A Guide to Mary Douglas's Three Versions of Grid-Group Theory

Sociological Analysis 1989, 50:2 151-170

A Guide to Mary Douglas's Three Versions of Grid/Group Theory*

James V. Spickard Cultural Development Institute

In several publications over the last 18 years, Mary Douglas has advanced a theory for correlating cosmological beliefs with concrete social life. Though she acknowledges that her thinking has changed with time, nowhere does she systematically address the underlying differences between her recent and previous formulations.

This article identifies three main versions of Douglas's theory, which are highly unlike. Each version differently typifies her comparative dimensions "grid" and "group." Sometimes the variables are understood socially, sometimes cosmologically. Each version has a different intent: the first speaks of the structural resemblances between cosmologies and individuals' social experiences; the latest concentrates on the ways cosmologies are used to keep individuals in line.

In the past few years a growing number of scholars has made use of Mary Douglas's "grid/group" theory for correlating beliefs with concrete social life. They have looked to her work for answers to two classic sociological questions of particular interest to students of religion: What social circumstances encourage particular kinds of religious sensibilities? And what kinds of institutions do people of given sensibilities construct for themselves?

Operating largely in a Durkheimian mode, Douglas has revived the issue of how social factors condition belief without, she claims, becoming reductionist. The ways social reality constructs consciousness areas important as the ways that reality is itself socially constructed. Certain social settings encourage certain ways of seeing the world: grid/group theory is designed to make the connection explicit and predictions possible.

In particular, New Testament scholars have been attracted to Douglas's work to help them talk about the social origins of early Christian texts (e.g., Malina, 1981, 1986; Neyrey, 1985a, 1985b; White, 1985; Isenberg and Owen, 1977; Moxnes, 1983; Gager, 1982; Segal, 1981). Unfortunately, some of these scholars have misunderstood her efforts. Malina (1986), for example, misreads her grid dimension,1 and White (1985)

1Malina defines grid as "the degree to which socially held values and individual experience match" (1986:207). The closest Douglas comes to this is to call it "the overall articulation of the categories which constitute a world view" (1973:82) -- i.e., the coherence of the worldview itself.

*A version of this paper was read at the 1987 annual meeting of the Society for Biblical Literature in Boston. I wish to thank Mary Jo Neitz, Stephen Kent, Janet Blumer, Aaron Wildavsky and several anonymous reviewers for their comments on a previous draft.

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152 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

applies her theory backwards, z Sociologists, too, have erred. Bergesen (1984) misreads grid/group theory at several

points, undercutting his otherwise useful introduction to Douglas's work. 3 Wilhelm (1981) and Rudwick (1982) both distort the beliefs to which they attempt to fit Douglas's model. 4 McLeod (1982), Kelly (1982), and Gaskell and Hampton (1982) rail to tie belief systems to concrete social life as the theory requires. 5

On reflection, much of the blame for such misreading must be laid at Douglas's feet. In various books she presents three distinct grid/group theories. The two editions of Natural Symbols (1970 and 1973) contain quite different versions of her theory, and Cultural Bias (1978) presents a third variant. Elaborations and truncations of this third form can be found in Essays in the Sociology of Perception (1982), which Douglas edited, and in Risk and Culture (1982), co-authored with Aaron Wildavsky. 6

Despite tF, eir family resemblances, these versions are highly dissimilar on theoretical grounds. Roughly put, where the early renditions speak of the resemblances between cosmology and the individual's experience of society, later versions concentrate on cosmologies as accountability devices -- the ways cosmologies are used to keep people in line. The former is concerned with symbolism; the latter with social control. Douglas moves, so to speak, from structuralism to ethnomethodology.

Nowhere has Douglas offered a systematic outline of these changes, nor has she clearly stated her reasons for moving from one formulation to another.70ther scholars have either ignored or failed to notice these changes (see Gross and Rayner, 1985; Bergesen, 1984). By providing such an outline, this article will serve a sa guide for

2White argues that the underlying messages of the Sermon on the Mount can tell us what Matthew's community was like: cosmology can be used to unearth social structure. Douglas, as we shall see below, takes pains to work from social structure to cosmology, because she thinks that similar cosmological elements can arise from quite different social locations.

3The passage on pages 122-24, for example, directly misunderstands Douglas's point about the origins of "witchcraft" beliefs in modern societies, criticizing her for "rejecting" the position she in fact takes. Despite his considerable insight, Bergesen does not note that grid/group theory has undergone development, and thus juxtaposes quotes ffom works separated in time in order to show Douglas's supposed inconsistency.

4Wilhelm underemphasizes the individualistic strain in Michaei Polanyi's philosophy of science in order to classify him as an establishment hierarchist. Rudwick overemphasizes the "factionalism" of nine- teenth century creationists Buckland and Sedgwick in order to group them with twentieth century "creation scientists." Both characterizations are quite at odds with history (on Polanyi, see Polanyi, 1962; on Buckland and Sedgwick, see Gould, 1983).

5Other sociological applications of grid/group theory include: Mars, 1982; Thompson, 1982b; Handeiman, 1982; Hexham, 1982; Rayner, 1982; Owen, 1982; Bloor, 1978; Bloor and Bloor, 1982; Caneva, 1981; Nelson, 1975. For a summary, see Spickard, 1984:286-326.

6Several of Douglas's sociological disciples have put forth their own renderings of the grid/group schema, of which the most engaging is by Thompson (1982 a, 1982b). See Gross and Rayner (1985), Bloor (1978), Mars (1982), and the articles collected in Douglas (1982b).

7Douglas provides a few remarks in the introduction to the 1982 reprint of the first edition of Natural Symbo/s (Douglas, 1982d:xxiiiff), in her introduction to the second ediuon of that book (Douglas, 1973:8-10), and in her chapter introduc¡ to Essays in the Sociology o… (Douglas, 1982b). Nowhere, however, does she present the detailed analysis practical scholars need.



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A GUIDE TO MARY DOUGLAS'S THREE VERSIONS OF GRID/GROUP THEORY 153

researchers interested in applying grid/group analysis. Sorting out Douglas's altera- tions of her grid/group scheme will provide analysts with clear directions about which of her theories they are using.

Of course the version that scholars use need not be Douglas's most recent, since there is no reason why an earlier version might not find some empirical support. Nor should scholars shy away from modifying her formulations as they see fit (see Malina, 1986:iii-iv). But whatever variation is used, it at least should be conceptually consistent, rather than wrongly pieced together from Douglas's conflicting writings.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF BELIEF

Douglas's work is a sociological theory of the plausibility of different forms of religion, worldview, and ideology. She attempts to relate different varieties of belief to different types of society. Individuals in different social settings, Douglas argues, are biased towards different cosmologies. People do not believe what makes no sense to them, and what makes sense to them depends on their social environment.

