2,928 Ceph./Zante

1 steam 832 SyrosVlassopulos Bros 2 wind 486 ZanteA. Total owned by members ofthe Ionian network

87 21,742

B. Total Greek-owned 1,256 231,478B class ships % (A)/(B) 7% 9%Sources: See Appendix 4.1 and Archangelos register of shipping 1879

Appendix 4.1 Growth of the Greek-owned shipping fleet, 1834–1914 (original raw data)

Sailing Ships

A′class* B′ class* Steamships Total

Year Ships Tons** Ships Tons** Ships Tons*NRT(GRT)

Ships Tons

1834 2,183 _ 708 _ _ _ 2,891 _1835(a) 2,410 – 760 – – – 3,170 82,4201838 – – – – – – 3,269 88,502

368 APPENDICES

Sailing Ships



Ships Tons

1839 – – – – – – 3,345 89,6421840(a) – – – – – – 3,184 110,6901843 2,220 15,180 949 122,378 – – 3,169 137,5581844 2,400 15,880 1,014 130,823 – – 3,414 146,7031845(a) 2,470 17,280 1,114 143,823 – – 3,584 161,1031848 2,527 17,309 1,456 237,914 – – 3,983 255,2331850(a) 2,534 18,070 1,482 248,131 – – 4,016 266,2011851 2,890 – 1,437 _ – – 4,327 256,1931852 2,852 19,696 1,375 228,055 – – 4,227 247,7511853 _ _ _ _ _ – 4,153 247,9531855 3,538 32,396 1,525 264,405 – _ 5,063 296,8011858(a) _ – – _ – – 3,918 268,2641860(a) 2,857 29,193 1,212 233,732 – – 4,069 262,9251861(d) – – – – – – 4,156 252,6891862(b) 3,181 34,556 1,153 222,612 4(f) 1,535(0 4,338 258,7031863(d) – – – – – – 4,452 262,5311864(b) 3,297 37,356 1,230 242,836 4(f) 1,535(f) 4,531 281,7271865 3,495 28,394 1,661 269,030 6 2,196 5,162 299,6201866(b) 4,146 47,150 1,355 276,425 11 5,240 5,512 328,8151868 3,961 46,880 1,450 282,781 11 5,240 5,422 334,9011870(c) 605 18,785 1,484 276,676 27 8,230 2,116 303,691(b) 4,138 50,856 1,733 347,847 12 5,360 5,833 404,0631872(b) 3,659 59,563 1,093 194,391 15 5,993 4,767 259,9471874(c) 703 21,784 1,518 280,337 20 5,971 2,241 308,092(b) 4,097 42,877 1,085 199,367 20 7,833 5,202 250,0771875(c) 903 25,779 1,565 288,332 25 8,096 2,493 322,207(b) 4,303 43,712 1,107 210,079 27 8,241 5,440 262,0321876(c) – – 1,567 291,278 24 6,925 – –1879(c) 736 20,044 1,256 203,816 41 9,617 2,033 261,1391883(d) – – 1,318 203,816 50 24,161 – –1887(d) [A′+B′] 4,447 226,148 82 39,774 4,529 265,9221888(d) [A′+B′] 5,731 216,649 98 32,325 5,829 248,9741889(d) [A′+B′] 5,809 223,158 82 40,589 5,891 263,7471890(d) [A′+B′] 5,744 226,702 97 44,684 5,841 271,3861891(d) [A′+B′] 5,675 213,812 105 54,987 5,780 268,799

APPENDICES 369

Sailing Ships



Ships Tons

1892(d) [A′+B′] 5,732 234,484 162 76,996 5,894 311,8401893(f) – 1,121 245,035 96 80,113

(128,469)– –

1895(e) – – 1,059 246,196 125 89,907 – –1896(d) – – – – 123 (144,345) –1897(d) – – – – 141 (175,592) –1900(f) – – – 183,677 191 143,436 – 327,1131901(f) – – (d)1,140 175,896

(d)158 (231,541) – –

1902(f) – – (g)910 175,999(g)

186 181,531 1,096 357,530

1903(f) – – (d) 1,030 145,032(d)

199 205,996(325,895)

1,229 351,028

Sailing Ships

A′class* B′class* Steamships Total

Year Ships Tons** Ships Tons** Ships Tons* ShipsNRT(GRT)

Tons

1904(f) – (g)889 170,147 (g)

212 223,020(335,049)

1,101 393,167

1905(0 _ _ _ _ 214 221,112

_ –

1906(f) _ _ _ – 231 236,322(373,222)

– –

1907(f) – (g)1,135

147,402 (g)

255 266,915(421,743)

1,390 414,317

1908(f) – – – – 282 304,668

370 APPENDICES

Sailing Ships

A′class* B′class* Steamships Total

Year Ships Tons** Ships Tons** Ships Tons* ShipsNRT(GRT)

Tons

(482,055)

1909(f) – (g)980 126,093 (g)

287 304,430(484,193)

1,267 430,523

1910(f) _ _ _ – 298 312,798(499,184)

– –

1911(f) – – – – 322 349,581(560,475)

– –

1912(f) – (g)760 101,459 (g)

346 407,137(648,667)

1,106 508,596

1913(f) – (g)788 101,671 (g)

365 (705,897)

1914(f) – – – 1 00,000 (g)

407 (820,861)

– –

Source: No letter: Pandora, 1852–3 pp. 216, 285–87, 1854–5, pp. 8–13, 160–1, 163–6,1853–4, pp. 108–10, 174–5, 192; 1866, p. 239. (a) Official state statistics,found in M.Panopulou, Economic and Technical Problems in the GreekShipbuildine Industry, 1850–1914, unpublished PhD thesis, Athens, 1991. (b)A.N.Vernadakis, About Trade of Greece, Athens, 1885, VivliopolioD.N.Karavias, repr. 1990, p. 231. (c) Archangelos register of shipping. (d) A.Metaxas and S.G. Georgopulos, Greek Merchant Shipping, 1821–1924,Athens, 1926, estimating 90 per cent of the sailing ship fleet for ships above 60tons. (e) The Bureau Veritas. (f) Lloyd’s Register of Shipping. (g) Data fromK.Antonopulos, ‘From Sail to Steam’, Nafiika Chronika, no. 699, January1964, p. III

Notes: * From 1836 to 1858 A′ class includes ships equal to or smaller than 30 tons,while from 1858 onwards it includes vessels equal or smaller to 60 tons.Accordingly B′ class from 1836 to 1858 are ships above 30 tons, while from1858 they are above 60 tons. ** Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek tonwas 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton, from 1868 to 1878 the Greek ton was103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, and from 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton

APPENDICES 371

Appendix 4.2 The growth of the greek-owned fleet according to Archangelos register ofshipping, 1870–9

Sailing Ships

A′ class* B′class* Steamships Total

Year Ships Tons** Ships Tons** Ships Tons* Ships Tons

1870 605 18,785 1,484 276,676 27 8,230 2,116 303,6911874 703 21,784 1,518 280,337 20 5,971 2,241 308,0921875 903 25,779 1,565 288,332 25 8,096 2,493 322,2071876 999 27,790 1,567 291,278 24 6,925 2,590 325,9931879 736 20,044 1,256 231,478 41 9,617 2,033 261,139Source: Archangelos register of shipping, 1870, 1874, 1875, 1876, 1879

Notes: * A’ class include ships equal to or smaller than 60 tons, while B’ class from 1858onwards include ships above 60 tons.

** Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton,from 1868 to 1878 the Greek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, andfrom 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton.

Appendix 4.3 The growth of the Greek fleet according to Vernadakis, 1870–5

Sailing Ships

A′class* B′class Steamships Total

Year Ships Tons** Ships Tons** Ships Tons* Ships Tons

1870 4,138 50,856 1,733 347,847

12 5,360 5,833 404,063

1872 3,659 59,563 1,093 194,391

15 5,993 4,767 259,947

1874 4,097 42,877 1,085 199,367

20 7,833 5,202 250,077

1875 4,303 43,712 1,107 210,079

27 8,241 5,437 262,032

Source: A.N.Vernadakis, About the Trade of Greece, Athens, Vivliopolio D.N.Karavias,1885, repr. 1990, p. 231

Notes: * A‘ class includes ships equal to or smaller than 60 tons, while B’ class from1836 to 1858 includes ships above 60 tons. ** Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsom ton, from 1868 to 1878 theGreek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton, and from 1878 it equalled theMoorsom ton

372 APPENDICES

Appendix 4.4 Registration of Greek-owned ships according to ports

1855* 1879 1895 1914

Port/Island Greek tons % Greek tons % NRT % GRT %

A.GREECEAEGEANISLANDS

(226,789) 67 140,330 60 131,227 38 211,706 26

Syros (121,342) 36 94,477 40 89,680 26 119,147 15Spetses (31,138) 9 12,933 6 7,171 2 165Hydra (22,965) 7 5,001 2 5,669 2 822Santorini (14,494) 4 5,386 2 8,041 2 2,939Andros (8,465) 3 3,784 2 10,802 3 86,678 11Scopelos (7,723) 2 3,481 2 3,278 1 1,132Milos (6,339) 2 5,401 2 501Skiathos (5,527) 2 5,162 2 4,360 1 823Myconos (5,508) 1 3,061 1 921Poros (3,288) 1 1,644 1 804MAINLAND (70,072) 21 68,491 26 48,606 17 267,788 32Galaxidi (27,430) 8 13,175 5 20,619 6 5,947 1Piraeus/Athens (18,331) 5 18,119 8 23,395 7 265,623 39Kranidi/ (5,678) 2 2,877 1CheliPatras (5,014) 2 4,163 2 1,825 1 5,236 1Amaliapolis (3,835) 1 – – – – – –Kymi (2,969) 1 1,973 1 713 – 152 –Chalkis (2,767) 1 1,397 1 158 – – –Messolonghi (1,940) 1 625 – – – – –Nauplion (1,114) – 130 – – – –Kalamata (974) – 832 – – – 548 –Limni Eub. – – – – 125 – – –

1855* 1879 1895 1914


Trikeri – – _ 867 _Volo _ _ 473 2,869 _Laurion – – – _ 431 _ –Other 25,190 – 10,613 – –IONIAN ISLANDS (40,000) 12 35,044 15 25,025 7 2,304 –Zante – – 15,986 7 7,415 2 – –

APPENDICES 373

1855* 1879 1895 1914


Cephalonia – – 10,260 5 13,807 4 2,245 –Corfii – – 4,952 2 _ _ _ _Ithaca – – 3,075 1 3,803 1 59 –Lefkas 771 – –OTHERISLANDS***

11,977 5 26,260 7 28,046 3

Chios – – 7,679 4 13,779 4 24,999Kassos – – 1,015 – 4,421 1 715Samos – – 722 – 2,273 2,088Castelorizo – – – – 1,149 244Lemnos – – – – 2,077 – _Leros 1,237Metelino 1,324B. OTTOMANEMPIRE

17,284 7 59,139 17 103,045 13

Constantinople – – 5,613 2 40,172 11 94,660 11Kerassund – – 2,255 1 765 – –Smyrna – – – – 2,890 8,233 –Enos – – _ _ 225 _ _Barten – – – – 514 – –Bigados – – _ _ 160 _ _Bulbuljeh – – 731 – –Cashot – – _ _ 2,096 _ _Cisme – – _ – 301 152 –Evranyiet – – – – 190 – –Ickehumin – – – – 125 – –Irekera – – _ _ 445 _ _Katirlee – – _ _ 112 _ _Midelee _ _ 142 _ _Mureftah – – _ _ 680 _ _Mysia – – – – 3,696 – –Nea Mitzela – – _ _ _ _ _ _Oonia – – _ _ 1,029 _ _Shakis – – _ _ 137 _ _Simire – – _ _ 405 – –Sinope – – – – 634 – –Terebolie – – 284Trebizond – – _ _ 162 _ _

374 APPENDICES

1855* 1879 1895 1914


Abahnah – – _ _ 271 _ _Agvah – – _ – 196 – –Aionoros – – _ _ 132 _ _Maiz Ada – – _ _ 1,646 _ _Canea – – _ _ 372 _ _Sakyz – – – – 213 – –

1855* 1879 1895 1914

Port/Island

Greektons

% Greektons

% NRT % GRT %

C SOUTH-EASTERNMEDITERRANEAN

783 501

Alexandria

_ 501

PortSaid

132 _

Beirut 141 _Tombrook

510 –

D.RUSSIA

8,403 3 68,633 8

Taganrog

2,829 9,928

Berdiansk

466 1,223

Eupatoria

413 –

Kertch 362 2,346Mariupol

159 29,148

Rostov 1,582 29,589Sevastopol

264 1,262

Odessa 1,473 249Nicolaieff

99 _

St.Petesburg

756 –

APPENDICES 375

1855* 1879 1895 1914

Port/Island

Greektons

% Greektons

% NRT % GRT %

E.BULGARIA

8,083 2

Agathopoli(AktarpoleeAkteboli)

or 5,167 501

Vassiliko

2,475 _

Szusaboli

170 –

Constanza

271 _

Roustchouck

– 3,603

F.RUMANIA

21,594 6 36,927 4

Braila 20,922 30,165Galatz 672 1,190Sulina 5,572G. WesternEurope

12,920 3 94,211 12

London 6,619 72,083Cardiff 498 _Marseilles

5,803 14,956

Rotterdam

3,189 3,189

Trieste – 2,983Total (336,861) 261,139 353,977**** 822,906****Sources: Data for 1855, Pandora 5/Z, 1854–5, pp. 10–11, and 7/PNA’ 1856–7, pp. 163–

5; for the estimates of the lonian islands, see N. Vlassopulos, note 23, ch. 4; for1879, register of shipping Archangelos 1879; data for 1895 and 1914 fromLloyd’s Register ofShipping

Notes: * Greek tons: from 1835 to 1867 the Greek ton was 122 per cent of the Moorsomton, from 1869 to 1878 the Greek ton was 103 per cent of the Moorsom ton,and from 1878 it equalled the Moorsom ton ** The lonian islands became partof the Greek state in 1864. *** Became part of the Greek state in die early 20thcentury. **** Includes Greek-owned fleet under all flags

376 APPENDICES

Appendix 4.5 Registration of Greek-owned ships according to ports in 1879

Port/Island Ships Tons % Average tonnage

Syros 455 94,477 36 208Piraeus 144 18,119 7 126Zante 102 15,986 6 157Galaxidi 101 13,175 5 130Spetses 102 12,933 5 127Cephalonia 92 10,260 4 112Chios 73 7,679 3 105Constantinople 31 5,613 2 181Santorini 56 5,386 2 96Milos 38 5,401 2 142Skiathos 42 5,162 2 123Ydra 47 5,001 2 106Corfu 71 4,952 2 70Patras 51 4,163 2 82Andros 37 3,784 2 102Scopelos 25 3,481 1 139Ithaca 26 3,075 1 219Myconos 14 3,061 1 218Kerassund 22 2,255 1 103Other 749 37,176 14 50Total 2,278 261,139 100 115Source: Archangelos register of shipping, 1879

Appendix 4.6 Greek-owned ships in 1879 according to place of building

Type of ship Total

Place of build Brig Gollette Gabara Barque Ships* Tonnage

A.GREECE 869 163,939Andros 2 185Kassos 43 2 4 2 51 9,720Castelorizo 4 1 5 1,152Chalkis 1 1 1 3 265Corfu 1 1 52Cumes 3 3 209Egina 1 1 60Galaxidi 77 7 3 3 96 20,772Hydra 2 1 3 356Ithaca 5 462

APPENDICES 377

Type of ship Total

Place of build Brig Gollette Gabara Barque Ships* Tonnage

Laconia 63Lefkas 60Limne 144Limnos 264Messolonghi 1 83Nio 1 90Patmos 75Patra 2 3 231Piraeus 10 2 1 1 14 2,580Rhodes 3 3 437Samos 5 2 8 937Santorini 1 60Scopelos 23 3,935

Type of ship Total

Place of build Brig Gollette Gabara Barque Ships Tonnage

Skiato 13 16 29 3,530Spetses 56 2 69 12,726Syros 337 123 33 11 539 104,921Zante 1 60Other 1 510B.ABROAD 216 40,569OTTOMAN 72 9,970EMPIREChios 31 4,602Constantinople 4 544Dardanelles 1 213Enos 2 205Gallipoli 3 398Kerassunda 18 2,230Lesbos 4 296Monopoli 2 410Pontos 2 520Simi 2 202Sinopi 1 200Thrace 1 81Trebizond 1 69

378 APPENDICES

Type of ship Total


BLACK SEA 21 3,292Azov 2 154Black Sea 1 195Braila 5 851Danube 2 270Euxene 1 147Galatz 2 403Rostov 1 93Toulza 2 440Vassilico 5 739WESTERN EUROPE 123 27,307Germany 1 150England 33 8,667Bristol 1 240Antwerp 2 215Atalia 2 137Austria 3 691Belgium 1 290Castelamare 7 1,071Copenhagen 2 309Scotland 1 251Espagne 1 108Fiume 4 896Genoa 15 3,968Holland 2 197Livorno 1 227Lussine 3 343Malta 9 2,025Naples 11 3,029Norway 1 332Palermo 1 170

Type of ship Total


Sorento 5 1,328Spalato 1 50Trieste 12 2,085

APPENDICES 379

Type of ship Total


Tripoli 2 150Venice 2 378C. Unknown 948 56,631Total 2,033 261,139Source: Data compiled from Archangelos register of shipping, 1879Note: Includes all types of ships

Appendix 4.7 Shipping loans in Syros, 1846

Lender/Interest Purpose Tons Amount* Rate*

A. FOR SHIPBUILDING/REPAIRSMerchantsM.C.Salvago Completion – 442 spd. ShareD. Apostolopulos(Trieste)

Completion – 2,480 dr. Monthly 1% & share

ShipbuildersM. Poutous Shiprepair 198 1,716 fr. Monthly 8%M. Poutous Completion – 12,000 dr. ShareN.D.Perdikas Completion – 1,300 dr. Monthly 2.5%OthersK.Petsalis (policeofficer)

Completion – 3,000 dr. Monthly 1% & share

B. FOR WORKING CAPITAL (to equip and rig the ship for the voyage, for wages andfood supplies)Chiot MerchantsZanni. A.Vouro 224 10,000 dr. Yearly 22.5%Leo. Eumorphopulos 224 2,000 dr. Yearly 18%Leo. Eumorphopulos – 1,200 dr. Monthly 2.25%P.Geralopulos 150 1,600 spd. Monthly 2.25%Z.Th.Avgerinos – 764 spd. Monthly 2.5%Z.Th.Avgerinos – 50 spd. Monthly 2.75%Z.Th.Avgerinos 180 100 spd. Monthly 2.5%Z.Th.Avgerinos – 1,000 spd. Monthly 2.75%Ambrosios Damalas 223 650 spd. Monthly 2.25%M.Salvagos 150 2,900 dr. Monthly 2.5%M.Salvagos 241 560 spd. Monthly 2.5%E.Z.Negreponte 137 4,000 dr. Share ¾ of shipZ.Negreponte – 1,200 dr. Monthly 2.33%P.Ralli – 774 spd. Monthly 1.75%

380 APPENDICES


Th.Petrocockino(Constantinople)

– 510 spd. Monthly 2.5%

OthersGeorge Yiourdis – 1,800 spd. Monthly 2.25%I.Peridis 174 1,000 spd. Monthly 2.25%


I.Peridis 238 500 spd. Yearly 20%F.I.Kyriakou – 540 dr. Monthly 2%I.Peridis 238 300 dr. Monthly 2%D.Vafiadaki – 500 spd. Monthly 2.5%I.Peridis – 1,200 dr. Monthly 2%P.Psycha – 4,400 dr. Monthly 2.5%M.K.Karali – 3,000 dr. Monthly 2%P.Kaniskeri – 175 spd. Monthly 2.5%C.Naxos – 5,000 dr. Monthly 2.5%Ioa. Pardalaki – 450 spd. Monthly 2.75%N.Zaroulaki – 250 spd. Monthly 2.75%D.Michail – 2,500 spd. Monthly 2.5%G.Calvocoressis

– 1,550 dr Monthly 2.5%

G.D.Koutsodontis

180 640 spd. Monthly 1.75%

Kousoulenti – 400 spd. Monthly 2.25%Em.Konstantinou

– 600 spd. Monthly 2.5%

Kyparisis &Sarafis

– 1,402 dr. Monthly 2%

G.Theologis 226 1,200 dr. Monthly 2.25%Chr.Emmanouel

226 6,593 dr. Monthly 2.5%

I.Kontoudi – 3,090 dr. Monthly 2%Source: Local Historical Archive of the Cyclades, Archive of the Notary Andreas David,

Notarial Acts 1838–59, Syros 1846 Note: * Currency: dr.=drachmas,spd.=spanish dollars, fr.=francs. ** Loans on monthly rates were usually to berepaid after six months

Appendix 4.8 Sales, purchases and newbuildings in Syros, 1846*

A. Newhuildings1) Ambrosios Th. Ralli built a eabara of 192 tons named Pandias, by shipbuilderPoutous, that cost 100,000 drachmas.

APPENDICES 381

VALUE=520 dr. per ton2) Newbuilding brig of 83 tons for 43,000 dr.VALUE=518 dr. per tonB. Second hand sales and purchases1) Sale of ship from agent A. Ladopulos, bought by D. Glykas (lumber merchant), of abrig 187 tons for 750 spd.VALUE=4 spd. per ton2) Pandelis Maskas, shipbuilder sells brig 148 tons for 18,000 dr.VALUE=122 dr. per ton3) Philippos Kyriakou Isidorou sells half goelette 23 tons for 1,312 dr.VALUE=114 dr. per ton4) Ap. Apostolopulos sells sells brig of 121 tons for 18,609 dr. to loannis Efstathiou.VALUE=154 dr. per ton5) Pantelis Pnevmantikos sells brig of 112 tons for 17,000 dr.VALUE=152 dr. per ton6) Sale of half a brig of 116 tons to Z.Th. Avgerinos (merchant) for 1,360 spd.VALUE=23 spd. per ton7) Sale of one Fourth of a brig 226 tons for 4,773 dr.VALUE=85 dr. per tonSource: Local Historical Archive of the Cyclades, Archive of Notary Andreas David,

Notarial Acts 1838–59, Syros, 1846 Note: * Currency: dr.=drachmas, spd.=spanish doilars fr.=francs

Appendix 4.9 Greek owners of steamships in 1890 according to the headquarters of theirfirms

Shipowner* Ships NRT % total Belonged to or financed by theIonian network

A. Greece 40 18,173 32Arvaniti E. 195Calamaris N. 706Carava Limnios 199Compethecra C. 33 YesCostalas J. 653Goudis D.P. 5 2,202Hellenic Steam. Nav. 17 7,594Markas & Coutsokeri 1 587Pandermaly Bros 1 14Panhellenic Steam. Nav. 9 5,384Papalla Bros 1 444Proveleghios A. 1 162B. Rumania 16 13,625 24

382 APPENDICES

Shipowner* Ships NRT % total Belonged to or financed by theIonian network

Chryssoveloni 1 958 YesEmbiricos A. 2 2,430 YesEmbiricos G.M. 1 1,109 YesStathatos Bros 7 5,695 YesTheofilatos Bros 3 3,297 YesTheofilatos & Stathatos 2 136 YesC. Southern Russia 10 4,490 8Cuppa R. 940 YesFoca C.A. 36 YesComneno J.E. 305 YesTheofilatos 538 YesMavrogordato 258 YesMussuri J. & Ferraponte 403 YesNegroponte D.A. 2 515 YesRodocanachi P.T. 2 464 YesScaramanga P.P. 1 1,031 YesD. Constantinople & Smyrna 20 10,901 20Courtgi P.M. 7 2,910 YesFoscolo & Valsamachi 1 1,044 YesFoscolo & Mango 3 1,152 YesMichalinos & Co 2 2,406 YesPantaleon** 1 223Spiteri Andrea 1 31Stamadiades MJ. 2 217Stathopulo G. 3 2,918 YesE. Westem Europe 10 8,694 16MarseillesCicellis P.G. 2 1,864 YesLiverpoolLambros C.G. 1 84 Yes

Shipowner* Ships NRT % total Belonged to orfinanced by thelonian network

London VaglianoBros

7 6,746 Yes

Total 96 55,883 100 37,002Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1890 Note: * Spelling of names

as found in Lloyd’s Register. ** Smyrna

APPENDICES 383


Shipowner Ships NRT % total Date of build Belonged to orfinanced bylonians

A. Greece 51 21,937 24Calamaris N. Hermes 706 1870Carava Limnios Anatoli 199Compethecra C. George 1st 33 YesCosmetto P. Lykavias 140 1884 YesCoutzis G. Georgios

Koutsis 558 1890Goudis D.P. Crete 302

Spetzie 110Nauplion 309Peloponessos 272 1863

Marlas Parnassos 587Marquides Bros& Macris

Phoenix 587 Yes

MacDowall &Barbour

Poseidon 363 1855

Margarita 133 1891Euboia 131 1874Thetis 317 1859Era 502 1855

Michalinudis J.A. Mitir Argyri 830 1882New HellenicSteamship

Iris 400

Navigation Sfactirea 690 1884Theseus 773Elpis 606Panellenion 195Chios 537Hermoupolis 493Eptanisos 332Pelops 596Pinios 435Omonia 3,167Karteria 317 1859Hydra 218

Pepas Egina 96

384 APPENDICES


Policantriti G. Polycantriti 74Portolos G. Agios loannis 59 YesProveleghios A. Samson 162 1864

Shipowner Ships NRT % total Date of buila Belonged to orfinanced bylonians

Navigation aVapeur

Ionia 881 1887

Panhellenique Argolis 247Macedonia 456 1862Thrace 881 1887Samos 809 1872Epirus 460 1862Thessalia 477 1864Albania 881 1881Paros 290 1879

Saliaris A.K. Aristea 1,132 1893 YesHeleni 910 1891 Yes

Serpieri Eucl. Siphnos &Eubee

87 1883

Synodinos Ch. Prinkipos 52 1894 YesGeorgios

Sinodinos T. Damaskini 93 YesVatis G.L. Adelphi 761Vlassopulo E. Annika 991 YesZygomalas M.T. Artemisia 150B. Rumania 27 26,421 29ChryssoveloniBros

Z.M. 858 Yes

ChryssoveloniAdelphi 1,498 1891 YesCnryssoveloni

Embiricos A. Embiricos 1,743 1893 YesMaria 1,692 1893 YesAndriana 1,174 Yes

APPENDICES 385

Shipowner Ships NRT % total Date of buila Belonged to orfinanced bylonians

Embiricos G.M. Constantinos 1,109 YesMilas J. Joannis Milas 1,327 1882 Yes

Eleni Milas 1,503 1892 YesStathatos Bros Andriana

Stathatos 1,610 1891 YesAntoniosStathatos 976 1883 YesTelemaque 29 1877 YesDionyssiosStathatos 1,274 1889 YesHellespont 116 1894 YesConstantineStathatos 1,501 1890 YesPoseidon 1,666 1895 Yes

Stathatos Othon CharilaosTrikoupis

1,626 1892 Yes

Euxine 18 1889 YesAthelete 12 1894 YesOthon Stath. 1,169 1888 Yes

Stathatos &Theofilatos

Mentor 34 Yes

Hellespontes 102 YesSulariotes Dionysios 23 1883 YesTheofilatos Bros Ithaca 1,081 1882 Yes

Odysseus 983 1884 YesParthenon 853 1877 Yes

Shipowner Ships NRT % total Date of build Belonged to orfinanced byIonians

Princess Sophia 1,491 1889 YesThrace 953 1887 Yes

C. SouthernRussia

10 3,603 4

Curcumelli D.N. Elena Couppa 223 1893 YesSophia Couppa 243 1891 Yes

Feonfani F. Phoenix 275 YesFoca C.A., GA. Eptanisos 36 Yes

386 APPENDICES


Focas 1,480 YesTheophilatos C. Gretzia 318 YesMavrogordatoC.

