"A Feast for Crows"

D R A F T : D O N O T C O P Y , C I T E O R Q U O T E

A Feast for Crows?: Probing Disaster-Related Land-Grabs in the Philippines

Jerik CruzGraduate Institute for International and Development Studies, Switzerland

Hansley JulianoDepartment of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University

Enrico La ViaSimbahang Lingkod ng Bayan

This article intends to develop analyses on the occurrence of disaster-related land- grabbing in the Philippines and how it opens potential challenges to the recovery and long-term restoration of disaster-stricken communities. While the phenomenon of land- grabbing is hardly new in the Philippines, we argue that present patterns of disaster- related land-grabbing are conditioned by the distinct evolution of Philippine capitalism since the mid-1980s, the institutional regimes governing access to and use of land resources, the shifting processes of global economic and environmental vulnerabilities, and the political dynamics of contention over land and natural resources. We explore how these factors play out in disaster-stricken areas in two case studies. First, the extent of supertyphoon Yolandas aftermath in Sicogon, Iloilo serves as an illustrative example of how disasters can impinge upon local land struggles in an exclusionary fashion, with Yolanda facilitating an episode of accumulation by dispossession for premier tourism development purposes. In contrast, the ongoing campaign of the rural communities of Casiguran, Aurora against the Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport (APECO), reveals how contingencies of natural disasters, such as typhoon Labuyo, may actually open opportunities for rural social movements to make significant advances in overcoming dispossession efforts by entrenched elites in the name of development. In sum, we explore these negotiated local resistances, historical pathways of relations between state and capital, institutional arrangements, and impacts of environmental change, in order to underscore the importance of reframing questions of land politics amidst rising political, economic and environmental vulnerability in the Philippines.


A Feast for Crows?: Probing Disaster-Related Land-Grabs in the Philippines

Jerik CruzGraduate Institute for International and Development Studies, Switzerland

Hansley JulianoDepartment of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University

Enrico La ViaSimbahang Lingkod ng Bayan

Close to midnight on August 12, 2013, disaster struck the town of Casiguran, Aurora province in the form of Tropical Cyclone Labuyo (English: Utor). Boasting winds reaching up to 240km/h, Typhoon Labuyo stood as the one of the most devastating storms to make landfall in the Philippines that year, second only to Typhoon Yolanda (English: Haiyan) in November 7, 2013 (Anonymous 2014). The damage inflicted upon the Casiguran was devastating with almost all reports confirming that 95% of all buildings in the destroyed, and at least PHP18-million in farm losses to the municipalitys vibrant coconut industry (Cabreza and Orejas 2013).

Yet even while crippling key segments of Casigurans infrastructural and livelihood systems, Typhoon Labuyo also proved to be an unforeseen opportunity for the many of the towns residents campaigning for their land rights against the controversial 12,923-hectare Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport (APECO). Remarkably, continued anti-APECO campaigning post-Labuyo resulted in (a) the resignation of APECOs president (Bagong Aurora 2014), (b) an 86 percent cut of the Freeports official government budget (Orejas 2014), and (c) considerable postponements in the implementation of APECO subprojects (Ranada 2014). Indeed, at a time when there have been increasing reports of post-disaster land seizures in the Philippines (Yap 2014), the dynamics of the APECO episode remains one of the few known cases where community organizations were able to secure strategic advances in a land dispute following an exceptionally-destructive calamity.

What were the factors and processes that enabled Casiguran residents to make substantial progress in the achievement of their campaign objectives against APECO after Typhoon Utor? In this discussion paper, we have undertaken an analysis of the structural-institutional context and the post-disaster contention dynamics of large-scale land disputes, which has enabled us to better understand conditions that enabled the exceptional campaign achievements in the APECO case in the aftermath of Typhoon Labuyo. Drawing from critical political economy, political ecology, and contentious politics perspectives, we aim to help spur discussion on the political options available for communities, social movements, and land rights defenders to ensure continued land tenure security amidst worsening extreme weather events linked to climate change.

The Changing Place of Land and Rising Pressures for Accumulation by Dispossession1

Regardless of the specific mechanisms by which Philippine land-grabs are executed, it is crucial to keep in mind the broad structural-institutional context in which they are taking place. Indeed, over the past seven years, reports of displacements of Filipino rural communities from their inhabited lands, and typically accompanied by human rights abuses such as intimidation, forcible evictions and killings, have dramatically escalated (Manahan et al. 2014: 40-41). Though difficult to quantify, various signs including rising numbers of land disputes filed at the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (Bello 2013), and official recognition of heightened human rights abuses in the countryside from civil society and international watchdogs (Focus on the Global South 2014), the Catholic

1 NOTE: We wish to acknowledge the important Influence that State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition (Pub.: Focus on the Global South and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung-Philippines, 2014), Standing on Contentious Grounds: Land Grabbing, Philippine Style in Keeping Land Local: Reclaiming Governance from the Market (Pub.: Focus on the Global South and Land Research Action Network, 2014), and CARPER Diem: A Socio-Legal Analysis of the State of Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in the Aquino Administration (Pub.: Ateneo Law Journal, Forthcoming) have had on the crafting of this section of this discussion paper. One of the authors here was also a co-author of these respective publications.


Church (Tubeza 2013), and the Philippine Commission on Human Rights (Tupaz 2012) all suggest that a more aggressive drive for commercially-linked land seizures is now under way.

Yet what is distinctive about this latest wave of dispossessions is that a much greater share of them are being driven by the anticipated commercial returns of large-scale land-use change of agricultural and forest lands. While land-grabbing for the sake of plantation crops such as biofuels, mineral extraction and mega-infrastructure (ex. dam) purposes continue to pose widespread impacts, the most prominent land acquisitions have arguably come in the form of real estate-driven efforts for land-use change such as in property development ventures, tourism conversions and special economic zones (SEZs). According to data from the Philippine Economic Zone Authority, for instance, the number of Philippine SEZs alone rose by 80.7 percent from June 2008 (166 official SEZs) to December 2013 (300 SEZs) (see Annex II). On the same vein, it should also be noted that most of the prominent land disputes that have received considerable attention in the media like the 1,125-hectare Hacienda Dolores case in Porac, Pampanga (with Ayala Land involved), the 8,650-hectare Hacienda Looc in Nasugbu, Batangas (SM Land Inc.), and the 1,160-hectare Sicogon Island in Iloilo (Ayala Land) (see Annex III) have been characterized by an exceptionally degree of involvement, if not control, of tourism-affiliated real estate interests over land-acquiring parties.