Mbuti pygmies, says Douglas, find neighboring Bantu fertility magic -- which in- volves the ritual coercion of spirits -- absurd because the pygmy experience of life downgrades formalism. Pygrnies are prone to individual initiative in social affairs. Social position is not fixed, and the individual pygmy moves from band to band, camp to camp, as led or pushed by the calls of opportunity, the ties of friendship, of the presence of strife. To them, the Bantu attempt to coerce spirits through magic seems witless. Their experience tells them that persons do not respond to coercion; they leave. Presumably, the spirits do the same.

In contrast to Bantu religion, pygmy religion: is one of internal feeling, not of external sign . . . . Their religion is not concerned with their correct orientation within elaborate cosmic categories nor with acts of transgression, nor rules of purity; it is concerned with joy. It is a religion of faith, not works, to use an ancient slogan (1970b'15).

Douglas points out that other groups share something of these qualities. The Nuer, in Evans-Pritchard's (1956) analysis, are bound to a God who speaks to the hearts of his worshipers, who refuses to be coerced by sacrifice, and who, Evans-Pritchard finds, may be aptly described in Christian theological terms. Lienhardt (1961) describes the Dinka a sa people who relate (religiously) to experiences summarized by symbolic concepts, which are misunderstood ir reified into supernatural deities. (This recalls modern talk of G o d a s an "experience" rather than a "being.")

These societies are all of a type, Douglas argues. In them religious allegiance is not publicly demanded, nor is any particular comprehensive image of the world necessary for social stability. In fact, these societies are not "stable" in the way that we think of the society of the European middle ages as "stable." Like the middle class in the modern West, these societies leave great scope for individual movement and initiative. Such freedom is incompatible with a view of the world emphasizing ritual and human limitation.

Why do people living in these social circumstances have similar religions? A s a Durkheimian, Douglas argues for a causal connection between social life and cosmology.



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With an anthropologist's eye, she opposes those -- such as secularization theorists -- who argue that modernity and personalized religion "naturally" go together. Religion did not become internal as a response to the breakdown of the all-encompassing medieval Church; nor is there something about the logic of Western intellectual culture that pushes religion toward individualista (Douglas, 1982a).

Douglas points out that the world has seen plenty of "savages" whose theology resembles our own (Douglas, 1970a). She argues that personalized or secularized religion typifies all these societies because of the cultural biases caused by their members' social experiences. Some social circumstances are biased toward ritualistic religion, others toward individualism, and still others generate sorcery fears and retributive magic. She rejects the model of the relationship between consciousness and society which suggests

that social life goes on comfortably on its own independent of symbols, while a separate symbolic life flourishes alongside, partly dependent and partly independent . . . . The nature of society is such that certain common social experiences take the same symbolic forms, recognisable across historical and cultural diversity (1982d:xx).

Douglas's self-appointed task is to chart people's social experiences in such a way that their connection with cosmologies becomes plain. Douglas's grid/group diagram (Figures 1, 2, and 3) is a schema for classifying social relations as they are experienced by the individual. She isolates two dimensions of social life that are relatively independent of one another -- vertically called "grid" and horizontally called "group." She then uses the matrix they construct to describe society as the individual encounters it. There is no magic to only two dimensions; she says there could be more, but two are all she can handle well (1982b:11). The dimensions must be distinct and social, and must influence individual experience. The details of her dimensions change from publication to publication, but the shape of her theory remains the same.

Early versions of Douglas's theory emphasize the human "drive to achieve consonance in all layers of experience" (1970b:vii) as the bridge by which cosmology and social experience are connected. She argues that the symbolic world of a people becomes structured like its social world. For example, she finds religious symbolism that focuses on boundaries -- either of the body or between the human and spiritual worlds -- typical of societies made up of small competing groups, for each of whom the chief social distinction is "them or us." Religious puritanism is, she claims, typical of such sectarians because this ideology is homologous with their experience of social structure. RelŸ control of the body and a strict conceptual separation between human and divine make sense for people who daily must control their contact with others and distinguish between insiders and outsiders.

Later versions of her theory take another focus. Less prone to treat religion and worldview as simply reflecting social life, Douglas comes to claim that cosmologies are ultimately used to make people accountable for their actions. "People who have banded together under a certain rubric or constitution will tend to coerce one another increasingly to develop the full implications of that style of life, or go to all the trouble of mustering support for an alternative rubric or constitution" (1982b:5).

In Douglas's words, "The theory predicts or explains which intellectual strate8ies are useful for survival in a particular pattern of social relations" (1982b:7). "Once a



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patter of social relations is chosen," she says, we can "describe the package of ideas and values that are going to surround anyone" (1982b:3). In her latest work she focuses on the usefulness of such ideas and values for stabilizing the social order (Douglas, 1986; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).

N A T U R A L SYMBOLS: THE BEGINNINGS

Natural Symbols -- where grid/group theory began -- has so lar appeared in three editions. The 1970 and 1982 editions are identical except for the addition of a long introduction to the latter. The 1973 edition is considerably rearranged and rewritten, enough to demand treatment as a separate text.

In all editions the book has a major a n d a minor theme. Its major theme is the search for the social correlates of belief, particularly the social correlates of a bias toward or away from the use of ritual as a condensed form of communication. Its minor theme is the symbolic uses that are made of the human body in varying social contexts. This provokes the ironic title -- for nothing is so "natural" as the body, nor so "unnatural" as the kinds of symbolism based on it. The differing symbolizations of the body provide continuing examples of the varieties of cultural bias generated by the experiences that differing social contexts provide. Douglas wants to know why some societies are ritualistic, and others are not; and why some religions symbolize the body in given ways, and others rail to do so.

Her major theme is an extrapolation of Basil Bernstein's work in sociolinguistics (Bernstein, 1964, 1971, 1973, 1977). Bernstein argues that speech, asa transmitter of culture, is differently patterned depending on the social structure within which it is generated. His research on London working- and middle-class families uncovered two basic speech codes -- the "restricted" and the "elaborated" -- and two systems of social control -- the "positional" and the "personal."

Bernstein's restricted speech code is the product of a social situation in which new information is limited. Speech serves mainly to reinforce social norms rather than to express cognitive content. Questions of "Why must I do this?" are answered with reference to: group hierarchy ("Because I say so."), role ("Because you are a boy."), group boundary ("Because you belong to this family."), and so on. Reasons per se are not given; rather, conformance is enforced. The individual is encouraged to fit in with the group, and any rebellion is seen asa threat to the group's hegemony. One is controlled, therefore, on the basis of one's social position.