Pietro 258 Yes

NegroponteD.A.

Akibiades 255 Yes

Ambrosios N. 258 YesNegroponte D. 257 Yes

D.Constantinolpe& Smyrna

33 22,412 25

Courtgi P.M. Odissos 1,241 1880 YesCardiff 352 1866 YesChios 194 1881 YesCrete 194 1881 YesHeraclia 478 1864 YesMassalia 868 1879 YesPanormos 138 1882 YesPolis Mytilene 686 1880 YesSmyrne 415 1879 Yes

Dandria Bros StefanoDandria 1,203 1885 Yes

Daoud FarkouhHadji* Alexandros 624 1883

Aphroditi 717 1869Georgios 430Sofia 429

Evangalatos E. Enossis 57 YesFoscolo &Valsamachi

Ernesta

Foscolo 1,044 1870 YesFoscolo &Mango

Demetrio S.

Schilizzi 1,277 1893 YesEptalofos 1,680 1890 YesGeorrios PBouooulis 1,613 1890 YesMarietta Ralli 1,501 1891 Yes

APPENDICES 387


Mathilda Fosc. 111 1883 YesPietro Foscolo 561 1864 YesThiresia 580 1869 Yes

Lambros C.G. Halcyon 186 1876Triton 186 1878

Laneoussi N. Dio Fili 18 1885 YesMicnalinos &Co

Ariadne Mich. 653 1873 Yes

Cornelia G.Michalinos 1,141 YesDespina G.Michalinos 1,141 1889 Yes


GeorgiosMichalinos

1,994 1893 Yes

Pantaleon* Eleni 223 1883Smyrna 443

StamadiadesMJ.

Olga 34 1879

E. WesternEurope

21 16,335 18

MarseillesCouppa N. Maris

Vaglianos 485 YesSophiaCouppa 1,350 1891 Yes

RodocanachiM.E.

Esther 184 1864 Yes

Vagliano A.A. Cephalonia 473 1864 YesCephalonia 929 1878 YesZakynthos 973 1882 Yes

LivornoRodinis Fides 1,007 1878NaplesStathopulo G. Lesbos 1,016 1879 Yes

388 APPENDICES


LondonVagliano Bros Adelphi

Vagtiano 1,010 1883 YesAghios Ioannis 1,093 1885 YesAndreaVagliano 1,045 1880 YesMari Vagliano 891 1880 YesNicholaosVagliano

1,119 1883 Yes

P.A.Vagliano 964 1880 YesAlexandros 26 1894 YesFlying Arrow 26 1882 YesEcateriniCouppa

883 1878 Yes

Ambatiellos 1,074 1889 YesDespina 779 1890 YesIthaka 703 1873 YesAstrea 305 Yes

Total 141 90,708 100 66,693Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1895Note: * Smyrna


Shipowner Ships NRT % total Belonged to or financed by the Ionians

A. Greece 80 58,432 41 19,048Athanassulis N.M. 1 121 YesBank of Athens 2 1,247 YesBassian A. 1 1,109

Shipowner Ships NRT % total Belonged to or financed by theIonians

Bassian A. & N.Couppa 1 1,032Bassian A. & Foscolo 1,044Calvocoressi J. 1,074Caracalo & Fustanos 102Castriottis C.N. 757Cosmas A. 619

APPENDICES 389


Cosmetti P. 178Coutzis 2 1,716Diakiki A. 2 668Embiricos A. 3 3,442 YesEmbiricos B. 2 2,839 YesEmbiricos G.M. 1 1,595 YesGangos Alex. 1 1,546Goudis D.P. 5 1,138Ladopulo E. 1 1,439Leousi G.E. 1 114Manianis B. 1 152Marlas 1 587MacDowall & Barbour 8 1,853Moraitis D.G. 3 4,345Navigation a VapeurPanhellenique(Psacharopulos)

10 7,297

New Hellenic Navigation 11 4,712Northwest Railway Co 1 136Papaleonardos S. 1 143Psaroudas & Rassoyiannis 1 912Roussos N. 2 2,341 YesSpetzoyannis 1 150Stathopulo S. 1 1,016Stathatos Othon 2 3,842 YesTheofilatos A.N. 1 1,491 YesThou N. 1 682Vagliano M. 1 1,139 YesVatis A.L., J.L. 2 2,244Vergotis 1 991 YesTsiropinas C. 2 2,619B. Rumania 7 9,938 7 9,836Embiricos L.M. 2 3,305 YesStathatos Bros 4 6,531 YesStathatos & Theofilatos 1 102 YesC. Southern Russia 26 13,793 10 9,466Curcumellis D.N. 3 729 YesDiamantidis D. 2 1,168

390 APPENDICES


Dmetrief P. 3 2,601Feofani F.A. 2 580 YesSifneo Bros 1 1,623 Yes

Shipowner Ships NRT % total Belonged to or financed bythe Ionians

Sifneo J.Th. 1 1,005 YesTheofilatos C. 2 756 YesManoussi D. 2 558Mavrocordato C., M 3 1,636 YesNegroponte D.A. 4 1,064 YesSvorono C. 2 992 YesSynodino P. 1 1,081 YesD. Constantinople & Smyrna 47 30,668 22 20,385Courtgi P.M. (Navigation aVapeur Egée)

11 5,947 Yes

Daoud Farkouh Hadji* 10 3,865Dandria Bros 1 1,202Foscolo & Mango (Mango &Doresa, London)

4 6,071 Yes

Lambros C. 2 628Langoressis N. 1 140Pantaleon P* (NavigationOrientale)

8 2,165

Saliaris A.K. 2 1,813 YesSiniossoglu S. 2 2,283Zarifi L. 6 6,554 YesE. Western EuropeMarseilles

20 29,260 20 28,430

Caramano G.P. 1 1,333 YesCicellis P.G. 1 1,534 YesCouppa N. 2 3,004 YesMicnalinudis 1 830Zouros D.N. London 1 1,132 YesEmbiricos S.G. 4 6,780 YesMichalinos 4 6,581 YesScaramanga Bros 1 1,835 YesVagliano Bros (ShippingAgencies) (Embiricos S.G.)

5 6,231 Yes

APPENDICES 391


(Mango Doresa)(Michalinos) (Vagliano Bros)Total 180 142,091 100 87,165Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1900Note: * Smyrna



A. Greece 137 147,360 50 61,698Ambatiellos E. 2 3,084 YesAnareyros S. 1 1,630Angelis E. 2 2,415Athanassulis N.M. 1 121 YesBaltagi S. 1 1,450Baltagi S. & Marlas 1 1,126Benecos J.D. 1 94Calvocoressis J.G. 1 1,074Calvocoressis & TrofimoffCo

1 1,204

Canakis P.C. 1,070Caracalo & Fustanos 102Castriotti C.N. 741Chalikiopulo D. 54Constanti D.E.Hadji 104Cosmas A.A. & Co 1,117Cosmas Bros 2 2,152Cornilakis M. 1 ,736Cosadinos 1 1,735Cosmetto P. 1 403Coutzis J.G. 2 1,716Curenti A. 1 1,044 YesDambassis A.J. 1 1,588Destuni & Yannoulatos(Navigation Ionienne aVapeur)

8 3,793

Diakakis J. & CalvocoressisJ.

1 1,460

Diakiki A. 3 1,569

392 APPENDICES


Embiricos G.M. 4 7,783 YesEmbiricos A. 3 5,013 YesEmbiricos B.L. 2 3,941 YesEmbiricos Basilios 1,476 YesFoustanos P. 1,631Gangos Alex. 2 3,109Goudis D.P. 1,138Goulandris Bros 1,312 YesKatsoulis N. 990 YesLadopulo E. 1,489Leonardus Papa 193Leousi G.E. 114Lykiardopulos N.D. 1,614 YesMandakas G.B. 1,407Manianis B. 636Margaronis P. 2 2,379Mavroleon G.B. 1 782 YesMcDowall & Barbour 8 2,573Moraitis D.G. 7 13,881Negroponte Z.P. 1 1,520 YesNew Hellenic Steam Nav. 9 3,474Nicolaides C. 1 1,493


Nicolaou G. 1 859Niotis, Mavrogordato &Mitarakis

1 1,119 Yes

Navigation a VapeurPanhellenique(Psacharopulos)

10 8,438

Northwest Railway Co ofGreece

1 136

Nostragis A. 1 993 YesPapadiamantopulos 1 1,071Pappaleonardos S. 1 143Picoulis J.P. 1 1,405 YesPolemis C. 1 1,573Psaroudas Rassojannis 1 912

APPENDICES 393


Roussos N.G. 2 3,007 YesRoussos N.P. 2 2,942 YesStathatos Othon 3 5,764 YesTheofilatos A.N. 2 2,699 YesTsiropinas Constantine A,. 1 1,598Typaldo-Bassia A. 1 1,109Typaldo-Bassia A. &N.Couppa

1 1,032

Vafiadakis S. 1 384Vagliano A.S. 4 6,807 YesVagliano C.S. & A.S. 2 4,478 YesVatis A.L. & J.L. 3 5,000Vergottis 1 991 YesVerveniotis N.M. 1 1,557Vlassopulo E. 1 1,479 YesVlassopulos S. & Papapetro 1 1,334 YesB. Rumania 13 17,477 7 17,380Aravandino & Karavia 1 26Cosmetto P. 1 71Drakoulis G.C. 1 1,846 YesEmbiricos Bros 2 5,098 YesKyriakides N.G. 1 1,552 YesStathatos Bros 6 8,782 YesStathatos & Theofilatos 1 102 YesC. Southem Russia 54 29,290 11 29,041Comninakis P.S. 2 2,731 YesCurcumellis D.N. 3 750 YesDestuni G.G. 1 334 YesDiamantidis D. & Son 3 1,578 YesDiamantidis K. 1 280Diamantidis K. 1 217 YesDimitrieff P. 2 1,916 YesFeofani EA. 2 554 YesFeofani F. & I.Frangopulo 1 288 YesFerendinos A.G. 1 295 YesKoussis & Theofilatos* 1 553 YesMavrogordato A.V. 1 314 Yes

394 APPENDICES


Mavrogordato C.C. 3 608 YesMussouri N. 1 192 YesNegreponte D.A. 6 1,026 YesNegrepontis & Societe deNav. Samienne

1 133 Yes

Sifneo Bros 2 3,033 YesSifneo Th. 3 2,788 YesSkarnavi & Sevastopulo 1 190 YesSvorono Constantine & Sons 3 1,395 YesSvorono Fotius C. 3 1,361 YesTheofani C. 3 890 YesTheofani F. 1 286 YesTheofani R & I.Frangopulo 1 249Theofani Th. A. 177 YesTheofani T. & G.Diacroussis 1,721 YesTheofilatos C* 354 YesVagliano & Co 550 YesVagliano M. & Frangopulo I. 393 YesVagliano M.S. 2 4,134 YesD. Constantinople & Smyrna 49 39,331 15 24,929Abadjis P.A. 1 3,10Calogero D. 1 1,493Christidi Ph. & M.Kyriakou 1 192Compagnie Hellenique deNavigation a Vapeur ‘LaPhocéene’ **

3 3,453

Courtgi P.M. (Navigation aVapeur ‘Egée’)

5 4,136 Yes

Dandria Bros 1 1,202 YesDaout Farkouh Hadji**(Paquebots Poste‘L’Archipel’)

9 3,791

Foscolo & Mango 1 1,501 YesGafos A. 1 1,237Lambros P.G. 1 188Negrepontis & Caroussis 1 903 YesPantaleon P** 8 2,165Pappadachis G.Filicos 1 1,573Patrikios 2 1,476 Yes

APPENDICES 395


Rethimnis B.N. 1 1,005 YesSaliaris A.K. 2 2,529 YesSiderides S.A. & X.A. 2 2,597 YesZarifis L. (Fitilis Z.Co)(Fitilis, agent)

8 9,580 Yes

E. Western Europe Marseilles 14 25,781 10 24,951Couppa N. 3 4,774 Yes


Cicellis P.G. 1 1,534 YesMichalinudis J.A. 1 830London 10 18,643 7Mango & Doresa 1 2,132 YesMichalinos 4 7,398 YesScaramanga Bros 3 5,926 YesSechiari P.A. (ShippingAgencies) (C.L.Embiricos)(S.G.Embiricos) (Galbraith& Pembroke)

2 3,187 Yes

F. Other 2 739AlexandriaSigalas St. 1 184Zalichi J. 1 555TOTAL 269 259,239 100 182,950Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1905Note: * St. Petersberg. ** Smyrna


Shipowner Ships NRT % total Behnved to or financed by theIonians

A. Greece 214 228,950 61 89,625Ambatiellos E. 1 1,119 YesAnargyros S. 1 1,630Anagnostis Sp. 1 449Andreadis D.E 1 1,055Andreadis G.D. 1 358Angelis E. 1 1,736

396 APPENDICES

Shipowner Ships NRT % total Behnved to or financed by theIonians

Assimacos M.D. 1 1,889 YesAthanassulis N.M. 1 121 YesCallimasiotis DJ. 1 1,748 YesCalvocoressis G. &Trofimoff

1 1,204

Capparis A.A. (CompagnieHellenique de Navires aVapeur de Syra)

3 3,202

Chalikiopulo D. (Navigationa Vapeur Hellenique JeanCominos)

2 617

Charopulos J. 1,534Constanti D.E.Hadji 104Cornilakis M. 1,790Coroneos K.A. 1,259Cosmas A. 1,202 YesCosmas C. & D.J. 1,437 Yes


Cosmas M. 1,117 YesCosmas J. 1,273 YesCottaropulos G.L. 316Coulouras G. 1,872 YesCoulouthros A.M. 350 YesCoutsodontis S.A. &Papanastassopulos

1,762 Yes

Cozzika P. 2 3,174Coutzis Bros 4 5,254Crinos A. 1 2,081 YesCyclades Steam Nav. 6 2,534Dambassis G.J. 1 1,758Dambassis Jean G. 1 1,588Daniolis L. 1 160Destouni & Yannoulatos(Navigation Ioniénne aVapeur)

14 4,605 Yes

Diakakis A. (La NavigationHellenique A.Diakakis)

5 2,854

Diakakis J. 2 3,027

APPENDICES 397


Domestinis & Oeconomou 2 2,354 YesDomestinis G.D. 1 1,613Economou L. 1 414Embiricos B. 1 1,476 YesEmbiricos G.M. 6 12,105 YesEmbiricos E.C. & N.M.(administrator John Goumas)

1 1,869 Yes

Embiricos Bros 2 4,351 YesFafalios 314Fameliaris B. 2,030Ferendinos A. 921Filinis N.M. 1,845Focas A. 740 YesFoustanos E.A. 4 1,283Foustanos P. 1 1,631Frangiscatos G.N. 1 768Frangopulo G. 1 135Gicas & Vafiopulos 1 109Goudis D.P. 5 1,453Goulandris Bros 1 1,312 YesGrohman G. 1 130Hadjipateras K. 1 1,047 YesHadjoulis A. 1 1,509Hellenic Transatlantic SteamNavigation

2 7,699

Katsoulis N. 1 991 YesKatrakis G. 1 250Katramandos I. 1 484Ladopulo E. 2 2,615Lembisis N. 1 143


Lemos P. 1 886 YesLeousi G.E. 1 114Limbirikis T. 1 110Lykiardopulos N.D. 3 5,153 YesMandakas 2 2,880

398 APPENDICES


Margaronis P. 1 1,600Mavrogordato A.E. 1 471Mavroleon G.B. 1 781Mavromatis G.G. 1 288McDowall & Barbour(Hellenic Steam Navigation)

7 2,550

Metaxas B.N. 1 1,904Michalaros G. 1 1,010 YesMichalitsianos E.M. 1 1,545Mitropulos Bros 1 256Murphy W., Crowe & Stevens(Achaia Steam Navigation)

2 578

Navigation a VapeurPanhellenique(Psacharopulos)

10 11,181

Negroponte D.A. & C.Saliaris 1 1,619Nicolau George 1 859Nicolaides Bros &V.Cokkinis

1 724

Niotis & Mavrogordato 1 1,493Nomicos N. 1 297Northwest Railway of Greece 1 136Palios P. 1 1,024 YesPanoutsos N.G. 1 1,405Papadopulos I.C. 1 110Papageorgacopulos 1 1,386Papapetrou 1 1,334Papaleonardos S. 2 280Perris S. 1 774Petritzis E. 1 1,381Petrochilos & Goudis 1 1,526Pittas G. 1 387Ponticos P. 1 497Portolos G.D. 1 133 YesPsacharopulos 10 11,181Rethymnis & Pneumaticos 1 1,904 YesRigopulos S. 1 920 YesRoussos N.P. 2 2,942 YesSactouris P.T. 1 959 Yes

APPENDICES 399


Sideropulo N. & Zissimos 1 1,389 YesSperanza G. 1 502Stamatiades & Riginos 1 1,444Stathatos Const. 2 3,503 Yes


Stathatos D.A. 3 5,433 YesStathatos Othon 3 5,744 YesSynodino Bros 1 1,109 YesTetenes Othon 1 2,338 YesTheophilatos Ant. 2 2,701 YesTogia C. 1 102Trofimoff Jean 1 1,563Tsiropinas C.A. 1 1,598Tsouros 1 463Typaldo-Bassia &N.Couppa

1 1,032

Vagliano A.S. 5 11,754Valmas N. 1 1,416 YesVatis A.L. & J.L. 4 6,218Vergottis C. Vernicos N. 1 1 2,301 804 YesVerveniotis N.M. 1 1,557Vulgaris T. 1 1,939 YesXenios J.E. 1 727Xenios X. 1 518Zerovos C. 1 447B. Rumania/Bulgaria 6 12,263 3 12,263Bebis C.D. (Roustchouck) 1 2,216 YesDracoulis G.C. 3 6,728 YesHarocopos C.G. 1 1,848 YesLykiardopulos B.E. 1 1,471 YesC. Southern Russia 52 25,350 7 24,680Barbati M.G. 1 857 YesCouppa H. 3 750 YesDestuni G. 1 334 YesDiamantidis D. & Son 1 375Logotheti P.S. 3 335 Yes

400 APPENDICES


Mavrogordato C.C. 3 708 YesNegroponte D.A. 3 732 YesPanagiotato G. 1 192 YesSvorono EC. 3 6,947 YesSifneo Bros 2 1,738 YesSkanavi A.D. 1 291 YesSvorono C. & Sons 8 2,989 YesSvorono EC. 1 112 YesSynodinos P.G. 1 842 YesTheofani A.A. 3 988 YesTheofani Ch.A. 8 4,475 YesTheofani Heirs of Th. 8 2,390 YesZizo G. 1 295D. Constantinople &Smyrna

62 38,091 10 23,362

Abadjis Per.A. 2 913Ambatiellos P. 1 1,220 YesAndreou G. 1 953 YesArvanitidi Bros 2 1,475 YesByron 1 192


Cardiacopulos N. 1 1,151Cosmetto Nicolas P. 2 1,100Courtgi P.M. 5 3,265 YesDandria S. 2,244 YesDelagrammatica Dem. 1,089Foscolo & Mango 657 YesGira & Vernudaki 453Lagoudaki A. 418Lambros P. 188Levantis E. 1 247Negroponte DA. & Caroussi 1 903 YesNicolaou M. 1 422Pandeli Bros 3 877Pandeli D. 1 474Pandeli V. 1 945

APPENDICES 401


Pandermaly St. 1 424Pantaleon P* 9 2,412Petzalis & Dounias 2 765Poriaz A. 1 528Potamianos J. 1 314Siderides S.A. & X.A. 5 7,066 YesSiniossoglu S. 1 1,254Svorono F.C. 1 112 YesSvorono Const. 7 2,933 YesVafopulo Bros 1 249Vernicos N. 1 124Yamaly 1 190Zarifi L. 2 2,534 YesE. Western Europe London** 40 71,116 19 70,286Ambatiellos E. 4 7,307 YesEmbiricos A.A. 8 12,990 YesEmbiricos Bros 2 4,351 YesEmbiricos C.L. 4 6,880 YesMango & Co 1 2,031 YesMetaxas B.N. 1 1,904 YesMichalinos 8 1,4955 YesScaramanga 4 7,642 YesSechiari 2 4,105 YesMarseillesCicellis PG. 2 3,101 YesCouppa N. 3 5,020 YesMichalinudis J.A. 1 830 YesTotal 374 375,770 100 220,216Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1910Note: * Smyrna. ** Shipping agencies not included



A. Greece 265 521,087 63Ambatiellos E. 1,740Anagnosti S. 1 768

402 APPENDICES


Antonopulos 1 125Andreadis G.F. l 1,973Angelatos G. 1 1,166 YesAngelis Elie l 2,707Antonacopulos & Maroulis 1 3,240 YesAthanassulis N.M. 1 310 YesBank of Athens 1 140 YesBenardos P. 1 1,336Benecos J.D. 1 124Bistis M.A. 1 2,622Caloutas A. 1,275Calvocoressis 1 2,993Calvocoressis & Trofimof 1 1,850Caristinakis 1 2,347Caroussis Bros 1 2,570Chalikiopulo 2 1,085Charopulos J. 1 2,415Cokinos Ch. 1 2,117Condylis L.N. 1 2,899Constanti Hadji 1 204Cornilakis CM. 1 2,831Coroneos C.A. 1 1,901Coroniadis Bros 1 2,269Corvissiano P.D. 1 1,994Cosmas J. 1 1,951 YesCottaropulos G.L. 1 548Coulouras Ghicas 2 4,940 YesCoulouthros A.M. 1 2,461 YesCoutsodontis S.A.G. 1 2,795Coutzis Bros 4 8,235Couviellos G. 1 988Culucundis E.M. 1 2,942 YesCyclades Steam Nav. 6 4,111Daniolos Bros 1 2,508Diacakis D. 2 4,786Diacakis J 2 5,405Diapoulis & Voulgaris 1 2,898Domestini & Oeconomou 2 5,019

APPENDICES 403


Embiricos A. 4 10,892 YesEmbiricos Basilios l 2,323 YesEmbiricos Bros (NationalSteam Navigation of Greece)

5 18,116 Yes

Embiricos E.C 2 4,431 YesEmbiricos G.M. 9 30,017 YesFafalios J. & S. 1 627Fameliaris Basilios 1 3,189Filinis N.M. 1 2,862


Focas A. 1 3,301 YesFoustanos P. 1 2,540Foustanos E.A. 5 2,785Frangiscatos G.N. 1 952Frangopulo G. 1 1,893Galeos G. 1 129Georgandis A.N.A. 1 1,132Georgopulos D. 1 671Giagakis S. 1 387Goudis D.P. 4 2,390Goudis G. 1 1,832Goulandis Bros 1 2,123 YesGoulandris John P. 1 3,153 YesGoulandris Petros D. 1 3,744 YesGoumas John 1 2,899Gregos G. 1 2,462Grohman G. 1 227Hadjipateras C. & PaterasD.**

2 3,909 Yes

Hardavelas E. 1 2,138Hellenic Transatlantic 2 12,787Isaias E.A. 1 569Inglessis D. Sons*** 1 2,088ossifoglu S. 1 3,560Kallimassioti D.J. 1 2,690Katrakis George 1 460

404 APPENDICES


Katsoulis N. & D. 1 1,460 YesKrinos A. 1 2,922 YesKyriakopulos 1 822Ladopulos E. 1 2,336Lelekopulos & Christides 1 778Lambisis N. 1 223Lemos P. 1 2,510 YesLemos Michael 1 2,485 YesLeoussi J. 1 220Levantis E. 2 2,404Lioris A. & D.Cairis 1 1,653 YesLos D.** 1 883Lukissos & Voyazides 1 3347Lykiardopulo N.D. 6 14,440 YesLymberakis Th. G. 1 187MacDowall J. NavigationHellenique

7 5,632

Mandacas G. 2 5,386Marengo J. l 1,496Marearonis P. 1 2,491 YesMarkettos G. 1 398Mavrogordatos A. 1 3,771Mavroleon G.B. 1 1,435 YesMelis 1 501Mesolongitis P. 1 3,581Michalinos Maritime 7 19,352Michalitsianos E.M. 1 2,430


Michalos N.** 1 3,406 YesNavigation Hellenique 7 5,632Navigation d’Egée 1 292Negreponte J.D. &A.D.Saliaris

2 5,526

Nicolaides Bros 1 964Nicolau G. 1 3,125Nicoludis C. 1 2,212

APPENDICES 405


Niotis & Mavrogordatos 1 2,306Northwest Railway Co 1 234Palios & Cambourides 2 6,184 YesPandermaly & Yannaghas 1 3,370Pageorgacopulo 2 5,236Panoutsos N.G. 1 2,318Papandopulos I. 1 193Papaleonardos S. 2 584Pappas J. & Spanoudakis C. 1 2,367Pateras C. 1 2,899Payavlas G. 1 2,372Petritzis E. son 2 5,878Polemis C.A. &Boyazides 1 2,996 YesPolemis V.A. 1 3,278Portolos G. 1 257Navigation a VapeurPanhellenique(Psacharopulos C.)

10 17,763

Psiachi 2 5,626Ralias D. & N. 1 2,255Rethymnis & Pneumaticc 1 2,931 YesRigopulos S. 1 1,432 YesRoussos John 2 4,787 YesRoussos N.P. 2 5,681 YesSachtouris P.T. 1,471Saliaris 2,700 YesSeretis D. 2 1,474Sideropulos N.P. 1 2,201 YesSociete de Orychia 1 132Stakos & Nanopulos 1 2,744Stathatos Constantin 2 5,477 YesStathatos Denys A. 3 9,511 YesStathatos Othon 3 9,167 YesSynodinos Bros 1 1,781 YesTetenes Othon 1 3,651 YesTheodorides A. 1 2,039Trandavelonis N. 1 383

406 APPENDICES


Trofimoff J. 1 2,437Tsiropinas C.A. 2 5,505Tsouros 1 761Vagliano A.S. 5 18,126 YesValmas N. 1 2,231 YesVardavas J. 1 138


Vatis A.L. 1 2,382Vatis J.L. 2 5,018Vergottis G. 3 8,978 YesVerveniotis N.M. 1 2,397Vulgaris T. 1 3,046 YesXenios J.E.** 1 1,124Xenios X. 1 998Yannoropulos 1 111Yannoulatos Bros(Navigation Ionienne aVapeur)

16 11,991 Yes

B. Rumania/Bulgaria 15 35,930 4Aravadino & Karavia 1 128 YesBebis C.D. & Sons(Bulgaria)

1 3,603

Dracoulis Bros (Vlassopuloand Gratsos)

6 20,414 Yes

Embiricos M. 1 101 YesKyriakides N.G. 2 5,572 YesNicolaides bros 2 5,776 YesStathatos & Theofilatos 1 143 YesVaziryandjikis C. 1 190C. Southern Russia 64 68,633 8Barbatti M.G. 1 1,465Couppa H. 1 398 YesCouppa Nicolaos 3 7,932 YesCouppa O. 2 825 YesCouroupos P. 1 488 YesDestuni G.G. 1 473 YesDiamantidi D.L. 2 3,151 Yes

APPENDICES 407


Ferendinos A. 1 1,447 YesFrangopulo I. 2 851Logotheti P.S. 2 455 YesMethinity 3 857 YesMoussouri A. 1 1,581Panagiotato G. 2 316 YesSifneo Bros 2 2,856 YesSifneo J. & P. Inglesselis 2 7,206 YesSifneo W.I. 2 731 YesSkanavi A. & SevastopuloG.

