A DIGEST ELECTION LAW REPORTS

E.L.R.

A DIGESTOF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTSVOLS. I TO X

1951-55

Editor:

A. N. AIYAR, B.A., B.L.,

Senior Advocate, Supreme Court.

Published under the authority of the Election Commission of Indiaby the Manager of Publications, Civil Lines, Delhi.

and

Printed by the Company Law Institute Press, Madras.

All Rights Reserved,

V

i.j

CONTENTS.

I. Table of Headings

II. Table of Cases Digested

III. Digest

IV. Index to Statutes referred to

V. Table of Cases overruled, followed etc.,

PAGE

v to viii

i—22

J—243

244—272

i—lxxviii

fTABLE OF HEADINGS.

PAGE

Abatement !

Aeroplane i

Agency I

Amendment 2

Ballot boxes 4

Ballot papers 8

Canvassing office 15

Certiorari (see High Courts infra)

Corrupt practice 16

1. Admission in pleadings, effect of " 162. Appeal on the ground of religion, caste or community 163. Appeal to national symbols 1 194. Bribery 205. Burden of proof 216. Conveyance of voters 227. Effect 238. Employing more persons 239. Exceeding prescribed limit of expenditure 25

10. False personation by agent 2511. False return of election expenses 2612. False statements relating to personal character or

conduct 3113. Fraud 3614. Fresh instances 3615. Government servants' assistance, procuring of 3716. Incurring expenses for candidate 4417. Interference with voters 4418. Naming guilty persons 4419. National anthem, use of 4520. Paid canvassers, employment of 45

m

i

VI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

21. Particulars of corrupt practice22. Printer's or publisher's name, omission of

23. Undue influence

Delimitation

Disqualification of candidates

1. Citizenship, want of2. Conviction3. Construction of s. 7(d)4. Interest in contract with Government5. Office of profit6. Part C States

7. Miscellaneous

Double member constituencies

Election agents

Election CommissionElectionElection

Election

1.

2 .

3-4-5-6.7-8.9-

1 0 .

1 1 .

1 2 .

13-14.

i 5 -16.

17-

enquiriesexpenses

petition

AbatementAdjourned hearingAdmissionsAmendment of petitionBurden of proofCollusionConsolidation of petitionsContentsCostsCourt feesDeposit of securityJoint petitionsLimitationList of particularsNew groundsPartiesRecriminatory petition

PAGE"

4552'

53

57

58585959

•60

799393

95

100

108

i n

112

114

114

116

116

126

129

129

129

130

130

131132132

139140

142

152

TABEE OF HEADINGS vii

PAGE

18. Reliefs19. Remand20. Signature21. Verification22. Withdrawal

Election RulesElection Tribunal

Electoral roll

Estoppel

High Courts

Illegal practice (see Corrupt practice above)

Legislative Council

Ministers

Nomination of candidates—I

1. Age of candidate2. Name of candidate3. Name of constituency4. Electoral roll5. Father's name6. Name of Legislature7. Name of village8. Proposer and seconder9. Scheduled Castes

10. Several nominations by same proposer11. Signature12. Symbols13. Withdrawal

Nomination of candidates—II

1. Improper rejection of nomination2. Improper acceptance of nomination

Non-compliance with rules

Part C StatesPolice

153155156156160

160

160

165

173X74

192

193

197198

' 198199209

209

2 1 0

2 1 1

2 1 2

2 1 2

214217219

2 2 0

223

229

229

230

Vlll ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Polling

Polling agent

Polling officers

Returning Officer

Scheduled Castes

Scheduled Tribes

Secrecy of voting

Sikhs

Supreme Court

Voting

Waiver

Words and phrases

PAGE

230

232

233

234

237

238

338

239

239

24O

240

24I

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED,E.L.R. VOLS. I TO X

Abdul Rauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant and Others :(Lucknow Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 240 7, 46, 48, 49, 51,

127, 157,164, 241Abdul Rouf v. Makhtar Ali and Others : (Gauhati

Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 340 22, 25, 38Ajayab Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh and

Others : (Hissar Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 368 205Ambedkar, B. R. and Another v. S. A. Dange and

Others : (Bombay Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R.364 54' 95

Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha : (Patna High Court)5 E.L.R. 40 109

Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others: (NagpurElection Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 57 27,28,41,45,194

Arunachalam, A. J. v. Election Tribunal, Vellore,and Others (Madras High Court), 9 E.L.R. 471 67

Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq and Others: (BareillyElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 341 59

Asrar Ahmad v. Nihal Uddin and Others : (BareillyElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 81 73, 151, 221

Atre, P. K. v. Dr. T. R. Naravne and Others : (Bom-bay Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 355 230

Audesh Pratap Singh v. Brij Narain and Others: «(Allahabad High Court), 9 E.L.R. 1 49,180,181, 241,

242Awadesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhawati Gupta and

Others : (Patna Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 176 120Awadhesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta and

Others : (Patna Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 45 39, 95, 154, 159,166, 173

Baddrudduja Syed v. Mohammad Khoda Buksh andOthers: (West Bengal Election Tribunal), 2E.L.R. 189 206

Baijnath Prasad Varma v. Chandreshwar NarainPrasad Singh and Others: (Patna Election Tri-bunal), 2 E,L,R. 88 235

ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bakaram Sukaram Konkani v. Shankar Rao ChindujiBedse and Others : (Bombay Election Tribunal),3 E.L.R. 409 96, 120, 222,

236, 238Balailal Das Mohapatra v. Trailakya Nath Prodhan

and Others: (West Bengal Election Tribunal),4 E.L.R. 221 10

Balasubramanian, P. N. v. C. R. Narasimhan andOthers: (Vellore Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 461 94, 166, 204

Balasubrahmanyan, P. N. v. Election Tribunal,Vellore, and Others : (Madras High Court), 7E.L.R. 496 166,199

Balbir Singh v. Arjan Singh and Others : (BarnalaElection Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 341 81,142, 173

Balchand v. Laxminarain Mateh: (Nowgong ElectionTribunal), 8 E.L.R. 465

Balwant Singh and Others v. Devi Lai and Others:[Hissar Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 1

Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan and Others : (BikanerElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 375

T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another: (ShimogaElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 197

Basappa T. C. v. T. Nagappa and Others : (SupremeCourt), 10 E.L.R. 14

Bawa Bachjttar Singh v. Election Commission andOthers : (Punjab High Court), 9 E.L.R. 506

Bajaysingh v. Narbada Charan Lai and Others:(Bhopal Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 426

Bena v. Jagat Singh and Others : (Kotah ElectionTribunal), 10 E.L.R. 174

Beni Madho Rai v. Bola and Others : (AllahabadElection Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 308

Bhagwan Singh v. Dr. Raghbir Parkash and Others :(Barnala Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 461

Bhairon v. Thakur Ganpat Singh and Others: (AjmerElection Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 409

Bhan Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another: (NowgongElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 212

68, 214, 219,229, 232,237

22, 72

152, 211, 221

2, 15, 26, II

231

132, 185, 242

183

213, 236

99

82, 94

82, 107, 213

96,99

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED 3

Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others(Kotah Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 407 218, 224

Bherusingh v. Prabhu Dayal Chaubey and Others:(Indore Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 325 88,170

Bhikaji Keshao Joshi v. Brijlal Nandlal Biyani(Supreme Court), 10 E.L.R. 357 46, 138, 151,

157Bhola Nath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others :

(Faizabad Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 288 104, 140, 160

Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others:(No. 2), (Faizabad Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R.104 60, 71, 85

Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Ram Bilas Sinha and Others:(Patna Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 60 218

Biswanatha Roy v. Tarakdas Banerjee and Others :(West Bengal Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 223 238

Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh: (AllahabadElection Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 80 88, 196, 243

Dr. Brijendra Swarup v. Election Tribunal, Lucknow,and Others: (Allahabad High Court), 10 E.L.R.

191 134. 154Brij Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh and Others:

(Lucknow Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 266 200Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sitaram and Others:

(Madhya Bharat Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 48 89, 91

Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others:(Bikaner Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 147 84, 221, 242

Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parash-ram and Others: (Supreme Court of India), 9E.L.R. 301 62, 237

Chenchurama Naidu, N. v. The Chief Electoral Offi-cer, Andhra State, Kurnool, and Another:(Andhra High Court), 10 E.L.R. 268 173

Chinna Malla Reddi and Others v. The RevenueDivisional Officer, Guntur, and Others: (MadrasHigh Court) 9 E.L.R. 361 166

Chiranji Lai v. Panna Lai Kaushik and Others: . . • - , . r

(Kotah Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 274 147 .


Chiranjit Singh v. Mam Raj and Others : (HissarElection Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 1

Damodar Goswami v. Narnarayan Goswami andOthers : (Allahabad High Court) 10 E.L.R. 272

Dandapani Das v. Mohan Nayak and Others: (OrissaHigh Court) 8 E.L.R. 220

Daulat Ram v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others :(Bilaspur Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 87

Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer and Others :(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 137

Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others :(Allahabad Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 138

Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab and Others :(Dharwar Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 380

69

180

20, 82, 92, 242

1 5 8

132

17, 20, 22, 30,

41, 49, i n , 159,

205, 226

Deshpande and Others, v. State of Hyderabad andOthers : (Hyderabad High Court) 10 E.L.R. 203 88, 185, 195

Devasharam Sinha v. Sheo Mahadev Prasad &Others : (Patna Election Tribunal) 10 E.L.R. 461

Dharam Vir v. Bhala Ram Others : (Barnala Elec-tion Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 64

Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others :(Supreme Court of India) 9 E.L.R. 485

Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others:(Jaipur Eiection Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 247

Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh :(Supreme Court of India) 9 E.L.R. 494

Elaya Pillai v. K. Parthasarathy and Others :(Madras High Court) 8 E.L.R. 20

Election Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao : (SupremeCourt of India) 2 E.L.R. 499

Faqir Chand v. Pritam Singh arid Others : (BarnalaElection Tribunal) 7 E.L R. 119

23, 35, 108,129,196, 228, 229

97, 147, 215

in, 124, 137138, 240

107

227,229,239,242

44,156, 241

109. 175

31. 55. 5«. 81


Fida Hussain v. Sheobhajan Singh and Others:(Patna High Court) 9 E.L.R. 33 150

Fida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others:(Hazeribagh Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 1 146

Gairola, K. N. v. Ganga Dhar Maithani and Others :(Bareilly Election Tribunal) 3 E.L:R. 162 145

Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (No. 2) :(Bareilly Election Tribunal) 8 E.L.R. 105 19, 21, 57, 233

Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh and Others : (BarnalaElection Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 17 59, 132

Gangadhar v. Election Tribunal, Vindhya Pradesh,and Others (Judicial Commissioner's Court,Vindhya Pradesh) 10 E.L.R. 183 141, 240

Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai Jain and Others :(Nowgong Eleetion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 392 30, 141

Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others:(Nowgong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 448 5, 30, 41, 214, 229

Gayaprashad v. Krishnachandra Sharma and Others :(Jabalpur Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 6 134. 165, 166

Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh and Others: (PatialaElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 124 39

Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others ; (PatialaElection Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 136 79, 103,142

Gidwani Choithram Partabrai v. Agnani ThakurdasChuharmal and Others: (Bombay ElectionTribunal), 1 E.L.R. 194 9, 174

Gokaldas Hirjee v. Zaveri Vallabhadas and Others :(Saurashtra Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 234 101

Govind Malaviya v. Murli Manohar and Others:(Allahabad Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 84 15, 37, 84, 154,

159Gulapchand Chordia v. Thakur Narain Singh and

Others : (Ajmer Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R.397 82

Gurdial Singh v. Manmohan Kour & Others (PatialaElection Tribunal), 10 EX.R. 450 100


Gurnam Singh and Another v. Partap Singh andOthers : (Ludhiana Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R.338

Haji Nazimuddin v. Dandiram Dutta and Others andSivaprasad Sarma v. Dandiram Dutta andOthers : (Assam Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R.412

Hakikatulla v. Nathu Singh and Others : (BikanerElection Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 10

Hamirkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, JamnagarCity, and Others (Saurashtra High Court), 5E.L.R. 230

Hans Raj v. Ram Singh and Others : (Delhi ElectionTribunal), 2 E.L.R. 12

Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin and Others :(Baroda Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 171

Hanuman Prasad Misra v. Tara Chand and Others :(Faizabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 446

Hari Das v. Hira Singh Pal and Others : (HimachalPradesh Election Tribanal), 4 E.L.R. 466

Hari Datt v. Madan Mohan and Others : (BareillyElection Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 25

Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta v. Shibban Lai Saksena(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 126

Hari Shankar Prasad Gupta v. Sukhdeo Prasad andAnother: (Allahabad High Court), 8 E.L.R.

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others :(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 216

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others :(Hoshangabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 248

Harish Chandra Bajpai and Another v. Trilok Singhand Others : (Allahabad High Court), 10 E.L.R.198

20, 26, 56, 204,234

103

81,

176

212

80,

65.

50,219

II,

39

171

, 221

242

97, 105 .

92, 97, 209, 222, 237

241

161, 180

13,109,186,242

8, 10, 172, 207.211

126, 185

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED ?

Harnam Singh v. Jwala Prasad and Others : (AjmerElection Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 332 199, 236

*Horen Jones v. Mohan Singh and Others : (Shillong

Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 147 79, 242Hukam Singh and Another v. Sardul Singh and

Others : (Pepsu High Court), 6 E.L.R. 162 176

Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh and Others:(Barnala Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 90 81, 105

Jadumani Mangraj v. Dinabandu Sahu and Others :(Cuttack Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 480 39, 44, 123, 138,

156Jagajeevandas Shetty v. Sanjeeva Shetty and Others :

JMangalore Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 358 48, 55, 152

Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others : (SupremeCourt of India), 9 E.L.R. 231 112 150, 152, 243

Jagannath v. Pandurang and Others: (JabalpurElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 167 91, 97

Jagannatha Sharma and Others v. S. C. Gupta andOthers: (Delhi Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 8 197

Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal and Others : (GwaliorElection Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 311 11, 90, 172, 227

Jaisingh v. Gopal Singh and Others : (Kotah ElectionTribunal), 3 E.L.R. 351 161

Jarnna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram RatanlalJain and Others : (Madhya Bharat High Court),5 E.L.R. 1 153,162

Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. LachhiRam and Others: (Supreme Court of India),10 E.L.R. 120 23, 31

Jamuna Nandan Prasad Sinha v. Jagdish Narain andOthers : (Patna Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R.14 199, 214

Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others:(Nowgong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 429 5, 42

Jaswant Singh v. Jagan Nath and Others: (DelhiElection Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 1 197, 225

Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das and Others ; (DelhiElection Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 385 199

s ELECTION LAW REPORTS JHCEST

Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirdaya Narain Singhand Others: (Faizabad Election Tribunal),3 E.L.R. 397

Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singhand Others (No. 2): (Faizabad Election Tribu-nal), 6 E.L.R. 495

Joginder Singh v. Harchand Singh and Others :(Kapurthala Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 447

Joginder Singh v. Raghbir Singh and Others :(Patiala Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 81 ,

Dr. John, V. K. v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others andSrinivasan, A. v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others :(Madras High Court), 10 E.L.R. 345

John Mathai, Dr. v. Returning Officer, Kottayam,and Three Others and Kurian Isaac v.Returning Officer, Kottayam, and Three Others:(Travancore-Cochin High Court), 1 E.L.R. 1

Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lall and Others : (KotahElection Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 457

Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahadeo and Others:(Rajnandgaon Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 473

Jyostna Chandra and Another v. Mehrabali andOthers : (Gauhati Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.

Kalika Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hayat Chand andOthers: (Patna Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R.118

Kalyan Chandra Mohile v. Bishambhar Nath Pandeyand Others : (Allahabad Election Tribunal),3 E.L.R. 125

Kalyan Singh v. Election Tribunal, Ajmer andOthers: (Ajmer Judicial Commissioner's Court),8 E.L.R. 207

Kanaiyalal Bhabhutbhai Mehta v. Satyendra KalidasZaveri and Others : (Palanpur Election Tribunal),1 E.L.R. 339

Kanaiyalal Durlabhram Bhansali v. Popatlal Mul-shanker Joshi and Others: (Palanpur ElectionTribunal), 1 E.L.R. 244

132

14,23,52,193,243

145

171

135.136,155.

188

35, 56,171

70, 133

17. 55. 234

85

219

123, 141, 179

140

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED

Kanauji Lai Shukla v. Bhagwan Din and Others:(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 1

Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar andOthers : (Vellore Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R.156

Dr. Kannabhiran v. A. J. Arunachalam and Others :(Vellore Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 167

Karnail Singh v. Election Tribunal, Hissar, andOthers : (Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 189

Kartar Singh v. Balu Ram and Others: (JullunderElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 71

Keshau Prasad v. Brijraj Singh and Others : (RewaElection Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. yy

Kesho Ram v. Hazura Singh and Others : (PatialaElection Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 320

Khader Sheriff, S. v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, andOthers : (Madras High Court), 7 E.L.R. 471

Khilumal and Another v. Arjundas and Others:(Ajmer Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 497

Khushwat Rai v. Karan Singh and Others : (FaizabadElection Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 93

Kishenlal Lamror v. Madan Singh and Others:(Ajmer Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 49

Kosalram, K. T. v. M. R. Meganathan and Others :(Madras High Court), 9 E.L.R. 278

Krishnaji Bhimrao Antrolikar v. Shankar ShantaramMore and Others : (Poona Election Tribunal),5 E.L.R. 34

Krishnaji Bhimrao Antrolikar v. Shanker ShantaramMore and Others: (Poona Election Tribunal),7 E.L.R. 100

Krishnappa v. Narayansingh and Others : (NagpurElection Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 294

71, 202, 241

232

66

206

53

4, 128

45, 80, 198

J37> *77> 241

139

47, 122, 141

81, 242

108, 124

136, 158

2, 32, 33. 47. 52,242

8o, 92

Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others:(Gwaliqr Election Tribunal), 9 EX-R- 149 16, 50, 150

10 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others : (Patiala Elec-tion Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 403 80, 129

Lakkappa v. Narasimhe Gowda and Others : (MysoreHigh Court), 9 E.L.R. 201 183

Lakhan Lai Mishra v. Trebeni Kumar and Others :(Bhagalpur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 423 213, 226

Lakshmana Pillai v. Chengam Pillai and Others :(Madras Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 103 143, 212

Lakshmi Chand v. Ladhu Ram Chodhri and Others :(Jaipur Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 200 105

Lallu Chand v. Tej Singh and Others : (Jaipur Elec-tion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 318 160

Lallu Chand v. Tej Singh and Others : (Jaipur Elec-tion Tribunal) 8 E.L.R. 28 108, 210

Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganeriwal and Others :(Secunderabad Election Tribunal) 1 E.L.R. 239

Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganerival and Others :(No. 2) (Secunderabad Election Tribunal) 2E.L.R. 20

Laxmidatta and Another v. Madanlal Bhupar andOthers : (Kotah Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 398

Linga Gowda, M.C. v. N.K. Shivananjappa (BangaloreElection Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 163

Linge Gowda v. Shivananjappa : (Bangalore Elec-tion Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 288

Lumba Ram v. Ram Narain and Others : (BikanerElection Tribunal) 5 E.L.R. 319 71, 173

151, 207

169, 172, 226,242

120

26, 29, 31, 37,48, 57, 194, 242

Madan Mohan v. Bankat Lai and Others : (RajasthanHigh Court) 8 E.L.R. 119 123, 148, 160

178

Madan Pal v. Rajdeo Upadhya and Others : (Gorakh-pur Election Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 28 35, 47, 147

Madan Singh v. Kalyan Singh and Others : (AjmerElection Tribunal) 6 E.L.R. 405 • 82, 141, 215

TABLE OF CASES DIGESTED I I

Madhadeo v. Audesh Pratap Singh and Others:(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 398 153

Mahadeo v. Jwalaprasad Mishra and Others : (NagpurHigh Court) 6 E.L.R. 1 122

Maharaja Anand Chand, In re : (Election Commissionof India) 5 E.L.R. 197 93, n o

Maharaja of Parlakimedi v. Bijay Chandra Das andOthers : (Cuttack Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R.101

Mahendra Sahu v. Dutia Raul and Others : (CuttackElection Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 117

Maharaja Singh v. Ratan Amol Singh and Others :(Ludhiana Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 320

Mahendra Kumar v. Vidyavati and Others : (SupremeCourt of India) 10 E.L.R. 214

Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others: (GwaliorElection Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 154

60, 72

92

42, 83, 134

42, 93, 229

90,130,170, 173,242

Majibar Rahman Chaudhury v. Abdul Barkat AtaulGani: (West Bengal Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R.481

Mandal Sumitra Devi v. Suraj Narain Singh andOthers :. (Bhagalpur Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R.136

Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji andOthers : (Nasik Election Tribunal) 9 E.L.R. 36

Mani Kanta Das v. Janab Amjad AH and Others :(Gauhati Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 406

Manjuran, M.M. v. K.C. Abraham (Ernakulam Elec-tion Tribunal) 10 E.L.R. 376

Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalani (Delhi Elec-tion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 347

Marutrao Bhaurao and Others v. Ghulabrao Dada-saheb and Others : (Poona Election Tribunal)

36, 4 1

104,225

109,

224,

120,

206,

239

156,

214,

78

34. 41. 54.

155, 163

113

73.

5 E.L.R. 303 14,132, 154, 233

H ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Mast Ram v. Harnam Singh Sethi and Others :(Ludhiana Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 301

Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and OthersPatiala Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 441

Meganathan, M. R. v. K. T. Kosalram and Others :(Tanjore Election Tribunal) 9 E.L.R. 242

26, 29, 48, 53,56,242

132, 172, 200, 222

24, 27, 30, 33,52, 123, 129,

150,112, 164, 242Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar

Dalumiyan and Others : (Ahmedabad Electiontion Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 499

Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada AkbarDalumiyan and Others (No. 2): (Bombay Elec-tion Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 374

Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas and Others : (Ajmer Elec-tion Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 301

Mohanlal v. Trilochan Singh and Others : (Rajnand-gaon Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 41

Mohan Vithal Raj v. Gangadhara Siva and Others :Vellore Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 91

Mohinder Singh v. Mihan Singh and Others : (Patiala rElection Tribunal) 10 E.L.R. 426

Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi : (Bombay Elec-tion Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 248

Moreshwar Parashram v. Chaturbhuj VithaldasJasani and Others : (Nagpur Election Tribunal)7 E.L.R. 428

Motiram v. Ramchandar Chowdhary and Others :(Bikaner Election Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 135

Motisinghji Maharamansinghji Mahida v. ChawdaIshwarbhai Khodabhai and Others: (Kaira Elec-tion Tribunal) 1 E.L.R. 330

Mukti Nath v. Uma Shanker Misra and Others :(Gorakhpur Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 109

Mulai and Another v. Lai DanBahadur Singh: (RewaElection Tribunal) 9 E.L.R. 8

169

26, 32, 82

102, 142, 151

33

105, 198

100

18, 34, 129, 231

6o, 98, 224, 237

207, 219

101

52, 241

216, 238, 241,243


Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff and Others :(Vellore Election Tribunal) 3 E.L.R. 74 139

Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff and OthersNo. 2.: (Vellore Election Tribunal) 4 E.L.R. 283 26, 28

Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh and Others : (MadhyaBharat High Court) 10 E.L.R. 135 124, 161, 162

Muthiah, M. v. A.S. Subba Raj and Others: (Tirunelveli *Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 109 119

Muthiah, M. v. A. S. Subbaraj and Others: (TanjoreElection Tribunal) 7 E.L.R. 165 36, 141

Nagappa, T. v. Basappa and Others: (Mysore HighCourt), 9 E.L.R. 216 183

Nagendra Mahto v. The State: (Patna High Court) 10E.L.R. 140 7, 114

Nagjibhai Govindbhai Arya v. Mithalbhai RamjiChawhan and Others: (Baroda Election Tri-bunal), 1 E.L.R. 162 98, 220

Naranarayan Goswami v. H. D. Chaudhury andOthers: (West Bengal Election Tribunal), 2E.L.R. 253 9

Naranjan Singh v. Brish Bhan and Others: (PatialaElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 179 96,140

Narasimhe Gowda v. Lakkappa and Another: (Banga-lore Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 234 61, 95

Narasinga Rao, P. v. Suryanarayana and Others:(Vishakhapatnam Election Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 83 217

Narotam Singh v. Des Raj and Others: (PatialaElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 309 211

Nathulal Mantri and Another v. Vindrawan PrasadTiwari and Others: (Madhya Bharat High Court)9 E.L.R. 375 130

Natwar Lai v. Bhartendra Singh and Another (KotahElection Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 408 81, 236

Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhan-dari and Others: (West Bengal Election Tribu-nal), 6 E.L.R. 197 123, 213

1


Niranjan Singh v. Jaidev Gadadhar and Others:(Rajnandgaoh Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 352

Nrisinha Kumar Sinha v. Satyendra Chandra GhoshMoulik and Others: (Calcutta Election Tribunal,2 E.L.R. 121

Nrisinha Kumar Sinha and Others v. Returning

Oincer,aBurwati-Khargram and Others: (CalcuttaHigh Court), 1 E.L.R. 23

Nurul Islam v. Muhammad Rafique and Others:(Nowgong Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 70

Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Election Tribunal,Ahmedabad and Others: (Bombay High Court),8 E.L.R. 417

Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Vithalbhai Ran-chhodhbhai Patel and Others: (Bombay ElectionTribunal), 9 E.L.R. 451

yy

210, 221

190

1, 14

39

41. 44.242

45. 156,

Padmanabha Menon v. A. M. Thomas and Others:(Ernakulam Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 404 54

Pandit Harish Chandra v. Raja Man Singh andOthers: (Jaipur Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 129 68, 92, 223

Paramasivam, N. v. Election Tribunal, Tiruchirapalliand Others: (Madras High Court), 8 E.L.R. 102 49

Parmatma Singh v. Deo Saran Sinha and Others:(Patna Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 353 76

Partap Singh v. Nihal Singh and Others: (PatialaElection Tribunal,) 3 E.L.R. 31 17, 197

Parthasarathy, K. v. Elaya Pillai and Others: (Tiru-chirapalli Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 188 41, 44, 52

Polaki Kotesam and Others v. S. M. Patnaik and- Others: (Orissa High Court), 8 E.L.R. 159 167, 172

Ponnuswami, N. P. v. Returning Officer, Namakkal:(Madras High Court), 1 E.L.R. 89 191, 241

Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal andOthers: (Supreme Court of India), 1 E.L.R. 133 192, 241

Prabhudas Ramjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai KishordasManiar: (Bhavanagar Election Tribunal), 1E.L.R. 154 67, 220


Prabhudas Ramjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai KishordasManiar (No. 2): (Saurashtra Election Tribunal),2 E.L.R. 249

Pradipta Kishore Das v. Md. Atahar and Others:(Cuttack Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 467

Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others:(Madras Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 384

Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 2):(Madras Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 54

Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 3):(Madras Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 376

Prakash Narain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi andOthers: (Rewa Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 205

Pranlal Thakorlal Munshi v. Indubhai BhailalbhaiAmin and Others: (Baroda Election Tribunal),1 E.L.R. 182

Prem Nath v. Ram Krishan and Others: (JullundurElection Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 271

Pritam Singh v. Charan Singh and Others: (LucknowElection Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 276

Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel v. ShantilalGirdharlal Parikh and Others: (Mehsana Elec-tion Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 223

Radhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others:(Vellore Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 148

Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Guptaand Others: (Lucknow Election Tribunal), 6E.L.R. 123

Raghunath Singh v. Kampta Prasad Saxena: (Now-gong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R. 424

Raghuraj Singh v. Vasant Rao and Others: (JabalpurElection Tribunal) 2 E.L.R. 295

Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo and Others:(Supreme Court of India), 9 E.L.R. 294

Ramchandra Choudhuri v. Sadasiva Tripathy andOthers: (Nayagarh Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R.450

1 0 3

7- 8, 243

1 1 8

47, no, 139

4. 8, 9, 44

171

197

144, 174, 217

144

4, 6, 8, 10, 231

156

16, 39, 149

119

42, 45, 155, 240

152


ftmachandra Choudhuri v. Sadavisa Tripathy andOthers (No. 2): (Nayagarh Election Tribunal),5 E.L.R. 401 39, 57, 194

Ramachandra Choudhuri v. Sadasiva Tripathy andOthers (No. 2): (Nayagarh Election Tribunal),5 E.L.R. 194 161

Ramachandran Nair v. Ramachandra Das andOthers: (Quilon Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 442 103, 153, 220

Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kamala Devi: (SecunderabadElection Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 173 208

Rama Reddi v. Chidanandam and Others: (BellaryElection Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. ^7^ 118

Rama Reddi v. Chidanandam and Another (No. 2):(Bellary Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 42 71, 77

Ramaswami, V. V. v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli,and Others : (Madras High Court), 8E.L.R 233 24, 65

Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. RameshwarYadav and Others: (Hazaribagh ElectionTribunal), 5 E.L.R. 296 95, 166

Ram Chand v. Wadhawa Ram and Others : (LudhianaElection Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 386 68, 95

Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das andOthers). (Hazaribagh Election Tribunal), 4E.L.R.112 210,234

Ramkrishna v. Thakur Daoosingh : (Nagpur HighCourt), 6 E.L.R. 186 177

Ramlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission ofIndia and Others: (Patna High Court), 7E.L.R. 364 168

Ramlal ;v. Sujaniram and Others: (RajandgaonElection Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 27 212, 237

Ram Murti v. Sumba Sadar and Others : (BerhampurElection Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 330 91, 94

Ram Singh v. Ghosi Ram and Others (Pepsu HighCourt) 9 E.L.R. 183 45, 241, 242

Ram Singh v. Hazari Lai and Others: JaipurElection Tribunal).. 6 E.L.R. 224 171, 198, 201

Ram Singh and Others v. Returning Officer, KotPutli, and Others: (Rajasthan High Court), 1E.L.R. 52 190

TABiE OF CASES DIGESTED 17

Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others:(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 129 24

Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Sanjalia MohanlalVirjibhai and Others: (Ahmedabad ElectionTribunal), 4 E.L.R. 493^ 198, 209

Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Election Tribunal,Ahmedabad : (Bombay High Court), 8 E.L.R.59 177, 208

Ratan Shukla v. Brijendra Swarup and Others:(Faizabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 116 122

Ratan Singh and Another v. Padam Chand Jain andOthers; (Rewa Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 189 5,7,215,243

Rattan Anmol Singh and Another y. Atma Ram andOthers : (Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R.41 217, 236, 241, 243

Rattan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others :(Ludhiana Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 234 17, 53, 66, 133,

154, 219, 237,239, 240

Rikhab Das v. Ridhichand Palliwal and Others :(Jaipur Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 115 16, 43, 47, 129,

230, 232Roopchandra Sogani v. Rawat Man Singh and

Others : (Jaipur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 339 163Roop Chandra Sogani and Others v. Rawat Man

Singh and Others (No. 2): (Jaipur ElectionTribunal), 5 E.L.R. 327 115

Roopchandra Sogani and Another v. Rawat ManSingh and Others (No. 3): (Jaipur ElectionTribunal), 9 E.L.R. 21 131, 210, 224, 243

Rudra Pratap Narain Singh v. Bhagwandin Misraand Others: (Allahabad High Court (LucknowBench), 1 E.L.R. 60 191

Sahi Ram v. Manphool Singh and Others, (BikanerElection Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 47 82, 84

Saka Venkata Rao v. Election Commission : (MadrasHigh Court), 1 E.L.R. 417 n o

Salig Ram Jaiswal v. Sheo Kumar Pande andOthers : (Allahabad Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R.67 98,114, 150, 154


Sambandam, S. K. v. Election Tribunal, Madras, andOthers: (Madras High Court), 5 E.L.R. 341

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, andAnother : (Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R.293

Sankara Pandia Nadar, A. S. S. S. v. V. V. Rama-swami and Others : (Tanjore Election Tribunal),5 E.L.R. 417

Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others : (LudhianaElection Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. Z03

Sardul Singh Caveeshar v. Hukam Singh and Others :(Patiala Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 316

Sarju Prasad Namdeo v. Gopal Saran Singh andOthers : (Nowgong Election Tribunal), 8 E.L.R.

- 444Satish Chander v. Ganga Singh and Others : (Bikaner

Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 38Satya Dev Bushahri v. Ghanshyam and Others :

(Himachal Pradesh Election Tribunal), 4E.L.R. 67

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Ghanshiam : (HimachalPradesh Judicial Commissioner's Court), 6E.L.R. 388

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others:(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 103

Satyanatham, N. v. K. Subramaniam and Others :(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 311

Seshaiah v. Koti Reddi and Others: (BellaryElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 39

Shah Mohammad Umair v. Ram Charan Singh andOthers : (Patna High Court), 8 E.L.R. 179

Shah Umair Sahib v. Ramcharan Singh and Others :(Patna Election Tribunal), 10 E.L.R. 162

Shakti Parshad Shukla v. Balwant Singh and Others :(Kapurthala Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 301

Shankare Gowda v. Mariyappa and Another : MysoreElection Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 101

Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Maruti Sitaram Sawantand Others: (Kolaba Election Tribunal), 1E.L.R. 302

3, 200

116,187

7. 25, 64

80, 83, 95

1,18, 19, 55,147

149

209

31. 153

164

42,229

75

15

149.

5.6,

203,

43.

178,

8

2 2 2

21,112

93. 95-

243

TABLE OF CASES DIGESt*I>

Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Returning Officer,Kolaba, and Another: (Bombay High Court),i E.L.R. 13

Shankar Rao Ramaji and Another v. The State ofMadhya Bharat: (Madhya Bharat High Court),1 E.L.R. 34

Shankar Tripathi v. Returning Officer, Mirzapur,and Others: (Allahabad Election Tribunal),2 E.L.R. 315

Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Hussain Zaidi andOthers : (Faizabad Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.280

Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Hussain Zaidi andOthers (No. 2): (Faizabad Election Tribunal),8 E.L.R. 300

Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Election Tribunal, Faizabad,and Others : (Allahabad High Court), 8 E.L.R.201

Shantilal Chaudhary v. Raghuraj Singh and Others;(Madhya Bharat High Court), 7 E.L.R. 489

Shantilal Chaudhary v. Raghuraj Singh and Others(No. 2): (Indore Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R. 93

Sheo Kumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others :(Allahabad High Court), 5 E.L.R. 103

Sheo Mahadeo Prasad v. Deva Sharan Sinha andOthers : (Patna High Court), 10 E.L.R. 144

Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani: (BhopalElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 401

Shibban Lai Saxena v. Hari Shanker Prasad andOthers : (Gorakhpur Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.313

Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker Prasad andOthers : (Gorakhpur Election Tribunal), 9 E.L.R.

403

Shiv Dayal and Others v. Teg Ram and Others :(Ludhiana Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 346

188

190

1, 17, 130, 159,232

48

5, 156, 214

162, 178

177

57,111,116, 164

175

125

23, 24, 36, 131,242

145

40,50, 151, 157,

233

201


Shiv Dutt and Others v. Bansidas Dhangar andOthers : (Faizabad Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R.55

Shiv Dutt and Others v. Bansidas Dhangar andOthers (No. 2): (Faizabad Election Tribunal),9 E.L.R. 324

Shiva Das and Another v. Sheikh Mohammad AbdulSamad and Others : (Allahabad Election Tri-bunal), 8 E.L.R. 265

Shivarama Karanth v. Venkataramana Gowda andOthers : (Mangalore Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R.187

Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others : (PatialaElection Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 496

T. Siddalingaiya, Member, Mysore LegislativeAssembly, In re : (Election Commission of India),7 E.L.R. 416

Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh ShankarSingh Parihar : (Bombay High Court), 2 E.L.R.283

Sivathanu Pillai v. Nesamony and Others: (Tri-vandrum Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 312

Sivathanu Pillai v. Election Tribunal, Trivandrum,and Others : (Travancore-Cochin High Court),2 E.L.R. 263

Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others : (Kapur-thala Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 401

Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others (No. 2):(Kapurthala Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 102

Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others : (LudhianaElection Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 55

A. Srinivasan v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others andV. K. John v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others :(Madras High Court), 10 E.L.R. 245

Sri Ram v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others:(Bareilly Election Tribunal), 8 EX.R. 139

158

19.30 ,241

6, 8, 16, 24,32, 50,170

40, 84

1, 114,

107,

"5

.243

29,

159.

60

117,144,164

36, 54, 118

174

154

104,140

4, T4, 240

3i, 52, 53. 135.136, 154

20, I2§, 232


Subba Raj, A. S. v. M. Muthiah and Others : (MadrasHigh Court), 5 E.L.R. 21

Subba Raj, A. S. v. M. Muthiah (No. 2): (Madras HighCourt), 9 E.L.R. 290

Subbaraya Goundar A. K. v. Muthusami Goundarand Others : (Madras High Court), 7 E.L.R. 465

Subramanya Bhatt v. Abdul Hameed Khan andOthers: (Madras Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R.225

Subramanya Goundar v. Kandasami Goundar andOthers : (Vellore Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 214

Subramania Goundar, K. S. v. Election Tribunal,Vellore, and Others: (Madras High Court),8 E.L.R. 66

Subramanyam, K. v. Abdul Hameed Khan andOthers: (Madras Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R.432

Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others : (PunjabHigh Court), 9 E.L.R. 145

Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu andOthers: (West Bengal Election Tribunal),4 E.L.R. 73

Sujaniram v. Lai Shyam Shah and Others : (NagpurHigh Court), 5 E.L.R. 183

Sukar Gope v. State of Bihar : (Patna High Court),1 E.L.R. 68

Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others : (Jullun-dur Election Tribunal), 7 E.L.R. 171

Surain Singh v. Waryam Singh and Others : (jullun-dur Election Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 99

Suraj Bhan v. Hem Chand Jain and Others : (DelhiElection Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 1

Suraj Narain v. Ram Nath and Others : (GorakhpurElection Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 305

Suryaji Rama Rao v. Bhika Trimbak Pawar : (NasikElection Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 205

Swaminatha Mercondar, R. v. S. Ramalingam : (Tiru-chirapalli Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R. 51

no , 121

124

215

203

117

126, 148

140, 170

" 3

19, 21, 128, 231

223, 238

189, 241

83

42

96, 131, 159

235

133,217

15


Swaminatha Merkondar v. Ramalingam and Others(No. 2): (Trichirapalli Election Tribunal),2 E.L.R. 390

Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and Others :(Rajastan High Court), 9 E.L.R. 193

Thakur Daoosing v. Ramkrishna Rathor and Others :(Rajnandgaon Election Tribunal), 4 E.L.R. 34

Thete Gopal Ramji v. Amolok Chand and Others :(Nasik Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 477

Tikaram Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga andOthers :(West Bengal Election Tribunal), 1 E.L.R. 252

Tirath Singh v. Bachitar Singh and Others : (PepsuHigh Court), 9 E.L.R. 163

Trambaklal Manishanker v. Prabhulal Bhimji andOthers (Saurashtra Election Tribunal), 2 E.L.R.245

Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others:(Rewa Election Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 26

Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others:(No. 2), (Rewa Election Tribunal), 5 E.L.R. 199

Ugam Singh v. Hari Singh and Others: (BikanerElection Tribunal), 6 E.L.R. 470

Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand and Others:(Supreme Court of India), 10 E.L.R. 30

Vijaya Mohan Reddy v. Paga Pulla Reddy andOthers: (Secunderabad Election Tribunal), 2E.L.R. 414

Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members, Inthe matter of: (Election Commission of India), 4E.L.R. 422

Yograjsingh Shankar Singh Parihar v. Sitaram Hira-chand Birla and Others: (Bombay Election Tri-bunal), 1 E.L.R. 389

Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hira-chand Birla and Others: (No. 2), (Bombay Elec-tion Tribunal), 3 E.L.R. 439

21

108,

89,]

193

205

182,

IOI,

59

147,

197,223

128,

104,

173.

221,

142,161,182

[46

„ 220

241

221

226

201, 203,

228,240

142,

198,

235

164,

212,

87, 242

119.143

85, 114 242

A DIGEST

OF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTSVOLS. I TO X.

ABATEMENT.

Abatement of proceedings—Resignation of returned candidate—Wherethe Election Commission has referred an election petition to a Tribunal,the Tribunal is bound to decide the petition, even though the candidatewho has been returned has resigned his seat, if the petitioner has notmerely asked for a declaration that the election of the returned candi-date is void but also for a declaration that he has been duly elected. Thepetition does not abate on the resignation of the returned candidate.

NuKtrii ISLAM V. MUHAMMAD BAFIQTTE AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 70.Dissolution of Assembly—Whether election petition abates—

An election petition does not abate on the dissolution of the Assemblyif there are allegations of corrupt practice against the respondent inthe petition.

SHIVDEV SINGH V. DABA SINGH AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.R. 496.

AEROPLANE.

Aeroplane.—Dropping leaflets from aeroplane—Whether corruptpractice—An aeroplane is not a vehicle used for road transport and thedropping of leaflets from an aeroplane does not amount to a corruptpractice within section 123(6) or 123(8). Section 123(8) does not prohibita public servant from giving permission to a candidate to hire and usean aeroplane for carrying on his election oampaign.

SHANKAB TBIPATHI v. BETURNING OFFICER, MIBZAPITB, ANDOTHERS, 2 E.L.B. 315.

AGENCY.Agency.—Newspapers—Agency in election law has a muoh wider

significance than under the ordinary law of principal and agent and maybe inferred from the circumstances and conduct. Newspapers whichmake special propaganda for the election of a particular candidate canbe treated as his agents for purposes of election law.

SABDUL SINGH CAVEESHAB V. HUKAM SINGH AND OTHEBS,6 E.L.E. 316. See also 8 E.L.E. 265.

Carrying voters—The term "agent" in election law has a widesignificance. No authorisation or declaration in writing is necessary


and the fact of agency may be established by circumstances arising outof the general features of the case, the conduct and connection of theparties, and the subsequent recognition of the acts of the supposedagent or at least an absence of disavowal of such aots. The doctrine ofagency is carried by election law much farther than in civil and cri-minal cases. Where the respondent was a member of the Traffic Board,and a person who was the owner of a bus service and well known to therespondent employed his buses exclusively for carrying voters free ofcharge to the polling booth on the election day with the placards of thesymbol of the respondent, and the respondent did not object to these acts:Held, (i) that the bus-owner acted as an agent of the respondent andthe latter was guilty of a major corrupt practice under section 126(6);(ii) that, even if the respondent had nothing to do with theseacts, they would amount to a minor corrupt practice under section 12read with section 123(6) of the Act.

T. C. BASAPPA v. NAGAPPA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 197.

Secretary of political party.—Even though the term "agent"has a much wider signification in election law than in the law of agencythe Secretary of the Election Propaganda Committee of a Party, whopublishes leaflets and posters in his capacity as such Secretary, cannotbe deemed to have done such act as the agent of the candidate set upby the Party, unless there is evidence to show that the act was donewith the knowledge> consent or connivance of the candidate. GreatYarmouth case (5 O'M. & H. 176), Bombay Central (M.B.) 1935 (Ham.mond 201), Baba Gurdit Singh v. Partap Singh Kairon (l Doabia 92)and Syed Mahamud Shah v. Ghulam Samad and Others (2 Doabia 3 0)referred to.

KBISHNAJI BHIMEAO ANTEOLIKAR v. SHANKAE SHANTAEAM MOEE

AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 100. See also 7 E.L.E. 457, 8 E.L.E. 417 and9 E.L.E. 451.

See ELECTION AGENT, ELECTION EXPENSES and NOMINATION.

AMENDMENT.

Amendment of particulars.—See COEEUPT PRACTICE.

Amendment of petition.—See ELECTION PETITION.

Amendment of rnles.—Applicability of new rules to pending elections—The words "the rules and orders made thereunder" in seotion 18(l)(b)of the E. P. Act, 1951, do not mean rules and orders made before thedate of the notification and in force on the date of the notification.They only mean rules made under the> power conferred by the Act.Where, after the notification of the Governor under section 18(1), butbefore the nomination papers of the candidates had been filed, Eules 91

AMENDMENT OF RULES 3

and 96 to 102, of the Representation of the People (Conduct of Eleo»tions and Election Petitions) Eules, 1951, (which related to the methodof counting of votes) were repealed and new rules were substituted forthe name and the Eeturning Officer counted the votes in accordance withthe new rules, and the election of the successful candidate was impugnedon the ground that the Eeturning Officer should not have applied thenew rules : the Election Tribunal held that no one had a vested rightin the manner of counting votes, as the rules relating to counting werea matter of procedure and the new rules were rightly applied to theelection in question. [S. K. SAMBANDAM V. SUBYA EAO AND OTHEBS,

2 E.L.R. 61]. On a writ application to the High Court of MadrasHeld, that, though the right to vote was a substantive right, yet, asthe rules in question did not abrogate any right to vote or to stand forelection but merely regulated the mode in which that right should beexercised, they were wholly procedural in nature, and the EeturningOfficer acted rightly in applying the new rules for the counting ofvotes. Held further, that until a person had chosen to stand as a candi-date and filed his nomination paper he could not acquire any substan-tive rights in respect of that election and, as the new rules had comeinto force before the nomination papers were filed, the new rules were,in any event, applicable to the case. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer,Namakkal (1 E.L.E. 133) and United States v. Classic (85 L.Ed. 136)referred to.

S. K. SAMBANDAM V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, MADBAS, AND OTHEBS,

5 E.L.E. 341.

The elected members of the Punjab Legislative Assembly werecalled upon to elect members to the Punjab Legislative Council "inaccordance with the Act and of the rules and orders made thereunder"by notification dated 4th March, 1952. Subsequently, the CentralGovernment, by a second notification dated 10th March, 1952, sub-stituted the new rules 96 to 102 for the existing rules. The EeturningOfficer applied the new rules to the election : Held, (i) that after the10th March, 1952, the old rules must be deemed to have been scoredout and the new rules written in their place, and the application ofthe new rules to the election would, therefore, in no way conflict withthe words of the notification of the 4th March, 1952, directing the elec-tion to be "in accordance with the Act and rules and orders made there-under;" (ii) that the right of the petitioner to stand for election was morein the nature of a "privilege" rather than an "acquired right" and, ifbefore the date of nomination that privilege was subjeoted to oertainconditions different from the previous ones, that oannot be taken tohave affected his vested interest: Starey v. Graham ([1899] 1 Q.B.D. 406),Reynolds.and Another v. Attorney-General .([1896] A.C. 240) referred to.


(iii) that rules 96 to 102 as amended by the notification dated10th March, 1952, were therefore rightly applied by the Eeturning Officerin counting the votes, and these were the only rules according to whichrecount could be taken. S. K. Sambandam v. M. Surya Sao and Others(2 E.L.E. 61) referred to.

SOHAN LAL v. ABINASH CHANDEB AND OTHEES, 4 E.L.E. 55.

BALLOT BOXES.

Ballot boxes.—Affixing of seals—The Conduct of Elections and Elec-tion Petitions Eules, 1951, do not contemplate affixture of seals by thecandidates or their polling agents on the ballot boxes at the close of thepoll. The expression "their seals" in rule 46(1) (iii) refers to seals on

*the boxes, not seals, of the candidates or their agents.T. PEAKASAM v. U. KEISHNAEAO AND OTHEES (NO. 3), 2 E.L.E. 376.

Arrangement of boxes—Under rule 21(5) of the Conduct ofElections and Election Petitions Eules, 1951, the ballot boxes have to beplaced at the polling booth side by side in the same order in which thenames of the candidates to whom such boxes have been alloted appearin the list of valid nominations published under rule 11. If the boxesare arranged in this order, and no objection is raised at the time, thevalidity of the election cannot be challenged on the ground that theboxes of the candidates of a particular party were kept side by side,and illiterate voters might have been misled to putting the ballotpapers into adjacent boxes without understanding the symbols.

BADHAKEISHNAN v. MASILAMANI CHETTIAB AND OTHERS, 4E.L.E. 148.

Defective boxes—Where the question is whether the design ofcertain ballot boxes was such that they could be opened without damag-ing the paper seals fixed by the presiding officers of the polling stations,open demonstration in court by a person showing that such ballot boxescould be opened without damaging the paper seals is relevant andadmissible evidence, even though he is not an expert, (ii) The mere factthat if the paper seals were fixed loosely and the threads bearing thelac seal were long, the ballot boxes used could be opened withoutbreaking the seals, or the fact that the ballot boxes could be opened bythe use of dexterity and skill of a high order, is not sufficient to provethat the construction of such boxes was mechanically defective and thatthere was non-oompliance with rule 21(1).

KESHAU PBASAD v. BEIJBAJ SINGH AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 77.

Prom the mere fact that the boxes were defective in design itcannot be presumed that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected. Haverford (L.E. 9 C.P. 7) and Hackney case (31 L.T. 69) distd.

KESHAU PEASAD v. BEIJBAJ SINGH AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 77.

BALLOT BOXES

The fact that a ballot box could be, opened without breakingthe seals by superior mechanical cunning and force does not prove thatits design was defective. Keshau Prasad v. Brijraj Singh (7 E.L.E. 77)followed.

EATAN SINGH AND ANOTHEE V. PADAM CHAND JAIN AND OTHBES,7 E.L.E. 189.

-Even if it is proved that the ballot boxes were defective andwere such that they could be tampered with and that there wereirregularities in conducting the election, the election cannot be set asideunder the Indian law unless it is proved further that the result of theelection has been —not merely might have been—materially affected bythe said defect or irregularity. The fact that in some cases it may bevery difficult to give positive proof of this fact is no ground for ignoringthe law laid down in the Indian Act. Woodward v. Sarsons (10 C.P. 733)distinguished.

SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIE HUSAIN ZAIDI AND OTHEES(No. 2), 8 E.L.E. 300.

The fact that certain types of ballot boxes had been ap-proved by the Election Commission does not debar the ElectionTribunal from considering whether' they have been constructedin accordance with and finding that they are defective. The merefact that the ballot boxes were inherently defective and instruc-tions for sealing the boxes were issued by the Election Commissionin ignorance of this defect and consequently the boxes could beopened without breaking the paper seal or wax seal and there was thusa non-compliance with rule 25(1) would not by itself invalidate anelection. It must further be established that the result of the electionwas materially affected by this non-compliance with rule 25(l).

JANG BAHADUB SINGH V. BASANT LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 429. <The mere fact that the ballot boxes used were defective and

rule 21(l) was not therefore complied with is not a ground for settingaside an election unless it is further proved that the result of theelection has been materially affected thereby.

GANGAPEASAD SHASTEI v. PANNA LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 448.Inspection of boxes.—Eule 46(l)(iii) of the Conduct of Elections and

Election Petitions Eules, 1951, which provides that the EeturningOfficer shall allow the candidates and their election agents and countingagents present an opportunity to inspect the ballot boxes and seals, issufficiently complied with if those who were present had an opportunityto inspect the boxes if they liked and no one was prevented frominspecting them. He need not show the boxes to each of them.

SHAH UMAIB SAHIB V. EAMCHAEAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E,162.


Opening of boxes.—Under rule 46(vi) as amended it is not irregularto permit more than one ballot box to be opened at the same time,provided all the boxes opened at the same time belong to the samecandidate.

EADHAKBISHNAN v. MASILAMANI CHETTIAB, 4 E.L.E. 148.

Symbols.—Where the absence of some of the symbols in someballot boxes does not present any difficulty in identifying the boxesowing to the presence of other symbols it is not a ground for settingaside the election.

SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHEB V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD

AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 265.

Tampering.—(i) The mere fact that the outer seals of some ballotboxes are missing or broken does not raise an inference or even a pre-sumption of "tampering." Tampering must be proved as a fact, (ii) Ifthe outer seals are missing or broken there is a duty on the Eeturn-ing Officer to enquire whether there was tampering, but the fact thathe has failed to make an enquiry does not invalidate the counting oravoid the election, (iii) To constitute "tampering" it is not necessaryto prove that the ballot papers were taken out, added to or destroyed.Actual meddling with the boxes is enough, (iv) If tampering is provedit makes the election at the booth concerned void. It is not necessaryto prove that the result of the election was affected.

SHAH UMAIB SAHIB V. RAM CHAEAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 10E.L.R. 162.

Where, at the time of counting, it was found that one of theballot boxes had the label of a ladder (the symbol of respondent No. 2.outside, and the label of two bulls and a yoke (the symbol of respond-ent No. 1) inside: Reid (MiTBA dissenting)—(i) that it must be presumedthat the mistake in labelling existed at the time of the polling; that themistake amounted to a "tampering" with the box within the meaningof rule 46(l)(iv), even though there was no evidence to show that any-one had actually meddled with the box, and it was incumbent on theEeturning Officer to postpone the counting of votes under rule 46(l)(iv)and to follow the procedure laid down in rule 58, that is, to take afreshpoll. He cannot make an enquiry as to whether the tampering was donebefore or after the poll, (ii) The provisions contained in rule 46(l)(iv)and rule 58 are not merely directory provisions, and if these provisionsare not complied with, and the result of the election has been materiallyaffected thereby, the election must be set aside under section 100(2)(c).Per MlTEA.—As there was evidence to show that all the labels onthe boxes were intact from the commencement of the poll until theywere delivered to the police, the so-called tampering must have taken

BALLOT BOXES

place afterwards. The removal of the outer label or its displacementafter the close of the poll would not materially affect the result ofthe election and, as such, would not amount to "tampering" withinthe meaning of rule 46(l)(iv), and the Returning Officer was not boundto order a re-poll in the circumstances of the case. [Procedure relatingto polling and the counting of votes described and disoussed in detail.]