In Bernstein's elaborated code, meaning is explicit rather than implicit, and speech is an independent tool of thought rather than a servant of social structure. Speech is replete with general concepts as contrasted to condensed symbols. Children are taught to express their feelings and to justify their acts verbally. ("Do this because it will make Mommy happy.") Individuals are trained to think analytically -- to break down their experience into units which may be recombined in new and individually differing ways. This elaborated code goes hand in hand with a personal family system, in which children are encouraged to be individuals and made to feel personally responsible for their actions. One does not do something "because he is a boy"; rather, one is trained to act out of a personal sense of appropriateness, which may be (and sometimes must be) defended in the elaborated speech forro.



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156 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSlS

Bernstein does not argue that either of these systems is "better." Each has a different purpose and is functional to a different style of life. Restricted speech and positional control correspond to the lack of power that working-class people experience over their lives. Elaborated speech and personal control enable the middle-class to cope with changing social circumstances, and to manipulate the higher reaches of the social environment. As schools reward elaborated speech and, to a lesser extent, in- dividuality (both of which come more easily to the middle-class), middle-class children often do better there. Family culture thus reinforces the social order.

Douglas is attracted to Bernstein's work because it connects the two levels of social life in which she is interested" symbolic forms and the kinds of social controls that structure a society's social relations (see Douglas, 1972, 1970b:21-36). Applying Bern- stein's insights to religion, she notes that

At first sight all ritual would seem to be a form of restricted code . . . . The causes ol Ÿ anti- ritualism today in middle-class European and American communities would appear to be a predictable result of a process of socialization in which the child never internalizes a pattem of social statuses . . . . His ears would not be attuned to catch the unspoken messages of a restricted code (1970b:33-34).

But Douglas sees the culture-boundness of Bernstein's model. By focusing on the modern middle- and working-classes, Bernstein's system is nest› in a speciflc division of labor. In particular, the elaborated code is a product of a highly differentiated social system with numerous specialized roles anda resulting pressure for explicit communication between them. "We shall need," she says, "to look closely at the social structures of these tribes, to finda set of variables which will be consistent both with the Berns- tein effect among ourselves and with what is known about primitive social structure and cosmology." Despite their theological similarities, "pygrnies cannot be equated with preachers, journalists and dons" (1970b:34-6).

THE FIRST VERSION: N A T U R A L SYMBOLS I

To generalize Bernstein's insights, Douglas focuses first on the dimensions of social structure. Dividing his positional control system in hall, she describes "two independent variables affecting the structuring of personal relations" (1970b:57), which she calls "group" and "grid."

First, societies vary according to the strength of their group ties. The group dimension (horizontal in her schema) "expresses the possible range from the lowest possible of associations to tightly knit, closed groups . . . . The further we travel along the line from left to right, the more permanent, inescapable and clearly bounded the social groups" (1970b:57). Any forro of structuring that is dependent on group organization is included in this measure. The duration of group life, the degree of a sense of"them" versus "us," the number of activities taken in common rather than individually all combine here.

The second dimension, grid, is made up of the individually-oriented aspects of social structure, specifically the phenomenon described by anthropologists as "networks." Networks are connections between particular individuals that do not carry with them



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group-centered consequences. For example, although kin groups may be corporate in one society, kinship in another may be j u s t a series of one-to-one contacts -- specifiable role relationships that carry implications for only the individuals involved. Douglas cites the temporary vengeance groups among the Ifugao and Kalingas of the Philippines as examples of this kind of social relations. These groups are not visible in daily life, but form rapidly when needed for blood-revenge. They exist only as long as the individual lives who serves as their focus. When he dies, the group then dissolves (1970b:58).

The grid dimension focuses on an individual's obligations to others -- the degree of social control that society exerts, leaving out the control accompanying his of her group membership. Grid measures the degree to which " a m a n is constrained not by group loyalties but by a set of rules which engage him in reciprocal transactions" (1970b:ix).

By separating group and grid as two elements of the control society exerts on the individual, Douglas merely notes that although a given society may be high on the former sacle, it may be low on the latter one. That is, group-centered social structure and ego-centered social structure vary independently, and provide a two dimensional field on which societies may be differentiated (Figure 1).

FIGURE 1

THE GRID/GROUP DIAGRAM ACCORDING TO NATURAL SYMBOLS, 1970 EDITION

GROUP

GRID

+



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In Douglas's summary: s

I n . . . square B a m a n is bound neither by grid nor group. He is free of constraints of any kind. Conventions do not irk him. All his human relations are in the interpersonal, optimal mode. In square A he belongs to no bounded group. But he is constrained in his relations with other people by a set of categories defined with reference to himself. In square D aU statuses are insignificant compared with one kind, the status involved in not belonging or belonging to a defined group. In square C society is cut across by both grids and groups of various kinds. An individual is involved with other people and separated from them by numerous lines and boundaries. Role definition is a t a minimum in square B and maximum in square C (1970b:59-60).

This whole system, of course, is designed to help Douglas "correlate part icular kinds of symbolic structures with predicted social variables." Her key thesis - - in this first version of her theory - - is that a "drive to achieve consonance in all levels of experience" (1970b'67) produces a cosmology tha t structurally mirrors social relations.

Her examples come from the field of body symbolism. 9 "I now advance the hypothesis," she writes, "that bodily control is an expression of social control" (1970b'70). Cultural ly defined att i tudes toward the body and the uses to which bodies are put in ritual should be isomorphic with a society's system of social control as it is experienced by the individual.

A s a preliminary example, she cites the case of a leader of the Bre thern move- men t in 1820s' England, in whom the neglect, even abandoment , of care for the body corresponded to an an t ipa thy to organized social bodies that was most extreme. "It seems not too bold to suggest," she notes, " that where role structure is strongly deflned, formal behavior will be valued" and vice versa (1970b:71).

Trance, bo th inside and outside religion, is a good test of this thesis, she says. Where grid and group are bo th low - - that is, where social control of the individual is at a min imum - - bodily restraint is unlikely to be valued. Trance, as a symbolic breaking of bodily and social barriers, will be regarded in a positive light. Where grid and group are bo th high - - that is, where society is heavily ordered and all things have their places - - t rance should be disvalued.