19 401 5,034 Yes Yes

Svorono ConstantineSvorono Fotius C. 1 105 YesSvorono F.C. 7 20,117 YesTheofani A. 2 863 YesTheofani Ch.A. 8 6,681 YesTheofani Heirs of Th. 2 1,264 YesTheofani M. & V. 1 821 YesTheofani Th.A. 3 1,400 YesTheofani W.S. 1 664 YesVarvatis P. 1 251 Yes


D. Constantinople & Smyrna 77 103,045 13Abadji & Co 274Aivadoglou Bros 3,603Ambatiellos P. 2,429 YesAnghelatos & Tsitsilianos 2,464 YesAntippa Bros 3,188 YesArvanitidi J. 7 11,905 YesArvanitidi L. & Son 500 YesAtychides S. 2 1,621Calafatas 1 935Caruso 1 2,265Clonisi 1 703Cosmettos & Filicos 1 2,426 YesDemetriades 1 3,100

408 APPENDICES


Elides & Mouca* 1 1,821Focas 2 2,677Glossoiis D.C. 1 597Karasoul & Anastasiades 1 1,083 YesLambros P. 1 301Los Pandelis 1 772Loyadis G. 1 635Mavris 1 785Michalos L. 1 3,406 YesNicolaou M. 2 2,054Nicoloudis C. 1 2,212Nikiforos J. 1 300Pandeli Bros 8 9,867Pandermaly St. 1 698Pantaleon R* (NavigationOrientale)

10 5,020

Papandopulos I. 1 193Pappaleondardos Stam. 2 584Pappas J. & Spanoudakis 1 2,367Pateras Const. 1 2,899 YesPetritsis E. sons 2 5,878Petzalis & Dounias 3 4,533Policantriti G. 1 135Potamianos J. 1 604Rieo M. 1 1,724Siderides S.A. 4 9,597 YesStathi Cornello 1 107Triandafilides & Kalias 1 1,489Vernico Nicol. 2 1,513Vernicos N.J. 1 803Yannoulatos A. 1 816 YesZarifi L. 1 2,159E. Western EuropeMarseilles

33 94,211 12

Cicellis P.G. 1 2,387 YesMichalinudis J. 1 1,464 YesCouppa N. 3 7,932 YesTheonlatos C. 2 4,173 Yes

APPENDICES 409


LondonAmbatiello Bros 3 9,546 YesEmbiricos A.A.(Anglo-Hellenuc & Anglo-Ionian)

8 23,992 Yes

Embiricos P & L.N. 1 2,751 YesScaramanga Bros 8 24,241 YesSechiari G.P. 3 10,931 YesTheofilatos D.J. (ShippingAgencies)

1 622 Yes

(Doresa C.)(Lykiardoptdo & Co)(Frangopulo A.)(Embiricos S.G.)(Embiricos C.L)(Michalinos)(Vergottis)TriesteCostomeni S. & Valmadis 1 2,983RotterdamTheophilatos D. 1 3,189 YesTotal 454 822,906 100 463,643Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1914Notes: * Smyrna. ** Chios. *** Samos

Appendix 4.15 Shipfinance from the Bank of Athens, 1900–14

Date Borrower/Shipowner Name of Ship Tons Built

1900A.Currenti Aglaia Currenti 1,044

Galaxidion 1,1261905

N.Katsoulis Eftimios 990A.Nostragis Vrisiis 993J.P.Piccoulis Beby 1,405

1910G.Andreou Marica 953 1889Assimacos M.D. Assimacos 1,889 1890Callimassiotis DJ. Pytheas 1,748 1895Cosmas Andreas Melpomeni 1,202 1885

410 APPENDICES


Cosmas C. & DJ. Demosthenes 1,437 1889Cosmas M. Aris 1,117 1889Cosmas J. Zafirios

Matsas 1,273 1889Coulouras G. Miaoulis 1,872 1893Coutsopontis S.A. Agia Paraskevi 1,762 1890Crinos A. Orion 2,081 1896Dandria S. StefanoDandria 2,244 1892Domestinis G.D. Mitylene 1,613 1891Domestini & Oekonomou Elpis 1,071 1879


1900K.Hadjipateras Leandros 1,047 1888Michalaros J.Pesmatzoglou 1,010 1882Palios P. Principessa

Aliki 1,024 1883Rigopulos S. Frosso 920 1882Sachtouris P.T. Leonardos 959 1889Sideropulo N. & Zissimo D. Zeus 1,389 1889Valmas N. Agios Nicolaos 1,416 1887Vergottis C. Rokos 2,301 1890Vulgaris T. Stefania 1,939 1896

1914Arvanitidi Sons Chalkydon 2,870 1894N.A. Dallas & A.Gaetano Osmanie 667 1884Karasoul & Athanasiades Carassoul 1,083 1881A.Lioris & D.Cairis Messolonghi 1,653 1874L.Nikolaides Euxeinos 2,891 1901

Source: Selected data from Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1900, 1905, 1910 and 1914

Appendix 4.16 Greek shipping offices in London in 1900

Shipowners/Representing offices Ships NRT Headquarters

A. Ionian Islands 9 13,7641. Vagliano Bros 4 6,231 London2. Mango Doresa 1 1,462 LondonFoscolo & Mango 4 6,071 ConstantinopleB. Andros 4 6,780

APPENDICES 411

Shipowners/Representing offices Ships NRT Headquarters

3. S.G.EmbiricosEmbiricos A. 3 5,185 AndrosEmbiricos G.M. 1 1,595 AndrosC. Chios 5 8,4164. Scaramanga Bros 1 1,835 London5. Michalinos 4 6,581 LondonD. Other 2 2,8396. Galbraith & PembrokeEmbiricos B. 2 2,839 AndrosE. Total NRT represented by London Offices 31,799F. Total NRT of Greek steamship fleet in 1900 142,091% (E)/(F) 22%Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1900


Shipping office/Representing Ships NRT Headquarters

A. lonian islands 3 4,9821. Mango & Doresa 1 2,132 LondonAnargyros S. 1 1,630 Spetses2. Vagliano Bros 1 1,220B. Andros 8 14,1083. C.L.EmbiricosEmbiricos A. 3 5,013 Andros4. S.G.EmbiricosEmbirikos G.M. 4 7,783 AndrosGoulandris Bros 1 1,312 AndrosC. Chios 9 16,5116. Michalinos & Co 4 7,398 London7. Scaramanga Bros 3 5,926 London8. Sechiari P.A. 2 3,187 LondonD. Other 1 1,4769. Galbraith & Pembroke Embiricos Bas. 1 1,476 AndrosE. Total NRT represented by London Offices 21 37,077F. Total NRT of Greek steamship fleet in 1905 259,239% (E)/(F) 14%Source: Lloyd’s Register of shipping, 1905

412 APPENDICES


Shipowners/Representing offices Ships Net tons Headquarters

A. Ionian islands 4 7,8331. C.DoresaLemos Pand. G. 1 886 ChiosSvorono F.C. 3 6,947 MariupolB. Andros 19 33,9272. Embiricos A.A. 8 12,990 LondonEmbiricos Bros 2 4,351 Syros3. Embiricos S.G.Embiricos G.M. 5 10,260 Athens/AndrosGoulandris Bros 1 1,313 Andros4. C.L.Embiricos 3 5,013C. Chios 20 35,5345. Michalinos & CoMichalinos & Co 8 14,955 LondonL.Zarifi 2 3,365 ConstantinopleB.N.Metaxas 1 1,904 CephaloniaD.Negroponte & Saliaris 1 1,619 PiraeusPittas G. 1 387 ChiosVerveniotis 1 1,557 Piraeus6. Scaramanga Bros 4 7,642 London7. Sechiari 2 4,105 London

Shipowners/Representing offices Ships Net tons Headquarters

D. Other 11 17,8618. Mango Co 1 2,031 LondonAnargyros 1 1,630 SpetsesRoussos N.G. 2 2,834 London9. Wigham & RichardsonAmbatiellos E. 4 7,307 LondonAmbatiellos P. 1 1,220 Constantinople10. Galbraith PembrokeEmbirikos B. 2 2,839 SyraE. Total NRT represented by London Offices 54 95,155F. Total NRT of Greek Fleet in 1910 375,770% (E)/(F) 25%Source: Lloyd’s Register ofShipping, 1910

APPENDICES 413


Shipowners/Representing offices Ships Gross tons Headquarters

A. Ionian islands 29 79,4241. Ambatiello Bros 3 9,546Ambatiello P. 1 2,429 Constantinople2. Lykiardopulo & CoLykiardopulo N.D. 7 14,440 Piraeus3. A.Frangopulo & CoNegroponte J.D. & Saliaris Bros 2 5,526 LondonA.S.Vagliano 5 18,126 Athens4. C.DoresaSvorono F.C. 7 19,757 Cephalonia5. Theofilatos D.J. 1 622 London6. VergottisVergottis G. 3 8,978 LondonB. Andros 23 90,9067. C.L.EmbiricosA.A.Embiricos 4 10,892 Andros8. Embiricos A.A. 8 27,007 LondonEmbiricos Bros (National Steam Nav.) 5 18,116 Piraeus9. Embiricos S.GEmbiricos G.M. 9 30,017 AthensGoulandris Bros 1 2,123 Andros10. Embiricos P. & L.N. 1 2,751C. Chios 21 57,50111. Michalinos & CoLemos Michael 1 2,485 LondonMichalinos Maritime & Commercial 6 14,087 PiraeusG.Payavlas 1 2,372 London


N.M.Verveniotis 1 2,397 HydraG.Couviellos 1 98812. Scaramanga Bros 8 24,241 Chios13. Sechiari 3 10,931 ChiosD. Other 1 2,323

14. Galbraith Pembroke Embirikos B. 1 2,323 AndrosE. Total GRT represented by London Offices 230,154F. Total GRT of Greek steamship fleet in 1914 822,906

414 APPENDICES


% (E)/(F) 28%Source: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1914

Appendix 5.1 Average wages on Greek ships (In French francs/month)*

Wages on Andriana Averagewages on100steamships

Speciality 1905 1907 1908 1909 1910

Master 400 400 375 375 330Second mate 130 170 160 160 160Third mate 80 125 110 110 115Firstengineer

400 400 375 378 320

Secondengineer

225 250 225 225 195

Thirdengineer

140 165 150 150 130

Bosun 80 100 90 90 90Donkeyman 90 110 90 90 95Carpenter 75 – 85 85 –Fireman (4) 80 110 80 80 80Seaman (4) 60 70 65 65 65Trimmer 60 60 60 60 50Cook 80 95 90 90 80Steward 80 – 75 75 –Engine boy 35 45 35 35 35Deck boy 30 40 30 30 30Source: Crew lists of 100 Greek steamships in 1910, Aegan Maritime Museum; book of

crew wages of Andriana, 23/6/1908–16/4/1909; Correspondence of A.Syrnasto A.Embirikos 19/7/1906–4/3/1909

Note: Exchange rate of 1 pound sterling and French Franc: 1875, £1 =25.41FF; 1905, £1=25.31FF; 1907, £1=25.43FF; 1908, £1 =125.32FF; 1909, £1=25.36FF

Appendix 6.1 Geographic position of ships lost in the First World War

Area where lost Number of Ships GRT % total

Mediterranean 49 114,337 31Atlantic 30 93,843 26North Sea 19 42,955 12Pacific 1 3,092 1

APPENDICES 415

Area where lost Number of Ships GRT % total

Indian 1 4,140 1Accidents (notrelated to war)

10 12,258 3

Unknown 35 95,783 25Total 147 366,408Average date ofbuild

1,894

Average size of lostships

2,493

Source: Processed data from catalogue of lost ships in Christos E.Dounis, GreekShipping during the First World War. Chronicle oflost Ships, Athens 1991

Appendix 6.2 Yearly losses of Greek ships during the First World War

Year Number of ships GRT % total losses

1915 18 38,115 101916 40 90,226 251917 69 186,167 511918 16 42,341 111919 4 9,559 3Total 147 366,408 100Source: See Appendix 6.1

Appendix 6.3 Tramp freight indices 1910–39

Year Index 1869=100 Index 1913=100

1910 501911 581912 781913 681914 671915 1991916 3651917 6951918 7511919 4901920 374 4271921 166 1621922 130 1271923 123 1211924 121 126

416 APPENDICES

Year Index 1869=100 Index 1913=100

1925 110 1081926 133 124

Year Index 1869 = 100 Index 1913 = 100

1927 122 1201928 112 1101929 115 981930 93 821931 90 851932 88 801933 85 771934 85 811935 88 811936 103 961937 146Sources: For index (1869 = 100), see L.Isserlis, ‘Tramp Shipping Cargoes, and Freights’,

Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, vol. 101, 1938, pp. 53–146, table VIII;for index (1913=100), see Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, 1938, p. 606

Appendix 6.4 Purchasing value of a newbuilding cargo ship of 7,500 dwt, 1900-39

Year (June) Value in sterling pounds

1900 54,0001901 49,2501902 43,0001903 50,5001904 38,7501905 36,5001906 43,0001907 41,0001908 36,0001909 36,2501910 36,5001911 43,0001912 50,5001913 54,0001914 42,5001915 82,5001916 180,0001917 178,500

APPENDICES 417


1918 180,5001919 195,8001920 180,0001921 63,7501922 62,0001923 62,5001924 60,0001925 55,5001926 52,5001927 63,0001928 57,0001929 55,0001930 31,0001931 12,0001932 4,5001933 6,5001934 10,5001935 15,000


1936 32,0001937 62,0001938 34,0001939 55,000Sources: For the years 1900 to 1928 see Nafiika Chronika, 1 January 1932; for the years

1929 to 1939 see Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Mercant Marine, 1910–1939, The Co-existence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis,University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, 1991, table 17, p. 90

Appendix 6.5 Geographic activity of Greek steamships in 1926 and 1936

Area Ships NRT % total

1926A. Northern Europe 314 745,964 17Cardiff 145 337,490London 36 92,617Antwerp 64 161,769Hamburg 69 154,088B. Mediterranean Sea 1,338 1,524,948 34Constantinople 101 115,537

418 APPENDICES


Malta 24 40,548Tunis 48 23,056Sfax 14 18,916Algiers 173 356,458Marseilles 88 154,667Genoa 82 144,504Naples 63 92,684Catania 16 17,312Brindisi 176 95,926Trieste 24 36,246Beirut 58 61,244Rhodes 140 57,864Alexandria 275 277,588Myrsini 13 9,414Smyrna 43 22,984C. Black Sea 496 2,007,088 45D. South America 63 161,612 4Total 2,211 4,439,612 1001936A. Northern Europe 849 2,262,086 30English ports 197 495,583Hamburg 51 105,524Antwerp 169 493,464Rotterdam 281 643,193Stettin 50 292,028Gdansk 90 212,938Oslo 11 19,356B. Mediterranean Sea 890 1,671,741 22Venice 41 103,039Naples 21 39,386


Genoa 45 117,635Tripolis 12 12,775Oran 134 301,807Alexandria 331 700,794Syria/Lebanon 124 135,233Marseilles 44 91,529

APPENDICES 419


Casablanca 16 26,538Tunis 17 34,096Smyrna 105 108,909C. Black Sea 1,630 1,495,607 20D. South America 394 1,075,063 14E. Indian Ocean 95 214,410 3F. Pacific Ocean 252 786,759 11Valparaiso 6 15,823Japan 246 770,936Total 4,110 7,505,666 100Sources: Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1926, pp. 38–44; EEN, 1936, pp. 334–

43

Appendix 6.6 Arrivals of ships at the port of La Plata, 1920-38

British Greek Total

Year ships NRT % total ships NRT % total ships NRT

1920 164 540,969

61 2 5,571 1 273 887,900

1921 91 249,394

44 232 561,053

1922 925 3,117,116

45 84 210,692

3 2,075 6,895,055

19231924 1,343 4,689,

94547 2,949 10,011,

33119251926 1,242 4,419,

30145 2,784 9,723,

4491927 1,563 5,620,

18147 3,376 11,862,

7371927 1,410 5,110,

23544 292 746,

4496 3,323 11,716,

05319281929 1,375 5,085,

71243 333 885,

6778 3,325 11,701,

9241930 1,064 4,289,

08243 94 259,

5783 2,557 9,886,

8121931 1,402 5,116,

49644 282 769,

9007 3,216 11,547,

7151932 1,164 4,395,

19843 239 650,

6306 2,744 10,128,

146

420 APPENDICES

British Greek Total

Year ships NRT % total ships NRT % total ships NRT

1933 844 3,441,059

37 300 822,470

9 2,511 9,253,939

1934 933 3,706,340

37 414 1,158,472

11 2,751 10,075,594

1935 1,069 4,154,924

40 394 1,132,140

11 2,852 10,389,175

1936 934 3 ,788,264

38 394 1,075,063

11 2,766 10,047,353

1937 1,064 4,214,163

37 519 1,425,602

12 3,245 11,408,981

1938 661 3,041,158

34 169 468,521

5 2,349 9,021,010

Sources: Data compiled from the Reports on the Financial, Commercial and IndustrialSituation of Argentina and Greece, Department of Overseas Trade, London,HMSO, 1920–38

Appendix 6.7 International fleet of dry-cargo tramp-ships (ships over 2,500 GRT)

Flag GRT % total

British 3,826,000 39Greek 1,583,000 16Japanese 1,100,000 11Norwegian 800,000 8Italian 660,000 7German 480,000 5Swedish 225,000 2Spain 220,000 2Netherlands 180,000 2Denmark 150,000 2France 134,000 1Others 474,000 5Total 9,832,000 100Sources: Statistical data calculated by the Tramp Shipping Administrative Committee,

published by EEN, 1938, p. 1019

Appendix 6.8 Geographic position of R&K steamers in September 1938

Area Ships GRT % total

A. Northern Europe 119,062 49Rotterdam 4,729Rotterdam 6,042

APPENDICES 421


Rotterdam 4,386Rotterdam 3,986Rotterdam 4,386Rotterdam 4,853Rotterdam 5,295Rotterdam 5,687Avonmouth 4,261Workington 5,446Emden 3,816Liverpool 4,739Nordenham 4,230Hamburg 3,325Hamburg 5,324Barry 4,207London 3,876Antwerp 4,292Antwerp 5,252Hull 5,403Hull 3,201Ahus 5,896London 5,729Gdynia 4,826Emden 5,875B. Mediterranean Sea 18,583 8Mytilini 3,489Piraeus 5,685Volo 5,188Salonica 4,221


C. Black Sea 32,403 14Odessa 4,151Odessa 5,275Odessa 4,340Odessa 4,732Kertch 3,742Nicolaieff 5,182Poti 4,981

422 APPENDICES


D. Atlantic Ocean 39,677 16Rio 5,548Rio 3,578Rio 5,000Tampa 6,651Port Campha 5,820Port Campha 5,166Mobile 7,914E. Indian Ocean 10,692 4Fremantle 5,476Fremantle 5,216F. Pacific Ocean 21,568 9Wakamatsu 4,371Sydney 5,214Port Lincoln 6,696Wallaroo 5,287Total 241,985 100Sources: Weekly report of the position of steamers on 26 September 1938, Rethymnis &

Kulukundis Ltd, Private Collection of Yannis Diniakos

Appendix 6.9 Greek shipping offices in London, 1929–30

Office Ships GRT Representing

A. Cephalonia/Ithaca 11 46,3091. Stathatos & Co 1 4,274 1 company2. Vlassopulo Bros 4 14,328 43. A.Frangopulo 3 14,316 14. Vergottis Ld. 2 9,845 25. Dracoulis 1 3,546 1B. Andros 8 35,3316. S.G.Embiricos 6 27,809 27. J.D.Corcodilos 2 7,542 2C. Kassos 11 46,1548. Rethymnis & Kulukundis 11 46,154 2D. Chios 18 59,9559. C.Michalos & Co 9 26,730 610. S.Livanos & Co 9 33,225 3E. Others 5 20,95511. Alec Gripaios 1 5,081 112. Pandelis & Co 3 11,747 1

APPENDICES 423

Office Ships GRT Representing

13. Neil & Pandelis 1 4,167 1Total 53 208,64Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1929/30

Appendix 6.10 Greek shipping offices in London, 1938–9

Office/Represented firms Ships GRT % total

A. Cephalonia/Ithaca 36 170,061 201. Dracoulis Ltd 7 30,976Dracoulis G.C. 5 22,101Dracoulis G.A. 1 5,329Vlassopulos El. 1 3,5462. Vlassopulo Bros 2 7,693Vlassopulo Bros 1 4,083Vlassopol Spir. 1 3,6103. Stathatos D. 6 30,375Stathatos D. 4 19,958Callinicos A.D. 2 10,4174. Adelphi Vergottis 3 17,656Eptanisos Steam. 2 11,323Vergottis Rokos 1 6,2435. Vergottis Ld. 6 28,887Myrtoon Steam. 1 4,706Aegeon S.S. Co 3 15,927Vergottis Andreas 2 8,2546. A. Lusi Ld 4 16,942Laimos C.P. & C.P.Ponticos 1 3,845Panas P.E. 1 3,299Lyras P. 1 4,798Galaxias Steam. 1 5,0007. Lykiardopulo 8 38,162Lykiardopulo N.D. 7 33,585Yannoulatos Pan. 1 4,577B. Andros 36 146,588 178. Goulandris Bros 22 87,985Goulandris E.A. 16 69,248Goulandris E.A. 1 3,470Goulandris N.J. 1 191Goulandris Heirs of late Petros 1 3,551

424 APPENDICES


Kyrtatas A.A. 1 4,784Valmas M.L. 1 2,080Koutsoukos B.&J. 1 4,6619. Embiricos S.G. 14 58,603Embiricos G.M. 2 1,615Embiricos S.G. 8 36,738Embiricos G.N. 1 3,470Embiricos C.E. 3 12,660Embiricos Leon. N. 1 4,120D. Chios 46 197,449 2310. C.Michalos & Co 16 59,363Michalinos Marit. 7 19,090Lagoutis Maria 1 2,216Hadjipateras J.C. 2 9,649Hadjipateras C. & Sons 1 4,573Hadjipateras J.C. & N.C. 1 4,573Pateras Ch.N. & Co 1 4,202Pateras Costas N. & Elias N. 1 4,362Pateras Ch.N. 1 5,719Margaronis 1 4,979


11. Michalinos & Co 1 4,343Tachmindji M. 1 4,34312. S.Livanos 21 100,500Livanos N.G. 12 57,223Livanos S.G. 3 14,414Livanos Maritime 2 10,877Livanos S.G. & Livanos Maritime 1 4,835Pateras Vas. J. 1 4,240Ktistakis Georgios 1 4,291Proios Brothers 1 4,62013. Lemos & Pateras 8 33,243Lemos Ant.G.Sons 3 11,775Lemos G.Ch. 1 3,862Pateras Anastas. 2 7,651Pateras DJ. & Sons 2 9,955C.Kassos 64 302,960 36

APPENDICES 425


14. Rethymnis dr Kulukundis 50 229,626Kulukundis Shipping 22 111,977Rethymnis & Kulukundis 2 7,785Kassos Steam Navigation 7 31,557Cosmetto J.A. & Kulukundis 3 16,437Inglessi D. fils 5 10,607Margaronis Isidoros 3 14,989Los S. & E.C.Andreadis 1 3,816Pateras Bros 2 9,305Roussos A. & Co 1 4,576Xilas Bros 1 3,742Xilas Bros & A.Constant. 1 5,875Lemos Brothers & Theseus 1 4,221Lemos Dem. Pan. Milt. G. 1 4,73915. George Nicolaou 5 22,654Nicolaou (Hellas)Ltd 8 45,997Yannaghas 1 4,68316. Hadjilias Ld. 5 22,634Hadjilias Elias E. 3 13,442Hadjilias E.P, G.P., P.E. 1 4,352Hadjilias Manuel 1 4,860E. Other 8 36,548 4Fred Hunter 3 14,266Pappas Andreas 1 14,266Cosmas A.I. 4,181Stavrou 1 5,15217. Neil & Pandelis 5 22,282Nikiforos J.M. 2 8,981Proios C.M. 4,620Pateras DJ. 4,330Angelos John 4,351Total GRT operated from London 190 853,606Total GRT of Greek fleet 1,889,269% total GRT operated from London to total GRT of Greekfleet

45%

Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping 1938–9

426 APPENDICES

Appendix 6.11 Greek owners of steamships in 1937–8 according to the headquarters oftheir firms

Shipowner Ships GRT % total Other office

A. Greece 647 1,727,182 96Aegeon S.S. Co., Ld 4 20,286 Vergottis LdAgrioyiannis A. 1 107Alexatos J. 1 1,406Alexatos Sp. & Marettos H. 1 1,406Andreadi Mrs P.G. 1 4,111Andreadis G.F. 1 4,227Andreatos A. 1 5,172Andreou G. 1 4,391Andronicos N. & G. 1 1,518Angelidis George 1 2,107Angelos John 1 4,351 Neil & PandelisAntipas P.S. 2 3,651Antoniou N.D. 1 1,393Athanassulis, Heirs of Gabriel N. 2 3,921Baikas, Pothitos E. 1 1,334Benierakis B.E. 1 5,438Boyazides N.D. & Co 2 6,290Boyazides Thras.L. & Co 2 7,846Bulgaris Charalambos 1 4,603Bulgaris N.Th. 1 4,567Canellopulos A. & Co 1 464Callimanopulos P.G. (Hellenic Lines) 6 13,118Callinicos Anast.Denis 2 10,417 Stathatos & CoCallinicos Anast.Theod. 1 5,655Cambanis, The Heirs of the late L.Z. 4 18,402Caravias E.D. 4 18402Caravias G.G. 1 3,843Carras Brothers 4 19,065Carras John 1 4,355 A. LusiCastanos S. & Sons 1 5,217Chalaris Antonios G. 2 1,720Chandris John D. 9 37,695Christofides John 1 725Christofidi Stavrou 1 1,437Christopulos P. 1 2,038Condylis Dimitrios L. 1 3,923

APPENDICES 427


Condylis George N. 1 4,439 S.G.Embiricos LdCosmas A.I. 1 4,933 Fred Hunter LdCosmetto J.A. & Kulukundis Bros 4 26,835 R&KCotzias N.D. 2 4,025Coulouras Ath. 3 13,280Coulouthros J.A. & N.N. Embiricos 4 18,362Coumantaros Bros 4 19,541Coumbis D., Xenios D. & Co 1 3,574Criezis D.N. 1 143Dambassis D.J. 3 13,216Daniolos John G. 1 5,143


Destounis Panaghis B. 1 3,299 Wigham & RichardsonDilaveris & Nicolarakos 1 269Dracoulis George A. 1 5,329Dracoulis G.C. 5 18,555Eleftheriades Mme Z. 1 164Eleftheriades Michael 1 170Embiricos C.E. 3 12,660 Embiricos S.G.Embiricos George Milt. 2 1,615Embiricos Geo.Nic. 1 3,470Embiricos Leonidas A. (NationalSteam Navigation)

3 14,195

Embiricos Leonidas N. 1 4,120 Embiricos S.G.Embiricos S.G. 7 27,651 Embiricos S.G.Epiphaniades, T.N. 6 13,690Epirotiki Steamship Navigation Co‘George Potamianos’

5 3,060

Eustathiou Nicolas & Co 3 16,752 R&KFafalios Stamatios & Dim. 2 7,252Fatsis Lambros M. 3,646 A. LusiFilinis M.N. 3,111Fouskas E. & A. 314Frangos Markos 3,442Galakis John Th. 4,211Georgandis Antonios G. 1,187Georgandis Brothers 3 11,929Georgilis G.A. 1 3,748 Neil & Pandelis

428 APPENDICES


Georgilis P. & A.Cosmas 1 4,461Georgopulos D. 1 3,681Goulandris Bros 16 74,480 Goulandris Bros*

Goulandris D.J. 1 3,531 Goulandris Bros*

Goulandris D. & M. 1 1,190 Goulandris Bros*

Goulandris E.A. 1 3,470 Goulandris Bros*

Goulandris J.N. 1 3,651 Goulandris Bros*

Goulandris N.J. 1 191Goulandris Heirs of the late PetrosJ.

1 3,551 Goulandris Bros*

Goumas J.G. 1 3,429Gounaris A.Z. & G.Z. 1 4,407Gounaris G.Z. 1 2,238Gratsos George D. Sons 3 11,662Gripaios A. 1 3,892Hadjiconstanti Bros 1 468Hadjilias Elias E. (Nereus S.N. CoLd)

5 24,395 Hadjilias & Co

Hadjilias E.P., G.P., P.E. 1 4,352Hadjilias Manuel 1 4,860Hadjipateras J.C., N.C., & A.C 1 3,661 Michalos & Co LdHadjipateras John C. & AdamantiosC.