PBADIPTA KISHOBE DAS V. MD. ATAHAB AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R.467.

The instruction issued by the Election Commission, that evenif the seal on the thread is not intact, if the paper seal is intact theballot box may be treated as untampered and closed, is unsatisfactoryand gives opportunity to tamper with the boxes.

ABDUL 'RAUF V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R.240.

Where the Form No. 10 prepared at several polling stationswere fictitious, there was serious manipulation of ballot papers, theprovisions of rule 33 were not observed and it was difficult to ascertainthe exact number of votes polled by each candidate: Held, that theelection was vitiated by non-compliance with the rules and the resultwas materially affected thereby, and the election should be declaredvoid. »

RATAN SINGH AND ANOTHEB V. PADAM CHAND JAIN AND OTHEBS,

7 E.L.R. 189.Where the evidence showed that the accused behaved in a

disorderly manner by entering into a room where the ballot boxes werekept, without the permission of the Presiding Officer, and'refused toquit when he was ordered to go out of the room, and that he attemptedto put some of the ballot papers into a ballot box, whereupon he wasarrested : Held, that though it was stated in the complaint that theaccused had thereby committed an offence under section 132(3) readwith section 128 of the R. P. Act, as the material allegations were setout in it, conviction of the accused under section 131(l)(b) and section136(l)(f) of the Aot would not be illegal.

NAGENDBA MAHTO v. THE STATE, 10 E.L.R. 140.-'•—Where the Presiding Officer of a polling station suspects that

there has been tampering with a ballot box, it is open to him to subs-titute another ballot box in its place and continue the polling and if itis subsequently found that there was no tampering, the ballot papers inboth the boxes can be counted. Such a case does not fall within section58 of the Act and there is no need for a re-poll.

SANKABA PANDIA NADAB v. V; V. RAMASWAMI AND OTHEBS, 5

E.L.R. 417.


Transport and custody of boxes.—The arrangements to be madeunder rule 34 for the safe transport and custody of the ballot boxesuntil the commencement of the counting of votes is a matter in whichthe Eeturning Officer has to use his discretion, but the measures adoptedshould be such as to be reasonably sufficient for their safe custody.

T. PBAKASAM v. U. KBISHNA EAO AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 2 E.L.B. 376.

BALLOT PAPERS.

Ballot papers.—Counting—Where one of the ballot boxes of a candi-date was missing and the counting of the papers in that box was heldover and the Eeturning Officer therefore counted the papers of anothercandidate, and when the missing box was discovered, the papers thereinwere counted : Held, though there was a non-compliance of rule 46(5)it was a mere irregularity which did not affect the result of the election.

SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD

AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B. 265.

Bale 46 does not contemplate that the result of the countingof the ballot papers of each candidate must be announced then andthere.

T. PRAKASAM v. U. KRISHNA BAO AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 2

E.L.E. 376.

Bule 46(1), els. (v) and (vi), do not prohibit the counting of aparticular candidate's boxes by more than one counting party at thesame time. It only prohibits the counting of more than one box bythe same person at the same time.

SHAH UMAIR SAHIB V. EAM GHARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 10E.L.E. 162.

Counting of votes on different dates and at different places isnot prohibited by the E. P. Act, 1951, or the rules thereunder.

HARI VISHNU KAMATH V. SYED AHMED AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.B. 248.

Procedure relating to counting of votes described and dis-cussed in detail.

PRADIPTA KISHOBE DAS V. MD. ATAHAR AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.B. 467.

Double member constituencies—The practice of providing eachelector with a plurality of votes in the case of double constituencies,with instructions to put one vote in each box is imperfect as it leads toa huge wastage of votes by illiterate people putting both the votes inthe same box. It is desirable to devise better machinery.

BADHAKBISHNAN v, MASILAMANI CHETTIAB AND OTHEBS, iE.L.B. 148,

- BALLOT PAPERS 9

Inspection of ballot papers—Candidates and their agents haveno right to claim inspection of all the ballot papers. Under rule 46, theright to inspect is restricted to such papers as in the opinion of theReturning Officer, are liable to be rejected. T. PRAKASAM V. U. KRISHNARAO AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 2 E.L.R. 376.

—.—Interchange of ballot papers 1.—Where elections for the Houseof the People and the Legislative Assembly were held on the sameday and in the election for the House of the People the PresidingOfficer of a particular booth by mistake gave to the voters ballot papersintended to be used for the election for the Assembly, and under theinstructions of the Election Commission the Returning Officer rejected

1 these votes on the ground that he had no power to condone the irregu-larity and regularise the votes as the poll was over and counting hadbegun: Held, that rule 47(l)(c) was not mandatory, and in any event asin the present case the ballot papers found in the ballot boxes actuallycontained the serial numbers and marks of ballot papers authorised foruse at the particular booth though there was an interchange of ballotpapers, there was a substantial compliance with rule 47(l)(c) and, asthere was nothing to show that the voters had been misled, the Return-ing Officer had power.even after the counting had started to condone theirregularity ; and the rejection of the votes was therefore improper.Abdul Majid v. Say ad Ahmed (1 Doabia 229) and Mohansingh v. SantokhSingh (l Doabia 192) referred to. GlDWANI CHOITHRAM PARTABRAI V.AGNANI THAKTJRDAS CHUHARMAL AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 194.

2. Where, in a poll for elections to the Assembly and the Houseof' the People held in the same polling station and on the sameday, there has been an interchange of ballot papers owing to the mistakeof the officers conducting the poll, votes cast in favour of a candidate forthe Assembly oannot be rejected as invalid merely on the ground thatthey have been cast on ballot papers meant for the House of the People.This is only a mere irregularity and is not fatal to the validity of thevotes. The fact that the Returning Officer had rejected such votes doesnot preclude the Tribunal from treating them as valid and if the Tribunalfinds that if such votes are also counted the petitioner would havemore votes than the returned candidate, the Tribunal can declare theelection of the latter void and declare the petitioner as duly elected.The Tribunal can inspect the ballot papers in a case like this, eventhough such procedure may infringe the secrecy of the ballot. QidwaniGhoitram Partabrai v. Thakurdas Ghuharmal and Others (1 E.L.R. 194)followed. NARANARAYAN GOSWAMI V. H. D. CHAUDHURY AND OTHERS2 E.L.R. 253. [Reversed in 10 E.L.R. 272, see p. 13 infra].


3. Wrong issue of Assembly ballot papers to voters for theParliament and vice versa for election held on the same day is an irregu-larity which would vitiate the election if the result of the election hasbeen materially affected thereby. RADHAKBISHNAN V. MASILAMANI

CHETTIAE, 4 E.L.B. 148.4. Where elections for the House of the People and the Assembly

were held at the same polling station on the same day, and due to amistake of the polling officers, there was an interchange of ballot papersat the time of distribution to voters, and votes whieh were cast for thepetitioner who stood for the Assembly were rejected on the ground thatthey were cast by ballot papers intended for use for election to theHouse of the People and it was also found that if those votes had been 'accepted as valid, the petitioner would have secured more votes thanthe returned candidate :—Held, (i) that the Tribunal had jurisdictionto consider whether the votes thus east on wrong ballot papers werevalid or not; (ii) that the Tribunal had the power to regularise themistake, even though the Election Commission had no opportunity todo so, as the matter was not brought to the notice of the Commission intime ; (iii) that rule 47(l)(c) with regard to proper serial numbers anddistinguishing marks of ballot papers was not mandatory but onlydirectory, and though rule 47(l)(e) was not strictly complied with, theballot papers could be accepted as valid in the circumstances of theoase; (vi) that the petitioner should therefore be declared to have beenduly elected. Woodward v. Sars&ni (10 C.P.D. 733), Qidtnani ChoithramPartabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Ohuharmal (1 3.L.R. 194) referred to.BALAILAIi DAS MOHAPATRA V. TKAILAKYA NATH PEODHAN AND05DHEES, 4 E.L.R. 221.

5. -The provision contained in rule 47(l)(c) of the E. P. Eules1951, that a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be rejected if itbears any mark different from the mark authorised for use at the poll-ing station or polling booth at which the ballot box in which it wasfound was used, is of a mandatory nature. Consequently, where therehas been an interchange of ballot papers intended for the LegislativeAssembly and the House of the People through a bona fide mistake ofthe Presiding Officer of a polling station in distributing the papers andballot papers containing marks authorised for use for election to theLegislative Assembly are used for election to the House of the People theballot papers must be rejected by the Returning Officer. Election Com-mission a]so has no jurisdiction to issue an order that such ballotpapers shall be treated as valid after they have been actually usedwrongly. (Puranih and Chatterji, S.M. Ahmed dissenting). HABI VlSHNTTKAMATH v. SITED AHMED AND OTHERS, 5 E.L..R. 248. (Trib).

BALLOT PAPERS It

6.—:—Where ballot papers intended for use for election to the Houseof the People were, by a- bona fide mistake of the presiding officer of apolling station, delivered to voters for election to the State LegislativeAssembly and the voters cast their votes for the Assembly insuch ballot papers: Held, that the ballot papers must be regard-ed as ballot papers "authorised for use at the polling station" withinthe meaning of rule 47(l)(c), and the vote3 cast in such ballot paperscannot be rejected under that rule. The provisions of rule 47(1)(o) are not direotory but mandatory. Obiter.—If such ballot paperscannot be deemed to be papers "authorised for use a,t the pollingstation" within the meaning of rule 47(l)(c) the Election Commissionoannot validate the votes cast in such papers by issuing directions tothe Returning Officer to treat such ballot papers as valid. GidwaniChoithram Partabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Chuharmal and Others(1 B.L.B. 194), Naranarayan Qoswami v. Dr. H. D. Chattdhury andOthers (2 B..LE. 253) and Balailal Das Mohapatra v. Trailahya NithProdhan and Others (4 E.L.E. 221) considered. Hari Vishnu Kamathv. Syed Ahmed and Others (5 E.L.E. 248) not followed. HABI DATT V.MADAN MOHAN AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 25.

7. An election cannot be declared void merely because therehas been an interchange of Parliamentary and Assembly ballot paperswhere it has been consistent and there is no evidence to show thatthe result of the election has been materially affected thereby.JAGDISH SINGH V. RUDBA DEOLAL AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R. 311.

8. By a bona fide mistake caused by the faintness of the distin-guishing marks Assembly ballot papers were wrongly given to Parlia-mentary voters by the Polling Officers and the votes cast by theParliamentary voters in the Assembly ballot papers were counted bythe Returning Officer. The Tribunal held that though under rule 47(1)(o) these papers ought to have been rejected, in considering whether theresult of the election had been materially affected by the non-observ-ance of rale 47(l)(c) the initial mistake of the Polling Officers in notfollowing rules 23 and 28 must also be taken into account and if theserules had been observed the result of the election would not have beanaffected, and the election could not be set aside under seotion 102(l)(c).—(see 5 E.L.R. 248). The High Court of Nagpur by a majority con-firmed the order of the Tribunal in an application under arts. 226 and227. Sinha C.J. and Bhutt J. held that there was no failure to exerciseany jurisdiction vested in the Tribunal or usurpation of jurisdiction notvested in it nor any substantial miscarriage of justice and the order ofthe Tribunal oould not be set aside under article 226 or 227. ButMudholkar J. held that in taking into consideration the non-compliance


with rules 23 and 28 the Tribunal acted beyond its jurisdiction and infailing to consider the effect non-compliance with rule 47(l)(c) it failedto exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by law and its decision mustbe quashed : [See 8 E.L.R. 350], On appeal the Supreme Courtheld:—

(i) Rule 47(l)(c) of the R.P. Rules, 1951, which provides that aballot paper shall be rejected if it bears any serial number or markdifferent from the serial number or mark of ballot papers authorised foruse at the polling station or the polling booth at which the ballot boxin which it was found was used, is mandatory.

(ii) The Election Commission which has the power to prescribe adistinguishing mark for the ballot papers has also the power to change it.But the prescribing of a distinguishing mark as contemplated by rule 28must relate to the election as a whole. There cannot be one distinguish-ing mark for some of the voters and another for others with referenceto the same election and at the same polling station.

(iii) Under rule 23 the Polling Officer has to deliver the properpaper to the voter and if a distinguishing mark had been prescribedunder rule 28, the ballot paper to be delivered must bear that mark.The approval by the Election Commission subsequent to the pollingcannot render valid ballot papers which did not bear the distinguishingmark prescribed for the election; such ballot papers are liable to berejected under rule 47(l)(c).

(iv) Under section 97 all matters which can be put forward asgrounds for setting aside the election of a candidate if he had beenreturned under rule 48 of the Election Rules can be urged in answer tothe prayer in his election petition that he might be declared duly elec-ted. Therefore, the returned candidate can show that if the petitionerhad been returned under rule 48 his election would have been liable tobe set aside for breach of rule 23, and that therefore he should not bedeclared elected.

(v) As the Returning Officer has no power under rule 47 to accepta vote which has not the distinguishing mark prescribed by rule 28 onthe ground that it was due to the mistake of the Presiding Officer indelivering wrong ballot paper, the Election Tribunal reviewing thisdecision under rule 47 (4) also can have no such power.

(vi) In maintaining the eleotion of the successful candidate onthe basis of the votes which were liable to be rejected under rule 47(1)(o) the Tribunal committed an error, and though this error was not oneof jurisdiction, as the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether on aconstruction of section 10C(2)(o) it could go into the fact of breach ofrule 23, it was an error manifest on the face of the record, and a ground

BALLOT PAPERS 13

for issuing a writ of certiorari. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad SayedIsak and Others (8 E.L.E. 350) reversed. HAKI VlSHNU KAMATH V.AHMAD SAYED ISHAQUB AND OTHBBS, 10 E.L.R. 216. (S.C.)

9. The provision contained in rule 47(l)(c) of the Representationof the People (Conduct of Eleotions and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951,that "a ballot paper contained in a ballot box shall be rejected if itbears a aerial number or mark different from the serial numbers ormarks authorised for use at the polling station or the polling booth atwhich the ballot box in which it was found, was used" is mandatoryand the Returning Officer is bound to reject a ballot paper which oon-tains a mark different from that authorised for use at the particularpolling station or booth, even though the use of the wrong ballotpaper was due to a bona fide mistake of the polling officer in distributingballot papers. The Tribunal has no higher powers in this respect thanthe Returning Officer and it cannot treat such ballot papers as valid,on the ground that the vot68 indicate the true intention of the voters

even though they are given by wrong ballot papers. If the law pre-scribes that the intention of the voters should be expressed in a parti-cular manner, the intention must be expressed in that manner.

Rule 47(l)(o) is applicable to a case where, even though there is acommon polling station for Assembly and Parliamentary elections,there are separate polling booths for the two elections. Hari VishnuKamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216) followed. DAMODAEGOSWAMI v. NABANABAYAN GOSWAMI AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 272.

—Marked ballot papers—1.—The petitioner who had unsuccessfullycontested the election for a seat in the Punjab Legislative Counoilchallenged the election on the ground, inter alia, that the result of theelection had been materially affected by the improper rejection of aballot paper. The elector marking this ballot paper gave his first andthe only preference in favour of the respondent by putting the figure " 1"in the column provided for the purpose opposite the name of the res-pondent, but he added a horizontal line " " after "l" . The Return-ing Officer rejected this ballot paper on the ground that from this markthe particular elector casting his vote could be identified. Therewas no evidence or suggestion that this mark " " was put inby any previous arrangement or understanding to identify thevoter. Held, that the ballot paper was improperly rejected inasmuch asthe horizontal line after the figure " l " was in no way material, and inany case, this was not a mark from which the voter could be identifiedand the chance of there being any arrangement between the voter andany candidate was excluded. A ballot paper is liable to be rejected insuch oases only if, either the mark itself reasonably gives the indication


of the voter, or there is some extrinsic evidence irorn which it can beinferred that the mark was placed by the voter by some arrangement.Woodward v. Sarsons and Sadler (10 C.P.D. 733) relied on. SOHAN LAL V.

ABINASH CHANDER AND OTHBBS, 4 B.L.B. 55.2. Ballot papers which contain marks or writings by which the

electors could be identified must be rejected even though those marksor writings were not made by the electors or at their instance but bythe offioers entrusted with the conduct of the poll. Rule 47(l)(a) is ofa mandatory nature and such ballot paper cannot be regularised by theElection Tribunal, as the irregularity is of a fundamental character.Oidwani Choithram ~Partabrai v. Agnani Thakudas Chuharmal (1 B.L.E.194) distinguished. Ballot papers over which the number of the electorin the electoral roll and the page number of the roll in which his nameis entered are noted are liable to the rejected under rule 47(l)(a).Ghamparan North case (2 Khanna 104) relied on. NUBUL ISLAM V.MUHAMMAD RAFIQUE AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.R. 70.

3. Where the Election Commission had merely directedunder rule 28, that the serial numbers in the ballot papers musthave a prefix "By" and had issued no direction under rule 20, forusing any official marks for the ballot papers, but the Returning Officer,thinking that such a mark was necessary, affixed the ballot papers withthe official Ash ok Chakra mark, after some ballot papers had beenissued, and it was contended that these papers were invalid under rule47(l)(c): Held, that, as the Election Commission had not issuedany direction under rule 20, rule 47(l)(c) was not applicableto the case and the ballot papers bearing the official mark ware notinvalid. MARUTRAO BHAURAO AND OTHERS V. GULABRAO DADASAHBBAND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 303.

—Postal ballot.—Attestation of a postal ballot by a person who hasmerely given consent to the inclusion of his name in an appeal insupport of a particular candidature would not invalidate the ballotpaper; for, mere consent to the inclusion of one's name in suchappeal would not amount to working for a candidate in or about theelection." JAWAHAR SHANKAR PACHOLI D. HIRDAY NARAIN SINGH ANDOTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 495.

—Recount and scrutiny.—(i) A candidate is not entitled to a recountor scrutiny of the ballot papers unless there are sufficient grounds tosatisfy the Tribunal that the return was not accurate and that recountand scrutiny are called for in the interests of justice. Mere vague andgeneral allegations that the proper procedure has not been followed andthat, on a proper counting, the petitioner would be found to have

BALLOT PAPERS 15

received more votes, are not sufficient. The charges should be definiteand must be substantiated by reliable prima facie evidence. (ii)Employment of assistants in the counting is permissible under thelaw. R. SWAMINATHA MERCONDAR v. S. RAMALINGAM, 2 E.L.R. 51.

In an election petition the petitioner is not entitled to a recountand scrutiny as a matter of right, merely for the asking. He has tomake out good grounds for believing that there have been mistakes onthe part of the Returning Officer and that a recount and scrutiny isnecessary in the interests of justice. At the same time, from the verynature of the case, positive proof of miscount at an election cannot begiven before the recount takes place. Where 2 unauthorised voteswere found in two ballot paper packets of the petitioner and 77 un-authorised votes in one ballot paper packet of the 2nd respondent and70 unauthorised votea in a ballot paper packet of the 4th respondent,the Tribunal held that there wasprma facie evidence that the validityof the votes counted had not been properly scrutinised by the ReturningOfficer and ordered recount and scrutiny. Lakshmana Aiyar v. BajamAiyar (58 M.L.J. 118) followed. SESHAIAH V. KOTI REDDI AND OTHERS,

3 E.L.R. 39.Spurious papers.—Where some ballot papers which were not

genuine were found in the ballot box of the respondent and there wasno evidence to show who put them in :

Held, that this did not prove any corrupt practice under sub-section (3) or (8) of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act,1951, on the part of the respondent but th'e case was one which wascovered by rule 47 of the Representation of the People Rules, 1951, andthe Returning Officer should have rejected the ballot papers as spuriousballot papers under that rule. GoviND MALAVIA V. MUBLI MANOHAR

AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 84.Where there is no evidence raising a presumption of any

stuffing or misconduct on the part of the Returning Officer in favour ofany particular candidate a mere excess of a few ballot papers in theboxes of a booth is not a ground for setting aside an election. Insein(2 Ham. E.P. 158) referred to. T. 0. BASAPPA V. T. NAGAPPA ANDOTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 197.

CANVASSING OFFICE.

Setting up canvassing office near polling booth.—Setting up a canvass-ing office within 100 yards of a polling booth is an electoral offence butnot a corrupt practice, and cannot by itself vitiate an election. Evenif it be a breach of section 130 of the Act, the election cannot bevacated unless there is proof that the result of the election was

IN ft

rd ELECTION EAW REPORTS DIGEST

materially affected thereby. ElKHAB DAS V. RlDIGHAND PAMJIWAL

AND OTHBBS, 9 B.L.E. 115.CERTIORARI.

(See H I G H COURTS).

CORRUPT PRACTICE.

1. Admission in pleadings.2. Appeal on the ground of religion

etc. [s. 124 (5)]3. Appeal to national symbols.4. Bribery.5. Burden of proof.6. Conveyance of voters.7. Effect of corrupt practice.8. Employing more persons.9. Exceeding limit of expenditure.

[s. 123 (7)].10. False personation.11. False return of election expenses.12. False statements relating to per-

sonal character or conduct[s. 123 (5)].

1. Admission in pleadings, effect

13. Fraud.14. Fresh instances.15. Government servant's assistance,

procuring of [s. 123 (8)].16. Incurring expenses for candidate

[s. 125(1)].17. Interference with voters.18. Naming guilty persons [s. 99].19. National anthem, use of.20. Paid canvassers, employment of

[s. 123(7)].21. Particulars of corrupt practice,

[s. 83 (2)].22. Printer and Publisher, omission

of name of [s. 125 (3)].23. Undue influence [s. 123(5)].

of.—Corrupt practices mustgenerally be pleaded and proved by the petitioner, but in the interestsof justice if a corrupt practice comes to the notice of the Tribunal fromthe admission of the respondent the Tribunal is bound to take notice ofit. This however, does not mean that the petitioner can be declaredelected without giving an opportunity to the respondent torecriminate. RAGHUNATH SINGH v. KAMPTA PBASAD SAXBNA, 8E.L.R. 424.

The Election Tribunal has no power to inquire into corruptpractices which are not set up in the election petition or the list ofparticulars even though they are admitted by the respondent. AmritsarCity case (Sen and Poddar 28) dissented from. SHIVA DASAND ANOTHERv. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8E.L.R. 265.

2. Appeal on the ground of religion, caste or community [s. 124(5)].—Though the cow is an object of reverence amongst Hindus it is not asymbol of the Hindu religion and appeal to save the cow is notthereforean appeal on the ground of religion or caste. LACHHIRAM V. JAMUNAPRASAD MUKHARIYA, 9 E.L.R. 149.

-An appeal to vote for a candidate who is a Chamhar on theground that he is a Chamhar is not an appeal on the basis of professionalbrotherhood but an appeal on the ground of qaste. LACOHIRAM VJA#UNA PRASAD MUKHARIYA, 9 E.L^R. 149,

CORRUPT PRACTICE 1J

Although an appeal to Basavanna or an appeal to Nandiwould be an appeal to religion, bullocks are not themselves religioussymbols and the taking out of a prooeasion of bullocks would not amountto a corrupt practice. DESAI BASAWARAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB ANDOTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 380.

In a case when the respondent is charged with carrying onpropaganda in the name of religion, a rigid standard of proof is requiredregarding his complicity in the propaganda, this being a oorrupt practice,and the standard is to be one as is demanded in a criminal case. JYOSTKACHANDEA AND ANOTHEE v. MEHEABALI AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 488.

The mere presence of the symbol of Khanda, Ghakar and 2Kirpans on the posters will not amount to an appeal to the voters onthe ground of religion, or to convey the sense that those who do notvote in favour of the Panthio candidates would be rendered objects ofdivine displeasure or spiritual censure. A general exhortation to votersand particularly to members of the Sikh community to vote solidly forthe nominees of the Akali party does not amount to a systematic appealto vote on the grounds of religion. Sardul Singh v. Hukam Singh andOthers (6 E.L.E. 316) followed. RATTAN SINGH v. DEVINDBE SINGHAND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 234.

An appeal to Muslims to vote for the Congress candidate andthat otherwise they would be turned out and would have to go toPakistan does not involve an appeal to voters on communal lines anddoes not violate section 124(5) of the Representation of the PeopleAct. SHANKAR TRIPATHI v. RETURNING OFFICER, MIRZAPUR ANDOTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 315.

Soliciting a vote on the ground of the voter and the candidatebeing kinsmen as evidenced by their common gotra is not an appeal onthe ground of caste, and certainly not of community, which is a term ofeven larger import. PARTAB SINGH V. NIHAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 3E.L.R. 31.

In order that an appeal to voters may be a corrupt praotioeunder section 124(5) there should be a systematic appeal. A sporadic orsolitary instance of an appeal is not enough. PARTAB SlNGH v. NlHALSINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 31.

The object of section 124(5) of the R. P. Act, 1951, was tointroduce the principle of non-discrimination between different castes,communities and religions, which was emphatically laid down in theConstitution of India and the said clause has merely carried into effect inthe sphere of the law of elections the provisions of articles 15, 16, 29 and325 of the Constitution of India. The mischief which section 124(5)

ELD—3

l 8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

aimed at preventing was the voting for or against a candidate only becauseof his religion, caste, race or community and that being the real object ofthe section, we must put a restrictive interpretation upon the undulywide terms of section 124(5). Looked at from this point of view it couldnot have been the intention of the Legislature by this section to preventall reference to religion in electioneering speeches, especially when theright to conserve the culture of a section of the citizens is expressly con-ceded in article 29(1) of the Constitution. The real intention of thesection was to prevent attacks on a particular religion, or a candidateonly on the ground that he is a follower of a particular religion. Conse-quently an attack on a candidate on the ground that in his attitude on thequestion of the teaching of the Koran in Municipal Schools he took a viewwhich was against the Koran, or against Islam, or against religion ingeneral, would not fall within the purview of section 124(5). MOINUDDINB. HABEIS v. B. P. DivGl, 3 E.L.E. 248.

The words "Panth" and "Panthic" have gained so muchcurrency as referring to the Akali Party of the Sikhs that no specialreligious or communal appeal is conveyed to the electorate by the useof these words during election propaganda than the use of the officiallyrecognised name of 'Akali Party". Baba Gurdit Singh's Case (1 Doabia92) referred to. SAEDUL SINGH CAVEESHAE V. HUKAM SINGH ANDOTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 316.

Criticism of the policy and doings of the Congress party is notobjectionable unless it oversteps the legitimate bounds of criticism andcomes within some forbidden corrupt practice.

An appeal to the effect that the Congress is interfering with theSikh religion, and the electorate should make the Akali Party strong bynot voting for the Congress, is an appeal on the grounds of religion andwould fall within section 124(5) of the Act if it is made systematically.An appeal to vote for the symbol of Tirkaman and for the saffronflag because of their association with the Gurus of the Sikhs is anappeal to vote on the ground of community within section 124(5).

Though in determining the scope of section 124(5) of the E.P. Act,1951, which makes systematic appeal to vote or refrain from voting onthe grounds of caste, race, community or religion a corrupt practice,regard should be had to articles 13, 19(l)(a), 25(1) and 29(1) of the Con-stitution, and the scope of section 124(5) cannot be narrowed down toprohibition of attacks on a particular religion or on a candidate, only onthe ground that he is follower of a particular religion. The scope ofthe words of section 124(5) is much wider as it prohibits all kinds ofappeals to vote on the ground of religion, whether it be the religion of

CORRUPT PRACTICE 19

the electorate or of the candidate; and even in its wider sense it wouldnot be inconsistent with the power of the State to make laws restrict-ing the freedom of speech and expression in the interests of security ofthe State etc., which is conferred by article 19(2). Moinuddin v.B. P. Divgi (3 B.L.R. 248) dissented from, SAETTL SINGH CAVBESHAB

v. HUKAM SINGH AND OTHBES, 6 E.L.E. 316.

The respondent who was a Gadaria by caste got printed anddistributed in his constituency a leaflet containing an appeal to theGadarias to help the respondent in the election and provide him withworkers and money and conveyances. Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SAEANand SANYAL (3?ABUQI dissenting) that the publication of the leaflet didnot amount to a corrupt practice under section 124(5) because, perRAGHUNANDAN SAEAN, it did not contain any appeal to vote or refrainfrom voting, and per SANYAL, the appeal for help was not confined toGadaria voters, but extended to the whole electorate including voters ofall castes.- Per FABUQI.—A general appeal to Gadarias to help therespondent implied an appeal to vote for him and the publication fellwithin section 124(5). SHIV DUTT AND OTHBES V. BANSIDAB

DHANGAE AND OTHBES (NO. 2), 9 B.L.R. 324.

Where a leaflet published by the respondent which was signedby the members of several castes contained an appeal to wage earners(Eameray Bhai) such as peasants, workers, artisans, petty shop keepersand petty servants like patwaris and school-teachers, to unite againstthe big men and zamindars and not to vote for them, but to vote for therespondent as he was a worker: Held, per RAGHUNANDAN SAEAN andSANYAL (FABUQI dissenting)—that the appeal was not an appeal on thegrounds of caste or community but an appeal on economic considera-tions and did not come within section 124 (5). Per FABUQI—The res-pondent and the persons to whom the appeal was made were a body ofpeople having a common interest and therefore " a oommunity " andthe distribution of the leaflet amounted to a corrupt practice undersection 124 (5). Per RAGHUNANDAN SAEAN.—The word " community "which is used in section 124 (5) in collocation with the words caste, raceand religion must be giv-en a narrower meaning than the dictionarymeaning of a body of people having common interest. SHIV DUTT ANDOTHBES V. BANSIDAS DHANGAE AND OTHBES (NO. 2), 9 E.L.R. 324.

——See also oases cited under SPIEITUAL INFLUENCE infrapp. 54, 55.

3. Appeal to national symbols—An appeal to vote or refrain fromvoting on the ground of caste, race, community or religion must besystematic. But an appeal to religious or national symbols need not be

29 ELECTION LAW RRPORTS DIGEST

systematic. DESAI BASAWARAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4E.L.E. 380.

Where a picture of the bust fof Mahatma Gandhi with foldedhands was put up on the same board on which the words Vote forDasankop" were written, making it appear that Mahatma Gandhi washimself appealing with folded hands to vote for the respondent(Dasankop): Held, the picture of Mahatma Gandhi was a nationalsymbol and the respondent did commit the minor oorrupt practice ofappealing to a national symbol for canvassing support for his eleotion.DESAI BASAWARAJ t>. BASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 380.

' -Hoisting of the National Flag in the Congress camp for shortperiod by mistake would not amount to an appeal to the national flagfor the furtherance of a candidate's election and in any event it is ofno consequence if it is not shown to have materially affected the resultof the eleotion. GURNAM SlNGH AND ANOTHER v. PARTAP SlNGH ANDOTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 338.

4. Bribery.—Burden of proof—The charge of bribery is a serious oneand the same kind of evidence is required to prove such a charge in pro-ceedings arising out of an election petition, as is necessary in criminaltrials. In any event, clear and unequivocal proof is required before acharge of bribery can be held to have been established; suspicion, how-soever strong, is not sufficient to prove suoh a charge. The evidence,whether it is direct or circumstantial, must be conclusive and if thereis any doubt, the returned candidate should be given the benefit of thedoubt. But the guilty mind or intention of the candidate need not beproved for declaring an election void, where the act of bribery is com-mitted by his agent. Where the issue is whether A paid a bribe to BtoinduoeB to withdraw his candidature, oral evidence to the effect that0 made a statement at a meeting that it was decided that A should paya certain sum of money to 0 to be paid to B for withdrawing his candi-dature, is admissible under section 10 of the Evidence Aot. SRI EAM V.MOHAMMAD TAQI HADI AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 139.

Entertainment expenses—Entertainment not exceeding thelimits of customary hospitality would not amount to "gratification"within section 123(1). DATTLAT EAM V. MAHARAJA ANAND OHAND ANDOTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 87.

Gratification offered before becoming prospective candidate—Section 123(1) would not apply to a gratification which was offered beforethe person who offered it began to hold himself out as a prospectivecandidate. DAULAT BAM V. MAHARAJA ANAND CHAND AND OTHERS, 6

1.87.

* CORRUPT PRACTICE 21

—Charitable expenses.—Though elections are not intended to pre-vent charity, there should be no sort of influence on the electorate inthe guise of charity for securing votes when election is imminent. If themotive behind the charity is corrupt it would be a subtle form ofbribery. East Nottingham (6.0'M. & H. 292), Kingston-upon-Hull {6 O'M.& H. 372) and Amritsar and Sialkot General Rural Constituency case (2Doabia 94) referred to. SHANKABE GOWDA V. MABIYAPPA AND ANOTHEB,9 E.L/R, 101.

Offer of land and cattle to the landless and the poor irres-pective ofi caste, creed, community and religion—The offer made by acandidate, of land and cattle to the landless and the poor, irrespectiveof caste, cread, community and religion does not amount to the corruptpractice of bribery as defined in section 123(1), for the giving of land tothe landless and improving the position of the poor in general is in theline with lessening of inequality of wealth and income which is a com-monly accepted aim and object of statesmen and Governments in mostmodern democratic countries.

The phrase "offer of gratification to any person whatsoever",occur ing in seotion 123 (1), should be given a liberal and reasonableinterpretation as a legislature could not have intended that a narrowinterpretation should be put upon it. SWAMINATHA MEEKONDAB V.EAMALINGAM AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 2 B.L.R. 390.

5. Burden of proof.—In the case of allegations of corrupt practice,the burden of proof is on the petitioner and that burden never shifts, thestandard of proof is as in criminal cases and the benefit of doubt will goto the respondent. [Case-law referred to]. D B . K. N. GAIBOLA V.GANGADHAB MAITHANI AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 8 B.L.E. 105.

-. I t cannot be laid down broadly that an enquiry into a corruptpractice is in the nature of a criminal case and that the respondent is inthe position of an accused person, and, though the burden of proof is onthe petitioner to prove a corrupt practice, the respondent is not absolvedfrom all liability to adduce evidence to disprove the case of the peti-tioner. STJDHANSU SEKHAE GHOSH V. SATYENDEA NATH BAST: AND

OTHEBS, 4 E.L.R. 73.

The enquiry into corrupt practices under the law of electionbeing of a quasi-criminal character, strict proof is to be demanded of theperson bringing the oharge to prove his case beyond all reasonabledoubt, but that does not fully exonerate the person charged with suob.corrupt practice, from producing evidence, specially of facts within bis

ELD—4


apecial knowledge as he-is bound to do under the provisions of sec-tion 186 of the Indian Evidence Act. ABDUL ROUFV. MAKHTAB ALIAND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R. 340.

See also 3 E.L.R. 488, 8 E.L.R. 1,10 E.L.R. 461.

6. Conveyance of voters [s. 123(6)].—Where it was proved that somevoters who had cast their votes for the respondents were sitting near a poll-ing station in a truck hired by the respondent and entrusted to one of hisworkers who had been asked to canvass voters, and the plea of the res-pondent was that the truck was not hired for conveying voters but forhis own workers and agents, and the voters were workers and were to becarried to another polling station for canvassing for the candidate, andthat as he was not present at the time, he was not liable even if hisworkers had misused the vehicle: Held, per MAHABAJ KlSHOBE and G. H.GTANI: The mere fact that the voters were found sitting in a motor truckhired by the candidate was not sufficient to prove a corrupt practiceunder section 123(6) in the absence of further evidence to prove that thetruck was hired for the purpose of conveying electors and not for con-veying his workers and agents and the offence would also not be com-plete unless it is proved that the truck had moved with the voters, forthe voters may change their mind and get down before the truck movedand a mere attempt to convey voters is not a corrupt practice. As acorrupt practice must be proved beyond doubt as in a criminal case,where the circumstances are capable of two interpretations, the benefitof the doubt must be given to the respondent. Per T. C. SETHI.—(i)Carrying of voters even as workers or canvassers for the respondent isprohibited by section 123(6), and even if it were otherwise the burden ofproof was on the respondent to show that the voters were transformed tocanvassers, (ii) I t is not the actual carrying of voters that is prohibitedbut even the hiring or procuring of vehicles for carrying voters is pro-hibited by section 123(6). (iii) If a candidate places a hired motor truckat the disposal of his workers and agents it is his duty to see that it wasnot misused. BALWANT SlNGH AND OTHERS V. DEVI LAL AND OTHERS,8 E.L.R. 1.

Necessity of particulars—In the case of a oorrupt practice ofprocuring motor trucks, for conveying electors to and from pollingstations, it is sufficient in an election petition to state the date ofprocuring the motor trucks and the motor trucks procured and it is notnecessary to state at what polling stations eleotors had been conveyed,for the corrupt practice defined in section 123 (6) is the procuring oftrucks and not the conveying of electors. DESAI BASAWARAJ v,DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHEBS, 4 E-L.R. 380.

CORRUPT PRACTICE 2$

Necessity of particulars—Where an allegation of a corruptpractice falling within section 123 (6) is made in an election petition fulldetails of the voters conveyed, the village from which they wereconveyed, the nature of the vehicles used and other particulars must bestated in the list of particulars supplied under section 83(2).SHEONARAYAN VAIDYA v. SARDARMAL LALWANI, 4 E.L.E. 401.

Nature of particulars required—The main ingredient of thecorrupt practice under section 123(6) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is the'hiring" or ' procuring" of the vehicle and it is necessary that the peti-

tioner should give full particulars of the date of hiring or procuring andthe names of the persons who hired or procured and other particularsrelating to hiring and procuring required by section 83(2). Stating thedates of carrying the voters and the names of persons who carried them isnot a compliance with section 83(2). The standard of proof required inthe matter of a corrupt practice is the same as that in a criminal charge.DEVASHARAN SIKHA v. SHEO MAHADEV PBABAD AND OTHERS, 10

E.L.E. 461.

7. Effect—Proof that election was materially affected, whether neces-sary.—If it is proved that an election has been procured or induced bythe commission of a corrupt practice, the election of the returned candi-date can be declared void under section 100(2) (a) of the E. P. Act, 1951,without further proof that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected by the commission of such corrupt practice. JAMUNA PBASADMUKHARIYA AND OTHERS v. LAOHHI EAM AND OTHERS, 10E.L.E. 120. [S.C.]

May cause disqualification though election not void—Under sec-tion 140 of the Act a candidate may be disqualified from membership ifhe is found to be guilty of an illegal practice; but under section 100(2) (a)his election cannot be set aside unless it is further proved that the resultof the election was materially affected by this illegal practice. [Theanomaly of the situation pointed out]. JAWAHAR SHANKAR PAOHOLI V.HIRDAY NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 495.

8, Employing more persons [s. 123(7)].—Incurring more expenditure— Gist of the offences—Employees of third persons assisting candidate inelection—Whether volunteers or employees of candidate—The gist of thecorrupt practice defined in section 123(7) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is thatthe employment of extra persons and the incurring or authorising of excessexpenditure must be by the candidate or his agent. The provisions ofrules 117 and 118 must be read in the light of the definition of thecorrupt practice in section 123(7), and a candidate cannot be held to beguilty of the corrupt practice under section 123(7) or 124(4) merely


because a number of persons employed in the estate of his father workedfor him in elections and if these persons and the remuneration theyreceived from his father were included, the maximum number ofpersons that a candidate might employ on payment and the expenditurehe might incur under the provisions of rules 117 and 118 would beexceeded. So far as the candidate is concerned such persons must beregarded as mere volunteers. [Their Lordships left open the questionwhether if one's own servants are also utilised or employed in the conductof the election, their salary for the period they are so utilised or employedshould be regarded as election expenses and shown in the return]. RANA-NJATA SINGH I>. BAIJNATH SINGH AND OTHERS, 10B.L.E. 129. (S.C.)

The employment of a driver for a motor car for driving thecandidate during the period of the election is not employment of a per.son "in connection with an election" within the meaning of rule 118,and employment of such a driver in addition to the number of personsprescribed in Schedule VI would not amount to a corrupt practice with-in section 123(7) of the Act. SHEONAEAYAN VAIDTA V. SARDARMAL

LALWANI, 4 E.L.R. 401.The employment of paid propagandists in connection with an

election comes within section 123(7) and is, therefore, prohibited by law-Quaere: Whether employment of coolies for pasting notices, affixingposters etc. is prohibited by section 123(7).

Expenses incurred in promoting or procuring the election of a cantdidate form a primary part of the expenses "in connection with the elec-tion" and the number of persons who could be employed in connectionwith an election, fixed by law is inclusive of the persons employed topromote the candidature of the candidate. It does not refer merely tothe number of persons who could be employed in connection with theconduct and management of the election. The words "for payment" inSchedule VI do not mean "for making payment" but "for remuneration."In order that the employment of more persons that the maximumnumber prescribed in Schedule VI may be a corrupt practice withinsection 123(7) it is not necessary that it should be done wilfully or witha corrupt motive. The law in India as laid down in section 123(7) isnot the same as the English law on the subject. M. R. MBGANATHANv. K. T. KOSALBAM, 9 E.L.R. 242.

——Rule 118 of the Conduct of Elections and Election PetitionsRules, read with Schedule VI thereto, prescribes the number of personsthat a candidate can employ for payment; and a candidate who employsmore than the prescribed number of persona would be guilty of a majorcorrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Act.

CORRUPT PRACTICE 25

Contravention of the rule limiting the number of persons that acandidate may employ on payment in connection with the election is notone which, under the Indian statute, the Tribunal is competent tocondone, whatever be the English Law.

The enquiry into corrupt practices under the law of election beingof a quasi-criminal character, strict proof is to be demanded of the personbringing the charge to prove his case beyond all reasonable doubt, butthat does not fully exonerate the person charged. ABDUL EOUP v.MAKHTAE ALI AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R. 340,

9. Exceeding prescribed limit of expenditure [s.lli {!)].—Expensesof meetings.—A candidate can incur expenses for meetings in connectionwith one's own candidature. Incurring of such expenditure does notcontravene sub-section (7) of section 123. Operation of the said sub-section (7) is confined to expenditure which is in itself in contravention ofany provision of the Act or the rules relating to expenditure, e.g., section77 and rule 117.' SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHEEI>. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL

SAMAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 265. [See also cases cited in p. 24 supra].

10. False personation by agent [s. 123(3)]. -Section 123(3) of the E.P.Act, 1951, applies not only to cases where the agent procures an applica-tion for a ballot paper by another person in the name of a third person forthe purpose of personation, but also where the agent himself applies for aballot paper in the name of another. I t is a settled rule of election lawthat personation by an agent is, without more, sufficient to avoid anelection, and section 123 (3) does not make any departure from thisfundamental principle. V. V. EAMASWAMI V. ELECTION TEIBUNAL,TlEUNELVKLI, AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 233.

Mens rea—presumption—Mens rea is an essential element inthe offence of false personation specified in section 123(3).

It is not an offence of a trivial character" within the meaningof section 100(3)(b).

Where a corrupt practice specified in section 123 has been commit-ted by any agent other than the election agent it cannot be presumed,in the absence of evidence to that effect, that it was committed contraryto the orders of the candidate. SHANKAEA PANDIA NADAK V.

V. V. EAMASWAMI AND OTHEES, 5 E.L.E. 417.

Corrupt motive.--A corrupt motive is necessary to make persona-tion a corrupt practice within section 123(3) of the E.P. Act, 1951. StepneyCase (4 O'M. & H. 34), Chhail Behari hall Kapur v. Shyam Sunderhall (3 Jagat Narain 59), Maulvi Yaqinuddin Ahmed v. Maulvi Kader

26- ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bux (2 Jagat Narain 75) and Belfast Case (4 O'M. & H. 108) referred to.LINGE GOWDA V. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 B.L.E. 288.

Full particulars to be given.—Where the corrupt practice of falsepersonation is alleged in an election petition, full particulars of eachinstance of personation must be given in the list of particulars and itmust also be alleged that the candidate or his agent abetted or procuredthe acts. Suspicion, however strong, is not sufficient to prove falsepersonation. T. C. BASAPPA V. T. NAGAPPA AND OTHEBS, 3 E.L.E. 197.

11. False return of election expenses* [s. 124 (4)].—When return'false',—A mere omission of a particular item of expenditure in the returnof election expenses which is not prompted by any corrupt motive wouldnot be a "false" return within the meaning of section 124 (4). GURNAMSINGH AND OTHERS V. PARTAP SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 338.

In order that a return may be "false" in material particularsfor the purposes of section 124 (4), the return must be deliberately false,i.e., made with a corrupt motive. Amritsar City Muhammadan Con-stituency, 1938 (Sen & Poddar 34), Lyallpur and Jhang General Con-stituency, 1938 (Sen & Poddar 504), and Hissar North General Constitu-ency (Sen & Poddar 367) referred to.

A return cannot be said to be false merely because the notionalhire of cars borrowed from others is not included in it. I t is sufficient toshow the actual expenses incurred by the candidate. MEHTA GOEDHANDAS GlKDHARILAL V. CHAVADA AKBAB DALUMIYAN AND OTHERS, 7E.L.E. 374.

The word "false" in section 124(4), which makes the filing of afalse return of election expenses a corrupt practice, is not equivalent to"incorrect" but means "deliberately false", and implies a corrupt motive;omission to include a minor item of expenditure would not thereforeamount to a corrupt practice under section 124(4) where the totalamount spent is much below the maximum allowed by law. Kalaprajv. Bishambhar Nath Tripathi (2 Doabia 355), relied on. MAST BAM V.

HARNAM SINGH SETHI AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 301.Knowledge of candidate, whether relevant—Under the Indian

law, exceeding the prescribed limit of maximum election expenses isa corrupt practice per se. The question of bona fides or knowledge ofthe candidate does not arise. MUNUSWAMI GOUNDER v. KHADER

SHARIFF AND OTHERS, (NO. 2) 4 E.L.B. 283.Motor car expenses—(i) Amounts spent for repair of motor

oars need not be shown as election expenses even though the immediateobject of the repairs was for using the car for election purposes, (ii)

•See also ELECTION EXPENSES infra.

CORRUPT PRACTICE 27

The reasonable hire for the cars belonging to others used by a candidatein connection with his elections, even if none was in fact paid, shouldbe included in the election expenses, for otherwise a candidate withrich and influential friends and supporters could easily evade the provi-sions of law as to the maximum of election expenditure, (iii) Withregard to the candidate's own cars used for election purposes it is notnecessary to include either a reasonable hire or value of depreciation ofthe same in the return. M. R. MEGANATHAN V. K. T. KOSALKAMAND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 242.

Expenses of meetings etc. —Expenses of party organisations—Expenses incurred in holding any public meeting or issuing advertise-ments, circulars or publications or in otherwise presenting to theelectors the candidate or the views or the extent or nature of his back-ing or disparaging another candidate, by the candidate or his electionagent or any other person with his connivance, with a view to promotesuch candidate's election, would be expenses on account of or in respectof the conduct or management of the election. Therefore, the expensesincurred after the nomination of a candidate by the candidate himselfsir by his election agent or by other persons (such as the All-IndiaCongress Committee; the Provincial Congress Committee and theDistrict Congress Committees in the case of a Congress candidate) andall other persons who took part in the election campaign, and by visitorswho visited the constituency to support the candidature of the candidateand to canvass votes on his behalf are expenses incurred or authorisedby the candidate for the " conduct and management " of his election andshould be included in the return of election expenses. AMIHCHAND V.SURENDBA LAL JHA AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 57.

Expenses incurred by associations—The mandatory provisionin rule 112 directing the inclusion of particulars in paragraphs 1 and 2of Schedule IV shows that expenses incurred by an association, club orsooiety for furthering the prospects of a candidate's election have to beincluded in the return of his election expenses. Though the explanationunder clause (l) of section 125 excludes the incurring or authorizing ofexpenses by an institution or an organisation from the definition ofillegal practice it does not permit exclusion of these expenses from thereturn. The failure of a candidate to include it in his return wouldamount to a breach of rule 112 and a return which does not includethese expenses would not be a correct return, and if a candidate excludesthese expenses wilfully then the return would further be a false one. Ifan association or a sooiety is interested in the success of a candidate,and members of that sooiety or organisation canvass for the candidate,

28 ELECTION LAW RS»O«TS DIGEST

suoh association or society and every member of such association orsociety would be an agent of the candidate under section 79(a) and theexpenses incurred by them would not be unauthorised expanses.AMIROHAUD V. StTBENDBA LAL JHA AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.R. 57.

When election begins^-Payment made to party organisationsbefore nomination—As soon as a person makes his choice and declaresunambiguously that he intends to stand for election and expresses thisdeclaration through an overt act, (e.g., an application to a political asso-ciation for a party ticket) he becomes a prospective candidate. MlTNTJ-SWAMI GOUNDEE V. KHADEB SHABIFF AKD OTHEBS (NO. 2), 4 E.L.E. 283.

Under the rules of the Tamil Nad Congress Committee a personwho wished to stand as a candidate on the Congress ticket had to apply tothe Committee paying a subscription of Bs. 100 which was not returnableand also a deposit of Es. 400 which was to be returned if he was not selectedas a candidate by the Committee. The respondent made an application tothe Committee declaring his intention to stand as a candidate and seekingthe Congress ticket, paying the sum of Es. 500. He also paid another sumof Es. 500 to the District Congress Committee as a 'donation". The evi-dence showed that candidates were selected on the recommendation of theDistrict Congress Committee and that the District Congress Committeespent moneys out of the donations for carrying on propaganda forCongress candidates. The respondent did not show these two items ofEs. 500 in the return of election expenses: Held, (i) that the respon-dent must be deemed to have become a prospective candidate from thedate on which he applied to the Congress Committee, and the sum ofEs. 500 paid to the Congress Committee was an election expense, andomission to show it in the return of election expenses was a corruptpractice under section 124(4). (ii) The sum of Es. 500 paid to theDistrict Congress Committee was not really a charitable donation but anexpenditure incurred for furthering his prospects as a candidate and thissum also should have been shown in the return. MtTNUSWAMI GoiTNDEBv. KHADEB SHABIFF AKD OTHEBS (NO. 2), 4 E.L.E. 283.

—•—-Until an intending candidate begins to 'institute a canvass' of theoonsitituency thinking that the election is imminent he cannot be styleda 'prospective candidate'. Consequently, where the Congress Organisationcalled for applications for candidature early in September, 1951, and therespondent deposited on the 3rd September, Es. 250 as application fee andEs. 1,500 for propaganda work on his behalf and he filed his nominationpaper only on the 21st of November, and there was nothing to show thathe started his election campaign before filing his nomination : Held, thathe1 became a 'prospective candidate' only from the date of nomination

COftfttJPT PRACTICE 29

and he was not, therefore, bound to include the two sums of Es. 250 andRs. 1,500 in his return of election expenses. Munuswami Qounder v.Khader Shariff and Others (No. 2) (4 E.L.R. 283) dissented from.Rochester Case (4 O'M. & H. 159) referred to. LlNGE GOWDA V. SHIVANAN-

JAPPA, 6 E.L.R. 288.

Expenses of party organisations—Expenses incurred by theCongress Organisation or other persons for a meeting held with the mainobject of propagating the cause of the Congress in general, cannot be heldto be election expenses of the candidate set up by the Congress. Elgincase (5 O'M. & H. 2), Lancaster case (5 O'M. & H. 44) and Haggerstoncase (5 O'M. & H. 69) referred to. MAST RAM v. HARNAM SINGH SETHI

AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 301.

Donations to party—A payment by way of donation to the Con-gress by a candidate after he had been selected as a Congress candidatecannot, without further evidence connecting it with the candidate's elec-tion, be deemed to be an election expense. Munuswami Gounder v. KhaderSharif and Others [No. 2] (4 E.L.R. 283) distinguished. MAST RAM V.HARNAM SINGH SETHI AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 301.

Payments made to party organisations—The respondent paidRs. 100 to the Congress Parliamentary Board, Lucknow, for a Congressticket to stand for Constituency A, but he was not given a ticket forthat constituency, but he managed to get'a ticket for Constituency B.After his nomination and before the date of polling he also donated asum of Rs. 1,000 to the B City Congress Committee expressly statingthat it was a mere donation by way of general help to the Congress andnot towards election expenses : Held, that as the sum of Rs. 100 was notan expense in respect of the election to Constituency B, and the sum ofRs. 1,000 was given expressly as a general donation to help the Congress,the respondent was not bound to include these expenses in his return ofelection expenses. Mast Bam v. Harnam Singh and Others (7 E.L.R.301) relied on. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMADABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8J1.L.R. 265.