This is exactly wha t she finds by comparing atti tudes towards t rance among two Nilotic tribles. The Dinka - - low on both grid and group scales - - regard trance as auspicious and incorporate mild forms of it in their ceremonies. Their neighbors the Nuer - - more organized in grid/group terms - - fear trance when it strikes them. The Nuer do use trance to cure, bu t its specialists are ragged, unkempt men on the margins of society. 1~

Sin both editions of Natural Symbols, Douglas labels the lower left square "B" and the upper left square "A" -- but does exactly the reverse in her more recent work. I have kept her labeling for each version rather than trying to "correct" one to match another.

9Natural Symbols is in many ways a rethinking of chapter 7 of Douglas's previous book on symbolism, Purity and Danger (1966).

l~ relies on the fieldwork of E. E. Evans-Pritchard (for the Nuer) and Godfrey Lienhardt (for the Dinka). Some critics have argued that the reported differences between these neighboring peoples are more the product of these two ethnographers than of social differences (see Newcomer, 1972).



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Though the parallel is complex, prima [acie the postulated isomorphism between bodily symbolism and the experience of social control works. The distinctions between controlled and uncontrolled, central and peripheral, bounded and unbounded fit roughly in both bodily and social spheres. 11

Space does not permit me to pursue Douglas's other descriptions of the parallels between cosmologies and social experience as comprehended by the grid/group scale. To give justa taste of her findings: the high social boundaries of square D create fears of external psychic invasion and internal pollution; the well-cultivated role structure of square C creates a well-ordered cosmos in which everyone has a place and ritual predominates; low group as in A and B throws each individual on his or her own resources, producing a success-oriented cosmology for those who benefit (B) o r a luck- cosmology lacking any extra-individual rationale for those (A) who don't (see 1970b:103-5). In sum, cosmologies are plausible to us in so lar as they symbolically replicate our social experience. Such is Douglas's theory in its earliest version.

Before passing on to the second version of her theory, we must note a few things. First, Douglas's description of society is grounded in the individual experience of social control. Grid and group are both measures of the individual's experience of constraints and freedom in relationship to others. This approach is not without problems (see Spickard, 1984), but any use of Douglas's work must begin here.

Second, in this version of the theory, the experience of society is logically prior to and to some degree generative of beliefs. People experience social control (as described in grid/group terms), and then find explanations of the world plausible or implausible based on that experience. In applying the theory, one flrst analyzes social relations, and then one predicts cosmologies. As we shall see, later versions of the theory recognize that people can alter their social relations to fit in with their cosmologies -- otherwise there would be no revolutions -- but the force of her analysis runs the other way. 12

And third, it is precisely her move to the individual experience of social structure that allows Douglas to avoid sociological determinism. Were she to argue that cosmology replicates social structure directly, as do Durkheim and Mauss (1903), she would be forced to postulate actors that are, in Garflnkel's phrase, "judgmental dopes." Ir, however, cosmology arises out of people's experience, then it is not strictly determined, for it may rise out of that experience in many ways. "There are fewer possible varieties of social system than possible varieties of worlds to be known" (Douglas, 1975:314). The individual retains a role in judging the plausibility of various worldviews and can even

11Marks and Simmons (1974) chaUenge Douglas's view of trance with their own research, which suggests that trance often accompanies more social organization rather than less. For a summary and critique of other empirical tests of Douglas's theory see Spickard, 1984:chs. 13, 14.

lZDouglas specifically warns against arguing: "from people's expressed ideas about the world to their social organization without having any evidence for the latter. The trouble about arguing from the ideas is that they are infinitely numerous and the method is quite impossible to use. Nothing [is] to stop the enthusiastic application of grid/group analysis to a hand-picked selection of ideas, leaving out all the ones that disprove the case" (letter, October 1983). Unfortunately, several investigators make this very mistake (e.g., White, 1985; Gager, 1982; Segal, 1981; Kelly, 1982). They apply grid/group analysis to belief systems in the hopes of telling what social structures of the past were like (see also Douglas, 1982c:247f0.



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160 SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSlS

deny them belief if they do not correspond to his or her observations. As long as the modes of experiencing may be socially typified, however, one can produce a sociological theory of belief without resorting to a strict determinism that erases the known capabilities of the individual.

THE SECOND VERSION: NATURAL SYMBOLS II

Shortly after Natural Symbols was published, Bernstein wrote a paper on the interaction between power and the curriculum in English schools (reprinted as chapter 5 in Bernstein, 1977). There he contrasted the extent to which information is controlled by school authorities with the extent to which information is divided into clearly bounded categories (subject-matters). As David Ostrander (1982:23-24) notes, Bernstein places a social dimension (the extent of control) against a cosmological dimension (the discreteness of the classiflcation system) "in order to derive socialization environments."

In Natural Symbols, edition 2, Douglas follows Bernstein's new lead. She abandons her former description of grid and group as two purely social dimensions of control and writes: "[W]e can concentrate upon the interaction of individuals within t w o . . , dimensions. One is order, classification, the symbolic system. The other is pressure, the experience of having no option but to consent to the overwhelming demands of other people" (1973:81).

Douglas recasts grid as "the overall atriculation of the categories which constitute a world view":

A classification system can be coherently organized fora small part of experience, and for the rest it can leave the discrete items jangling in disorder. Or it can be highly coherent in the ordering it offers for the whole of experience . . . . We can therefore take the scope and coherent articulation of a system of classiflcation as one social dimension in which any individual must flnd himself (1973:82).

She redraws her vertical line asa pair of opposite tendencies from incoherence: a symbolic system may be either public or private, and more or less coherent in its classifications. On her new diagram, absolute incoherence is in the middle, public coherence is up, and private coherence is down (see Figure 2).

Group is likewise redrawn in this scheme, and to some extent combines the two forms of social pressures on the individual that she differentiated in the first version. At the center of the horizontal line, there is no social pressure being either felt or exerted by the individual. To the right, the group dominates the individual; to the left, the individual dominates the group.

Point one on the diagram, says Douglas, is the position of the artist, successfully resisting the group cosmology while possibly influencing others by his or her crea- tions. Point two is that of infancy and childhood, as "it is surely impossible for an adult to accept heavy social pressure and yet to develop a privately articulated philosophy" (1973-86). Point three is the social location of the witch-fearing religions, where intense group pressure and high boundaries combine with a low-grid sense of dassification and order. Four is the area inhabited by hierarchical society, weU-organized, with foUowers and leaders alike trapped by its extremely elaborated cosmological system.