2 8,371 Michalos & Co Ld

Hadjidakis George F. 2 589Handris Steamship Co Ld 1 1,706 R&KHellenic Coast Lines Co. Ld(Yannoulatos)

29 31,737


Hellenic Shipping & Commercial 1 875Iliopulos Ilias 1 2,527Inglessi D. fils SA. (Navigation deSamos)

5 10,593

Ionion Steamship Co Ld 2 12,995 Vergottis Ldlossifoglu Socrates 3 17,512(Hellenic Tramp S.S. Co Ld)Karagiorgis Michail A. 2 1,768Karavias Emmanuel 1 294Kassos Steam Navigation (Rethymnis,Pneumaticos and Yannaghas)

8 35,416 R&K

APPENDICES 429


Katopodis S. 1 3,175Kottakis P.Th. 1 1,070Katsourakis G. 1 858Kavounides N. & Ch. 1 223Kerambos D. & Co 1 317Keranis Leonidas G. 1 3,508Kirtatas Bros 1 2,529Koletsis Panos N. & Georges M.Katzourakis

1 667

Koniordos Brothers 1 489Koryzis Stylianos 2 955Koufos Demetrios N. 2 3,687Koutsoukos Basil & John 1 4,661 Goulandris BrosKrinis Georgios S. 1 365Ktistakis Georgios K. 1 4,291 S. livanos & Co LdKulukundis Brothers (Tramp ShippingDevelopment; Theseus S.S. Co Ld;Proteus S.S. Co Ld; Rethymnis &Kulukundis Hellas)

16 83,072 R&K

Kulukundis Brothers & C.N. Pateras 1 5,313 R&KKulukundis Brothers & NikitasKampouris

1 3,693 Kampouris N.

Kulukundis Brothers & Partners 1 3,566 R&KKydoniefs D.A. 1 3,874Kydoniefs Michael E. 1 4,215Kydoniefs N.A. 1 4,393Kydoniefs Petros A. 1 4,129Kyriakides K. 1 313Kyriakides N.G. 3 9,481Kyrtatas A.A. 1 4,784Lagoutis Mme Maria N. & Evang.G.Angelidis

1 2,216 C.Michalos

Laimos C.P. & J.C.Ponticos 1 3,845 A.LusiLakoniki Steam Nav. Co 2 1,626Lemos Andr. Geo. & Dem. and TrampShipping Dev.

1 4,340 R&K

Lemos Brothers & Theseus S.S. Co Ld 1 4,221 R&KLemos Constantine Marcou 1 1,364Lemos Constantine Michael 1 4,144 R&K

430 APPENDICES


Lemos Costis E. 1 4,707Lemos Dem., Pan., Milt. G.Emm., Pan., and Rethymnis& Kulukundis (Hellas Ld) 1 4,739 R&KLemos George Christos 1 3,862Lemos P.C. & G.C. 1 4,419Lemos S.A. & P.A. 2 8,046 S. LivanosLemos Spiros A. 1 3,729 S. LivanosLivanos Bros 3 13,249 S. Livanos*Livanos J.G. 1 1,926 S. Livanos*Livanos N.G. 13 57,059 S. Livanos*(Theofano Maritime Co Ld)Livanos S.G. 3 14,455 S. Livanos*Los Dimitrios M. 1 1,882Los S. & C.M. & E.C. Andreades 1 3,816Louloudis G.N. 2 5,191 Goulandris BrosLoverdos Theodore S. 1 509Lykiardopulo N.D. 8 36,286 Lykiardopulo*Lykiardopulo RN. & G.N. 1 5,085 LykiardopuloLykouris J. 2 868Lyras MJ. & Co 2 8,082Lyras P. 1 4,798 A. LusiMalamos C. 1 4,299Macris Pandelis N. 1 2,082Maniatis N.G. 1 149Mantacas Bros 1 3,246Marchessini P.D. 1 3,557Margaronis D.P. 1 4,979 C. MichalosMargaronis Isidoros, Anastassios 3 143,989 R&K& George (OceanosMaritime Steamship Co)Maris N. 1 4,195Martis S.S. Co Ld 1 2,483 R&KMatsas Loucas & Sons 3 586Matsoukis D. 1 751Mavris J.G. & P. Diacon Zadeh 1 2,143 Diacon ZadehMavros B.G. & S.N. Mendrinos 1 3,726Mazaraki A. & C. 1 3,553Mazarakis D.C. & J.C. 1 5,411

APPENDICES 431


Michalinos Maritime & 7 22,106 C. MichalosCommercial Co LdMichalitsianos E.M. 4,937 Vergottis LdMoraitis N.A. & E.G. Loucas 330Moraitis N.G. 3,576Nasos E. & Th. Antippas 303Nausicaa Shipping Co Ld 6,559Neil & Pandelis (Greece) 3,714 Neil & PandelisNicolaou Georgios 6 34,680 George NicolaouNikiforos John M. 1 4,745 Neil & PandelisNomicos Loukas N. 5 5,381Nomicos Petros M. Ld 14 39,865Pagasitikos Steamship Co 2 720Palaiocrassas J.D. 1 1,457Panas G.E. 1 2,495


Pandakis Demetrio Z. 1 367Pantaleon D. Sons 1 4,248Papadeas John 1 5,709Papadimitriou Theo. 2 6,726Papageorgiou Const. 1 389Papayannakis George J. 2 2,240Papoulias D. & K.Tsesmelis 1 792Pappas Andreas 1 4,181 Fred HunterPappas G. & S. Eleftheriades 1 1,054Pappas John & Co 1 153Patazis A. & G. Goumas 1 118Pateras Bros 2 8,521 (R&K for 4,729

GRT; Michalinosfor 3,792)

Pateras Ch.N. 1 5,719 C.Michalos & CoPateras Ch.N. & N. 1 4,202 C.Michalos & CoPateras Costas N. & Elias N. 1 4,362 C.Michalos & CoPateras DJ. 1 4,330 Neil & PandelisPateras Demetrius A. 2 7,651Pateras Diamantis J. & Sons 2 9,955Pateras Vas. J. 4,240 S.Livanos & Co

432 APPENDICES


Peppas Christos 1 1,800Perivolaris S. 1 4,584 S.Livanos & CoPerris S. D. & D.A. Tsatsaronis 1Petas K. 1 128Petroutsi C.A. 1 3,435 PetroutsisPetsalis K. 1 231Pezas A.K. 2 4,218Pheax Shipping Co Ld 1 7,188Piangos M.N. 1 4,499 Goulandris BrosPinotsis G. 2 387Pittas G.N. Bros & Co 3 6,868Politis J. & W. Coums 319Polychronidou Olga & K. Liakasitis 1 123Proios C.M. 2 8,856 Neil & PandelisProtopapas Panos 2 7,330Rallias N.D. 1 3,860Raptakis Anthony L. & 1 3,547Nicolas G.RoussosRethymnis & Kulukundis 2 7,785 R&K(Hellas) Ld & Const. Scarvelis 5Rigas M. & E. 1 137Rossolimos Basile S. 1 4,540Rousso Bros & Louloudi Bros 1 904Roussos A. & Co 1 4,576 R&KSachtouris P. Th. 1 146Samothrakis Zacharias A. 1 3,885Seretis D. 2 388Seretis E. & G. 1 129Sifneo Brothers 1 1,005Sigalas Brothers 3 6,275Sigalas G.Th. 1 2,425Sitinas M. & Co 2 8,646 S.G.Embiricos


Societe Commerciale et 3 11,819d’ Armament Soc. Anon.Stafilopatis Th.F. 2 3,625Stathatos G.N. 2 9,414

APPENDICES 433


Stavrou J. & Co 1 5,152 Fred HunterSteriotis M.J. 1 2,399Stoforos Ef. (Atmoploia Parnassidos) 2 534Strifoulis E. & K., A.Siatras & MmeS.Hadjiconstanti

1 125

Stringo George C. 1 276Synodinos Bros 4 7,651Tachmindji John A. 1 3,313Tachmindji Michael A. 1 4,343 Michalinos & CoTatakis A.M. 1 4,271Teryazos Theodoros L. 9 16,359Theofanides S. 1 1,134Theophilatos E. 1 2,282Theseus Steamship Co 1 4,371 R&KToyias Alcibiades 1 489Toyias E.K. 1 1,092Toyias John S.S. Co 1 1,433Tricoglu E.M. 1 5,175Trilivas G. 1 4,514Tsanopulos B.D. 1 268Valmas Michael L. 1 2,080 Goulandris BrosVassiliou John 1 1,781 P.Wigham

RichardsonVayannis & Caraictides 523Veliotis Eleftherios 1 1,192Venetzianos P. & A. 1 423Venizelos K.E. 1 5,005Vergottis Andreas 1 3,895 Vergottis LdVergottis Georgios 1 5,123 Vergottis LdVergottis Gerassimos, Cargo 1 919 C.MichalosSteamship Co Ld,& G.Vergottis SonsVergottis Rokos 3 14,316Vernicos E.N. 1 591Vernicos M.N. 1 1,594Vernicos N.E. 3 948Vestarchis A. 1 6,067Vlachakis Leonidas 1 3,404Vlassopulos Eleftherios 1 3,546 Dracoulis Ld

434 APPENDICES


Vlassopulos Aristotle G. 1 3,283Vlassopulos I.N. & others 1 4,225 Vlassopulo BrosVlassopulos Stylianos N. 1 4,083 Vlassopulo BrosVrionis E. 1 313Vrondisis J.A. 1 2,690Xenios E. & Christoforides 1 3,699Xylas Bros 1 3,742 R&KXylas Bros & A. Constantinidis 1 4,574 R&KXylas Michael M. 1 4,810Yannoulatos George 2 8,156


Yannoulatos Panaghis 1 4,557 Lykiardopulo & Co LdZoiopulos Ath. 1 1,354B.Western Europe 6 25,113Genoa(Agency)(Vintiadis E.)LondonStathatos Demetrius D. 4 19,958(Agencies)(Dracoulis Ld)(Vlassopulo Bros)(Vergottis Ld)(Lusi Ld)(Lykiardopulo)(Goulandris Bros)(Embiricos S.G.)(Michalos C.)(Michalinos)(Livanos S.)(Rethymnis & Kulukundis)or (R&K)(George Nicolaou)(Hadjilias Ld)(Fred Hunter)(Neil Pandelis)(Wigham Richardson)

APPENDICES 435


ParisEmbiricos Andrew Maris,Maris Pericles 1 4,785Kokotos George H. 1 370(Agencies)(Naftilos)C. Other 17 44,340AlexandriaAntoniou George 1 151Deftereos Basilios P. 1 1,383Hamozlou Marie 1 339Pithis Bros & Co 2 7,726Sapovalos Basile 1 3,338(Agency)(Kampouris N.)Buenos AiresOnassis A.S. 2 10,843Constantinople(Agencies)(Diacou Zadeh)(Pappas G.)RumaniaCourouclis Nicolaos D. 1 1,755Georgiades D.B. & Sofianos S.A. 1 2,187Matsoukis Jean G. 1 122Papadakis A.G. 3 6,086Portolo George 2 6,800


VlassopolSpiridion N.

1 3,610 VlassopuloBros

(Agencies)(PetroutsisC.A.)Total 671 1,796,635Sources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1937–8Note: * These agencies do not appear in Lloyd’s Register of Shipping in these particular

companies but from other information we know that they were represented bythese particular London offices

436 APPENDICES

Appendix 8.1 Geographic position of ships lost in the Second World War

Area where lost Number of ships GRT

Atlantic Ocean 70 295,218Mediterranean Sea 144 244,168North Sea 42 179,365Indian Ocean 14 55,376Pacific Ocean 19 59,165Unknown 140 539,061Total 429 1,372,353Average size of lost ships 3,199Source: Processed data from catalogue of lost ships in Babouris, The Greek Merchant

Marine during the Last War, Athens, 1949

Appendix 8.2 Yearly losses of Greek ships during the Second World War

Year Number of ships GRT % Total losses

1939 16 61,939 51940 87 341,144 251941 156 377,123 271942 63 251,753 181943 26 111,598 81944 12 30,258 2Unknown 69 198,538 15Total 429 1,372,353 100Sources: See Appendix 8.1

Appendix 9.1 The evolution of the Greek-owned fleet in the second half of the twentiethcentury, (in thousand GRT)

Year Greek flag fleet Greek-ownedfleet

Rate ofincrease %

World fleet Rate ofincrease %

1949 1,301 2,377 82,3001950 1,265 2,930 23 84,600 31951 1,239 3,642 24 87,200 31952 1,176 4,030 11 90,200 31953 1,140 4,738 18 93,400 4

Year Greek flagfleet

Greek-owned fleet

Rate ofincrease %


1954 1,242 5,945 25 97,400 41955 1,270 6,906 16 100,600 31956 1,444 8,533 24 105,200 5

APPENDICES 437


Greek-owned fleet

Rate ofincrease %


1957 1,576 10,543 24 110,200 51958 2,275 11,899 13 118,000 71959 3,892 12,456 5 124,900 61960 5,575 12,201 −2 129,800 41961 6,519 13,213 8 135,900 51962 7,009 13,300 1 140,000 31963 7,503 15,025 13 145,900 41964 7,267 16,498 10 153,000 51965 7,198 18,575 13 160,400 51966 7,518 19,725 6 171,100 71967 7,665 21,821 11 182,100 61968 8,739 23,897 10 194,200 71969 10,564 26,932 13 211,700 91970 12,850 30,899 15 227,490 71971 14,562 34,102 10 247,203 91972 18,660 39,068 15 268,340 91973 21,832 42,625 9 289,926 81974 22,741 45,368 6 311,323 71975 25,108 48,298 6 342,162 101976 28,661 50,585 5 372,000 91977 33,752 52,864 5 393,678 61978 36,314 52,508 −1 406,002 31979 38,570 52,950 1 413,021 21980 41,422 53,626 1 419,911 21981 42,289 54,318 1 420,834 01982 42,289 53,455 −2 424,742 −11983 38,057 56,139 5 422,590 −11984 35,781 53,601 −5 418,682 −11985 27,765 * 46,909 −13 416,268 −11986 24,183 45,104 −4 404,910 −31987 21,007 47,537 5 403,498 01988 19,759 48,046** 1 403,406 01989 19,250 45,554** −5 410,481 21990 20,750 46,580** 2 423,627 31991 22,752 47,907** 3 436,026 31992 24,542 53,891** 12 444,304 21993 25,486 56,918** 6 469,151 6

438 APPENDICES


Greek-owned fleet

Rate ofincrease %


Sources: Naftika Chronika, 1974, 1990; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, Statistical Tables,1990; OECD, Maritime Transport, Paris, 1990; Helen Thanopulou,International and Greek Shipping. Changes in the International Division ofLabour. The Case of the Greek Merchant Fleet, Athens, Papazissis, 1994,tables A.1.VIII, A.1.IX, B.4.I, B.4.VIII and appendix 1.3; N.E.Mikelis, ‘GreekControlled Shipping’, Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 12 March1993

Notes: * Data on Greek flag and Greek-owned flag fleet from Naftika Chronika before1985 include all merchant and passenger ships above 100 GRT. After 1985they include bulk carriers, tankers, combination carriers and other cargo shipsof 1,000 GRT and over. ** Data from N.E.Mikelis

Appendix 9.2 Merchant fleets of selected traditional maritime nations under nationalflags, 1948–92, (in million GRT)

Year Japan Norway USA UK

1948 1 4.3 29.2 181949 1.6 4.9 27.8 181950 1.9 5.4 27.5 18.21951 2.2 5.8 27.3 18.51952 2.8 5.9 27.2 18.61953 3.2 6.3 27.2 18.61954 3.6 6.8 27.3 191955 3.7 7.2 26.4 19.41956 4.1 8 26.1 19.51957 4.4 8.5 25.9 19.91958 5.5 9.4 25.6 20.31959 6.3 10.4 25.3 20.81960 6.9 11.2 24.8 21.11961 7.9 12 24.2 21.51962 8.9 12.5 23.3 21.71963 10 13.7 23.1 21.61964 10.8 14.5 22.4 21.51965 12 15.6 21.5 21.51966 14.7 16.4 20.8 21.51967 16.9 18.2 20.3 21.71968 19.6 19.7 19.7 21.91969 24 19.7 19.5 23.81970 27 19.3 18.5 25.81971 30.5 21.7 16.3 27.31972 34.9 23.5 15 28.6

APPENDICES 439

Year Japan Norway USA UK

1973 36.8 23.6 14.9 30.21974 38.7 24.8 14.4 31.61975 39.7 26.1 14.6 33.21976 41.7 27.9 14.9 32.91977 40 27.8 15.3 31.61978 39.2 26.1 16.2 30.91979 40 22.3 17.5 27.91980 40.9 22 18.5 27.11981 40.8 21.7 18.9 25.41982 41.6 21.9 19.1 22.51983 40.7 19.2 19.6 19.11984 40.3 17.7 19.3 15.91985 39.9 15.3 19.5 14.31986 38.5 9.3 19.9 11.61987 35.9 6.4 20.2 8.51988 32.1 9.3 20.8 8.31989 28 15.6 20.6 7.61990 27.1 23.4 21.3 6.71991 26.4 23.6 20.3 61992 25.4 22.6 18.2 6Source: Lloyd’s Register ofShipping, Statistical Tables, June 1992

Appendix 9.3 Real ownership of world fleet by leading maritime nations, (milliondeadweight tons)

1984 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992

Greek-owned

98.6 87.9 85 81.9 84.4 100.6

Greek flag 62.2 42.8 36.4f.o.c. 36.4 45.2 48U.SA.-owned

78.9 68.1 59.1

U.S.A.flag

29.1 29.1

f.o.c. 49.8 39.0Japanese-owned

87.5 88.5 90.2

Japaneseflag

64.6 54.7

f.o.c. 22.9 33.8

440 APPENDICES

1984 1987 1988 1989 1990 1992

Norwegian-owned

38.6 26.3 41 44.1 55.4 54.1

Norwegian flag

30.6 9.6

f.o.c. 8 16.7Sources: See Appendix 9.1 and C.J.Dean, ‘The Fleet Controlled by the European

Community. Present Status and Some Historic Trends’, Lloyd’s Register ofShipping, a paper for the 5th International Congress of the InternationalMaritime Association of East Mediterranean, Athens, 28 May–1 June 1990;Table 10.5

Appendix 10.1 Twentieth century shipowning families according to place of origin (1900–94)***

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GREECEA. AEGEAN ISLANDSAmorgosVekris i/war i/warVlavianos pWWIIDendrinos 1910sMatsas 1890sFostieris 1937 WWIIAndrosAndreou 1930 1942Assimacos 1907 1930sBeis 1923 1932Bistis 1913 1924Caristinakis 1911 1930Condylis 1906Coulouthros 1900sDambassis 1899Daniolos 1911 1934Diapoulis 1926 1932Embiricos 1882Fakis 1915 1920Falangas 1923 1932Fountos 1971Goulandris 1902Gounaris 1925 1940Hadoulis 1923

APPENDICES 441

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Kairis pWWIIKambanis 1907Keranis 1925Konstadakis 1924 1929Kottakis 1930sKoutsoukos 1928 1940Kydoniefs 1911Kyrtatas 1910Loukissas 1911 1915Logothetis 1922 1933Louloudis 1931Malamos 1933 1962Mandakas 1899 1930Maris 1921Mavros 1931Moraitis 1893 1908Palaiocrassas 1926Pantazis 1963Piangos 1928 1941Polemis 1905Porfyratos pWWIIRallias 1921Sakelliou 1926 1933Symbouras 1925Syrmas 1923 1930Tatakis 1925Trikoglou 1919Tsatsomoiros 1926 1937Vestarchis 1928Vlachakis 1926 1940Voyatzides 1910 1934Voulgaris 1923 1933Vrondissis 1925 1937ChiosAndreades 1900sAngelakos 1970sAngelos 1931Angelicoussis 1950Angelidis 1910 i/war

442 APPENDICES

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Apodiakos pWWIIAspiotis pWWIIBachas 1970sBelegris pWWIIBousses pWWIICaminis 1963Carras 1907Caroussis 1900sChalkoussis 1960Chalkias 1947Chandris 1914Choulis 1969Christoforidis i/warDemades i/war 1962Fafalios 1924

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Fatsis 1932Fisfis pWWIIFrangos 1924Galakis 1921Gerimoglou 1978Georgantis 1909Georgilis 1918 1940sGlyptis 1928Katsambis pWWIIKallimasias 1978Kallimassiotis i/war i/warKatsikas 1960sKaravolos 1961Kastanos 1908 1960sKefalas pWWIIKokalis pWWIIKolonas pWWIIKontomanis pWWIIKontos pWWIIKouloukas pWWIIKtistakis 1911

APPENDICES 443

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Livanos 1902Los 1916Madias pWWIIMamalis i/war 1960sMartakis i/war 1960sMattheos 1964Margaronis 1897Mavrogordatos 1905 i/warMelis i/warMichalinos 1892 1940Michalos 1910Negrepontis 1900s i/warNikolakis 1897 i/warNotias pWWIIPalios A. 1916 1919Palios S. 1972Pantelidis pWWIIPapalas 1890Papalios 1950sPappas 1930sPappis i/warPerris 1910s i/warPlatis pWWIIPloumis pWWIIPikoulis 1963Pithis 1910s i/warPittas 1907Peratikos 1950sPerivolaris 1923Poulmentis pWWIIPoutous i/war 1951Prinias pWWIIProios 1923

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Psaros i/warPsilos 1923Revithis pWWII

444 APPENDICES

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Saliaris 1893 1930sSarantis pWWIISideris 1923Skarvelis 1926Skoufalos 1961Stravelakis 1962Tachmintzis 1928Tsangaris pWWIITsakos 1970Tsimblis 1964Tsouros 1910 i/warVassilakis 1898 1930sVassiliades i/warVeniamis 1977Volikas 1900s i/warXenios 1912Xylas 1914Yemelos 1968Zafirakis 1910s 1930sZanaras i/warChios (Oinoussai)Angelidakis pWWIIAndreadis i/warArkadis pWWIIChalkias i/warHadjiandonakis i/warHadjipateras 1905Georgilis 1918Kolakis pWWIIKostis 1969Kritikos 1960Lemos 1905Lignos 1925Lyras 1908Mantzavinos pWWIIMattheos 1938Mavrophilipas i/warNikiforos i/warNikolos 1947

APPENDICES 445

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Papapontikos 1958Pateras 1905Pontikos 1908Samonas pWWIISkinitis 1937Tserdos pWWIIYannakis pWWIIEuboiaBenakis i/warToyias 1922 1950s

Enter* Leave**

HydraCoulouras 1914 1950sBrouskos 1935Kyriakopulos 1910sMethenitis 1964Martinos 1964Protopappas 1931Rassoyanis 1900s 1913Sachtouris i/warVerveniotis 1905 WWIIkariaRaptis pWWIISpanos pWWIIKarpathosDiakomanolis 1970KassosAntoniou 1913 1941Diacakis 1901Emiris 1904 1916Hadjiilias 1902Kambouris 1935 1955Kapotas 1944 1962Kathreptis 1960 1977Kulukundis 1899Lendakis 1948Makris 1940s 1964

446 APPENDICES

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Malandris 1896 1916Markou 1925Mastrandreas 1959Mavroleon 1900sMavris 1919 1937Minakoulis 1933 1973Nikolaou 1901Nikolaidies 1938 1965Papadakis 1928Papadimitriou 1891Papanicolaou 1967Pneumaticos 1898Protopappas 1937 1958Rethymnis 1903Sitinas 1933Sorotos 1954Tsampouniaris 1920 1929Vardavas 1910Vidiadis 1930Yannaghas 1902KeaKozadinos 1904 1907Leventakis 1959Maroulis 1910sKimolosRoussos 1964Ventouris 1956

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Ventouris 1960KithiraCoroneos 1904 1912Katrakis 1910sLerosAntonellos 1910s i/warMatantos i/warNikoloudis 1910s i/warRoussos 1900

APPENDICES 447

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Tomazos 1900s i/warLesbosArapoglou pWWIICourtzis 1883 i/warMitrelias 1972Sifneos 1900s 1910sTyropoulis 1920s 1938MilosZoulias 1962MyconosDracopulos 1914Sigalas i/warPsaraCosmas 1971Domestinis 1906 1910sFilinis 1910s 1940sHadjikyriakos 1910s i/warKalafatis 1910Kalimeris 1909 1916Pappas 1910sVelissarios 1960SamosInglessis 1910Soutos 1969SantoriniAlafouzos 1960Baikas i/war WWIIBelonias i/war i/warDakoutros pWWIIHalaris i/warKaravias 1910Koutsofios 1971Manolessos i/war WWIINomicos 1909Platis i/warPothitos 1963Psychas 1920s 1935Roussos 1955Sigalas 1912

448 APPENDICES

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SifaosCosmettos i/war 1938Depastas 1950s

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Psacharopulos 1884 1910sStafylopatis 1930Vernicos 1870sVernicos-Eugenides 1954SkiathosEpifaniades 1930sKoubis i/war 1951Frangistas 1951SpetsesAnargyros 1903 1915Coutzis 1895 1912Goumas 1909Goudis 1910s i/warKastriotis 1902 1910sPetsalis 1909 i/warSyrosCornilakis 1910s i/warCoroniadis 1910sCosmas 1900sCoutsodontis 1910 1915Droutsi i/war i/warFemeliaris 1911 i/warFoustanos 1901Gangos A. 1899 1914Georgopulos 1938Calvocoressis 1910s i/warKokinos 1910 1930sGregos 1909Kapparis 1900s i/warKarellas i/warKotzias 1893Krinos 1912 i/warKostomenis 1913

APPENDICES 449

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Pangalos 1900s 1916Petritsis pWWIIPsiachis 1900s i/warRigopulos 1910sTsiropinas 1900 1930sTrofimoff 1900s i/warValmas 1907 1970sVattis 1891Vafiadakis 1900s i/warB.CRETEAngelakis 1960Dimitriadis pWWIIKambalios pWWIILefakis 1966Lelakis 1971Lianantonakis 1960Mamidakis 1960Marcakis 1974Marcantonakis 1947

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Moatsos 1935Sfinias 1960sStavroudis 1910s i/warTsourinakis 1946Vardinoyannis 1966Venizelos 1930sVoyatzakis 1948C.IONIAN ISLANDSCephaloniaAngelatos 1912 1960sAthanassoulis 1898 WWIAmbatiellos 1900 1920sAnastassatos 1930sAndreatos 1930sAntypas 1911 WWIAntonatos pWWIIBassias-Typaldos 1900s 1924

450 APPENDICES

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Destounis 1902 1936Diakroussis 1901 1913Doryzas 1902Couppas 1880s 1910sCicelis 1892 1912Frangopulos 1909 1930sFokas 1904 1915Lalis 1935Lusis (Luzi) 1929 1950sLykiardopulos 1897Magliveras i/warMazarakis 1907 1960sMarchessini 1929Markettos 1908Matsoukis 1914 1916Metaxas 1906 1960sMichalinudis 1910sMichalitsianos 1902 WWIIMonopolis 1900s 1917Neofytou 1957Panayotatos 1900s 1917Panas i/warPapadakis pWWIIPatrikios 1908 1914Portolos 1910Potamianos 1910sRossolimos 1915Strintzis 1960Svoronos 1900 i/warSynodinos 1900 i/warTetenes 1906 WWITheofanis 1895 1920sTheotokatos 1914 1929Typaldos i/war 1960sVergottis 1898Vagliano 1879 1910s