The immediate momentum for this upsurge in real estate, tourism, and special economic zone-related land acquisitions owes both to (a) longstanding tendencies among land-based elites to evade the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program through land-use conversions (a strategy which has been well-documented since the 1990s) (Kelly 2003: 170-187), as well as to (b) intensified pressures among land developers to cash-in on the latest Philippine property market boom, which has been ongoing since 2010 (Bello et al. 2014: 196). From that year onwards, key economic sectors associated with the property boom, most especially in real estate, construction and financial intermediation, have outstripped the Philippines national growth rates, reflecting highly-intensified economic activity in these sectors. Based on Philippine Statistical Authority data, while the countrys gross domestic product expanded by an already-impressive 21.9 percent between the second quarters of 2011 and 2014, those of real estate, construction and financial intermediation grew even further by 27.4 percent, 33.5 percent and by 24.9 percent respectively. By contrast, the agriculture sector only grew by a paltry 4.9 percent (NSCB 2014).

At the same time, one can trace the structural pressures undergirding the present wave of land-grabs to the long-term impacts of the Philippines neoliberal restructuring experience since the 1980s on the very contours of Philippine capitalism. While an extensive presentation of this argument has been done elsewhere2, neoliberal reform cemented the demise of agriculture as the traditional base of accumulation of the Philippines landed elites, who, faced with heightened competition from global trade, were pressured to venture increasingly into the real estate sector an unintended consequence of the 1987 Constitutions prescription that no foreigners can own land (Bello et al. 2014: 37, 39, 41-42). Under these conditions, the dynamics and motivations of land-based elites have become more and more distinct from those of the semi-feudalistic hacendero landlords of yore, with the practice of land brokerage, aggressive spatial expansion and conversion, and the constant mobilization of massive sums of finance characterizing their accumulative activities (Bello et al. 2014: 54-56).

In the context of a sustained property boom, at stake in this Philippine land rush lies the accruing of mega-profits to property developer and land broker elites; better tax revenues and land rents for local governments; and the fulfillment of consumer class demands for suburban residences, commercial zones and tourism hubs (Bello et al. 2014: 196, 209-210). Given that the interests of these distinct actors can so align, the immediate acquisition of land may be only one element of a broader strategy by which multiple agents of property-based capital are reshaping national and local institutions (ex. influence over land-use planning bodies), policy frameworks (ex. pro-private sector SEZ development laws), government units organizational features (ex. privatized planning and administrative apparatuses), and knowledge structures (ex. analyses by noted economists and think-tanks favoring real estate expansion over agriculture) all so as to guarantee their expanded accumulation in the present and future3. At its most extreme, the potential rapprochement of interests between government and private realtors is

2 See: Bello, W., K. Cardenas, J. Cruz, A. Fabros, M. Manahan, C. Militante, J. Purugganan and J.J. Chavez. State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition. Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, 2014.3 NOTE: We cite these in particular since these are processes which have already been occurring in the Philippines. Just to give one powerful example of how privatized planning and administrative apparatuses manifest, the chief marketing and sales executive of Ayala Land said explicitly in a May 2014 interview in Singapore:By developing big tracts of land, we become the government; we control and manage everything. We are the mayors and the governors


facilitating the rise of what sociologist Michael Levien has dubbed the land broker state in which the state has become a mere land broker for increasingly real-estate driven private capital, in order to achieve the expropriation of land from small farmers and transferring them to large, and sometimes foreign, corporations for increasingly real estate-driven projects (Levien 2012: 13).

This does not mean that obstructions do not exist for those seeking to benefit from these land acquisitions and conversions. Many such barriers to land-based capital accumulation indeed remain: the past uneven geographical development of Philippine capitalism may have left desirable lands with acute deficits in their infrastructural environments (ex. an absence of roads, power and other utilities); the rhythms of politics and policy implementation in the localities at stake may likewise be unpredictable and inconsistent (ex. electoral cycles, changes in bureaucratic leadership).

But perhaps the most critical barriers, however, concern the limited supply and complexity of formal land markets, as well as the resistance of smallholders already residing upon lands desired by property developers. As it happens, multiple and often conflicting property regimes often govern Philippine land resources, and the features of some laws undergirding some of those regimes (ex. CARPER and the 1987 Constitution) have insulated certain kinds of rural land from market transactions by default. Soaring transactions costs (ex. capital gains taxes of 6%), and the lack of a reliable land information system, have further inhibited the titling, registration, and tradability of other land parcels (Chikiamko and Fabella 2011: 132). This same messiness of Philippines property regimes has normally proven a fertile ground for conflict with different actors often pressing competing claims to the same plot of land on the basis of different property regimes, or occasionally, fraudulent and manipulated titles (Chikiamko and Fabella 2011: 133). Not surprisingly, when their land tenure security are put at risk, smallholders physically occupying lands eyed for acquisition and conversion typically engage in various forms of resistance against losses in their access to land imposing considerable costs and obstacles on the plans of would-be developers, while depressing whatever market value the plot of land under dispute may have (Bello et. al 2014: 211-212).

All things considered, the institutional barriers within the Philippines formal land markets have created a situation where the enormous commercial demand for prime rural land is unlikely to be glutted solely by means of official market transactions. This is one prime reason why land developers and their allies have increasingly employed extra-economic (i.e. non-market) processes of accumulation by dispossession against farmers and other smallholders unwilling or unable to sell their lands. To assimilate non-marketized or difficult-to-acquire territories into the property development market, accumulators of capital, state officials and land rentiers have increasingly adopted land-appropriation strategies based on legal manipulation, misinformation machines, national and local horse-trading, supplementary infrastructural development, and frequently, naked force. Somewhat more recently, taking advantage of the disarray brought about by natural disasters has come into prominence as yet another tactic of land-based elites to overcome their barriers to capital accumulation (Yap 2014).