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FIGURE 2

THE GRID/GROUP DIAGRAM ACCORDING TO NATURAL SYMBOLS, 1973 EDITION

+

GROUP

GRID +

0 +

Five is a dual society, whose position Douglas somewhat ambiguously describes, in which leaders and followers do not share the same social experiences (see 1973:88-92). "Strong grid divides between the heroic society of the Big Men, and the recurrent millenial tendencies of their subjects" (1973:91). The zero point is presumably the home of the enlightened master, for whom all social involvements and symbolic systems are irrelevant.

Besides this change in the grid dimension, Douglas reshuffled the contents of several chapters -- though largely keeping the same chapter titles -- incorporated the preface into the text and added a new, short, introduction. The result is to obscure somewhat the argument of Natural Symbols I that cosmology and social experience are isomorphic.

This is because Douglas has shifted her emphasis. In a new passage she claims that "the system of control is va//dated by a typical bias in the system of beliefs" (1973:91, my emphasis). This amounts to a claim that cosmologies are directly functional to the social systems and serve to stabilize them. Here she parallels Bernstein's argument: for him the restricted code makes constant reference to an individual's social place, while the elaborated code reinforces a social structure where the only comtant is change, and individuals have abandoned secure role relationships for the ability to "network" with others on the basis of commonly negotiated meanings.

In perhaps her dearest statement of her intentions, she notes that, following Bernstein, she:

is deriving cosmology from control systems, or rather showing how cosmology is a part of the social bond, according to the following principles. First, any control system, since



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it has to be made reasonable. . , must appeal to ultimate principles about the taature of man and of the cosmos . . . . Second, that the control s~q interacts with the media of control (speech, ritual). Third, that certain consistencies hold between the coding of the medium and the character of the control system. That they should match is a iong-run prediction. In a short run the transition process might obscure the match (1973:80).

The isomorphism between a cosmology a n d a type of social control remains an element to her theory, 13 but is demoted to third place. Her first two points emphasize the role of cosmology in preserving the social order.

This shift makes sense. Every time the witch-averse expel a witch, they draw their boundaries tighter and reinforce theirAsolation. When the hierarchists create a cosmology with "a place for everything and everything in its place," they not only replicate their social experience but also make sure that it cannot change: change would vŸ "the way things are." Individualists -- uncontrolled by both groups and grids -- are drawn by their individualism to sunder their remaining commitments, accentuatŸ their private state (see Douglas, 1982b:6).

The move from an argument that "there is a strong tendency to replicate social situations in symbolic form" (1970b:vii), to the notion that one must "look beneath the overt cosmology to the pattern of power which it realizes" (1973:9), is progressive in Douglas's work, and will become more evident as we consider the mext major version of her theory, found in Cultural Bias.

But Natural Symbols II makes a false step, which Douglas corrects in her later writings. This is her shift from graphing social experience along two social dimensions to charting it by the contrast of a social with a cosmological one. If Douglas is trying to "correlate particular kinds of symbolic structures with predicted social variables" (19701o:67), of derive "cosmology from control systems" (1973:80), then she must separate the two halves of her equation. Otherwise she will be deriving cosmology from cosmology, replicating the work of generatŸ of cultural idealists, which she has rejected. Ir she is to show that "common social experiences take the same symbolic forros, recognisab[e across historical and cultural diversity" (1982d:xx), then she must isolate those social experiences.

The key variable she places between society and cosmology, Ÿ should be remembered, is the individual experience of social control. Experience is what ties her system together, and is what her two dimensions ate supposed to capture -- at least in the first version of her theory. Grid in this new version -- as "order, classification, the symbolic system," in short, as part of cosmology -- does not describe that experience, h describes how people think about their experience, which in her system is part of what is to be explained. 14 Ir the grid/group diagram is intended to be "a diagram of possible social environments, across which an individual may move"

13For example: internally undifferentiated yet highly bounded societies still recreate their social relations symbolically in their fear of the witch who attacks their pure insides by penetrating their bodies' houndaries; student millenarians stil[ destroy card catalogues out of a protest against their catalogued (over-gridded) existentes (Douglas, 1973:168-9).

14For a discussion of the difficuhies of Douglas's notion of "experience," see Spickard (1984:203-209, 229-234).



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(1982d:xxiv), then both of its dimensions must be social. Ir they are cosmological, the connection she seeks between cosmology and social environments cannot be achieved.

Douglas apparently has seen this, for her third version of grid/group theory returns to purely social dimensions. She rightly reprinted the 1970 edition of Natural Symbols in 1982: its model of grid and group is closer to her current thinking than is the 1973 version. To my knowledge, she has nowhere formally acknowledged her error. 15

THE THIRD VERSION: CULTURAL BIAS

In some ways, Douglas's third version of grid and group returns to her first; in other ways, it is a radical departure. Once again she maps the social universe by means of two intersecting social dimensions. But the "cosmology" she connects with these dimensions has changed.

In Cultural Bias (1978; reprinted in Douglas 1982c:183-254), group is described asa "dimension of social incorporation" and "defined in terms of the claims it makes over its constituent members, the boundary it draws around them, the rights it con- fers on them to use its name and other protections, and the levies and constraints it applies" (1982c: 190-91).

Group captures the personal pressures brought to bear on an individual and "ex- cludes other kinds of larger, looser, more nominal and impersonal group formulations" (1982c:201). Like the first edition of Natural Symbols, this is a purely social dimension. Unlike that version, however, Douglas here contrasts a social "environment in which a person finds himself the centre of a network of his own making which has no recognizable boundaries" (on the left) with a society (on the right) which "incorporates a person with the rest by implicating them together in common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation, and by exerting control over marriage and kinship" (1982c:201-202). The two dimensions of Natural Symbols I have been collaps- ed: ego-centered networks and group-centered social organization are presented as two ends of a continuum rather than as independent variables.

Grid is likewise changed. Douglas wants "to establish a dimension in which the social environment can be rated according to how much it classifies the individual, leaving minimum scope for personal choice" (1982c'202). k "suggests the cross-hatch

lSSeveral writers have followed Douglas in this false step, to the detriment of their work. Neyrey (1985a:117), for example, states that grid "refers to the degree of assent that people give to the symbol system which is enjoined on them" (see also Malina, 1986:15,207; White, 1985:66; Neyrey, 1985b: 132). Douglas is concerned whether people accept received cosmologies, but this concern is not built into her grid dimension. Instead, she sees establishment and anti-establishment cosmologies as products of distinct social environments conceived in grid/group terms (see 1982d:xxf0. Neyrey sets a dimension measuring individual experience of group membership against a dimension measuring individual response to that group's cognitive system. Douglas's connecting link between society and cosmology -- the individual experience of social control -- is left aside. The theory's motor is gone. Malina (1986:15) goes further. After defining grid as "the degree of socially constrained adherence normally given to the symbol system," he defines high grid as indicating "a high degree of fit or match between the individual's experiences and societal patterns of perception and evaluation." Low grid "indicates a low degree of fit or match." He comphtely abandons the underlying logic of Douglas's theory, which perhaps explains how he can typify "achievement-oriented individualism" as "weak-group/high-grid" (Malina, 1986:206), though Douglas calls it "weak-group/low-grid" (1982b:4).