APPENDICES 451

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Vassilatos 1960Yannoulatos 1902CorfuParamithiotis i/war 1950IthacaAnagnostatos 1970Gratsos 1907Dracoulis 1890sKallinicos 1910s 1950sMoraitis 1970sStathatos 1880 WWIITheofilatos 1879Vlassopulos 1912Vlismas pWWIIZakynthosTheodorakopoulos 1947 1980sMylonas 1968MAINLANDAthens/PiraeusAgapitos 1953Agoudimos 1970sAlexandratos 1971Alexatos 1930sAngelakis 1970sAngelis 1910 i/warAngelis 1976Arapoglou pWWIIArapis 1970sAssimomitis 1930sAthanasiades 1958Caloutas 1910sCatsogiorgis pWWIIChalikiopulo 1910sChristopulos 1930sComninos 1966Constantinides 1930sCorvissiano 1910sCoustas 1970sDaifas pWWII

452 APPENDICES

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Dalacouras 1969Davaris 1930sDedes 1972Deligiannis pWWIIDiamantis pWWIIDontas 1970sDouros 1970sDrakos pWWIIEconomou pWWIIEfthimiades i/warEfthimiou 1950Efstathiou 1977Eleftheriadis 1925

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Frangoudakis 1960Frangoulis 1976Fostiropulos 1970sGabriel 1947Georgopulos 1957Giacoumis pWWIIGiannakis 1979Gianniotis 1970sGiatzoglou 1980sGotsis 1970sHadj iconstanti 1910sHadjieleftheriades 1966Hadjis 1980sIliopulos 1980sIsaias 1911 1916Kakomanolis 1970sKalamoutoussis 1970sKalis 1980sKalitsis 1966Kampalios pWWIIKararotias 1971Karastamatis 1960sKarayannis 1977

APPENDICES 453

Enter* Leave**

Karypidas 1967Katounis 1970sKatsoulakos 1939Katsoulis pWWIIKazakos 1958Kertsikoff 1966Klavdianos 1967Kontominas 1960sKonstantopulos 1967Koros 1970sKoufos 1930s i/warKosmas 1970sKtistakis 1970sKyriakou 1968Ladas 1977Laios 1972Laliotis 1969Laskaridis 1970sLekanides pWWIILelekopulos 1910sLendoudis 1950sLeopulos 1980sLeoussis 1910sLevantis 1910sLeventakis 1959Logothetis 1980sLoukides 1964Louloundis 1930sLyberopulos pWWIIManios 1985Marangopulos 1970s

Enter* Leave**

Marengo 1910sMarinakis 1970sMarkakis S. 1974Mavrakakis 1968Meletis 1963

454 APPENDICES

Enter* Leave**

Messolonghitis 1910sMoundreas 1966Nkaroyannis 1980sOikonomakis 1970sPanayotides 1967Papadimitriou 1930sPapaleonardos 1910sPapadeas 1930sPappas 1964Papathomas 1970sPapayannakis 1930sParaschis 1968Parissis pWWIIPavlidis pWWIIPayavlas 1910sPetrakis 1980sPolitis 1970sPothitos 1963Prokopiou 1970sRestis 1970sRiniotis 1973Rigas 1923Sarantopulos 1970sSarros 1980sSimetas 1960Sachinis 1963Seretis 1910sSotiriadis 1968Soutos 1964Stavrou 1930sTavlarios 1961Tavoulareas 1970sTeryazos 1930sTomazos 1960sTrifides 1979Trivilas 1930sTsaoussis 1973Tsafos 1956Tsavliris 1940s

APPENDICES 455

Enter* Leave**

Tzortzatos 1976Tragakis 1980Vafias 1970sVassilatos D. 1971Veliotis 1930sVelissarios 1960Veniazis 1977Vergos 1978Vlassis 1941Vourlides 1960

Enter* Leave**

Vrettos pWWIIZachariou 1975Zafirakis pWWIIZerelakis 1955Zoiopulos 1930sZorzos 1970sEpirusTsakalotos pWWIIMacedoniaGigilinis pWWIIPapachristides 1946Theodoridis 1910sPeloponneseAlevizos 1970sAngelopulos D.N. 1951Angelopulos D. Th. i/warAntonopulos 1913 WWIApostolou 1970sBilinis 1925Constantacopulos 1974Cottaropulos 1910sCoumantaros 1932Dragonas 1965Gourdomichalis 1950sKallianis 1969Kallimanopulos 1924

456 APPENDICES

Enter* Leave**

Kapelacos 1975Karageorgis 1934Katsogiorgis 1970sKatsoulakos 1939Kollentzas 1960Kolokotronis 1960s 1970sKotsovilis 1961Krialakos 1977Lambrou 1972Latsis 1950sMaltezos 1972Niarchos 1932Panagopulos Bros 1949Panagopulos P. 1971Panoutsos 1906 WWIPapadopulos 1960sPapageorgacopulo 1910sPapas 1964Sarlis 1951Stathakis 1972Topalis 1951Tsitouras 1969Vassilakopulos 1974Vertsiotis 1957Zoulas 1948Sterea Ellas(Galaxidi)

Enter* Leave**

Angelis 1904 1920sCharopulos 1900 1915Hardavellas 1910sMerintzos i/war i/warMitropulos 1907 i/warSideropulos 1910sVlassopulos 1900s 1910sZissimos 1912 i/war(Itea)

APPENDICES 457

Enter* Leave**

Alogoskoufis pWWIIRigas i/war(Other)Karailias 1971Kouremenos 1954ThraceEugenides 1923Hadjiyannakis 1944Kessaniotis 1970sThessalyAntonopulo 1910sDraikis 1956Nanopulos 1910sStaikosVarsamis 1964ABROADRussiaAnastassiades 1971ConstantinopleArvanitides 1910 1930sCritikos 1960Efthymiades pWWIIKedros 1951Kiosseoglou 1964Mango 1890 1910sManopulos 1964Tsikopulos 1963Siderides 1900 1914Zarifis 1900 1912Propontis/Asia MinorAnastasiou 1933 1968Efstathiades 1914 1955Efstathiou N. 1924Elides 1910slossifoglou 1913 1930sHadji-Daout F. 1874 i/warKavounides 1928Konialides 1932Konstas 1933

458 APPENDICES

Enter* Leave**

Kyriakides 1907 1935Onassis 1933Pandelis 1908 1960sPantaleon 1875

Enter* Leave**

Pezas 1920s 1960sVlachos pWWIICyprusEfstathiou 1968Hatziioannou 1930sXydas 1980sOther(Beirut)Carapiperis 1967(Cairo)Economakis 1971Marinos 1971(Sudan)Revinthis 1960sSources: Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, various years; Greek Shipping Directory, Piraeus,

Skoularikos, various years; ‘Who is Who of Shipping’, Argo various issues1965–85; Naftika Chronika, various issues 1933–85; Andreas Lemos, ModernGreek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopoulos, 1971; Hellas’ Shipowners, 1981–1982,Athens, Marad Hellas; Leonidas E.Bistis, The Steamship Fleet ofAndros, 1882–1945, Andros, the ‘Andros Society’, 1982; Minos D.Komninos, KassiotShipowners in the 19th and 20th Century, Adiens, 1990; various interviews

Notes: * The date of entry is counted at the first purchase of steamship or theestablishment of a shipping company, or participation in co-ownership. I/waraccounts for interwar, and pWWII for postSecond World War including theperiod from the 1950s to the 1970s. ** The date of leave is stated when known.*** There are a number of shipowners who are not included in the catalogue.These were usually small, short-term shipowners who entered and left thebusiness according to the level of the freight rates

APPENDICES 459

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Nicos G.Svoronos, The Unsaid on Modern Greek History and Historiography,Athens, Themelio, 1987, in Greek, p. 36.

2. The chapters dealing with the postwar period are less extensive than some of theothers. Readers interested in greater detail on these years can consult GelinaHarlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, 1945–1975. From Separate Developmentto Mutual Interdependence, London, Athlone, 1993.

1TRADE AND SHIPPING OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN AND

THE BLACK SEA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1. There is a vast bibliography on the subject. Among the most important works are:Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age ofPhilip II, 2 vols, New York, Harper and Row, 1986; Frederic C.Lane, Venice, AMaritime Republic, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973;G.V.Scammell, The World Encompassed. The First European Maritime Empires,c. 800–1650, London, Methuen, 1981; Carlo Cippolla, Before the IndustrialRevolution. European Society and Economy, 1000–1700, New York, W.W.Norton, 1980; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 2 vols, Berkeley,Academic Press, 1974; J.H.Parry, ‘Transport and Trade Routes’, in E.E.Rich andC.H.Wilson (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. IV,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1980; Ralph Dayis, The Rise of theEnglish Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18th Centuries, London, Macmillan,1962.

2. Braudel, op. cit., p. 115. For a review article on developments in the area, seeG.Leontaritis, ‘Greek Merchant Marine’, in S.Papadopulos (ed.), Greek MerchantMarine (1453–1850), Athens, National Bank of Greece, 1972, pp. 13–56.

3. The largest part of the Turkish fleet was manned by Greek seamen. In fact, this waspart of the ‘taxes’ levied on the sançak (province) of the Aegean archipelago. Theestablishment of this sançak in the mid-sixteenth century coincided with theformation of the institution of dragomani (interpreters). When the Ottomangovernment was obliged to communicate with European powers it used

dragomani, most of whom by tradition were Greek. The official, with the title‘dragoman of the fleet’, based in Constantinople, followed the admiral to theAegean for the collection of taxes and other administrative fees. The ‘dragoman ofthe fleet’ proved vital to the inhabitants of the islands as a problem-solver withinthe Ottoman bureaucracy. See Vassilis Sfyroeras, The Dragomans of the Fleet. TheInstitutions and the Bearers, Athens, University of Athens, Department ofPhilosophy, 1965, in Greek.

4. See Alexandra Kradonelli, History of Piracy during the First Years of TurkishDomination (1390–1538), Athens, Hestia, 1985 and History of Piracy during theMiddle Years of Turkish Domination, 1538–1699, Athens, Hestia, 1991, in Greek;Tryphon Konstantinides, Ships, Captains and Seamen, 1800–1830, Athens, RoyalNavy Historical Editions, 1953, pp. 5–29, in Greek.

5. Kradonelli, op. cit.,6. Leontaritis, op. cit., p. 21.7. Konstantinides, op. cit., pp. 20–1.8. W.A.Cole and Phyllis Deane, ‘The Growth of National Incomes’, in H.J.Habakkuk

and M.Postan (eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, vol. VI,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1979, pp. 1–44.

9. Ibid.; see also Ralph Davis, The Industrial Revolution andBritish Overseas Trade,Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1979, table 22.

10. Barbara Jelavich, Balkan History. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, repr. 1987, pp. 179–82.

11. Olga Katsiardi-Hering, The Greek Community in Trieste, 1751–1830, vol. 1,Athens, University of Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, p. 32, in Greek;Traian Stoianovich, ‘Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant’, Journal ofEconomic History, vol. 20, 1960, pp. 234–313; Spiros Asdrahas, The EconomicStructure of the Balkan Countries, 15th–19th Centuries, Athens, Helissa, 1979, inGreek.

12. Katsiardi-Hering, op. cit., pp. 27–32.13. Patricia Herlihy, ‘Russian Wneat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal of

European Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 79–80.14. E.Pavlides, The Greek Population of Russia and the 33 Years of the Association of

the Greeks from Russia, Athens, 1953, pp. 38–9, in Greek. Although these numbersmust be handled with care, the author, president of the Association of the Greeksfrom Russia for a number of years, is reliable. Eleftherios Pavlides, born in 1876 inTrebizond, was a successful general merchant in Odessa. A Russian citizen, he leftin 1918 only to return, to Moscow this time, from 1926 to 1928 as commercialattaché of the Greek embassy. He died at the age of ninety-eight in 1974 (personalinterview with his son, Danis Pavlides, and his grandson, Professor EleftheriosPavlides, December 1990).

15. House of Commons, Parliament, Great Britain, ‘Report by Consul Palgrave on theTrade and Commerce of Trebizond during the Year 1872’, British ParliamentaryPapers (BPP), vol. LXV, 1872, p. 489.

16. Vernon John Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East,Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1935, pp. 215–16; P.Cernovodeanu andB.Marinescu, ‘British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between1837 and 1857’, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 8, no. 3, winter 1979;Paul Cernovodeanu, Relatiile Comerciale Romano-Engleze in Contextul Politicii

NOTES 461

Orientale a Marii Britanii, 1803–1878, Cluj-Napoor, Editura DACIA, 1986, inRumanian. This book was translated for me in part by Dr Florin Marinescu.

17. ‘Report by Mr Consul General Green on the Trade and Agriculture of thePrincipalities of Moldavia and Wallachia for the Year 1866’, BPP, vol. LXIX,1866, p. 460.

18. S.Shaw, ‘The Population of Istanbul in the Nineteenth Century’, InternationalJournal of Middte East Studies, no. 10, 1979, pp. 265–77. For more on theactivities of the Greeks in Constantinople, see Harris Exertzoglou, ‘Greek Bankingin Constantinople, 1850–1881’, PhD thesis, King’s College, University of London,1986.

19. Pavlina-Maria Nassioutzik, ‘Protestantism and Enlightenment in Smyrna in thenineteenth Century: The Case of the Apothiki Ofelimon Gnoseon’, PhD thesis,University of Thessaloniki, 1992. For more on the Greek merchants in Smyrna, seeElena Frangakis, ‘The Commerce of Izmir in the Eighteenth Century (1695–1820)’, PhD thesis, London University, 1986; and Daniel Goffman, Izmir and theLevantine World, 1550–1650, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1990.

20. Christos Hadziiossif notes that at mid-century there were about 6,000 families inCairo and Alexandria. If we consider each family to consist of six members, thenapproximately 36,000 Greeks lived in Alexandria. See Christos Hadziiossif, ‘LaColonie Greque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Universitéde Paris-Sorbonne, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980, p. 89.

21. Alexander Kitroeff, The Greeks in Egypt, 1919–1937. Ethnicity and Class Oxford,Ithaca Press, 1989.

22. For detailed bibliographic references on the Greek merchant communities, seeChapter 2, notes 4–12.

23. Davis, The Rise, p. 176.24. Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794–1914, Cambridge, MA, Harvard

University Press, 1986, pp. 104–5.25. Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno,’ pp. 45–68.26. The preceding analysis is based largely on Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 101–7; and

Herliny, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno’.27. See Sarah Palmer, Politics, Shipping and the Repeal of the Navigation Laws,

Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1990; Alan Cafruny, Ruling the Waves:The Political Economy of International Shipping, Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press, 1987, chapter 2.

28. Alan R.Richards, ‘Primitive Accumulation in Egypt, 1798–1882’, in HuriIslamoglu-Inan (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, repr. 1990, p. 226.

29. ‘Report by Mr Consul Stanley on the Trade and Commerce of Alexandria for theYear 1867’, BPP, vol. LIX, 1868–9.

30. The London Customs Bills of Entry provide valuable data about the activities ofRalli Brothers in the United States and India; they were among the earliestimporters of cotton direcdy from Savannah and jute from Calcutta in the late1860s.

31. For the detailed shipping statistics of each group of Black Sea ports, see Tables3.5, 3.7, 3.9, 3.11 and 3.12.

32. J.K.Campbell and Ph.Sherrard, Modern Greece, London, Ernest Benn, 1908, p. 93.

462 NOTES

33. Vassilis Kremmydas, Greek Shipping, 1776–1835, vol 1, Athens, HistoricalArchive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1985–6, pp. 36–44, in Greek.

34. Great Britain: Foreign Office (FO) 257/1: Russia: Odessa, Embassy and ConsularArchives, 1819–1829.

35. For a highly interesting article on ships’ names (and more), Christos Hadziiossif,‘Social Values and Business Strategies in the Naming of Ships in Greece, 18th–20th Centuries’, in Speros Vryonis Jr (ed.), The Greeks and the Sea, New York,A.D.Karatzas, 1992.

36. BPP, vol. LX, 1873, p. 317.37. BPP, vol. LXVII, 1874, p. 879.38. The Greek Steamship Company assigned to fulfil Greece’s internal and external

communication needs was established in 1856; see Chapter 4 for more details.39. London Customs Bills of Entry, Bill A, 6 January 1880.40. Ibid., 24 January 1880.41. Arcadia arrived from Bombay in England on 22 June 1880. Data on other arrivals

of the same company’s ships at Liverpool indicate that Papayanni carried outregular trips to Bombay.

42. London Customs Bills of Entry Bill A, 2 February and 22 June 1880.

2GREEK COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME NETWORKS: THE ‘CHIOT’

PHASE, 1830s–1860s

1. Frederic Mauro, ‘Merchant Communities, 1350–1750’, in J.D.Tracy (ed.), The RiseofMerchant Empires. Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern World (1350–1750), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 285.

2. Ibid., p. 266.3. Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain. From Industrial Revolution to

World War I, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 131.4. This term has been used by Patricia Herlihy in reference to the Greek commercial

network. See Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History, 1794–1914, Cambridge, MA,Harvard University Press, 1986.

5. Although Nicos Svoronos, Le Commerce de Salonique au XVIIIe Siècle, Paris,Presses Universitaires de France, 1956, has indicated the importance of the growthof diaspora merchant communities in Greek historiography since the 1950s, a greatdeal of research still needs to be done in order to get the full picture of the works ofthe networks. The most integrated theoretical analysis of the network of the Greekmerchant communities has been done by Christos Hadziiossif, in his excellent ‘LaColonie Grecque en Egypte (1833–1856)’, Doctorat de troisieme cycle, Universitéde Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV), Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, IVe section, 1980,who examined the works of the network from Alexandria. Another significantstudy of the merchant community of Trieste has been done by Olga Katsiardi-Hering, The Greek Community in Trieste (1751–1830), 2 vols, Athens, Universityof Athens, Department of Philosophy, 1986, in Greek. Spyridon Fokas has studiedthe works of the Greeks at the ports of the Danube in the nineteenth and twentiethcenturies: Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Lower Danube,Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975, in Greek. Susan Fairlie was the

NOTES 463

first to analyse in detail the methods of ‘Anglo-Greeks’ trading in ‘The Anglo-Russian Grain Trade, 1815–1861’, PhD thesis, University of London, 1959.B.Tsimpidaros, The Greeks in England, Athens, Alkaios, 1974, in Greek, is theonly detailed source I know or about the Greek merchants in England, while thelocal museums or orthodox churches of Manchester, Liverpool and London as wellas the Municipality of London are reported to have data on the Greek population.There are also two masters’ theses on the Greeks of London: D.Mangriotis, ‘TheGreek Population in London, 1837–1881’, MSc thesis, London School ofEconomics, 1984; and M.W. Vidali, ‘Chiot Shipowners in London and thePersistence of Ethnicity’, MPhil thesis, Polytechnic of Central London, 1988. Seealso D.Mangriotis, ‘The Demographic History of the Greek Merchant Communityof London, 1837–1881’, Historica, vol. 3, no. 6, December 1986, pp. 349–68, inGreek. The most recent and interesting account of the Greek merchants in Britain isfound in Chapman, op. cit., chapter 5. Patricia Herlihy provides a mine ofinformation on the activities and the network of the Greeks in Odessa: PatriciaHerlihy, ‘Russian Wheat and the Port of Livorno, 1794–1865’, Journal ofEuropean Economic History, no. 5, 1976, pp. 45–68; Herlihy, ‘The EthnicComposition of the City of Odessa in the Nineteenth Century’, Harvard UkrainianStudies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1977, pp. 53–78; Herlihy, ‘Greek Merchants in Odessa in theNineteenth Century’, Harvard Ukrainian Studies, vols 3–4, 1979–80, pp. 399–420;Herlihy, Odessa; Herlihy, ‘The Greek Community in Odessa, 1861–1917’, Journalof Modern Greek Studies, vol. 7, 1989, pp. 235–52. For the first years of the Greeksin Odessa see Viron Karidis, ‘The Greek Communities in South Russia: Aspects oftheir Formation and Commercial Enterprise, 1774–1829’, MA thesis, University ofBirmingham, 1976; and Karidis, ‘A Greek Mercantile Paroikia: Odessa 1774–1829’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence,London, Macmillan, 1981, pp. 111–36. More studies of the Greek merchantcommunities in the main knots of the commerce in the Black Sea, the ports ofEngland, Marseilles and Livorno are, however, badly needed in order to get theoverall picture of the commerce and shipping involved, of the social and economicorganisation of the communities involved, as well as of the organisation, structureand business strategies of the Greek firms. Olympia Selekou of the National Centreof Social Research is preparing a doctoral thesis on the Greek merchant communityof Taganrog. Anna Mandilara is preparing a PhD thesis on the activities of themercantile community of Marseilles at the European University Institute inFlorence, Italy, and Despina Vlami at the same university for the Greek mercantilecommunity of Livorno. For the early years of the Greek community in Marseilles,see Pierre Echinard, ‘Grecs et Philhellènes à Marseilles de la Révolution Françaiseà l’ Indépendance de la Grèce’, thèse de doctorat, Institut Historique de Provence,Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1973; Nikos Psiroukis is also amongthe first to bring to the fore the importance of Greek settlements abroad. SeeN.Psiroukis, Greek Settlers in Modern Times, Athens, Epikairohta, 1974.

6. One of the most visible features of British mercantile enterprise in the first half ofthe nineteenth century was the rise of Liverpool from a small port as a challenger toLondon. Indeed, by mid-century the Mersey port had over-taken London in totaltonnage. See Gordon Jackson, The History and Archaeology of Ports, Surrey,(UK), World’s Work, 1983.

464 NOTES

7. Brief mention of the Greeks at Liverpool is made by P.L.Cottrell, ‘LiverpoolShipowners, the Mediterranean, and the Transition from Sail to Steam during theMid-Nineteenth Century, in L.R.Fischer (ed.), From Wheel House to CountingHouse: Essays in Maritime Business History in Honour of Professor Peter NevilleDavies, St. Johns NF, 1992.

8. A highly interesting account of the merchant activities of the Gerussi family isgiven by Maria-Christina Hadjiioannou, ‘The Merchant House Gerussi, (1823–1870). From the Ottoman Empire to the Greek State’, University of Athens, PhDthesis, 1989, in Greek.

9. Elena Frangakis, ‘lzmir—An International Port in the Eastern Mediterranean’,Economies méditerranéennes Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe—XIXesiècles, Athens, Center of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of ScientificResearch, vol. 1, 1985, pp. 107–27; Hadziiossif, op. cit., 262–72.

10. See Herlihy, ‘Greek Merchants’, pp. 399–420. 11. Paul Cernovodeanu, ‘L’activité des Maisons de Commerce et des négociants

loniens du Bas-Danube durant l’Intervalle 1829–1853’, EconomiesMéditerraneennes. Equilibres et Intercommunications, XIIe—XIXe Siècles, Athens,Centre of Neohellenic Research, National Foundation of Scientific Research, 1985,pp. 91–106.

12. Hadziiossif, op. cit., p. 138.13. Herlihy, ‘Russian Wheat’.14. Katsiardi-Hering, op. cit., pp. 431–4, 537–56.15. Ibid., pp. 468–74.16. Hadziiossif, op.cit., p. 113.17. Harris Exertzoglou, ‘Greek Banking in Constantinople, 1850–1881’, PhD thesis,

King’s College, University of London, 1986, pp. 78–9, 84.18. Frangakis, op cit.19. Katsiardi-Hering, op cit., p. 556.20. V.Kardassis, Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857),

Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank, 1987, table 26 and p. 172.21. Hadziiossif, op. cit., pp. 262–72.22. See also Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate

Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993,chapter 1.

23. D.Vikelas, Loukis Laras. Autobiography of an Elderly Chiot, Athens, Odysseas,repr., 1988, pp. 116–17. According to Tsimpidaros, op. cit., p. 146, the tale orLoukis Laras was based on Loukis Zifo, a Chiot merchant in England.

24. For more details see Mangriotis, ‘Demographic History’. It is worth noting that thesame practices are prevalent in the twentieth-century Chiot shipowning communityin London; see Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners, chapter 1.

25. D.Vikelas, My Life, Athens, 1908, p. 327.26. See Mikes Syriotes, ‘The House of Ralli Brothers’, Chiaka Chronika, vol. A’,

1911, pp. 101–9. Information on the Rallis firm is also based on the account of oneof its employees, Christos Moulakes, The House of Ralli Brothers, Athens, 1964;Chapman, op. cit., pp. 131, 158–9; and T.Catsiyannis, Pandias Stephen Ralli,London, 1986, p. 118.

NOTES 465

27. The account of the Mavros firm is derived from Vikelas, My Life, and M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnaire Historique et Généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce,d’Albanie et de Constantinople, Paris, 1983.

28. Vikelas, My Life, pp. 89–90. Demetrius Vikelas became a merchant in Englandbefore becoming a well-known Greek writer. He was a nephew of EuphrosyneMavros and his successful commercial career started in the London branch officeof the Melas firms.

29. Vikelas, My Life, pp. 168–9.30. Letter of Consul Yeames in Odessa to Consul John Green in Athens, 13 March

1850, Foreign Office (FO) 257/1.31. Hadziiossif, op. cit., p. 185.32. See also Fairlie, op. cit., pp. 241–91.33. Hadziiossif, op. cit., pp. 262–72.34. ‘Report by Consul Barrow on the Trade and Commerce of Kertch for the Year

1877’, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), vol. LXXV, 1878, p. 86.35. See H.Barty-King, The Baltic Exchange, London, Hutchinson Benham, 1977.36. H.Barty-King, op. cit., p. 68.37. Ibid., p. 97.38. Ibid., pp. 113–14.39. From a series of satirical pieces written by ‘Baltico’ in Fairplay, 1895–96 as

quoted in Barty-King, op. cit., p. 237. 40. Chapman, op. cit., p. 165.41. Chapman, op. cit., p. 157.42. Fairlie, op. cit., pp. 341–65, attributes the development of this trade to Pandia Ralli.43. The criteria used to determine Greek ownership were the following: a) whether the

same ship appeared in 1835, 1840 and 1850; b) whether there were repetitivevoyages in the same year; c) whether the ship had a Greek name and a Greekcaptain; and d) whether there were data from other sources indicating that a vesselwas owned by a Greek merchant.

44. He was the author of a number of patriotic novels concerning the Greek revolution,and also the general editor and owner of the political and literary journal TheBritish Star, by which he advocated in tne entire Levant his Anglophile ideassupporting Prince Alfred as the successor of King Otto. The British Star ran forroughly three years at the beginning of the 1860s, a period during which Xenos wasinvolved in financial troubles concerning his steamship company.

45. Stephanos Xenos, Depredations; or Overend, Gurney and Co, and the Greek andOriental Steam Navigation Company, London, 1869, pp. 48 and 76.

46. Fairplay, 19 September 1884. For more on the Papayanni firm and family, seeJames Taylor, Ellermans. A Wealth of Shipping, London, Wilton House Gentry,1976, pp. 177–81.

47. The Papayanni firm established its steamship company in the early 1850s with thesupport of most of the Liverpool and Manchester Greek commercial houses.Pandora, no. 215, 1 March 1859, pp. 521–2.

48. The author is referring to the steamship lines of Maclver, the Leyland and the Mosscompanies.

49. Fairplay, 19 September 1884.

466 NOTES

50. See Constantine Papathanasopulos, Greek Steamship Company. The Impasses ofProtectionism (1855–1872), Athens, National Bank of Greece, Cultural Foundation,1987, chapter 2, in Greek.

51. Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral AnastassiosZografos, ‘Autobiography.

52. Panaghi Vagliano to Basil Papayanni, 12 September 1875, Archive of CaptainAnastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

53. Herlihy, Odessa, pp. 170–3.54. Lewis Siegelbaum, ‘The Odessa Grain Trade’, Journal of European Economic

History, vol. 9, spring 1980, pp. 131–2.55. Ralph Davis, ‘Maritime History: Progress and Problems’, in Sheila Marriner (ed.),

Business and Businessmen. Studies in Business, Economic and Accounting History,Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1978.

56. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18thCenturies, London, Macmillan, 1962, p. 81.

57. Lewis R.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘From Broager to Bergen: The Risks andRewards of Peter Jebsen, Shipowner, 1864–1892’, Sjøfartshistorisk Årbok, 1985,Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1986, p. 41.

58. Frank Broeze, Mr Brooks and the Australian Trade. Imperial Business in theNineteenth Century, Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1993.