Disasters and the Question of Land Tenure

Discussing how disasters are received, responded to and subsequently utilized for the purposes of specific interest groups must take into account historical developments of contentious land issues, considering the limited treatment of their growing correlation within existing literature. For this purpose, we are assisted by advances done by the field of political ecology, which responds to emerging questions as to how capital accumulation and the exploitation of disaster situations is beginning to develop connected dynamics. This requires acknowledging that, in any discussion about environmental realities, environmental knowledge is unevenly distributed within local societies (Peet and Richards 2004: 18). Subsequently, it should also question the existing belief that disaster response is largely a matter of improving scientific prediction, engineering preparedness and the administrative management of hazard, which renders it as a specialised problem for the advanced research of scientists, engineers and bureaucrats, and so be appropriated within a discourse of expertise that quarantines disaster in thought as well as in practice (Bankoff

of the communities that we developed and we do not relinquish this responsibility to the government. But because we develop all the roads, water and sewer systems, and provide infrastructure for power, we manage security, we do garbage collection, we paint every pedestrian crossing and change every light bulb in the streets the effect of that is how property prices have moved [N]obody on the political side would want to do anything that would upset whats happening in business, so they tend to be quite supportive of us. (From: http://www.stproperty.sg/articles-property/singapore-property-news/lack-of-an-urban-planner-a-blessing-for-ayala-land/a/163543)


2002: 11). With these basic assumptions in mind, we can therefore properly acknowledge how the treatment of the relationship between climate and agricultural activity (a very important and quite fragile one, at that) can be the source of existing tensions and potential imbalances in social relations.

Philippine communities capability for adapting to disasters have varied depending on the areas topography, state of urbanization, as well as the existing socio-economic stability of the households living in the area. Rural areas in the Philippines have been documented to house 77% of the countrys impoverished households, who rely heavily on agriculture, fishing and forestry for their livelihood. Around 60 per cent of the occupied land in the country is informal and 46 per cent of the alienable and disposable lands are untitled. Many people occupy and use public land without secure tenure. Many of the rural poor are concerned about the lack of land tenure, and there has been an increasing trend towards people living and having livelihoods in high-risk areas. These include the danger zones of volcanoes, deforested mountains, riverbeds, low-lying flood plains and coastal areas. Despite their precarious conditions, these households have little incentive to improve and stabilize their houses (or for that matter their land security), choosing either to just rebuild after a disaster strikes (Mitchell 2011: 12), or relocate to another informal area of habitation where there is less risk of being driven off, either by disasters or by human intervention. Subsequently, these poor households vulnerability is further magnified by their uncontrolled expansion of informal settlements on public land and hazard-prone areas (29).

Select rural areas in the Philippines have been documented to be capable of adapting to these conditions via changing their consumption expenditure in response to changes in commodity prices caused by the disaster [T]he availability of emergency informal transfers from close relatives and aid from the local government in the form of food basket and house repair materials helped the affected households, most importantly the poor landless households, to cope with the damages brought about by the typhoon. Furthermore households shifted their fuel use away from fossil fuels such as liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene, and electricity toward firewood because of the sharp decrease in the shadow prices of firewood due to the typhoon (Israel and Briones 2014: 9). These existing socio-economic relations for people living in rural communities are observed to have given them an edge over some urban households (both wealthy and impoverished ones), whose losses have more adverse impacts on their livelihoods, daily survival, and future capability to deal with flood hazards (ibid.). Nevertheless, this does not suggest that rural communities will always have it easier due to their wider resources, as massive disasters can wipe out large chunks of an environment, leading to loss of land, crop and equipment through landslide and/or flooding coupled with loss of homes and lives (ibid.).

The question of how people could secure their residence and utilization of the land they currently inhabit, therefore, becomes the linchpin of the relationship between disasters and land tenure. As we have illustrated in the previous paragraphs, the situations that develop for many residents and households are not pretty pictures:

Access to land and security of tenure are very often damaged as a result of natural disasters, leaving people unable to access their land either for production or for housing purposes. The effects can result from destruction of land tenure records the total or partial destruction of physical evidence of property boundaries; the disappearance or death of people who have the memory of property boundaries; [and] the emergence or intensification of conflicts over land tenure that were already present but deteriorated as a result of the disaster, such as conflicts over inheritance of land rights (Garibay et. al., 2010: v).

This situation is important to be addressed, considering insecure, inequitable and opaque land tenure systems lead many to live in marginal, hazard-prone areas without the infrastructure required to withstand the natural threats dictated by geography and climate (Brown & Crawford 2006: 2). It has been argued that for recovery to actually happen, the following are necessary:

1. Clearly defined and equitable land rights may help to improve planning in areas vulnerable to natural disasters, as illustrated in the vulnerabilities experienced by the landless farmhands in Divi Seema, India (2-3);

2. [T]he sooner people can return to their land in a safe environment and with the right tools to rebuild, the sooner they can recover independence from humanitarian aid, (3); and

3. Recovering and protecting communal and private property rights can lay a solid foundation for reconstruction, spatial planning, compensation and long-term economic regeneration, the failure of


which has haunted the recovery process of areas hit by the Asian tsunami such as Aceh and North Jakarta (6-8).

That being said, the possibility of pursuing such means of inclusive community recovery relies largely on the political and institutional will of governments to actually take into account the desires and priorities of the affected communities for restoration and recovery. The moment peoples desire for recovery becomes inimical to emerging institutional interests towards reshaping the socio-economic makeup of an area, unwelcome impositions are likely to crop up and conflicts are likely to take place. Exclusivist approaches to disaster response and management, exhibiting a serious imbalance of power relations within contemporary societies, allows for the isolation of affected communities in the wake of disaster incidents, rendering them vulnerable not only to the vagaries of nature but more importantly to the intervention of socio-economic elites which will likely reshape social conditions and access to resources along more-exclusive and profit-oriented lines.

Disasters and the Dynamics of Land Contention

One of the still-overlooked elements of state-society relations with regards to disaster response and recovery is the potential conflict over resource usage and realignment, especially in disaster situations where the socio-economic base of an area is wiped out or in dire need of rehabilitation. After all, governments possess the capacity towards producing and managing economic capital, through which resources are levied from the population for the benefit of the consolidation of the states authority and, subsequently, the provision of services supposedly for the benefit of the public (Bourdieu 1994: 5-6). Through governments capacity to control and mobilize vast amounts of resources to achieve its specific concerns (and private capitals evolving ability to do the same), it is therefore possible to engage in the processes of creative destruction, where formerly-unspoilt areas of nature (initially termed first nature) is intervened upon, utilized, exploited and further modified into new configurations of geography, topography and wildlife (subsequently termed second nature). These leads to changes in the natural material world, where [t]he geographic landscape of capital accumulation is perpetually evolving, largely under the impulsion of the speculative needs of further accumulation (including land speculation) and only secondarily in relation to the needs of people (Harvey 2010: 184-185).