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of rules to which individuals are subject in the course of their interaction" (1982c: 192). This measure now consists of four components: "insulation," the degree of social separa- t'ion between dasses of people; "autonomy," independence in individual decision-making; "control," the degree of control over other people; and "competition," the amount of negotiation over rules between equal-status individuals. Ii: autonomy, control, and competition all are strong while insulation is weak, then the situation is low-grid. If insulation is strong while the others are weak, then high-grid prevails (see Figure 3).

F I G U R E 3

THE GRID/GROUP DLAGRAM ACCORDING TO CULTURAL BIAS (1978)

- G R O U P +

+

GRID

insulated strong B group

C

individualist strong A group

D

These dimensions measure what Douglas now calls the "social c o n t e x t . . , conceived in strictly social terms, selected for its permitting and constraining effects upon the individual's choices" (1982c:190). More clearly than in any of the previous versions, these divisions measure the individual's experience of social control. As she puts ir: "Two dimensions of control over the individual: group commitment, grid control, every remaining form of regulation; combined, these two dimensions give four extreme visions of social life" (1982b:3).

In its description of the various social types, this third version of grid/group theory is very close to that found in Natural Symbo[s I. Societies with strong group loyalties appear on the right side of the diagram, while those with weak group loyalties appear on the left. Societies with elaborate tole structures appear at the top, while those with little internal heterogeneity appear at the bottom. HierarchŸ are in C, sectarians in D, competitive individualists in A. Bis less coherent, being a repository for social fallout from C and A.



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As with the other versions, Douglas still expects a certain consistency between this context and cosmology. But in Cultural Bias her description of cosmology has changed. She is no longer concerned with the entirety of people's beliefs. Now she is interested in explaining only the ultimate justifications people use to bring one another to account.

[Grid/group analysis] selects out of the total cultural field those beliefs and values which are derivable as justiflcations for actions and which I regard as constituting an implicit cosmology (1982c: 190).

The operative level [of this theory] is that at which excuses are required from individuals and made by them and where moral judgments materialize into pressures from other persons to act in certain w a y s . . , the relevant level of analysis is that at which people find it necessary to explain to each other why they behave as they do (1982c:201).

The concept of social accountability, which Douglas developed in her work on "active voice" social theories and in her 1980 biography of E. E. Evans-Pritchard (see Douglas, 1979, 1980; Spickard, 1984:ch.11), is now central to her notion of cosmology. Gone is the question of which religions are ritualized and which are not. Gone are considerations of bodily symbolism that were appropriated in differing forms by differing types of societies. Instead, she sees cosmologies as "ultimate justifying ideas which tend to be invoked as ir part of the natural order and yet which . . . are evidently not at all natural but strictly the product of social interaction" (1982b:5).

Cosmologies ate sticks people use to coerce one another, and Douglas argues that different sticks will work in different social contexts. It makes little sense to criticize the individualist (square A) for his or her lack of group identity, for example, because in this social setting group loyalty is an impediment to success. Individualist society rewards those who do not respond to demands for conformity; individualist cosmology highlights the freely negotiating individual, responsible for his or her own late.

Likewise the sectarians of square D will not allow open access to their groups, because group boundaries are all the social structure they have: abolishing their boundaries would erase their social map. The hierarchists of square C, on the other hand, are open to incorporating outsiders, provided these outsiders take their place among the many insulated divisions and departments that make up this social type. Here people are brought into line by calls to uphold tradition and procedures. Challeng- ing these threatens both the social group and its elaborate role-structure.

The kinds of explanations and justifications that work in each context, Douglas argues, generate an implicit cosmological bias. Each social context develops arguments that "naturally" sustain it. The worldviews that inhabitants of each square will find plausible must be consonant with these arguments. The "drive to achieve consonance" identified in Natural Symbols I is no longer directly between social experience and cosmology, as in her earlier theory, k is now mediated by the arguments people use to sustain their social relations. StiU, "the individual's subjective experience and con- ception of his social con tex t . . . [is] a mediating link between a more 'objective' definition of social c o n t e x t . . , and the cosmological values to which the individual adheres" (1982c:247).



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Much of Cultural Bias is taken up by Douglas's predictions in this realm, a sample of which will illustrate her style. Concern ing the views of nature tha t are typical of different places on her social map, she writes:

Taking D, strong group, first, the deominant social condition in this section is that all human beings are divided into insiders and outs iders . . , an anti-intellectual bias towards 'small is beautiful' will best support a small group's decision to opt out of wider social inter- actions . . . . We should expect to find 'nature' outside society divided as is society itself into the lambs and wolves . . . .

Turning now to C, the group here survives not only by justifying its boundary against outsiders but also by justifying its separate graded compartments and their relations as part of a whole. So here one should expect an intellectual effort to elaborate a transcendental metaphysics which seeks to make an explicit match between civilization and the purposes of God and nature. Synecdoche in metaphors of society and nature shows their isomorphic structure and expounds their reciprocal support . . . .

On the top left side [B], dominated by insulation and consequent enforced withdrawl from free social activity, people cannot be expected to show theoretical elaborations of the concept of nature in the cosmos . . . .

Lastly, the low-grid cosmology A is an accommodation to the harsh experience of competitive society . . . . Corruption, self-seeking and aggression will tend to be seen as the charac- teristic features of human social lq in contrast nature is idealized as good and simple (1982c: 209-212). 16

Perusing these descriptions (part of some 18 pages of cosmological predictions on topics as diverse as "death" and "cookery"), one encounters precisely the change from an argument based on structural parallels between cosmology and society to one based on the social utility of ideas. Ideas of nature - - and of culture, humani ty , garden- ing and so on - - are "part of the action" (1982c:200) precisely because they are used for social control. For example, "D" opposes foreign travel because it sees outsiders as evil - - and those who have relations with outsiders are apt to be expelled from the group. "A," on the other hand, loves foreigners because any novel ty is apt to give it one up on the competi t ion (1982c:212-213). Ideas help mainta in social relations. In Douglas's words:

The argument throughout takes a particular kind of social environment asa starting point, and demonstrates how, given the premises involved in defining that social environment, certain distinctive values and belief systems will follow as necessary for the legitimation of actions taken within it (1982c:247).