59. Eric W.Sager with Gerald E.Panting, Maritime Capital. The Shipping Industry inAtlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montréal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1990,chapters 4 and 7.

60. Ibid., p. 83.61. Ibid., p. 147. 62. Helge W.Nordvik, ‘The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries, 1850–

1914’, in Lewis R.Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation inMaritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St John’s,NF, Maritime History Group, 1985, pp. 117–48.

3GREEK MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL NETWORKS: THE

‘IONIAN’ PHASE, 1870s–1900s

1. Reports on the Danube Trade, BPP, vol. LXVII, 1874, Turkey, p. 117.2. Spyridon G.Fokas, The Greeks in the River-traffic of the Lower Danube,

Thessaloniki, Institute of Balkan Studies, 1975, p. 84.3. Fokas, op. cit., p. 316.4. Fairplay, 11 September 1885, p. 425.5. M.L.Harvey, ‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its

Significance’, PhD thesis, Berkeley University of California, 1938, Appendix F.6. ‘Report by Consul Carruthers on the Trade and Commerce of Taganrog for the

Year 1876’, British Parliamentary Papers (BPP), vols. LXXII–LXXXIII, 1877,Russia, pp. 101–2.

7. ‘Report by Vice-Consul Colledge on the Trade and Commerce of Kertch for theYear 1881’, BPP, vol. LXXI, 1882, Russia, pp. 357–8.

NOTES 467

8. See also Lewis Siegelbaum, ‘The Odessa Grain Trade’, Journal of EuropeanEconomic History, vol. 9, spring 1980, pp. 131–2.

9. Patricia Herlihy, Odessa: A History 1794–1914, Cambidge, MA, HarvardUniversity Press, 1986 chapter 9.

10. ‘Report by Vice-Consul Peacock on the Petroleum Trade of Baku, and Batum as itsFuture Oudet’, BPP, vol. LXXIV, 1983, Russia, p. 364.

11. ‘Report of Consul P.Stevens on the Trade and Commerce of Batum for the Year1892’, BPP, vols IIIC–IIC, 1893–4, Russia.

12. ‘Report on the Trade and Shipping of Bulgaria’, BPP, vol. LXV, 1886, Bulgaria, p.208.

13. RJ.Crampton, ‘Bulgarian Society in the Early 19th Century’, in R.Clogg (ed.),Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence, London, Macmillan, 1981, pp.157–204.

14. The discrepancies shown between Table 3.14 and Appendix 1.16 of the Greekparticipation in Marseilles, especially for the years 1870, 1880 and 1890, is owed tothe fact that Table 3.14 indicates only ships chartered by Greek merchants, whereasAppendix 1.16 includes ships chartered by Greek merchants under various flagsand also ships under the Greek flag chartered by other foreign merchants.

15. Information about Vaglianos comes from Andreas G.Lemos, Modern GreekSeamen, Athens, Tsikopulos, 1971, pp. 77–8; and M.D.Sturdza, Dictionnairehistorique et généalogique des Grandes Familles de Grèce, d’Albanie et deConstantinople, Paris, 1983, pp. 442–3.

16. I am grateful to Mr Nicos Vlassopulos for providing me all the data I needed fromhis own research on the PRO on this particular point. Details on each of theseships, and generally on Ionian shipping, to be found in his book, The History oflonian Shipping, forthcoming.

17. Nicholas B.Metaxas, ‘London Shipping Offices’, in Andreas G.Lemos (ed.), TheGreeks and the Sea. A People’s Seafaring Achievements from Ancient Times to thePresent Day, London, Cassell, 1976, pp. 156–7.

18. E.Embiricos, About Our Steam Shipping, Athens, P.Leonis Printing House, 1900,pp. 37–8.

19. Metaxas, op. cit., p. 157.20. The analysis of the Embiricos is based on A.N.Embiricos, History of the Embiricos

Family, 1765–1981, Athens, 1983, in Greek.21. George Embiricos had six sons; it was the grandsons from his sons Andreas and

Miltiades that excelled in the first half of the twentieth century: these wereAndreas’ sons, Leonidas, George, Michael, Antonios and Maris, and Miltiades’ sonGeorge M.Embiricos. See Demetrios Polemis, ‘Andreas Embiricos Writes theBiography of his Father’, Petalon, vol. 5, 1990, p. 12.

22. Ibid., pp. 3–27.23. Fairplay, 18 March 1897, p. 438.24. Fairplay, 31 August 1883, pp. 378–9.25. Fairplay, 4 February 1897, pp. 175–6.26. Susan Fairlie, ‘The Anglo-Russian Grain Trade, 1815–1861’, PhD thesis,

University of London, 1959, p. 352.27. For more details on the banlang activities of the Zarifis in Constantinople, see

Harris Exertzoglou, Adaptability and Policy of Greek Capital. Greek Bankers in

468 NOTES

Constantinople: The ‘Zarifis-Zafiropulos’ Office, 1871–1881, Athens, Institute ofResearch and Education, Commercial Bank of Greece, 1989.

4SHIPPING AND GREECE, 1830–1914

1. About the pre-revolutionary fleet see Vassilis Kremmydas, Greek Shipping, 1776–1835, 2 vols, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1985–6, in Greek.

2. As late as 1900 Epaminondas Embiricos, an MP and Minister of the MerchantMarine, doubted that total exports were more than 100,000 tons annually; seeEpaminondas Embiricos, About Our Steam Shipping, Athens, P.Leonis PrintingHouse, 1900, p. 27, in Greek. Greece’s main export was currants, which weretraditionally carried by English ships, since Britain was the main consumer. Theywere high-value—in the last third of the nineteenth century, they represented 40–53per cent of the total value of exports—and low-space; as a result, the majority ofsailing vessels that carried them were smaller than 100 tons. See British CustomsBills of Entry, Bill A, 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860 and 1870.

3. For detailed analysis not only of wheat freights from the Black Sea but also of allbulk freights of the Mediterranean and Atlantic routes, see C.Knick Harley, ‘OceanFreight Rates and Productivity, 1740–1913: The Primacy of Mechanical InventionReaffirmed’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 48, no. 4, December 1988, pp. 851–76; Harley, ‘Coal Exports and British Shipping, 1850–1913’, Explorations inEconomic History, vol. 26, 1989, pp. 311–38; Harley, Aspects of the Economics ofShipping, 1850–1913’, in Lewis R. Fischer and Gerald E.Panting (eds), Changeand Adaptation in Maritime History. The North Atlantic Fleets in the NineteenthCentury, St John’s, NF, Maritime History Group, 1985, pp. 169–86; and LewisR.Fischer and Helge W.Nordvik, ‘Maritime Transport and the Integration of theNorth Atlantic Economy, 1850–1914’, in Wolfram Fischer, R.Marvin Mclnnis andJurgen Schneider (eds.), The Emergence of a World Economy, 1500–1914,Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986, pp. 519–44.

4. Maria Synarelli, Roads and Ports in Greece (1830–1880), Athens, Cultural andTechnological Foundation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, 1989, inGreek.

5. George Dertilis, The Greek Economy and Industrial Revolution (1830–1910),Athens, Sakoulas, 1984, in Greek pp. 32–3; Vassilis Kardassis, From Sailto Steam. Greek Merchant Shipping, 1858–1914, Athens, Cultural andTechnological Foundation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank, 1993, p.137, in Greek.

6. Synarelli, op. cit., p. 141. Synarelli’s erroneous analysis in her otherwise usefulbook is based on totally inadequate and undigested statistics. She goes so far as tostate that ‘the steamship consolidates itselr only after the First World War: in 1918the tonnage of steamships has surpassed the tonnage of sailing ships (p. 128). Theauthor has made a mistake of fifteen years: Greek steamship tonnage surpassedsailing tonnage in 1902–3 (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.11).

7. Pandora, 15 July 1866, p. 239. The Bavarian King Otto reigned in Greece from1832 to 1862. As he had no heirs, and for various other political reasons, he was

NOTES 469

deposed in 1862 and was replaced by the young King George of Hanover in 1863.King George I reigned in Greece from 1863 to 1913.

8. Shipping Bank Archangelos, Archangelos, Athens; from the printing house of Perriand Vamba, 1869.

9. For a brief reference to the company see, Shipping Conference in Syros on 1stSeptember 1902, reprint, Athens, Greek Association of Economic Sciences,Municipality of Ermoupolis, Syros, and Greek Hellenic Association for Ship andAircraft Insurance, 1973, p. 152 in Greek. The works and the importance of theShipping Bank Archangelos, however, have been almost totally neglected andremain totally unresearched by Greek economic historians. More research andinformation about this company will shed light on the problems of the sailing shipfleet at a very crucial time.

10. I first ‘discovered’ these valuable volumes in summer 1989, at the Aegean Museumof Myconos where its founder, Mr George Dracopulos, kindly allowed me tomicrofilm them.

11. A.Metaxas and S.G.Georgopulos, Greek Merchant Shipping, 1821–1924, Athens,1926. The data they give are approximately the same as in Mari Panopulou,‘Economic and Technical Problems in the Greek Shipbuilding Industry, 1850–1914’, PhD thesis, University of Athens, 1991, pp. 341, 357. Dr Panopulou usesdata for thirteen years for the period 1835–1901, from the official state statisticsthat she was able to trace in the Statistical Tables of Greece’s foreign commerce ofthe period.

12. Since the fiill series of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Registry Books of theBureau Veritas and Lloyd’s do not exist in Greece, the Department of MaritimeStudies of the University of Piraeus has undertaken to order the full series and toprocess the data by computer. Another project has undertaken to microfilm from allthe ports of Greece all the old surviving Registry Books with an aim to construct acomplete shipping series of the Greek fleet. Until both projects are complete,nineteenth-century statistical data on the sailing ship fleet will only be fragmentary.

13. See Michael Marshall, Ocean Traders, New York, Facts-on-File, 1990; R.Riegel,Merchant Vessels, D.Appleton & Co, New York, 1921, pp. 185–90.

14. S.Zarkos, ‘The Historical Evolution of the Measurement of Greek Ships’,Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou, vol. 26, July 1927, pp. 8–18.

15. The Constantinople Conference of 1873 introduced two measurement rulesaccording to the Moorsom system, Rule A and Rule B.Rule A was the accurateway of measuring the vessel but the problem was that the ship had to be empty fora few days to take the measurements. To give ships provisional measurements untilthey were re-measured under Rule A, the Conference provided that if a ship wereloaded it could be temporarily measured by Rule B, a method based on the oldBOM system which yielded approximate results. A large number of vessels thatcame to Greek ports were laden and hence were measured by Rule B. The problemwith the Greek law was that it did not specify that this was temporary and hencemost remained measured under Rule B. As a result there are many smalldiscrepancies between Lloyd’s Register of Shipping and the Greek registries.

16. S.Gorgorini, ‘Document of the Ministry of Shipping 3922, of 30 June 1880 to theMinistry of Economics: About the Moorsom Measurement System in Comparisonto the Previous Systems’, Marine Code, Athens, 1896, pp. 408–13.

17. By the latter criterion the Papayanni fleet, for example, is excluded.

470 NOTES

18. It has been found in recent decades that deadweight tonnage provides the mostaccurate measurement of carrying capacity. The carrying capacity of a vessel isexpressed in tons of 2,240 lbs. The deadweight capacity is equal to the differencebetween the vessels displacement in salt water when loaded and the displacementon her light draught. The draught of a vessel is the vertical distance between thewaterline and the keel. For rough calculations one assumes that 1 grt=1.5 dwt.

19. See Basil Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp Shipping, London, Athlone Press,repr. 1981.

20. For more about this economic crisis, see D.Morier Evans, The Commercial Crisis,1847–48, London, Letts, Son & Steer, 1848.

21. For a scholarly analysis of this crisis and its effects on Greek shipping see ChristosHadziiossif, ‘Conjunctural Crisis and Structural Problems in the Greek MerchantMarine in the Nineteenth Century: Reaction of the State and Private Interests’,Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 12, no. 4, winter 1985, pp. 5–20. See alsoVassilis Kardassis, Syros: Crossroads of the Eastern Mediterranean (1832–1857),Athens, Cultural Foundation of the National Bank, 1987, pp. 200–7.

22. This letter was published for the first time in the daily newspaper Sémaphore deMarseilles, 25 July 1850, and then republished in the Athenian newspaper Eon, 14October 1850. See Hadziiossif, op. cit., p. 6.

23. D.Morier Evans, The History of the Commercial Crisis, 1857–58, and the StockExchange Panic of 1859, London, Thomas Harrild, 1859. See also M.L.Harvey,‘The Development of Russian Commerce on the Black Sea and its Significance’,PhD thesis, University of California at Berkeley, 1938, chapter 4.

24. Christina Agriandoni, The Beginning of the Industrialization of Greece in the 19thCentury, Athens, Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, 1986, pp.84–105, in Greek. Constantine Papathanassopulos, Greek Merchant Marine.Development and Re-adjustment (1833–1856), Athens, Cultural Foundation of theNational Bank of Greece, 1983, pp. 92–8. See also Kardassis, Syros.

25. Christos Hadziiossif, ‘Constructions Navales et Constructeurs de Navires en Grèce.De l’Independance à l’Introduction de la Navigations a Vapeur (1833–1856)’,Navigations et Gens de Mer en Méditerranée, Paris, 1980; see also Kardassis,Syros pp. 168–89.

26. Kardassis, Syros, pp. 190–1.27. Papathanassopulos, op. cit., p. 92.28. For a detailed and a highly interesting account of the history of Galaxidi, see

Efthimios Gourgouris, Galaxidi at the Time of Sailing Vessels, 3 vols, Athens,1983, in Greek.

29. These are estimations of Nicos Vlassopulos in The History of Ionian Shipping,forthcoming. I am grateful to Mr Vlassopulos for sending me part of his work atthis stage. For 1854 he has calculated that Cephalonia had 146 vessels of 24,800lonian tons; Ithaca had eighty-one craft (8,815 tons); and other regions had 105vessels (12,360 tons). Given the possibility of a 10 per cent error, this means thatthere may have been as many as 365 Ionian craft (39,575 tons).

30. Harley, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping’ p. 174.31. Ibid., pp. 173–5.32. See Harley, ‘Aspects of the Economics of Shipping’; Harley, ‘On the Persistence

of Old Techniques: The Case of North American Wooden Shipbuilding’, Journalof Economic History, vol. 33, June 1973, pp. 372–98.

NOTES 471

33. See Helge W.Nordvik, ‘The Shipping Industries of the Scandinavian Countries,1850–1914’, in Fischer and Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation, pp. 137–9.

34. The Greek Steamship Company is very well researched by ConstantinePapathanassopulos, op. cit.; Papathanassopulos, Greek Steamship Company, TheImpasses of Protectionism (1855–1872), Athens, Cultural Foundation of theNational Bank of Greece, 1987 in Greek; Papathanassopulos and Vassilis Kardassis‘European Steamship Companies and the Trade of Syros’, Historica, vol. 2, no. 3,May 1985, pp. 125–48.

35. Captain Anastassios Syrmas, ‘Professional Correspondence of Captain A. Syrmaswith Nicolopulos, 1880–1881’, Sunderland, 17/8/1880, Archive of AdmiralAnastassios Zografos.

36. Ibid., Letter of Syrmas to Nicolopulo, Marseilles, 17 July 1880.37. Ibid., Syrmas to Aristide Cosmas, 30/8/1880, where he informs Cosmas that a new-

built steamship of 1,300 NRT costs £14,000; Syrmas to G.Kulukundis, 25/8/1880,where he informs Kulukundis that a 1,400 NRT steamship costs £17,000.

38. The Department of Maritime Studies at the University of Piraeus is currentlyundertaking a project to microfilm all existing ship registries from 1830 to 1939from Syros, Andros, Chios, Santorini, Myconos, Skiathos, Skopelos, Piraeus,Galaxidi, Patras, Cephalonia, Ithaca, and Corfu, and to enter these on computer. Itis due to this project that we have access to the ship registries of Syros and Piraeus.

39. See Panellinion Lefkoma Ethnikis Ekatontaetiridos, 1821–1921, vol. A, Athens,National Bank ot Greece, 1921, pp. 94–103.

40. Jesus Valdaliso, ‘Spanish Shipowners in the British Mirror: Patterns of Investment,Ownership and Finance in the Bilbao Shipping Industry, 1879–1913’, InternationalJournal of Maritime History, vol. 5, no. 2, December 1993.

41. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18thCenturies, London; Macmillan, 1962, pp. 82–3; Sarah Palmer ‘lnvestors in LondonShipping, 1820–1850’, Maritime History, vol. 2, 1973, pp. 46–68; Nordvik, op.cit.; R.Caty and E.Richard, Armateurs Marseillais au XIXe Siècle, Marseilles,Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Mars,eilles, 1986, pp. 45–6; Valdaliso,op. cit. As all authors point out, the vessel’s ownership was divided among anumber of individuals, generally merchants and mariners. Co-owners or partners ina ship were called in the Greek nautical argot parcineveli.

42. Valdaliso, op. cit.43. Nordvik, op. cit.; Eric W.Sager with Gerald E.Panting, Maritime Capital. The

Shipping Industry in Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montreal, McGill-Queen’sUniversity Press, 1990, chapters 4 and 7.

44. Valdaliso, op. cit.45. See G.A.Rallis, Interpretation of the Greek Commercial Law, Book 2, Athens,

Printing House of Andreas Koromilas Sons, 1863, p. 74. According toV. Kremmydas for the period before the formation of the Greek state the number ofpartners in the sailing ships was usually from two to sixteen. See Kremmydas,Greek Shipping, 1776–1835, vol. 2 Athens, Historical Archive of the CommercialBank of Greece, 1985–6, pp. 20–5, in Greek. D.Polemis, who draws hisconclusions from a sample or 805 notarial documents on sales and purchases ofshares of sailing ships during the period 1830–50, indicates that the number ofshares on the big sailing snips was usually around sixteen. See Demetrios Polemis,The Sailing Ships of Andros, Andros, Kairios Library, 1991, p. 44, in Greek. The

472 NOTES

introduction of steam brought the adaptation of one hunderd as the usual measure ofthe shares of ships.

46. Report on the Situation of the Greek Merchant Marine and the GovernmentMeasures that Should be Taken for its Encouragement and its Growth, Ministry ofShipping, Syros, Renieri Printezi Printing House, 1899, p. 53.

47. Professor Kremmydas supports the view that the third reason must be regarded asthe main reason for tne joint-shipownership practice. His view is that ‘thepredominance of the institution of this type of company must be interpreted as thebehaviour of capital in a specific time of the Greek economy, and must beconsidered as a clear and conscious entrepreneurial practice implemented by acertain category of capitalists: it is about the expansionist character of capital in aninternationally tried type of commercial company’. See Kremmydas, op. cit., pp.20–5.

48. According to Kremmydas, op. cit., p. 54, even as early as this period the masterwas not usually the main owner of the ship.

49. On the definition of sermagia, see The Syros Shipping Conference of the 1stSeptember 1902, reprint, Atnens, Hellenic Association of Economic Sciences,Municipality of Syros, Hellenic Company of Ship and Aircraft Insurance, 1973,pp. 152–3, in Greek. According to Kremmydas ‘sermagia is a company capitaldestined to cover the expenses of the cargo of the ship’; Kremmydas, TheHadjipanagiotis Archive, 1973, pp. 70–104, in Greek; D.Gofas further extends thisdefinition and supports tne view that sermagia apart from being a company capital,determines the company relation that is based on the given company capital.Sermagia is also often used in the nautical jargon to define a maritime loan.However, the difference between sermagia and the maritime loan lies in the factthat the first aims at a share in the profits whereas the second at interest rates. SeeD.Gofas in ‘Maritime Loans, Sermagias and Vlissidia‘, Analekta Naftikou Dikaiou,vol. 1, 1988, pp. 287–311.

50. Kremmydas, Hadjipanagiotis Archive, pp. 49–151.51. For more about marine insurance and credit, especially about the local market of

Syros see V.Kardassis, Syros, chapter 4.52. John Hadjipateras (ed.), Autobiography of Constantine I. Hadjipateras, London,

1963, in Greek.53. Polemis, op. cit., p. 51, presents equivalent data for the same period from the

notarial archives rrom Andros.54. Notarial Archives are an extremely valuable and completely unused source for the

Greek maritime history. To give an example, Andreas David, who was a notaryfrom 1832 to 1859 had made 31,505 notarial acts, all found in the Local HistoricalArchive of the Cyclades on the island of Syros. From the samples we took it seemsthat half of these were in shipping. If we take into consideration that the Archive ofSyros has the archives of another forty-six notaries and if we include the notarialarchives of another fifteen important maritime islands or city-ports, we end up withan enormous amount of material. A research programme that will process bycomputer large samples of this material will give us important results about theGreek and eastern Mediterranean maritime economic history. For more details onthe Local Historical Archive of Syros, see Christos Loukos and Popi Polemi, Guideto the Municipal Archive of Ermoupolis, 1821–1949 Athens, Association for theStudy of New Hellenism, 1987.

NOTES 473

55. Polemis, op. cit., p. 74.56. Ibid., pp. 48–9.57. Ibid., p. 105.58. See the long debate between Petros Chrysanthopulos, Jurist and Manager of the

New Greek Steamship Company, who supported the implementation of the Frenchlegal system and Epaminondas Embiricos, shipowner and MP who supported theEnglish legal system. For the details of tne debate see, Report on the Situation ofthe Greek Merchant and Marine and the Government Measures that should beTaken for its Encouragement and its Growth Ministry of Shipping, Syros, RenieriPrintezi Printing House, 1899; and Study on the Articks 216 and 407 of theCommercial Law, Ministry of Shipping, Athens, Printhouse of Alex. Papageorgiou,1891. All the main factors of shipping met on 1 September 1902, at tne SyrosShipping Conference, where they discussed extensively all the problems that hadrisen with the introduction of the new technology ships. The main subjectsdiscussed at this highly interesting conference were about maritime mortgage, theestablishment of a shipping bank and insurance, and the education of masters andengineers.

59. G.Diovouniotis, ‘About Maritime Mortgage’, The Syros Shipping Conference of 1September 1902 2nd edn, Greek Company of Economic Sciences, Municipality ofHermoupolis in Syros, Greek Insurance Company of Ships and Aircraft, Athens,1973, pp. 86–7.

5VOYAGES, MASTERS AND SEAMEN

1 A.I.Tzamtzis, ‘Preface’, to John S.Vlassopulos, Odysseas. A Ship from Ithaca,1837–1841 Athens, Melissa, 1992.

2 The information on Odysseas is based on Vlassopulos, op. cit., and it is the onlyship of the seven presented here whose information is based on published material.Mr Vlassopulos did an excellent job in processing and presenting the logbook ofthe ship found in the Historical Archive of Ithaca by providing translation of thedifficult language of the text—Ithacan dialect in combination with nautical argot—and important information on the various customs and aspects of the seamen’slives. He pedantically follows the routes of the ship by checking out the givenlatitudes and longitudes, provides detailed maps with the snips itineraries, winds,sketches of the brig and the various tecnnical terms of the ship. To my knowledge,it is the first annotated and published logbook of a nineteenth-century Greekmerchant vessel and a very important one; logbooks of sailing ships of the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century are extremely rare to find. The only other publishedlogbook about which I know is that of the merchant ship Alexandros which, duringthe Greek war of Independence, was converted into a warship; the logbook coversexactly the period of the war (1821–8). See Zoe Kolikourdi, Alexandros of HadziAlexandri. A Warship from Psara in Action. Logbook and Action (1821–1838),Athens, 1972. Parts of logs of sailing ships from Galaxidi during this period arepublished in Efthimios Gourgouris, Galaxidi at the Time of Sailing Vessels, 3 vols,Athens, 1983, in Greek.

474 NOTES

3. The log of Anastassia was given to me by Elias Martis Kulukundis. It waspresented to him by the Kassian master, Antonis Hadjipetrou.

4. For more about the Kulukundis family, see Minos D.Komninos, KassiotKaravokirides in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Athens, 1990.

5. Elias G.Kulukundis’ five sons, George, Nicholas, Manuel, John and Michael,became among the top twentietn-century Greek shipowners and the Kulukundisfamily remains an important shipowning family to the present day. See Chapter 6for the family in the interwar period.

6. The document was found in the Arvanitis Archive, Hellenic Literary and HistoricalArchival Society (ELIA). The master and owner of the ship, D. Katzulis, came fromGalaxidi and the ship was insured by Alexander Mavros —who probably acted forKatzulis—in the insurance company Gli Uniti Assicuratori, established in Odessa.The insurance contract is dated 28 November 1850.

7. Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum, documents of the Dracopoulos’ family.8. Logbook of Anastassia, Private Collection of Elias M.Kulukundis.9. Mike Ratcliffe, Liquid Gold Ships, A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyd’s of

London Press, 1985.10. Logbook of Anastassia Private Collection of Elias Kulukundis.11. Ibid.12. Manuel E.Kulukundis, Voyages on My Father’s Ships and Others, Piraeus, Naftika

Chronika, 1986, p. 9.13. The original logbook is found in the Archive of the Aegean Maritime Museum. The

book was kept by the scribe of the ship. In comparison to the other logbooks presentedit is kept very insufficiently, never mentioning the type of cargoes involved andgiving relatively brief descriptions of the activities on board.

14. See Kolikourdi, op. cit., p. 149. The writer has combined evidence from Greeksources and from the Boston Post of 14 March 1835. According to the samesource, Alexandros made two further voyages to the US in 1836 and 1837.

15. ‘Autobiography of Anastassios Syrmas’, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas,Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zographos.

16. Ibid.17. Demetrios Polemis, The Sailing Ships of Andros, Andros, Kairios Library, 1991, pp.

83–4.18. For Ithaca see Gerassimos Kolaitis, The Chronicle of Ithaca, Piraeus, Hellenic

Maritime Museum, 1988, p. 44.19. Ibid., and Hugh Gilchrist, Australiam and Greeks vol. 1, Melbourne, Halstead

Press, 1992.20. For the sailing vessels from Kassos see D.Komninos, op. cit., p. 209.21. A great problem arises in all Greek documents with regard to the Greek version of

the names of the various ports or geographical places. For example, in the logbookof Theofania Hull is ‘Ouli’, Dunkirk is ‘Doger’, Gibraltar is ‘Ziberalta’; inAnastassia Duke was ‘Thouk’. The appropriate names have usually been tracedonly by the given longitude and latitude.

22. The ship named Calliope Nicolopulo took five months to finish and was launcheaon 20 October 1880. See also Chapter 4, Section 2.

23. Syrmas, ‘Autobiography’.

NOTES 475

24. Discharge Book of Anastassios Syrmas, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas,Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos; Lloyd’s Register of Shipping,1885, 1890, 1895, 1900, 1910.

25. Syrmas, ‘Autobiography’.26. Logbook of ss Leonidas Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, 17/7/1904–4/5/

1906. The information on Leonidas is based on this log, on the book of expenses forthe period 1/4/1905–10/9/1905 and on the professional correspondence ofA.Syrmas with the Embiricos in a letterbook that covers the period 12/3/1905–2/5/1906.

27. The information on Andriana is based on the professional correspondence ofSyrmas with the Embiricos in the letterbook that covers the period 19/7/1906–4/3/1909, and on the logbook of the ship for the period 5/3/1908– 12/7/1909, and thebook of expenses for the period 5/6/1906–5/2/1910.

28. Syrmas to Embiricos, 24/10/1905 Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, PrivateCollection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

29. A substantial number of charter parties and bills of lading from 1805 to the 1840scan be found in the Arcnive of the Aegean Maritime Museum and in Dekozi-Vouros Archive in the Hellenic Literary and Historical Archival Society.