The increasingly-contentious collusion between governments and private investments for the purpose of land usage and reallocation are also being reproduced in developing countries. Disasters, for their part, have actually expedited and facilitated the land broker state-private capital speculator relationship, considering the displacement of large numbers of people without clearly defined land ownership can enable private and government land grabs, as illustrated in the cases of the Phang Nga people of Ba Tung Wah, Thailand (whose lands are being sold off by their government to the German Embassy in Bangkok), Indias Tamil Nadu government using the disaster to plan to redevelop the area in favour of tourism after the 2004 Asian tsunami, (Brown & Crawford 2006: 4). The internal and social dynamics of such public-private partnerships were vividly illustrated by Naomi Kleins reportage on how the government of the United States of America was able to practice predatory forms of resource allocation via the close cooperation of state apparatuses and outsourced private firms. In The Shock Doctrine (2007), she documented how the U.S. governments cooperation with private military contractors (PMCs) allowed for the virtual practice of apartheid in occupied territories in Iraq, labelled green zones where almost all aspects of life were controlled by private-company services deputized by the U.S. government. The experiences and practices utilized here (which involved total social control and the utilization of maximum force to create conditions of precarity) were later transplanted wholesale during the attempts to reconstruct areas in America hit by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The eponymous shock doctrine was explicitly practiced by what is argued to be a hollowed-out government (298) cooperating with the corporate sector in intervening and reshaping the social structure of disaster-stricken societies, encountering little to no resistance specifically due to the vulnerability of target communities.

These pressures, in more ways than one, contribute to the grim utilization of land and its subsequent negative backlashes to the Philippine rural economy for the past few decades, where it traditional farming households have barely kept up with low productivity and even lower incomes. Land speculation and foreign investments are adding upward pressure to land prices and to entice farmers to lease their lands, some of them losing their CAR (comprehensive agrarian reform)-awarded lands in the process. The problems in industry prevent the sector from absorbing excess rural labor, making them suffer the blight of urban poverty (Bello et. al. 2014: 125). The multiple cases of land-grabbing in the Philippines affecting the localities of Casiguran, Aurora, Caluya Island in


Antique, Porac, Pampanga, Nasugbu, Batangas, Plaridel, Bulacan and Sicogon Island in Iloilo4 are mostly cases of rural economies being forced by multiple pressures from state and big capital to re-orient towards more service-oriented and urbanized economies, at the cost of endangering existing socio-economic relationships on the ground.

Yet, all the same, we must remember the classic observation [w]here there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather, consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power (Foucault 1990: 94-95). In the same fashion that governments and private capital have shaped the material conditions by which communities may be forced to subsist, communities and households nonetheless have an incentive (and subsequently, mechanisms) by which they can shape and pressure these forces to respond to their immediate concerns. Insofar as these sections of society have enough resources to deploy in their contention over their tenure and usage of the land, competition over space and resources may not necessarily be as one-sided as previously thought. The interplay between disaster capitalism and land use conflict thus must be explicitly spelled out.

Fig. 1. Interaction Dynamics of Resources and Institutions within Development Projects

The initial framework we use in this study is illustrated in Fig. 1, where the relationship between land and population is to be rendered stable (i.e. conducive to the populations demand and usage) insofar as the influence of government institutions and private developers in land utilization does not impinge on the residents concerns. Most residents and/or households concerns centre on whether the changes to be made on the land-scape will translate towards the building of public infrastructure which will afford these residents social and spatial mobility, which could facilitate the employment and transformation of the population into a productive workforce. The accomplishment of these priorities, on baseline, will allow for the pursuit of a private development project even if it changes the socio-economic base of a locality. This is almost always made possible by [t]he involvement of local politicians mayors and governors in particular in the process of land and labour management, with the ability of such figures to act as go-betweens in the entry of foreign capital to their jurisdictions has enabled them to entrench their political power through the financial benefits accompanying such development and facilitates the discursive self-representation of power holders as the intermediaries in bringing the benefits of rapid industrialization to their people (Kelly 2000: 161). This nonetheless acknowledges that the power of state structures pursuing urbanization can (and almost always will) coordinate with the priorities of private investors, and may attempt to transform the population and land towards more urbanized economies which may or may not entirely be done with their consent. The situation, however, can potentially change when disasters strike a specific location.

Fig. 2, on the other hand, intends to illustrate the potential rearrangement of forces in light of the advent of disaster situations. Depending on which of the socio-economic components in a specific area (as well as the institutions

4 Details regarding these land-grabbing cases in the Philippines are provided in Annex III.


involved in the development of the area) is hit, the conversion of land, resources, governance structures and socio-economic relationships towards less-inclusive forms of development may be sped up or slowed down by community/population resistances. The interplay of disaster and political opportunity is best illustrated in in the subsequent figures which attempt to approximate what is happening in the municipalities of Casiguran, Aurora.

Fig. 2. Interaction Dynamics of Society and Institutions with Disasters

For its part, Casigurans resident population (Fig. 3) is able to resist the intervention of public structures and private capital due to the areas wide land mass, diverse population, diversified workforce (some rural economy, others gravitating to relative urbanization), and established infrastructure, which allows it to be less-receptive to imposed urbanization efforts precisely because its imposition is non-inclusive and is economically unfeasible. The municipality of Casigurans wide land mass (currently pegged at 71,543 hectares) allows for the dispersal of its diverse population into different forms of economic activity, with a balanced number of their people continuing to sustain and cultivate traditional farming, fishing and indigenous activities while allowing more of their numbers to participate in more modernized forms of employment and income-generation.