Omission of small items—per RAGHUNANDAN SARAN and SANYAL

(FAEUQI dissenting)—The omission of an item of expense incurred inconnection with the election would not make the return false in a"material partioular" within section 124(4), except where it relates toa corrupt practice or if the item is included in the return the totalamount would exceed the prescribed limit. Omission of a small amountrepresenting the cost of printing a leaflet would not therefore be acorrupt practice under section 124(4) if the leaflet did npt in fact

ELD—5


contain any offensive matter and its publication did not amount to acorrupt practice. Per FARUQI.—If the omission of an item of expensefrom the return is made deliberately and is made with a view to con-ceal a real or supposed corrupt practice, it would be hit by sec-tion 124(4), The mere fact that the amount was small or that theimpression of the candidate that it related to a corrupt practice was•wrong, is immaterial. SHIV DUTT AND OTHEES V. BANSIDAS DHANGAEAND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.R. 324.

Where item if included would exceed maximum—amounts paidto Congress Committee.—Though, when the charge is that the respondenthaa committed a corrupt practice under section 124(4) by making afalse return it ia neoesaary to prove a corrupt motive, it is not neces-sary to establish any such corrupt motive when the omission of certainitems of expenses in the return is relied on only to prove that if theyhad been included, the maximum fixed would have been exceeded andthe election would be void under section 100 (2) (b) read with section123(7). Amounts paid to the Congress Committee for nomination astheir candidate need not be shown in the return of election expenses if,under the rules, they are refundable, even though they had not beenactually refunded on the date of making the return. M. R. MEGA-

NATHAN V. K. T. KOSALEAM AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.R. 242.

Necessity of giving full particulars—The making of a falsereturn of election expenses is a corrupt practice, and unless full parti-culars of the false items are given in the election petition or the list thepetitioner cannot be allowed to adduce evidence relating to them.GANGA PRASAD SHASTRI v. PANNA LAL JAIN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R.392.

In the case of the corrupt practice of filing a false return ofelection expenses, it is not necessary to state the items of the returnwhich are alleged to be false. That would be a matter of evidenceand particulars of evidence need not be given in an election petition as inthe case of suits. DESAI BASAVAEAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND

OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 380. "*

Since the making of a false return of election expenses is acorrupt practice under section 124(4), the petitioner cannot be allowedto give evidence about the return being false in material particularsif he has not given in the list of particulars full particulars of theitems in the return which are alleged to be false. GANGA PHASADSHASTRI V. PANNA LAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 448.

Scope of enquiry of Tribunal—An Election Tribunal cannot gointo the question whether the return of election expenses was filed with

CORRUPT PRACTICE 31

the proper authority or within the prescribed tirne. The Election Tri-bunal cannot make an enquiry as to whether the return of election ex-penses filed by the petitioner is false in material particulars unless arecriminatory petition is filed by the respondent against the petitioner.FAQIR CHAND v. PEITAM SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 119.

12. False statements relating to personal character or conduct [s. 123(5)].—Comparing a party (the K.M.P. party) to a Kudilce marriage anda transitory bubble does not amount to an attack on the personal con-duct or character of the candidate of the party and would not comewithin section 123(5). Cumberland {Cockermouth Division) Case (5O'M. & H. 155) referred to. LINGE GOWDA V. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6

E.L.R. 288.False statements relating to personal character of candidate—

Law relating to—Whether ultra vires—Section 123(5) of the R. P. Act,1951, (which makes the publication by a candidate or his agent of falsestatements about the personal character or conduct of any candidate amajor corrupt practice) and section 124(5) of the Act (which makes asystematic appeal to vote or refrain from voting on the grounds ofcaste, race, oommunity or religion, e tc , a minor corrupt practice) donot contravene article 19(l)(a) of the Constitution and are not ultravires. These provisions do not curtail any fundamental right but onlylay down conditions attached to the exercise of the right to stand as acandidate for election to Legislature, which is not a common law rightbut only a statutory right. JAMUNA PBASAD MTJKHARIYA AND OTHERSv. LAOHHI RAM AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 122(S.C).

Statements that candidate would destroy Hindu religion etc.—Where the allegation in the petition was that the respondent and hisagents, at various places and on various occasions, exhorted the peoplenot to vote for the petitioner because he would bring about social inter-course between low caste and high caste Hindus and that he would put anend to their devtas and destory the Hindu religion: Held, that the allega-tions did not relate to the personal character or conduct of the respondentbut only pointed out to the voters who believed in untouchability andthe devtas, what the views of the petitioner were in the matter and did notamount to undue influence under section 123(5). SATYA DEV BtrSHAHRIv. GHANSHTAM AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 67.

Galling a person a communist—Whether calling a person acommunist amounts to a corrupt practice under section 123(5) is a ques-tion of law and not a mixed question of law and fact. A. SRINIVASANv. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS; V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I



Must be statements of fact, not opinion—In order that thepublication of a statement may be a corrupt praotioe under section 123(5), the statement must be one of fact, not one of opinion, and commentas to political conduct as distinguished from personal conduct will notcome within section 123(5). A statement referring to the speech madeby a person who had left the Congress party and joined the Socialistparty that he is a betrayer and unworthy son of his mother(meaning the Congress) and wants to dig her grave does not amountto a corrupt practice within section 123(5). Jadunandan Mahtoon v.Mosahib Singh (1 Doabia 46) referred to. MEHTA GOBDHANDASGlEDHAELAL V. CHAVADA AKBAE DALUMIYAN AND OTHEBS (NO. 2),7 E.L.R. 374.

Must be statements of fact—Newspaper comments—Where anewspaper, started to support Congress candidates and which waspublished for 38 days, contained statements to the effect that J. S. arival candidate set up by the Jan Sangh party would withdraw in favourof the respondent who was a Congress candidate, that the Jan Sanghvoters were eunuchs and Jan Sangh workers were monkeys, that adancing girl was employed for securing votes for J. S. and that Jan Sanghleaders were contemplating the murder of Pandit Nehru : Held, thaton the facts of the case the editor and publisher could not be held to beagents of the respondents, and, as the statements could not be held tobe false statements of fact, or to cast aspersions on the personalcharacter or conduct of J. S., the respondent was not guiltyof any corrupt practice under section 123(5). Amritsar City case(Sen and Poddar 34) and Bihar and Orissa Landholders' Constituencycase (Sen and Poddar 129) referred to. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHEBv. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.B.265.

Statements relating to candidature—In order that a statementmay be one relating to the ' candidature" of a person within the mean,ing of section 123(5) of the E. P. Act, 1951, it must relate to the rightor qualifications of the candidate or the factum of his candidature.Statements relating to the prospects of his election do not come withinsection 123(5). KBISHNAJI BHIMEAO ANTEOLIKAB V. SHANKAB SHANTA-EAM MOBE AND OTHEBS, 7 B.L.E. 100.

Must relate to personal character or conduct—Where a posterwhich was headed "For purification of the Congress" contained thefollowing words, viz-, "to eradicate goondaism defeat Dr. A": Held,that the statement did not relate to the personal conduct or characterof the candidature of Dr. A. and its publication did not amount

CORRUPT PRACTICE 33

to a corrupt practice under section 123(5). KEISHNAJI BHIMBAOANTBOLIKAB v. SHANKAR SHANTAEAM MOEB AND OTHBBS, 7

E.L.E. 100.

Statements mutt relate to personal character or conduct— Thepublication of a false statement will not amount to a corrupt practicewithin section 123(5), unless it relates to the personal character or conductof any candidate or to his candidature or withdrawal. "Where a pamphletpublished by the members of the Socialist party stated that the petitionerrepresented the Congress party which was responsible for scarcity ofgrain, cloth, etc., and that Marwadis represented capitalists who engagedin anti-social activities and exploitation of the masses : Held, that thepublication did not amount to a corrupt practice within the section 123(5)or section 124(5), as it did not relate to the personal character or conductof the petitioner, and did not contain any appeal to vote or refrain fromvoting on the grounds of caste, community or religion. A verification ofa list of corrupt practice can be amended by making verbal alterationsto comply with the requirements of Order VI, rule 15, of the CivilProcedure Code. MOHANLAL v. TEILOCHAN SlNGH AND OTHEES, 2E.L.E. 41.

Statements relating to political activities involving personal char-acter—There is no sharp dividing line separating what is personal fromwhat is political or otherwise. A statement may involve both importa-tion sand if it affects the veracity and honour of the candidate aswell as his political character it will be within the mischief of the Act.M. E. MEGANATHAN v. K. T. KOSALEAM AND OTHBES, 9 B.L.E. 242.

Allegations made against a candidate would amount to aaoffence under section 123(5), only if they refer to his personal characteror conduct. A distinction must be drawn between criticism of a candi-date as a politician or a public man, and statements in relation to hispersonal character and conduct. Criticism of his public activities, how-ever ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated it may be, is not forbidden. Itis only when the man underneath the politician" is attacked and hishonour, integrity or veracity is assailed that the allegation amounts to acorrupt practice. Shaikh Muhammed Mansoor v. Maulvi MuhammadShafi Daudi (Hammond 677), Hoshiarpur West Muhammadan Consti-tuency Case (Sen and Poddar 399) and Cockermouth Division Case (5 O'M.& H. 154) referred to. Where it was alleged against the petitioner whowas a member of a Municipal Corporation that he opposed the teaching ofthe Koran in municipal schools and that if he were elected he would usehis position and influence to stop the teaching of the Koran : Held, thatit related to his public character and to bis conduct as a member of the


Municipal Corporation and not to his personal character or conduct anddid not therefore amount to an offence under section 123(5) of the Act.MOINUDDIN B. HABEIS V. B. P. DlVGl, 3 B.L.E. 248.

Liability for statements of supporters.—To establish agency forwhich the candidate would be responsible, he must be proved, by himselfor by his authorised agent, to have employed the persons whose conductis impugned, to act on his behalf, or to have to some extent put himself intheir hands or to have made common cause with them, for the purposeof promoting his election. To what extent such relation may be sufficientto fix the candidate must be a questisn of degree and of evidence to bejudged by the Election Tribunal.

Mere non-interference with persons, who, feeling interested inthe suecess of the candidate, may act in support of his canvass, is notsufficient to saddle the candidate with any unlawful acts of theirs ofwhich the Tribunal is satisfied he or his authorised agent is ignorant.

Where a charge of publication of false statements about thepersonal character and conduct of a candidate is made, it must besustained by a false statement directly relating to the personalcharacter or conduct of the candidate, and reference to the personalcharacter or conduct of the candidate must be explicit and derivablefrom the plain meaning of the words used.

The mere fact that a person is a subscriber to a newspaper doesnot raise any presumption that he had knowledge of the contents ofthat newspaper.

Where the managing director of a newspaper was the Presidentof the Provincial Congress Committee and the editor and publisher ofit was a prominent Congressman, and the paper was actively canvassingfor the Congress through its editorials, reports, circulars and advertise-ments and receiving donations from the Congress: Held, that thesefacts were not sufficient to make that newspaper or its editor an agentof the candidate put up by the Congress so as to make the candidateliable for the statements made in that paper.

The circumstances in which by reason of the relationship betweena candidate and the association to which he belongs, the association orany of its members could be regarded as the agent of the candidate, anddecisions bearing on the topic, discussed. M. M. MATHBW V. K. C.ABEAHAM 10 B.L.E. 376.

A statement of opinion, however unjust or harsh it may be,without reference to any concrete fact, does not come within the mischiefof section 123(5), The mere statement of a defamatory opinion, unlesscoupled with the grounds upon which it is formed, is not a statement of

CORRUPT PRACTICE 35

fact. Further, the statement must relate to the personal character orconduct. A distinction must be drawn between the criticism of a candidateas a politician or a public man and statements in relation to his personalcharacter or conduct. Criticism of his public or political activities,however ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated it may be, is not forbidden-It is only when the man underneath the politician is attacked and hishonour, integrity or veracity assailed in the statement, that the state-ment becomes offensive within the meaning of section 123(5). Statementscriticising the public and political acts of a Minister as such, do notcomewithin section 123(5), however pungent and offensive they may be, if hispersonal character is not attacked. DEVASHARAN SlNHA V. SHEOMAHADEV PEASAD AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 461.

False allegations of bribery—A false allegation that the petitionerhad bribed Government officials and got a false report from them is not amere expression of opinion or of a trivial or limited character but a seriousallegation about the personal character of the petitioner and it wouldamount to major corrupt practice under section 123(5) and is a ground forsetting aside an election under section 100(2)(b). MADAN PAL V. EAJDEOUPADHTA AND OTHEBS, 6 B.L.E. 28.

False statements by secretary of party organisation—The factthat an objectionable poster was published by the Publicity Departmentof a society which' has set up a candidate and not by the candidate him-self would not absolve the latter from liability for such publication, asthe society which set him up as a candidate could be treated in law as theagent of the candidate. Amritsar South (l Doabia 92) relied on. JUJHAR

SINGH V. BHAIRON LALL AND OTHERS 7 B.L.E. 547. See also 6 B.L.E.316, 7 E.L.E. 100, 7 E.L.E. 457, 8 B.L.E. 265.

False statement must be by candidate or agent^—Publication ofposters containing objectionable matter would not amount to a corruptpractice under section 123(2) in the absence of evidence to show conniv-ance of the candidate or the agent, and though circumstantial evidenceis good evidence, a particular inference can be drawn from suchevidence only if it is not capable of any other explanation or inter-pretation. North Oaya {General) Bural Constituency case (l Doabia43) followed. FAQIR CHAND V. PRITAM SlNGH AND OTHERS, 7B.L.E. 119.

False statements about oneself—While the Indian law relating toelection makes publication of a false statement regarding a rival candidatea major corrupt practice under section 123(5), it does not make publica-tion of a false statement of a candidate's own personal qualifications acorrupt practice specifically. Such publication or propaganda c^n be a


ground for declaring an election void under seotion 101 (l) (a) only if it isof such a character as to amount to "undue influence" within the mean-ing of section 123(2) of the Act. Where a candidate published severalleaflets in which he was falsely described as a 'Bar-at-law": Held, thatthough the propaganda was of a very highly objectionable nature, it didnot in the eye of the law amount to a corrupt practice within section 123(2)and could not be made a ground for setting aside his election.MAJIBAE EAHMAN CHATJDHURY v. ABDUL BARKAT ATATJL GANI, 4

B.L.E. 481.

Particulars must be given—Where an allegation of a corruptpractice under section 123(5) is made, the names of the persons who madethe statement should be stated in the list of particulars and evidence can-not be allowed to be adduced of statements made by persons whose namesare not given in the list. SHEONARAYAN VAIDYA V. SARDARMAL LAL-WANI, 4 E.L.E. 401.

13. Fraud.—Though fraud is not expressly mentioned in section 100of the Act as a ground for declaring an election void, fraud isinvolved in many of the corrupt practices mentioned in the Act andan election can, therefore, be set aside for fraud if the fraudulentact falls within one or other of the sub-clauses of section 100(2)and also satisfies the other requirements of the particular sub-clauseunder which it falls. SlVATHANTJ PlLLAI V. NESAMONY AND OTHERS, 1E.L.E. 312.

14. Fresh instances.*— Whether can be proved—Adding fresh instancesof a corrupt practice cannot be regarded as a mere amendment of theparticulars of such corrupt practice; on the contrary, each single instanceof a corrupt practice is a substantial charge in itself which has to be

• alleged in the original petition. Consequently, where a petition containsa charge of a corrupt practice and some instances are given it is not opento the petitioner to rely on other and similar instances of the same charge,(e.g., bribery), and adduce evidence in support thereof. MohamedallyAllabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdullabhoy Lalji (Hammond 173) and AbdulJabbar v. Azizur Bahman (3 Jagat Narain 215) dissented from. Kistnacase (N.M.B.), 1938, (Hammond 447) and Eistar North {General) Con-stituency case (1 Doabia 297) followed. M. MUTHIAH v. A. S. SUBBARAJAND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 165.

An election petition need not contain all the details of the corruptpractices and if a corrupt practice is alleged in the petition, particulars ofother instances of the same practice can be given in the list of corrupt

•See also cases cited under "21 PARTICULARS" infra p. ^$ft.

CORRUPT PRACTICE :$f

practices. GOVIND MALAVIA V. MUBLI MANOHAE AND OTHBES, 8E.L.E. 84.

'Though section 83(3) allows further and better particulars to begiven in respect of matters referred to in the list of corrupt practices, itdoes not allow fresh instances of corrupt practices, which were not origi-nally mentioned, to be added. Where it was stated in the list of corruptpractices annexed to an election petition that the votes in villages A, Band C were procured by the respondent by payment of Es. 5 each and thata full list would be supplied later on, and nearly 5 months after the filingof the petition, the petitioner supplied a list containing the names of 21persons who had been so bribed: Held, that the list of corrupt practicesdid not set forth full particulars as required by section 83 and the peti-tioner could not be allowed to supplement the particulars given, by givinga further list of the voters who had been bribed. Bohtak MuhammadanConstituency case, 1946: Mohammad Shafi Ali Khan v. MohammadKhurshid Khan (Sen and Poddar 728), Calcutta North MohammadanUrban Constituency case, 1937: Mohammad Siddique v. Khwaja SirNazimuddin (Sen and Poddar 253) followed. BHAGWAN SINGH V. D E .

EAGHBIB PAEKASH AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 461.

15. Government servants' assistance, procuring of [s. 123 (8)].—A. Who are government servants.—

-Director of Government owned company.—A director of a companydoes not become a Government servant merely because the Governmentowns a large number of shares in the company and he was nominated asa director by the Government under a clause in the articles of associationof the company which empowered the Government to nominate somedirectors of the company. LlNGE GOWDA v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.R. 988.

District Board Chairman.—See 9 E.L.R. 403, p. 40 infra.Employee of Cane Development Board.—An employee of a Cane

Development Union formed in pursuance of the United Provinces SugarP actories Control Rules, 1948, is not a government servant within themeaning of section 123(8) of the E.P. Act, 1951, even though the appoint-ment of such employee is subject to the approval of the Cane Commis-sioner of the U.P. State Government, as he does not receive any salarytorn the Government and is not directly under the control of the Govern-ment. MADAN PAL V. EAJDEO UPADHYA AND OTHEES, 6 E.L.R. 28.

Adalati Punches and Adalati Sarpanches are Government servantseven though they are appointed by election, as they are village officersemployed in the State and Explanation (b) to section 123(8) includes such

illage officers within the definition of Government servants. MADAN PALv. RAJDEO UPADHYA AND OTHEES, 6 E.L.R. 28.

ELD-6


——Gaonburahs—A Gaonburah is a village headman employed bythe Government of Assam for performing some public duties and is aperson serving under the Government" within the meaning of section123(8) of the E.P. Act, 1951, and a candidate who issues leaflets signedby Gaonburahs to further the prospects of his election would be guilty ofa major corrupt practice under section 123(8). The enquiry into corruptpractices under the law of election being of a quasi-criminal character,strict proof is to be demanded of the person bringing the charge to provehis case beyond all reasonable doubt, but that does not fully exoneratethe person charged with such corrupt practice, from producing evidence,specially of facts within his special knowledge as he is bound to do underthe provisions of section 186 of the Indian Evidence Act. ABDUL EOXTPv. MAKHTAB ALI AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 340.

Government servant who is also President of Party Association—Where a Government servant was also President of the District CongressElection Propaganda Board and as such he issued letters to electors tovote for Congress candidates, and in an election petition against aCongress candidate who was successful in the elections, it was contendedthat the respondent was guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8)of the R. P. Act, 1951, as he had procured the assistance of a Govern-ment servant for furthering the prospects of his election : Held, (i) thatit was the duty of the Election Tribunal to consider whether therespondent had knowledge of the propaganda made by the President ofthe Congress Propaganda Board or had ratified his acts, and whether onthe facts the President could be considered to be an agent of the respond,ent within the meaning of section 70 of the Aot; (ii) that, if he could beconsidered to be an agent, the respondent would be guilty of corruptpractice under section 123(8) in having obtained the assistance of aGovernment servant though the Government servant happened to be theagent himself; (iii) that, as copies of the letters sent by the President ofthe Congress Election Propaganda Board to the voters were sent to therespondent and other Congress candidates, there was prima facie evidenceto show that the respondent had knowledge of the acts done by thePresident for the furtherance of the prospects of his election and theTribunal should have considered whether this constituted ratification onthe part of the respondent of the acts done by the President; (iv) thateven if the President of the Congress Propaganda Board was not an agentof the respondent, he would be guilty of an illegal practice under section125(1) as he had incurred expenses for posting the letters to the variousvoters; (v) that in not considering the above questions and passing thenecessary orders in the light of its finding on these questions, the Tribunalhad failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it under section 99 of the

CORRUPt PRACTICE 3$

Act and the High Court could interfere under articles 226 and 227 of theConstitution and remand the case to the Tribunal and direct it to givethe necessary findings in compliance with the provisions of section 99 ofthe Act. NYALCHAND VIRCHAND SHETH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,

AHMEDABAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 417. See also 9 E.L.R. 451.Member of Debt Conciliation Board—A member of a Debt

Conciliation Board receiving an honorarium is a Government servant andgetting his assistance would amount to a corrupt practice under section123(8) of the R. P. Act, 1951. GHASI RAM V. RAM SINGH ANDOTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 124.

Mukhia—A Mukhia of Uttar Pradesh is not "a person servingunder the Government of the State" within the meaning of section 123(8)of the R. P. Act, 1951, and appointing him as a polling agent does notamount to a corrupt practice under section 123(8). AWADESH PRASADSlNHA V. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 45.

Mukhias and Zamindars of Vindhya Pradesh are Governmentservants; -at any rate they are village officers. RAGHUNATH SINGH v.KAMPTA PRASAD SAXENA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 424.

Explanation (b) to sub-section (8) of section 123 of theR. P. Act, 1951, enlarges the definition of persons "serving under theGovernment of any State" contained in the sub-section so as to includea village headman or any other village officer, by whatever name, he iscalled, within the said expression : and, as a Mukhia is a village headman,and, in any event, a village officer, employing a Mukhia to canvass is amajor corrupt practice under section 123(8), which is sufficient to renderan election void. The argument that as a village headman is not paid bythe State he cannot be in the service of the State is not sound, for, pay-ment is not the test of service. Shibban Lai Saksena v. HarishankarPrasad and Others (9 E.L.R. 403) affirmed. HARI SHANKAR PRASADGUPTA V. SHIBBAN LAL SAKSENA, 10 E.L.R. 126. (S.C.).

Officer of Court of Wards—Sub-manager of the Aul Court ofWards governed by the Orissa Court of Wards Act, 1947, is not a personserving under the Government within section 123 (8), but only anemployee of the Court of Wards. JADUMANI MANGRAJ V. DlNABANDHUSAHU AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 480.

The Manager of a Court of Wards under the Orissa Court ofWards Act, 1947, is not a Government servant within the meaning ofsection 123(8) of the R. P. Act, 1951, though he is a ' public servant 'within the meaning of section 12 of the Indian Penal Code.RAMACHANDRA CHOWDHURI V. SADASIVA TRIPATHY AND OTHERS,

5 E.L.R. 401.

ELECTION tAW &EP6£TS DIGES?

Panohes and Sarpanches—Clause (b) of the Explanation to sec-tion 123 (8) expands the scope of the expression " person serving underthe Government of any State " used in the body of sub-section (8) so asto include within that expression all village headmen and village officerswhether such persons be Government servants or not in a strict sense.Sarpanches, Panches, Sabhapathis, Upasabhapathis and Mukhias of theUttar Pradesh are therefore " persons serving under the Government ofa State" within section 123(8), and obtaining their assistance forfurtherance of the prospects of a candidate's election would constitute acorrupt practice. The Chairman of a District Board does not hold anoffice of profit under the Government and is not therefore disqualified forbeing chosen as a member of the Legislature of a State even though hereceives a monthly allowance in lieu of the cost of petrol, oil and otherexpenses which he may have to incur in touring through the Districtto perform duties as Chairman of the Board. B E U BEHABI LAL.— It isdoubtful whether Presidents and Vice-Presidents of Gaon Sabhas, andPanohes and Sarpanches of Panchayati Adalats of Uttar Pradesh comewithin the expression ' any other village officer by whatever name heis called " in section 123(8) (b). Deo Chand v. Vashist Narain and Others(6 B.L.E. 138) dissented from. Balchand v. Laxmi Narain and Others(8 E.L.E. 465), Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lal and Others (8 E.L.E.448), Baghunath Singh v. Kamta Prasad Saxena (8 E.L.E. 424), MadanPal Singh v. Bajdeo Upadhya (6 E.L.E. 28), Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh(3 E.L.B. 403) relied on. SHIBBAN LAL SAKSBNA V. HAEISHANKBEPBASAD AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 403. [Affirmed in 10 E.L.E. 126].

President of Co-operative Stores—President of a Co-operativeStores which receives food grains procured by the Government anddistributes them to ration shops is not a person serving under theGovernment within the meaning of section 123 (8) of the E. P. Act, 1951.SHIVARAMA KARANTH v. VENKATAEAMANA GOWDA AND OTHEBS,3 E.L.E. 187.

Secretary of Rural Board getting honorarium—The mere factthat a person may be getting an honorarium from the State, or may bepaid travelling allowances by the State, or that the appointing authorityis the State, or bis services are liable to be terminated by the State arenot conclusive on the question whether he is serving the State or not.These are facts that may be taken into consideration, but the real testis the right to control the manner in which that person does his workA non-official Secretary of a District Eural Development Board in theState of Bombay is not a person serving the Government though hemay hold an office of profit under the Government; and obtaining theassistance of such a person would not therefore amount to a corrupt

CORRUPT PRACTICE 4I

practice under section 123(8). NYALCHAND VIBCHAND SHBTH V.

VlTHALBHAI RANCHHODBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 451.Teacher of aided school—A teacher of a Government aided

school is not a Government servant within the meaning of section 123(8)of the Aot. MAJIBAR RAHMAN CHAUDHURY V. ABDUL BARKAT ATAUL

GANI, 4 E.L.R. 481. See also M. M. MATHEW V. K. C. ABRAHAM,

10 E.L.R. 376.Vatandar Patil—Procuring the services of a vatandar Patil

would not amount to a corrupt practice unless it is also proved thatthe vatandar Patil was officiating as the Patil at the time when hisservices were procured. DESAI BASAWARAJ V. DASANKOP HASANSABAND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 380.

Zamindars of V. P.—Zamindars of Vindbya Pradesh arevillage officers employed by the State and a candidate who obtains theassistance of such zamindars for furthering the prospects of his electionis guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8). GANGA PRASADSHASTBI v. PANNA LAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 448.

B. What amounts to procuring assistance.—

Attending meetings—asking for votes—Where'°the respondentattended a Conference of Village Officers in which a resolution waspassed appealing to all to set up as candidates, and obtain the electionof, the respondent and two other Village Munsiffs at the ensuing elec-tions : Held, that the respondent's mere presence would not amount toa corrupt practice under section 123(8) in the absence of evidence toshow that he had offered himself as a candidate at the Conference orsolicited the help of the Village Officers for his election, or connived atthe passing of the resolution. Held also, that it was perfectly legiti-mate for the respondent to ask for the votes of the Village Officers them-selves and for that purpose to draw their attention to the resolutionpassed at the Conference. K. PARTHASARATHY V. ELAYA PlLLAI ANDOTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 188.

Inviting for meetings—asking for votes—A candidate, his agentor any other person with his connivance is entitled to obtain orattempt to obtain the vote of a person serving under the Governmentof India or the Government of any State; and, in doing so, if the candi-date or his agent, or any other person working for him, asks a personserving under the Government of India or the Government of anyState, to attend any meeting or in any other lawful manner inducessuch person to vote for a candidate, that would not be corruptpractice. AMIR CHAND V. SURENDBA LAL JHA AND OTHERS, 10

B.L.R. 57.


r—l—Appointment as polling agent—Acting as a polling agent doesnot in itself, and in absence of any further act, amount to "assisting aoandidate in the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's elec-tion" and the mere appointment of a lambardar or sarpanch as a poll-ing agent does not, therefore, amount to a corrupt practice under sec-tion 133(8). Naraindas v. Manohar Das (E.P. No. 3 of 1952) and SatyaDev Bushahri v. Padam Dev (6 B.L.E. 414) followed. Ghasi Bam v.Bam Singh and Others (4 B.L.E. 124) explained. MAHABAJ SlNGH v.BATAN AMOL SINGH AND OTHBES, 7 B.L.E. 320.

The zamindars of Vindhya Pradesh are Government servantsand village officers, and employing them as polling agents would amountto a corrupt practice under section 123(8). JANG BAHADITB SINGH V.BASANT LAL AND OTHBBS, 8 B.L.E. 429. [Overruled in 10 E.L.E. 103].

The appointment of a Government servant as a polling agentdoes not, without more, contravene section 123 (8). But if it is madeout that the candidate or his agent had abused the right to appoint aGovernment servant as a polling agent by exploiting the situation forfurthering his election prospects, the matter can be dealt with as aninfringement of section 123(8). SATYADEV BUSHAHRI V. PADAM D E VAND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 103 (S.C.).

The appointment of a Government.servant as polling agent doesnot per se fall within the mischief of section 123(8) and does not constitutea corrupt practice under that provision. Obiter:—If such polling agentdoes canvassing work also that would be corrupt practice under section123(8). Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others (10E.L.E.103) followed. MAHENDBA KUMAB V. YIDYAVATI AND OTHEBS, 10

E.L.B. 214. (S.C.)

•—•—Proposing or seconding a candidate—Obtaining the signature of aGovernment servant as a proposer to a nomination does not amount toprocuring any assistance from him for the furtherance of the prospects ofan election within the meaning of section 123(8) and is not a corruptpractice. SUBAIN SINGH v. WABYAM SINGH AND OTHEBS, 6 B.L.B. 99.

The fact that a candidate was proposed or seconded by a Govern-ment servant does not constitute a corrupt practice under section 123(8)of the E.P. Act, 1951, and is not a sufficient ground for setting aside theelection of that candidate. But, though it is permissible for a candidateto get himself proposed or seconded by a Government servant, he cannotgo further, and if the procurement of Government servants to propose andsecond a nomination is part of a plan to procure their assistance for the.furtherance of the candidate's prospects in other ways than by vote, thensection 123(8) is attracted, for, in "that case, the plan and its fulfilment

CORRUPT PRACTICE 43

must be viewed as a connected whole and the acts of proposing or second-ing, which are innocent in themselves, cannot be separated from the rest.RAJ KRUSHNA BOSB V. BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 294.(S.C)

It is permissible for a candidate to canvass Government ser-vants for their votes and if a Government servant chooses to reveal hishand, it would be permissible for the candidate to disclose the fact anduse it in furtherance of his election; for the law imposes no secrecy on theintentions of those who, of their own free will, choose to say how theyintend to vote. But they cannot be compelled to disclose the fact and anyimproper attempt to obtain such information would be a corrupt practice.The policy of the law is to keep Government servants aloof from politicsand also to protect them from being imposed on by those with influence orin positions of authority and power, and to prevent the machinery ofGovernment from being used in furtherance of a candidate's return. Butat the same time it is not the policy of the law to disenfranchise them orto denude them altogether of their rights as ordinary citizens of the land.RAJ KRUSHNA BOSE V. BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 294(S.C.)

Per DAS J. (VIVIAN BOSE J. dubitante).— The proposing orseconding of a person by a Government servant cannot be regarded asassistance for the furtherance of the prospects of a candidate's electionwithin the meaning of section 123(8), in the absence of a finding that at thetime of the proposal or seconding the candidate had begun to hold himselfout as a prospective candidate. RAJ KRUSHNA BOSE V. BlNOD KANUNGOAND OTHERS, 9 B.L.R. 294. (S.C.)

Section 33(2) of the R. P. Act, 1951, confers a privilege onthe electors, including Government servants, to propose or second acandidate ; and, as section 123(8) does not deprive him of this privilege,the proposing or seconding of a candidate by a Government servantdoes not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(8) of the Act.SATYA DEV BUSHAHRI v. PADAM DEV AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 103 (S.C).

Participation in election propaganda—Participation by aGovernment servant in election propaganda in favour of a candidatewould not amount to a corrupt practice under section 123(8) unlessthere is evidence to show that the assistance of the Government ser-vant was procured or obtained by the candidate or his agent or by anyother person with the connivance of the candidate or his agent.Abdul Bouf v. Makhtar Ali and Others (2 E.L.R. 340) and Lahri Singhv. Attar Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 403) referred to. RIKHAB DAS t>.RlDHICHAND PALLIWAL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 115.

44 ELECTION LAW KEPORTS DIGEST

C. Government servant on leave.—Government servant on leave—Procuring the services of a

Village Munsiff for furthering the prospects of election would not ceaseto be a corrupt practice under section 123(8) merely because at the timewhen the services were procured the Village Munsiff was on leave andwas not actually discharging the duties of his office, as he does not ceaseto be a Government servant when he is on leave. Emmens v. Elderton(4 H.L.C. 624) referred to. K. PABTHASABATHY V. ELAYA PILLAI ANDOTHBES, 4 E.L.E. 188.

A Village Munsiff who is on leave and for whom a substitutehas been appointed, and who does not consequently receive any salaryfrom the Government, is still "a person serving under the Government"within the meaning of section 123(8) of the E.. P. Act, 1951. The word' employ" is used in a variety of contexts and the meaning to be attri-buted to the word depends upon the context and purpose of the enact-ment in which it is used. A Village Munsiff who is employed in a Statedoes not cease to be "employed" in that State within the meaning ofsection 123(8) of the B. P. Act, 1951, when he is on leave and is notactually performing his duties. Emmens v. Elderton (4 H.L.C. 624)applied. Ashworth v. McGuirk & Go. Ltd. ([1944] K.B. l) and BeFeldman (97 L.T. 548) distinguished. ELAYA PILLAI v. K. PABTHA-SABATHY AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 20.

Procuring the assistance of a Government servant even whenhe is on leave would come within section 123(8), for a Governmentservant does not cease to be such when he is on leave. The objectof the Explanation to clause (8) of section 123 is to bring within themeaning of "persons serving under the Government," persons who maynot be Government servants in the strict sense of the expression.J ADUMANI MANGRAJ V. DlNABANDHU SAHTJ AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R. 480.

16. Incurring expenses for candidate. —Expenses incurred by a per-son for posting letters for supporting a candidate would not constitutean illegal practice under section 125(1), where he does so in his capa-city as an agent of the political party who has put up the candidate, assuch a case would be covered by the Explanation to the section. NYAL-

CHAND VlBCHAND SHETH V. VlTHALBHAI EANCHHODBHAI PATEL ANDOTHEBS, 9 E.L.E. 451. See also 8 E.L.E. 417, supra p. 38.

17. Interference with voters.—Merely directing voters to go to theCongress Office and asking them to get the tickets bearing their electoralroll numbers from there, does not amount to an interference with the voters.T. PBAKASAM v. U. KBISHNA EAO AND OTHEBS (NO. 3), 2 E.L.E. 376.

18. Naming guilty persons.—An Election Tribunal is bound to makean order under section 99, only in respect of any corrupt or illegal practice

CORRUPT PRACTICE 45

alleged in the petition. NTALOHAND VlBOHAND SBTH V. VlTHALBHAIEANCHODBHAI PATBL AND OTHEBS, 9E.L.E. 451.

If any charge of corrupt practice is made the duty of theTribunal does not end with declaring the election void, but they mustalso as laid down in section 99 record a finding whether any corruptpractice has been committed, the nature of such corrupt practice andpersons found guilty of such practice. EAJ KBUSHNA BOSB. V. BlNODKANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 294 (S.C.)

Held, per K. B. KABTAR SINGH and JAI EAM SAXENA

(V. B. SABWATE dissenting) ^—Under the proviso to sub-section (l) ofsection 99 of the E. P. Act, 1951, the Election Tribunal must, beforemaking an order recording the names of persons who have been provedguilty of a corrupt practice, under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of thatsub-section, give notice to show cause not only to persons who are notrespondents to the petition but also to the respondents to the petition.Per SARWATE.—Persons who have been joined as respondents to thepetition can be named under section 99(l)(a)(ii) without giving them afresh notice or a further hearing under the proviso to section 99(l).KESHO EAM V. HAZUBA SINGH AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 320.

Where a respondent, who was the principal respondent, waspresent before the Tribunal and had defintie notice of the corrupt prac-tices alleged against him and evidence was adduced in respect of thesepractices in his presence and witnesses were cross-examined by him;Held, that it was not necessary to give him fresh notice and opportunityto cross-examine witnesses under the proviso to section 99(1), before heis named as a person guilty of corrupt practice under secsion 99(l)(a)(ii).Ghasi Bam v. Bam Singh and Others (4 E.L.E. 124) affirmed. EAMSINGH V. GHASI EAM AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 183.

19. National anthem, use of.—A national anthem is not a nationalsymbol, nor is a song relating to the cow, the use of, or appeal to, a reli-gious symbol and singing such songs does not therefore amount to a minorcorrupt practice. AMIROHAND V. SURENDRA LAL J H A AND OTHERS,

10 E.L.E. 57.

20. Paid canvassers, employment of.—Under rule 118, it is notpermissible to employ paid canvassers and such an employment wouldamount to corrupt practice under section 123(7) of the Act. No candidateis therefore at liberty to use under the cloak of a messenger a paid can-vasser. AMIECHAND v. StTEENDRA LAL JHA AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 57.

21. Particulars of corrupt practice.—Necessity ofUnder the Indian law if corrupt and illegal practices are alleged, the peti-tion must be accompanied by a list setting forth the full particulars of the

ELD—7

4© ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

practices alleged. A statement of particulars in the petition itself is notenough. The Indian law is more stringent in this respect than-theEnglish law as section 83(2) is clear and mandatory and omission tocomply with its requirements entails the penalty of dismissal undersection 85. Malik Barkat AH v. Maulvi Muharram Ali. (Hammond 467at p. 473) and P. K. Atre v. Naravne (l B.L.E. 365) relied on. ABDULBAST V. GQVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 240.

Full particulars must be given—The requirement of full parti-culars of all corrupt practices alleged in the petition including the namesof the parties and the date and place of commission, enjoined by sec-tion 83 (2) must be complied with, with sufficient fullness and clarifica-tion, so as to enable the opposite party fairly to meet them ; and theymust be such as not to turn the enquiry into a rambling and rovinginquisition. BHIKAJI KESHATT JOSHI AND ANOTHER v, BBHLALNANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHBBS, 10 E.L.E. 357(S.C).

Tribunal is not bound to call for full particulars—Duty • is onpetitioner—While the Tribunal has undoubtedly the power to permitamendment of the schedule of corrupt practices by permitting thefurnishing of better particulars as regards the items therein specified,there is no duty cast upon the Tribunal to direct suo motu the furnishingof better particulars. As the primary responsibility for furnishing fullparticulars in full compliance with section 83(2) is on the petitionersthey are not absolved from their duty to comply with the requirementsof section 83(2) merely because neither the Tribunal nor the respondenthas called upon them to furnish full particulars. BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI

AND ANOTHBB v. BBIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.R.357 (S.C.)

Where particulars are given with regard to some corruptpractices only—Where full particulars are given with regard to some ofthe corrupt practices alleged, but are not given with regard to others,the Tribunal will not be justified in dismissing the petition in ioto at anearly stage on the ground that, taking the petition as a whole, there wassubstantial non-compliance with the requirements of section 83(2). In acase of this kind, the Tribunal should exercise its powers and call forbetter particulars. On non-compliance with this, it should strike outsuch of the charges as remain vague and call upon the petitioner tosubstantiate those which are reasonably specific. BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHIAND ANOTHEB V. BBIJLAIi NANDLAL BlYANI AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E.357 (S.C.)

Under section 85 of the Act the power of the Eleotion Commis-sion to condone delay is confined to delay in the presentation of the

CORRUPT PRACTICE 47

petition. I t has no power to condone non-compliance with requirementsof section 83 with regard to the filing of the list of particulars of corruptpractices. An election petition cannot, however, be dismissed where theparticulars relating to the corrupt practices are given in the petition it-self, on the mere ground that they were not given in a separatelist. T. PBAKASAM v, U. KBISHNA RAO AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2E.L.R. 54.

Particulars mentioned in petition but not in list, whether suffici-ent—False statements—' Relating to candidature", meaning of—B.P. Act,1951, ss. 83(2), 123{5), 125{3) If particluars of a corrupt practice are givenin the election petition, evidence relating thereto cannot be shut outmerely because such particulars are not repeated in the list of particularsalso. KRISHNAJI BHIMRAO ANTROLIKAR V. SHANKER SHANTARAM

MORE AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 100.

Where full particulars of corrupt and illegal practices aregiven in the election petition itself which is duly signed and verified, thepetition cannot be dismissed on the ground that no separate list of corruptpractices has been filed along with the petition as required by section 83(2).Purshottamdas Banchhoddas Patel v. Shantilal Girdharlal Parek (l E.L.R.223), Kanaiyalal Durllabhram Bansali v. Popatlal Mulshankar Joshi (lE.L.R. 244), Debi Prasad v. Mohammad Nasir and Others (3 E.L.R. 137),Mukti Nath Bat v. Uma Shankar and Others (3 E.L.R. 109) and T. Pra-kasam v. Dr. U. Krishna Bau and Others (2 E.L.R. 54) followed.KHUSHWAQT RAI v. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 93.

The objection that there was no separate list accompanying theelection petition containing the full particulars of the corrupt practicesmentioned in the petition, as required by section 83(2) cannot be takenfor the first time after the issues have been framed and evidence on bothsides about the corrupt practices had been adduced. PurshottamdasBanchholddas Patel v. Shantilal Girdharlal Parikh (1 E.L.R. 223) andKanaiyalal Durllabhram Bhansali v. Popatlal Mulshankar Joshi andOthers (1 E.L.R. 244) distinguished. RlKHAB DAS V. RlDHICHAND PALLI-WAL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 115.

^Necessity of full particulars—-To deliver particulars whichcontain nothing but the name of the candidade and the character of theoffence suggested, leaving everything else in blank, and to attemptunder them to fish out some possible material from which the blank maybe filled up is an abuse of procedure, and allegations which are made tomake a fishing inquiry and to introduce such kind of evidence as may beavailable at the time of hearing must be struck out. Pontefract (4 O'M.& H. 202), Worcester (1892, Day's Election Cases, 88), Bedfast Borough

4$ ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Western Division case (4 O'M. & H. 105) referred to. ABDUL E A O F V.

GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 240.The provisions of section 83(2) are mandatory and an election

petition is liable to be rejected if full particulars of the corrupt practicesalleged are not clearly set out in a list accompanying the petition or atleast in the petition itself. Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer (3 E.L.B/137) relied on. LiNGE GOWDA v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.E. 288.

——Further and better particulars of corrupt and illegal practicescan be called for under section 83(3), only with regard to those mattersthat have already been referred to in the list filed along with the petitionunder section 83(2); vague allegations without particulars, contained inthe petition, cannot be developed into specific charges after the expiry ofthe period of limitation. Ambala North {Sikh Rural) Constituency (2Doabia 290) and Calcutta North (Mohammadan Urban) Constituency (2Doabia 322) followed. MAST BAM V. HAKNAM SlNGH SETHI ANDOTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 301.

The provision contained in section 83(2) of the E.P. Act, 1951,that an election petition shall be accompanied by a list signed and verifiedsetting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which thepetitioner alleges, is mandatory and if the allegations of corrupt practicesmade in the petition and the list are vague and indefinite, they must bestruck off. The petitioner cannot be allowed to give full particulars byfiling another list. Under section 83(3) the petitioner can be permitted togive further or better particulars only if he has given some particularsin the original list. Even with regard to irregularities a concise state-ment of the material facts must be furnished by the petitioner. [Case lawreviewed.] SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIR HUSSAIN ZAIDI AND

OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 280.

The rule enunciated in section 83(2) of the Act which providesthat the petition shall be accompanied by a list setting forth full parti-culars of any corrupt practice including as full a statement as possibleas to the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corruptor illegal practice and the date and place of the commission of each suchpractice, is a salutary rule and is intended to avoid surprises to theopposite party and manipulations and developments of the case asoriginally presented. A petition which does not comply with the re-quirements of the section is therefore liable to be dismissed. JAGA-JEEVANDAS SHETTY V. SANJEEVA SHETTY AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 358.

If the petitioner does not give particulars required of anycorrupt or illegal practice alleged by him in the petition, he cannot leadevidence ab6ut such practice. I t is not clear from the Act whether

CORRUPT PRACTICE 49

the Act contemplates any other consequences for failure to furnish thaiparticulars of a corrupt or illegal practice. But, even if the petitioneris not allowed to lead evidence on the ground that he had not furnishedthe particulars required, still it may be open to him to put questions byway of cross-examination of witnesses of the opponent, because thatwould not be leading evidence. I t would also be open to the Tribunalto give a finding that the opponent has committed a corrupt practice oran illegal practice, if there is a sufficient material for such a finding, e.g.,in the admissions made or an admission found in the documentary evi-dence led by an opponent. DESAI BASAWAEAJ V. DASANKOP HASAASABAND OTHBBS, 4 E.L.B. 380.

——The word "may" in section 90(4) of E.P. Act confers a discre-tion on the Tribunal, and the Tribunal is not therefore bound to dismissa petition for non-compliance with section 81, 83 or 117 of the Act. TheHigh Court will not therefore interfere by a writ with an order of theTribunal declining to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with the pro-visions of section 83. AUDESH PBATAP SINGH v. BBIJ NABAIN ANDOTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 1.

Where particulars of some only are given—If a petition containsalso grounds other than corrupt and illegal practices, the proper proce-dure is not to dismiss the petition completely for failure to give a list ofparticulars but to shut out those grounds which cannot be urged forwant of particulars and proceed to hear the remaining grounds. MuktiNath Bai v. Uma Shanker Misra and Others (3 E.L.E. 109) and DebiPrasad v. Mohammed Naseer and Others (3 E.L.E. 137) not followed.ABDUL E A U F V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 240.

If the respondent does not raise before the Election Tribunalthe objection that full particulars of the corrupt practices are not givenin the petition and he does not move the Election Tribunal to strike offthe allegations in the petition relating to those malpractices or to callfor further and better particulars but fights the case before the Tribunalon the materials placed before it, it is not open to him to contend beforethe High Court in an application for a writ of certiorari, that, as fullparticulars were not given in the petition, it should be deemed that suchmalpractices were not alleged in the petition and they should not havebeen inquired into. N. PAEAMASIVAM V. ELECTION TBIBUNAL,

TlBUCHIEAPALLI, 8 E.L.E. 102.

If an election petition is not accompanied by a list containingfull particulars of the corrupt practices alleged in the petition asrequired by section 83(2), it oan be dismissed by the Election Commis-sion under section 85 or by the Election Tribunal under section 90(4). At

I


any rate, evidence should not be allowed to be adduced with regard toany such practices about which full particulars are not given. HAEI

DAS v. HIRA SINGH PAL AND OTHBBS, 4 B.L.R. 466.

—:—Amendment of list of particulars—An election petition is notliable to be dismissed summarily on the ground that full details of theexact place and time of commission of the corrupt practices alleged inthe petition are not stated with perfect precision if the particulars givenare sufficient to enable the respondent to make enquiries and adducecounter evidence and he is not prejudiced. The list of particulars canbe allowed to be amended by giving further particulars, and at any ratethe petition will have to be heard so far as corrupt practices, of whichfull particulars are given, are concerned. Abdul Bauf v. Govind BallabhPant (8 B.L.R. 240), Sri Ram v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi (8 E.L.R. 139),Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Ganga Dhar Maithani and Others, (3 E.L.R. 162),M. C. hinge Gowda v. N. K. Shivananjappa (2 E.L.R. 163), RamchandraGhoudhari v. Sadasiva, Tripathi (5 E.L.R. 194), Bhola Nath v. KrishnaChandra Gupta (3 E.L.R. 288) referred to. SHIBBAN LAL SAKSENA V.

HAEISHANKEE PBASAD AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 403.

A petitioner cannot be allowed to amend the list of particularsso as to introduce a new corrupt practice not mentioned in the listsaccompanying the petition. The power to allow amendment contemplatedby section 83(3) is confined to giving better or further particulars ofcorrupt practices included in the lists. LACHHIEAM V. JAMUNA PEASAD

MUKHARITA, 9 E.L.R. 149.

•• A petitioner cannot be allowed to amend the list of particularsattached to an election petition by adding fresh instances of a corruptor illegal practice mentioned therein, e.g., by giving fresh instances ofpersonation or new items of expenditure not shown in the return ofelection expenses. The R. P. Act, 1951, has not altered the law in thisrespect. Bombay City, 1924 case (Hammond 173), Saharanpur, 1920case (Hammond 621), Kistna, 1928 case (Hammond 447), Akyab, 1928 case(Hammond 45), North- West Gurgaon Mohammadan Constituency, 1946case (Sen and Poddar 655), Ferozepore Central Mohammadan Constitu-ency, 1946 case (Sen and Poddar 903), Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patelv. Shantilal Girdharlal Parekh (1 E.L.R. 223). SHIVA DAS ANDANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHEBS,

8 E.L.R. 265.——Under section 83 (2) of the Act a petitioner cannot be allowed

to add new grounds to the list of particulars already submitted, thoughhe may be allowed to give further particulars of grounds already alleged,SAHI RAM v. MANPHOOL SINGH AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 47.

CORRUPT PRACTICE ! : 51

New list of particulars—An application for amendment of thepetition by giving new lists or adding particulars to the lists beyondwhat is allowed by section 83(3) cannot be entertained after the timeprescribed for filing the petition under rule 119 has expired, and it isonly when there are lista aoeonipanying the petition and they containsome particulars required by section 83 (2) that the Tribunal oan allowthose particulars to be amended, or order such furtha* and better pafcti*oulars to be furnished with regard them under section 83 (3). Muham-inad Siddiqui v. Sir Nazimuddin (2 Doabia 322), Radhey ShyamSharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others (E. P. 256 of 1952) andSaharanpur case (Hammond 621) followed. , Sitaram Hirachand Birlav. Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar (2 B.L.E. 283) dissented from,ABDUL RAUE1 V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 240.

••- Where the list of corrupt and illegal practices filed with anelection petition under section 83(2) was not verified by the petitionerthough the election petition itself which enumerated the corrupt andillegal practices was verified, and the Tribunal further found on scrutinythat the/list did not in a majority of the cases set forth full particularsof the alleged corrupt and illegal practices such as the date and place ofcommission and the averments made were of a vague character. Held,ijhat the provisions of section 83(2) had not been sufficiently compliedwith as the list itself was not verified and M l particulars were not givenand the petition had to be dismissed. Held further, that the petitionercould not be allowed to file a new list after the filing of the petition norcan the list itself be amended subsequently, though under section 82(3)amendment of the particulars given in the list can be allowed.PUESHOTTAMDAS EANCHHODDAS PATEL V. SHANTILAL GlBDHAELALPAEIKH AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 223.

— -Fi l ing .after expiry of period of limitations-Power of Tribunal toamend petition and to receive list—If an election petition, in which thereare allegations regarding corrupt and illegal practices committed by therespondents is not accompanied by a list as contemplated in sub-section(.2) of section 83, such an election petition cannot be deemed to be aproper and valid election petition. There is no provision in the Actenabling the Tribunal to amend the petition itself, and though sub-section (3) of section 83 gives the Tribunal power to amend the parti-culars given in the list, it does not give any power to the Tribunal toamend the petition itself, or to allow the petitioner to give a list after theperiod of limitation has expired. The words "conclusion of the trial" insection 98 of the E. P. Act have not been defined in the Act, and thesection does not mean that the Tribunal cannot dismiss a.petition unlessthe entire oral evidence of the parties is recorded and arguments are


heard in full. If an election petition is-dismissed because it is found tobe time-barred, or on any other technical ground which might be suffi-cient for the decision of the case, the trial of the case must be legallydeemed to have concluded at that stage. Pritam Singh v. Charan Singhand Others (2 E.L.E. 276) and Purshottamdas Banchoddas Patel v.Shantilal Girdharilal Parekh (l E.L.E. 223) referred to. MUKTI NATHE A I v. UMA SHANKER MISRA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 109.

The reception of an additional list particulars within the periodof limitation is not prohibited by law. M. E. MEGANATHAN v.K. T. KOSALRAM, 9 E.L.E. 242.

Where allegation is of general corruption or undue influence—Whatever might be the case where a corrupt practice is alleged for thepurpose of obtaining the relief of setting aside an election of a returnedcandidate under sections 84(a) and 100(2), where the allegation is one ofgeneral corruption or general undue influence falling within section 100(l)auch particulars cannot in the very nature of things be given and there-fore cannot be insisted upon. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA PAI AND

OTHERS and V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS, 10

E.L.E. 245.