30. Arvanitis Archive, Hellenic Literary and Historical Archival Society. Capitals inthe original.

31. Ibid.32. Logbook of Anastassia.33. Altnough the Kulukundis were from Kassos, they were established in Syros.34. A very limited number of accounts books of sailing ships can also be found at the

Archives of the Museum of Galaxidi. See Gourgouris, op. cit.35. Eric W.Sager, Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820–

1914, Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 1989, p. 81.36. Ministry of Shipping, Collection of the Main Laws, Decrees and Circulars Related

to the Greek Merchant Marine and the Ports Service, Athens, National PrintingHouse, 1893, p. 34. According to A.N.Vernadakis, with the Law of 11 April 1867,marine schools were established in Ermoupolis of Syros, Hydra, Spetses, Galaxidiand Argostoli of Cephalonia and, with the Law of 22 June 1882, Patras, Piraeus,Syros, Cephalonia, Galaxidi, Hydra, Spetses and Santorini. All these, however,were either elementary or high schools with some classes on maritime subjects. SeeA.N.Vernadakis, About the Trade of Greece, Athens, Vivliopolio D.N.Karavias1885, repr. 1990, pp. 214–15; Constantine Papathanassopoulos, Greek MerchantMarine. Development and Re-adjustment (1833–1856), Athens, CulturalFoundation of the National Bank of Greece 1983, in Greek. A proper school thatprovided formal training for masters of merchant marine was only established aslate as 1931 in Hydra and remained the only one in Greece until 1956 when theAspropyrgos School for Masters of the Merchant Marine was established. SeeI.Kyriazikidou, ‘The Marine Education in Greece and the Needs of Greek Shippingfor a Better Manpower’, PhD thesis, University of Athens, 1968, chapter IV.

37. Andreas G.Lemos, Modern Greek Seamen, Athens, Tsikopoulos, pp. 23–24.38. In a discussion I had with the Andriot historian Demetrios Polemis, Director of the

Kairios Library in Andros, in June 1993, I was told commonly known stories ofCaptain Syrmas’ honesty and justice.

476 NOTES

39. A.Syrmas to C.L.Embiricos in London, October 1909, Archive of CaptainAnastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

40. A.Syrmas to A.Embiricos, 28 May 1909, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas,Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

41. Theodoros Syrmas actually became master on Embiricos ships before the FirstWorld War. In fact we find Theodoros Syrmas as master not of Andriana butof A.Embiricos’ ss Rozina (1677 NRT) in 1913, crew lists, 1913, found in theArchive of the Aegean Maritime Museum.

Theodoros honoured his father a decade later, when he acquired his first steamshipand named it Anastassios Syrmas. Archive of Captain Theodoros Syrmas, PrivateCollection of Anastassios Zografos.

42. For more details see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on theEve of the First World War, Myconos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994, pp. 80–1.

43. Research on nineteenth-century seamen regarding their numbers, origin and wagesbased on archival material is almost non-existent in the Greek historicalliterature.Fortunately the Aegean Maritime Museum with the help of the Hellenic Literaryand Historical Archive has recently acquired the largest known archival collectionon Greek seamen for the period 1860–1918. These archives, which originate fromthe Seamen’s Pension Fund, consist first of large books of ‘Registers of theWorkers of the Sea’ from 1860–1900, and second of naftologia or crew lists whichevery ship had to have and renew in every change of crew at the first available portwith Greek Port Authorities. These crew lists which cover the period 1908–18,were used by the Seamen’s Pension Fund in order to calculate the contributions tothe Fund. Only when this valuable material is processed will we be able to have aclearer view of the structure and wages of Greek seamen.

44. Markus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen,Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 126–7.

45. Logbook of Leonidas, October 1905, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas,Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

46. Syrmas to Gioni, Sunderland 5 August 1880, in the Letterbook of CaptainA.Syrmas to Nicolopulo, 1880–1, Archive of Captain Anastassios Syrmas, PrivateCollection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

47. Embiricos apparently was outraged by the fact that Syrmas ordered ‘Jamaica Rhum’and wrote so. Syrmas replied on 22 March 1906, ‘Regarding the Rhum we askedafter the proposal of the second mate who thought it useful to have on the ship, Ialso protested on the brand “Jamaica Rhum” but he convinced me it was thecheapest and best for the ship.’

48. Captain Anastassios Syrmas, ‘Autobiography’. Compare also with the food onboard Odysseas.

49. A.Embiricos to C.L.Embiricos, Newport, 1 January 1908, Archive of CaptainAnastassios Syrmas, Private Collection of Admiral Anastassios Zografos.

6GREEK MARITIME ‘EXPANSION’, 1914–39

NOTES 477

1. A.Andreades, Les Effets Economiques et Sociales de la Guerre en Grèce, Paris,1928, p. 108.

2. See Christos Dounis, Greek Merchant Shipping, Athens, 1991, p. 82. These‘foreigners’ were in most cases Norwegians and Germans. The English and theFrench created many problems for the neutral Greek ships by delaying them in thevarious ports of the Mediterranean and the North Sea for inspection on thesuspicion of war contraband.

3. Dounis, op. cit., p. 83; Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping, London,John Murray, 1990, pp. 349–56.

4. K.Antonopulos, ‘The Greek Shipping Policy’, Naftika Chronika, January 1976;D.G.Papamihalopulos, The State and the Merchant Marine, pp. 90–5.

5. There were actually three C-standard type ships at £145,000 each and six B-standard type ships at £220,000 each in addition to £500,000 for timely delivery.The account of Ambatielos’ case is based on the rich file on the subject found inBritains Public Record Office, Maritime Transport 53/6/150058.

6. Ambatielos’ case lasted for more than thirty-five years until his death in 1956. In1925 the Greek government took over his case for unfair treatment of its subiectbut the British government refused to re-open the case. After more useless appealsin the 1930s, the Greek government referred the matter to the International Court ofJustice at The Hague in May 1949. In 1953 the International Court ruled thatBritain was obliged to submit the claim to arbitration. Ambatielos claimed £8,000,000 for financial damages but died at the age of seventy-one before theInternational Arbritration Commission sat. The Commission, which finally sat inLondon on 6th March 1956, announced its decision. The compensation claim hadfailed.

7. The reasons behind the success of the various nations were of course different. Therise of the Japanese fleet was linked to the economic rise of the country; seeTomohei Chida and Peter N.Davies, The Japanese Shipping and ShipbuildingIndustries, London, Athlone, 1990. The growth of the Norwegian fleet in theinterwar period and after was related to their success in tanker shipping; see StanleyG.Sturmey, British Shipping and World Competition London, Athlone, 1962,chapter 4, pp. 61–97. The expansion of the Greek shipping fleet was due to postwarinvolvement in tankers and bulk-carriers as well as the use of flags or conveniencein the 1940s and 1950s. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. FromSeparate Development to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone,1993.

8. Apart from British and Greek ships, a further 50 per cent of the Argentinian tradein the interwar period was carried by nine other nationalities, which wereapparently involved almost exclusively in passenger or liner trade. Among the topthree were Italy and Germany, in connection with emigration from Europe to LatinAmerica on Italian passenger liners of Navigazione Generale Italiana, the LloydSabaudo and Societa Triestina as well as tne German liners of North German Lloydand the Hamburg-South American Line. In the economic conditions of the 1930s, aworking arrangement had to be made between these two principal Germanpassenger lines, while the French and Italian passenger lines had to make agreementsamong themselves. See, Report on the Financial, Commercial and IndustrialSituation of Argentina, Department of Overseas Trade, London, HMSO, 1932, p.133. As well, the Dutch, Spanish and Belgians participated. Two Japanese firms

478 NOTES

Nippon Yusen Kaisha (NYK) and the Osaka Shosen Kaisha (OSK), maintainedregular services to Buenos Aires until the former ceased operations in the early1930s. According to the British Commercial Secretary in 1937, regular servicesbetween Japan and Argentina were launched by two other Japanese companies, theYamashita Line and the Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Line, together with Osaka ShosenKaisha Line.

9. Sturmey, op. cit., chapter 4.10. See Helen A.Thanopulou, ‘The Anticyclical Behaviour of Greek Shipowners, 1974–

1989.’, unpublished paper, University of Piraeus, 1992. I thank Dr Thanopulou formaking the paper available to me.

11. Metaxas to Andreas Lemos, published in Andreas G.Lemos, The Greeks and theSea. A Peoples Seafaring Achievements from Ancient Times to the Present Day,London, Cassell, 1976, p. 157.

12. Cited in Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910–1939. The Co-existence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia,1991, p. 131.

13. Lambert Bros Ltd have been shipowners since 1841, and at the last third of thenineteenth century were known to be owners of several colliers. At the turn of thecentury the company extended its activities to deep-sea trading and during theinterwar period they were owners of several tramp cargo steamers. See Sea Breezes,vol. 32, December 1961; I would like to thank Mr Alan H.McCleveland forproviding me with this information. Not much else is, however, known about theirship-financing business apart from occasional references by Greek ship-ownerstnemselves. Greeks often refer to them also as ‘coal merchants’.

14. R&K retained its leading position in the 1940s and 1950s. One of its founders,Manolis Kulukundis, was among the top five Greek shipowners in 1956. Sturmey,op. cit., pp. 359–62, in 1962 called R&K the most important London tramp-shipping office. Although it is still operating, after 1945 it became part of theKulukundis shipowning group witn branches in London, New York and Piraeus.

15. Minos D.Komninos, Kassiot Shipowners in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century,Athens, 1990, p. 58.

16. Manolis Kulukundis and his four brothers created a number of companies forvarious purposes—some probably to avoid taxes, others to take advantage of localopportunities. Tramp Shipping and Development, Atlanticos, and HymettusSteamship, for example, were companies that owned shares in Kulukundis’ or hisclients’ ships. According to Minos Komninos, apart from those operated under theGreek flag in 1939 R&K also ‘owned another 60 ships under the British andCanadian flags operated by “Counties Ship Management” that it had established inEngland’ (Komninos, op. cit., p. 76). R&K’s British fleet was owned by LondonOverseas Freighters Ltd (LOF), founded by R&K just prior to the Second World Warand operating about fifteen ships; LOF continues its activities to the present day.On Canadian operations, Komninos is apparently confused: the Greek-ownedCanadian flag fleet did not exist until after 1945 when Nicholaos Kulukundis(Manolis’ brother) persuaded Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King and theCanadian Marine Administration to sell on credit sixty-eight Victory ships to hisAcadia Shipping Co. Very little is known about this fleet; it would be interesting toexamine its ownership structure through Canadian archival materials.

NOTES 479

17. In June 1991 I was able to interview the last surviving member of this company atits empty but daunting offices in Hermoupolis. Eighty-four-year-old YannisDiniakos, who worked for the Rethymnis family for fifiy-eight years, wasemployed since the firms formation in 1925.

18. Manolis E.Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and the Sea’. Naftika Chronika, 15 January1982.

19. Komninos, op. cit., p. 57.20. Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and the Sea’.21. Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEN) 1937, pp. 153–5.22. Ronald Hope, op.cit., p. 364.23. Ibid. See also Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and Sea’; Kulukundis, In the Service of

Shipping, 1960–1984. Articles of M.Kulukundis in Naftika Chronika, Piraeus,Naftika Chronika, 1984, p. 89.

24. Kallimanopulos’ son founded and still runs a successful tramp company. The onlyliner container company in Piraeus today is Sarlis Containers, a small but successfulfirm operating in the Mediterranean.

25. At this point I have profited from discussions with my colleague HelenThanopulou. This subject, however, requires further investigation.

26. EEN, 1937, p. 313.27. Diniakos, interview, June 1991.28. This is reported by Comninos, op. cit., p. 62, but has not yet been confirmed

independently.29. This information is based on Lloyd’s Register of Shipping, 1938.30. Mount Ida, for example, bought by R&K for £6,200, was sold to German owners

before the Second World War for £55,000. The same strategy was followed verysuccessfully by Stavros Livanos and Chandris Brothers. See Ship Registries,Piraeus Port Authorities.

31. Hope, op. cit., p. 366.32. On the economics of MRS see Basil Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp-Shipping

London, Athlone, repr. 1981, pp. 229–34. Metaxas’ father, the shipowner NicholasB.Metaxas, was an active member of the Greek Co-operation Committee set up inLondon in the 1930s to supervise the implementation of the MRS. See Metaxas toLemos, in Lemos, op. cit., pp. 156–69.

33. Manolis E.Kulukundis, ‘Fifty Years 1935–1985, Greek Snipping Co-operationCommittee’, in Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee, 50 Years, Piraeus, Dioptra, 1985, pp. 57–62.

34. Manolis E.Kulukundis wrote on the fiftieth anniversary or the Committee in 1985:‘I am perhaps the last surviving member of the original group and until June of1940 I was in London and can enumerate the contribution that the Committee madeto the Shipping Industry during the first five years of its existence. First andforemost the spirit of co-operation it had engendered among the London owners asit was reflected during the frequent meetings we had and helped us to face up to thecrises we were confronting. The success of the Minimum Rate Scheme initiated thesteady progress that was recorded during the period, until the advent of the SecondWorld War and the increase of tonnage under the Greek control to the discomfitureof the British owners—our chief competitors.’ Greek Shipping Co-operationCommittee, p. 57.

480 NOTES

35. Department of Overseas Trade, Report on the Financial, Commercial andIndustrial Situation of Argentina, London, HMSO, 1926.

36. Kulukundis, ‘The Greeks and the Sea’.37. For example, on 20 February 1928, fifteen of the thirty-three steamers that R&K

operated in 1928 had left from Argentinian ports (see Appendix 6.8). ‘Position ofSteamers, 20 February 1928’, Private Collection of Yannis Diniakos. This kind ofreport was made weekly by R&K for their clients. A copy of this report was givento us by Yannis Diniakos in June 1991.

38. Naftika Chronika, Review of 25 Years: 1931–1956, January 1956.39. See Costas Chlomoudis, ‘The Greek Merchant Marine, 1910–939. The Co-

existence of Different Modes of Production’, PhD thesis, University of Macedonia,1991.

7LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE GREEK-OWNED FLEET IN THE

INTERWAR PERIOD

1. All references to the age of seamen for 1910 are based on table 3.5 in GelinaHarlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on the Eve of the First World War,Myconos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994; for 1930, the data come from Table 4of the Census, as published in Epitheorisi Emporikou Naftikou (EEE), 1931, pp.1164–207.

2. This Review, wnich produced its first issue in 1925 gives us valuable publicationsand consistent data for the rest of the interwar period. The body of the PortAuthorities Officials was formed in 1919 and one of the first tasks it undertook wasto start running a Review that would contain all appropriate data on the statistics ofthe Greek Merchant Marine and to keep the shipping world informed ofinternational maritime affairs. The new Review sustained its high standardthroughout the interwar period, but unfortunately did not keep it up in the postwarperiod. As a result, in the Library of the School of the Port Authorities Officialsone finds complete series of the Fairplay, Scandinavian Shipping Gazette, Journalde la Marine Marchande, Lloyd’s Register of Shipping and other valuable editionsonly for the interwar years.

3. Spiros A.Ferendinos, ‘The Sailing of the Greek Cargo Vessel loannis Th.Vlassopulos to the Southern Polar Seas’, EEN, 1929, pp. 514–25.

4. George Abouselam, Memories of the Sea, Piraeus, 1990, pp. 163–4, in Greek.5. Royal Decree 6/12/1939, ‘Regulation of Work on Board Greek Cargo Vessels of

800 GRT and Over’. A detailed and illuminating analysis of the master’sresponsibilities on board nineteenth-century Canadian vessels is to be found in EricW.Sager, Seafaring Labour: The Merchant Marine of Atlantic Canada, 1820–1914, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1989, pp. 81–8.

6. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the English Shipping Industry in the 17th and 18thCenturies, London, Macmillan, 1962, chapter 5; Helge W.Nordvik, ‘The ShippingIndustries of the Scandinavian Countries, 1850–1914’, in Lewis R. Fischer andGerald E.Panting (eds), Change and Adaptation in Maritime History. The NorthAtlantic Fleets in the Nineteenth Century, St John’s, NF, Maritime History Group,1985, pp. 130–7.

NOTES 481

7. Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development toMutual Interdependence, 1945–1979, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 1.

8. A vessel built in 1924, of a tonnage of 4,000–5,000 GRT and of an average speed of9 to 9.5 miles, consumed 27–8 tons of coal per day. See N.Katsambis, Greek CargoShipping, Athens, 1940, p. 32. On the basis of this data, six firemen shovelled 460kilos of coal in every four-hour shift.

9. Abouselam, op. cit., p. 20.10. Ronald Hope, A New History of British Shipping, London, John Murray, 1990, p.

378. For the impact of steamships on Britisn maritime labour force, DavidM.Williams, ‘Industrialisation, Technological Change and Maritime Labour Force:The British Experience 1800–1914’ in C.Koninckx, Proceedings of theInternational Colloquium ‘Industrial Revolutions and the Sea’, Brussels, 28–31March 1989, Wetenschappelijk Comit voor Maritieme Geschiedenis.

11. Markus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Merchant Seamen,Pirates and the Anglo-American Maritime World, 1700–1750, Cambridge,Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 149.

12. Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships, chapter 3.13. Margarita belonged to N.B.Metaxas; Interview with his son, Professor Basil N.

Metaxas, December 1991.14. There exist very few dictionaries of the nautical language. One of the first from

Greek to Greek is by P.E.Segditsas, Our Commonly Used Nautical Terms and theRomanic Languages, Athens, E.Eugenides Foundation, 1954. The more recent onesthat are Greek-Greek, Greek-English and vice versa are by Roy Papangelou, TheLanguage of the Vessel, Athens, Okeanida, 1991, and by John S.Vlassopulos andPeter R.Brodie, Dictionary of Shipping Terms. Greek-English and English-Greek,London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1989.

15. Abouselam, op. cit., pp. 19–21.16. Abouselam, op. cit., p. 20.17. Frank Broeze, ‘Militancy and Pragmatism. An International Perspective on

Maritime Labour, 1870–1914’, International Review of Social History, vol.XXXVI, 1991, pp. 165–200.

18. Cited in Ibid.19. Ibid.20. Yannis Kordatos, The History of the Greek Workers’ Movement, 3rd ed., Athens,

Boukoumanis, 1972, p. 191.21. Ibid., p. 309.22. George Stefanatos, Greek Seamen’s Movement, Athens, Sychroni Epochi, 1978,

pp. 38–9.23. See Alexander Kitroeff, ‘The Greek Seamen’s Movement, 1940–1944’, Journal of

Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 7, fall/winter 1980, pp. 73–97.24. Head Port Autnorities’ official N.Courbelis, ‘Crews of Greek Steamships’, EEN,

1926.25. Rediker, op. cit., chapter 5; Sager, op. cit., chapter 6.26. Spiros A.Ferendinos, ‘Discipline in the Greek Merchant Marine’, EEN, 1929, pp.

886–97.27. Abouselam, op. cit., p. 20.28. Ibid., p. 27.29. Ferendinos, ‘Discipline’, pp. 886–97.

482 NOTES

30. See Naftergatikos Agon, 19 September 1948.31. Preamble to Law 6209, ‘On Wages of Sea Workers’, Government Gazette, 250 A,

31/7/34.32. ‘Crew Wages on Greek ships’, EEN, 1925.33. Michalis Riginos, Productive Structures and Workers’ Wages in Greece, 1909–

1936, Athens, Institute of Research and Education, Commercial Bank of Greece,1987, p. 206. I calculated an average of twenty-five working days per month.

34. Port Authorities’ official B.Skarpetis, ‘Terms and Conditions of Work on BoardEnglish Merchant Ships’, EEN, 1927.

35. For crimping in nineteenth-century Britain, see Conrad Dixon, ‘The Rise and Fallof the Crimp 1840–1914’, in Stephen Fisher (ed.), British Shipping and Seamen1630–1960: Some Studies, Exeter, Exeter University Press, 1984, 49–67. See alsoC.I.Hamilton, ‘Seamen and Crime at the Cape, 1860–1880’, International Journalof Maritime History, vol. I, no. 2, December 1989, pp. 1–35; J.Stevenson, ‘TheLondon “Crimp” Riots of 1794’, International Review of Social History, vol. 16,1971, pp. 41–2.

36. Abouselam, op. cit., pp. 211–13.37. Sotiris A.Agapitides, Current Trends in the Protection of Sea-labour, Athens, 1940,

pp. 16–25, in Greek. For an excellent analysis of the works of the ILO and itsimpact on the development of the organisation of labour in Greece see AntonisLiakos, Labour and Politics in Greece during the Interwar Years. TheInternational Labour Office and the Rise of Social Institutions Athens, Institute ofResearch and Education, 1993.

8THE TROUBLED 1940s: SETTING THE BASIS FOR THE ‘LEAP

FORWARD’

1. Part of this chapter has been published in a very different form in Gelina Harlaftis,‘Greek Shipowners and State Intervention in the 1940s: A Formal Justification forthe Resort to Flags-of-Convenience?’, International Journal of Maritime Historyvol. 1, no. 2, December 1989, pp. 37–63.

2. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Developmentto Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1979, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 7.

3. United Kingdom, Public Record Office (PRO), Maritime Transport, ‘The Anglo-Greek Agreement’ in ‘The Vergottis Case’, MT 59, 1552.

4. United Kingdom, Public Record Office, Maritime Transport, ‘Neutral TonnagePolicy Committee’, MT 59, 1405, 106993.

5. Atle Thowsen, Fra Nøytral til Alliert Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1985, p. 60.6. PRO, ‘The Vergottis Case’.7. Aristotle Onassis, ‘Our Post-war Shipping, the State and the Shipowners’,

[Memorandum to the president of tne Greek shipowners in New York,M.Kulukundis in 1947], Ethnikos Kyrex, 8, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25March 1953, in Greek.

8. Greek Shipowners’ Union (GSU), Greek Shipping During the War and After,Athens, 1946, in Greek.

NOTES 483

9. E.Babouris, The Greek Merchant Marine during the Last War, Athens, 1949, p. 24,in Greek; A.I.Tzamtzis, The Liberties and the Greeks, Athens, Hestia, 1984, p.133, in Greek; GSU, op. cit.

10. Onassis, op. cit.; O.Eidikos, ‘The Greek Fleet and its Reconstruction’, NeaOikonomia, vols 3 and 5, 1947, in Greek.

11. Thowsen, op. cit., p. 62.12. Ibid., p. 8.13. GSU, op. cit., pp. 19–20.14. PRO, ‘The Vergottis case’.15. Along these lines the Greek government tried to strengthen its power over the

shipowners through a series of laws. LD 3140/1943 altered ENEL’s composition toseven persons appointed by the government and three shipowners. See EleftheriosGeorgandopulos, The Greek Shipping Policy (1931–1961), Piraeus, 1964, p. 48, inGreek.

16. Angeliki (Gelina) Harlaftis, ‘The Greek Shipowners, the State and the Economy(1958–1974)’, DPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1988, p. 55 and table 1.12.

17. Govemment Gazette 487/A, 14.11.1939.18. The government attempted to reissue the same law it had passed twenty-six years

before under the Venizelos government but at that time it had more control overshipowners who were using the Greek flag, and who had not yet adopted flags orconvenience. The wholesale degeneration of implementation of the law is a typicalexample of the extremely loose control the Greek government maintained over theshipowners during the 1940s. For more details see Greek Shipping Co-operationCommittee, The Deduction of Insurance Indemnities, London, 1949, andGeorgandopulos, op. cit.

19. Georgandopulos, op. cit., p. 47.20. G.Drosopulos, ‘The Issue of the Taxation of Ships’, Report to the Inter-party

Committee of Merchant Shipping by the Cyclades MP, 10 May 1949, Athens, pp.29–30.

21. Government Gazette 45A/1949. 22. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 7.23. Alexander Kitroeff, ‘The Greek Seamen’s Movement, 1940–1944’, Journal of

Hellenic Diaspora, vol. 7, fall/winter 1980, pp. 73–97.24. George Abouselam, Memories of the Sea, Piraeus, 1990, pp. 53–5, in Greek.25. For detailed account on Liberty ships see Frederic Lane et al., Ships for ‘Victory’:

A History of Shipbuilding under the U.S.Maritime Commission in World War II,Historical reports on War Administration, US Maritime Commission, Baltimore,1951. L.A Sawyer and W.H.Mitchell, The Liberty Ships, Devon, Davis and Charles,1970.

26. See Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 3.27. Cited in Tzamtzis, op. cit., pp. 79–80. This book provides the most integrated

account of the purchase of Liberties by Greek shipowners.28. According to Onassis there was a sterling market in New York in which many

shipowners sold one sterling pound for $3 while the legal equity was $4 per £1.The sale of sterling pounds in that market by the various Greek shipowners wasestimated to be around half a million pounds sterling. Onassis, op. cit.

29. Onassis, op. cit.

484 NOTES

30. Efstathios Batis, ‘The Chronicle of the Miracle (1947–1961)’, Naftika Chronika, 1January 1962.

31. Onassis, op. cit., 17/3/53.32. Traditional shipowners are defined as those who after the Second World War were

at least second generation shipowners, i.e., those who inherited their positions fromtheir fathers. In 1950 they owned 80 per cent of the Greek-owned tonnage, apercentage that decreased by half by 1975. For more details see Harlaftis, GreekShipowners and Greece, chapter 1.

33. Basil Metaxas, The Economics of Tramp Shipping, London, Athlone, repr. 1981, p.197. For a detailed discussion of flags of convenience see Metaxas, Flags ofConvenience, London, Gower Press, 1985.

34. For a detailed analysis on the formation of the Liberian flag of convenience seeRodney P.Carlisle, Sovereignty for Sale. The Origins and Evolution of thePanamanian and Liberian Flags of Convenience, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press,1981, pp. 115–33.

35. Alan Cafruny, Ruling the Waves: The PoliticalEconomy of International Shipping,Berkeley, University of California Press, 1987, p. 87. Mike Ratcliffe, Liquid GoldShips: A History of the Tanker, London, Lloyds of London Press, 1985, p. 314.

36. R.Doganis and B.N.Metaxas, The Impact of the Flags of Convenience, London,Polytechnic of Central London, Transport Studies Group, 1976, p. 7.

37. For a more integrated analysis on the subject see Harlartis, Greek Shipowners andGreece, chapters 3 and 7.

9INTERNATIONAL SEA-TRADE AND GREEK-OWNED SHIPPING IN

THE SECOND HALF OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

1. For a detailed analysis of the three principal dry-bulk cargoes, see Paul J.Velduizen, Freight Futures. Targeting the 90s London, Lloyd’s of London Press,1988.

2. H.L.Beth, A.Hader and R.Kappel, 25 Years of World Shipping, London, FairplayPublications, 1984, pp. 10–15.

3. For more details see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece: From SeparateDevelopment to Mutual Interdependence 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993,chapter 3.

4. Harlaftis, op. cit., chapters 3 and 7.5. This division of the post-Second World War period and the analysis that follows is

based on the excellent book by Helen Thanopulou, Greek and InternationalShipping. Changes in the International Division of Labour in Shipping. The Caseof the Greek Fket Athens, Papazissis, 1994.

6. The long-term development of the tanker freight market and of the dry-cargo ships’freight market was more or less parallel during the period under examination. SeeThanopulou, op. cit., p. 51; and P.Faust, The Influence of Exogenous Factors ofFreight Rate Development Bremen, Institute of Shipping Economics, 1976.

7. Part of the abrupt decrease of the Greek-owned fleet as shown in Figure 9.16 isfictitious and is due to a change in the collection of statistical data since 1984–5from Naftika Chronika which, since that date, started collecting data for ships of 1,

NOTES 485

000 GRT and over, thus excluding smaller ships. See also Thanopulou, op. cit., p.312.

8. Stanley G.Sturmey, British Shipping and World Competition London, Athlone,1962, pp. 61–97.

9. Atle Thowsen, Shipping and a Planned Economy, Bergen, Sjøfartsmuseum, 1986,p. 35.

10. For a detailed analysis, see Thanopulou, op. cit., pp. 64–71, 233–8.11. For an early discussion on these trends in world shipping see Helen Thanopulou,

‘La Marine Marchande Grecque dans la Marine Marchande Mondiale: Les EnjeuxRécents’, DEA, Université Paris I–Sorbonne, 1984; also Thanopulou, Greek andInternational Shipping.