As will be illustrated further in our discussion of the case of Casiguran, a development project that intervenes in the status quo of a locality will largely be received/opposed based on the economic feasibility and the actual capacity of the project to integrate the existing economic systems/relationships in that locality. The imposition of the project, despite potential opposition of the existing society in the locality, is dependent on the access of the locality to the implementing body/structure/institution and their relative social balance/amicability with the local community. The addition of a disaster in the equation will depend on which side is further hit or damaged by the disaster, and which of these competing sides manage to recoup and reorganizes their forces and resources to validate their claim on the reconstruction of the locality. As this study will show, the fortuitous damages that APECO sustained (in contrast to the damages endured by the people of Casiguran) in the aftermath of Typhoon Labuyo, coupled with an existing network of social forces and governance structures that oppose the APECO project, accounts for the continuing failure of APECO to fully exploit disaster capitalism while allowing the communities in Casiguran to engage in a sustained counterattack to defend their holding rights to their land and territories.


Fig. 3. Casiguran, Aurora Situation Map

The Politics of Land Struggles and Disasters in Casiguran

The case of the Angara political dynasty, the main proponents of the APECO Freeport, illustrates the intersection of heightened disaster risk, real-estate accumulation, and special economic zone-related land-grabbing. In the APECO episode, we argue, the Angara clan occupies dual roles as (a) land-brokers of cheap land for real-estate developers and (b) property developers that will lead the development of Casiguran into a commercial, industrial, and tourist center. In the first capacity, the Angaras, through the state-sanctioned powers of APECO, are aiming to make the municipality conducive to private-sector led development, which would entail, acquiring cheap land, implementing business-friendly policies, neutralizing local opposition to land acquisitions, improving the built infrastructure of the area (ex. roads, power, water, sanitation, ports). Yet at the same time, the Angara family is also positioning itself to directly reap the benefits of a tourist and real-estate boom in Casiguran as indicated in their control over many of Auroras local government units and dominant presence in key provincial markets. It seems, in other words, that the Angaras are collectively functioning as the middlemen and buyers of land at once both brokers and developers of property in Aurora.

The Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority covers 12,923 hectares, arguably making it one of the biggest ongoing attempts at land-grabbing in the Philippines today. Moreover, occupying key posts in the local government (Gov. Bellaflor Angara-Castillo), the Senate (Sen. Edgardo Angara), and Congress (Rep. Juan Edgardo Angara) at the time of APECOs creation by law in 2007 (via R.A. 9700) and immense expansion in 2010 (R.A. 10083), the role of the Angara political dynasty in the Freeports establishment and implementation cannot be understated. Indeed, they were chiefly responsible for the railroaded passage of both APECO laws; they constituted the majority of APECOs board of directors, and have likewise served since the projects inception as its most vocal and recognizable political champions (Task Force Anti-APECO 2013).

However, APECOs presence in Casiguran must also be understood as part of the broader process of what Aurora-based civil society organizations call the Angarafication of Aurora (Bataris 2013). This Angarafication is already evident in the experience of what the Angara family has achieved in the transformation of Baler, the provincial capital of Aurora province: namely, how they have driven a sweeping tourism and property development transformation in Baler and how they have been one of the biggest beneficiaries of boom in that municipality.

For all their public image as builders of Aurora, the Angara family remains strategically positioned to directly reap some of the greatest benefits of the real estate and tourism booms now buffeting Aurora province. In 2010, available documentation reveals that members of the family and their land companies (ex. Sea and Sierra Vista, Inc., and GMA


Farms Inc.) owned no less than 48 distinct property lots in Brgys. Sabang and Zabali in Baler, which have since been developed into some of Auroras premier private resorts such as the Costa Pacific, Bahia de Baler, Bays Inn Baler, and Dicasalarin Cove (see Annex IV). More properties still have been documented acquired by family members, particularly former Senator Angara, in the neighboring towns of San Luis and Maria Aurora. In addition, according to the church-based Bataris Formation Center based in Baler, members of the Angara clan have also been reputed to own or have acquired a significant presence in provincial banking (Aurora Bank), transport companies (Genesis Transport Service Inc., Aurora Bus), schools (Aurora Polytechnic College, Aurora State College of Technology), and agricultural processing complexes. (Bataris 2013). Provided this commanding position in Auroras economy, the Angara family has received tremendous direct and indirect returns from increased commercial, financial, vehicular, and human flows into Aurora province over the past few years.

These present condition of Baler illustrate how the Angaras are also likely to benefit from the SEZ-led development of Casiguran. Yet the Angaras can only become the Builders of Casiguran, by seizing already-owned land for a cheap value. Given the lack of robust land markets in Aurora province, and the unwillingness of a considerable share of Casigurans residents to sell their lands, it would be tremendously difficult for the Angaras to acquire land and pave way for massive property development without the state-sanctioned powers of APECO. This was most likely why the Angaras were compelled to mobilize their formidable political and social capital behind the creation of a Freeport with special powers of expropriation and control over land usages, which can effectively act as an instrument for generating the enabling conditions of high-level capital accumulation. Their efforts, in earlier years of APECOs operationalization, appeared to have been bearing fruit: in then-Governor Bellafor Angara-Castillos words, APECOs creation resulted in a real estate boom in Casiguran, with a tide of property purchases and tourism developments by regional businessmen driving the towns land parcel prices up by 300% between 2009 and 2011 (de Asis 2011). It is through APECO that the Angaras exercise their role as the land-brokers of Casiguran. On the level of policy and laws, APECO is attempting to attract domestic and foreign investors through the implementation of economic policies and laws that are more free-market-oriented than the Philippines national laws. For this reason, APECO claims to offer investor various investment incentives: (a) income tax holidays, (b) net operating loss carry over, (c) raw materials incentives, among others (APECO, accessed Feb. 8, 2015). Yet what APECO can truly offer to investors would be undervalued land. According to R.A. 10083, APECO has the power to acquire either by purchase, negotiation, or condemnation proceedings any private land within or adjacent to the Aurora Ecozone (Republic Act 10083, 2010). This effectively vests APECO with the power to expropriate land from the Agta people of the San Ildefenso Peninsula as well as other long-time settlers who have resided in and cultivated the majority of the territory spanned by the economic zone. In granting the Freeport these powers, R.A. 10083 essentially disregards the tenurial rights of the farmers, fisherfolks, and indigenous people of Casiguran as well as numerous asset reform laws that have been ratified to protect those rights the CARPER Law, the IPRA Act, and the Fisheries Code (PAFID 2011: 9).