22 Printers' or publisher's name, omission of.—The omission of thename of the printer and publisher in printed circulars having reference toan election, by ignorance or oversight without any ulterior motive,would not amount to an illegal practice under section 125(3). JAWAHAR

SHANKAR PACHOLI V. HIRDAY NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6.

E.L.E. 495.-The omission of the publisher's name in a printed notice in

which the printer's name is given is not corrupt practice under section125(3) of the Act as the printer will in such a case be presumed tobe the publisher. K. PARTHASARATHY v. ELAYA PILLAI AND OTHERS,

4 E.L.E. 188.

Under section 125(3), publication of a poster would be an illegalpractice if it does not bear on its face the name of the printer as well asthe name of the publisher; giving the name of the printer alone orpublisher alone is not enough to take it out of section 125(3). KRISHNAJI

BHIMRAO ANTROLIKAR V. SHANKER SHANTARAM MORE AND OTHERS,

7 E.L.E. 100.

Per HANS E A J KHANNA and PARMA NAND SACHDEVA.—For

the purposes of section 125(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the name of thepress may be taken as the trade name of the printer and by the customof the printing trade, the printer of a pamphlet should be assumed to bethe publisher, if the publisher's name is not given in the pamphlet. PerHARBANS SINGH,—At the most there is only a presumption that the

CORRUPT PRACTICE 53

printer is the publisher, and where it is admitted or proved that a posterwas in fact published by the candidate, the candidate will be guilty of anillegal practice under section 125(3), if the poster does not bear his nameas the publisher. The motive of the candidate or the innocent nature ofthe contents is immaterial, as a corrupt motive is not an ingredient of aa"illegal practice" defined in section 125. Saran South Case (2 HammondE. P. 250) and Parthasarathy v. Elaya Pillai and Others (4 B.L.B. 188)and Tipperah Case (Sen and Poddar 802) discussed. MAST EAM V.

HAENAM SINGH SETHI AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 301.

For the purposes of s. 125(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the nameof the press may be taken to be the name of the printer and the printermay be assumed to be the publisher, if the name of the publisher is notstated. RATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDSR SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 234.

23. Undue influence [S. 123(2)].—Necessity of particulars—In the listof corrupt practices accompanying an election petition in which allega-tions of undue influence and threats of ostracism on voters have beenmade it is not incumbent on the petitioner to state the names of thevoters on whom these alleged corrupt practices have been practised.Amritsdr City Muhammadan Constituency case 1938 (Sen and Poddar 34)and Hissar North General Constituency case 1938 (Sen and Poddar 367)relied on. KAKTAB SINGH v. BALU EAM AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 71.

Coercion and intimidation—Coercion and intimidation are notenumerated among the corrupt practices and, having regard to thedefinition of "undue influence" it is clear that "coercion" and "inti-midation" have been used in the E. P. Act, 1951, not in their ordinaryliteral sense of an improper act by an individual but in a very technicalsense of what might bo termed as undue influence by a group. Wherean election petition alleges that the election was void under section 100(l)(b) on account of coercion and intimidation, the petitioner muststate in the petition the particular group, community or section whichexercised such coercion or intimidation, and the group, community orsection on which it was exercised. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA PAI

AND OTHERS ; V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA PAI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R.245.

Misleading of voters—-Where the representatives of a candidatefor a double member constituency, one of the seats in which was reserv-ed for the Scheduled Castes, issued an appeal to the voters to give boththeir vote's to the same candidate and deliberately told them that theywere not bound to give one of their votes to a Scheduled Caste candi-date : Held, that this did not amount to the exercise of any undueinfluence on the voters within the meaning of as, 100(a) and 123(2) or

ELD—8


induoing the voters to do something which was forbidden, by law orfraudulent. B. E. AMBEDKAR AND ANOTHER V. S. A. DANGE AND

OTHERS, 1 B.L.E. 364.Beligious and spiritual influence—*(i) Publication in a newspaper

and in pamphlets to the effect that the Bishop had blessed the candi-dature of the respondent does not amount to exercise of undue influenceor intimidation or corrupt practice under section 123(5). BellaryMuhammadan Rural Constituency case (l Doabia 169) and North WestGhirgaon Muhammadan Constituency case (2 Doabia 332) relied on. (ii)When it is alleged that spiritual influence has been exercised, thenature or substance of the direction issued by the spiritual head shouldbe given in the particulars. SlVATHANU PlLLAI v. NBSAMONT ANDOTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 312. •

A Catholic priest has great influence and in the-proper exer-cise of that influence on electors the priest may counsel, advise, recom-mend, entreat, and point out the true line of moral duty, and explainwhy one candidate should be preferred to another, and may, if he thinksfit, throw the whole weight of his character in the scale ; but he maynot appeal to the fears, or terrors or superstition of those he addresses.He must not hold out hopes of reward here or hereafter, and hemust not use threats of temporal injury, or of disadvantage, or ofpunishment hereafter. He must not threaten to ex-communicate orwithhold the sacraments. [Case law referred to.] MATHAI MATHEWMANJURAN v. K. C. ABRAHAM, 10 B.L.R. 376.

In this case the Tribunal held after a careful perusal of a pas-sage in a newspaper in which the answers given by the Archbishop,Ernakulam, and the Bishops of Quilon, Kottayam and Palai to the ques-tion "who are they for whom you should not vote" were published thatthe publication of the answers did not amount to the exercise of undueinfluence. PADMANABHA MENON V. A. M. THOMAS AND OTHERS,

1 E.L.E. 404In the case of a corrupt practice under section 123(2), what is

relevant is the intention of the person who is actually charged with havingcommitted the corrupt practice. The words actually used by himare very material. The effect produced on the elector is not the crucialthing, except in so far as the election is sought to be set aside on theground that it was not a free one by reason that the corrupt practicehas extensively prevailed. But even there, the intention of the personcharged with 'the commission of the corrupt practice is an essentialfactor. Longford (2 O'M. & H. 16); South Heath (4 O'M. & H. 132);Malik Barkat AH v. Maulvi Muharram Ali Chisti (Hammond 469)

•See »J?p upder "i. Appeal on grounds ofreligion"r p, 16 supra,

CORRUPT PRACTICE 55

referred to. If a case of undue influence described in section 123(2) ofthe E. P. Act is sought to be rested on the use of spiritual authority,proviso (a) to section 123(2) applies and restricts it to cases where threatsof divine displeasure or spiritual censure (not mere promises of divinegrace) are made. The mere holding out of an inducement of pioushopesf spiritual benefits, divine pleasure etc., in the absence of any suchspiritual threat, would not constitute undue influence. The distributionof prasadams and taking promises from electors touching cocoanuts wouldnot amount to undue influence referred to in section 123(2). Even eminentpersons in the religious and secular field are as much entitled to takepart in elections and advise electors in the matter of their franchise, forthe law does not strike at the existence of influence but only the abuse ofinfluence. JAGAJEEVANDAS SHETTT V. SANJEEVA SHETTT AND OTHEES,

3 B.L.E. 358.

An appeal to the voters in the name of the Koran that the elec-tion of a woman is against the injunctions of the Koran, being in thenature of mental coercion would amount to corrupt practice only if it hasbeen proved to have emanated from persons whose opinion in matters ofreligion carried great influence with the voters. JYOSTNA CHANDRA ANDANOTHEE v. MEHEABALI AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 488.

• To constitute "undue influence" within section 123(2) of theAct, it is not necessary that there should be any actual threat or physicalcompulsion, but the method of inducement adopted should convey to themind of the person addressed that non-compliance with the wishes of theperson offering the inducement may result in physical or spiritual harm tohimself or to any other person in whom he is interested. Some fear ofharm resulting from non-compliance with the request is thus an essentialelement in undue influence. Where the influence is said to.be by a reli-gious appeal it should be shown that it was made to appear to the personsaddressed that non-compliance would be considered to be irreligious orsinful. This kind of undue influence can generally be exercised by religiousteachers or persons having reputation for learning and piety, but it maybe exercised by a newspaper editor also if he has some standing in thesociety. Where the propaganda which has been carried on in favourof a candidate or party does not amount to undue influence within section123(2) but only to a corrupt practice within section 124(5), the eiectioncannot be set aside unless it is proved further that the result of the elec-tion has been materially affected by such propaganda. SAEDUL SINGHCAVEESHAE t). HtTKAM SlNGH AND OTHEES, 6 B.L.E. 316.

• Where a poster contained a statement that a vote cast for theAkali Party candidate was a vote in favour of the Guru and asked the


Sikhs to get the blessings of the Gurus by supporting the Akali Partycandidate: Held, that the publication and distribution of such posters didnot amount to undue influence with the exercise of any electoral rightwithin section 123(2), but could be regarded as a systematic appeal tovoters to vote for a particular candidate on the ground of religion, and assuch a minor corrupt practice under section 124(5). FAQIR CHAND V.PBITAM SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 119.

• Where the title of a poster published under the signature of aneminent political leader who was not a spiritual or religious leader impli-ed that not voting for the Congress was 'mahan pap': Held, that the word'pap' though it originally meant 'sin' has come to be applied to anythingethically undesirable, especially when it is not used by spiritual or religiousleader, and the poster did not mean that not voting for the Congress wouldbring divine displeasure or spiritual censure within the meaning of sec-tion 123(2)(a) of the Act, and its publication did not amount to exercisingundue influence as defined in section 123(2). Southern Towns (Moham-madan) Constituency (2 Doabia 310), North Gaya {General) Bural Con-stituency (1 Doabia 46), Hoshiarpur West (Mohammadan) Constituency(l Doabia 267) referred to. MAST BAM v. HAENAM SINGH SETHI ANDOTHERS, 7 B.L.B. 301.

Statements and expressions cannot amount to exercising undueinfluence within the meaning of section 123(2)(a), unless they induce orattempt to induce fear of spiritual censure or divine displeasure. State-ments invoking divine pleasure or spiritual benefit for those who vote ina particular way would not fall within section 123(2)(a). GURNAMSINGH AND ANOTHER V. PARTAP SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.B. 338.

——To constitute undue influence it is not necessary that thereshould be any physical compulsion ; methods of inducement which areso powerful as to leave no free will to the voter in the exercise of hischoice may amount to undue influence. Where a poster published bythe Congress Committee against a rival candidate, who was a Jagirdar,contained the picture of a tenant tied up to a tree and a well dressedJagirdar asking another who is seen waving a whip to flog the tenant,and the tenant's wife was shown lying prostrate on the ground : Held,that, though the poster could not be brought under section 123(5) as afalse statement relating to the personal character or conduct of the peti-tioner, it amounted to exercise of undue influence over the voters (whowere mostly illiterate villagers) and fell within section 123(2). JUJHABSINGH V. BHAIEON LALL AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 457.

Undue influence by Government servants—Minister doing elec-tioneering campaign during official tours—A candidate who is a Minister

CORRUPT PRACTICE 57

is not guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8) merely becauseduring the course of his official tours as a Minister he conducted hiselectioneering campaign also. Nor wouid a District Magistrate's tourjust before election, by itself amount to exercising undue influence onvoters. Habibgang South N. M. B. 1924 (Hammond 387) and GajendraChandra Chaudhuri and Others v. P. G. Datta (2 Jagat Narain 85) reliedon. RAMACHANDRA CHOWDHUBI v. SADASIVA TEIPATHY AND OTHBKS

(No. 2), 5 E.L.R. 4C1.A leader of a political party is entitled to declare to the public

the policy of the party, and ask the electorate to vote for his partywithout interfering with any electoral right and such declarations onhis part would not amount to undue infiuence under section 123(2). Thefact that he happens to be a Minister or Chief Minister of the Statewould not deprive him of this right. Lichfield (I O'M. & H. 26) andSurendra Narayan Sinha v. Babu Amulyadhone Boy and Others (2 Doabia368) referred to. LlNGB GOWDA v. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.R. 288.

Must prevail extensively—An election can be declared whollyvoid under section 100(l)(a) on the ground of undue influence only,if it has prevailed extensively and the election has not been afree election by reason thereof. DK. K. N. GAIBOLA V. GANGADHAR

MAITHANI AND OTHEES (NO. 2), 8 E.L.R. 105.Where the allegation in the petition was that the workers of

the respondent threatened the electors that if they did not vote for therespondent, Shri Tung Nath, Shri Badri Nath and Kalimai, the localdeities of the various areas, would be displeased, but the evidenceshowed that such threats were made only in 4 out of the 58 pollingstations of the constituency and also that the workers who made thesethreats had no pretence to any religious or spiritual leadership : Held,that it cannot be held, even if the allegations were true, that the undueinfluence prevailed extensively nor was it such as to have had mucheffect on the electors, and the election could not be declared void on theground of undue influence under s. L00(l)(a). Lahore City M. 1922(Hammond 467), Drogheda case (1 O'M. & H. 256), Bridgewater case (l O'M.& H. 116), North Durham case (2 O'M. & H. 156) referred to. DR. K. N.GAIBOLA V. GANGADHAR MAITHANI AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 8 E.L.K. 105.

DELIMITATION.

Delimitation. —Finality of President's order—The President of Indiais the final authority for delimitation purposes under the Indian Cons-titution,' *nd a notification of a State Government including certainvillages in a particular tappa cannot override the President's Order inwhich they are included in another tappa. SHANTILAL CHOUDHUBY V.

RAGHUBAJ SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.R. 93.


DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES.

1. Citizenship, want of.2. Conviction [s. 7(a)].3. Construction of s. 7(d).4. Interest in contract with Govt. [s. 7(d)J.5. Office of profit [s. 7(e)].

• 6. Part CStates.7. Miscellaneous.

Disqualification of candidates—Citizenship, want of.—Person born inIndian State leaving for JPaki&tan after 1st March, 1947, and returning toIndia—The petitioner was born in the Eampur State and joined theservices of the Government of India in 1945. On the partition of Indiahe intimated to the Government of India his final choice to serve inPakistan and proceeded to Lahore in August, 1947, relinquishing hisappointment in India and joined the Pakistan service. In January, 1948,the Nawab of Bampur promulgated constitutional reforms for Eampurand the petitioner returned to Eampur from Pakistan in March, 1948,with a view to stand for election and got himself enrolled as a pleader inthe Eampur High Court. During the elections in Eampur his name wasentered as a voter in the electoral roll of the Eampur State and he waselected as a member of the Legislative Assembly of the State, andeventually became a Minister of that State. In July, 1949, the EampurState merged in India and became a district of Uttar Pradesh. Thepetitioner's name was included in the electoral roll for Eampur City forthe general elections of 1951-52 for the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assem-bly as no one raised any objection to the inclusion of his name, but hisnomination paper for the general elections was rejected by the EeturningOfficer on the ground that he was not a citizen of India. He filed anelection petition to set aside the election of the returned candidate on theground that his nomination paper was improperly rejected : Held, (i) thelack of statutory qualification, or statutory disqualification, can be con-sidered both by the Eeturning Officer and by the Election Tribunal, evenif an objection on this ground was not raised at the time of the prepara-tion of the electoral rolls and the name of the petitioner was entered as avoter in the final electoral roll; (ii) the petitioner must be held to havemigrated to Pakistan "from the territory of India" within the meaning ofarticle 7 of the Constitution of India, even though at the time when heleft for Pakistan, Eampur State had not merged in India ; (iii) the ques-tion whether the petitioner had migrated to Pakistan so as to disentitlehim to be deemed a citizen of India under article 7 depended on theintention with which, and the purpose for which, the petitioner went toPakistan'; (iv) the evidence in the case and the conduct of the petitionerplearly indicated that the petitioner's intention was to settle permanently

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 59

in Pakistan when he opted for Pakistan services and went to Pakistan inAugust, 1947, and he should therefore be deemed to have lost his statusas a citizen of India under article 7 of the Constitution; (v) his return toEampur in 1948 could not restore him to the status of a citizen of Indiaand he was therefore disqualified to stand for the election and his nomina-tion paper rightly rejected by the Eeturning Officer on the ground thathe was not a citizen of India. The expression "conclusive evidence" insection 36(7) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not used in the same sense as con-clusive proof" in section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act, and does not meanthat the entries in the electoral roll cannot be challenged before theEeturning Officer. 'Migration" implies moving from one country toanother with the intention of shifting permanently to the latter. AsLAMKHAN V. EAZLUL HAQ AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 341.

2. Conviction.—An order of amnesty passed by the Euler of a Stategranting unconditional release of prisoners is one passed by him as theChief Executive Officer of the State under section 401 of the CriminalProcedure Code. The effect of such an order of remission of sentence isto wipe out the remitted portion of the sentence altogether and not merelyto suspend its operation, and for the purpose of deciding whether a personis disqualified under section 7(b), it is the period of sentence that wasactually undergone by him and not the sentence originally awarded bycourt that is relevant. Such an order is not in the nature of a jail orderunder which remissions are allowed to prisoners during the period ofimprisonment on grounds of good behaviour or working on holidays underthe jail rules, but which cannot operate to affect the order of sentencepassed by a court of law. Braja Rishore Chandra Singh Deo v. OobindaPradhana (Sen and Poddar 82) and Venkatesh Yeshwant v. Emperor(A.I.E. 1938 Nag. 513) relied on. GANDA SINGH V. SAMPUBAN SINGH


In order that a person may be disqualified for being chosen as,or for being, a member of either House of Parliament or the LegislativeAssembly or Council of State under section 7(b) of the E. P. Act, 1951,it is not necessary that he should have undergone any part of the sentenceimposed upon him. Nor does the fact that he has preferred an appealfrom the conviction and sentence, and the appeal is pending, remove thedisqualification under section 7(b) except in the case of a sitting memberwho has been convicted after his election. Braja Kishore Chandra SinghDeo v. Gobinda Pradhana (Sen.and Poddar 82) distinguished. UDAINATH

SINGH V. JAGAT BAHADTJB SINGH AND OTHEBS, 3 E.L.E. 26.

3. Construction of s. 7(d).—Seotion 7(d) must be strictly construedand is not applicable unless there is a contract with the Government

So ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

which fulfils the requirements of the Constitution with regard to suchcontracts. BHOLANATH V. KRISHNA CHANDBA GCTTA AND OTHBBS(No. 2), 6 E.L.R. 104. Overruled in 9 E.L.R. 301].

Words employed in statutes regulating the qualifications forentry into Legislatures are proper subject-matter for beneficial construc-tion that would advance the object of the statute, and in construing clause7(d) of the Act the Tribunal is not fettered by the technical rules of lawin the Indian'Contract Act regarding formation of contracts. MAHABAJAOP PARLAKIMEDI v. BUOY CHANDBA DAS AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 101.

Section 7(d) should be liberally construed and the beneficialeffect of it should not be allowed to be whittled down by subtle argumentsbased upon a conflict of powers or the law of agency. A. J. ABUNA-CHALAM v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 471.

4. Interest in contract with government.—Contract for supply ofgoods and contract for work and labour distinguished—Contracts ancillaryto or for purposes connected with performance of services, and contractsfor performance of services distinguished—The expression "contract forthe performance of any services" in section 7(d) means a contract directlyfot the performance of any service itself and does not include contractswhich are only ancillary to or for purposes connected with theperformance of any such service. In re T. SlDDALINGAIYA, MEMBER,MYSORE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 7 E.L.R. 416.

The word "works" in the expression "contract for the execu-tion of any works" in section 7(d) connotes something to be built orconstructed and not something to be done. In re T. SfDDALINGAIYA,MEMBER, MYSORE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, 7 E.L.R. 416.

-——Contracts not fulfilling constitutional formalities—In orderthat a person may be disqualified under section 7(d), it is not necessarythat the contract in which he has a share or interest should be with theappropriate Government or that it should be a contract which fulfils therequirements laid down by article 299(l) of the Constitution with respectto contracts made by the Government. Hanuman Prasad Misra v. TaraChand (5 E.L.R. 446) and Maharaja of Parlakimedi v. Bijay ChandraDas and Others (4 E.L.R 101) referred to. Horen Jones v. Mohan Singhand Others (2 E.L.R. 147) dissented from. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM

v. CHATXTRBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 428.[Affirmed by the Supreme Court in 9 E.L.R. 301].

Firm supplying when orders were placed—In response to anotification issued by the Deputy Commissioner, calling for tenders forthe supply of tiles and bricks for Government buildings for the year1909-51, a firm, of which the respondent was a partner, submitted -a

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 6 l

tender on 20th September, 1950, which was accepted on 4th November,1950; and in pursuance of this, the respondent's firm supplied tiles andbricks for 1950-51. For the next year, fresh tenders were called for.The respondent's firm did not make any tender and the tender made byanother firm was accepted. This firm failed to supply and the DeputyCommissioner isssued an order to all the Amildars of the district to place

orders for their requirements of tiles and bricks with the respondent'sfirm, fixing also the price of the materials, and forwarded a copy of theorder to the respondent's firm also "for information and needful action."The respondent's firm supplied tiles in September and October, 1951, andthe respondent's nomination paper was filed on 20th November, 1951,before some of the bills therefor had been paid. The question beingwhether the respondent was disqualified to stand as a candidate on theground that he was interested in a contract for supply of goods to theGovernment, under section 7(d) of R.P. Act, 1951:

Held Per HOMBE GOWDA and Mm IQBAL HUSSAIN (KANDASWAMI

PlLLAl dissenting) that, from the correspondence and the conduct of thefirm an implied contract by the firm to supply goods to the Governmentcould be inferred, that this contract subsisted at the date of the nomi-nation, and the respondent was therefore disqualified under section 7(d).Per KANDASWAMI PILLAI {contra).—The contract to supply goodsterminated at the close of the year 1950-51, i.e., on the 31st March, 1951,and the subsequent supplies of tiles were casual sales. NAEASIMHB'GOWDA V. LAKKAPPA AND ANOTHER, 4.E.L.R. 234. •

Agreement to supply goods if and when orders are placed—Whether contract—Term for replacement of goods unsold within-certainperiod—Whether separate contract—Whether contract terminates beforepayment is received—Contract not complying with constitutional formali-ties.—(i) Where the correspondence between the parties merely sets outthe terms on which the parties are willing to supply and purchase goodsif and when orders are placed, a contract does not come into existenceuntil an order is placed, and each order and acceptance constitutes adistinct contract.

(ii) A contract for the supply of goods does not terminate as soonas the goods are supplied but continues in being until the vendors arefully paid and the contract is fully discharged by performance on bothsides. The view that the moment goods are supplied and the contractis fully executed on one side and all that remains is for the purchaser toreceive payment, the contract terminates and a new relationship ofcreditor and debtor takes its place, is not correct. O'Carrol v. Hastings('1905, 2 Ir. R, 590), Satyendra Kumar Pas v, Chairtnan of the Municipal

PLD-9 .


Commissioners of Dacca (I.L.E. 58 Cal. 180) followed. Boyse v. Birley(L.E. 4 C.P. 296), Tranton v. Astor (33 T.L.E. 383) and Cox v. Truscott(21 T.L.E. 319) distinguished and doubted. Where a contract for supplyof goods contains an agreement for replacement of the stocks whichremained unsold within a certain period the contract could not bedeemed to terminate as soon as the goods are supplied ; for, the guaranteeclause is only a term of the main contract to supply goods and so longas the guarantee clause remains in force the contract cannot terminate ;at any rate, as the obligation even under this clause was to supply freshstocks in exchange for stocks returned, there would still be a subsistingcontract for the supply of the goods which are sent as replacements.CHATTXRBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI v. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM ANDOTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 301 (S.C.).

A contract for the supply of goods to the Government is not voideven though it is not executed in the manner prescribed by article 299(l)of the Constitution, and even though the Government could not be suedon such a contract. Section 7(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951, does not requirethat the contracts at which it strikes should be enforceable against theGovernment; all that it requires is that the contract should be for thesupply of goods to the Government. Therefore, a person interested in acontract for supply of goods to the appropriate Government would b ^disqualified under section 7(d), even though the contract does not complywith the formalities prescribed by article 299(l) of the Constitution.CHATURBSUJ VITHALDAS JASANI V. MORESHWAR PARASHRAM ANDOTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 301 (S.C.).

^Contracts under food distribution and procurement scheme forprocurement, storage, distribution, etc.—'The members of a joint Hindufamily, of which the respondent was the manager, formed themselvesinto a firm in 1950, to carry on the family business, and in 1951, thefirm entered into four kinds of contracts with the Governor ofMadras, viz., (i) a stock-holder's agreement by which the firm undertookto hold the reserve stock of the Government, store them safely and todispose of them as directed by the Government; (ii) to store and sellimported foodgrains and food-products which were allotted to the firmby the Government; (iii) a quota-holder's agreement by which the firmagreed to pay tjae Government the difference between the landed costand market price of paddy aud rice allotted to the firm ; and (iv) awholesale procuring agency agreement under the Madras Foodgrains(Intensive Procurement) Order, 1951. The respondent, intending tostand as a candidate for election, executed a deed on the 15th Novem-ber, 1951, by which he'relinquished his> interest in the firm to the otherpartners, and gave notice of hi? retirement to the Eegistrar of Firms


and in the newspapers, and his retirement was accepted by the Collectoron 1st October, 1952, " with effect from 15th November, 1951 ". Theaccounts between the respondent and his firm, and the accounts betweenthe firm and the Government were not however settled until the 15thMarch, 1952. The nomination paper of the respondent was filed on the20th November, ^ 5 1 : Held, (i) that a formal contract with theGovernment complying with the formalities laid down in article 299 ofthe Constitution is not necessary for the purposes of disqualificationunder section 7(d); (ii) the fact that the stock allotted for storage hadbeen disposed of on the date of nomination did not put an end to thestock-holder's agreement as the agreement was not confined to one allot*ment alone, and moreover the accounts had not been settled ; (iii) as itis open to the members of a joint Hindu family to form themselves intoa firm to carry on their business, and the members of the respondent'sfamily had done so, section 9(2) of the Act had no application ; (iv) thecontracts in question were contracts for performance of services

undertaken" by the State Government under the scheme for equitabledistribution of foodgrains contemplated by the Essential Supplies(Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, and the various foodgrain control andprocurement Orders passed thereunder, even though the State hadassumed the performance of such services voluntarily and was under nostatutory or enforceable obligation to do so; Leek v. Epsom BuralDistrict Council (1922, 1 K. B. 383) referred to; (v) the relinquishmentdeed was not, on the facts of the case, a real one and at any rate it wasnot effective as the accounts between the partners and the share of therespondent in the assets and liabilities of the firm had not been settled ;(yi) even if the relinquishment was a true one, as it was one betweenthe partners inter se, and was not made with the concurrence of theState Government, it could not put an end to the obligation of therespondent under the contracts ; (vii) as election is a matter of publicconcern, it was not open to the Collector to accept the relinquishmentwith retrospective effect from 15th November, 1951, so as to affect therights of third parties or remove the disqualification which attachedto the respondent on the date of nomination ; Ford v. Newth (11901]1 Q.B. 683) relied on; Maidstone 1831, and Dartmouth 1845 ([1845],B and Arn. 460) distinguished ; (viii) whatever may be the correct viewwhere the only thing that remains is an outstanding liability on thepart of the Government, there can be no doubt that where a person hasnot completely performed his obligations under the contract, he isinterested in the contract within the meaning of section 7(d); (ix) therespondent was therefore interested in contracts for the performance ofservices undertaken by the appropriate Government within the meaning


of section 7(d) on the date of hia nomination and disqualified to stand asa candidate. SANKABA PANDIA NADAE, A.8.S.8. v. V. V. EAMASWAMIAND OTHEES, 5 E.L.R. 417.

Besignation of membership—Unconditional acceptance withoutsettlement of accounts and payment of dues—Whether terminatescontract—An association of merchants styled "Merchants' AssociationSidhauli" of which the respondent No. 1 was the President, and a firm,of which respondent No. 1 was a partner, was one of the members, obtain-ed a 'license' from the Controller of Foodgrains of the U. P. Government,under the foodgrains procurement and levy scheme of the Government,by which the association undertook to buy, store and deliver to the StateGovernment controlled foodgrains of such specification as may be prescri-bed by the Food Controller and to deliver such foodgrains only to suchperson or persons, and at such prices, as may be fixed by the StateGovernment. The agreement was terminable by mutual consent or onone month's notice. Ti# respondent, intending to stand as a candidate,tendered resignation of his office of President of the Association on the21st November, 1951, and his resignation was accepted, but he wasrequested to sign cheques until a new President was appointed, and he con-tinued to sign cheques after his nomination. The respondent's firm alsoresigned its membership on the 22nd November and its resignation wasaccepted on the same day but moneys due to it for grains supplied to theassociation were fully paid only after the acceptance of the nomination.Eespondent No. 1 was elected to the general seat. An election petitionwas filed to declare that the election of respondent No. 1 was void andpetitioner was duly elected, without an express prayer for declaring theelection of the candidate for the reserved seat also void: Held, perD. N. EOT and A. SANYALB (M. U. FABUQI dissenting)—(i) though therespondent's firm as such could not be a partner of the association as a firmis not a juristic person, the legal effect of one firm becoming a partnerof another firm was that the individuals of the two firms become part-ners in the latter firm, and the respondent No. 1 was therefore a partnerof the association; (ii) that the license' was really a contract as there weremutual obligations under it; (iii) that for the purposes of section 7(d) it isnot necessary that there should be a contract with the Government; it isenough if there was a contract for supply of goods to, or the executionof any works or the performance of any services undertaken by, theGovernment; and there need not be a contract satisfying the requirementsof the Constitution with regard to contracts made on behalf of the Govern-ment; (iv) that under the procurement and levy scheme, the State Govern-ment had undertaken an essential service, viz., the equitable distribution offoodgrains at fair prices to consumers and retail dealers, and the association


had therefore entered into a contract for the performance of a serviceundertaken by the State Government; (v) that, as the security amounthad not been returned and the respondent No. 1 continued to sign chequesas President and the accounts with the association had not been finallysettled and payments made before the nomination was filed, the contractcontinued to subsist at the time of nomination, and the resignation of therespondent and his firm could not remove the disqualification of the res-pondent under section 7(d); (vi) that, on the facts, the result of the electionwas materially affected by the improper acceptance of the nomination ofrespondent No. 1 and the whole election must be declared void. PerM. U. PABUQI {contra).—(i) Neither the Merchants' Association nor itsmember firms were juristic persons capable of entering into a contract,and it was no one's case that the members individually had entered intoa contract with anybody and section 7(d) had no application to the case;(ii) as the respondent's resignation and the resignation of the firm wereunconditionally accepted and the Eegional Controller had consented tothe resignation, the respondent was not interested in the agreement inquestion; the mere signing of cheques after acceptance of the resignationuntil another person was appointed did not negative the effect of theresignation; (iii) in the case of an improper acceptance of a nominationas election cannot be set aside unless the petitioner proves positively thatthe result of the election was materially affected thereby, and as therewas no. evidence at all to prove it, the result of the election cannot beheld to have been materially affected. HANUMAN PBASAD MISEA V.

TABA CHAND AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 446.

Contracts with State Government for supply of foodgrains underControl Orders—Where, under an order issued by the Central Governmentunder section_4(b) of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,1946, empowering the State Governments to exercise the power of con-trolling the production and distribution of essential commodities, theMadras Government issued Foodgrains Control Orders, and under the pro-visions of these Control Orders it entered into contracts with a firm, ofwhich the petitioner was a partner, for the stocking and equitable dis-tribution of foodgrains: Held, that in exercising its powers under section4, the State Government was not acting on behalf of the Central Govern-ment but on its own behalf and the contracts in question were, therefore,for the performance of services undertaken by the "appropriate Govern-ment," that is, the Government of the Madras State, within the meaningof section 7(d) of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1951, and not theCentral Government, and the petitioner was disqualified under aection7(d).V. Vi' EAMASWAMI v. ELECTION TBIBUNAL, TIRUNELVJBLI^ AND

OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 233.

• -J


Contract for supply and distribution offoodgrains—Persons whohave entered into a contract with a Government for the distribution andsupply of foodgrains, under a scheme of the Government for equitable dis-tribution of foodgrains in the State are persons interested in a contractfor the performance of services undertaken by the Government and sodisqualified under section 7(d). Per SACHDEVA and HANS E A J KHANKA(HARBANS SlNGH dubitante):—A person who has entered into a contractfor the transport of foodgrains under such a scheme is also disqualifiedunder section 7(d). Bam Chand v. Wadhawa Bam and Others (5 E.L.B.386) followed. BATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDEE SINGH AND OTHERS, 7

E.L.E. 234.' Nominee for distribution of yarn within a district under the

State nominee system—The agreement between the Governor and anominee under the State Nominee Scheme for yarn distribution, by whichall the yarn in the country was taken over by the Indian Union and theCentral Government distributed the yarn to the various States for supplyto the consumers, and the States, in their turn, appointed a certainnumber of nominees for each district who were authorised to lift the yarnfrom the mills and distribute it to the other licensed dealers in thedistrict, is not a mere license but a contract. In view of the provisionscontained in the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, of theCentral Government, the Madras Essential Articles Control and Bequisi-tioning (Temporary Powers) Act, 1941, and the Madras Yarn DealersControl Order, 1948, the State Nominee Scheme for the distribution ofyarn was a service undertaken by the State Government in the interestof the community. The State Government did not act as a mere agentof the Central Government in performing this service. A nominee of theState Government under this scheme is therefore a person.interested in acontract for the performance of services undertaken by the appropriateGovernment within the meaning of section 7(d) of the B. P. Act, 1951,and disqualified for membership of the State Assembly. Where thenomination paper of the returned candidate was improperly accepted theelection has to be wholly set aside. The election of the candidate alonecannot be declared void and another candidate cannot be declared dulyelected. Dictum: The E.P. Act, 1951, must be suitably amended with a viewto have questions relating to the validity of the nomination papers finallydisposed of as far as possible before the holding of elections. The Englishmodel is not a sure guide on this point as the conditions there are whollydifferent and election petitions have become very rare in that country.DR. KANNABHIEAN V. A. J. AEUNACHALAM AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 167.

—*—Stock-holder appointed under Iron and Steel Control Order,1941.-+-The word "contract" in section 7(d) applies to allihe three kinds


of contracts mentioned in the said clause and not merely to the first two,and consequently a candidate would be disqualified for being chosen as amember of the Parliament or a State Legislature if he has any share orinterest in a contract for the performance of any services undertaken bythe appropriate Government. A person who is registered and appointedby the Central Government as a stock-holder in a State under the Ironand Steel Control Order, 1941, is not, however, disqualified for beingchosen as a member of the Legislature of that State under section 7(d),for, (i) there is no express or implied contract between him and the StateGovernment, and (ii) the services, if any, in the case of the Iron and SteelControl Order, are undertaken by the Central Government and not bythe State Government. PBABHUDAS EAMJIBHAI MEHTA V. LALLUBHAI

KISHOBDAS MANIAB, 1 E.L.E. 154.

Licence for distribution of yarn under State Nominee Scheme—Licence on terms and conditions fixed by parties —Where in pursuance ofthe scheme for the supply and distribution of yarn to the public laid downby the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, of the CentralGovernment, the Madras Essential Articles Control and EequisitioningAct, 1946, and the Madras Yarn Dealers Control Order, 1948, the peti-tioner obtained a licence and entered into an agreement with the Govern-ment of Madras for the distribution and supply of yarn to the public :Held, (l) that whether the service of supply and distribution of yarnundertaken by the Madras Government was performed in exercise of thepowers delegated to it by the Central Government under section 4 of theEssential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act of 1946, or it was acting inexercise of the t statutory powers conferred on it by the Madras Act of1946, in either case it was exercising its power as a Provincial Govern-ment and not as an agent of the Central Government, in issuing, .thelicence and entering into the agreement with the petitioner and theagreement entered into by the petitioner was therefore one for the per-formance of services undertaken by the "appropriate Government" withinthe meaning of section 7(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951 ; (ii) that as the licencewas issued to the petitioner subject to terms that were mutually agreedupon between him and the Government and for valuable consideration,there was a valid contract between him and the Government and the peti-tioner was therefore disqualified to be chosen as a member of the MadrasLegislature under section 7(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951. A. J. AEUNACHALAM-v. ELECTION TBIBUNAL, VELLOBB, AND 0THEBS,9 E.L.E. 471.

Licence-holder for supply to ration shops —A person holding alicence from the Government for the supply of sugar to ration-cardholders under the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, is not a person"interested in a contract for the supply of goods to, or the performance of


any services by, the Government" within the meaning of section 7, clause(d), and is not disqualified to stand as a candidate for election under thesaid clause. Gian Ghand v. Sri Bam Bansal and Others (2 B.L.E, 136)followed. Dr. Kannabhiran v. A. J. Arunachalam and Others (2 E.L.E.167) distinguished. PANDIT HAEISH CHANDRA V. RAJA MAN SINGHAND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 129.

Licensee for supply of sugar under Sugar Control Order—A Statewhich makes provision for the supply and distribution of sugar in accord-ance with the Sugar Control Order issued by the Central Governmentunder the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946, does notundertake any service of supplying sugar to the public but merely carriesout the directions' of the Central Government under the Sugar ControlOrder. Consequently, a member of a firm which supplies and distributessugar under a licence granted by the State in accordance with the schemefor distribution of controlled articles is not disqualified under section 7(d)of the-R. P. Act, 1951. At any rate, even if the Government should bedeemed to have undertaken the service of supplying sugar in such cases, itis the Central Government that undertakes such a service and not theState Government. Prabhudas Bamjibhai Mehta v. Lalhibhai KishordasManiar (1 E.L.R. 154) followed. BALCHAND V. LAXMINARAIN MATBH,

8 E.L.R. 465.

Contract to distribute rice under East Punjab Paddy and Bice(Mill Control and Procurement) Order, 1948—In pursuance of the schemefor distribution of foodgrains at fair prices introduced by the EastPunjab Paddy and Rice (Mill Control and Procurement) Order, 1948, theGovernor of the Punjab entered into an agreement with» an associationcalled the "New Rice Association," by which the association agreed todistribute all rice manufactured by it, in the manner laid down, and atthe prices fixed, by the Government. The petitioner, who was a partnerof a firm which was a member of this association, stood as a candidatefor election to the Punjab State Assembly, but his nomination wasrejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that he was interestedin a contract for the performance of services undertaken by the StateGovernment: Held, that the Punjab Government had taken upon itselfan essential service for the equitable distribution and availability at afair price of foodgrains and other essential commodities, and the contractentered into by the association was a dontraot for the performance of aservice undertaken by the Punjab Government, and, as the petitioner'sfirm was a member of the association, he was interested in the contractand was disqualified to stand for election under section 7(d) of theR. P . Act, 1951, and his nomination was rightly rejected : RAM CflA$fT>v. WAPHAWA RAM AND OTHBRS, 5 E.L.R. 38§.


Forest contractor undertaking to resell stock to Government if sorequired, to clear all undergrowth and shrub and to give housing accommod-ation to labourers—Where a forest contractor had purchased certainQpupes from the Government under an agreement which provided interalia that when the production of 1951-52 sales was ready, if he was callednpon by the Government to sell his stock of firewood and charcoal, hewill have to sell the stock to the Government at a certain maximumceiling selling price: Held, that the contract to sell the firewood andcharcoal to the Government if so required, was a valid one and amount-ed to a contract to supply goods to the Government and the contractorwas disqualified under the first part of cl. (d). Held also, that a provi-sion in the agreement to clear all undergrowth and shrubs and to burnfire traces 50 feet wide round the coupe did not amount to a contractfor ' the execution of any works"; and an undertaking to collectcertain kinds of bark and fruits to meet the requirements of the loca-lity and to sell the same to them and to provide housing accommodationto the labourers did not make him "interested in a contract for theperformance of any services undertaken by the Government" within cl.(d) of s. 7 of the Act. SHANKAB NANASAHEB KAEPE V. MABUTI

SITAEAM SAW ANT AND OTHEBS, 1 E.L.E. 302.

Depot-holder under food rationing scheme—Whether contractor ormere licensee—Under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act,1946, and the East Punjab Rationing Order, 1948, the Punjab Govern-ment assumed control of the supply and distribution of food-grains tothe public and, therefore, supply and distribution of food-grains underthese enactments was a service undertaken by the Government"within the meaning of section 7(d) of the R. P. Act, 1951. But a personwho has been appointed as a depot-holder and authorised by the Govern-ment to supply rationed food-grains to card-holders in accordance withthe provisions of the Rationing Order, is a mere licensee and not aperson who has entered into a contract with the Government, becausethere is no finality in the arrangement, as the authorisation can bewithdrawn or cancelled by the Rationing Controller at any time and nomutuality, as the depot-holder has no enforceable rights against theGovernment. Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others (2 E.L.R. 136),and Pandit Harish Chandra v. Raja Man Singh and Others (5 E.L.R.129) followed. Bam Ghand v. Wadhawa Bam{5 E.L.R. 386), Dr. Kanna-bhiran v. A. J. Arunachalam and Others (2 E.L.R. 167) and SankaraPandia Nadar v. V. V. Bamaswami and Others (5 E.L.R. 417) distin-guished. CHIBANJIT SINGH V. MAM RAJ AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.R. 1.

Agent for procurement and supply of food-grains—The respond-ent was a partner of a firm which acted as the procurement agent of the '

ELD—IO

70 ELECTION LAW* REPORTS DIGEST

State Government and had undertaken to supply food-grains and renderincidental services to it. The agreement provided (i) that during theperiod commencing from 1st November, 1950, to the date of terminationof the agreement, the agent will purchase for the Government at themost economical prices, the kinds, qualities and quantities of food-grainsas may be specified by the Deputy Commissioner and that the agentwill render such further services as provided in clause 15, if so requiredby the Deputy Commissioner ; (ii) the agent will be paid the price forfood-grains which are accepted under clause 6 and such incidentalcharges as the Director of Food Supplies may consider reasonable. Thecontract was subsisting and operative at the time when the respondentfiled his nomination paper. Held, that the agreement for the supply ofgoods to the Government was not void for uncertainty under section 29of the Indian Contract Act, but was a valid contract and the respondentwas disqualified to be a member under section 7(d). JwALA PEASADMISBA v. MAHADBO AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 473.

Contracts for supply of printed receipt books and forms to Collec-tor and Civil Surgeon—Where the nomination paper of the petitionerwas rejected under s. 7(d) of the E. P. Aot, 1951, on the ground that hewas interested in a contract for supply of goods to the appropriateGovernment, as a printing firm of which petitioner was a partner hadsubmitted tenders for printing a certain number of forms and receiptbooks, which were called for by the Collector, Civil Surgeon and by theDistrict Rural Development Board of a District and these tenders hadbeen accepted by them : Held, (i) that when the tender made by thepetitioner's firm was accepted by the Collector, Civil Surgeon and theBoard respectively, there was a complete contract for printing as thetender was an offer and not a mere invitation for offers ; (ii) the ques-tion whether a contract for supply of printed matter was a contract forwork and labour or for supply of goods would depend on the particularfacts of each case and in the present case the contracts were for supplyof goods within the meaning of s. 7(d), not for mere work and labour ;Clay v. Yates (25 LJ. Ex. 237) and Bobinson v. Graves ([1925] 1 K.B.579) distinguished ; Lee x- Griffin (30 L.J.Q.B. 252), applied ; (iii) thatthe expression "contract for supply of goods" in s. 7(d) did not neces-sarily imply a course of dealings but would include contracts which areto be completed by a single delivery and isolated contracts ; (iv) thatthe contracts for supply to the District Collector and Civil Surgeon werecontracts for supply of goods to the appropriate Government and theycame within the purview of s. 7(d) even though they were not expressedto be made by the President or Governor as required by art. 299 of theConstitution ; (v) that the petitioner was accordingly disqualified under

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES Jl

s. 7(d) and his nomination paper was rightly rejected. KANAIYALAL

BHABHUTBHAX MEHTA V. SATTENDEA KALIDAS ZAVBEI AND OTHERS,

JL,iJ,LTB,339.

;):.••-•• —a—Becognised contractors and firms—The respondent was the pro-prietor of a firm which, along with some other firms, had been approvedby the Government for the purchase of medicines and drugs byAushadhalayas under the control of the District Board, Municipal Board,Notified Area Committee, and Eural Development Department. It wascontended that the respondent was disqualified for membership undersection 7(d) of the Act. Held, that the respondent cannot be said tohave any share or interest in a contract for supply of goods to or for theexecution of any works or the performance of any service undertaken by,the State, simply because his firm was approved by the State Governmentfor supply of some drugs to different dispensaries within the Province, andhe was not disqualified under section 7(d) of the Act. KANAUJI LALSHUKLA v. BHAGWAN DIN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 1.

The mere fact that the name of a person is in the list of contrac-tors approved by the Government does not disqualify him under sec-tion 7(d). EAMA EBDDI v. CHIDANANDAM AND ANOTHEB (NO. 2),3 E.L.R. 42.

Lessee of land under Collector—A person to whom the Collectorhas leased out land under section 4 of the U. P. Land Utilization Act,1948, is not disqualified under section 7(d) of the E.P. Act, 1951, as thetransaction is not a contract express or implied, between the lessee andthe State Government, for the supply of goods to or the performance ofany services undertaken by, the State Government. BHOLANATH V.KEIRHNA CHANDEA GUPTA AND OTHEES (NO. 2), 6 E.L.E. 104.

Lessee for quarrying stone—Where the Director of the Depart-ment of Mines, and Geology of a State granted to the petitioner the soleright to quarry building stone from the various quarries of the State undera contract which contained a stipulation that the petitioner agreed tosubmit to the excavation and removal of all stone required for the StateEailway and Military works, and also to allow the P.W.D. contractorsto excavate and remove all stone required for Government works onpayment of a fixed royalty : Held, that the contract was not one for thesupply of goods" to the Government within the meaning of section 7(d)of the E.P. Act, 1951, as there was no agreement to supply goods butonly to allow the removal of stone required for Government purposes.Shankar Nanasaheb Earpe v. Maruti Sitaram Sawant and Others(1 B.L.E. 302) distinguished. LUMBA EAM V. EAM NAEAIN AND

QTHEKS, 5 B.L.B, 319-


Lessee of salt factory from Government—By registeredlease deed executed by the petitioner as lessee and the Governor-General in Council as lessor, the latter demised to the petitionerfor a period of 25 years certain piece of land together with all saltpans and brine pans, compendiously described as a salt factory.Clause 17(a) of the agreement provided that "the lessor shall be entitledto a lien every year on 50 per cent, of the salt produced by the lessee inthe factory and the lessee shall in any season in which notice is givenbefore the 15th January, store at his own expense and keep in reservethe first and every succeeding alternate heap of 1200 or 2400 maunds (asthe case may be) of the salt manufactured in the leased land in thatseason, which the Government will have the option to purchase atsuch rate as may be decided by the Collector from time to time, providedthat each heap of the Government Eeserve stock of one season shall bereleased for disposal by the lessee -as it is replaced by a heap of equalquantity of the new salt of the succeeding season". Clause 18 providedthat "the lessee shall pay in cash in a lump sum on the first day of Junein each year so much of the charge incurred by the Collector in payingthe Government establishments of the factory as may be in excess ofsuch percentage of duty as the Central Board of Eevenue may fix undersection 43 of the Madras Salt Act 1889 or any statutory modificationthereof on salt manufactured in the leased premises and removed there-from in the previous official year." Held, (i) that clause 17(a) containeda contractual obligation and was not merely an incident of the lease ;(ii) that salt supplied to the Government under clause 17(a) was not rentunder section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act; (iii) that the provisioncontained in clause 17(a) was not merely a burden imposed upon thelessee in consideration of the demise but a contract which was primarilyentered into for the supply of salt to the Government; (iv) that the agree-ment was not merely a standing offer which became a contract when theGovernment exercised its option to purchase the salt (after giving noticebefore the 15th of January of any year) but a binding contract to supplygoods ; and (v) the petitioner was, therefore, 'interested in a contractfor supply of goods to the appropriate Government" within the meaningof section 7 (d) and his nomination paper was rightly rejected.Shankar Nanasheb Karpe v. Maruti Sitaram (1 E.L.E. 302) followed.Beg v. Demers ([1900] A.C. 103), Helby v. Mathews ([1895] A.C. 471),and Nutton v. Wilson (1899, 22 Q.B.D. 744) referred to. MAHABAJAop PAELAKIMBDI V. BIJAY CHANDEA DAS AND OTHEES, 4 B.L.E. 101.

Licensee for sale of arms—A person who holds a licence for thesale of arms and ammunition from the Government is not disqualifiedunder section 7 (d). BALWANT SINGH AND OTHEES V. DEVI LAL AND

OTHEBS, 8 B.L.E. 1.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES >/$

Manager of grant-in-aid educational institutions.—Where ascheme framed" by the Government of a State for giving aid to privateeducational institutions provided that institutions which wished toaccede to the scheme must deposit 80 per cent, of their fee collections inthe State treasury for payment of the teaching staff, and if they did so,the deficit, if any, necessary for paying the staff would be met by theGovernment, and it was contended that the Head-master and managerof a private institution which had acceded to the scheme was a personinterested in a contract for the performance of services undertaken bythe appropriate Government and was therefore disqualified to be chosenas a member of the Legislative Assembly under section 7(d) of the E. P.Act, 1951: Held, (i) that the imparting of education was not a servicewhich was the monopoly of the State Government and private educationalinstitutions were not performing any service undertaken by the Govern-ment ; (ii) that the scheme framed by the Government and the accessionof the institution to the scheme did not amount to an offer by theGovernment and acceptance by the institution with a view to the forma-tion of any contract ; (iii) that the Head-master and manager of aninstitution receiving aid under the scheme was not 'interested in acontract for the performance of a service undertaken by the Government'and not disqualified under section 7(d). Held also, that the decision ofthe S upreme Court in Vithaldas Jasani's case (9 E.L.R. 301) did notmean that for the purposes of section 7(d) there need not be a legal con-tractual relation resulting from an offer and acceptance supported byconsideration. MATHAI MATHEW MANJURAN V. K. C. ABRAHAMAND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E .376.

Person running buses taken over by Custodian of Evacuee Pro-perty—The Custodian of Evacuee Property took possession of certainmotor buses, trucks and cars when the petitioner's brothers who appar-ently owned them in part migrated to Pakistan and the petitioner ranthe buses under an agreement with the Custodian who gave possessionof these to the petitioner. The nomination of the petitioner to a seat inthe Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh was rejected on the groundthat he had a share or interest in a contract for the execution of worksor performance of services undertaken by the State of Uttar Pradesh:Held, that the Custodian was not acting for the Uttar Pradesh State inany event, and the petitioner was not therefore disqualified. ASRAR•AHMAD V. NIHAL UDDIN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 81.

-Transport permit-holder—Carriage of mails under conditionattached to permit—A contract is none the less a contract even though itis entered into under the terms of a permit granted under a statute, whichmakes it obligatory on the holder to enter into such a contract in eertain

^4 ELECTION LAW fcfefORTS DIGEST

conditions. Under section 48 of the Madras Motor Vehicles Act andrule 160(B) of the Eules made thereunder the Transport Authority mayattach to any stage carriage permit a condition that the holder of thepermit shall, if so required by the authority which granted the permit,carry mails at such rates and conditions as that authority may fix. Thepetitioner who was a transport permit-holder was directed under theabovesaid condition contained in his permit to carry mails, and he enteredinto a formal agreement with the Union Government in this behalf andcarried mails between certain stations: Held, that, though the petitionerwas under a statutory obligation to carry mails if so required under theterms of the permit granted to him, yet, as there was a contract betweenhim and the Union Government for the performance of services under-taken by that Government, the petitioner was disqualified under section7(d) of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1951, for being chosen as amember of the Parliament. Bansom v. Surbiton ([1949] Ch. 180)distinguished. SATYANATHAN V. SUBBAMANYAM AND OTHERS, 9

E.L.E. 394.

Bule 160-B of the Madras Motor Vehicles Eules provided that itshall be a condition of every stage carriage permit, that the holder of thepermit shall, if so required by the Transport Authority which grantedthe permit, carry mails at such rates and on such terms as the TransportAuthority may fix after consultation with the holder of the permit andthe postal authorities concerned. In pursuance of such a condition in hispermit, the appellant, who was the holder of a stage carriage permit,entered into a formal agreement with the Governor-General to carrymails on a monthly remuneration of Es. 200. , The agreement could beterminated by either side by giving 4 months notice. # The election of theappellant to the House of the People was challenged in an election peti-tion on the ground that, as this contract was subsisting on the materialdates, the appellant was interested in a contract for the performance of aservice undertaken by the Central Government and was, therefore, dis-qualified for being chosen as a member under section 7 clause (d). Theappellant contended that section 7(d) did not apply as the obligationundertaken by him to carry mails was a statutory obligation imposed byrule 160-B of the Madras Motor Vehicles Eules and not a contractualone, that there was no consideration for this contract and that the t»ans-port of mails was not a "service undertaken" by the Central Government.The Tribunal overruled these contentions and held that the appellan#*ra#'disqualified. On appeal to the Supreme Court: Held, (i) that the obliga-tion undertaken by the appellant under the agreement to carry mails wasnot a statutory liability but a contractual obligation even though it wasentered into in pursuance of a statutory condition in the stage carriage


permit, as it was open to the appellant not to accept a permit with sucha condition, or to terminate the contract by notice, (ii) the contractwas fully supported by consideration; and (iii) the transport of mails wasa service undertaken by the Central Government within the meaning ofsection 7(d), and the appellant was, therefore, disqualified and his electionwas rightly set aside by the Election Tribunal. N. SATYANATHAN V.