12. Thanopulou, Greek and International Shipping, Table A.2 and Appendix,Table 1.5.

13. Helen Thanopulou, ‘The Growth of Fleets Registered in the Newly-EmergingMaritime Countries and Maritime Crises’, Maritime Policy and Management, vol.22, no. 1, 1995, pp. 51–62.

10THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME NETWORK OF THE GREEKS IN

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

1. Basil Metaxas, Flags of Convenience, London, Gower, 1985, p. 11.2. See Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece. From Separate Development

to Mutual Interdependence, 1945–1975, London, Athlone, 1993, chapter 2.3. According to G.Gabriel these firms are operated by 350 managing companies in

Piraeus. Lecture of G.Gabriel, 12 November 1993, in the Third Cycle of OpenLectures organised by the Department of Maritime Studies, University of Piraeus.

4. Nikos Karellis, director of the Piraeus branch of the Midland Bank, has calculatedthe market value of the fleet managed out of Piraeus and found it to be 63 per centof the total Greek-owned fleet, while the equivalent percentage for London was 25per cent, for New York 8 per cent and for Monte Carlo/Switzerland 5 per cent.Nikos Karellis, Midland Bank Report, September 1991. I thank Mr Karellis for thisinformation.

5. There were many families like the Lemos and Goulandris that had not only one butmany shipping offices each. There were also other families who together owned thesame firm, such as Pneumaticos, Rethymnis and Yannaghas, or Vattis and Gregos,etc.

6. See Harlaftis, op. cit., chapter 1.7. See Harlaftis, op. cit., appendix 1.8. Matheos D.Los, ‘Les Armateurs Grècs et les Transports Maritimes Internationaux

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9. For 1910, see Gelina Harlaftis, Greek Seamen and Greek Steamships on the Eve ofthe First World War, Myconos, Aegean Maritime Museum, 1994, table 3.5. For1930, Epitheorisis Emporikou Naftikou (EEN), 1930, pp. 291–6; for 1961,K.Antonopoulos, ‘Results of the Census’, Naftika Chronika, January 1961; for1975, see A.Corres, The Greek Seamanpower, Athens, Institute of Economic and

486 NOTES

Industrial Research (IOBE), 1974; for 1980, Census of Seamen on 31 May 1980,Ministry of Shipping, Direction of Maritime Labour.

10. Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece, chapter 2.11. Ibid.12. Ibid.13. ‘Report by Vice-Consul Wagstaff on the Trade and Commerce of Nikolaev for the

Year 1877’, Bitish Parliamentary Papers (BPP), 1878, vol. 75, p. 88.14. Barbara Conway, Maritime Fraud, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 1990.15. Harlaftis, Greek Shipowners and Greece chapter 10.16. Ibid., chapter 7.17. Ibid.18. See Chapter 6; and Helen Thanopulou, ‘The Anticyclical Behaviour of Greek

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20. Ibid., p. 148.21. Fairplay, 18 March 1897, p. 438.22. Roundtable discussion organised by Argo and the Department of Maritime Studies,

University of Piraeus, May 1993.

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INDEX

Abouselam, Captain George 212, 216, 219–20, 222–3

accident rates 278Adrianople, Treaty of (1829) 48, 147age of ships 235, 278‘Agreements and Accounts of Crew’ 170–1alcohol 176–7Alexandria 9, 14;

and Chiot network 40;Greek merchants in 50, 399n.

Ambatiello family 128Ambatielos, Nicolas 186–7, 414n.Ameros family 50Anastassia (sailing ship) 144, 147–53, 168;

voyages 147–52Andreades, S. 237Andriana (steamship) 163–6, 168, 412n.;

profits 169Andros 158, 168;

continuing influence 274;Ottoman rule in 3;see also Embiricos family

Anglo-Greek Agreement (1941) 228anticyclical investment behaviour 193–4,

281Ararat (sailing ship) 36–7Arcadia (sailing ship) 36Archangelos company xxivArchangelos shipping register 106–7, 111–

12, 117–18Argenti & Co 44, 46Argenti, P. and Sechiari, F. 48Argentina 414n.;

British trade with 189–91Arvanitides, Cosmas 102Arvanitides family 84–5, 87, 102

Arvanitis, Captain Alexander 166, 167Atlantic trading 153–4, 246–7Australia, Greek seamen on ships to 154Avierino 46Azov ports, bulk cargo 25;

commuaications difficulties 78–80;and Ionian network 78–81

Bahamas, flags of convenience 241Baltazzi firm 51Baltic Coffee House 57Baltic Exchange 57–9, 63;

Greek members 57–9, 68, 95–8, 280;Jewish members 97–8

Bangladesh, flags of convenience 241Bank of Athens 94–5, 133–4bankruptcy, insurance firms 113;

merchants 115banks 62, 133–4, 140;

established by shipping families 93, 94–5;as shipowners 141–2

Barbarossa, Kayr al Din 5Basiliou, Euphrosyne 53–4Batum (port) 84–5bauxite/alumina trade 251, 253Berdiansk (port) 79Bermuda, flags of convenience 241Black Sea, communications 57;

grain trade 25;hostile environment of 56–7;Ionian network in 82–7;land ownership 67;nineteenth-century shipping 24–38;

498

reduction of trade in First World War185–6

blockades, Greek disregard of 277–8Britain, cargo 13;

and Chiot network 40–1;decline of tramp fleet 188–9;and flags of convenience 245;and grain trade 20–1;Greek ships using flag of 32;Greeks handling Eastern Mediterraneantrade 91;and growth of Greek tramp fleet 201–2;merchant communities in 39;Navigation Laws (1849) 21;route to Argentina 189–91;size of fleet 265, 266;and textile trade 21, 59;tonnage measurement 110–11;transition from sail to steam 130;wage levels 233;see also Baltic Exchange;London

Bulgaria 85–7bulk cargo 9, 10, 12–14, 21–3, 34, 182;

diminishing importance 37;Greek specialisation in 38, 280–1

bulk carriers 245, 257–61, 264Bureau of Work at Sea (GENE) 223business strategy 277–83

Cairo 9, 14;and Chiot network 40

Calliope Nicolopulo (steamship) 158–62,176

Canada, shipowning networks 69cargo, of liner and tramp companies 36–7;

trading in 59–60;see also bulk cargo;dry cargo;general cargo;oil trade

Cassavetti firm 42Caucasus ports, bulk cargo 25Cayman Islands, flags of convenience 241Chandris Brothers 237, 276charter parties 62, 166–7

China 278, 281;size of fleet 266

Chios, destruction by Turks 115;as Genoese colony 3;maritime tradition 4–5;shipping network see Chiot network

Chiot network, becoming shipbrokers andagents 89;differences to Ionian network 90–5;and Rethymnis and Kulukundis (R&K)197;role of Syros 118;shipowning 40–51, 60–7;survival of traditional practices 274–6;transition to Ionian network 67–9;and twentieth-century Chiotshipowners 100–3

Chrussaki family 85Chryssoveloni Bros. 74Cicellis family 88;

purchasing steamships 121, 125citizenship, benefits of 55City of London Marine Insurance

Company 96co-ownership 134–8, 408–9n.;share-holders 133, 134–8, 195–7

coal trade 163, 164–5, 251, 253, 254, 255Comnas, Anargyros B. 153, 156Comnas, Nicholas 156Constantinople 9, 14Constantinople, and Chiot network 40, 50;

and grain trade 48;and Ionian network 85, 87;as necessary stopping place 167;steamship owners in 126

consuls, Greeks as 55, 56convenience, flags of see flags of

convenienceCorgialegno family 88Corn Laws 20, 112Costa Rica, flags of convenience 241cotton 21, 24Couppa family 88Courtgi, P.M., as steamship owners 126Cremidi family 41Crete, maritime tradition 4–5crew see seamenCrimean War 68, 278

INDEX 499

crimps 222–3, 418n.Cuba 278Cucussi family 41currants 405n.Cyprus, flag of convenience 241, 278

D’Anastassy 50, 56Danube area, European Commission of the

Danube 72, 78;Ionian network in 71, 72–8

David, Andreas 138, 409n.Davis, R. 69Dellaporta family 88Demetrius S.Schilizzis (steamship) 160–1,

162deposit trade 14–21desertion 153, 154, 174Dracoulis Brothers 101, 128Dracopulos, George P. 151Dreyfus, Louis 81Dromocaiti family 44, 46, 47, 88;

shipowning 60, 61Drosopulos, G. 232dry cargo trade 245, 247, 250, 251–5duration of voyages 168

education, maritime 157, 171–2, 223,418n.;for merchant families 54

Egypt, and grain trade 21;and textile trade 21

Egyptian (liner) 35–6Embiricos A.A. 128Embiricos, Alcibiades 94, 162, 163–5, 166,

173–4Embiricos, Epaminondas 94–5, 141, 405n.Embiricos family 93–5, 101, 128, 274;

employment of Captain Syrmas 162–3,173–4, 404–5;political activities 94–5;purchasing steamships 121, 125

Embiricos, George Miltiades 95, 128Embiricos, Leonardos 93–4Embiricos, Leonidas 94–5Embiricos, Leonidas M. 154Embiricos, Matheos 154Embiricos, S.G. and Michalinos 89

Embiricos, Stamatios 94entrepreneurial methods 277–83Eugenides, Eugene 234exploitation of seamen 222–3, 418n.

Fachiri family 41Fairplay (journal) 64–6, 74–5, 95–8, 282Fakis, Captain Francesco 139family, as basis of shipping companies 203–

4;relations in crews 215–17;role in Chiot trade 51–5, 59

Federation of Greek Maritime Unions(OENO) 234–5

Ferendinos, Spiros 211, 218, 220financing, by London shipping offices

195–203;mortgages 93, 94, 140–1, 205;short-term loans 138;of steamships 132–4

Firemen, Union of 217First World War, Greek role in 181–7, 278;

loss of Greek ships 182, 183–5;profits 228

flags of convenience 29–33, 111, 112, 226,227, 240–5, 264;advantages 242, 243–5;boycott against 243–5, 265;countries offering 240–1;disadvantages 242–3;move away from 245, 265

Fokas, Spyridon 73Foscolo & Mango 161, 162;

purchasing steamships 121, 125, 126France, tonnage measurement 110–11Franghiadi family 41fraud, sinkings 113freight rates 114;

falls in 151;in First World War 187;fluctuations 113, 115;inter-war 189;Minimum Rate Scheme (MRS) 200–1;and purchase of steamships 122–3,126, 129;in Second World War 228–9;and unemployment 218

500 INDEX

frequency of voyages 168

Galati family 50Galaxidi, as maritime centre 115, 118, 119general cargo 9–14, 34–5Georgacopulo family 41Geralopulo family 41Gerussi family 41, 401 n.Goulandris, P. & Sons 237, 276grain trade 14–21, 251, 253, 255;

and Azov ports 78;Bulgaria 85–7;in Danube 72–8;trading methods 55–6;use of steamers 98

Greco-Turkish war (1896–7) 33Greek Committee for the Merchant Marine

195–6Greek General Confederation of Labour

(GSEE) 218Greek Merchant Shipping 107Greek Revolution (1821) 115Greek Seamen’s Union (NEE) 234Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee

201, 206Greek Shipping Committee in London

(ENEL) 229–30Greek state, foundation of 29Greek Steamship Company (GSC) 66, 120–

1, 140, 400n.gross and net tonnage (GRT) 112growth rate of fleets 191–4

Hadjioannou family 277, 278Hadjipateras, Constantine I., auto-

biography 138Harley, C.Knick 119Heckscher, Siegfried 217Hellenic Lines 199Herlihy, P., on Livorno 49Homere firm 51Honduras, flags of convenience 241Hong Kong, flags of convenience 241Hydra, as maritime centre 118

Inchcape, Lord 197insurance 96, 137–8, 278;

fraudulent claims 113International Labour Organsation (ILO)

223International Transport Federation (ITF)

218, 243–5Ionian islands, as maritime centre 3, 4–5,

118–19Ionian network, and Azov ports 78–81;

in Constantinople 85, 87;in Danube 71, 72–8;differences to Chiot network 90–5;investment in steam 98, 99–103, 133–4;location 71–2;in London 87, 89;and Marseilles 87–9;organisation and business methods 89–99;structure of 70–1;transition firom Chiot network 67–9;in twentieth century 99–103, 274

Ionides 42iron ore trade 251, 253–5

Isle of Man, flags of convenience 241Italy, as maritime power 3;

seamen’s union 218

Japan 246, 247, 414n.;shipbuilding 264;size of fleet 264, 268

Jewish merchant communities 39, 68, 96–7joint ownership 134–8, 408–9n.;

shareholders 133, 134–8, 195–7

Kallimanopulos, Pericles 199Karavias A.G. 74Karouso X. 74Kassos Steamships 197Katzoulis, D. 166–7kinship ties 51–5, 59, 203–4, 215–17, 275–

6Kitroeff, A. 234Kondylis, Demetrios 139Korea, size of fleet 266Korean War 240, 264, 278Kouklelis & Michaelides 74Kulukundis, Elias G. 147, 153

INDEX 501

Kulukundis family 152–3, 276, 411 n.,415n.;buys steamship 153;owner-ship of Anastassia 147

Kulukundis, Manolis 153, 200–1, 202,235, 415n., 416n.;establishment of R & K 196, 197

Kylsant, Lord 197–9Kyriakides, N.G. 128

labour relations 203, 233–5, 282;quality of on Greek ships 214–15

Lambert Bros. 196, 197, 415n.Lambrinudis, A. 133

land ownership, and Black Sea trade 67Lascharidi firm 50Lazarachi family 88Lebanon, flags of convenience 241Lemos, Andreas 173Lemos, Costas M. 276Lemos family 275Leonidas (steamship) 162–3, 168, 412n.Liberia, flags of convenience 240–1, 243–

4, 264Liberty ships 235–40, 264, 282lighthouses 144, 152liner shipping 34–7, 199–200, 253, 257Livanos, George S. 276Livanos, G.P. 277Livanos, Stavros 102, 237, 240, 278Liverpool 9, 42, 401n.Liverpool Journal of Commerce 40–1, 41–

2living conditions of crew 176–7, 210–12,

219–20Livorno, and Chiot network 40;

and grain trade 14, 20, 49–50Lloyds, and ‘approved’ list 202;

asking for extra premiums 202–3Lloyd’s Register of Shipping xxiv, 60–2,

85, 107, 121, 134–5, 205loans, ‘loan of necessity’ 140;

mortgages 93, 94, 140–1, 205;short-term 138, 140

logbooks 410n., 411n.London, development as operational centre

126–7, 128–9;

Greek merchants in 9, 400n.;Greek shipowners in during SecondWorld War 226, 227;Ionian network and 87, 89

London Customs Bills of Entry xxiv, 41,81–2, 147

London shipping offices 128–9, 194–203,269–70, 279–80

London shipping offices, based on islandof origin 194–5;collaboration with British firms 196–7;collaboration with companies 204;profits 195–6, 201;in Second World War 229–31;as shareholders 195–7;and single-ship companies 205;structure 195–6

Lykiardopulos, N.D. 128, 237

Malta, flags of convenience 241marine schools 412n.Maroulis A.P. 74marriage, in Chiot network 51–5;

in Ionian network 89–90;and owner-ship structure 275

Marseilles 9, 37, 38;cargo 12, 14, 15–16, 23;and Chiot network 40;Greek merchants and shipowners in 44;and Ionian network 87–9

Marshall Islands, flags of convenience 241master, as co-owner 172–3;

foreign languages 157, 172, 173;qualifications 157, 171–2, 223;relationship with owners 212;role of 138–40, 171–2, 212

Mavrandonis, A. 152Mavrogordato, C.N. 56Mavrogordato firm 49Mavros family 48, 53–4, 89Mavros, Stephanos 53–4Melas family 44, 48, 54;

shipowning 61, 62Melas, L. 124merchant communities 39, 68, 96–7, 400–1

n.merchant houses, Chiot network 49–51;

502 INDEX

structure of 51–5Metaxas, Nicholas B. 195Michaelides, Byron 283Michalinos family 128;

as steamship owners 126migration, in Mediterranean 9;

to Black Sea ports 7–9Miliotti family 88Minimum Rate Scheme (MRS) 200–1mortgages 93, 95, 140–1;

mortgage law (1910) 205

NAT (Seamen’s Pension Fund) 171, 232,237, 413n.

National Bank of Greece 140navigation 72, 145Navigation Laws 112;repeal (1849) 147Negroponte family 52net registered tonnage (NRT) 112Neufeld & Co. 97–8Neufeld, M. 81New York, shipping offices 272, 280Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs)

247, 255, 266Niarchos, Stavros 262–4, 276Nicolaieff (port) 81;

bulk cargo 25Nicolopulo Brothers 158, 159, 161–2;

purchasing steamships 121, 122, 125night sailing 144, 152Nikolaou, G. 237Nomikos, M. 237Norway 69, 414n.;

British requisitioning of ships 228,229;and flags of convenience 245;inter-war growth of fleet 192;and oil trade 152;sailing vessels 120;size of fleet 264, 266–8;tanker ownership 262–4

notarial archives 409n.

Odessa 44–6, 67–8, 81;bulk cargo 25;and grain trade 20;

Greek merchants in 401n.Odysseas (sailing ship) 144, 168, 410n.;

arming of 147;voyages 145–6

Oikos Naftou (House of Seamen) 223oil trade 151–2, 226, 245, 247–51, 252,

256–7, 280–1Oinoussai, traditional practices of

shipowners 274–6Onassis, Aristotle 262–4, 276, 420n.;

on tax evasion 237–8Organisation of Petroleum Exporting

Countries (OPEC) 251Ottoman Empire, decline 6;

and piracy 4–5;and Russia 7;trade with Europe 6–7

Overend, Gurney & Co. 64ownership, definition of 29–33;

occupational categories of 141–2

Palmyra (steamer) 35Pana family 41, 88Panama, flags of convenience 240–1, 243–

4Pandora (journal) 106, 169Panhellenic League of Wireless Officers

217–18Panhellenic Seamen’s Federation (PNO)

218, 220–1, 234–5Panhellenic Socialist Congress 217 Panhellenic Union of Marine Cooks 217Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine

Engineers 217Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine

Masters 217Panhellenic Union of Merchant Marine

Stewards 217Papayanni, Basil 62, 64–7, 157Papayanni family 41, 400n., 403n.;

purchasing steamships 121, 124, 125;shipowning 61, 62

Papudoff family 44, 46, 47;shipowning 60, 61

passenger lines 34, 414n.Pavlides, Eleftherios 398n.

INDEX 503

Petalas-Maratos, Antonis (master ofOdysseas) 144, 145–6

Petrocochino & Agelasto 44, 47;shipowning 60, 61

Petrocochino family 50phosphates trade 251, 253piracy 4–5Piraeus, increasing influence 277;

as maritime centre 51, 118, 126–7, 129;registration of vessels 132, 141–2;shipping offices 272–4

Polemis, Demetrios 95, 140, 154Polemis, S. 277‘ports for orders’ 59–60postal system 57profits, in First World War 181, 182, 183–

7, 228;of London shipping offices 195–6, 201;of routes 168–9;in Second World War 228–9;taxation of war profits 185

protectionism 186

Ralli & Petrocochino 52Ralli, Antonio 57Ralli, Augustis 52Ralli Brothers 41, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 51,

399n., 402n.;branches of 52–3

Ralli family 50, 52Ralli, John 52, 53, 56, 59Ralli, Pandia 52, 53, 56, 57, 59Ralli, P.T., shipowning 61, 62Ralli and Scaramanga 46Ralli, Schilizzi & Argenti 44, 46, 48, 60,

61, 88Ralli, Stephen 53Ralli, Stratis 52Ralli, Tomazo 52Rediker, Marcus, on wages 175–6Renieris, Markos 106–7repairs 168Rethymnis and Kulukundis (R&K) 194–5

196–9, 415n.;and Chiot families 197;and Lambert Brothers 196, 197;ownership structure of ships 199;

purchasing secondhand ships 197–9;structure 198

Rodocanachi & Co 44–6, 47, 48Rodocanachi family 41, 42, 48–9, 50, 52,

89;purchasing steamships 122, 125;shipowning 60, 61

Rodocanachi, M.E. 57Rodocanachi, Paul 56Rodocanachi, P.P. 97Rodocanachi, Th. 56Romano family 88Roskill, Eustace, on Vergottis case (1945)

231Rostov-on-Don 78, 79Russia, development of Black Sea ports 82–

5;Greek settlement in 7–8;Greek ships using flag of 31, 33;see also Black Sea

Russo-Turkish War, (1770s) 7;(1828–9) 7, 8;(1877–8) 7, 8, 33, 119, 278

Sager, Eric 171sailing ships, combination of trade and

transport 137–8;competitiveness with steam 120;crew 169, 171;and development of Greek fleet 106–20;duration of voyages 168;frequency of voyages 168;ownership patterns 136–7;transition to steamships 120–30

Saint Vincent, flags of convenience 241Scaramanga family 50, 52, 53, 88–9;

purchasing steamships 122, 125Schilizzi family 42, 50, 51, 52;

purchasing steamships 124;shipowning 61, 62

Schilizzi, St. P. & Co. 41schleps (lighter ships) 72, 73Scliri firm 48seamen, archives on 413n.;

class consciousness 216–17;composition of 171, 172, 209;

504 INDEX

exploitation by crimps 222–3, 418n.;introduction of employment legislation223;kinship or island ties 174, 276, 282;

lack of legal protection 222–3, 225;language of 216;living conditions 176–7, 210–12, 219–20;numbers of 169–71, 209;overtime pay 219, 220;ratings and officers 208–9, 211, 213,214;trade unions 217–25;umemployment among 208, 217, 218;wages 174–6, 204, 210–11, 220–2, 224–5, 233–5;working hours 209–10, 213, 218–19

Seamen’s Pension Fund (NAT) 171, 232,237, 413n.

Seamen’s Union of Greece (NEE) 218, 220Second World War, British use of Greek

ships 228;effect on Greek fleet 226–9;profits 228–9;taxation in 231–3

secondhand vessels 281–2Sémaphore de Marseilles (journal) xxiii,

32, 42–3, 47, 48, 60, 62, 81–2, 170sermagia (capital) 137–8, 409n.Sevastopol, bulk cargo 25Sevastopulo family 48, 49, 50, 52, 89shareholders 133, 134–8;

London shipping offices 195–7shipbroking 68–9shipbuilding 115–17;

coastal 117;deep-sea 117;Japanese 264;Liberty ships 235–40;in Second World War 235;tankers 262–4

Shipping Law (1910) 95shipping offices 63, 78, 168;

in America 270–1;in Buenos Aires 269;

in London see London shippingoffices;and ownership structure 271–4;in Shanghai 269;socialist countries 281

ships’ names 399n.Ships Sales Act (1946) 235Siderides family 84–5, 87, 101Siderides, Spyridon 101–2single-ship companies 203, 204–5, 212Skaltsounis, Ioannis 106–7Smyrna 9, 14;

and Chiot network 40, 50;Greek merchants in 50–1

Spanish Civil War 278Spartali firm 41, 42, 44, 89;

purchasing steamships 124Spartali firm, shipowning 61, 62Spetses, as maritime centre 115–17, 118Stathatos Bros 74, 75–6;

purchasing steamships 121Stathatos, Constantine A. 128Stathatos, Dionyssios A. 128Stathatos family 100–1Stathatos, Othon A. 74, 128Stathatos and Theofilatos, purchasing

steamships 121, 125Stathopulos family, purchasing steamships

121, 125steam tugs 72–4, 144, 152steamships 34–7;

competitiveness with sail 120;crew 170, 171, 172, 209;duration of voyages 168;introduction of 68;and Ionian network 98, 99–103;main companies 35;necessitating changes in financing 140–1;patterns of ownership and finance 130–42;as proportion of national fleets 130,131;routes 35–6, 37–8;secondhand 133;shareholders in 133, 135–8;single-ship companies 134–5;size of holdings 134–5;

INDEX 505

subsidies for 120;superseding sailing vessels 120–30;use in grain trade 98

strikes 217, 218, 220–1, 233–4Sturmey, Stanley 191subsidies, for steamship companies 120;

for tramp shipping 200Suez Canal 251Sulina, importance as port 72–3, 75, 78Svoronos, Nicos, on Greek history xxsyndicalism 217–18Syngros, Georgiadis 139Syrmas, Captain Anastassis 66–7, 156–7,

408n.;autobiography 153–4, 157–8;as commander of Calliope Nicolopulo158–62;communications with owners 162–3,171, 173–4;on living conditions 176–7;marriage 158;as master of Leonidas 162–3;and purchase of steamship 122;rescues Italian crew 166;treatment by Embiricos 173–4;voyages 157–8

Syrmas, Captain Theodoros 153–4, 157,158

Syrmas, Demetrius 174Syrmas, Theodoros 163, 174, 412n.Syros 168;

and Chiot merchant network 40, 50,51;as maritime centre 115, 117–18, 134,140–1;Ottoman rule in 3;registration of vessels 130–2, 141–2

Taganrog 78, 79tankers, rising share of world fleet 255–64;

T2 237tax evasion 237–8taxation, London shipping offices and 195,

280;in Second World War 231–3;in United States 280

telegraph, introduction of 68

textiles 21, 24;British-Ottoman trade 59

Theodosia, bulk cargo 25Theofania (sailing ship) 144, 153, 154–6,

168Theofilatos A.N. 128Theofilatos Bros 74Theofilatos D.J. 128Theofilatos family 98, 100–1;

purchasing steamships 125Theofilatos J. 74tonnage measurement 109–12, 406–7n.;

gross and net tonnage (GRT) 112;owners of world fleet 264–8

Tossizza, Const. 50, 56Tossizza, Michael 56trade, postwar patterns of 246–62trade unions 217–25, 234–5, 245;

and communism 217;Greek organisation 217–18

trading, Greek strategy 277–83trading methods, Chiot merchants 55–62traditional and non-traditional shipowners

274–7, 420n.tramp shipping 34, 59, 257–61;

British decline 188–9;and fluctuating freight rates 113;Greek specialisation in 280–1;growth of Greek tramp fleet 197–203;subsidies for 200

Tramp Shipping AdministrationCommittee (TSAC) 200–1, 206

Trieste, and Chiot network 40;Greek merchants in 50

tugs 72–4, 144, 152Turkey, and piracy 4–5;

size of fleet 397–8n.Turkeysee also, Ottoman EmpireTymbas family 41Tzamtzis, Captain Tassos 143

United States, and flags of convenience240–1, 242;as Greek trading partner 245, 281;Liberty ships 235–6;New York shipping offices 272, 280;

506 INDEX

settlement of Greek shipowners in 226;shipbuilding 280;size of fleet 265, 266

USSR 281

Vagliano, Andreas 92Vagliano Brothers 68, 278;

London shipping office 67, 92, 93;purchasing steamships 121, 122, 124,125

Vagliano family 78, 88, 89, 92, 98, 404n.;banking activities 93, 100;ship ownership 92–3

Vagliano, Maris 92;Panaghi 66–7, 92

Valieri family 89Vanuatu, flags of convenience 241Vardinoyannis family 278Varvakis, Ioannis 5Vassiliades Engine Works 95Vergottis case (1945) 230–1Vernadakis, A.N., About the Trade of

Greece 111–12, 169Vietnam War 278Vikelas, Demetrius 54, 402n.Vlassopulos, Nicos, The History of Ionian

Shipping 407n., 410n.Vlasto family 50Vouros family 48

wages 174–6, 204, 210–11, 220–2, 224–5,233–5;overtime pay 219, 220

weather conditions 152, 155, 211–12Wrench (British vice-consul) 33

Xenos firm 48;shipowning 61, 62

Xenos, Stephanos 63–4, 403n.;purchasing steamships 124;Depredations 64

Yannoulatos firm 128

Zafiropulo firm 50Zarifi family 44, 47, 50, 87, 101;

shipowning 60, 61

Zizinia Brothers 44, 46, 47, 88;shipowning 60, 61

Zizinia, Etienne 50, 56Zizinia, George 56Zizinia, Pandia 56Zohrab (British consul) 33

INDEX 507

A History of Greek Owned Shipping

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