With such legal powers, APECO has combined both coercive and economic means to acquire land. One of APECOs most common tactics is to compel farmers, fisherfolks, and indigenous people to comply with the projects development plans and accept P45,000 per hectare or be forcefully evicted from their lands. In this, it is important to bear in mind that according to APECOs own Senate testimonies the market cap for rice land is valued at around P200-thousand per hectare five times more than APECOs offer (Philippine Senate, Oct. 2011, 8). Other times, APECO has offered financial aid (employment and dole-outs) in exchange for support to the ecozone. These promises, though usually unfulfilled, have been fairly effective in dividing the community and weakening opposition.

It has been argued that natural disasters can provide a window for the land-grabbers to seize the land from smallholders. As earlier said, APECO was unable to take advantage of Typhoon Labuyo. In August 12 2013, Casiguran was hit by the typhoon hurting at least 32 people, destroying 453 houses, and damaging 2,824 structures in the process (Cabreza and Orejas 2013). It would have been the perfect time for APECO to take physical possession of the territory it was claiming and gain significantly leverage in inducing residents to cede their lands in exchange for financial support.

Yet there was no such real attempt from APECO. In Table 1, we enumerate the factors that led to the failure of APECO to take advantage of Typhoon Labuyo.


TABLE 1: Factors that led to the failure of APECO to take advantage of Typhoon Labuyo

Pre-Disaster Factors Post-Disaster OutcomesALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF POST-DISASTER AID AND SUPPORT.

The local opposition to APECO is strongly supported by the Church and other national groups. Church and NGO relief activities proved vital in the rapid recovery of Casiguran and resumption of campaigning efforts after Labuyo so as to minimize the vulnerability of residents to APECO offers.

1: The damage caused by Typhon Labuyo was partly offset by the speedy and substantive support given by the national Taskforce and the Church of Infanta. However, it was vital in providing another channel for community members to circumvent the political interference by APECO supporters with the delivery of aid, as well as the sluggishness of government response.

DIFFUSED AND DIFFERENTIATED NATURE OF LOCAL OPPOSITION.

The local Taskforce is composed of a variety of sectors (coconut farmers, rice farmers, indigenous people, and fisherfolks) that are spread out by land and sea over 12,923 hectares. The diffused nature of local opposition makes it difficult to defeat in one stroke.

2: Not all sectors and communities were hit as hard by the typhoon. Some of the groups were badly hit, while others were relatively unharmed and therefore able to provide aid and support. Worst-hit were upland/coconut farmers, while indigenous peoples, who are highly adapted to extreme weather events and did not rely on long-term crops for their livelihoods, were able to recover quickly.

APECO UNPREPAREDNESS FOR DISASTERS.

APECO was unprepared for coping with disasters. No feasibility studies to inform them of which areas were disaster-prone were conducted a feature which has been characteristic of almost all of their initiatives.

3: The administration building of APECO as well as several other projects was wrecked by the disaster. These projects remain unrepaired, almost two years later.

ESTABLISHED CONTROVERSY PERCEPTIONS RESULTING FROM PAST ANTI-APECO CAMPAIGN EFFORTS.

Already-diminishing investor confidence in APECO because of its perceived financial unviability due to its distance from Manila and vulnerability to disasters.

4: APECOs ability to expand and act crippled by lack of private sector and cohesive government support. They have to rely on limited public funds. The long-declining prospects for APECO, heightened by the disaster, triggered a reported exodus of personnel, and negligence of Utor-damaged facilities.

COMMUNITY PREPAREDNESS AND ADAPTEDNESS FOR DISASTERS.

Effective municipal disaster risk policies (ex. regular storm drills) as well as considerable experience among the locals in dealing with natural disasters.

5: Losses and fatalities were mitigated by the effective response of the residents. This contrasts with the record of APECO, which has not been effectively adapted to the environmental vulnerabilities of Casiguran since its creation, and has failed to learn from prior storm experiences.

Since 2013, the local communities of Casiguran have gradually been able to recover from the onslaught of Typhoon Labuyo. APECO, on the other hand, is still reeling from the disasters impacts with its administration building and many of its other projects still unrepaired. Even more importantly, its credibility as a project has been irreparably damaged. Indeed, one of the most cited and convincing reasons in the Senate Budget deliberations of 2014 why APECOs 2015 budget should be reduced was because of the wreckage that it suffered during the disaster. It was contended that the impact of Typhoon Labuyo validated how Casiguran is too environmentally-risky for the kinds of investment and property projects envisioned by the ecozone (Alpasa 2014). The resulting budget cuts have further paralyzed the megaproject by severely limiting its access to public funds: it was set to receive only P40-million instead of its proposed P251-million budget for 2015. In this manner, the APECO case illustrates the possibility that disasters can function as a double-edged sword for would-be land-grabbers. They can provide a window of opportunity for gaining the advantage in land disputes, yet can also backfire, as seen in the Casiguran experience.


On the whole, APECO remains but a microcosm of a form of land-grabbing that is becoming increasingly prevalent in the Philippines: one that is propagated by rent-seeking political actors like the Angaras who function as both land-broker and property developers. As the land-broker, the Angaras have dispersed obstacles to land-based capital accumulation such as residents who have resided in the land for years. As property developers, they remain strategically positioned to benefit from this commodification of rural land for private sector-led development. While elsewhere natural disasters have been taken advantage of to acquire land amidst the disorientation of local communities, the Typhoon Labuyo and APECO example suggest that this remains only a contingent, and in some cases, a high-risk undertaking that can boomerang unexpectedly against the forces of dispossession.

About the Authors

Jerik Cruz was a researcher and advocacy communications specialist focused on issues of development, land/environmental rights, and democratization in Southeast Asia. He has been affiliated with the Bangkok-based policy research organization Focus on the Global South since graduation (with honors) from the Ateneo de Manila University in 2009, and is a co-author of Focus-Philippines forthcoming book entitled State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition (2014). He is now pursuing a Masters with full scholarship at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland this 2014.