K. SUBRAMANYAN AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E. 311 (S.C.).When contract terminates—Payment of final bill for work done

—Whether terminates contract —The petitioner, who was a prominentman of a village in Bihar, execiited an agreement in favour of the Sub-Divisional Officer undertaking to repair certain minor irrigation works atan estimated cost of Es. 2,508, before the 4th December, 1949, and tookadvances amounting to Es. 1,600, but being unable to complete the work,requested the Collector on 8th April, 1950, to measure the work that hehad done and pay him for it and to prepare a new estimate for theunfinished work and entrust it to some others. The Circle Officer wasaccordingly directed to measure the work and he submitted a final billwhich was duly checked and passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, forEs. 1,512-11-0. The petitioner was accordingly ordered on 25th June,1950, to refund Rs. 87-5-0 and certificate was issued for recovering it on23rd August, 1951, and the amount was recovered on 18th November,1952. It appeared, however, that the correct amount due to the petitionerwas Es. 1,612-11-0 and not Es. 1,512-11-0 and that a sum of Es. 12 wasreally due to the petitioner. The petitioner filed his nomination paper onthe 23rd November, 1951, and it was rejected on 'the ground that he wasinterested in a contract for the execution of works undertaken by theGovernment and was therefore disqualified under section 7(d) of the E. P.Act, 1951: Held, per HARGOBIND PRASAD SINHA and ADITYA NABAYAN

LAL (BASU PRASAD dissenting)—that, as the petitioner had unequivo-cally expressed his inability to perform the contract and the Collector hadsettled the amount payable to the petitioner for work done by a final billand never insisted on his completing the contract, the contract must bedeemed to have been put an end to with the consent of both partiesunder section 39 of the Indian Contract Act, at any rate when the certifi-cate for recovery was issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer in August,1951, and, as the contract did not subsist on 23rd November, 1951, whenthe nomination paper was filed, the rejection of the nomination wasimproper. The fact that the correct amount payable to the petitionerwas Es. 1,612-11-0 could not alter the legal posilion. Per BASU PRASAD

{contra)—(i) There was not sufficient evidence for coming to the conclu-sion that the Sub-Divisional Officer had terminated the contract withinthe meaning of section 39 of the Indian Contract Act; (ii) whatever

76 ELECTION LAW REPARTS DIGEST

might have been the intention of the Sub-Divisional Officer, as he hadnot paid the petitioner in full on a correct statement of accounts, he hadnot performed his part of the contract in its entirety, and as this con-tractual obligation of the Sub-Divisional Officer cannot be deemed tohave been put an end to by the petitioner's acquiescence or relinquish-ment under section 63 of the Contract Act until 18th November, 1952,when the certificate amount was paid by him, there was a subsisting con-tract when the nomination paper was filed and the nomination wasrightly rejected. Held also, BASU PBASAD and HABGOBIND PEA8ADSlNHA (ADITTA NABAYAN LAL dubitante)—that the agreement enteredinto by the petitioner was a contract and not merely an obligation under-taken by the petitioner as headman of the village in the discharge of hisduties as headman under the Bihar Private Irrigation Works Act, 1922.Satyendra Kumar Das v. The Chairman of the Municipal Commissionersof Dacca (I.L.E. 58 Cal. 180), Seshaiah v. Koti Beddi (3 B.L.E. 39),Boyse v. Birley (1869, 38 L.J.O.P. 203), Baidyanath Prasad v. Chandresh-war Prasad (2 E.L.E. 88) and Kalika Prasad v. Hayat Chand (4 B.L.E.118) referred to. PARMATMA SINGH V. DEO SABAN SIHNA AND OTHERS,

5 B.L.E. 353.

Belinquishing claims against Government before filing nomina-tion A person would be disqualified under section 7(d), if he has a shareor interest in a contract for the execution of any works undertaken bytlis appropriate Government. I t does not refer to the completion orotherwise of the works undertaken, and once it is proved that the personconcerned has a share or interest in a contract of that type, the disqualifi-cation would not cease merely because the work has been completed. I tis, however, open to him to relinquish his claims for payment and thusterminate his interest in the contract. The respondent was a contractorwho had undertaken to do certain works under the appropriate Govern-ment. Prior to the date of filing his nomination, he had completed theworks and had also relinquished his claims for money due for works thathe had done : Held, that, though the mere fact that the respondent hadcompleted his work would not remove the disqualification under section7(d) of the Act, under section 63 of the Indian Contract Act the respond-ent was entitled to dispense with the performance of the promise of theother party, which in this case was the payment of money by theGovernment to him, and he had thus ceased to have any share or interestin the contract and was not, therefore, disqualified for membership undersection 7(d). La Feuvre v. Lankester (118 E.R. 1241), Boyse v. Birley(1869, 20 L.T.B. 786), Ford v. Neivth (1901, 1 Q.B. 683), 0'Carroll v.Hastings (1905, 2 Irish Eeports 593) referred to. Satyendrakumar Dasv, Chairman of Municipal Commissioners of Dacca (I.L.E. 58 CaJ, 180),

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 7f

and Athikesavtdu Naidu v. Ekambara Mudaliar (1939,1 M.LJ. 420)followed. RAMA EBDDI V. CHIDANANDAM AND OTHERS, (NO. 2)

3E.L.B. 42.

Retirement by notice in writing to other partners—Public noticeand notice to Registrar not given before nomination—The respondentwas a partner in a registered firm which had entered into an agreementwith the State for the supply of grains at certain rates. On the 25thOctober, 1951, he gave intimation to his partners through the managingpartners and to the Deputy Commissioner that he intended to retire fromthe partnership with effect from the 1st November, 1951. The partnersconsented and some of the remaining partners continued the firm andentered into a new agreement with the Government on the 28th March,1952, with effect from the 1st November, 1951. The respondent filed hisnomination paper on the 15th November : Held, by the majority(MANDLEKAB dissenting)—that as the partnership was one at will it wasopen to the respondent to retire by giving notice to the other partners andhe ceased to be a partner from the 1st November, even though he had notgiven public notice of his retirement or notice to the Eegistrar of Firmsas required by sections 63 and 72 of the Partnership Act and continued tobe liable to third parties. Per MANDLEKAB.—As the respondent had notgiven written notice-to all the partners but only to the managing partnerand as he had not also given notice to the Registrar of Firms and publicnotice as required by the Partnership Act, and the new agreement with thaState was drawn up long after the date of nomination, the respondent-continued to be a partner and was disqualified under section 7(d) on thedate of nomination. Held also, that when a nomination paper of a disquali-fied person has been improperly accepted the result of the election mustbe deemed to have been materially affected. Mula Singh v. Mangu Ramand Others (2 Doabia 268) referred to. NlEANJAN SlNGH v. JAIDBV

GADADHAB AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 352.

Retirement from firm interested in contract—The petitionerwas a partner in a registered firm which had entered into a contractwith the Central Government in the Postal Department to carry mail.The petitioner assigned his interest in the firm in favour of the otherpartners a few days before filing his nomination paper. No mention washowever made about the contract with the Government in the aforesaiddeed of assignment. Held, that, inasmuch as the petitioner could not bedischarged of his liability to the Central Government under the con-tract except with the. consent of the aforesaid Government, he continuedto be under the disqualification under section 7(d) of the R. P. Act, 1951.Obiter.—If there had been, in fact, a valid assignment of a contract


before nomination that would save a contractor from disqualificationthough some formalities connected with the assignment, such as thegiving of notice under section 63(l) or 72(e) of the Indian PartnershipAct might not have been gone through by them as there is no time limitfixed for giving these notices and this provision is made for the protec-tion of the customers in respect of their future dealings which would notbe affected in any way without such notice having been previously given.MANI KANT A DAS V. JANAB AMJAD ALI AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 406.

What constitutes 'financial interest'—In orderthat the Govern-ment may have financial interest" in a corporation within the meaningof section 7(e) of the E. P. Act, 1951, it is not necessary that the Govern-ment should have an interest in the corporation itself. It is enough, if ithas a financial interest in the business of the corporation. Where aCo-operative Society acted as procuring agents of textile goods for aState and at the relevant period held a permit for lifting a certain quota ofGovernment, and though the agreement provided that all risks, liabilitiesand expenses shall be borne by the Society, the Government was entitledto levy a cess at a certain rate on the price of the cloth sold by thesociety : Held, that the Government had a "financial interest" in theSociety, and the manager of the Society was disqualified under sec-tion 7(e). The mere fact that the Government holds a certain sum ofmoney as security for the due performance of a contract by a corporation and is entitled to forfeit it in certain circumstances does not makethe Government financially interested in the corporation within sec-tion 7(e). The fact that a corporation has taken loans from the Bank towhich the Government has advanced moneys and over which the Govern-ment has effective control does not make it a corporation in which theGovernment has a financial interest," even if the goods pledged by theOdrporation with the Bank are re-pledged by the Bank with the Govern-ment. As the provisions contained in section 7, clauses (d) and (e), aredisabling provisions they must be construed strictly. Bai Saheb BhagwanDas's case (4 Jagat Narain 12) referred to. A ' contract for the supplyof goods" in section 7(d) means a contract of an abiding and subsistingcharacter and is not intended to cover casual supplies of goods. Wherea society had, in response to letters addressed to the local firms by theEegistrar of the Government Secretariat to quote their price for articlesof stationery, quoted its prices and without any further agreement onthe part of the Government to place orders, or on the part of the society tosupply, executed orders from the Government from time to time : Held,that there was no "contract for the supply of goods to the Government"within the meaning of section 7(d), and a shareholder of the society wasnot disqualified under that clause. McPhersQn v. Appanna (A.I*E, 1951

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 7§

S.0.184) and State Aided Bank of Travancore Ltd. v. Dhritram (A.I.E.1942 P.O. 6) relied on. HOREN JONES v. MOHAN SINGH AND OTHERS,

2 B.L.E. 147.

——-Licensee of food grain depot—Royalty on sale of wood—License to quarry stone.—(i) The owner of a food grain depot undera license from a State in which the scheme of rationing, procurement anddistribution of grains laid down by the Essential Supplies (TemporaryPowers) Act, 1946, is in force is not disqualified under section 7(d) of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, on the ground that he is interestedin a contract for performance of services undertaken by the State; for underthe Essential Supplies (Temporal Powers) Act, 1951, and the Orders madethereunder the State does not undertake any services to the people butmerely controls the production, supply and distribution of food grains in theState. Membership of a grain dealers' association which has agreed to pur-chase all food grains arriving at a particular mandi and to sell them to suchpersons and at such prices as the Government may fix, does not entail dis-qualification under section 7(d). (ii) A person who has purchased from theGovernment for a fixed sum of money the right to collect royalty on thesale of wood from certain villages for a certain period is not disqualifiedunder section 7(d), on the ground that he is interested in a contract for theperformance of any services on behalf of the Government, (iii) A lease ofa Government quarry for the extraction of ore does not amount to a con-tract for supply of goods to the Government within the meaning of sec-tion 7(d) of the Act even though it contains a term that if the Governmentrequires any quantity of stone or sand, the contractor will not refuse tosell to the Government at the current price. GlAN CHAND V. SBIEAMBANSAL AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 136.

5. Office of profit.—"Holding office of profit under Government"—Tests—Source from which profit is derived—Power to appoint and remove— Vice-Chancellor of Baroda University—The source from which a personreceived profit is not the sole test as to whether he holds an office ofprofit under the Government within the meaning of art. 102 (l) (a) of theConstitution, The power to appoint and remove is also one of the testsand if a person is appointed by the Government to an office of profit andis removable by the Government from the office he would be a personholding an office of profit under the Government even though he is notpaid out of Government funds. The petitioner who was the Vice-Chancellor of the "University of Baroda received an honorarium ofRs. 500 per month, a car allowance and a free furnished house from thefunds of the University, but was appointed by the Government of Barodaand was liable to be removed from office by the Government: Held (i)

8o ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

that even though the petitioner received her allowances from-the fundsof the University and not from the State direct, as she was appointed bythe Government of Baroda and was liable to be removed by the Govern-ment he was disqiialified under art. 102(l)(a) of the Constitution forbeingsch osen as a member of Parliament; (ii) the fact that she wasoriginally appointed by the Government of the State of Baroda and notby the Government of Bombay did not make any difference, as all thepowers of the Government of Baroda vested in the Bombay Governmenton the merger of the State in Bombay. S. N. Haider v. S. N. Malik(Hammond 257), Khwaja Hakim Jain v. Moulvi Shaikh MahomedHusain (Hammond 311) and Delane v. Hillcoal (9 B. and C. 310) referredto. HANSA JlVEAJ MEHTA v. INDUBHAI B. AMIN AND OTHERS,1 E.L.B. 171.

Office of profit—tests—The consideration to be borne in mind inthe case of an office of profit is not whether the holder himself madeprofit out of the office, but whether the office was one which enabled himto make profit. LAHBI SINGH v. ATTAR SINGH AND OTHEBS, 3 E.L.E. 403.

The most important test for determining whether an office isheld under the Government is whether the power of appointment anddismissal vests in the Government. KRISHNAPPA V. NABAYANSINGHAND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.B. 294.

-See also Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members, In re,4 E.L.B. 422 pp. 85-87 infra.

Resignation of office before filing nomination—Besignation notaccepted—Whether disqualification continues—Where a candidate whowas in the service of the State Government as a teacher and thus heldan office of profit under the Government resigned his post a few daysbefore the date of filing the nomination and thereafter ceased to attendto his duties, but the Government did not accept his resignation as theintention to resign was not intimated to them before the stipulated date-Held, that under article 310 of the Constitution his service wasdependent on the pleasure of the Government and his resignation nothaving been accepted, the disqualification continued to operate. LAHBISINGH V. ATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.B. 403. [See also 2 E.L.B.330, 4 E.L.B. 34, 5 E.L.B. 48, 6 E.L.B. 308].

Assessoi—An assessor of a Ssssions Court does not hold anoffice of profit under the Government and is not disqualified underarticle 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. KESHO BAM V. HAZUBA SlNGHAND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B, 320.

An assessor of a Sessions Court does not hold an office of profitunder the Government. SANT SINGH V. SHAMSHER SlNGH ANDOTHERS, 7 B.L.B. 203.

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 8 l

An assessor of a Sessions Court does not hold an office of profitunder the Government within the meaning of section 7(d). NATWAR

LAL v. BHARTENDRA SINGH AND AKOTHEE, 5 E.L.E. 408.

An assessor does not hold an office of profit under the Govern-ment but merely gives assistance to the State in the administration ofJustice in his capacity as a citizen and is not therefore disqualified underarticle 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. ISHBB SlNGH v. MANJIT INDEB

SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 90.

An assessor does not hold an office of profit under the Govern-ment and is not disqualified for being chosen as a member under article191(l)(a) of the Constitution. FAQIR CHAND V, PRITAM SlNGH ANDOTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 119.

A person who is put on the list' of assessors of a Court ofSessions does not thereby hold an office of profit within the meaning ofarticle 19l(l)(a) of the Constitution. BALBIB SINGH V. ABJAN SlNGHAND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 341.

A person who has been appointed as an assessor on the EailwayBates Tribunal for a certain period by a notification of the Governmentis not thereby disqualified under article 102 or 191 of the Constitution;for, assessorship of the Tribunal is not an office" as it is not an employ-ment and has no existence independent of the incumbent, nor can a personappointed as an assessor be said to hold an office except when he actuallysits as an assessor. Further, the office, if any, is not one held under theGovernment of India or the Government of any State. KlSHENLALLAMBOB v. MADAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 49.

Chairman of Municipality—Whether the post of Chairman ofany particular Municipality held by any person, is an office of profit heldunder the Government of a State, will depend upon the various provisionsof the Municipal Act which govern the said Municipality. As the Presidentof the Jodhpur Municipality receives an honorarium of Es. 130 a monthand the Jodhpur Municipal Act does not make the President and the Vice-President of the Jodhpur Municipality absolutely independent of theGovernment but they are, on account of the provisions of the Act, underthe control of the Government so far as their appointment, removal etc.are concerned, the President of the Jodhpur Municipality holds an officeof profit under the Government of the State of Bajasthan. HAKIKATUL-

LAH v. NATHU SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 10.

Director of Government company—A person would not be dis-qualified under section 7 (e) by being a Director of a Bank in which theGovernment baa a financial interest unless the office of such Director is

$2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

declared by Parliament by law to so disqualify its holder. DAULAX BAM

v. MAHAEAJA ANAND CHAKD AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 87.

-—Honorary Magistrate—An Honorary Magistrate is not dis-qualified for membership of the State Legislature. BENI MADHO BAI V.BHOLA AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.B. 308.

—Honorary Secretary of District Development Board—The non.official Honorary Secretary of a District Development Board of theGovernment of Bombay holds an office of profit, but he does not boldthe office under the Government of Bombay, as there is no relationshipof master and servant between him and the Government. Mere powerof appointment and dismissal, and payment of an honorarium from theGovernment treasury and general supervision or control cannot makea person a servant of the Government if he has not agreed to be subjectat all times to the orders and direction of the Government not only withregard to the nature of the work but also in the manner of doing it.Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin (l E.L.B. 171), and MajibarBahman Chaudhury v. Abdul Barkat Ataul Gani (4 E.L.B. 481) referredto. MEHTA GORDHANDAS GIEDHARIAL V. CHAVADA AKBAE DALU-

MIYAN AND OTHERS [NO. 2], 7 E.L.B.. 374.

Istimrardar An Istimrardar does not hold an office of profitunder the Government. BHAIBON V. THAKUB GANPAT SINGH AND

OTHERS, 6 E.L.B. 409.

I An Istimrardar is not a holder of an office of profit underf the Government. MADAN SINGH V. KALYAN SINGH AND OTHEBS

6 E.L.B. 405.

——An Istimrardar is not the holder of an office of profit underthe Government. GULABCHAND CHOEDIA V. THAKUR NAEAIN SINGH

AND OTHEES, 6 E.L.B. 397.

Lambardar Even assuming that lambardari is an office ofprofit, it is only the holder of the lambardari in question who will bedisqualified to be a member of a State Legislature ; the other membersof his family who are joint with him are not disqualified, as thedisqualification in question is a personal one so far as the holder isconcerned. SAHI BAM V. MANPHOOL SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 47.

Lambardars—'Ihe Punjab State Legislature (Prevention ofDisqualification) Act, VII of 1952, is not ultra vires the State Legisla-ture either on the ground that it violates the fundamental right ofequality before the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution or

•op.the ground that it renders nugatory the provision debarring a


lambardar and other village headmen from giving any assistance to acandidate to further the prospects of his election, or on the ground thatit is given retrospective effect from 26th January, 1950. SUMER SINGHv.. THAKUB GURDAT AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 171.

. Lambardars—Law removing disqualification of lambardars withretrospective effect from 26th January, 1950—Whether infringes funda-mental right of equality before the law—Held per HABBANS SINGH andHANS E A J KHANNA (PAEMA NAND SAGHDBVA dissenting):—Alambardar appointed under the Punjab Land Revenue Act holds anoffice of profit under the Government, within the meaning ofarticle 191(1) (a) of the Constitution but this disqualification underarticle 191(1) (a) is removed with retrospective effect from the 26thJanuary, 1950, by the Punjab State Legislature (Prevention ofDisqualification) Act, VII of 1952. The Punjab State Legislature(Prevention of Disqualification) Act. VII of 1952, does not make anyunreasonable discrimination between one class of lambardars andanother class of lambardars, even though lambardars who did not standfor election on the belief that they were disqualified did not get thebenefit of the retrospective operation of the Act and others whostood for election notwithstanding the disqualification imposed byarticle 191(1) (a) got the benefit of the Act, and the Act is not thereforeultra vires on the ground that it contravenes article 14 of the Constitu-tion. Per PARMA NAND SACHDEVA.—The clause (2) of section 1 of thePunjab State Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1952,which gives it retrospective operation from the 26tb January, 1950involves an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination as amongst thelambardars, as many lambardars could not take advantage of the retros-pective operation of the Act while others could, and is therefore ultravires on the ground that it infringes the fundamental right of equalitybefore the law guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. Held bythe Full Tribunal:—(i) The Election Tribunal has jurisdiction todecide whether an enactment passed by a Legislature is ultra viresor not. SANT SINGH V. SHAMSHER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 203.MAHARAJ SINGH V. RATAN AMOL SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 320.

Lawyers approved but not retained by Government for conduct-ing railway cases—A lawyer who is an approved railway pleader",that is, a pleader who is engaged by the Government for conductingrailway cases who does not receive any retaining fee but only afee for the cases conducted, does not hold an office of profit under theGovernment within the meaning of section 7(e) or article 102(l)(a) ofthe Constitution of India. Harnandan Prasad v. Kamta Prasad Kakkar([1924] A.L.J. 129), Mohammad Bux v. Mohammad Abdul Baqi Khan


([1923] Ind. Cas. 490) and Great Western Bailway v. Bater ([1922] A.C. 1)referred to. GOVIND MALAVIYA V. MUELI MANOHAE AND OTHERS,8 B.L.R. 84.

Member of Committee receiving travelling and halting allmoances—Travelling and halting allowances received by a member of an AreaCommittee constituted under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charita-ble Endowments Act. 1951, are not remuneration but representreimbursement of out of pocket expenses, and a member of anArea Com-mittee constituted under the Act does not, therefore, hold an office ofprofit" within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitution and is notdisqualified for membership of the Legislature. To constitute an officean office of profit" within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitu-tion of India, prestige and like advantages attached to the office will notsuffice. Pecuniary advantage is an essential element, and once thereis, or there can be, pecuniary gain, its quantum is immaterial. But theConstitution does not enjoin a wholesale ban on every type of officeirrespective of whether any remuneration is attached to it or notmerely because the office carries prestige and other advantages.Hansraj Jivaraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin and Others (1 E.L.R. 171)distinguished. SHIVABAMA KARANTH V. VENKATARAMANA GOWDA


Membership of the District Vitran Committee is not an officeof p?:ofit under the Government within the meaning of article 19l(l)(a)of the Constitution and does not entail disqualification to become amember of the State Legislature. Chander Nath v. Kunwar JaswantSingh (3 E.L.R. 147) followed. SAHI RAM v. MANPHOOL SlNGH ANDOTHERS, 7 E.L.R, 47.

The word profit" in article 191 of the Constitution of Indiadoes not necessarily mean any remuneration in cash, but it certainlymeans some kind of advantage or gain which is tangible or which can beperceived ; the mere influence which one gains by virtue of his positionas member of a committee which has no remuneration attached to it isnot profit within the meaning of article 191 of the Constitution and themember of such a committee would suffer no disqualification by beinga member thereof. CHANDER NATH V. KUNWAR JASWANT SINGH


Membership of Legislative Assembly constituted under theGovernment of India Act, 1935—The prohibition contained in article171(3)(d) of the Constitution applied to members of the new Assemblyconstituted under the Constitution of India and not the members of theold Assembly, then functioning temporarily under article 382 of the


Constitution. A member of the old State Legislative Assembly was not,therefore, disqualified to stand for election to the State LegislativeCouncil. The word "Assembly" occurring in the two parts of sub-clause (d) of article 171(3) of the Constitution of India means the samebody, i.e., the Legislative Assembly first constituted under the Constitu-tion. KALIKA PBASAD SINGH V. ABDUL HAYAT CHAND AND OTHEBS,

4 E.L.B. 118.

-Member of Legislative Assembly—A member of the LegislativeAssembly of a State drawing a fixed salary and travelling ar"3 dailyallowances does not hold an office of profit under the State Governmentand is not therefore disqualified under Isection 7(d). BHOLANATH V.KEISHNA CHANDRA GUPXA AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 6 B.L.R. 104.

Member of out-going Legislative Assembly receiving salary—Theexpression 'office" in article 191 of the Constitution means a positionor place to which certain duties are attached more or less of a publiccharacter and is a sort of a permanent position held by successive incum-bents. An office which has a salary attached to it is an office of profitand a member of the Legislature receiving a monthly salary as a mem-ber holds an office of profit. But he does not hold an office of profitunder the Government (which in the case of a Part A State is synony-mous with the Governor) since he is subordinate only to the Speakerand the House, and not to the Governor. YoGEAJSiNGH SHANKAR-SING-H PARIHAE V. SlTAEAM HlRACHAND BlRLA AND OTHEES (NO. 2),3 B.L.E. 439.

Members of Assembly appointed Members of District AdvisoryCouncils—Receipt of travelling and daily allowances—Whether Membershold office of profit—Office of profit, essentials of—"Hold", "office","profit", meanings of—Guiding principles as to disqualification—•English and Indian law—The Vindhya Pradesh Government appointeda District Advisory Council for each of the eight districts in theState, and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the Staterepresenting these districts were all appointed members of the res-pective District Advisory Councils. The order of appointment providedthat the members will get travelling allowance and daily allowance appli-cable to members of the Legislative Assembly for the day or days of themeetings. Under the rules the travelling allowance was one and a half firstclass railway fare and the daily allowance was Es. 5 for each day of resid-ence at the place where the meetings were held. The question whetherthe members who had been so appointed had become disqualified to bemembers of the Assembly was referred by the President to the Election

ELP—i?


Commission. The Commission was of opinion—(i) Membership of theVindhya Pradesh District Advisory Councils was an office" within themeaning of sections 16 and 17 of the Government of Part C States Act,195], read with the provisions of articles 101 and 102 of the Constitutionand the members held that office "under" the Government of VindhyaPradesh, (ii) Members of the Assembly who had actually attended anymeeting of a Council must be said to have "held" such office, (iii) Eorthe purpose of deciding the question of disqualification, so long as anyprofit was attached to an office, it did not matter whether the profit hadin fact been appropriated or not and therefore there was no distinction forthe present purpose between members who drew their allowances andthose who did not. (iv) "Where a member of a council, committee, orboard is merely entitled to a bona fide travelling allowance or daily allow-ance (as distinguished from a "sitting fee" or "attendance fee") whichpurports to covet, and presumably covers, only his actual out-of-pocketexpenses, and the amount of allowance is not fixed at such a high figureas to make it a mere cloak for giving a profit, there is no profit". Conse-quently, the payment of li first class railway fare to the members ofDistrict Advisory Councils was not a source of profit to the members,(v) The daily allowance at the rate of Es. 5 per diem, which was beingpaid to the members of the Legislative Assembly in respect of their attend-ance at the sessions of the Assembly was such a reasonable amount thatit could not be said to yield any profit to the members of the Councilwho went to attend meetings thereof, (vi) But, by making the dailyallowance rate the same for resident and non-resident members, theGovernment laid itself open to the charge of offering a certain amount ofprofit, though a small profit, to the resident members, and as the quantumof profit is not a material consideration, members residing in the DistrictHeadquarters, who had attended any of the meetings of the respectiveDistrict Advisory Councils, should be deemed to have held offices of profitunder the Government and, therefore, incurred the disqualification referredto in section 17 of the Government of Part C States Act, 1951. "Profit"within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitution and thelaw must be material in character and not merely moral or spiritual, butany material advantage, howsoever insignificant, will constitute profit"and bring the member in question within the mischief of the relevantprovisions. The English law in this respect is, however, very strict.There is no justification for adopting such a strict and technical view ofthe matter in India. The word profit" should be given a reasonable andnatural interpretation. If consideration is paid in the shape of a remunera-tion, "sitting fee" or 'attendance fee," it becomes a "profit," inasmuch asit does not even purport to cover any actual expenses. Such consideration

DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES 8/

or remuneration should be deamad to constitute 'profit" even though,on detailed accounting, it may be found that no financial advantage hasin fact, been gained by the member in question. In the matter ofVINDHYA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MEMBERS, 4 E.L.E. 422.

Ministers and Deputy Ministers—-The respondents who wereelected members of a State Legislative Assembly were appointed DeputyMinisters on the 5th February, 1954. At that time, no emoluments,either by way of salary or allowance, were attached to that office, butsalary was attached to that office with effect from the 5th February, 1954,by an Ordinance passed on the 13th February, 1954. The very sameOrdinance declared in exercise of the powers vested in the Bajpramukhunder article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution that the office of a DeputyMinister would not constitute nor be deemed to have constituted at anytime a disqualification for its holder being chosen or retained as a memberof the Legislative Assembly. Certain members of the State LegislativeAssembly applied under article 228 of the Constitution for the issue of awrit of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ or direction on theground that the office of the Deputy Minister was "an office of profit" andits acceptance by the respondents disqualified them for retaining theirrespective seats in the Legislative Assembly after the date of their appoint-ment, that the vacancies which thus arose could only be filled up by theprocedure laid down by section 150 of the Eepresentation of the PeopleAct, 1951, and that the action of the Bajpramukh and the State Assemblyin removing the disqualification retrospectively by enacting an Ordinanceand, later on, the Hyderabad Act V of 1954, operated in effect to re-appoint the respondents to fill up the vacant seats without holding a freshelection as required by law, and, further, that in order that a declarationcontemplated by clause (a) of article 191(0 may be effective, it should bemade prior to the occurrence of the vacancy : Held, (i) that when a salarywas attached to the office of the Deputy Minister and it became an officeof profit, the disqualification envisaged by article 191(l)(a) was also takenaway and the two acts being simultaneous, the acceptance of the office ofthe Deputy Minister did not disqualify and did not bring about anyvacancy, and section 150 of the Bepresentation of the People Act had noapplication ; (ii) that the fact that the members would have entertainedthe hope when they accepted the office of Deputy Minister that the Legisla-ture would ultimately fix a remuneration for the post, and salary wasgiven to them with retrospective effect from the 5th February, would notmake the acceptance of that office on 5th February, 1954, acceptance ofan office of profit on that date, so as to attract to itself the disqualificationmentioned in article 191 and to render the respondents' seats automatically

&8 feLECTIOisf LAW SEPO&TS E>1GEST

vacant; (iii) that , as under article 192 of the Constitution questionsof this nature must be referred to the Governor or Eajpramukh for deci"sion, it was not a proper case for the issue of a writ of quo warrantoby the High Courts. V. D. D B S H P A N D E AND O T H E B S V. S T A T E OF

H Y D E E A B A D AND O T H E R S , 10 B.L.E. 203.

Minister—Election declared void—Nomination for by-electionmore than six months after first election but within six months from dateof order declaring election void—Exemption of Minister from disqualifi-cation on the ground of holding office of prof it—Applicability—-When thoelection of a candidate who has been returned as a member and subse-quently appointed as a Minister is declared void in an election petition,the period of six months for which he can continue as a Minister underarticle 164(4) of the Constitution runs from the date on which the orderof the Tribunal is published and not from the date of his appointment as aMinister. B E A J N A E E S H S I N G H V. HUKAM S I N G H , 9 B.L.E. 80.

Pateli—Pateli is an office of profit under the Government withinthe meaning of article 191 of the Constitution of India as a Patel hasimportant duties to perform under the Land Eevenue System and hisappointment and removal rests with the Government and there is alsoprofit attached to the office. The actual making of profit is not necessaryto make an office one of profit; it is enough if the holder may reasonablybe expected to make a profit out of it. Delane v. Hillcoat (9 B. and C.310) referred to. BHEBUSINGH v. P E A B H U D A Y A L C H A U B E Y AND

O T H E B S , 2 E.L.E. 325.

Patel—Tender of resignation—Whether terminates office beforeacceptance-- The office of a Patel under the Madhya Pradesh Abolition ofProprietory Eights Act, 1951, is an office of profit under the State Govern-ment within the meaning of article 191(l) (a) of the Constitution. Inorder that an office may be an office of profit' it is not necessary thatthere must be some sort of regularity of income. Neither is it necessarythat there should be actual making of profit by the incumbent; it isenough if the holder of the office may reasonably be expected to makea profit out of it. The Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Eemovai ofDisqualifications) Act, 1950, did not apply to Patels appointed under theMadhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Eights Act (Act I of 1951),and, as the Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Eemovai of Disqualifications)Amendment Act of 1952 was deliberately given retrospective effect onlyfrom 23rd February, 1952, Patels holding office as such under Act I of1951 were disqualified to stand for election until tha t date. The respond-ent who was appointed as a Patel under the Madhya Pradesh Abolitionof Proprietory Eights Act, 1951, intending to stand as a candidate for

DISQUALIFICATION Ot CANDIDATES 89

election as a member of the Legislature, tendered resignation of his officeto the Tahsiidar on the 8th November, 1951. The Tahsildar acceptedthe resignation on the same date and the respondent filed his nominationpaper on the 15th November, 1951. Under the rules the appointingauthority was the Deputy Commissioner and a Patel had to give threamonths' notice before resignation : Held, per PANDE and MANDLEKAR

(CHIPLONKBB, dissenting)—that the acceptance of the resignation by theTahsildar was invalid as he was not the appointing authority and, there-fore, had no right to accept the resignation, and also because threemonths' notice was not given as required by the rules, and the respondent,therefore, continued to hold the office of a Patel and was disqualified.Per CHIPLONKBR.—The respondent ceased to hold office as a Patel whenhe tendered his resignation and ceased to do his duties, though he may beliable for the consequences of not giving three months' notice. THAK.URDAOOSING v. EAMKRISHNA EATHOR AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 34.

-Patels—Zamindari Abolition—-Zamindars appointed as patels—Injunction by Court against taking possession of Zamindaris—Whetherappointee disqualified—On the promulgation of the Madhya BharatZamindari Abolition Act, the Government of Madhya Bharat fixed a datefor the vesting of the villages, but before that date, on a petition for awrit of mandamus, the High Court of Madhya Bharat issued an injunc-tion ad interim restraining the Government from taking possession of theZamindari lands. During the interval between the promulgation of theAct and the interim injunction, the Government had notified the appoint-ment of the erst-while Zamindars including the petitioner as the Patelsof the villages previously held by them as Zamindars, but by reason ofthe injunction the operation of the Act was suspended and the Govern-ment issued instruction to the Collectors directing that notwithstandingthe notification of appointment, the nominees should not do the work ofPateli: Held, that under the circumstances the petitioner did not holdthe office of a Patel under the Government during the period when theinjunction was in force. BRINDABAN PRASAD TlWARI V, SITA EAM ANDOTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 48.

Patels—Appointment of patels —Implied acceptance—Notifica-tion under Madhya Bharat Zemindari Abolition Act, 1951—Injunctionrestraining Government from taking possession of Zemindari lands—Whether terminates appointment—-Where the respondents who had filedtheir nominations on 20th November, 1951, were appointed patels for oneyear from 2nd October, 1951, under the Madhya Bharat ZemindariAbolition Act, 1951, by a Notification published in the Gazette on 2ndSeptember, 1951, and they were personally informed of the appointment


and the evidence also showed that later on they received the remunera-tion for the whole year : Held (i) that the conduct of the respondentsamounted to an acceptance of their office and they must be deemed tohave held the office of patels on the date of nomination ; (ii) they did notcease to be patels because an order of injunction was passed by the HighCourt on 1st October, 1951, directing the Government not to take actualpossession of the lands and a letter was issued to the patels by theGovernment asking them not to work as patels but only to make certainreports. Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sitaram and Others (5 E.L.E. 48)dissented from. The office of patel is an office of profit under theGovernment. MAHESH DATTA V. MUELIDHAR AND OTHBES, 7 E.L.R. 154.

Patels —Injunction restraining functioning, effect of—Inpursuance of the Madhya Bharat Zemindari Abolition Act, 1951, and thePatel Appointment Bules thereunder, the respondents were appointedPatels by a Notification in the Gazette in September, 1951. Copies of thenotice were served on them and they accepted the copies. In October,1951, the High Court of Madhya Bharat issued an injunction against theGovernment against taking possession of the zemindaris. They filed theirnomination papers in November, 1951: Held, that the respondents werevalidly appointed as patels and held an office of profit at the time ofnomination notwithstanding the injunction of the High Court restrainingthe Government from taking possession, though owing to the injunctionthey could not work for the time being, or the scope of their work wasrestricted. Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others (7 E.L.B. 154) followed.Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sita Bam and Others (5 E.L.B, 48) dissentedfrom. JAGDISH SINGH V. RUDEA DEOLAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B. 311.

Patel appointed under Madhya Pradesh Abolition of ProprietaryBights Act, 1951—Where the respondent was selected as a patel underthe Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Bights Act (I of 1951),and was formally appointed as a patel by the Deputy Commissioner, buthe did not execute an agreement in Form A or Form B or give securityas required by the rules before entering upon his duty, nor was heexempted from these formalities, and he did not do any act as a patel:Held, that there was no valid appointment as a patel, and even if therewas an appointment, the respondent did not hold",the office of a patel.Held also, that though the office of a patel under Act I of 1951 was anoffice of profit under the State, it was exempted from disqualification bythe Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Bemoval of Disqualifications) Act(VII of 1950), inasmuch as this office was merely a substitute for theoffice of lambardar which was expressly exempted by Act VII of 1950.The fact that the Bemoval of Disqualifications Amendment Act (IV of

DisQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES Ql

1952) was given retrospective effect only from the 23rd February, 1952,does not show that the office of patel tinder Act I of 1951 was notexempted by Act VII of 1950. JAGANNATH V. PANDUBANG ANDOTHEBS, 4 E.L.E. 167.

Besignation—Effect 0/—The disqualification of a person who holdsan office of profit under the State does not cease on his submitting an un-qualified resignation of his office but only when his resignation is acceptedby the proper authority. A person who held an office of profit tenderedan unqualified resignation of his office on the 19th October, and got areply that he ̂ cannot be relieved until a substitute was available. Heapplied for one month's leave on a medical certificate on the 6thNovember, and ceased to work from the next day and filed a nominationpaper on the 10th November. On the 12th December, he was placedunder suspension with effect from the 7th November and his resignationwas accepted only on the 14th January, next year: Held, that he did notcease to hold his office by tendering his resignation or by ceasing towork or by being suspended and was disqualified to stand for election onthe 10th November. Aberbrothock (25 Journ. 667), Lanarkshire (2 Doug.367) and Bengal Marwari Association case (Hammond 157) distinguished.Sudarsana Bao v. Christian Pillai (45 M.L.J. 798), President TalukBoard, Hospet v. / . Chandrappa (A.I.E. 1925 Mad. 173), People'sCo-operative Bank Ltd. v. Bameshwar Prasad Varma (A.I.E. 1942 Pat.452) and Venkatasubba Bao, In re (A.I.E. 1944 Mad. 132) relied on.BAM MUBTI V. SUMBA SADAB AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E. 330.

The material date for consideration of the validity of the nomi-nation paper is that of the nomination, and not of the scrutiny, and there-fore, if a candidate held the office of patel on the date of nomination, hissubsequent resignation before the date of scrutiny will not validate thenomination. The plea that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected by the improper acceptance or rejection of any nominationcould be raised by any petitioner, whether he is a candidate or not. Thematerial date for the determination of the question whether a nominationhas been improperly rejected is that of the nomination itself and if anomination paper is improperly rejected, subsequent acceptance of anoffice of profit by the candidate is not a ground for holding that theresult of the election has not been materially affected by the improperrejection. The improper rejection of a nomination renders the electionvoid. (Case law referred to). BEINDABAN PBASAD TlWARl V. S ITAEAM


Buler getting alloivance as privy purse under Agreement ofMerger—An ex-Euler of an Indian State who receives a sum of money

f2f ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

annually as privy purse from the Central Government under an Agreementof Merger in consideration of his having given up his rights as aEuler does not hold an office of profit under the Government within themeaning of article 102 or 191 of the Constitution. DAULAT EAM V.MAHABAJA AN AND CHAND AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 87.

The mere fact that a. junior member of a royal family of a Statereceived a substantial monthly allowance from the State and, under therules all allowance holders are bound, under certain contingencies, torender certain services to the State, will not render him the "holderof an office of profit under the Government" within the meaning ofarticle 191 of the Constitution. PANDIT HARISH CHANDRA y.BAJA MANSINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 129.

Sarbarakars—Sarbarakars in the State of Orissa are not holdersof an office of profit under the State within the meaning of article 19l(l)>(a) of the Constitution, inasmuch as (i) the office of Sarbarkar is herit-able, (ii) a salami is paid on every appointment, (iii) an interest in land iscreated in favour of the Sarbarkar and he is a tenant in respect of it ; and(iv) the source from which he gets his commission is not the generalrevenue of the State but the collection from tenants from out of whichhe pays the revenue. Lala Sohan Lai V. Lala Binda Saran (Sen andPoddar 685) and Nawab Talib Mehadi Khan v. Baja Mohammad AkramKhan (1 Doabia 240) referred to. MAHENDRA SAHU V. DUTIA EAULAND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 117.

——Teacher of grant-in-aid school—A person serving as a teacher ina grant-in-aid school does not hold an office of profit under the Govern-ment merely because the school receives grants from the Governmentfor payment of a portion of the dearness allowance and the pay of theteachers. KRISHNAPPA V. NARAYANSINQH AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.E. 294.

University Employees—University, whether Corporation inwhich Government has any financial interest"—The Punjab Universityconstituted under the East Punjab University Act, 1947, is not a cor-poration in which the Government has any financial interest" within themeaning of section 7(e) of the E.P. Act, 1951, even though it receives asubstantial annual grant from the Government, its accounts are examinedand audited by the Government, it uses service postage stamps, its fundsare deposited in Banks approved by the Government, the Governor is theChancellor, and the Vice Chancellor is also appointed by the Governorand a person who holds an office of profit under the University is nottherefore disqualified from standing for election under section 7(e) of theAct. Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. lndubhai S. Amin and Others (1 E.L.B.171) distinguished. HARI DAS V. HlRA SlNGH PAL AND OTHERS,4 B.L.E, 466,


6. Part C States.—Disqualification of candidates—Under section 17of the Part C States Act, 1951, read with article 102(e) of the Constitutionwhat would be a disqualification for a candidate for being chosen to eitherHouse of Parliament under article 102, would be a disqualification to bechosen for the Legislature of a Part C State. The omission in section 8of the Part C States Act, 1951, of Part II of the E. P. Act, 1951, in whichsection 7 of the latter Act occurs, does not lead to the conclusion thatthe disqualifications referred to in section 7 do not apply to Part G States.A contract with the Chief Commissioner of a Part C State would, undersection 9 of the Part C States Act, read with section 3(8) of the GeneralClauses Act, be a contract with the Central Government and wouldoperate as a disqualification for election to either House of Parliamentunder sections 7(d) and 9 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and it would be adisqualification under section 17 of the Part C States Act, 1951, forelection to the Legislate Assembly of the State. SATTA DEV BUSHAHEIv. PABAM DEV AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E. 103 (S.C.). See also MAHENDEA

KUMAR V. VIDYAWATI AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E. 216 (S.C.).

7. Miscellaneous.—Disqualification arising before election—Powerof Governor or Election Commission to make enquiry—Articles 190(3) and192(1) of the Constitution of India are applicable only to disqualifica-tions to which a member of the Legislature becomes subject after he iselected as such and neither the Governor nor the Election Commissionhas jurisdiction to enquire into a disqualification which arose before theelection. SAKA VENKATA EAO V. ELECTION COMMISSION, 1 E.L.E. 417,

affirmed by Supreme Court in 2 E.L.E. 499.

If a question whether a member has, or has not, becomesubject to a disqualification properly arises under article 103 of theConstitution and, on the representation of any person, that question isreferred by the President to the Election Commission for its opinion,the fact that the person who raised the question and made the repre-sentation to the President does not wish to proceed with the matter andasks for permission to withdraw his petition, is not a sufficient groundfor the Election Commission to desist from giving its opinion on thereference. Articles 101(3) and 103(1) of the Constitution are applicableonly to disqualifications to which a member of a House of the Legisla-ture becomes subject after he is elected as such member, and neitherthe Governor nor the Election Commission has jurisdiction to enquireinto a disqualification which arose before the member's election. Elec-tion Commission v. Saka Venkata Rao (2 E-L.B. 499) followed. MAHARAJAANAND CHAND, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197,

ELD—13


The Election Tribunal has power to decide whether a candi-date was disqualified under article 191 of the Constitution of India.Article 192 applies only to disqualifications arising after a person hasbecome a member of the Legislature. RAM MTTRTI V. STTMBA SADAR

AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 330.

-Grounds of disqualification—Poiver of State Legislatures tocreate new grounds—Under article 191(1) of the Constitution of Indiadisqualifications other than those expressly mentioned in the saidarticle can be created only by any law made by the Parliament. TheState Legislatures have no power to create new disqualifications, andrule 61-A(1) of the U. P. Panchayat Eaj Eules cannot, therefore,have the effect of disqualifying a panch for membership to the StateLegislature, though on the face of it, it purports to do so. BENI MADHO

E A I v. BHOLA AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 308.

Material date for deciding qualification —Candidate not enteredon any electoral roll at the time of nomination—Entry as voter in a rollbefore scrutiny of nominations—The question of qualification or dis-qualification of a candidate has to be ascertained with reference to hisstatus on the date of his nomination and a candidate whose name didnot appear in any electoral roll on the date of his nomination does notbecome qualified to stand for election by getting his name entered onan electoral roll before the date of the scrutiny of the nominationpapers and producing that electoral roll before the Returning Officer atthe time of scrutiny. Sections 33(6) and 36(7) (a) of the R. P. Act, 1951,properly construed, do not preclude a Returning Officer before whom anelectoral roll containing the name of a candidate is produced at the

"time of scrutiny of nominations from making an enquiry as to whetherthe name of the candidate was in any electoral roll on the date of hisnomination and from rejecting his nomination if his name did notappear in any roll on the date of the nomination. A revised electoralroll does not speak from the date of the original roll and nominationof a person who was not in a roll at the time of nomination cannot bevalidated by a subsequent amendment or revision of the roll. Hardfordv. Linskey (L.E. 1889, 2 Q.B. 852), Pritchard v. Mayor of Bengor(13 Appl. Cas. 241), Gethard v. Clarke (L.R. 5 C.P. 253), Baldurni v.Ellis (1929,1 K.B. 273), Sir Manindra Chandra Nandy v. PravashChandra Mitter (Hammond 545), Saka Venkata Rao v. ElectionCommission (1 E.L.R. 417) referred to. P. N. BALASTJBRAMANIAN V.C. R. NARASIMHAN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 461.

The question whether a candidate was qualified to be chosen asa member should be determined with reference to his status on the date

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 95

on which his nomination paper is presented and not with reference tothe date of scrutiny of the nomination papers. Consequently, if a person'sname is not entered on the electoral roll as a voter on the date onwhich his nomination paper was presented, his nomination must berejected, even though on an application made by him to the ElectionCommission before the date of nomination an order is issued by theElection Commission before the date of scrutiny to include his name inthe electoral roll. AWADESH PEASAD SlNHA v. PEABHAVATHI GUPTA

AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 45.

A candidate is not qualified to stand for election unless hisname is in the electoral roll as a voter on the last day fixed for nomina-tions, and if his name was not in the electoral roll on that day his nomi-nation must be rejected even though his name was included in the roll bya direction of the Election Commission before the date of scrutiny ofnominations. BAJTAYAN SHAEAN SINGH AND ANOTHER v. RAMESHWAE

YADAV AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 296.

The material date for determining whether a candidate wasqualified is the date of his nomination and if he was disqualified on thatdate, his nomination must be rejected, even though the disqualificationwas removed before the date fixed for scrutiny of nominations. RAMCHAND v. WADHAWABAM AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 386.

The crucial date with respect to which the respondent'squalification has to be determined is the date of nomination. NAEASIMHEGOWDA V. LAKKAPPA AND ANOTHER, 4 E.L.E. 234.

If a candidate was not qualified on the date of nominationhis nomination must be rejected even though the disqualification is re-moved before the date of scrutiny of the nominations. SANT SlNGKH V.SHAMSHER SINGH AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 203.

-The observation of the court in Chathurbhuj Vithaldas v.Moreshivar Parasram (9 E.L.E. 301) that the material period for deter-mination of the qualification of a person starts with nomination andends with the announcement of the result of the election is not a deci-sion on the point as it proceeded on an agreed statement of the counselon both sides. I t was not decided in the case that the period did notextend up to the notification of the result in the Gazette. SATYA DEVBUSHAHEI V. PADAM DEV AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 103 (S.C.).

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES.

Appealing to voters to give both votes to same candidate—Whetherundue influence. See B. R. AMBEDKAB AND ANOTHER V. S. A. DANGE

AND OTHEES, 1 E.L.R. 364 (pp. 53-54 supra).


Nomination paper—Specification of seat for which candidatestands, necessity of—Where a nomination for a double member consti-tuency, one of the seats in which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes,was rejected by the Beturning Officer on the ground that the candidatehad not specified whether he sought election for the general seat or thereserved seat, but it appeared from the nomination paper that the can-didate had crossed out the portion referring to the declaration requiredfor candidates standing for the reserved seat and he did not also mentionhis caste against column 6 but simply put a cross against it: Held, thatthere was sufficient indication in the nomination paper that the candi-date did not intend to stand for the reserved seat but was standing forthe general seat and the rejection was improper. BHAN SlNG-H V.KRISHNA KANT AND ANOTHER, 4 E.L.E. 212.

Omission to state whether candidate stands for general or reservedseat—Validity of nomination—-Improper rejection of candidate for generalseat—Whether affects election to reserved seat.—Where the nominationof a candidate who was not a member of a Scheduled Caste, for a seat ina double member constituency, one of the seats in which was reservedfor the Scheduled Castes, was rejected on the ground that he had notstated anywhere in the nomination paper that he was a candidate forthe general seat, but it appeared that he had placed a cross mark againstclause VI of the form and had indicated therebj' that he was not amember of the Scheduled Caste: Held, that there was no substantialdefect in the nomination and the rejection of the nomination paperwas improper. Held further, that the entire election, including theelection of the candidate for the reserved seat, was void. Where anomination paper has been improperly rejected the result of the elec-tion must be deemed to hava been materially affected. SUBAJBHANv. HEM CHAND JAIN AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 1.

Improper rejection of candidate for one seat—Whether wholeelection void—In a double member constituency if the nomination paperof a candidate for the reserved seat has been improperly rejected andthe election to that seat has to be set aside, the whole election, includ-ing that for the general seat must be set aside. BAKAEAM SUKAEAMKONKANI v. SHANKAB EAO CHINDUJI BEDSE AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.R.409.

• In a double member constituency the declaration of the elec-tion as wholly void must relate to the general as well as the reservedseat irrespective of whether the candidate whose nomination was im-properly rejected was eligible for the reserved seat or the general seat.NAEANJAN SINGH V> BEISH BHAN AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.R. 179.

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES 97

In the case of double member constituency in which there is ageneral seat, and a seat reserved for the Scheduled Castes, election tothe general seat and the reserved seat are not two separate elections butone indivisible election in which candidates of the Scheduled Castes arealso contesting for the election to the general seat. Consequently, theexpression "the election" in section 100(l)(c) should be interpreted insuch a case as meaning the election to both the seats, and if the improperrejection of a nomination for either of the two seats has affectedthe election, the election for both the seats should be set aside. SurajBhan v. Hemchand and Others (2 E.L.E. l)» Ramchandran Nair v. Rama-chandra Das (1 B.L.E. 442), Vijay Mohan Reddy v. Paga Pulla Beddy(2 E.L.E. 414), and Nagjibhai v. Mithabhai (l E.L.E. 162) followed.JAGANNATH v. PANDURANG AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 167.

In a double member constituency if the nomination of a candi-date for the general seat is found to have been improperly rejected andthe result of the election to that seat has been materially affected thereby,the whole election, including the election of the candidate for thereserved seat also, has to be declared void. Suraj Bhan v. Hem GhandJain and Others (2 E.L.E. l) followed. HARI DAS V. HIRA SINGH PAL

AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 466.

Petition for setting aside election to one seat—Maintainability—Power to set aside whole election.—-(i) Though the petition did notcontain an express prayer for declaring the election of the candidatereturned for the reserved seat also void, the Tribunal has power to givesuch relief as was just and proper on the facts and circumstances proved ;

(ii) that in the case of a double member constituency, the principle thatthe election for the two seats is one indivisible election applies to theimproper acceptance as well as improper rejection and the whole electioncan be set aside even in the case of improper acceptance of a nominationfor the general seat, if the result of the election has been affected;(iii) that on the facts, the result of the election was materially affectedby the improper acceptance of the nomination of respondent No. 1 andthe whole election must be declared void. HANUMAN PRASAD MlSRAv. TARA CHAND AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 446.