Douglas's recent work, particularly her Risk and Culture (1982), co-authored with Aaron Wildavsky, takes this argument further. Tha t book explores the question of why some people become more concerned with the risk of environmenta l disaster t han do others. It relates people's concerns to the social organizations within which they live,

16One wonders about the accuracy of Douglas's predictions. Hobbes, Social Darwinists, and other celebrants of competitive life portrayed dog-eat-dog nature as the proper model for society.



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particularly three types of organization which provide separate social contexts -- and separate perceptions of risk -- for their members.

The three tvpes they present are familiar to us: the individualistic, entrepreneurial society of square A, the hierarchical, bureaucratic societv of square C, and the sectarian organizations of square D. (The grid/group diagram only minimally appears here, to keep the book relatively short.)

In "market" societies fA), say the authors, benefit is gained by individual risk- taking, and short-term results ate favored. Individuals ate dependent on themselves alone and must be willing to pay the price for their failure in order to claim the benefits of sucsess. A s a result, these individuals can tolerate a good deal of environmental risk, and there is little concern for long-term difficulties. After all, the individuals reaping the benefits will not be alive when the payments come due.

Bureaucracies (C), on the other hand, are long-lived creatures, and tend to think in terms of generations when weighing risks and benefits. They are thus more apt to consider environmental risks in their planning. However, they also think planning can manage whatever crises emerge, and so are not apt to be alarmed as new risks are discovered. (More threatening in the minds of bureaucrats are outside disturbances against which planning is impossible: wars and popular elections.)

"Sectarian" organizations (D) -- by which Douglas and Wildavsky mean voluntary organizations formed around a specific issue, such as Greenpeace or Friends of the Earth -- are faced with the organizational taks of retaining their members' commitment without returning the tangible benefits (such as salaries) that more established organizations can offer. They argue that these organizations can insure their survival only by insisting on the goodness and importance of their causes. For environmental groups this means magnifving the potential threat to which the general population -- in whose name the group acts and whose contributions ir covets -- is exposed. The more people who can be convinced of the gravity of the environmental danger, the more resources the sectarian organization gains.

Thus sectarians are driven to claim that "everything" is being polluted, and that everyone is stalked by unseen death, while entrepreneurs and governments tend to play down the severity of risk. In the last analysis, Douglas and Wildavsky argue that perceptions of environmental risk are caused by the organizational dynamics of groups rather than by any facts of the matter. "People select their awareness of certain dangers to conforto with a specific way of life" (1982:9).

One need not accept the claim that perceptions of risk are socially caused to acknowledge the fact that different social experiences bias people to see things in different wavs. One does not have to agree that environmental groups exaggerate the risk from nuclear power in order to attract members to recognize that such groups will emphasize cases of bureaucratic cover-up while bureaucrats will emphasize their successes. The facts of the matter can be determined but are often irrelevant (see Spickard, 1984:262-77; Holdren, 1983). Douglas's point is that people's perceptions are mediated by the contexts of their social lives. The requirements of maintaining particular kinds of societies lean people toward one or another cosmology.



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DOUGLAS'S CURRENT WORK

For the past few years, Douglas has concentrated on the sociology of risk analysis and the sociology of food rather than pursuing grid/group theory. A recent book, How Institutions Think (1986), for example, contains no references to her grid/group work. How Institutions Think, however, picks up many of the other themes she discussed in Natural Symbols, Cultural Bias, and Risk and Culture, including her description of what she sees as the three basic kinds of society: individualist, hierarchical, and sectarian.

Douglas bills How Institutions Think as providing the underpinning for her work on risk analysis and, by extension, for much of her previous labor. She investigates the means by which a society creates "public goods" -- those things such as highways, clean air, and worldviews that are produced and used in common. Rational-choice theory -- the notion that individuals act only out of self-interest -- predicts that people will never sacrifice for one another without coercion and that a community calling for self-sacrifice will fall apart. Who will produce public goods if their effort outweighs the benefits they could receive by riding for free on the efforts of others?

Obviously, self-sacrifice occurs in society, despite such predictions. How, then, is it possible?

Douglas argues that self-sacrifice is possible because societies are tied together by modes of thought which make sacriflcing for others seem appropriate. Moreover, these thought-modes are not sui generis: they can be explained by their functionality for the social order, viewed in rational-choice terms. Sectarian ideologies, for example, arise when individuals desire the benefits of group membership while wishing to retain total freedom -- an a pr/or/sensible preference under the rational choice model. Such individuals will reject strong leadership as coercive, and insist on one-hundred-percent participation in the organization by others so as to eliminate those who want benefits without effort. Everyone must participate equally or be thrown out.

But how to enforce these rules? For such a society, a belief in an evil outside con- spiracy makes plausible the self-serving behavior of others, while at the same time justifying the destruction of potential leaders and the explusion of free-loaders. The belief system explains social experience while making the society work. Douglas argues that such beliefs are an unintended consequence of this mode of living together, and in turn keep the society going.

Space does not allow me to pursue this argument in depth here (see Spickard, forth.). For now it is important to note only that Douglas's latest writings constitute no major break with her previous work, despite the formal absence of the grid/group scheme. She is still seeking to resuscitate a sociology of belief in the Durkheimian mode.

REFERENCES

Bergesen, Albert. 1984. "The cultural anthropology of Mary Douglas," pp. 77-132 in Robert Wuthnow, James Davidson Hunter, Albert Bergesen, and Edith Kurzweil (eds.), Cultural Analysis: The Work of Peter L. Berger, Mary Douglas, Mi&el Foucault and Jurgen Habermas. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bemstein, Basil. 1961. "Social class and psycho-therapy." British Joumal of Sociology 15:54-64.



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~ . 1971. C/ass, Codes and Control I: Theoretical Studies Towards a Socio/ogy oŸ Language, 2nd ed. New York: Schocken.

~ . 1973. C/ass, Codes and Control II: Applied Studies Towards a Sociology o… Language. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

~ . 1977. C/ass, Codes and Control III: Towards a Theory of Educational Transmission, 2nd ed. Lon- don: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Bloor, Celia and David Bloor. 1982. "Twenty industrial scientists: a preliminary exercise," pp. 83-102 in Douglas, 1982b, q.v.

Bloor, David. 1978. "Polyhedra and the abominations of Leviticus." British Joumal [or the History oŸ Sc/ence 11:245-72. (Also pp. 191-218 in Douglas, 1982b, q.v.)