Hansley Juliano currently serves as a part-time lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Ateneo de Manila University. He received his Masters of Arts in Political Science (major in Global Politics) last 2013 from the same university, and was awarded the 2014 Outstanding Graduate Thesis Award for his research on Philippine leftist political parties. Among other commitments, he is also engaged as a researcher-writer for Task Force Anti-APECO, a national coalition of peoples organizations and civil society groups protesting land rights violations in Casiguran, Aurora. His research interests include socio-political movements, political and economic development, issues of precarious sectors and methods in comparative political research.

Enrico La Via is currently the Political Officer of Simbahang Lingkod ng Bayan, the socio-political arm of the Philippine Jesuits. He is also an officer of Taskforce Anti-APECO, a national coalition of peoples organizations, civil society groups, and university students protesting land rights violations by the in Casiguran Aurora. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy (with honors) from Ateneo de Manila University in 2014 where he first participated in the APECO issue. His other involvements include civic education, labor rights, and good governance reforms.


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ANNEX I. Bibliography Alpasa, Xavier. Api Ako sa APECO. Presentation at the Philippine Senate, Sub-committee hearing on APECO 2015 Budget, Pasay, October 21, 2014. Anonymous. Yolanda, other destructive typhoon names replaced. GMA News Online, March 15, 2014. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/352701/news/nation/yolanda-other-destructive-typhoon-names-replaced Aurora Pacific Economic Zone (APECO). Incentives.Aurora Pacific Ecozone and Freeport Authority, accessed February 8, 2015. http://www.aurorapacific.com.ph/sub_page.php?s_page=Incentives. Bataris Formation Center. Pork Barrel Presentation on the Angaras and Pork Barrel. Baler, 2013. Bankoff, Greg. Cultures of Disaster: Society and natural hazard in the Philippines. New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002. Bello, Walden. Waterloo for Agrarian Reform? Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 16, 2013. Accessed October 30, 2014. http://opinion.inquirer.net/61273/waterloo-for-agrarian-reform Bello, W., K. Cardenas, J. Cruz, A. Fabros, M. Manahan, C. Militante, J. Purugganan and J.J. Chavez. State of Fragmentation: The Philippines in Transition. Quezon City: Focus on the Global South, 2014. Bourdieu, Pierre. Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field, in Sociological Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1, March 1994. 1-18. Brown, Oli and Alec Crawford. Addressing Land Ownership after Natural Disasters: An Agency Survey. Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2006. Cabreza, Vincent and Tonette Orejas. Typhoons test Aurora towns resilience. Philippine Daily Inquirer. August 20, 2013. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/470473/typhoons-test-aurora-towns-resilience. Chikiamko, Calixto and Raul Fabella. Property Rights Reform in the Philippines: The Residential Free Patent Act. Built on Dreams, Grounded in Reality: Economic Policy Reform in the Philippines. Asia Foundation, 2011. De Asis, Jason. Aurora ecozone site booming in real estate Bagong Aurora, 30 January 2011. Editorial. Quo Vadis, APECO? Bagong Aurora, 12 January 2014. Accessed October 30, 2014. http://bagongaurorawebsitengbayan.wordpress.com/editorial-news/quo-vadis-apeco/. Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: An Introduction. New York: Vintage, 1990. Garibay, A. H., P. de Wit, L. Eleazar, F. J. Bucheli, S. Norfolk, R. S. Mena and S. Shafi. Land Tenure and Natural Disasters: Addressing Land Tenure in Countries Prone to Natural Disasters. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations, 2010.


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Harvey, David. The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile Books, 2010. Israel, Danilo C. and Roehlano M. Briones. Disasters, Poverty, and Coping Strategies: The Framework and Empirical Evidence from Micro/Household Data - Philippine Case. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 2014-06. Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), 2014. Kelly, Phillip. Landscapes of Globalization: Human geographies of economic change in the Philippines. London: Routledge, 2000. ___________. Urbanization and the politics of land in the Manila region. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (Nov. 2003): 170-187. Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007. Levien, Michael. The Land Question: Special Economic Zones and the Political Economy of Disposession in India. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, April 6-8, 2011. ____________. The Politics of Dispossession: Theorizing Indias Land Wars. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) and the Department of Development Sociology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. October 17-19, 2012. Orejas, Tonette. Govt wont shut down Aurora ecozone. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 January 2014. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/563303/govt-wont-shut-down-aurora-ecozone Manahan, Mary Ann et. al. Standing on Contentious Grounds: Land-Grabbing, Philippine Style, Keeping Land Local: Reclaiming Governance from the Market. LRAN Briefing Paper Series No. 3, Focus on the Global South and Land Research Action Network, October 2014. ____________________. Justice for Ka Melon and his family! Stop the attacks on peasants and peasant leaders! Petition, 2014. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://focusweb.org/content/justice-ka-melon-and-his-family-stop-attack-peasants-and-peasant-leaders Mitchell, David. Assessing and Responding to Land Tenure Issues in Disaster Risk Management: Training Manual. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 2011. Peet, Richard and Michael Watts, eds. Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (2nd ed.). London: Routledge, 2004. Philippine Association for Intercultural Development. Impacts of Special Economic Zones on Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines. Quezon City: PAFID, 2011. Philippine Statistics Authority. Gross Income and Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Shares 2nd Qtr 2008- 4th Qtr 2014. National Statistical Coordinating Board, Economic Accounts. Accessed 25 Sept. 2014. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_accounts.asp.