In a double member constituency the whole election for theconstituency for the reserved seat as well as the general seat has to bedeclared void if the election to one of the seats is found to be void.DHARAM VIR v. BHALA BAM AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 64.

• In the case of a double member constituency if a nominationfor the reserved seat is found to have been improperly rejected and theresult of the election has been materially affected thereby, the whole


election, including that for the general seat also, has to be declared void.MORESHWAB PABASHRAM V. CHATTJRBHUJ VlTHALDAS- JASANI ANDOTHERS, 7 B.L.E. 428.

In a double member constituency, where the whole election isnot declared void under sub-section (l) of section 100, but the election ofthe candidate to the general seat alone is declared void on the ground ofirregularity and fraud in counting the votes, it is not necessary to setaside the election of the candidate returned for the reserved seat also,merely because the election of the other candidate has been declared void.A candidate for the general seat in a double member constituency isentitled to file an election petition challenging the election of the candi-date for the reserved seat. SALIG RAM JAISWAL V. SHEO KUMARPANDE AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 67.

Petition to set aside election of candidate for reserved seat alone—Candidates duly nominated for general seat not impleaded—In a plura 1member constituency which was entitled to elect candidates for twoseats, one of which was reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the other,a general seat, the nomination paper of the petitioner who stood for thereserved seat was rejected on the ground that he did not belong to theScheduled Castes but was an Arya Samajist. The petitioner filed anelection petition impleading as respondents only the four ScheduledCaste candidates who had been duly nominated without impleading theduly nominated candidates for the general seat, and praying only for adeclaration that the election of the first respondent was void : Held, (i)that the words at the election" in s. 82 of the B. P. Act, 1951, meantthe whole election and the petiti oner was accordingly bound to impleadas respondents the candidates who had been duly nominated for thegeneral seat also and, as s. 82 was mandatory and the petitioner hadfailed to implead them, the petition was not maintainable ; Held also,that, as the ground for setting aside the election was the improper rejec-tion of a nomination paper, the case was covered by s. 100(l)(c) of theAct and the election can be declared void only as a whole, and the prayerfor declaring the election of the first respondent alone void could not begranted. Bathischandra v. Amulyacharan (I.L.E. 58 Cal. 87) followed.Line and Others v. Warren and Others (14 Q.B.D. 548) distinguished.Basantsing v. Ratansingh (l Doabia 80) and Lewis v. Gibbon (l Doabia259) referred to. NAGJUBHAI GOVINDHBAI ARYA V. MITHABHAI RAMJI

CHAWHAN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 162.

Petition to set aside election to general seat—Candidate returnedfor reserved seat—Whether necessary party —Where in a double memberconstituency the candidate for the reserved seat was declared elected

DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES. 99

under section 54(2) and an election petition to set aside the election ofthe candidate returned for the general seat alone was filed withoutimpleading the candidate elected for the reserved seat and it was foundthat the nomination paper of the petitioner for the general seat wasimproperly rejected : Held, (i) that the election for the two seats was asingle election and not two different elections and the election for oneseat alone could not be declared void ; (ii) the candidate elected for thereserved seat was also a necessary party to the election petition undersection 82 of the Act; (ii) non-compliance with section 82 was not fataland the candidate for the reserved seat could be added as a party on theapplication of the petitioner or by the Tribunal suo motu ; (iv) that if hewas so added the proceeding against him could be deemed to have com-menced only when he was added as a party, and, as the period of timeprescribed by rule 119 had expired, there was no use of impleading himat this stage and the petition was liable to be dismissed. BHAN SINGHv. KRISHNA KANT AND ANOTHER, 4 E.L.E. 212.

Petition to set aside election of candidate for general seat—Candidate for reserved seat, whether necessary party—As the election toa double member constituency is a single election and the entire electionhas to be set aside if the election of one of the candidates is void, thecandidate elected for the reserved seat is a necessary party to an eleotionpetition to declare the election of the candidate to the general seat void.Non-joinder of such candidate even after objection is raised will be fatalto the maintainability of the petition. The question whether non-joinderof a candidate as respondent to an election petition is fatal or not, willdepend on the answer to the further question whether the Tribunal canor cannot grant the relief sought behind the back of such a candidatewithout causing any detriment to his interests. BENA V. JAGAT SINGHAND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 174.

•——Symbols—Unrecognised party—Allotment of common symbol—Legality—Held, per NAWAL KISHORE and KRISHNA SAHAI.—Under theElection Rules, and instructions issued by the Election Commission,candidates who are not members of a recognised All India Party could betreated only as Independent candidates, and in the case of a doublemember constituency, a common symbol, e.g., Camel, cannot be allottedto the candidates of an unrecognised party, with a thick black circlearound that symbol for the Scheduled Caste candidate. But the electioncannot be set aside on account of such an irregularity in the allotment ofsymbols unless it is further proved that the result of the election wasmaterially affected thereby. Per DALIP SINGH.—The symbol of a Camelwith a black circle around it is not an unapproved symbol and can be


assigned to a Scheduled Caste candidate of an unapproved or unrecognisedparty. The difference between the recognised and unrecognised partiesin the matter of allotment of symbols is that in the case of recognisedparties certain symbols are reserved for them and in the case of un-

, recognised parties, one common symbol cannot be reserved for all thecandidates. But if a symbol is allotted to one candidate for a generalseat, the same symbol with a circle may be assigned to the ScheduledCaste candidate set up by the party even though it is an unapproved

1 party. Th9re is no prohibition or bar in the instructions or rules againsti allotting to a Scheduled Caste candidate set up by an unapproved party ai • symbol with a circle round it. MOHINDEB SINGH v. MlHAN SlNGH ANDI OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 426.

I _ ' ELECTION AGENTS.

I Election agents.—Acceptance of agent, necessity of—Election law does" . not require that Form 5A must be filed along with the nomination paper,' and a nomination paper cannot therefore be rejected summarily on the

ground that Form 5A was not filed with the nomination paper. But, ifI Form 5A is not produced along with the nomination paper or when the

candidate is required by the Beturning Officer to do so,, and it is foundthat the agent had not accepted his appointment and signed Form 5A

f before the delivery of the nomination paper, the Beturning Officer will be' fully justified in rejecting the nomination on the ground that section 33

or Act XLIII of 1951 had not been complied with, for, acceptance by theagent of his appointment as agent is necessary for a valid appointment ofan election agent. Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas and Others (2 E.L.B. 301)followed. GXJEDIAL SINGH v. MANMOHAN KAUB AND OTHEES, 10

E.L.B. 450.

Declaring different election agents in different nomination papers—Rejection of all papers—Whether proper—Validity of first appointment—A candidate filed two nomination papers on a certain date in which hedeclared that he had appointed X as his election agent. He filed twomore nomination papers on the next day in one of which he declared thathe had appointed Y as his agent and in the other, that he had appointedhimself as his agent. All the four nomination papers were rejected by theBeturning Officer on the day of scrutiny on the ground that the candi-date had appointed more than one person as his agent: Held, that whena Beturning Officer scrutinises the nomination papers he should notscrutinise all the nomination papers collectively but should scrutinisethem one after the other, and since in the first nomination paper thecandidate had appointed only one agent that nomination paper was valid,

ELECTION AGENTS IOI

and as the power to appoint an agent can be exercised only once, thesubsequent appointment of another person as agent was invalid, but theinvalidity of the subsequent appointment cannot affect the validity of thefirst appointment, and the rejection of all the nomination papers wastherefore improper. Held further, that non-compliance with the provi-sions of section 40 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not a ground for rejecting anomination inasmuch as section 40 is not mentioned in section 36(2) (d)while sactions 33 and 34 are expressly mentioned. Benares and MirzapurDistricts Muhammadan Bural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 154)and Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 716)approved. Manipuri and Etah District Muhammadan Rural Consti-tuency, 1946 (Sen and Poddar 530) distinguished and doubted.MOTISING-HJI MAHAEAMANSINGHJI MAHIDA v. CHAWDA ISHWARBHAI

KHODABHAI AND OTHERS, 1 B.L.R. 330.

Different persons appointed in different nomination papers --Rejection of all papers—Legality—Validity of first nomination —A candidate can appoint only one person as his election agent, but wherehe has appointed different persons jmder different nomination paperswhich are not presented simultaneously, all the nomination papers cannotbe rejected. The first nomination paper would be valid and the othersshould be rejected. Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency case, 1937(Sen and Poddar 716) not followed. Benares and Mirzapur DistrictMuhammadan Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 154), and Moti-singhji Mahida v. Iswarbhai Khodabhai and Others (l E.L.E. 330)followed. Manipuri andEtah Districts Muhammadan Rural Constituencycase (Sen and Poddar 530) distinguished. GOKALDAS HlEJEB v. ZAVBBIVALLABHDAS AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 234.

Different persons appointed under different nomination papers—Procedure —Rejection of all papers—Legality—Validity of first nomina-tion—Power to revoke appointment before scrutiny—A candidate canappoint only one person as an election agent. Where a candidate appointsdifferent persons as election agents in different nomination papers whichare not presented simultaneously all the nomination papers cannot berejected. The first nomination paper and appointment of agent would bevalid and the others invalid. A candidate is entitled to revoket heappointment of an agent after the filing of the nomination papers andbefore their scrutiny. I t is well settled that when the nomination of acandidate is improperly rejected by the Eeturning Officer there is a strongpresumption that the result of the election has been materially affected.TRAMBAKLAL MANISHANKEE v. PEABHULAL BHIMJI AND OTHEES, 2

E.L.E. 245.ELD—14

1 0 2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Declaring different agents in different nomination papers—Validity of nomination—A candidate can appoint only one election agent,and his nomination will be invalid and all the nomination papers must berejected if he appoints different election agents in different nominationpapers, even though he has not appointed more than one agent in eachnomination paper. The view that each nomination paper is a separateentity and has to be considered independently at.the time of scrutiny andthe first nomination can be held to be valid in such cases is not correct.The fact that the nomination papers were not presented simultaneously butonly at short or long intervals cannot make any difference and the viewthat once the candidate has appointed an election agent he cannot exercisethe power again and the subsequent appointments are thereforeineffective and should be ignored is also erroneous. Benares and MirzapurDistricts Muhammadan Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 154 ;2 Doabia 197), Bazzar Muhammadan Bural Constituency case (Sen andPoddar 716), Motisinghji Mahida v. Iswarbhai Khodabhai and Others(l B.L.E. 330) dissented from. Manipuri and Etah District MuhammadanBural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 530) and Mahomed Hussain v.Mohamed Baffique (-A.I.E. 1941 Cal. 130) followed. Held also (i) thatin an election petition the respondent can support the order of theReturning Officer rejecting a nomination paper on grounds other thanthose mentioned in the order of the Returning Officer, (ii) If the ReturningOfficer has not called upon the candidate to produce a certified copy ofthe electoral roll, the respondent to the election petition cannot urge thenon-production thereof as a ground for supporting the rejection of thenomination paper, (iii) Omission to file a statement in Form 5A with thenomination paper is not a contravention of section 33(3), and does not in-validate a nomination, (iv) Omission to specify three symbols and omissionof the words ' with yoke on" after ' two bulls" in the only one symbolwhich had been mentioned, are not defects justifying the rejection of anomination paper, (v) A person holding an office of profit under Governmentis not disqualified to be an election agent under section 145 of the R. P .Act. (vi) A candidate is a "duly nominated" candidate if he has filed anomination paper in accordance with the formalities prescribed in section33(3) of the Act even though his nomination paper was later rejected onscrutiny, and such a candidate, must be joined as a party to an electionpetition under section 82 of the Act. The non-joinder of a duly nomi-nated candidate is not fatal to the maintainability of a petition ifadequate relief can be granted to the parties in his absence. MENGHRAJv. BHIMANDAS AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.R. 301.

Candidate appointing himself as election agent-—Appointmentdeclared in nomination paper itself—Validity of nomination—The norni-

ELECTION AGENTS 103

nation paper of a candidate who has appointed himself as his election.. agent cannot be rejected merely because the declaration of appointment• of himself as election agent is not made in a separate document but is•'j noted in the nomination paper itself. It is well settled that if a nomi-•. nation of a candidate is improperly rejected the result of the election

is presumed to have been materially affected thereby, inasmuch as theentire electorate is deprived of its right to vote fora candidate who was

• qualified to stand as such. This presumption would require the mostconclusive evidence for its rebuttal and in the absence of such evidencethe election of the returned candidate must be declared void if a nomi-nation paper has been improperly rejected. H A J I NASIMUDDIN V.

DANDIRAM DUTTA AND OTHEES ; and SlVAPKASAD SARMA V. DANDI-EAM DUTTA AND OTHERS, 1 B.L.R. 412.

-The instruction contained in the form of nomination paperthat if more than one nomination paper is delivered by or on behalfof a candidate the name of the election agent, whether such agentis the candidate or any other person, shall be specified in each suchnomination paper, is sufficiently complied with if the candidate describesthe agent as "myself" in each nomination paper. The nomination paperscannot be rejected on the ground that he does not write down hisproper name in each of them. In any event the description of the agentas myself" is only 'a technical defect which is not of a substantialcharacter" within the meaning of section 36(4) of the Act. EAMA-CHANDRAN NAIR V. EAMACHANDRA DAS AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 442.

'Forin 5-A of the Eules has to be attached to a nominationpaper only when the candidate appoints a person other than himselfas his election agent. GlAN CHAND V. SBIRAM BANSAL AND OTHERS, 2E.L.E. 136.

Where a candidate who intended to appoint himself as hiselection agent filed three nomination papers in which he had struck offthe words printed in the form of nomination paper in Schedule II refer-ring to the appointment of another person as election agent, so that theprinted matter read as follows: "I hereby declare that I have appointedmyself as my election agent " : Held, that the nomination could not berejected on the ground that the candidate had not written his name infull or even the words "myself" in the declaration in the nominationpapers. The footnote in the form which requires that the candidateshould writs his name even when he appoints himself as his agent goesbeyond section 33(3) of the E. P. Act, and non-compliance with it willnot invalidate the nomination, PEABHUDAS EAMJIBHAI MEHTA V.

LALLUBHAI KISHORDAS MANIAR (NO. 2), 2 E.L.E. 249.


Provisions regarding the filling up of forms are merely direc-tory and it is sufficient if they are obeyed substantially. They do notenjoin literal compliance and exact fulfilment. Where, therefore, acandidate haa signed his full name in the declaration form and hasstated above that he declares that he appoints himself as hi3 electionagent there is substantial compliance with section 40 of the Act andrules framed thereunder and Schedule II , inasmuch as it is clear fromthe declaration who is the person appointed as election agent and thereis no possibility of mistake or ambiguity in this. Wasawa Singh v.Warayam Singh (2 Doabia 263) and Gurbaksh Singh v. Baldev Singh(1 Doabia 13) relied on. VlJAYA MOHAN BEDDY V. PAG-A PlTLLA BEDDYAND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 414.

-Failure to file Form V-A—Whether invalidates nomination—Failure to file Form V-A with the nomination paper can at best be anon-compliance with the provisions of section 40 of the E. P. Act, 1951,for which no penalty is prescribed and it cannot invalidate the nomi-nation paper. Such an omission doe-s not bring the case within section36(2)(d) of the Act as it does not amount to failure to comply with theprovisions of section 33(l) or (3). Mengh Raj v. Bhimandas and Others(2 E.L.E. 301) followed. SOCKET SINQH i>. THAKAE SINGH AND OTHBBS

(No. 2), 3 E.L.E. 102.

Nomination paper—Appointment of election agent—No separateform has been prescribed for appointing the candidate himself as hiselection agent other than the appointment and declaration contained inthe form of nomination paper itself. I t is not therefore necessary thatthe declaration should be contained on a separate chit of paper in orderto fulfil the meaning of the word accompanied" contained in section33(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951. BHOLA NATH V. KRISHNA CHANDRA

GUPTA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 288.

-The provision contained in section 33(3) of tha B. P. Act, 1951,that no candidate shall be deemed to be duiy nominated unless a decla-ration of appointment of an election agent is submitted along with thenomination is mandatory. Where, in the nomination paper no personother than the candidate was appointed as agent and the words "myself"and "as my", were also struck off: Held, that the nomination wasnot valid. MANDAL SUMITRA DEVI V. SURAJ NABAIN SINGH AND


Candidate appointing himself as agent—Provision to insertname and father's name of agent—Whither applies—The form of nomina-tion paper contemplates the insertion of the name of the election agentand his father's name only where the candidate appoints a person other

ELECTION AGENTS 105

than himself as his election agent. In any event, omission to insert thename of the election agent and his father's name in the nominationpaper is not a material defect, when the candidate appoints himself ashis agent, and a nomination paper cannot be rejected merely on theground of such omission. The foot-note in the form relating to thismatter is unhappily worded and requires amendment. RamachandranNair v. Ramachandra Das and Others (1 B.L.E. 442) followed. MOHANVITHAL EAJ v. GANGADHARA SIVA AND OTHBES, 4 B.L.E. 91.

It is not necessary to state the name of the election agent andhis father's name in the declaration of appointment of election agentwhere the candidate appoints himself as his election agent and only onenomination paper has been filed by him, or on his behalf. Quaere: Whetherhe should state his name again in the declaration of appointment of agent,when more than one nomination paper are filed. Ramachandran Nairv. Ramachandra Das and Others (l B.L.E. 442), Prabhudas RamjibhaiMehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas Maniar (l E.L.E. 154) and Bejoy Singh,v. Narbada Gharan Lai and Others (2 B.L.B. 428) referred to. LAKSHMICHAND v. LADHU RAM OHODHEI AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.R. 200.

Under sections 33(3) and 40 of the R. P. Act, 1951, it is incum-bent upon a candidate to deliver a declaration in Form 5-A along withthe nomination paper, and a nomination paper can therefore be rejectedif such declaration is not filed along with it. ISHER SlNGH v. MANGITINDBR SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.R. 90.

(i) A declaration that the candidate has appointed himself ashis election agent on the form of nomination itself is a sufficient compli-ance with sections 33 (3) and 4.0 of the R. P. Act, 1951. The words" accompanied by a declaration " in section 33 (3) do not necessarilyimply that a separate paper containing such declaration is essential,(ii) The appointment of an election agent need not be made before thetiling of the nomination paper, (iii) Omission to state the place ofverification or to add words to the effect that the statements made oninformation are believed to be true, are not substantial defects for whicha petition could be dismissed, (iv) Indian election law relating to givingof particulars of corrupt practices is much more stringent than theEnglish law and allegations of corrupt practices in respect of which fullparticulars are not given must be struck off. PlANUMAN PRASAD MlSEAv. TARA GHAND AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 446.

' Appointment of election agent—Omission to file Form V, effect of

—Candidate appointing himself as agent—Declaration in nomination

I o 6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

paper, whether sufficient—Construction of declaration—Name of anotheragent inserted without striking off myself" and as my "—Whether twoagents appointed—Validity of nomination—Appointment of more than oneagent—Whether all nomination papers void—Oral evidence as to factumof appointment of agent—Admissibility—-The respondent filed threenomination papers. In the first, which was in Hindi, in the form ofdeclaration of appointment of agent he inserted the name of " G. S." butdid not strike off the words " swayam ho " and " apna " though he struckoff the word " mera". In the second form, which was in English, thename of " G. S." was inserted and the words " myself " and " as my "were both struck off. In the third, which was in Hindi, the name of'" G. S." was inserted and words " swayam ko " and " mera " were bothstruck off. The first was rejected on the ground that the candidate hadappointed both " G. S." and himself as agents, and the remaining twoon the ground that Form V was not filed along with the nominationpapers : Held, (by the Full Tribunal) that there is no provision whichmakes the Sling of Form V with nomination papers compulsory and therejection of the second and third nomination papers on the ground thatForm V was not filed along with them was improper. Held perK. K. SHAEMA and A. N. KAUL (P. L. SHOMB, dissenting)—(i) that, oathe face of the first nomination paper, read with the statements of thecandidate, he had appointed "G. S." and himself as agents, and, therefore,this nomination paper was invalid ; and as the candidate had appointedmore than one agent, all the nomination papers, including the 2nd and3rd, could be rejected on this ground. P. L. SHOME.—In the declarationin the first nomination paper the appointment of either the one, or theother, or both, was not clear and so there was no valid appointment ofany agent in that paper and the question of the validity of the 2nd and3rd on the ground that more than one agent was appointed did not arisefor decision. Held further (by the Full Tribunal) that oral evidence asto the factum of appointment of an election agent is not excluded bysection 91 of the Evidence Act, though the appointment itself has to bein writing. Held also Per K. K. SHAEMA and A. N. KATJL (P. L. SHOMB,dissenting)—(i) Under section 40 of the E. P. Act, 1951, where a candi-date appoints himself as his agent it is not necessary that there shouldbe a separate appointment in writing in addition to a declaration in thenomination paper itself to that effect. Haji Nasimuddin and Anotherv. Dandiram Dutta and Others (l B.L.E. 412) followed, (ii) The appoint-ment of an election agent can be made by a candidate under section 40only after his nomination paper has actually been subscribed by theproposer and seconder and the nomination has been assented to by thecandidate, and before delivering to the Eeturning Officer. Section 33(3)

ELECTION AGENTS 107

does not require any writing anterior to the declaration of appointmentof agent to evidence such appointment. Per K. K. SHABMA andA. N. KAXJL.— Where more than one election agent is appointed by acandidate all his nomination papers must be rejected as all the nomina-tion papers must be considered collectively. The view that eachnomination paper must be taken as a separate entity and one of themcan be accepted and the others rejected, is not sound. Benares andMirzapur District (Sen & Poddar 154), Bazzar Muhammadan RuralConstituency Case (Sen & Poddar 716), Gohal Das Hirji v. ZaveriVallabhdas (2 E.L.R. 234), Motisinghji v. Ishwarbhai Khodabhai(1 E.L.R. 330) not followed. DIN SINGH AND OTHERS V. KAPIL DEOAND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 247.

——-The nomination of a candidate who has appointed himself ashis agent cannot be rejected on the ground that he has not written hisname in the declaration of appointment in the form of nomination paperbut retained the word ' myself ". Haji Nasimuddin v. Dandiram Dutta(1 E.L.R. 412) referred to. BHAIRON V. THAKUR GANPAT SINGH AND

OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 409.

Though a candidate files several nomination papers, if he doesnot appoint any person other than himself as his election agent, it is notnecessary that he should write out his own name as the agent in eachpaper. It is enough if he writes "myself". SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER

v. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 265.Though there should be a separate declaration of appointment

of election agent in addition to the nomination paper, the form of nomina-tion prescribed under rule 4 provides for appointment of election agentalso, and if the form is properly filled up and filed, sections 33(3) and 40are sufficiently complied with. Deo Ghand and Others v. Vashist Narainand Others (6 E.L.R. 138) explained. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V.

SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 265.

Candidate appointing himself as agent—Declaration of appoint-ment in nomination form itself—Whether sufficient—Per K. K. SHARMA J.and A. N. KAUL (SHOME, dissenting)—"Where a candidate appoints himselfas his election agent, the declaration in the nomination paper that he hasappointed himself as his election agent is a sufficient compliance with sec-tion 40 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. It is not necessarythat he should appoint himself as his election agent in a separate piece ofpaper before filing his nomination paper. SHOME.—Section 40 requires thatan appointment of an election agent, whether it be the candidate himselfor another person, should be made before the delivery of the nominationpaper and that it should be in writing. A declaration in the nomination

io8 ELECTION 1AW REPORTS DIGEST

paper itself cannot therefore satisfy the provisions of section 40 ; and if noseparate appointment in writing is made before delivering the nominationpaper, apart from the declaration in the nomination paper itself thenomination must be rejected. Haji Nasimuddin v. Dandiram Dutta andOthers (1 E.L.R. 412) and Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others(6 B.L.E. 247) followed. LALLXJ CHAND V. T E J SINGH AND OTHERS, 8B.L.E. 28.

A declaration made in the form of nomination paper itself beforeit is delivered to the Returning Officer that the candidate hasappointed "self" as his election agent, is sufficient compliance with theprovisions of sections 40 and 33(3) of theEepresentation of the People Act,1951. T E J SINGH V. ELECTION TBIBTJNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS,

9 E.L.R. 193.

Form VA is not a "declaration" within the meaning of section33(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, but only a documentevidencing the act of appointment and failure to file Form VA with thenomination paper is not therefore a ground for rejecting the nominationfor non-compliance with section 33(3). Isher Singh v. Manjit InderSingh and Others (7 E.L.R. 90) dissented from. Mengh Baj v. Bhimandasand Others, (2 E.L.E. 301) followed. DEVASHARAN SINHA V. SHEOMAHADBY PEASAD AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 461.

——If an election agent is not appointed under Form VA, therewill be a non-compliance with section 40(2) and rule 11-A, but suchnon-compliance is not a ground for setting aside an election unless it isshown to have materially affected the result of the election. DEVASHABAN

SINHA v. SHEO MAHADEV PRASAD AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 461.

ELECTION COMMISSION.

Election Commission—Jurisdiction of High Courts over—Where theElection Commission has referred a petition to an Election Tribunal fordisposal, it is not open to the Tribunal to go behind the order of theElection Commission and consider whether the Election Commissionought to have dismissed the petition under section 85 for non-compliancewith the provisions of section 81, 83 or 117, and whether it acted illegallyor without jurisdiction in referring the petition to the Tribunal. I t isalso not within the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the legalityor otherwise of the order of the Election Commission as the Commissionis not within the reach of the High Court. K. T. KoSALRAM vM. R. MEGANATHAN AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 278.

The fact that the Election Commission has its office at Delhiwhich is outside the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court will not

ELECTION COMMISSION IO9

cease to be a ground for holding that the Madras High Court has nojurisdiction to issue a writ against the Commission merely becausethe election is to the Madras State Legislative Assembly. ELECTIONCOMMISSION V. SAKA VENKATA EAO, 2 E.L.E. 499 (S.C.).

-High Court—Power to issue writ against Election Commission.See HIGH COUETS infra.

Power to regulate its own procedure —Power to authorise officer tosign on behalf of Commission—High Court—Power to issue writ againstElection Commission—The Election Commission can regulate its own pro-cedure and can authorise one of its officers to authenticate and sign notifica-tions issued in the name of the Election Commission under sections 39(2)and 151 of the Eepresentation of the People Act, 1951. The issue of noti-fications under sections 39(2) and 151 of the Act is a part of the process ofthe election within the meaning of article 329(b) of the Constitution, andthe said article 329(b) excludes the jurisdiction of the High Courtto issue a writ under article 226 to restrain the Election Commissionfrom issuing such notifications. AMIN AHMAD V. NAND LAL SlNHA, 5E.L.E. 40.

Press notes—Press notes issued by the Election Commission haveno legal force, but are merely directory in their nature. MANEKLALAMOLAKCHAND v. THBTB GOPAL EAMJI AND OTHEBS, 9 E.L.E. 36.

Approval of defective ballot boxes—Effect—See BALLOT BOXESsupra p. 5 (8 E.L.E. 429) and p. 7 (8 E.L.E. 240).

—Interchange of ballot papers—Power of Election Commission tovalidate votes cast on wrong ballot papers —The Election Commissionwhich has the power to prescribe a distinguishing mark for the ballotpapers has also the power to change it. But the prescribing of a distin-guishing mark as contemplated by rule 28 must relate to the election asa whole. There cannot be one distinguishing mark for some of the votersand another for others with reference to the same election and at thesame polling station. Under rule 23 the polling officer has to deliver theproper paper to the voter and if a distinguishing mark had been prescribed*under rule 28, the ballot paper to be delivered must bear that mark. Theapproval by the Election Commission subsequent to the polling cannotrender valid ballot papers which did not bear the distinguishing markprescribed for the election ; such ballot papers are liable to be rejectedunder rule 47(l)(c). JlARI VISHNU KAMATH V. AHMAD SAYEDISHAQTTE AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 216 (S.C.) reversing 8 E.L.E. 350.;

See also 5 E.L.E. 248 and 7 E,L,B, 25,ELD—15


Power to condone non-compliance with section 83—The ElectionCommission has no power under section 85 of the E. P. Act, to condonenon-compliance of the requirements of section 83 with regard to the filingof the list of corrupt practices along with an election petition. T. PRAKA-SAM v. IT. KRISHNA EAO AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2 E.L.E. 54.

Power to inquire into disqualification 'of candidates arisingbefore election— Articles 190(3) and 192(l) of the Constitution of India areapplicable only to disqualifications to which a member of the Legislaturebecomes subject after he is elected as such and neither the Governor northe Election Commission has jurisdiction to enquire into a disqualifica-tion which arose before the election. SAKA VENKATA EAO V. ELECTIONCOMMISSION, 1 E.L.E. 417, affirmed by Supreme Court in 2 E.L.E. 499.See also MAHAEAJA ANAND CHAND, In re, 5 E.L.R. 197.

Withdrawal of complaint—Duty of Commission to proceed withenquiry—If a question whether a member has, or has not, become subjectto a disqualification properly arises under article 103 of the Constitutionand, on the representation of any person, that question is referred by thePresident to the Election Commission for its opinion, the fact that theperson who raised the question and made the representation to thePresident does not wish to proceed with the matter and asks for permis-sion to withdraw his petition, is not a sufficient ground for the ElectionCommission to desist from giving its opinion on the reference. MAHARAJAANAND CHAND, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197.

Power to condone delay in presentation of election petition—SeaELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION, pp. 136 to 138 infra.

Power to condone delay in filing return of election expensesand: effect of condonation—See 3 E.L.E. 347, p. 113 infra.

Power to allow amendment of verification—Section 85 did notmake it imperative on the part of the Election Commission to dismissan election petition for defective verification ; the Election Commis-sion has inherent jurisdiction to permit the necessary amendments inan election petition so as to make it conform to the requirements ofsection 83 and the power of dismissal under section 85 is intended to beexercised only if there is failure to amend after being required so to do ;even if it is held that the only jurisdiction which the Election Com-mission possessed under the Act for defective verification was to dismissthe petition under section 85, it could not affect the jurisdiction of theElection Tribunal to proceed with the trial. A. S. SlTBBA RAJ V.M. MUTHIAH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 21.

Whether the Election Commission has inherent power to allowamendment of a defective verification or not, if it does not in fact dismiss

ELECTION COMMISSION III

a petition for defective verification but appoints a Tribunal for hearingthe petition, the Tribunal has a discretion under section 90(4) to allowthe verification to be amended and if it does so the Supreme Court willnot interfere wtih its order in an appeal under article 136 of the Con-stitution. DlNABANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHEBS,9 B.L.E. 485 (S.C.).

ELECTION ENQUIRIES.

— -Election enquiries—nature of—respondent's evidence—An electioninquiry, though quasi-criminal in nature, allows the respondent to beexamined and cross-examined on oath and, while deciding whether theallegations of the petitioner are proved beyond reasonable doubt or notthe evidence of the respondent on oath must also be considered. DsSAIBASAWABAJ v. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHEES, i B.L.E. 380.

Election enquiries—political considerations—Though the con-duct of the trial of an election petition must not be left to the caprice ofthe parties and it ought to be the concern of the Tribunal to purge electionsof all kinds of corrupt practices and impurities so as to guard the politicalrights of the citizens and the constituency, this does not justify adeparture from legal principles. Though political justice is concernedwrth the political rights of the citizen, its administration is governed notby politics but by law, equity and good conscience. Allah Dad Khan v.Sardar Mohammad Azam (2 Doabia 314) and Amir Mohammad Khan v.Atta Mohammad Khan (1 Doabia 98) distinguished. SHANTILAL

OHAUDHUEY W.BAGHUBAJ SINGH AND OTHEES (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 93.

Election enquiries—general principles—(i) The general rule iswell settled that the statutory requirements of election law must bestrictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or asuit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the com-mon law and that the court possesses no common law power, (ii) It isalso well settled that the success of a candidate who has won at an elec-tion should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking suchinterference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law. (iii)None of these propositions, however, has any application if the speciallaw itself confers authority on a Tribunal to proceed with a petition inaccordance with certain procedure and when it does not state the con-sequences of non-compliance with certain procedural requirements laiddown by it. (iv) Though the election of a successful candidate is not tobe lightly interfered with, one of the essentials of that law is also tosafeguard the purity of the election process and also to see that people donot get elected by flagrant breaches of that law or by corrupt practices.


(v) In cases where the election law does not prescribe the consequence ordoes not lay down a penalty for non-compliance with certain proceduralrequirements of that law, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal entrusted withthe trial of the case is not affected. JAGAN NATH V. JASWANT SINGHAND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 231 (S. C) .

ELECTION EXPENSES.

[See also CORRUPT PRACTICE p. 26ff. supra].-Accounts—Duty of agent to keep regular accounts—Method of

keeping accounts—Duty to preserve them—Non-production—Adverse in-ference—It is the duty of an election agent to keep separate and regularbooks of accounts of all election expenses in the manner prescribed insection 44 of the B. P. Act, 1951, and rule 111 of the rules thereunder,and he must preserve such account books and connected papers till thedisposal of an election petition. Stepney case (4 O' M. & H. 178) andEast Dorset case (6 O' M. & H. 22) referred to. (The method of keepingelection accounts as laid down in the Stepney case pointed out). Non-production of books of account of election expenses without properexplanation creates an adverse inference either that the candidate has notmaintained such books at all, or if he has maintained them, the entries inthem might go against him. Mohammad Zakria Kitchlew v. ShSikMohammad Sadiq'(Sen and Poddar 34) referred to. SHANKARE GOWDA

v. MARITAPPA AND ANOTHER, 9 E.L.E. 101.

False return, effect of—Mere falsity of a return of electionexpenses is not a ground for declaring an election void under s. 100(2)(a)though if the items omitted are expenses forbidden by law, they would begrounds for avoiding the election. M. E. MEGANATHAN V. K. T. KOSAL-RAM AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.E. 242.

Omission of items—Inference—If any particular item of expendi-ture is not included in the return of election expenses it is evidence ofknowledge on the part of the election agent that the expenditure iscorrupt. Sitakanta Mahapatra v. Harekrishna Mehtab (3 Jagat Narain93 ; Hammond 102) referred to. T. C. BASAPPA V. T. NAGAPPA ANDOTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 197.

Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider whether return is false—Condonation of delay and removal of disqualifications by Election Com-mission—Effect of—"At the election," meaning of—The Election Tribunalhas jurisdiction in the trial of an election petition, to go into the questionwhether the return of election expenses filed by a candidate is false in

^ ELECTION EXPENSES . 113

material particulars. There is no difference in this respect between thelaw under the old Constitution and the present Constitution of India.

.;' The fact that the Election Commission had condoned the delay in filing••j a return of election expenses and the irregularities in it and removed the'-s disqualifications arising from default in filing a proper return, in the

..•: exercise of its powers under sections 7(e) and 144 by permitting thecandidate to file a fresh return does not take away the jurisdiction of

.1 the Election Tribunal to go into the question whether the originalreturn was false in material particulars. The words "at the election"in section 99 of the Act must be interpreted to mean "in relation to theelection" and not "during the course of the election". The Attoch case(1 Jagat Narain 1 ; 1 Hammond's E. P. 1); Farrukhabad case : SampNarain v. Baja Durga Narain (3 Jagat Narain 22) and Ghittagongcase: Haji Badi Ahmad v. Md. Anwarul Azim (Sen and Poddar 261)followed. MANMOHANI SEHGAL V. SUCHETA KEIPALANI, 3 E.L.E. 347.

-Though the filing of a false return of election expenses is onlya minor corrupt practice and is not a ground for setting aside an election,an Election Tribunal constituted to hear election petitions has jurisdic-tion to go into the question whether the return of election expenses madeby the respondent was false in material particulars as alleged in thepetition ; for the acts committed by the candidate which have beenfalsely reported in the return may amount to corrupt practices and mayhave affected the result of the election materially. Further, though aminor corrupt practice is not sufficient for setting aside an election, itmay involve the disqualification of a candidate for voting for a certainperiod, and for this reason also an Election Tribunal can go into thequestion whether the return of election expenses submitted by a candi-date was false. At any rate the Election Tribunal does not act in excessof its jurisdiction in proceeding to try the question and the High Courtwill not prohibit it from doing so by issuing a writ under article 226

I or 227 of the Constitution. SUCHETA KBIPALANI V. S. S. DULAT ANDOTHEBS, 9 E.L.E. 145.

ff Election expenses—Amount paid to a party for nomination/ asthe party candidate—Amount paid by a candidate to the CongressParliamentary Board for being nominated by the Congress is an elec-

I tion expense" contemplated by Chapter VIII of theE.P. Act, 1951, even| though the expenditure wrs incurred before the date of nomination, and1 should be shown in the return of election expenses. Omission to men-

tion the expenditure in the return would not, however, amount to aminor corrupt practice under section 124(4) unless such omission wasactuated by a corrupt motive. SALIG EAM JAISWAL V. SHEO KUMAR

.:. ELD—16


PANDE AND OTHEES, 9 B.L.E. 67. [See also cases cited at p. 24 ff.supra],

' Enquiry into petitioner's return—The respondent is not entitledto claim an inquiry in an election petition into an allegation that thepetitioner's return of election expenses is false, if the petitioner has notclaimed that he should be declared elected. SHIVDEV SlNGH V. DARA

SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 496.ELECTION OFFENCES

Though an act may be an offence under section 130 of theE. P. Act, 1951, it would not necessarily amount to an illegal practiceto serve as a ground for setting aside an election. YOGRAJSINGHSHANKARSINGH PARIHAR V. SlTABAM HlRACHAND BlRLA AND OTHERS,(No. 2), 3 E.L.E. 439.

The use of badges and wall paintings within 100 yards of thepolling station on the polling day cannot be a ground for declaring theelection of the returned candidate to be void under section 100(2) of theAct, even though it may amount to an offence under section 133 of theAct. YOGRAJSINGH SHANKARSINGH PARIHAR v. SlTABAM HlRACHANDBIRLA AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 3 E.L.R. 439.

-As the subject matter of section 13l(l)(b) and section 130(l)(f)of the E. P. Act falls within article 327 and item 72 of List I -'and alsounder item 93 of list I of the Constitution the Parliament had full com-petence to legislate with regard to election offences in the mannerprovided in these sections, and these sections are not therefore ultravires, NAGENDRA MAHTO V. T H E STATE, 10 E.L.E. 140.

Necessity of sanction. See 6 E.L.E. 388; pp. 163—164 infra.ELECTION PETITION

1. Abatement.2. Adjourned hearing.3. Admissions.4. Amendment of petition.5. Burden of proof.*6. Collusion.7. Consolidation of petitions.8. Contents.9. Costs.

10. Court fees.11. Deposit of security.

12. Joint petition.13. Limitation.14. List of particulurs.15. New grounds.16. Parties.17. Recrimination.r8. Reliefs.19. Remand.20. Signature.21. Verification.22. Withdrawal.

1. Abatement.—Dissolution of Assembcj—By the combined opera-tion of sections 98 and 99 of the E. P. Act, 1951, when an election issought to be set aside on the ground of corrupt practices the Tribunal

ELECTION PETITION—ABATEMENT 115

has, in addition to declaring whether the election is or is not void, torecord a rinding whether any corrupt practice was proved or not.Consequently, though it has declared the election void in another electionpetition or owing to the President's Proclamation dissolving the Assemblythe necessity for making a declaration of the election being void does notremain, still the petitioner could insist that a finding about corruptpractices us3d in the election should be given. Carter v. Mills (9 0. P.117), Marshall v. James (9 C. P. 702), Exeter Case (6 O'M. and H. 228)and Nurul Islam v. Aid. Rafique and Others (2 B.L.E. 70) referred to.The petitioner cannot, however, insist that the Tribunal should record itsfindings about all the corrupt and unfair practices alleged in the petition,the cumulative effect of which may have been necessary to be consideredto see if the election had to be declared void as being materially affectedby such practices. SHIVDEV SINGH V. DARA SINGH AND OTHERS, 5E.L.E. 496.

On resignation of candidate. See 2 E.L.E. 70.

2. Adjourned hearing.— Non-appearance of parties—Dismissal fordefault—Propriety—Non-appearance of petitioner—Power of Tribunalto permit ex parte respondent to prosecute petition—If the petitioner failsto appear on a date to which an election petition has been adjourned,whether the adjournment was made by the Tribunal on its own motionor at the request of a party, the Tribunal is not bound to dismiss thepetition summarily for default of appearance. On the other hand, aselection petitions do not concern merely the parties but affect the entireconstituency summary dismissal of election petitions for default ofappearance of the petitioner would be contrary to the spirit of electionlaw. Where the petitioner shows negligence in the prosecution of thepetition or deliberately wants to defeat his own petition by non-appearance, a respondent who expresses a desire to prosecute the petitionmust in the interests of justice be permitted to do so. The Tribunal mayin such a case call upon him to give security for the costs of therespondent. The fact that the respondent who desires to prosecute thepetition did not put in appearance at previous hearings and was madeex parte, is not a ground for not permitting him to prosecute the petitionwhen he finds that the petitioner is negligent or colluding, for the factthat the petitioner was prosecuting the petition at the previous hearingsis a sufficient cause for his non-appearance at such hearings. EOOPCHANDRA SOGANI AND OTHERS V. EAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHERS

(No. i), 5 E.L.E. 321. '

——Non-appearance of respondent—Appearance at subsequenthearing—Failure to show good cause for non-appearance—Bight to take


part in further proceedings—Discretion of court —Failure to exercisediscretion—Power of High Court to issue writ of certiorari—Ii arespondent to an election petition fails to appear at an adjourned hearingof the petition and the Tribunal decides to proceed ex parte, but at asubsequent hearing the respondent appears, he cannot be prevented fromtaking part in the proceedings from that stage, merely because he did notappear at the previous hearing and was not able to show sufficient causefor his non-appearance at that hearing. The view that, unless he getsthe decision of the court to proceed ex parte set aside, he is debarred fromtaking part in the further hearings is incorrect. The Tribunal has in suchcircumstances a discretion to allow him to take part in the further pro-ceedings on such conditions as it may think fit. Whether the petitionerhad, owing to the non-appearance of the respondent and the decision ofthe court to proceed ex parte, contented himself with adducing evidencejust enough to prove a prima facie case and would be prejudiced by givingpermission to the respondent to take part in the further proceedings inthe case is a matter to be considered by the Tribunal in exercising itsdiscretion. If a Tribunal prevents a respondent who appears at a subse-quent hearing from taking part in further cross-examination and to arguehis case, on the ground that he is not entitled to do so until he got thedecision of the court at the previous hearing to proceed ex parte setaside, the Tribunal will be failing to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it bylaw and the High Court can quash its decision by issuing a writ ofcertiorari under article 226 of the Constitution. SANGBAM SINGH V.ELECTION TEIBUNAL, KOTAH, AND ANOTHEB, 10 B.L.E. 293 (S. C).

3. Admissions—Judgment on.—Judgment on admissions of respondent— Section 92 of the E. P. Act, 1951, which specifies some special powerswhich may be exercised by an Election Tribunal, does not limit thegeneral jurisdiction conferred on the Tribunal by section 90 to apply theprovisions of the Civil Procedure Code, as nearly as may be, to the trialof election petitions. A judgment on the admissions made by the respond-ent could, therefore, in proper cases, be given by an Election Tribunal,provided the admission is clear, as provided in Order XII, rule 6, of theCivil Procedure Code. SHANTILAL CHAUDHAEY V. RAOHUBAJ SlNGHAND OTHBBS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 93.

4. Amendment of petition.—Power to amend—Where an electionpetition is filed within the period of limitation, no question of limitationcould arise with regard to a subsequent amendment of the reliefs prayedfor by way of addition or in the alternative, and if in the original petitionitself there is a prayer 'for such other and further reliefs as the Tribunalmay deem fit", the Tribunal can grant additional or further relief even

ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT I17

without an amendment of the petition .GlDWANI CHOITHBAM PA14TAB-EAI v. AGLVANI THAKUBDAS CHUHABMAL AND OTHBBS, 1 E.L.E

194.

——Though section 82 is mandatory, the Election Tribunal haspower, in an appropriate case, to direct the impleading of additionalrespondents not originally impleaded, in accordance with section 82because the Tribunal can apply the relevant provisions of the Code ofCivil Procedure under section 90(2) of the B. P. Act, 1951, to the trial ofelection petitions in the interests of justice. Kangra cum GurdaspurM. B. Case (Hammond 437) Saharanpur N. M. B. Case (Hammond 623),OJcara Muhammadan Constituency Case (2 Doabia 149), GidwaniChoithram Partabrai v. A. T. Chuharmal (1 E.L.E. 194) distinguished.

SlTBBAHMANYA GOUNDAR V. KANDASAMI GOUNDAR AND Ol'HEBS,1 E.L.E. 214.

No obligation iscast upon an Election Tribunal under section90(4) of the E. P. Act, 1951, to dismiss an election petition which does notcomply with the provisions of section 83. The word used in section 90(4)is may" and this confers a discretion on the Tribunal, and the very factthat the Legislature has left it to the discretion of the Tribunal clearlygoes to show that the Legislature has conferred the power upon theTribunal in proper cases to amend a petition and to bring it in conformitywith section 83 so that it need not be dismissed. When in the samestatute, with regard to the same subject-matter the Legislature has usedthe expression shall" in one section and may" in another, it is notproper to hold that these two expressions were used with the same mean-ing and connotation in both the sections. The expression "trial of suits"in section 90(2) of the Act does not mean the same thing as the hearingof a suit, but covers the earlier stages also and the power conferred uponthe Tribunal by section 90(2) to try a petition in accordance with theprocedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure is a power muchwider than merely applying procedure which would be applicable to thehearing of a suit. SITABAM HIBACHAND BIBLA v. YOGBAJ SINGH

SHANKAB SINGH PABIHAB, 2 E.L.E. 283.

The Election Tribunal has no power to allow amendment ofthe election petition itself though under section 83(3) of the E. P. Act,1951, it has power to allow amendments to the particulars given in thelist of corrupt and illegal practices. The provision in section 90(2) ofthe Act of 1951, that an election petition has to ba tried as nearly asmay be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CivilProcedure Code to the trial of suits refers to the conduct of the enquiryand not to the petition itself. Kangra cum Gurdaspur M. B. case

Il8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

(Hammond 435), Amritsar City case (Hammond 83) and SaharanpurN. M. B. case (Hammond 621) followed. SIVATHANU PlLLAi v.MESAMONY AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 312.

Under the provisions of section 90 of the E. P. Act, 1951, allthe provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which relate to trial of suitsare applicable to trial of election petitions, subject to special provisionsin the Act itself relating to any particular matter, and an Election Tri.bunal has, therefore, ample power to allow amendments of the electionpetition. An election petition can be allowed to be amended even afterthe period of limitation for filing the petition has expired, when theamendment does not introduce any new cause of action or change thenature of the case or the relief asked for. Section 92 of the Act ismerely an enabling section and does not indicate that other provisionsin the Civil Procedure Code relating to trial of suits are not applicableto election petitions. The provisions contained in section 83(2) relatingto amendment of particulars of corrupt practices also do not lead to anyinference that other amendments to pleadings cannot be allowed.Appasivami Padayachi v. Ethirajulu Naidu (A.I.E. 1926 Mad. 1043) andKandaswami Chettiar v. Foulkes (A.I.E. 1926 Mad. 396), relied on.Where in an election petition the acceptance of the nomination paperof the respondent was objected to on the ground that he was disquali-fied as he was a P.W.D. Contractor who has undertaken certain buildingcontracts for the State and the petitioner sought to amend the petitionby adding and repairs to X", a piece of work which he had omitted tomention in the petition : Held; that the amendment could be allowed.BAMABEDDI v. CHIDANANDAM AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 373.

The Election Tribunal has ample power to allow duly nomi-nated candidates, who have been inadvertently omitted, to be impleadedas parties to an election petition. The word ' trial" is used in section90(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, in a wide sense and includes all steps in asuit or proceeding from its inception till final judgment, and Order I,rule 10. of the Civil Procedure Code is therefore applicable to electionpetitions. Bombay City case (Hammond 181) and Saharanpur case(Hammond 621), not followed. T. PBAKASAM V. U. KRISHNA EAO ANDOTHERS, 1 E.L.R, 384.

A defect in verification as distinguished from the totalabsence of verification may be rectified by amendment. ElectionTribunal has very wide powers of amendment of pleadings and canexercise them at any stage of the proceedings subject to specific provi-sions to the contrary in the Act. The enumeration of certain powersjn section 92 of tlie Act is not intended to restrict the scope of the

ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT II9

powers of the Tribunal to those mentioned therein. An amendment toan election petition for impleading a new party can be allowed evenafter the expiry of the period of limitation for presenting the petitionprescribed by rule 119 if no one has acquired any substantive rights byreason of the failure to implead the party in time, and no prejudice islikely to be caused to any party including the party sought to be im-pleaded. YOGBAJSINGH SHANKABSINGH PABIHAR V. SlTABAM HlBA-CHAND BlBLA AND OTHERS, 1 B.L.R. 389.

The provisions contained in section 90(4) of the E. P. Act,1951, that the Tribunal may dismiss an election petition which doesnot comply with the requirements of sections 81, 82, 83, or 117 is notmandatory but merely permissive, and an election petition cannot bedismissed by the Election Tribunal summarily merely because theverification does not strictly comply with the requirements of OrderVI, rule 15, of the Civil Procedure Code. The Tribunal is bound to givean opportunity to the petitioner to correct the verification. By virtueof seetion 92(2) the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code so far as theycan be applied gavern the procedure-relating to the trial of electionpetitions, that is the entire proceeding before the Tribunals. Sections90(2) and 92 do not indicate that the Tribunal is only clothed with suchpowers as are mentioned in those sections and there is nothing in thelanguage of section 82(3) which limits or narrows the general powers ofamendment which the Tribunal has. Section 82(3) only lays down inwhat particular respect the list of corrupt or illegal practices can bemodified or altered. Piare Lai v. Bhagaivandas (I.L.E. 55 All. 216)applied. Be Baker, Nichols v. Baker (44 Ch. D. 262), Julius v. LordBishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 214), Beg y. Commissioners (14 Q.B. 474),Raja of Vizianagaram v. Secretary of State (I.L.R. 1930 Mad. 383)relied on. Ananda Chandra v. Panchilal Sarma (5 Bom. L.R. 691) andViswambhar Pandit v. Vasudev Pandit (I.L.R. 13 Bom. 37) distinguished.M. MUTHAIAH v. A. S. STJBBARAJ AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 109.

Though the powers under Order VI, rule 17, of the CivilProcedure Code have not been conferred on them, Election Tribunalslike all civil courts have inherent power to allow amendments ex debitojustitiae and to prevent abuse of process. Amendment of verificationstands on a different footing from amendment of pleadings, and even ifthe Tribunal does not possess the powers under the Civil ProcedureCode, it should exercise its inherent powers and permit amendments ofthe verification to rectify clerical errors, e.g., in the dates, and inadvert-ent omissions in the petition also, RAGHURAJ SINGH V, VASANT RAOAND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.R. 295,


The only provision in the R. P. Act, 1951, which enables apetitioner to amend an election petition is clause (3) of section 83 whichrelates to amendment of particulars of corrupt practices mentioned inthe list. Apart from this, the Tribunal has no power to allow amend-ment of an election petition. The word " trial " in section 90(2) meansthe regular trial and does not include all the preliminary stages of plead-ings which lead to the trial. Amritsar City case (Hammond 83) andLala Chaman Lai v. Lala Shadilal (l Jagat Narain 66) relied on.Mohammad Allah Baksh v. Jafferbhoy Abdulbhoy and Others (II JagatNarain 48) not followed. M. C. LlNGA GOWDA v. N. K. SHIVANANJAPPA,2 B.L.E. 163.

The Election Tribunal has no power to allow amendment of anelection petition by impleading a new party to the petition. Evenassuming that the Tribunal may under certain circumstances add aperson as respondent, it cannot do so after the period of limitation forfiling the petition has expired. Lala Chaman Lai v. Lala Shadi Lai(1 Jagat Narain 66) followed. AwDESH PKASAD SlNHA V. PBABHAWATIGUPTA AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 176.

The Tribunal has power to allow amendment of an electionpetition for adding as parties candidates who had withdrawntheir candidatures, who were not originally impleaded as parties.BAKAEAM STTKABAM KONKANI v. SHANKAB RAO CHINDUJI BEDSE AND


If the verification in a petition is defective the petitionermay be allowed to remove the defect and make a proper verifica-tion even after the period of limitation. Where the petitionerfiled an election petition in time but omitted to sign the petition andthe list above the verification also, but the Election Commissionpermitted him to put his signature after the expiry of the period oflimitation : Held, that the petition was not time-barred. MANDALSUMITRA DEVI V. SITBAJ NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 136.