Caneva, Kenneth L. 1981. "What should we do with the monster? Electromagnetics and the psycho- sociology of knowledge," pp. 101-31 in Everett Mendelsohn and Yehudi Elkana (eds.), Sciences and Cultures: Anthropological and Hª Studies of the Sciences. Dortrecht, Holland: Reidel.

Douglas, Mary. 1966. Purity and Danger: Ah Analysis of the Concepts o… Pollution and Taboo. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

~ . 1970a. "Heathen darkness, modern piety." New Society (12 March):432-34. (Reprinted in Douglas, 1975.)

1970b. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. London: Barrie & Rockliff. 1972. Review of C/ass, Codes and Control by Basil Bernstein. The Listener (9 March):2241.

~ . 1973. Natural Symbols, 2nd ed., revised. London: Barrie & Jenkins. �9 1975. Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

~ . 1978. Cultural Bias. London: Royal Anthropological Institute. (Reprinted in Douglas, 1982c.) �9 1979. "Passive voice theories in religious sociology." Review o… Religious Research 21:51-61.

(Reprinted in Douglas, 1982b.) ~ . 1980. Edward Evans-Pritchard. Harmondsworth: Penguin. ~ . 1982a. "Effects of modernization on religious change." Daedalus 111:1-19.

(ed.). 1982b. Essays in the Sociology o… Perception. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ~ . 1982c. In the Active Voice. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ~ . 1982d. Natural Symbols, 3rd. ed., with a new introduction by the author. New York: Pantheon.

�9 1986. How Institutions Think. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky. 1982. Risk and Culture: Ah Essay on the Selection o… Technical and

Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press. Durkheim, Emile and Marcel Mauss. [1903] 1963. Primitive Classifications. Chicago: University of Chicago

Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1956. Nuer Religion. New York: Oxford University Press. Gager, John G. 1982. "Body-symbols and social reality: resurrection, incarnation and asceticism in early

Christianity." Religion 12:345-63. Gaskell, George and James Hampton. 1982. "A note on styles in accounting," pp. 103-11 in Douglas,

1982b, q.v. Gould, Stephen Jay. 1983. "Unconnected truths." Natural History 92:22-28�9 Gross, Jonathan L. and Steve Rayner. 1985. Measuring Culture: A Paradigm … the Analysis of Social

Organization. New York: Columbia University Press. Handelman, Don. 1982. "Reflexivity in festival and other cultural events," pp. 162-90 in Douglas, 1982b,

Hexham, Irving. 1982. "Some aspects of religion and spiritual healing in cultsville, a contemporary North American city," pp. 4-15-29 in W. J. Sheils (ed.), The Church and Healing. Oxford: Blackwell.

Holdren, John P. 1983. "The r isk assessors." Bulletin o… the A tomic Scientists 39(6):33-38. (See the responses by Douglas, Wildavsky, and Holdren in 39[7]:58-60.)

Isenber8, Sheldon R. and Dennis E. Owen. 1977. "Bodies, natural and contrived: the work of Mary Douglas." Religious Studies Review 3:1-17.

Kelly, George A. 1982. " 'Les gens de lettres': an interpretation," pp. 120-31 in Douglas, 1982b, q.v. Leinhardt, Godfrey. 1961. Divinity and Experience: The Religion o… the Dinka. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Malina, Bruce J. 1981. The New Testament W'orld: Insights from Cultural Anthro~logy. Atlanta: John Knox

Press. ~ . 1986. Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology: Practical Mode/s … Biblical Interlxretation.

Atlanta: John Knox Press.



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Marks, Morton and William Simmons. 1974. "A stranger to the spirit: Mary Douglas' view of trance behavior." Paper delivered at the 1974 meeting of the Northeastern Anthropological Association.

Matas, Gerald. 1982. Cheats at Work: An Anthropology o… Workplace Crime. London: Allen and Unwin. McLeod, Katrina C. D. 1982. "The political culture of warring states China," pp. 132-61 in Douglas,

1982b, q.v. Moxnes, Halvor. 1983. "Kropp som symboh Bruk av socialantropologi i studiet av det nye testamente."

Norsk Teologisk Tidsskrift 84(4): 197-217. Nelson, Mary Jane. 1975. "Social and Psychological Determinants of Cosmology: A Test of Mary Douglas's

Theory of Cosmology." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago. Newcomer, Peter J. 1972. "The Nuer ate Dinka: an essay on origins and environmental determinism."

Man 7:5-11. Neyrey, Jerome H. 1985a. "The idea of purity in Mark's gospel." Semeia 35:91-128. ~ . 1985b. "Body language in I Corinthians: the use of anthropological models for understanding

Paul and the apostles." Semeia 35:129-70. Ostrander, David. 1982. "One- and two-dimensional models of the distribution of beliefs," pp. 14-30

in Douglas, 1982b, q.v. Owen, Dennis E. 1982. "The perception of time and space in egalitarian sects: a millenarian cosmology,"

pp. 247-74 in Douglas, 1982b, q.v. Polanyi, Michael. 1962. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy. Chicago: University of

Chicago Press. Rayner, Steve. 1982. "Spectral evidence: the witchcraft cosmology of Salem village in 1692," pp. 275-301

in Douglas, 1982b, q.v. Rudwick, MartŸ 1982. "Cognitive styles in geology," pp. 219-41 in Douglas, 1982b, q.v. Segal, Alan F. 1981. "Ruler of this world: attitudes about mediator figures and the importance of sociology

for self-definition," pp. 245-68 in E. P. Sanders (ed.), Jewish and Christian Sel… 2. Philadelphia: Fortress.

SpŸ James V. 1984. "Relativism and Cultural Comparison in the Anthropology of Mary Douglas: A Meta-Theoretical Evaluation of Her Grid/Group Theory." Ph.D. Dissertation, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley. . . . . forth. "A revised functionalism in the sociology of religion: Mary Douglas's recent work." Religion.

Thompson, Michael. 1982a. "A three-dimensional model," pp. 31-63 in Douglas, 1982b, q.v. ~ . 1982b. "The problem of the center: an autonomous cosmology," pp. 302-27 in Douglas, 1982b,

cl.v. White, Leland J. 1985. "Grid and group in Matthew's community: the righteousness/honor code in

the sermon on the mount." Seme/a 35:61-90. Wilhelm, Peter. 1981. "Legitimates en sociale structuur: insiders en outsiders in de wetenschap." Kennis

en Methode 5:32-55.



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A Guide to Mary Douglas's Three Versions of Grid-Group Theory

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