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Harvey, David. The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. London: Profile Books, 2010. Israel, Danilo C. and Roehlano M. Briones. Disasters, Poverty, and Coping Strategies: The Framework and Empirical Evidence from Micro/Household Data - Philippine Case. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES NO. 2014-06. Makati: Philippine Institute for Development Studies (PIDS), 2014. Kelly, Phillip. Landscapes of Globalization: Human geographies of economic change in the Philippines. London: Routledge, 2000. ___________. Urbanization and the politics of land in the Manila region. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (Nov. 2003): 170-187. Klein, Naomi. The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007. Levien, Michael. The Land Question: Special Economic Zones and the Political Economy of Disposession in India. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, University of Sussex, United Kingdom, April 6-8, 2011. ____________. The Politics of Dispossession: Theorizing Indias Land Wars. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI) and the Department of Development Sociology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY. October 17-19, 2012. Orejas, Tonette. Govt wont shut down Aurora ecozone. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 13 January 2014. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/563303/govt-wont-shut-down-aurora-ecozone Manahan, Mary Ann et. al. Standing on Contentious Grounds: Land-Grabbing, Philippine Style, Keeping Land Local: Reclaiming Governance from the Market. LRAN Briefing Paper Series No. 3, Focus on the Global South and Land Research Action Network, October 2014. ____________________. Justice for Ka Melon and his family! Stop the attacks on peasants and peasant leaders! Petition, 2014. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://focusweb.org/content/justice-ka-melon-and-his-family-stop-attack-peasants-and-peasant-leaders Mitchell, David. Assessing and Responding to Land Tenure Issues in Disaster Risk Management: Training Manual. Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 2011. Peet, Richard and Michael Watts, eds. Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (2nd ed.). London: Routledge, 2004. Philippine Association for Intercultural Development. Impacts of Special Economic Zones on Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines. Quezon City: PAFID, 2011. Philippine Statistics Authority. Gross Income and Gross Domestic Product by Expenditure Shares 2nd Qtr 2008- 4th Qtr 2014. National Statistical Coordinating Board, Economic Accounts. Accessed 25 Sept. 2014. http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_accounts.asp.

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Ranada, Pia. A small-time Angara faces the skeletons of APECO. Rappler, 12 April 2014. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/investigative/55253-apeco-angara-skeletons-promises Republic of the Philippines. Senate Committee on Finance Hearing Transcripts. Transcripts of hearing, Philippine Senate, October 2011. Task Force Anti-APECO. Walang Daang Matuwid sa APECO: An Appeal to Stop the Serial Abuses of Aurora by the Angara-Sponsored/Controlled APECO. Petition, 2013. Tubeza, Philip. Revamp DAR, 78 bishops urge Aquino. Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 2nd, 2013. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/351161/revamp-dar-78-bishops-urge-aquino Tupaz, Voltaire. Are environmental activists targeted for killing? Rappler, October 31, 2013. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/15226-are-environmental-activists-targeted-for-killing Yap, Dj. Land-grabbing now prevails in Yolanda disaster areas rights groups. Philippine Daily Inquirer, 11 December 2013. Accessed Oct. 30, 2014. http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/544803/land-grabbing-now-prevails-in-yolanda-disaster-areas-right-groups


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ANNEX II. Philippine Special Economic Zones 2008 and 2013

Source: Philippine Economic Zone Authority


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ANNEX II. Philippine Special Economic Zones 2008 and 2013

Source: Philippine Economic Zone Authority

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ANNEX III: Profiles of Selected Large-scale Land-Grabs in the Philippines CASE SIZE AND

LOCATION AGENTS INVOLVED

RATIONALE ALLEGED COMMUNITY IMPACTS

APECO (Aurora Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority)

12,923-hectares / Casiguran, Aurora province

Angara political dynasty; APECO administration; investors

Creation of Freeport / Special Economic Zone

Harassment and intimidation, illegal land conversions, loss of land tenure security, environmental degradation

CALUYA Up to 3,095 hectares / Caluya Island, Antique

Semirara Mining Corp.; Javier family; local government officials

Tourism development and expansion of coal mining

Eviction from homes, demolitions, environmental degradation, loss of fishing grounds, harassment and detainment of residents

HACIENDA DOLORES

1,125-hectares / Porac, Pampanga

Ayala land; Leonio Land; FL Properties and Management Corporation

Establishment of Alviera, a large-scale mixed-use community and business district

Eviction from homes, demolitions, harassment and intimidation, killings

HAMILO COAST / PICO DE LORO

Up to 8,650-hectares / Nasugbu, Batangas

SM Land Inc.; Manila Southcoast Development Corporation; Fil-Estate

Coastal tourism zone, residential community and environmental reserve

Harassment and intimidation, loss of land tenure security, illegal land conversions

LUMINA HOMES 12.47 hectares / Plaridel, Bulacan

Lumina Homes of Vista Land; Villar family

Establishment of residential subdivision

Illegal land conversions; flooding of farmlands

SIDECO (Sicogon Island Development Corporation)

1,160-hectares / Sicogon Island, Iloilo

Ayala land; Sarroza family; SIDECO administration

Establishment of Sicogon Island Resort Complex

Eviction from homes, harassment and intimidation, loss of land tenure security

Source: Various Sources


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ANNEX IV: Documented Properties of Angara Clan in Baler, San Luis, and Maria Aurora Aurora Province, 2010 REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES OF THE ANGARA FAMILY


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ANNEX IV: Documented Properties of Angara Clan in Baler, San Luis, and Maria Aurora Aurora Province, 2010 REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES OF THE ANGARA FAMILY

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IMAGES OF ANGARA PROPERTIES IN BALER Dicasalarin Cove and Bay which is owned by GMA Inc.

Picture on the right: Former Senator Edgardo Angara escorting people around Dicasalarin. Costa Pacifica

Costa Pacifica is the only four star hotel in Baler which has become a surfing hotspot in the country. Owned by the Angara family (Sea and Sierra Vista, Inc.) the hotel, according to residents, is fully booked during summer.


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IMAGES OF ANGARA PROPERTIES IN BALER Dicasalarin Cove and Bay which is owned by GMA Inc.

Picture on the right: Former Senator Edgardo Angara escorting people around Dicasalarin. Costa Pacifica

Costa Pacifica is the only four star hotel in Baler which has become a surfing hotspot in the country. Owned by the Angara family (Sea and Sierra Vista, Inc.) the hotel, according to residents, is fully booked during summer.

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ANNEX V: APECO Infrastructure Post-Typhoon Labuyo and Angara-owned Developments in Baler POST-LABUYO IMPACTS ON APECO INFRASTRUCTURE Casiguran International Airport- PHP 486-million (2014)

Airport being used as a rice dryer by farmers. No commercial planes have landed in the airstrip. APECO Administration Building- More than PHP 61.7-million (2013 and 2014)

Administration building destroyed by the typhoon. Almost two years later, APECO has yet to repair the building.

2013


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Mariculture Project of APECO- P10-Million (2013)

Fish cage project of APECO destroyed by the Typhoon. Baler-Casiguran Highway- PHP 4.001-billion (2012 and 2014)

Many parts of the Baler-Casiguran highway remain unpaved.

"A Feast for Crows"

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