Where the verification of a petition stated generally that the factsmentioned therein were true to the knowledge and information of thepetitioner and did not specify what he verified of his own knowledge andwhat, upon information believed to be true, and did not also state whenand where it was signed and the Election Tribunal which was appointedby the Election Commission to hear the petition held that though theverification was defective and section 83 of the R. P. Act, 1951, wasnot strictly complied with, as it had a discretion under section 90(4) ofthe Act, it was not bound to dismiss the petition summarily on thisground, and allowed the petitioner to rectify the verification, and the

ELECTION PETITION—-AMENDMENT 121

respondents applied to the High Court for a writ restraining the Elec-tion Tribunal from proceeding to hear the petition on the ground thatthe Tribunal had no jurisdiction : Held, (i) that section 85 did notmake it imperative on the part of the Election Commission to dismissan election petition for defective verification ; (ii) the Election Com-mission has inherent jurisdiction to permit the necessary amendmentsin an election petition so as to make it conform to the requirements ofsection 83 and the power of dismissal under section 85 is intended to beexercised only if there is failure to amend after being required so to do ;(iii) even if it is held that the only jurisdiction which the ElectionCommission possessed under the Act for defective verification was todismiss the petition under section 85, it could not affect the jurisdictionof the Election Tribunal to proceed with the trial ; (iv) when once thematter came before it under section 86, the powers of the Election Tri-bunal were those which are conferred on it by section 90(4); (v) undersection 90(4) what is conferred on the Election Tribunal is a discre-tionary power to dismiss the petition for non-compliance with section 83and that power is " notwithstanding anything contained in section 85,"and the Tribunal was, therefore, not bound to dismiss the petition fordefective verification ; (vi) apart from the wider question whether anElection Tribunal has jurisdiction to order amendment of election peti-tions, as the amendments ordered in this case were of a formal characterand as every Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to permit clerical andformal amendments, the Election Tribunal had exercised a sound discre-tion in permitting the verification to be amended as required byOrder VI, rule 15, C.P.C., and its order was eminently reasonable andjust, and a writ of prohibition cannot be issued. Cases referred to :—Jones v. Robson ([1901] 1 Q.B. 673), King v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tri-bunal; Stubbins, ex parte ( [1917] 1 K.B. 1), Ghinnappa Beddi v. ThomasuBeddi (A.I.E. 1928 Mad. 265), Martin v. Mackonochie ([1878]3 Q.B.D. 730), Mackonochie v. Penzance ([1881] 6 App. Gas. 424);Worthington v. Jaffries ([1878] L.E. 10 C.P. 379), Farquharson v.Morgan ([1894] 1 Q.B. 552), Bex v. North; Ex parte Oahey ([1927]1 K.B. 491), Be London Scottish Permanent Building Society ([1893]63 L.J.Q.B. 112), Madangopal v. Bhagwandas (11 All. 304), Pandurangv. Bamachandra (A.I.E. 1930 Bom. 554), Julius v. Bishop of Oxford( [1880] 5 App. Gas. 214), Bajitram v. Kateswarnath (18 All. 396), Basdeov. John Smidt (22 All. 55), Piarelal v. Bagwandas (A.I.E. 1933 All. 295),Ma Yon v. Ma Sawe Thin (A.I.E. 1933 Eang. 410), Bishanlal v. KisanVithoba (A.I.E. 1937 Nag. 108), Lahore City case (1 Hammond's E.P. 148)and Amritsar City case (2 Hammond's E.P, 26). A. S. SUBBA E A J V.M. MTJTHIAH AND OTHEES, 5 E.L.E. 21.

ELD—17 ,


The Election Tribunal has full power to allow an amendmentof the election petition for the purpose of rectifying mistakes in theaddress of the respondents to the petition. KHUSHWAQT EAI V. EAR ANSINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 93.

Where, through a clerical mistake the respondent's name in anelection petition was wrongly typed as ' Saraswati Parsad " instead of

Sheo Parsad " : Held, that it was perfectly competent to the Tribunalto permit an amendment of the petition to correct this mistake. Theview that an Election Tribunal has no power at all to allow an amend-ment of the petition under any circumstances is erroneous. PritamSingh v. Gharan Singh and Others (2 E.L.B. 276) dissented from;Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (3 B.L.R, 162) andSitaram Hirachand Birla r. Yograjsingh Shankarsingh (2 E.L.E. 283)followed. EATAN SHUKDA V. BEIJENDRA SWARUP AND OTHERS,5 E.L.E. 116.

Where an election petition contained all the three reliefsmentioned in section 84 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and, as the relief for adeclaration that the election was wholly void was barred by limitationunder rule 119(b), the petitioner applied for amending the petition bydeleting the prayer for a declaration that the election was wholly void,and the application was allowed by the Tribunal: Held, that the Elec-tion Tribunal had power to allow the petition to be amended and didnot act without, or in excess of, jurisdiction in doing so, and the HighCourt would not interfere by issuing a writ under article 226 or 227of the Constitution. While it is not open to the Election Commissionto allow amendments, the Election Tribunal is empowered to do so,not only by the use of the expression " may " in section 90, sub-sec-tion (4), but also by the provisions of sub-section (2) of that section andof section 92 which confer on the Election Tribunal the power possessedby a civil court in the trial of suits. The "tr ial" of an electioncommences when the Tribunal proceeds to deal with the petition andnot when it begins to hear the evidence. The word " may " in sec-tion 90, sub-section (4), does not mean ''shall" and the ElectionTribunal is not bound to dismiss a petition for non-compliance withsections 81, 83, or 117. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograjsingh(2 E.L.E. 283) followed. Julius v. Bishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 214)distinguished. MAHADEO V. JWALAPRASAD MlSHRA AND OTHERS,6 E.L.E. 1.

The Election Tribunal has no power to allow amendment of anelection petition ; allowing amendment of the petition itself is againstthe tenor and spirit of election law. Section 90(2) of the B. P, Act, 1951,

ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT 123

applies only to the trial of the petition and not to the petition itself^Adding the correct addresses of the respondents does not, however,amount to amendment of the petition and a petitioner can be allowedto supply them even after the expiry of the period of limitation forfiling the petition. Saharanpore District {N.M.B.) Case (l Jagat Narain66) referred to. NlHAEENDU DUTT MAZUMDAR V. SXJDHIB CHANDBABHANDARI AND OTHEBS, 6 E.L.R. 197.

'Section 92 which enumerates some of the powers which theTribunal may exercise does not cut down the powers granted to aTribunal by section 90(2). Section 92 gives certain minimum powersto the Tribunal, and is not subject to the rules made under the Act.Section 90, sub-section (2), on the other hand, gives all the powers,which may be necessary for the trial of petitions and which are to befound in the Code of Civil Procedure, to the Tribunal; but this issubject to the provisions of the Act and the rules made thereunder.MADAN MOHAN V. BANKAT LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 119.

Though there is conflict of judicial opinion on the questionwhether the Election Tribunal has power to allow amendment of anelection petition, it has jurisdiction to decide whether it could permitan amendment and whether it is entitled to consider an objection raisedin the written statement, and the High Court cannot interfere with itsdecision on this question, under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution,even if its decision be wrong. KALYAN SINGH v. ELECTION TBLBUNAL,

AJMEB, AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.R. 207.

The Election Tribunal is not bound to dismiss an electionpetition which is not duly verified or does not otherwise comply with theprovisions of section 83 of the Act; it has a discretion to dismiss it ornot to dismiss it. The Election Tribunal has also ample power to allowthe verification of an election petition to be amended. JADUMANI

MANGABAJ v. DINABAKDHU SAHU AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 480.

——Election Tribunal has power under section 90(2) to allowamendment of defective verification. M.R. MEGANATHAN V. K.T. KOSAL-

EAM, 9 E.L.R. 242.

Where, in the verification of an election petition the petitionerdid not specify the paragraphs in which he made the allegationsfrom his own knowledge and the other paragraphs, the allegationsin which were made on his information, and the Election Tribunalallowed the petitioner to amend the petition for rectifying thisdefect: Held, that the Tribunal had inherent power to grant leave toamend the verification for rectifying defects in the same. Order VI, rule


17, of the Civil Procedure Code which empowers the court to grant leaveto amend, would also apply to proceedings before an Election Tribunal,under section 90(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, as the enumeration of powersin section 92 does not exhaust the procedure applicable to the trial ofsuits. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v.Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar(2 E.L.E. 283) followed. K. T. Ko SALE AM v. M. E. MEG-ANATHAN ANDOTHBES, 9 E.L.E. 278;

A quasi-judicial Tribunal has ample power to allow a party torectify clerical and formal defects in the pleadings and proceedings beforeit. Omission in the verification of an election petition to specify withreference to the separate paragraphs of the petition what the petitionerverifies from his own knowledge and what he verifies from informationreceived by him and believed to be true, and omission to state the dateon which and the place at which it was signed are merely defects of aformal character and an Election Tribunal has power to allow the peti-tioner to rectify these defects. A. S. SUBBA E A J V. MUTHIAH [NO. 2],9 E.L.E. 290.

A reference of an election petition by the Election Commissionto a Tribunal is not void or ultra vires simply because the petition didnot fully comply with the provisions of section 81, 83 or 117 of theE. P. Act, 1951. Quaere : Whether section 90(2) of the Act confers onan Election Tribunal the powers given to a court by O. VI, r. 17, of theCivil Procedure Code to allow amendment of the pleadings generallyA. S. Subba Baj v. Muthiah (5 E.L.E. 21) affirmed. A. S. SUBBA EAJ v.MUTHIAH [No. 2], 9 E.L.E. 290.

Whether the Election Commission has inherent power to allowamendment of a defective verification or not, if it does not in fact dismissa petition for defective verification but appoints a Tribunal for hearingthe petition, the Tribunal has a discretion under section 90(4) to allowthe verification to be amended and if it does so the Supreme Court willnot interfere with its order in an appeal under article 136 of the Constitu-tion. DlNABANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHEES,9 E.L.E. 485 (S. C).

Under section 90(4) it is not obligatory for the Election Tribu-nal to dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provi-sions of section 83. The Tribunal has power to allow the petitioner toamend the petition by adding further particulars so as to bring it inconformity with section 83. Sitaram, Hirachand Birla v. Yograj SinghShankar Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) and Mahadeo v. JwalaprasadMishra and Others (6 E.L.E. l) referred to. MXJELIDHAE V. KADAMSINGH AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 135.

ELECTION PETITION—AMENDMENT 125

The combined effect of sections 90(2) and 92 of the Bepresenta-tion of the People Act, 1951, is that while an Election Tribunal canexercise the powers which are vested in a court under the Civil ProcedureCode with respect to the items enumerated in section 92 of the Act with-out any restriction, the provisions of the Code in other respects may alsobe applicable to the trial of an election petition subject to the restrictionsmade by the Act or the rules framed under the Act. Sitaram HirachandBirla v. Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) relied on.The scheme of the Act, however, is that sufficient opportunity should begiven to the candidates to know what they may have to allege in theirelection petitions if they choose to iile such petitions and that before theprescribed period it should be ascertained once for all what the petitionis and what charges are to be met by the respondents. This rules outthe possibility of permitting an amendment to be made in the electionpetition by raising new charges after the prescribed period and if anElection Tribunal allows an amendment to be made adding a new chargeor an independent prayer which was not laid before the authority withinthe prescribed period, it would be acting beyond its jurisdiction. Where,after an election petition had been filed and the time prescribed for filingthe petition had expired, the petitioner made an application for amendingthe petition by adding a new allegation that the ballot boxes of a parti-cular polling booth were not included in the counting and the votestherein were not counted and also that votes in the tampered ballot boxesof another polling booth were included in counting and the Tribunalallowed the amendment: Held, that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction toallow such an ednondment and the order allowing amendment could bequashed by the High Court in an application under article 226 of theConstitution. Dictum.—The very fact the Legislature has made provisionfor the amendment of the election petition in the Act itself goes to showthat the general provision of amendment of pleadings as laid down inOrder VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code was not contemplated tobe applicable for the amendment of the election petition. The contents ofan election petition could, be amended only under the provisions of sec-tion 83(3) of the Act. Order VI, rule 17, of the Civil Procedure Code isnot applicable for making amendments thereof. SHEO MAHADEO PBASADv. DEVA SHAEAN SINHA AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 144.

"Where an application for amendment of an election petition ismade under section 83(3) of the E.P. Act, the Election Tribunal has theright to decide whether it comes within section 83(3) and if the Tribunalholds that the petition should be allowed on the ground that it does notchange the nature of the original petition but merely gives further parti-culars, the order, even if wrong, cannot be said to be without jurisdiction,


nor can it be said that it is such a patent error, or the decision is sopalpably erroneous, as to justify interference under article 226 of theConstitution. HABISH CHANDRA BAJTAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOKSINGH AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.R. 198.

5. Burden of proof—In election petitions—Under the English lawburden of proving that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected by an irregularity or contravention of the rules is on the partywho seeks to sustain the election, whereas under the Indian law asenacted in section 100(2)(c) of the E.P. Act, 1951, it is upon the personwho impugns the election. K. S. SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAR V. ELECTIONTRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 66.

Though it is necessary to prove that the result of the electionhas been materially affected, not only that it might have been materiallyaffected, a finding of fact that the result has been materially affectedcan be arrived at as an inference from circumstances and probabilities,where direct evidence is not available. The method of deciding thequestion whether an election has been materially affected by delay incommencing polling, by working out an average on the basis of thenumber of voters in a particular station and the number of votesrecorded during the hours when the polling went on, and arriving at theproportionate number of votes that would have been polled for thebalance of the scheduled hours or the number of votes that would havebeen polled in the particular station but for the irregularity, is generallya faulty method ; but it cannot be ruled out altogether, and in somecases it may be the only method available for arriving at a finding.K. S. SUBRAMANIA GOUNDAR V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, ANDOTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 66.

Though the procedure to be followed in the trial of electionpetitions is that laid down in the Civil Procedure Code, the standardof proof required to prove corrupt practices is the same as in criminalcases. SRI BAM V. MOHAMMAD TAQI HADI AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 139.

The burden of proving that the result of the election has beenmaterially affected by a contravention of the law or the rules is, underthe Indian law, on the person who impugns the election, though it isotherwise under the English law. S R I E A M V. MOHAMMAD TAQI H A D I


-Under the English law relating to Parliamentary elections ifnon-compliance with any of the provisions of the rules is proved, theonus lies on the respondent to show that it did not affect the result ofthe election, whereas under section 100(2)(c) of the Indian Act, eventhough the petitioner succeeds in proving non-compliance with rules, the

ELECTION PETITION—BURDEN OF PROOF 127

onus still remains on him to prove that it has materially affected theresult of the election, that is to say, it has caused the returned candidateto obtain a majority of votes. It is not enough to show that the resultof the election might have been affected. Islington West Division Case(5 O'M. & H. 120), Woodward v. Sarsons (L. E. 10 C. P. 748), Durham{County) Northern Division Case (2 O'M. & H. 152), and WarringtonCase (1 O'M. & H. 42) referred to. ABDUL RAUF V. GoviND BALLA.BHPANT AND OTHBES, 8 E.L.R. 240.

Improper acceptance, or rejection of nomination—Burden ofproving that "'result of election has been materially affected"—English andIndian law—-When result "materially affected"—Duty of producing posi.tive evidence—Decision not to be based on mere possibility and conjectures—Before an election can be declared wholly void under section100 (1) (c) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the Election Tribunal must findthat the result of the election has been materially affected" by theimproper acceptance or rejection of a nomination. The words the resultof the election has been materially affected" in this clause indicate thatthe result should not be judged by the mere increase or decrease in thetotal number of votes secured by the returned candidate but by proof ofthe fact that the votes would have been distributed in such a mannerbetween the contesting candidates as would have brought about thedefeat of the returned candidate. The language of section 100 (l) (e) ofthe E. P. Act clearly places the burden of proving that the result of theelection has been materially affected on the petitioner who impugns thevalidity of the election, though under the English Act (Ballot Act, 1872,s. 13), the burden is upon the respondent to show the negative, i.e., thatthe result of the election has not been affected. Bai Bahadur SurendraNarayan Sinha v. Amulyadhone Boy aud Others (Sen and Poddar 188)followed. G. M. Karale v. B. K. Dalvi and Others (2 Jagat Narain 31), BasuSinha v. Bajandhari Sinha (3 Jagat Narain 80), Jagadish v. BudraDeolal (8 E.L.R. 311) referred to.

In the case of the improper acceptance of a nomination: (a) ifthe nomination accepted was that of the returned candidate, the

result of the election must be materially affected ; (b) if the differencebetween the number of votes is more than the wasted votes theresult cannot be affected at all; (c) if the number of wasted votes isgreater than the margin of votes between the returned candidate and thecandidate securing the next highest number of votes it cannot be presumedthat the wasted votes might have gone to the latter and that theresult of the election has been materially affected. This is a matterwhich has to be proved and, though it must be recognized that the peti-


tioner in such a case is confronted with a difficult situation, he cannot berelieved of the duty imposed upon him by.' section 100(l)(c) and if thepetitioner fails to adduce satisfactory evidence to enable the court to findin his favour on this point, the inevitable result would be that theTribunal would not interfere in his favour and would allow the election tostand. Lakhan Lai Mishra v. Tribeni Kumar (3 E.L.E. 423) andMandal Sumitra Devi v. Surajnarain Singh (4 E.L.R. 136) dissentedfrom.

It is impossible to accept the ipse dixit of witnesses coming fromone side or the other to say that all or some of the votes would havegone to ona or the other on some supposed or imaginary ground. Thequestion is one of fact and has to be proved by positive evidence. If thepetitioner is unable to adduce evidence the only inescapable conclusionto which the Tribunal can come is that the burden is not discharged andthat the election must stand. The language of section 100(l)(c) is tooclear for any speculation about possibilities. VASHIST NARAIN SHABMAv. DEV CHAND AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 30 (S. C) .

'An infringement of the rules alone is not sufficient to vitiate anelection. The determining factor is whether the result of the electionhas been materially affected and every case is to be judged, regard beinghad to its special circumstances. The burden of proof rests upon theparty who maintains the validity of the election notwithstanding theinfraction of tho rules, to establish that the result of the election has notbeen materially affected. Shyam Chand Basack v. Chairman of theDacca Municipality (24 C.W.N. 189) referred to. SUDHANSU SEKHARGHOSH V. SATYENDRA NATH BASU AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 73.

Non-compliance with the provisions of the Act or rules madethereunder would not justify a declaration that the election of thesuccessful candidate was void unless it is also proved that such non-compliance had materially affected the result of the election. KESHAUPEASAD v. BBIJEAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 77.

English and Indian law —There is a material difference betweenthe English law on the subject and the law which prevails in this countrywith regard to elections to Legislatures. Under the Indian law if apetitioner has to bring his case within.-the provisions of section 100(2)(e),mere proof of non-compliance with even the mandatory provisions of theConstitution or of the R. P. Act is not enough, even though such non-compaliance or gross irregularity may possibly have affected the result ofthe election ; he must further prove that the result of the election has beenmaterially affected by such non-compliance or irregularity. Under theEnglish law an Election Tribunal would be justified in setting aside the

ELECTION PETITION—BURDEN OF PROOF 129

election if it were satisfied that there was a likelihood that the result of theelection may have been affected by the non-compliance or the irregularity.MOINUDDIN B. HARRIS V. B. P. DIVGI, 3 E.L.R. 248.

Under the law in India as enacted in section 100 of the R. P. Act,1951, mere proof of non-compliance is not sufficient to avoid an election ;it must further be shown that the result of the election was materiallyaffected thereby and the burden of proving this is on the petitioner whochallenges the election, though it is otherwise under the English law.Shy am Chand Basak v. Chairman of Dacca Municipality (24 0. W. N.)•189), Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari andOthers (6 B.L.R. 197), P. K. Atre v. T. B. Naravne and Others (l E.L.R.355) and Moinuddin B. Harris v. Dr. Divgi and Others (3 B.L.R. 248)followed. RIKIIAB DAS v. RIDICHAND PALLIWAL AND OTHERS,

9 E.L.R. 115.

6. Collusion—Collusion—Other respondents' rights—-Where thepetitioner though not openly withdrawing the petition is tryingcollusively to keep back the available evidence for sustaining the groundstaken in the petition, the Tribunal has, in order to ensure a fair andeffectual trial of the petition, power to permit any respondent to thepetition to support the grounds by leading evidence to prove them.LAHRI SINGH V. ATTAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 403.

7. Consolidation of petitions—It is open to a person who hasperferred an election petition to prefer a second petition containing newallegations within the time prescribed by law and in such a case theElection Commission can consolidate the two petitions and refer themboth to an Election Tribunal and the two petitions must be treated as onein the eye of the law. In any event it is open to the petitioner to applyfor leave to amend the earlier petition by adding the new allegationscontained in the second petition and then withdraw the later petition.M. R. MBGANATHAN v. K. T. KOSALRAM AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 242.

8. Contents— Material facts—An election petition and the list ofparticulars and the schedule attached to the petition, m,ust be readtogether, and if the list contains the material facts, the petition cannotbe summarily dismissed on the ground that it does not contain a state-ment of the material facts. DEVASHARAN SlNHA V. SHBO MAHADEVPRASAD AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 461.

Concise statement of facts—The Tribunal is not bound to dismissan election petition under section 90(4) of the R.P. Act, merely because

it does not contain a concise statement of the material facts as requiredELD—18


by section 83(1). "May" in section 90(4) does not mean "shall" and isnot mandatory. MAHESH DATTA V. MUKLIDHAE AND OTHEES,

7 B.L.E. 154. See also cases cited under CORRUPT PRACTICE, pp. 46-52.

9. Costs—Quaere: Whether the Tribunal has power to award specialcosts to a Eeturning Officer who has unnecessarily been made a party.SHANKAR TEIPATHI v. EETURNING OFFICER, MIRZAPUR AND OTHERS,

2 B.L.E. 315.

Costs—Duty of Tribunal to determine amount of costs andspecify by whom it is payable when it makes an order tinder s. 98—Drawing up statement of costs subsequently—Legality—Order for pay-'inent of costs without fixing the amount or person by whom it is payable—Whether executable—Order as to costs—Execution by civil court—Orders,whether appealable—Though the E. P. Act, 1951, does not provide for anappeal against an order passed in execution proceedings of an order as tocosts, the fact that an order of an Election Tribunal as to costs is to beexecuted in the same manner and by the same procedure as if it were adecree for the pa3'ment of money made by the Principal Civil Court ofOriginal Jurisdiction or the Small Causes Court imports that the ordinaryincidents of the procedure of that court are to attach. The general rightof appeal from the decisions of the civil court in execution procedings ofa money decree would, therefore, apply to orders made by that court inthe course of the execution of an order of the Election Tribunal as tocosts. When an Election Tribunal makes an order under section 98 of theE.P. Act, 1951, disposing of an election petition it must also fix the totalamount of costs payable and specify the persons by and to whom costs shallbe paid. As the Tribunal becomes functus officio as soon as the order undersection 98 is notified in the Gazette by the Election Commission it hasno jurisdiction to draw up a statement of costs subsequently ; nor can theexecuting court draw up a statement of costs. Where a Tribunal merelystated in its order that the petitioner shall get 50 per cent, of the costsincurred and fixed the pleader's fee at Es. 250, but did not specify theamount of costs or by which of the respondents it should be paid: Held, (i)that the order was not executable even in respect of the amount ofEs. 250 : (ii) that a statement of costs drawn up after the order under sec-tion 98 was notified by the Election Commission could not be treated asa valid order of the Tribunal as it was not in existence on that date andthe statement had not been adopted and notified by the Election Commis-sion. NATHULAL MANTRI AND ANOTHER V. VINDRAWAN PRASAD

TIWAEI AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 375.

10. Court fees—An election petition presented under Part VI of theR. P. Act, 1951, is not a petition presented to an executive authority

I

ELECTION PETITION—COURT-FEES I3I

within the meaning of article l(c) of the Second Schedule to Che CourtFees Act and is not subject to any court-fee under that Act. SURAJBHAN v. HEM CHAND JAIN AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.R. 1.

11. Deposit of security—Deposit in Bank of Baroda for Government—Treasury—Whether sufficient—Where a constituency was once part ofthe Baroda State and in accordance with the usual practice followedthere with respect to deposits ir favour of Government the sum ofRs. 1,000 which had to be deposited as security for costs under section117 of the E. P. Act, 1951, was deposited by the petitioner in the Bankof Baroda to the account of the Government Treasury and the receipt ofthe Bank of Baroda was enclosed with the election petition : Held, thatthere was substantial compliance with the provisions of section 117 andthe Tribunal was not bound to dismiss the petition on the ground that aGovernment Treasury receipt had not been produced as required bysection 117. PURSHOTTAMDAS RANCHHODDAS PATEL V. SHANTILALGlEDHAELAL PABIKH AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 223.

-Deposit of security —Omission to file proper Treasury receipt— Whether fatal—Power of Election Commission to accept properreceipt after limitation—'Where the receipt of deposit of securityfiled with an election petition was not in favour of the Secretaryto the Election Commission as required by section 117 of the E. P. Act,1951, and the Election Commission pointed out this defect to the peti-tioner and asked for a proper receipt without prejudice to the lawgoverning the case, and a proper receipt was filed by the petitioner, butonly after the period of limitation for filing the petition had expired:Held, that the provision contained in section 117 of the E. P. Act, 1951,relating to deposit of security is mandatory and as this provision was notcomplied with, the Election Commission was bound to dismiss the petitionutider section 85. It had no power to condone the default and receive aproper Treasury receipt after the period of limitation had expired.SHBON.VRAYAN VAIDTA v. SABDARMAL LALWANI, 4 E.L.R. 401.

— Where a Tribunal orders that security must be deposited"within" a certain period of time from the date of the order, the day onwhich the order was made must be excluded in computing that period onthe principle embodied in section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ehbal S Go. (A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 316),Secretary of State v. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan (A.I.E. 1935 Lah.653), Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din and Others (A.I.R. 1935 Lah. 291), andBamchandra Govind Unavne v. Laxman Sevleram Bonghe (A.I.R. 1938Bom. 447) referred to. EOOP CHANDRA SOGANI AND ANOTHER V.

BAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 9 E.L.R. 21.


See also JOINT PETITIONS infra.

12. Joint petitions—A candidate whose nomination was rejected andsome of the electors of the constituency may join as petitioners and file asingle election petition for declaring the election of the returned candi-date void. MATHBA DAS AND OTHEBS V. DAE A SINGH AND OTHERS,

4 E.L.E. 441.

Joint petition—Security—Beliefs—A joint election petition'by more than one petitioner is maintainable. Sections 110 and 112of the R. P. Act, 1951,f clearly envisage such joint petitions. A securityof Es. 1,000 is sufficient for a joint petition. MARUTBAO BHAURAO ANDOTHERS V. GULABRAO DADASAHEB AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.E. 303.

Joint petition—Security—An election petition can be presentedby two or more electors jointly. There is also no objection toa candidate and some electors making a joint petition. In the caseof a joint petition, a single security of Rs. 1,000 is sufficient even if thereare two or more petitioners. DEO CHAND AND OTHERS V. VASHIST

NARAIN AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 138.

13. Limitation— Computation of time—Day on which notice under rule113 was published to be excluded—In computing the period of limitationfor filing an election petition under rule 119 the day on which the noticeunder rule 113 was published in the official gazette must be excluded.T. C. BASAPPA v. T. NAGAPPA AND ANOTHER, 10 E.L.R. 14.

When last day is a gazetted holiday —Where the last day forthe presentation of an election petition falls on a gazetted holiday it is tobe excluded from the computation of the period of limitation under sec-tion 4 of the Limitation Act, and a petition filed on the next working daywill be within time. GANDA SINGH V. SAMPURAN SINGH AND OTHERS,

3 E.L.R. 17.

——Application of rule 119 {a) and (b)—Case where more than onecandidate has been returned—Petition not praying for setting aside wholeelection—Sub-rule (a) of rule 119 does not apply to cases where there ismore than one returned candidate as defined in section 79 (f) of the E. P .Act, 1951. Such a case is governed by sub-rule (b) of rule 119 eventhough the petitioner does not pray for the setting aside of the electionas a whole but only for a declaration that the election of the returnedcandidates is void and that the petitioner has been duly elected. JAWAHARSHANKEB PACHOLI v. HIRDAXA NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E.397.

Application of rule 119 (a) and (b)—The final authority for decid-ing whether an election petition is barred by limitation is the Election

ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION 133

Tribunal. The period of limitation laid down in clause (a) of rule 1 19applies to a case where there is only one returned candidate, and clause(b) applies where there are' more returned candidates than one and theelection petition calls in question the whole election. An electionpetition which calls in question the election of one of the returnedcandidates on the ground that he was below 25 years of ageattracts the application of sec. 100(l)(c) and is governed by clause (b) ofrule 119. SURYAJI RAMA EAO V. BHIKAJI TBIMBAK PAWAE, 2 E.L.R. 205,

Unders ection 84 it is open to a petitioner to pray for any oneof the three reliefs mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of that section inthe alternative, in a single petition. Where a petitioner claims one ofthe three reliefs referred to in section 84 in the alternative, limitation foreither of the two reliefs, namely (a) that election of the returned candi-date is void and (b) that the election of the returned candidate is voidand the petitioner has been duly elected, will be governed ' by the longerperiod of limitation under rule 119(a) while the limitation for the thirdrelief (that the election is wholly void) will be governed by the shorterperiod in rule 119(b). The entire petition will not be barred merelybecause the relief governed by rule 119 (b) is also claimed in thealternative. The Tribunal has ample power in such a case to allow thepetitioner to withdraw the relief for a declaration that the whole electionis void. When two candidates have been returned, one for the generalseat and one for the reserved seat, it is not a case where there are morereturned candidates than one at an election" within the meaning ofrule 119 (b), and a petition for declaring the election of one of the candi-dates void is governed by rule 119 (a). JAWALA PEASAD MlSBA V.MAHADEO AND OTHBES, 3 E.L.R. 473.

Where two candidates have been returned in an election for adouble member constituency, one for the general and the other for thereserved seat, and an election petition is filed for declaring (i) that theelection of both the returned candidates is void and (ii) that the.electionis wholly void, the petition is one in which there are more returned can-didates than one and the election petition calls in question the election asa whole" within the meaning of rule 119(b) and both the reliefs claimedin the petition are governed by the period of limitation prescribed in rule119(b). The view that in a case like this, relief No. (i) is governed byrule 119(a) and relief No. (ii) by rule 119(b) is not correct. RATTANSINGH V. DEVINDEB SINGH AND OTHBBS, 7 E.L.R. 234.

Held, per HANS RAJ KHANNA and PABMA NAND SACHDEVA

(HABBANS SINGH, dissenting):—-The grounds mentioned in sub-section (l)of section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, are grounds

i n

1 3 4 "ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

sub t ° r r i n to? f 6 C T 1 b6 W h ° l l y V° i d ' and thS gl'°UDds — t i o - d insub-secion (2) of sectIOn 100 are grounds for declaring the election of there urned candidate void. Consequently, if a petitioner claims only a decla!lation that the election 18 wholly void, he cannot ask for an enquiry intogrounds which are not covered by sub-section (l) but by sub-section (2)

two' 1 fnd 7' "r *f " " I t °f l i m i t a t i ° n Pr6SCribed by rule 119 * » t l « etwo kinds of reliefs 1S different, grounds alleged in an election petitionwhich are covered by sub-section (2) alone and do not come withL sub-section (1) cannot be enquired into if the petition has not been filedwithin the time prescribed by rule 119(a) for claiming a declaration thatthe election of the returned candidate is void. Per HAEBANS SINGH -The grounds mentioned in sub-sections (l) and (2) of section 100 are notmutually exclusive, and if in a petition the election is attacked as a whole

grounds mentioned in sub-section (l) are not proved b u U h o ^ menfo ed

0 ^ (TELEIS6 TYf BaUanSi^v. Deviser StnghandOthers (7 E.L.E. 234) referred to. MAHABAJ SINGH V. BATAN ANMOISINGH AND OTHBES, 7 E.L.E. 320. 0 L

A n 6 l e c t i ^ Petition in which both the election of the candidatefor the reserved seat and the election of the candidate for the general seaare sought to be declared void on the ground that the election as a whotewas void as the electoral rolls on the basis of which the election was heldwere not prepared m accordance with law and the result of the electionas a whole was materially affected thereby, is governed for purposes oflimitation by sub-rule (b) of rule 119 and not by sub-rule (a) of the J drue. GAYAPKASHAD „. KBISHNACHANDBA SHABMA AND OTHEBS 10ili.ij.xl. o. '

— T h e period of 14 days prescribed in rule 119 applies to a petitionin which the relief mentioned in section 84(a) or 84(b) is claimed, whilehe penod of 60 days applies when the relief under section 84(c) is claimed-

When there is only one returned candidate section 84(c) cannot apply a n d

there can therefore be no overlapping of section 84(a) and (c) in such aease. Dr. BEUENDKA SWAEUP „. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, LUCKNOWAND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 191. -^^OKJSO^ ,

— S u b - r u l e (a) of rule 119 covers only those cases where the elec-lon o a smgle returned candidate is called in question, whatever may be

the rehefs sought by the petitioner. If the petition calls in question theelection of more returned candidates than one, sub-rule (a) cannot apply

ELECTION PETITION—LIMITATION I35

The words "calls in question the election as a whole " in sub-rule (b)means calls in question the election of each of the returned candidateswhether the reliefs asked for are those falling within section 84(a) or 84(c).Where two candidates, A and B, were returned and an election petitionwas filed praying for declaration, first, that the election of both thereturned candidates A and B was void and secondly, that the election waswholly void : Held, that the petition was not governed by sub-rule (a) sofar as the first relief was concerned, but was in its entirety governed bysub-rule (b). A. SRINIVASAN v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTILEBS, V. K.JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHEES, 10 B.L.E. 245. [Eeversed in10 B.L.E. 345.]

-Clause (a) of rule 119 of the E. P. (Conduct of Electionsand Election Petitions) Eules, 1951, would apply to every electionpetition in so far as it is directed against a returned candidate.If there is only one returned candidate clause (a) would apply, whetherthe relief prayed for is that his election should be set aside or the electionshould as a whole be set aside, because the result comes to the samething though the grounds may be different. When there are more returnedcandidates than one, an election petition may pray for a declaration thatthe election of any one of them is void. Even then, clause (a) wouldapply. I t would equally apply when the election of more than one can-didate is impugned individually. In such a case, though an electionpetition may comprise reliefs directed against several candidates, for thepurpose of limitation such a petition should be deemed to comprise severalpetitions, each directed against one of the candidates returned, and timemust be calculated under clause (a) with reference to each of them.Clause (b) of rule 119 would apply only to a case where there are morereturned candidates than one and the election petition prays that theelection be declared to be wholly void. The words ''calls in question theelection as a whole" in clause (b) must be construed with reference tosection 84 (c) and section 100(1), that is to say, with reference to theprayer for a declaration that the election is wholly void. A. Srinivasanv. G. Vasantha Pai and Others (10 E.L.E. 245) reversed on this point.Dr. V. K. JOHN V. Q. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS and A. SBJNIVASAN

v. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 345.

Where an election petition prayed, first, that the election bedeclared wholly void and secondly, that the election of respondents A andB (the two returned candidates) be declared void and the petition wasnot filed within the period prescribed in rule 119(b) but within that pres-cribed in rule 119(a) and the Election Tribunal held that the petition inits entirety was governed by clause (a) and so was within limitation:

I36 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Held, that the petition so far as it related to the second prayer, namely,for a declaration that the election of the two returned candidates wasvoid was governed by clause (b) and was time-barred and only the firstprayer for declaring the election wholly void was within time. Held also,that, as the Election Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with thetrial of the petition so far as the second relief was concerned, the HighCourt had power under article 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ ofprohibition prohibiting the Tribunal from proceeding with the trial of thepetition so far as this relief was concerned. Hari Vishnu Kamath v.Ahmad Ishaque and Others (10B.L.E. 218), T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappaand Another (10 E.L.E. 14), Krishn%sw%mi Ayyar v. Mohanlal Binjnni([1948] 2 M.L.J. 559) and B. v. Northumberland Compensation AppealTribunal ([1952] 1 A.B.R. 122) referred to. Da. V. K. JOHN v. G. VASAN-THA PAI AND OTHERS and A. SRINIVASAN U. G. VASANTHA PAI AND


The fact that the Election Commission has referred an electionpetition to an Election Tribunal does not necessarily lead to an inferencethat it has condoned the delay in the filing of the petition. DinabandhuSahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (9 E.L.E. 485) distinguished. A. SBINIVASANv. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHBES and V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA PAI

AN-DOTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 245.

-Condonation of delay by Election Commission—Power of Elec-tion Tribunal—The point of view from which the Election Commissionhas to consider the condonation of delay in th9 presentation of an electionpetition and the point of view which an Election Tribunal has to considerthe question whether it should dismiss an election petition for delay inprasentation in spite of the condonation of such delay by Election Com-mission, are entirely different. The Election Tribunal can only inquirewhether the Election Commission had not properly exercised itsdiscretion. I t cannot go into the question whether there was sufficientcause for condoning the delay. KRISHNAJI BHIMAEAO ANTROLIKAR V.

SHANKAE SHANTABAM MOEB AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 34.

-Condonation of delay by Election Commission suo motu— Legality— Validity of reference—Tribunal's power to reconsider the question—The Election Commission has jurisdiction to excuse delay in the presenta-tion of an election petition, and even if it excused delay suo motu with-out any application in this behalf by the petitioner and without hearingthe respondents, it cannot be said to have acted in excess of its jurisdic-tion or without jurisdiction and a reference of the election petition to atribunal for hearing the petition cannot be held to be incompetent andcannot, therefore, be set aside by the High Court by a writ of certiorari.


Under the E. P. Act, 1951, the respondents who have not been heardwould in such a case have a right to question the order of the ElectionCommission before the Election Tribunal and the tribunal has powerunder section 90(4) of the Act to hear the objections of the respondentsand to vacate the order of the Election Commission and dismiss the peti-tion if it is of opinion that there was no sufficient cause for excusing thadelay and that the order of the Election Commission was wrong.S. KHADBE SHERIFF V. ELECTION TEIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS,

7 E.L.R. 471. [This view has been overruled by the Supreme Court.See infra].

Delay in filing petition—Power of Election Commission tocondone delay—Application for condonation and notice to respondent,whether necessary—Power to condone delay suo motu—Finality of orderof Election Commission.—The proviso to section 85 of the E. P. Act,!1951, does not contemplate a formal application for condonation of delay,or the Election Commission giving to the respondent notice of the appli-cation or the holding of an enquiry as to the sufficiency of the grounds inhis presence before passing an order condoning delay in the presentationof an election petition. I t is open to the Election Commission to condonethe delay suo motu, if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for thedelay and the policy of the Legislature is to make the decision of theElection Commission on the question final and not open to question at anylater stage of the proceedings. In this respect, the position under theproviso to section 85 is materially different from that under section 5 ofthe Limitation Act, under which an order excusing delay is not final, andis liable to be questioned by the respondent at a later stage. The words"notwithstanding anything contained in section 85" in section 90(4) ofthe Act does not empower an Election Tribunal to review any orderpassed by the Election Commission under section 85. Section 90(4) willbe attracted only when the Election Commission passes on the electionpetition to the Tribunal without passing any order under section 85.DlNABANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R.485 (S.C.).

Condonation of delay—Election Commission s power—The words"sufficient cause" in the proviso to section 85 should receive a liberalconstruction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence orinaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Krishna v.Chathappan (I.L.R. 13 Mad. 269) relied on. The jurisdiction of theElection Commission to pass an order under section 86 of the Act con-stituting a Tribunal for hearing an election petition arises if the petitionis not dismissed under section 85 as a matter of fact. I t does not depend on

ELD—19


the legal position whether the petition was liable to be dismissed under s. 85.Section 90(4) itself contemplates that a petition not complying withsection 81, 83 or 117 may be referred to the Tribunal. Even assumingthat the Election Commission has no jurisdiction to condone delaysuo motu, if it refers the petition to the Tribunal for disposal, the Tribunalhas jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders under section 90(4). DiNA-BANDHU SAHU V. JADUMONI MANGARAJ AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 485(S.C.).

-Election petition—Limitation—Condonation of delay by Elec-tion Commission—Jurisdiction of Tribunal to reconsider—Where theElection Commission has condoned the delay in filing an election petitionin the exercise of its discretion under section 85 of the E. P. Act, 1951,it is not open to the Election Tribunal to which the petition is referredfor trial by the Election Commission, to reconsider the matter anddismiss the election petition as time-barred on the ground that there wasnot sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Dinabandhu Sahu v.Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others (9 E.L.E. 485) followed. BHIKAJI

KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHER V. BRIJLAL NANDLAL BIYANI AND

OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 357 (S.C.).

The Election Commission may condone delay in the presenta-tion of an election petition even without an express personalrepresentation by the petitioner for condonation of delay. JADUMANIMANGARAJ V. DINABANDHU SAHTJ AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 480.

——Petition sent by post before, but received after, expiry of period oflimitation—Whether time-barred—Condonation of delay by Election Com-mission suo motu—Legality—Interference by Tribunal—When an electionpetition is sent by registered post it can be deemed to be presented to theElection Commission within the meaning of section 81(2) of theE. P. Act,1951, only when it is delivered to the Secretary of the Commission or theofficer appointed by the Election Commission in this behalf. T. Prakasamv. U. Krishna Bao and Others (No. 2) (2 E.L.E. 54) dissented from. TheElection Tribunal has power to dismiss an election petition under section90(4) of the Act on the ground that it is barred by limitation, even thoughthe delay in presenting the petition has been condoned by the ElectionCommission ; but it would be proper to do so only in very expectionalcases, where the Election Commission has act9d in a grossly illegalmanner or ultra vires. The Tribunal cannot sit as a caurt of appeal orrevision over the Election Commission. Th.9 Election Commission haspower to condone delay in presenting an election petition suo motu with-out hearing tb.9 respondents to the petition. Khiluinal v. Arjan Das andOthers (l E.L.E. 497) and Krishnaswami Panikonder v, Ramaswami


Ghettiar (I.L.R. 41 Mad. 412 P.O.) explained. [The question whether theElection Tribunal has power to condone delay independently of the Com-mission, was left opan.] MUNUSWAMI GOUNDEE v. KHADER SHERIFF

AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 74. [Partly overruled by 10 E.L.E. 357 above].

The Post Office is not an agent of the Election Commission forreceiving election petitions and an election petition sent by post can bedeemed to have been presented to the Election Commission only when itis actually delivered to the Secretary to the Commission or any personauthorised by the Commission in this behalf. Section 85 of theR. P. Act,1951, empowers the Election Commission to condone delay in thepi'essntation of the petition if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause,but it is doubtful whether the Election Tribunal has such power. Eromthe mere fact that the Election Commission did not dismiss a petition onthe ground that it was time-barred it cannot be inferred that the Com-mission in the exercise of its discretion condoned the delay in thepresentation of the petition. Delay in the presentation of an electionpetition cannot be condoned if it is due to want of care and attention.KHILUMAL AND ANOTHER, V. AEJUNDAS AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 497.

Petition sent by registered post—Date of presentation—Date ofdelivery to post office or date of receipt by Commission—Whan a petitionis sent by registered post to the Secretary to the Election Commission itis presented to tha Election Commission within the meaning of section81(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, on the date on which it is delivered to thepost office and not when it is delivered by the post office to the Secretary.T. PEAKASAM v. IT. KRISHNA EAO AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2 E.L.E. 54.

Under section 81(2) the date of presentation of an election peti-tion, when it is sent by registered post, is the date on which it is so sentand not the date on which it is delivered. The reference to "delivery"in clause (b) is only to show that it must also be delivered in fact.JADUMANI MANGRAJV. DINABANDHU SAHU ANT) OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 480.

14. List of particulars.—Section 83 lays down in unequivocal termsthat an election petition shall contain a concise statement of thematerial facts on which the petitioner relies, and shall also be accom-panied by a list setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegalpractice which the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement aspossible as to the names of the parties alleged to have committedsuch corrupt or illegal practice and the date and place of commission ofeach such practice. I t is not open to the petitioner making an electionpetition, in the face of this express provision of section S3 of the Act, toplead that the list was not given in the original petition with full parti-culars because it would have made the petition cumbrous, or because it


would only be a matter of evidence to be gone into without expresspleading. If full particulars are not given, those paragraphs in thepetition or in the list which lack in particulars and which deal withcorrupt and illegal practices should be struck off. A subsequent petitionunder section 83(3) for amending the election petition or the list forgiving full particulars eanuot be accepted. BOLA NATH V. KRISHNA

CHANDEA GUPTA AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 288.

The provision contained in section 82(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951,that an election petition shall be accompanied by a list signed andverified setting for the full particulars of any corrupt practice which peti-tioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible as to the namesof the parties alleged to have contributed to such corrupt or illegalpractice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice,is mandatory. Consequently, where an election petition is not accom-panied by such a list it is liable to be dismissed, even though parti-culars of the corrupt or illegal practices are given in the petition or inthe exhibits attached to the petition. On the facts the Tribunal heldthat even the averments in the petition amplified by the exhibits didnot satisfy the requirements of section 83(2). Section 83(2) of the ActAct does not contemplate the filing of a fresh or supplementary listafter the filing of the petition, nor an amendment of list itself,though amendments of the particulars included in the list can beallowed under section 83(3). Purshottamdas Banchhoddas Patel v.Shantilal Girdharilal Parikh (l E.L.R. 223) followed. The Attock case(l Hammond) distinguished. "When evidence with regard to allegedcorrupt or illegal practices is to be led, the petitioner can be allowed tolead evidence only with regard to the corrupt or illegal practices inrespect of which he has given sufficient particulars as required by sec-tion 83(2) and not with regard to others. KANAYALAL DUBLLABHRAMBHANSALI V. POPATLAL MULSHANKEE JOSHI AND OTHBES, 1 B.L.E. 244.

See also under COEEUPT PEACTICB—PAETICULAES, pp. 45-52

supra.

15. New grounds.—A. Grounds not raised in the petition—Undersection 80 of the Act an election can only be called in question by anelection petition and in no other way. It is'therefore not open to arespondent to challenge the validity of the election on grounds whichare not raised by the petitioner. K. SUBBAMANYAM v. ABDUL HAMEEDKHAN 1 E.L.E. 432 ; SOGHET SINGH V. THAKAE SINGH AND OTHEES

(No. 2), 3 B.L.E. 102 and NAEANJAN SINGH V. BEISH BHAN AND

OTHBES, 3 E.L.E. 179.

ELECTION PETITION—NEW GROUNDS

-In an election petition it is not open to the' respondent tochallenge the validity of the election on grounds which are not raisedin the petition. Naranjan Singh v. Brisk Shan Singh and Others (3 B.L.R.179), Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others (3 B.L.E. 102) andK. Subrahmanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others (l B.L.R. 432)followed. KHUSHWAQT RAI V. KARAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 93.

Held, by the majority (P. LOBO dissenting):—It is not open to arespondent to an election petition to support the petition on the groundof illegalities and irregularities on the part of the returned candidatewhich have not been alleged in the petition itself. P. LOBO.—There isno bar to a respondent who is not a returned candidate to bring to thenotice of the Tribunal illegalities and irregularities not allegedly thepetitioner and incidentally support the election petition by provingthem. It would be in the interests of justice to do so. GANGA PBASAD

SHASTEI v. PANNA LAL JAIN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 392.

It is open to a respondent who is not the returned candidate tochallenge the election on grounds not alleged in the election petitionMADAN SINGH V. KALYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 405.

It is not open to a respondent to an election petition who is adefeated candidate to seek to avoid the election of the returned candidateon grounds not alleged by the petitioner in the election patition-M. MUTHIAH V. A. S. SUBBARAJ AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.R. 165.

An Election Tribunal will not be acting in excess of its juris-diction if it hears grounds in support of the election petition which areraised in the written statement of the respondent and 'not raised in thepetition itself. It is not bound to decide the election petition as it stoodwhen it was forwarded by the Election Commission to the Tribunal fordisposal. KALYAN SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, AJMER, AND OTHERS,

8 E.L.R. 207.

An Election Tribunal cannot set aside an election on a groundnot taken by the petitioner himself ; if it does so, the decision of theTribunal will be erroneous on the face of it and could be quashed by awrit of certiorari. Where the ground on which an election petition isallowed is not one mentioned in section 100, the decision of the Tribunalwill be in excess of its jurisdiction. GANGADHAE V. ELECTION TRIBU-NAL, VINDHYA PRADESH, AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 183.

B. Grounds not taken before Returning Officer —The validityof the nomination paper of a candidate is a matter which concerns notmerely the petitioner but also other candidates as well as other membersof the electorate who are interested in exercising or abstaining from


exercising their right of franchise. It is therefore open to a partychallenge the validity of a nomination before the Tribunal even ongrounds not taken before the Eeturning Officer or to challenge thevalidity even where no objection was raised at the time of the nomina.tion. The right of objection to a nomination paper cannot ba waivednor is any estoppel created against a candidate by his not raising anyobjection at the time of nomination to the act of theEeturning Officer.Mohan Lai Mandal v. Badhanath Das and Others (Sen and Poddar 388),Panna Lai v. Mohan Lai (2 Jagat Narain 143) relied on. VlJAYAMOHAN EBDDY V. PAGA PULLA EEDDY AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 414.

Fresh grounds for supporting the rejection of a nominationother than those stated by the Eeturning Officer, can be urged before anElection Tribunal, and if the Tribunal finds these new grounds are truethe rejection of the nomination can be upheld. GIAN CHAND V. SRI-BAM BANSAL AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 136.

-——It is settled law that in an election petition the respondentcan support the order' of the Eeturning Officer rejecting a nominationpaper on grounds other than those mentioned in the order of theEeturning Officer. If the Eeturning Officer has not called upon thecandidate to produce a certified copy of the electoral roll, the respondentto the election petition cannot urge the non-production thereof as aground for supporting the rejection of the nomination paper. MENGHE A J v. BHIMANDAS AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 301.

The fact that the objection that a candidate was disqualifiedfor standing as a candidate was not taken before the Eeturning Officerat the time of scrutiny cannot create any estoppel or bar against con-testing his election in an election petition on that ground. BALBIBSINGH V. ARJAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.E. 341.

The respondent to an election petition is entitled to raise aplea that the nomination of the petitioner, though rejected on oneground by the Eeturning Officer, was defective on one or more of theother grounds mentioned in section 36(2) and such a plea, if taken,must be enquired into by the Election Tribunal. T E J SINGH V. ELEC-

TION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHERS. 9 E.L.E. 193.

16. Parties—Candidates who have withdrawn—-Whether necessaryparties—Effect of non-joinder—Power to implead—The expression"dulynominated" in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not synonymouswith the expression "validly nominated" which occurs in section 38,and a candidate who satisfies the requirements of section 33 is a "dulynominated candidate" within the meaning of section 82 even though he

ELECTION PETITION — PARTIES 143

has withdrawn his candidature within the time fixed for withdrawalsunder section 37, and is a necessary party to an election petition. Non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate, is not however, a defect fatal tothe maintainability of an election petition, but can be cured by implead'ing the necessary party by amending the petition, unless such a pro-cedure would result in some prejudice to the other parties or after thenature of the petition. YOGBAJSING SHANKAB SINGH PAEIHAB V.

SlTAEAM HlBACHAND BlBLA AND OTHEBS, 1 E.L.S. 389.

Candidates whose nominations have been accepted afterscrutiny are "duly nominated" candidates within section 82 and aretherefore necessary parties to an election petition, even though theyhave withdrawn their candidature. Where candidates who had with-drawn have not been made parties to an election petition, the tribunalcan allow an amendment of the petition for joining them as partiesAnglo Indian Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 51) referred to-LAKSHMANA PILLAI v. CHENGAM PILLAI AND OTHBBS, 2 E.L.E. 103.

A candidate becomes a "duly nominated" candidate withinthe meaning of section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, on his makingthe requisite deposit if he files his nomination papers with theReturning Officer within the prescribed time duly proposed and secondedwith a declaration that the candidate who has appointed an electionagent who is not disqualified to act as such. Candidates who have notwithdrawn and whose nomination papers are accepted after scrutinyare validly nominated candidates. Candidates who have been thusnominated remain "duly nominted" even though they have withdrawntheir candidature under section 37 or their papers have been rejectedduring scrutiny under section 36 and are necessary parties to an electionpetition. An election petition cannot be summarily dismissed for non-joinder of a "duly nominated" candidate if it is possible for the Tribunalto decide the questions between the parties to the petition without,requiring the presence of the persons who have not been impleadad.The Election Tribunal has no power to allow new parties to be implead-ed. The powers of the Election Tribunal in the matter of amendmentof pleadings is not co-extensive with those of the Civil Courts underthe Code of Civil Procedure. If an election petition does not contain astatement of the material facts and a list setting forth the full parti-culars of the corrupt or illegal practices alleged in the petition asrequired by section 83 the Election Tribunal has no power to allowan amendment of the petition though it has power to allow the parti-culars included in the list to be amended and to call for further parti-culars. Quaere: Whether it is not open to a petitioner to claim two of


the reliefs mentioned in section 84 either cumulatively or alternatively.P R B M N A T H v. RAM KISHAN AND OTHEES, 1 E.L.E. 271.

A candidate whose nomination has been accepted by theReturning Officer is a ' duly nominated" candidate within the meaningof section 82 of the R. P. Act, 1951, and is therefore a necessary partyto an election petition even though he has withdrawn his candidature.The Election Tribunal has no power to allow an application to impleada necessary party to an election petition after the time prescribed byrule 119 for presenting the petition has expired. If a duly nominatedcandidate is not impleaded as a party as required by section 82, theelection petition has to be dismissed. The absence of a reference tosection 82 in seation 90(4) of the Act, does not curtail the powers of theTribunal to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with section 82, inview of the provisions of section 80. Mahommedally Allabux v.Jafferbhoy (Hammond 172), Hazara Barn's case (Sen and Poddar 395) andBaba Khalil Ahmad's case (Sen and Poddar 168) relied on. BamachandranNair v. Bamachandra Das (1 E.L.R. 442) not followed. PEITAM SINGHv. CHAEAN SINGH AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 276.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are notnecessary parties to an election petition, as they are not "candidates whohave been duly nominated at the election" within the meaning of section82 of the Act. There is a vital distinction between candidates for anelection and candidates at the election. As a candidate who has withdrawnis not a nesassary party to an election petition, the fact that the Tribunalhas aided him as a party is a mere surplusage and cannot be made aground for issuing a writ against the Tribunal. There is neither a statu-tory obligation nor even a statutory discretion vested in the Tribunal todismiss a petition for mere non-joinder of parties. It does not follow thatbecause a party to a suit or to an application or to a petition is broughton the record at a late stage and even beyond the period of limitationthe suit, application or petition must fail as a whole. It is for thecourt to consider what is the effect of non-joinder and if relief can begranted to the plaintiff in the absence of the party who was notbefore the court during the period of limitation, the court is notbound to dismiss the suit or petition as a whole ; the plaintiff or petitionermay be given a limited relief. It is only if the High Court is satisfiedthat there is a clear and unequivocal statutory obligation upon theTribunal to dismiss an election petition that it can issue a writ and directthe Tribunal to dismiss the petition. SlTAEAM HlEACHAND BlBLA v.

YOGBAJ SINGH SHANKAE SINGH PAEIHAE, 2 E.L.R. 283. I

ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES I45

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are dulynominated" candidates and are necessary parties to an election petition.But a petition cannot he summarily dismissed because they have not beenmade parties. They can be impleaded as parties even after the expiry ofthe time prescribed for filing tha petition. Though an amendment of anelection petition should not ordinarily be allowed, an amendment can beallowed where the amendment sought for does not change the nature ofthe case or widen the scope of the inquiry and is made in good faith and itdoes not prejudice any of the parties. Pritam Singh v. Charan Singhand Others (2 B.L.E. 276) dissented from. T. Prakasam v. U. KrishnaRao and Others (1 B.L.E. 384) and Bamachandran Nair v. RamachandraDas and Others (1 B.L.R. 442) followed. K. N. GAIROLA V. GANGA DHAR

MAITHANI AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 162.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are "dulynominated candidates" within the meaning of section 82 of theE. P. Act,1951, and are necessary parties to an election petition, but non-joinder ofsuch candidates is not fatal to the maintainability of the petition and thecourt has power to implead such candidates as parties on an applicationbeing made to it in that behalf by the petitioner. Pritam Singh v. CharanSingh (2 B.L.E. 276) not followed. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. YograjSingh Shanher Singh Parihar (2 E.L.R. 283), Lakshmana Pillai v.Chengam Pillai and Others (2 B.L.E. 103), Menghraj v. Bhiman Das andOthers (2 E.L.E. 301), and Prem Nath v. Ram Kishan and Others (lB.L.E. 271), referred to. SHIBBAN LAL SAXENA V. HARI SHANKER

PRASAD AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 313.

Held by the majority (MEHAR SlNGH dissenting):—Candidateswho have withdrawn their candidatures are "duly nominated candidates"within the meaning of section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and must there-fore be joined as parties to an election petition, but an election petitioncannot be dismissed merely because such candidates are not joined asparties. The provisions of section 82 are directory and not mandatory.MEHAR SINGH —The provisions of section 82 are mandatory and ifcandidates who had withdrawn their candidature are not impleaded asparties to the petition within the period of limitation for filing the elec-tion petition, the petition has to be dismissed. The question whether thematter in dispute between the petitioner and the respondents could bedisposed of in the absence of the candidates who have not been impleadedis not relevant under the present election rules. [Case law reviewed.]JOGINDER SINGH V. HAROHAND SINGH AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 447.

Held by the majority (GOBIND SARAN dissenting).—Candidateswho were duly nominated and who withdrew their candidatures thereafter

ELD—20


under section 37 of the E. P. Act, 1951, are necessary parties to anelection petition under section 82. Section 82 of the Act is mandatoryand non-compliance with its provisions is fatal, and neither the ElectionCommission nor the Election Tribunal has any discretion to proceed withan election petition if the petitioner does not join all duly nominatedcandidates as parties to the petition as required by section 82. The termconclusion of the trial" used in section 98 means the stage when the

election petition can be finally disposed of and the trial can therefore beconcluded. "When therefore the Election Tribunal finds that for thefailure to comply with the provision of section 82, the election petitionis not maintainable and for this defect the election cannot be called inquestion under section 80, it can dismiss tha petition under section 98.The provisions contained in rules 3, 6 and 9 of Order I of the CivilProcedure Code regarding joinder of defendants cannot be applied toelection petitions, having regard to the mandatory nature of section 82of the Act. Under the E. P. Act, the Tribunal has, therefore, no powerto add as parties those who were duly nominated at the election buthave not been joined as respondents in the original election petition. PerGOBIND SABAN.—Candidates who have withdrawn are duly nominatedcandidates" within the meaning of section 82 and they are proper partiesto an election petition; but non-joinder of such candidates is not fataland a petition cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of such non-joinder unless the Tribunal finds that the nature and character of theallegations are such that it is not possible to pass a just decision in theirabsence. When an application1 is made for impleading such a candidate,the Tribunal has power to implead him, even if the time for filing theelection petition has expired. PlDA HUSSAIN v. SHBO BHAJAN SlNG'rfAND OTHBES, 4 E.L.B. 1.

Omission to join candidates who had withdrawn their candi-datures as parties to an election petition is not fatal to the maintainabilityof the petition. The defect can be cured by adding thorn as partiessubsequently. Pritam Singh v. Char an Singh (2 E.L.B. 278) not follows 1.THAKOOB DAOOSING v. EAMKEISHNA BATHOS AND OIHEBS, 4

E.L.B. 34. '

A candidate whose nomination has been rejected by theBeturn-ing Officer is not a duly nominated" candidate and he is not a necessaryparty to an election petition. A candidate who has withdrawn his candida-ture is a "duly nominated" candidate and is a proper party to an electionpetition, but an election petition is not liable to be dismissed merelybecause such a candidate has not been joined as a party. The Tribunalhas a discretion in the matter and if the controversy in relation to the

ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES

election can be settled finally in the absence of such candidate it would beunjust to dismiss a petition on the ground of non-joinder of such a candi-date. Even under the old election rules where the words used were mustjoin" it was necessary to join all the other candidates who were nomi-nated, only when the petitioner in addition to questioning the election ofthe returned candidate claimed a declaration that he himself or any othercandidate has been duly elected. CHIRANJI LAL V. PANNA LAL KAUSHIKAND OTHEES, 4 B.L.E. 274.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are notnecessary parties to an election petition within the meaning of section 82of theE. P. Act, 1951. [The conflict of opinion on this point has beenset at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaganath v. JaswantSingh and Others (Civil Appeal No. 100 of 1952 decided on January, 20,1954)]. UDAINATH SINGH V. JAGAT BAHADUR SINGH- AND OTHERS,

(No. 2) 5 B.L.E. 199.

• —Candidates who have withdrawn their candidatures are neces-sary parties to an election petition but a petition is not liable to be dis-missed for non-joinder of such candidates. They may be added as partiesif an application is made for that purpose, and the fact that they are addedonly after the period of limitation for filing the petition has expired, willnot make the petition time-barred as against the respondents againstwhom the petition was filed in time. MADAN PAL V. EAJDEO Ur-ADHYAAND OTHERS, 6 B.L.E. 28.

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are "dulynominated candidates and as such they should be made parties to an elec-tion petition under section 82 of the Act. The petition is not, however,liable to be dismissed for such non-joinder. The tribunal will in suchcases be guided by the rules contained in Orders V and VI of the CivilProcedure Code and such candidates can be joined as parties even afterlimitation. But if a party is added after limitation the petitioner cannotbe allowed to claim the relief that he or any other candidate should bedeclared duly elected. There is no material difference in this respectbetween the law before Act XLIII of 1951 and the present law under thisAct. SARDTJL SINGH CAVEESHAB V. HTJKAM SINGH AND OTHEESI

6 E.L.E. 316.

-Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are dulynominated candidates" but non-joinder of such candidates as parties is notfatal to the validity of an election petition. They can be impleaded asparties even after limitation. DHARAM V I E V. BHALA EAM AND

OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 64.

14° ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGfeST

Candidates who have withdrawn their candidature are notduly nominated candidates," and an election petition is, therefore-

maintainable even though they are not impleaded as parties to the peti-tion. An Election Tribunal has power to add necessary parties in appro-priate cases. K. S. SUBEAMANIA GOUNDAR V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 66.

Candidates who had withdrawn their candidature are not'candidates duly nominated at the election" within the meaning of sec-

tion 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, and an election petition cannot be dis-missed merely because such candidates have not been impleaded asparties to the petition. Sheo Kumar Pande v. V. G. Oak and Others(5 E.L.E. 103) and Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh ShankarSingh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) followed. Even if such candidates are heldto be candidates duly nominated at the election, non-joinder of suchparties is not a fatal defect and the Election Tribunal has power to im-plead them. Such candidates are not "necessary parties" in the sensethat relief cannot be given to the parties to the petition in their absence,where the petitioner claims only a declaration that the election of thereturned candidate is void and does not claim that he himself or anyother candidate should be declared duly elected, and in such a case theElection Tribunal would not be acting in excess of its jurisdiction inpermitting the petitioner to implead such candidates as parties evenafter the period of limitation for filing an election petition has expired.Obiter: Where the petitioner claims a declaration that he himselfshould be declared duly elected, it would be against the principles ofnatural justice to grant the relief claimed, in the absence of candidateswho had withdrawn their candidature and the election petition will haveto be dismissed if they have not been impleaded as parties before theexpiry of the period of limitation for filing the election petition. MADANMOHAN V. BANKAT LAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 119.

The provision contained in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951,that the petitioner shall join as respondents all the candidates who wereduly nominated at the election other than himself if he was so nomi-nated is not mandatory but only directory and an election petitioncannot therefore be dismissed merely because candidates who bad beennominated but who had withdrawn their candidature have not beenjoined as respondents. Where an Election Tribunal dismisses an electionpetition on the ground that candidates who had withdrawn their candi-dature have not been joined as respondents it does not commit a mereerror of law but refuses to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it by lawthrough a misconception of the law and the High Court can set aside its

ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES 149

decision in the exercise of its powers of superintendence under article227 of the Constitution, though it may not be possible to issue a writunder article 226 owing to the dissolution of the Tribunal or for otherreasons. Mere use of the word ' shall" does not necessarily make aprovision imperative, the nature of the provision must depend upon thecontext and the collocation in which the word "shall" is used, and must begathered from the intention of the Legislature and from the four cornersof the Act itself. Per SINHA J.—Candidates who had been nominatedbut who have withdrawn their candidature are still candidates whowere duly nominated at the election" within the meaning of section 82.The two expressions "candidates at the election" and "candidates forthe election" have been used indiscriminately in the Act without anyidea of drawing a distinction between the connotation of these expres-sions. Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Shankar Singh Parihar(2 E.L.E. 283) and Sheo Kumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others(5 B.L.E. 103) dissented from. Candidates who have withdrawn are notonly not necessary parties but are not even proper parties, but in viewof the language of section 82 they should be made parties to an electionpetition, and if they have not been made parties at the time of filing thepetition there is absolutely no bar to make them parties later by amend-ing the petition. Such amendment is of a formal nature and no question oflimitation arises. SHAH MOHAMMAD UMAIE V. BAM CHAEAN SINGH

AND OTHEER, 8 E.L.E. 179.

——The question whether non-joinder of any candidate as respond-ent to the petition is fatal to the petition or not, will depend on theanswer to a further question whether the Tribunal can, or cannot, grantthe relief sought, behind the back of such candidate, without causingany detriment to his interests. BAGHUNATH SINGH v. KAMPTA PBA-SAD SAXENA, 8 E.L.E. 424.

Section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not mandatory, and omis-sion to implead as a party even a candidate who has been validly nomi-nated as a candidate and who has gone to the polls is not fatal to themaintainabilityof an election petition, much less omission of a candidatewho has withdrawn his candidature. The question whether the non-joinder of a person as respondent is fatal to the petition or not, willdepend in each case upon the answer to the further question whetherthe Tribunal can safely grant to the petitioner the relief prayed for,without adversely affecting the interest of the party who has notbeen joined and who ought to have been joined under section 82.SAKJU PBASAD NAMDEO v. GOPAL SAEAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 8

E.L.E. 444.


The provision contained in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951,that the petitioner shall join as respondents all the candidates who wereduly nominated at the election is not mandatory in character and anelection petition cannot be dismissed on the preliminary ground thatthe candidates who had withdrawn their candidature have not beenjoined as respondents. If an Election Tribunal dismisses an electionpetition summarily on this ground it fails to exercise a jurisdiction vestedin it by law and the High Court can set aside its order in the exerciseof its powers of superintendence under article 227 of the Constitution.Shah Mohammad Umair v. Bam Charan and Others (8 B.L.E. 179)followed. FIDA HUSSAIN v. SHEOBHAJAN SINGH AHD OTHEES, 9 E.L.E.33.

A candidate who has withdrawan his candidature is not a dulynominated candidate and is not a necessary party to an election peti-tion. SALIG- EAM JAISWAL v. SHEO KUMAB PANDE AND OTHEES, 9E.L.E. 67.

A candidate who has withdrawn his candidature is not a neces-sary party to an ejection petition, and failure to join him as a party isnot fatal to the maintainability of the petition. LACHHIEAM V. JAMUNAPBASAP MDKHAEIYA AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 149.

The provision contained in section 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951,that all duly nominated candidates shall be joined as parties to an elec-tion petition is only a directory provision. Failure toimplead a candi-date who has withdrawn his candidature is therefore not a fatal defect,and an election petition cannot be dismissed in limine for failure toimplead such a candidate. The Tribunal should proceed in such a casein the manner provided in the Civil Procedure Code, which has beenmade applicable to the trial of election petitions, and it can permit-candidates who have not been impleaded to be made parties to the peti-tion. The court reserved its final opinion on matters specifically coveredby sections 81, 83 and 11.7 of the E. P. Act, 1951. JAGAN NATH V.JASWANT SINGH AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 231 (S.C.).

——Though section 82 requires all the candidates duly nominatedto be included omission to implead all of them is not by itself a reasonfor dismissing the petition in limine. An opportunity should be givento petitioner to amend the petition to implead them. M. E. MEGANATHANv. K. T. KOSALBAM, 9 E.L.E. 242.

Non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate is not a fatal defectfor which an election petition could be summarily dismissed. TheTribunal can permit the parties left out to be impleaded and such par-ties can be impleaded, even after the period of limitation for filing the

ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES

election petition had expired. Sita Bam Hira Ghand Birla v. YograjSingh Shankar Singh Parihar (2 E.L.E. 283) and Jag an Nath v. JaswantSingh (9 E.L.E. 231) followed. SHIBBANLAL SAKSBNA V. HAEISHANKBE

PRASAD AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 403.

An election petition is not liable to be dismissed in liminemerely because candidates who had withdrawn their candidature havenot been impleaded as parties to the petition. The effect of non-joinderof such parties is a matter to be taken into consideration at the appro-priate stage with reference to the final result of the case. Jag an Nathv. Jaswant Singh and Others (9 E.L.R. 231) followed. BHIKAJI KESHAO

JOSHI AND ANOTHEE v. BEIJLAL NANDLAL BITANI AND OTHERS, 10

E.L.E. 357 (S.C.).

-Candidates whose nomination papers have been rejected by theReturning Officer on scrutiny are not ' duly nominated" candidatesand are not, therefore, necessary parties to an election petition undersection 82 of the E. P. Act, 1951. Pandit Mangal Bam and Others v.Ghaudhari Anant Bam and Another (Sen and Poddar 438), ManzurHussain v. Ghulam Mohammad (Sen and Poddar 746), Mohammad Shaftv. Mohammad Iqbal Ahmed Khan (Sen and Poddar 970) and Piarey Laiv. Munshi Amba Prasad (Hammond 29), referred to. LAXMAN RAO V.LAXMINIVAS GANERIWAL AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 239.

A candidate whose nomination has been rejected by the Re-turning Officer is not a ' duly nominated" candidate within the mean-ing of section 82 of the R. P. Act, 1951, and is not a necessary party toan election petition. LAXMAN RAO v. LAXMINIVAS GANERIVAL ANDOTHEES (NO. 2), 2 E.L.R. 20.

A candidate whose nomination has been rejected is not a neces-sary party to an election petition but joinder of such a person as aparty is not a ground for rejecting the petition. ASEAE AHMAD V.NIHAL UDDIN AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.R. 81.

A candidate is a ' duly nominated" candidate if he has filed anomination paper in accordance with the formalities prescribed in sec-tion 33(3) of the Act even though his nomination paper was later rejec-ted on scrutiny, and such a candidate must be joined as a party to anelection petition under section 82 of the Act. But, the non-joinder ofa duly nominated candidate is not fatal to the maintainability of a peti-tion if adequate relief can be granted to the parties in his absence.MRNGH RAJ U. BHIMANDAS AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 301.

Power to implead new parties as respondents after limitation —An Election Tribunal has power to implead new parties as respondent?


to an election petition, even after the expiry of the period of limitationfor filing the petition. Election cases are not purely cases between pri-vate parties, but the State is even more interested in them and it is allthe more necessary that all parties should be on the record. The ex-pression "trial of suits" is used in section 90(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951,in a wide sense so as to cover all the stages of the enquiry into an elec-tion petition from its presentation until its disposal; there is no justi-cation to restrict it to the stage commencing with the hearing of thepetition. Section 92 of the Act is not exhaustive of the powers of theTribunal. On the other hand section 90(2) gives a wide scope to theTribunal to use such provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as mightbe necessary and appropriate for the trial of an election petition pro-vided they are not inconsistent with any provisions of the B. P. Act,or rules made thereunder. Mahommedally Allabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdulla-bhoy Lalji (Hammond 173), Lala Ghainan Lai v. Lala Shadi Bam(Hammond 621) and Ghiraghdin and Another v. Gh. Jahanghir Khan(2 Doabia 144) not followed. EAMACHANDEA CHOTTDHURI V. SADASIVA

TEIPATHY AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.E. 450.

The non-joinder of a duly nominated candidate is not fatal toan election petition and no question of limitation therefore arises whensuch a candidate is joined later on, after the period of limitation hasexpired. The provisions of section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act donot apply to election petitions. Those are governed by the of the E. P.Act, 1951, which is a complete code in itself. Suraj Bhan v. HemchandJain and Others (2 E.L.E. 1), Menghraj v. Bhimandas (2E.L.B. 301)referred to. Pritam Singh v. Gharan Singh(1 E.L.E. 276) not followed.BANKAT LAL v. MADAN MOHAN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 375.

Objections to be taken early—All objections on the ground ofnon-joinder of parties should be taken at the earliest possible oppor-tunity as the provisions of Order I, rr. 9 and 13 of the Civil ProcedureCode apply to election petitions. JAGAJEEVANDAS SHBTTY V. SANJEEVA

SHETTY AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 358.

Tribunal's power to decide—The determination of the questionwhether the parties to an election petition have been properly implead-ed is a matter not for the Election Commission but for the Tribunal todecide. JAGAN NATH V. JASWANT SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 231(S.C.).

17. Recriminatory petition—Withdrawal of claim for declarationthat petitioner was duly elected—Effect of—A recriminatory petitionbecomes redundant and need not be heard if the petitioner withdrawshis prayer for a declaration that he has been duly elected. Jullundur

ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES 153

North Constituency 1946 case, (2 Doabia 223 ; Sen and Poddar 965)referred to. SATYA DEV BUSHAHEI V. GHANSHYAM AND OTHEES, 4E.L.E.67.

Notice of recrimination—Under section 86(5) and section 97a notice of recrimination to the Tribunal in or to be valid must begiven to the Chairman by presenting the notice personally or by send-ing it by registered post so as to reach him within time in the ordinary

- course of post. The presentation of the notice to a member of the Tri-bunal who was not authorised either by the Act, or by the Chairmanhimself, to receive the notice would not be a valid presentation. The' trial" of an election petition commences when, after the filing of areply thereto and of a recriminatory petition, if any, the points in con-troversy between the parties are settled and their investigation begins.JAMNA PEASAD MUKHAEIYA v. LACHHIEAM EATANLAL JAIN AND

OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 1.

18. Reliefs—Petition claiming more than one relief—Maintain-ability- Section 84 of theE. P. Act which prescribes the three kinds ofreliefs which may be claimed in an election petition does not prevent apetitioner claiming reliefs alternatively so long as he does not seek morethan one relief at a time, and even if two or more reliefs are claimedcumulatively the petition cannot be dismissed summarily for this reason.Whether sub-sections (l) and (2) of section 100, and section 101, aremutually exclusive or not and whatever be the scope of the prayer madein an election petition, the relief which the tribunal can and is bound togrant must depend on the grounds alleged and proved. EAMACHANDEANNAIB v. EAMACHANDBA DAS AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 442.

Section 84 of theE. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that the peti-tioner can claim in an election petition only one of the three declarationsmentioned in the section. Where a petitioner claimed (a) that the elec-tion of respondent No. 1 be declared void and the petitioner be declaredduly elected and (b) that in case the petitioner be not declared dulyelected, the entire election be declared void : Held, that the petition wasnot defective and could not be summarily dismissed. Gidwani GhoithramParlabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Ghuharmal and Others (1 E.L.E. 194)referred to. MAHADEO V. AUDESH PEATAP SINGH AND OTHEES,

2 E.L.E. 398.

In an election petition, the petitioner is not bound to confinehis claim to one of the three declarations referred to in section 84,clauses (a), (b) and (c). He can claim any one of these reliefs alternativelybut he cannot claim two or more reliefs cumulatively. Bamachandran

ELD—2i


Nair v. Bamachandra Das and Others (l E.L.R. 442) followed. SOCKET

SINGH V. THAKAE SINGH AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.R. 401.

I t is competent to a petitioner to pray for one or more of thethree reliefs mentioned in section 84 ; he is not bound to confine hisprayer to one of the three reliefs. MARUTRAO BHATTEAO AND OTHERSV. GULABEAO DADASAHEB AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 303.

Section 84 of the R. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that in anelection petition the petitioner can claim only one of the three reliefsmentioned therein. I t means that he can claim any one or more of thethree reliefs. RATTAN SINGH v. DEVINDEE SlNGH AND OTHERS,7 E.L.R. 234.

A petitioner has a light to claim the reliefs mentioned inclauses (b) and (c) of section 98 in the alternative. GOVIND MALAVIYA V.MURLI MANOHAR AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 84.

A petitioner can claim in an election petition two or more ofthe reliefs mentioned in section 84 of [the R. P. Act, 1951. AwADESHPEASAD SINHA v. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 45.

In an election petition the petitioner may claim one or moreof the reliefs mentioned in section 84. He is not bound to confinehimself to one of the reliefs mentioned in the section. SALIG RAMJAISWAL v. SHEO KUMAE PANDE AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.R. 67.

It is not open to a person filing an election petition to claimmore than one of the reliefs mentioned in section 84 of the R. P. Act,1951, even alternatively. Each of the three reliefs mentioned in thatsection are separate and distinct reliefs and the grounds upon which thedifferent reliefs could be granted are also different. I t is also not open tothe Tribunal to grant any relief other than the relief that has been prayedfor in the petition. Accordingly, where the prayer in the petition is todeclare the election of the returned candidate void the Tribunal cannotdeclare the whole election void. DR. BEIJENDEA SwAEUP V. ELECTIONTBIBUNAL, LUCKNOW, AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 191.

The relief for declaring an election wholly void referred to inclause (c) of section 84, and the relief for declaring the election of thereturned candidate to be void referred to in clause (a) of section 84 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951, are alternative and not cumula-tive, but a petition praying for these reliefs cumulatively is not liable tobe dismissed on that account. It is for the Tribunal to decide towhich of the reliefs the petitioner is entitled, and to grant himsuch relief. A. SRINIVASAN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHERS,

10 E.L.R. 245.

ELECTION PETITION—RELIEFS 155

Under section 84 of the E. P. Act, 1951, it is open to thepetitioner in an election petition to pray for any one or more of the reliefsmentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the section. The petition is notliable to be dismissed merely because he claims more than one of thesereliefs nor can he be compelled- to confine himself to one of these reliefs,though the Tribunal can actually grant him only the particular relief towhich he is entitled on the facts found by the Tribunal. Audesh PratapSingh v. Brji Narain and Others (9 B.L.E. l) Mahadeo v. JwalaprasadMishra and Others (6 E.L.E. l) and Durga Sharikar Mehta v. ThakurBaghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.E. 494) relied on. A. Srinivasan v.G. Vasantha Pai and Others (10 E.L.E. 245) affirmed on this point.Dr. V. K. JOHN V. G. VASANTHA P A I AND OTHBES and A. SRINIVASAN

v. G. VASANTHA PAI AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 345.

Where an election petition claims only one of the reliefs men-tioned in section 84 the Election Tribunal has power to permit thepetitioner to amend the petition so as to include in it a prayer for anotherrelief mentioned in section 84, and claim either relief in the alternative,provided the other party is not prejudiced thereby. MATHAI MATHEW

MANJTTRAN v. K. 0. ABRAHAM, 10 E.L.E. 376.

19. Remand— Remand of petition to Election Tribunal—Legality—As Election Tribunals are ad hoc bodies to which remands cannot easilybe made as in ordinary courts of law, it is essential that Tribunals shoulddo their work in full and decide the whole case. If any charge of corruptpractice is made their duty does not end with declaring the election void,but they must also, as laid down in section 99 of the Act, record a findingwhether any corrupt practice has or has not been committed and thenature of that corrupt practice, and also the names of all persons foundguilty of any corrupt practice. E A J KRUSHNA BOSE V. BlNODKANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 294 (S.C.)

When an Election Tribunal announces its order and the orderis published by the Election Commission, the Tribunal becomes functusofficio. If after the Tribunal has become functus officio the High Courtin an application for a writ passes an order directing the Tribunal to makea further order under section 99 of the Act relating to the commission ofany corrupt practice, the order of the High Court will not be binding onthe Election Commission as the Commission is not within its jurisdiction;and, even if the Election Commission, in pursuance of the order of theHigh Court, appoints a fresh Tribunal, it will not be a legally con-stituted Tribunal as the conditions necessary for constituting a Tribunalmentioned in section 86 of the E. P. Act, 1951, do not exist in such a


case. NYALCHAND VlBCHAND SHBTH V. VlTHALBHAI EANCHHODBHAIPATEL AND OTHBES, 9 E.L.E. 451.

20. Signature—Signature on a blank paper—-Where the draft of anelection petition was fully approved by the petitioner and the petitionwas afterwards typed on some blank papers which the petitioner hadsigned before hand at the proper places : Held, that the petition was notinvalid and could not be rejected on the ground that it was not signed,though the corrections not initialled by the petitioner might be ignored.EADHEY SHYAM SHABMA V. CHANDEA BHANU GUPTA AND OTHERS,

6 E.L.E. 123.

Where the petitioner filed an election petition in time but omittedto sign the petition and the list above the verification also, but theElection Commission permitted him to put his signature after the expiryof the period of limitation : Held, that the petition was not time-barred.If the verification in a petition is defective the petitioner may be allowedto remove the defect and make a proper verification even after the periodof limitation. MANDAL SITMITBA DEVI ». STJEAJ NAEAIN SINGH AND


Signature after declaration only—An election petition cannotbe dismissed merely because it has been signed only at one place, namely,after the declaration at the foot of the document, and ihere is no signatureafter the body of the petition also. The signature to the declaration atthe end of the document constitutes sufficient execution of the wholedocument. JADUMANI MANGBAJ V. DINABANDHIT SAHTJ AND OTHEES,

8 E.L.E. 480.

21. Verification—The objection that the election petition was notproperly verified cannot be raised for the first time before the High Courtin a writ petition, for if it was raised before the Election Tribunal,the Tribunal might have permitted the petitioner to rectify the defect.ELAYA PILLAI v. K. PABTHASABATHY AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 20.

An election petition cannot be thrown out on the ground thatsome of the paragraphs of the petition have not been verified at all, whenthe verification with regard to the remaining :portion of the petition issubstantially according to law. SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIEHUSAIN ZAIDI AND OTHEBS (NO. 2), 8 E.L.E. 300.

The provisions contained in section 83 of the E. P. Act, 1951,are mandatory and consequently if an election petition does not (i) con-tain a concise statement of the material facts relied on, or (ii) is notsigned by the petitioner, or (iii) is not verified in the manner laid downin the Civil Procedure Code for the verification of pleadings, or (iv) if any

ELECTION PETITION—VERIFICATION 157

corrupt or illegal practice is alleged, it is not accompanied by a listsetting forth full particulars including as full a statement as possible ofthe names of the parties who committed and the place and date of com-mission of such practice, it can be dismissed under section 85. If thepetitioner himself verifies the petition, a single signature below the peti-tion and the verification is enough. Omission to put two signatures, oneat the end of the petition, and the other after the verification is, in anyevent, only a technical defect of an unsubstantial character and does notaffect the validity of the petition. A verification that certain allegations

are true on belief and knowledge", even though it is ambiguous, may betaken to be verification on knowledge ('belief" being superfluous) and ascomplying with order VI, rule 15, of the Civil Procedure Code. But averification,as "true on belief" is bad if it does not state that the beliefis based on information received by the petitioner. Bajit Ram v.Kateshar Nath (I.L.E. 18 All. 396) referred to. ABDUL BAUF V. GOVIND

BALLABH PANT AND OTHERS, 8 B.L.E. 240.

Where the date and place of verification are stated in the peti-tion, the lists attached may be presumed to be made at the same placeand on the same date and the petition cannot be rejected for omis-sion to specify the date and place of verification. ABDUL BAUF V.GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND OTHBES, 8 E.L.B. 240.

An election petition is not liable to be dismissed summarilybecause the date and place of verification have not been stated in theverification. SHIBBAN LAL SAXENA V. HABISHANKEB PEASAD AND

OTHEBS, 9 B.L.E. 403.

'Where a verification is meant to express that all the allega-tions in the petition are in their entirety based on information andbelief, there is no scope, and hence no need, to specify with reference tothe various paragraphs which of the allegations are based on personalknowledge and which upon information and belief. A verificationdiffers from an affidavit in this respect, (ii) An election petition cannotbe dismissed on the sole ground that the verification of the petition doesnot show the date on which it was signed. In such a case the petitionershould normally be called upon to remove the defect by adding a supple-mentary verification. BHIKAJI KESHAO JOSHI AND ANOTHEE V. BRIJ-

LAL NANDLAL BlYANI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.B. 357 (S.C.).

Irregularities in the signing and verification of an election peti-tion or list which do not affect the merits of the case or prejudice theother side are not grounds on which an election petition could be dismiss-ed in limine. The Tribunal has ample power to allow them to beamended so as to bring them into conformity with the requirements of


the law. Where an attestation to a verification merely stated that it wasdeclared on a certain date and at a certain place, but it did not state theplace at which or the date on which it was signed : Held, that this wasonly a technical defect not of a substantial character. KBISHNAJI

BHIMAEAO ANTBOLIKAB v. SHANKAB SHANTARAM MOBB AND OTHEES,

5E.L.E. 34.Where the petitioner filed an election petition along with a list

of corrupt practices but he failed to verify the list as required bysection 83(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, and after the expiry of thetime prescribed for presenting the petition, he filed a verified list ofcorrupt practices : Held, that the law of election required the fulfilmentof technicalities to some extent rigidly, and inasmuch as the petitionerdid not file a verified list along with the petition, the petition filed byhim did not comply with section 83(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951, and shouldbe dismissed, even though the details of the corrupt practices werementioned in the petition which was verified. Held, further, that thepetitioner cannot be permitted to verify the list after the period oflimitation for filing the petition had expired. DEBI PBASAD V.

MOHAMMED NASEBB AND OTHERS, 3E.L.E. 137.

Where an election petition which contained full particularsof the corrupt practices alleged and was duly signed and verified butthe list of corrupt practices filed with it was not verified and onthis defect in the list being brought to the notice of the petitioner bythe Election Commission, the petitioner filed a duly verified list,but' the period of limitation for filing the petition had expired whenthis verified list was filed : Held, per A. SANYAL and. M. U. FABUQI(D. N. EOT dissenting) (i) that as the election petition contained fullparticulars of the corrupt practices, and this was duly verified, omissionto verify the list was not a defect for which the petition could be dismiss-ed summarily; further, as the list forms part of the petition it should alsobe deemed to have been verified ; (ii) that, as the Election Commissionhad called for a verified list and such a list had been filed and the ElectionCommission had the power to condone delay in the filing of a petition,the defect in the presentation of the original petition was cured By thefiling of the second verified list. D. N. BOY (contra)—The principle tobe applied to cases of defective verification is that if the defect is trivialit will be condoned but if it is serious the election petition must be dis-missed. The total omission to verify the list of corrupt practices is asubstantial defect and this defect cannot be cured by the subsequent filingof a duly verified list after the period of limitation has expired. SHIVA

DUTT AND OTHERS V. BANSIDAS DHANGAR AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 55.

ELECTION PETITION—VERIFICATION • 159

Where a defect in the verification of a petition is not such as toprejudice the respondent on the merits, it is merely a technical defectnot of a substantial character and the petition could not be rejected onthis ground. SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHBIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL

SAMAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 265.

An election petition cannot be thrown out on account of meredefect in the verification, as defect in verification is a mere irregularityand not a substantial defect affecting the maintainability of the petition.AWADHESH PEASAD SINHA v. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHEES,

8 E.L.E. 45.

——'A vrification should show what paragraphs are true tothe knowledge of the petitioner and what paragraphs are true to hisinformation and belief. Where a verification merely states that thepetition is true to the knowledge, information and belief of the petitionerit does not comply with the strict requirements of verification, but thisis not necessarily a ground for rejecting a petition. It is not necessaryin an election petition to state the sources of information of the factsalleged in it, as the sources of information are not material particularsrequired within section 83 of the Act. DESAI BASAWAEAJ V. DASANKOPHA SAN SAB AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.E. 380.

Where the verification of an election petition merely stated thatthe contents of the petition are true to my knowledge and belief" with-

out mentioning separately with reference to the different paragraphs asto which were verified from knowledge, and which on information received.Held, that though the verifiction. was defective, there was a substantialcompliance with Order VI, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code, and section 83of the E. P. Act and the petition could not be dismissed on the ground ofdefective verification under section 85. GoviND MALAVITA V. MURLI

MANOHAE AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E'. 84.

Where the verification of a petition ran as follows: "Statementsmade in paragraphs 1 to 9 and 11 are true to the best of my knowledgeand the statements made in paragraphs 10 and 12 are true to the best ofmy belief" : Held, the verification was not defective. SlIEAJ BHAN V.HEM CHAND JAIN AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 1.

Omission to mention date and place of verification is not a fataldefect. SHANKAR TEIPATHI V. EETUENING OFFICER, MIRZAPUR, AND


Where an election petition was verified as follows:—"That, I dohereby verify that the contents of paragraphs 1 to 41 above are true tothe best of my knowledge, and information, and belief and I affix my

l 6 o ' ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

signature this 15th day of May, 1952, at 12-20 hours in verificationwhereof. Held, that, although the verification of the election petitionwas defective, there was substantial compliance with Order VI, Eule 15C. P. 0. and section 83 of the B. P. Act, 1951, and the election petitioncould not be dismissed merely on the ground of defective verification.Under s. 90(4) of the E. P. Act, 1951, the Tribunal is not bound to dis-miss an election petition for every non-complinance of ss. 81, 83 and 117of the Act. The question of dismissal is a matter for the Tribunal's dis-cretion and the test to be applied will be that if the defect is trivial itwill be condoned, and if the defect is serious, the election petition will bedismissed. Bajit Bam v. Katesar Nath (I.L.E. 18 All. 396) followed.BOLA NATH V. KRISHNA CHANDRA GUPTA AND OTHEBS, 3 B.L.E. 288.

22, Withdrawal.—A petitioner who asks for withdrawal of an elec-tion petition is not bound to show sufficient reasons for the withdrawal.I t is for those who object to the withdrawal, if any, to prove why thepetitioner should not be allowed the withdraw. North Durham case(3 O'M. & H. 2) referred to. SHIV DAYAL V. TEG EAM AND OTHEES, 6

E.L.E. 346.

See also COLLUSION, p. 129 supra.

ELECTION RULES.

Change of rules—Applicability of neiv rules to pending petitions—See pp. 2 to 4 supra.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL.

(See also cases under ELECTION PETITION).

Qualifications of members—Advcoate of High Court of anotherState—Under section 86 of the E. P. Act, 1951, it is not necessary thatthe district judge Chairman or 'member, or the advocate memberof an Election Tribunal should be selected from the list of districtjudges or the list of advocates, respectively, supplied to the ElectionCommission by the High Court of the State in which the constituency,the election for which is contested, is situated. They can be appointedfrom the list of district judges or the list of advocates supplied to theElection Commission by the High Court of any other State. LALLU

CHAND v. TEJ SINGH AND OTHEES, 3 E.L.E 318.

Section 86 of the E. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that personswhose names have been included in the lists submitted by the High Courtof one State cannot be appointed as Chariman or members of an ElectionTribunal constituted for trying an election petition in another State.MADAN MOHAN V. BANKAT LAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 119.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL l 6 l

An advocate practising in the High Court of one State can heappointed as a member of an Election Tribunal which has to function inany other State. Hadan Mohan v. Banhat Lai and Others (8 B.L.E. 119)referred to. TEJ SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR, AND OTHEES,

9 E.L.E. 193 ; SAHI BAM V. MANPHOOL SINGH AND 'OTHERS, 7 B.L.E.47.

Practice for a period of not less then ten years, meaning of—Ten years' practice as advocate, whether necessary—Under section 86(2)(b)of the E. P. Act, 1951, a person who is an advocate of the High Courtand who has put in practice as a lawyer for a period of not less than tenyears is qualified to be appointed as a member of an Election Tribunal.The section cannot be interpreted to mean that the person should havepractised "as an advocate" of the High Court for a period of not less thanten years. HARI SHANKAR PRASAD GUPTA V. SUKHDEO PRASAD ANDOTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 341.

The expression "persons who are or have been District Judges"in section 88(2) (a) of the E. P. Act, 1951, is wide enough to includepersons who have officiated as District Judges even though their sub-stantive post was that of a Subordinate Judge, and also retired DistrictJudges. EAMACHANDRA CHOUDHURI v. SADASIVA TRIPATHY AND

OTHERS (NO. 2), 5 E.L.B. 194.

It cannot be said that there is bias, or a possibility of bias onthe part of a member of the Tribunal merely because his wife is a mem-ber of the Congress party and the petitioner defeated a Congresscandidate at the bye-election. MUELIDHAR v. KADAM SlNGH ANDOTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 135.'

• -Where the petitioner challenged the constitution of the Elec-tion Tribunal on ground that one of the members was not qualified toact as such member at the date of his appointment but at the date of thehearing of the petition he had become so qualified and there was nothingto bar his reappointment: Held, that the High Court would not interfereunder article 226 of the Constitution of India. HARI SHANKAR PEASADGUPTA V. SUKHDEO PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 8 E.L.E. 341.

Qualification of Chairman—Under section 86 of the E. P. Act,1951, it is not necessary that the Chairman of an Election Tribunal, whois a District Judge, should be a District Judge who has served, or isserving, as a District Judge in the State in which the Tribunal is consti-tuted. The words "in the State" in section 86(2) do not mean in theState in which the Tribunal is constituted. JAISINGH. V. GOPAL SINGHAND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 351.

PLP-J2

l 6 2 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

The Chairman of an Eieotion Tribunal can continue to functionas Chairman of the Tribunal even after he is appointed as Legal Bemem-brancer of the Government. There is nothing illegal or against the Consti-tution in his continuing as Chairman of the Tribunal for trying certainelection petitions and resigning his office as Chairman of the Tribunal fortrying other election petitions. Article 14 of the Constitution doesnot prohibit such procedure. State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarhar(A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 75) distinguished. SHASTA DEVI VALDYA V. ELECTION

TBIBUNAL, .FAIZABAD, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 201.

Jurisdiction—The power of the State Legislature to make alaw on the subject of elections to Legislatures of States is subordinateto the Parliament's power. A Tribunal appointed under the E. P. Act,1951, is therefore competent to try a petition calling in question anelection to the State Legislature of Madhya Pradesh even though thesaid Act is not an Act of the Madhya Pradesh State. MURLIDHAR v.KADAM SINGH AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 135.

Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with decisions of Tri-bunal —-Though it is not open to the High Court to exercise its powersunder article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution so as to interferewith a decision of an Election Tribunal merely upon the ground that thedecision is erroneous either in respect of facts or in point of law, it hasthe power to examine and correct any decision of the Tribunal on theground of jurisdiction, fraud or violation of the principles of naturaljustice. An Election Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine finallywhether a person desiring to give evidence under section 97 of the B. P.Act, 1951, has or has not satisfied the conditions laid down in section97 and, even though the Tribunal has arrived at an erroneous decisionon this question, it cannot be held that the decision was made withoutjurisdiction or that the Tribunal gave itself, or deprived itself of, juris-diction by the wrong decision, and the High Court cannot, therefore,interfere with the decision of the Tribunal under article 226 or 227 ofthe Constitution merely because the decision was erroneous. JAMNAPBASAD MlTKHAEIYA V. LACHHIBAM EATANLAL JAIN AND OTHERS,5 E.L.E. 1.

Constitution—Retirement of Chairman or member—Re-consti-tution of whole Tribunal by fresh appointment of Chairman and member-—An Election Tribunal does not cease to exist as soon as the Chairmanor any one of its members relinquishes his office or otherwise becomesincapable of sitting on the Tribunal, and it is not necessary to recon-stitute the whole Tribunal again. The place of the Chairman or mem-ber which has become vacant can be filled up and the Tribunal can

ELECTION TRIBUNAL 163

continue to function as the same Tribunal. It is also not necessary thatthe Chairman should be appointed beforethe other members are appoint-ed or that the other two members should be appointed at the sametime and by the same order. BOOPCHANDBA SOGANI v. RAWAT MANSINGH ANDOTHEBS, 3 E.L.B. 339.

Status—Whether "court"—Power to declare laws ultra vires—An Election Tribunal is not a "court" within the meaning of the provisoto section 113 of the Civil Procedure Code, and it has therefore no juris-diction to declare a provision of a statute, such as section 133 of theCivil Procedure Code, unconstitutional on the ground that it infringesthe fundamental right to equality before the law guaranteed by article14 of the Constitution, or to refer the question to the High Court undersection 113 of the Code. MATHAI MATI-IEW MANJURAN V. K. 0.ABEAHAM, 10 E.L.E. 376.

Whether court"—Forged nomination paper—Private complaintfor forgery—Jurisdiction of magistrate to take cognizance—Complaintfrom Election Tribunal, whether necessary—Returning Officer and Elec-tion Tribunal, whether "court"—Proceedings before a Eeturning Officerunder section 36 of the E. P. Act, 1951, are not judicial or even quasi-judicial proceedings and he is not therefore a "court" within the mean-ing of section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Election Tri-bunal is however a court" within that section. Where a nominationpaper which is alleged be forged was produced by the petitioner beforethe Eeturning Officer and it was also produced subsequently before theElection Tribunal at the instance of the rival candidate in connectionwith a recriminatory petition, and a complaint was filed by the rivalcandidate before a Magistrate against the petitioner for the offences offorgery under section 465, and using a forged document as genuine undersection 471, of the Indian Penal Code in respect of that nominationpaper, and it was contended that under section 195 of the CriminalProcedure Code the Magistrate had no power to take cognisance of theoffences: Held, that, though the Eeturning Officer was not a "court"w ithin the meaning of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, the Elec-tion Tribunal was a ' court", and under section 195, the Magistrate had,therefore, no jurisdiction to take' cognisance of the offences withouta complaint in writing by the Election Tribunal. Held further, that,for the application of section 195, Criminal Procedure Code, it was notnecessary that the nomination should have been forged with the inten-tion of using that document as evidence before the Election Tribunal,or that the proceedings before the Election Tribunal should be pendingwhen the complaint was made or that the document should have been


produced by the accused himself before the Tribunal. Gobindram v.Emperor (A.I.E. 1942 Sind. 62), Emperor v. Bhawanidas (A.I.E. 1916All. 299) and In re Baku Vyankatesh (A.I.E. 1926 Bom. 433) followed.SATYA DBV BUSHAHHI v. GHANSHIAM, 6 E.L.E. 388.

Nature and powers of—The Election Tribunal is a judicial bodyand derives its power and authority from the provisions of the E. P. Act.Its procedure is regulated by the said Act and as a judicial body it isgoverned, by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.VIJAYA MOHAN BEDDY V. PAGA P U L L A EEDDY AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E.414.

Power to enquire into corrupt practice suo motu—The Tribunalhas jurisdiction to inquire suo motu into allegations of corrupt practicemade in an election petition for the purpose of taking action under section99 of the E. P. Act, 1951, but it will not do so unless it is properly seizedof the matter and there is material which could be made the foundationof an enquiry. SHANTILAL CHAUDHAEY V. EAGHUEAJ SINGH ANDOTHEBS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 93.

Power to question competency of reference—It is not open to anElection Tribunal to challenge the competency of the Election Commis-sion to refer an election petition to it for trial N. E. MEGANATHAN V.K. T. KOSALEAM AND OTHBES, 9 E.L.E. 242.

Once an election petition has been referred to a Tribunal by th'eElection Commission the duty of the Tribunal is to dispose of it accordingto law. It is not open to the Election Tribunal to challenge the compe-tence of the Election Commission to appoint the Tribunal or to refer theelection petition to it for trial. SlTAEAM HlEACHAND BlELA v.YOGEAJ SINGH SHANKAE SINGH PABIHAE, 2 E.L.E. 283.

Power to reconsider question of limitation See, ELECTION

PETITION—LIMITATION supra.

Power of High Courts to interfere with orders of—See H I G H

CoUBTS infra.

Does not possess common law powers—As an election contest isnot an action at law but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to thecommon law, the court possesses no common law powers in such pro-ceedings and as a general rule strict observance of the statute is requiredas regards the steps necessary to give jurisdiction. Section 85 enactsthis principle of election law. ABDUL EAUF V. GO VTND BALLABH PANT

AND OTHBES, 8 E.L.E. 240.

Irregularities in electoral roll—Though ordinarily a Tribunalwill have no jurisdiction to enquire into irregularities committed in the

ELECTION TRIBUNAL 165

preparation and publication of the electoral roll, it will have jurisdictionin the matter if there has been a non-compliance with the rules madeunder the Act and this is alleged to have materially affected the resultof an election. GAYAPKASHAD V. KEISHNACHANDEA SHAEMA ANDOTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 6.

ELECTORAL ROLL.

——Bogus inclusion or exclusion of names—Remedy of elctors andcandidates—Application for inclusion by third person—Written authorityand presentation to proper officer, necessity of- Removal of name—Noticeto party —Application by third person for writ of certiorari for inclusionor exclusion of names—Maintainability—Application to Election Commis-sion— Whether more adequate remedy -Bule 11 of theEules framed underthe E. P. Act, 1950, which provides that a claim for including a personin the electoral rolls shall be signed either by the person desiring hisname to be included or by an agent authorised in writing by such person,necessarily implies that the authority in writing, if the claim is preferredby an agent, 'must be in existence at the time the claim is presented ; asubsequent ratification of the act of another person who has taken uponhimself the responsibility of making a claim is not enough. A claim underrule 11 for including a person's name in the electoral rolls must be madepersonally to the appropriate officer and in the absence of any ruleswhich authorise such officer to delegate his power in this behalf to any-one else, presentation to the manager of his office will not be a valid pre-sentation- Queen Empress v. Arlappa (I.L.E. 15 Mad. 137), Habib Shahv. Deli Bax Singh (14 I.C. 221) relied on. Under rule 14(2) the name ofa person entered in an electoral roll cannot be removed on the objectionof any other person without serving notice on the former, of the groundson which inclusion of his name has been objected to and hearing him,except in cases where the Eevising Authority is prima facie satisfied asto the validity of the objection. It is open to an elector or an intendingcandidate to apply for a writ for the inclusion or the exclusion of anotherperson's name from the electoral roll ; for, a writ of certiorari does notrequire any personal right or interest to support it. The only distinctionis that in the case of a man personally aggrieved he can ask for a writalmost ex debito justitiae and that in the case of a man who has notsuffered any injury the court has a discretion to grant or refuse theapplication according to the circumstances of the case. A person's namecannot, however, be removed from the roll by a writ unless he is made aparty to the application and has been given an opportunity to show causewhy his name should not be removed. The remedy provided by rule 20(2)does not prevent the issuing of a writ, for it is not an adequate remedywhere there has been a large scale exclusion of names and further does

i 6 6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

not provide for removal of names at all where bogus additions have beenmade. They remedy provided by rule 25(a) under which the ElectionCommission may at any time revise the rolls, is, however, an adequateremedy for a person complaining of the inclusion or exclusion of names inan electoral roll, and it will not be proper to issue a writ for such purposewhen the law provides a more adequate remedy in rule 25(a). CHINNAMALLA EBDDT AND OTHEES v. THE BEVENUE DIVISIONAL OFFICER,

GUNTUB, AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 361.A revised electoral roll does not speak from the date of the

original roll and nomination of a person whose name was not in theroll at the time of nomination cannot be validated by a subsequentamendment or revision of the roll. P. N". BALASUBEAHMANTAN V.C. K. NAEASIMHAM AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 461.

The words the electoral roll shall be deemed to have beenrevised accordingly" in section 25(2) of the E. P. Act, 1950, were notintended to give retrospective effect to an order for inclusion of a namein the electoral roll from the date of the final publication of the roll butonly mean that the electoral roll need not be reprinted and republishedon account of the addition or alteration. P. N. BALASUBBAHMANYANv. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 496.

The words "the electoral roll to which such direction relatesshall be deemed to have been revised accordingly" in rule 20(3) of theEepresentation of the People (Preparation of Electoral Eolls) Eules,1950, are not intended to give retrospective effect to such direction-EAMATAN SHAEAN SINGH AND ANOTHER V. EAMBSHWAE YADAV AND

OTHEES, 5 E.L..E 296.

The words "shall be deemed to have been revised accord-ingly" in sub-rule (3) of rule 20 of the Eepresentation of the People(Preparation of Electoral Eolls) Eules, 1950, do not give retrospectiveeffect to an order of the Election Commission for the inclusion of aperson's name in the roll under the said rule from the date of the finalpublication of the roll; such an order has effect only from the date onwhich it was issued. AWADESH PEASAD SlNHA V. PRABHAVATHI

GUPTA AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 45.

Revision—Notice to individuals not necessary—A revised elec-toral roll is not invalid merely because the names of some persons wereexcluded from the roll without giving a separate notice to each of themto show cause why his name should not be removed. GAYAPBASAD V.

KEISHNACHANDEA SHAEMA AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 6.

Revision'—Reprinting entire roll with amendments as single roll—Legality-—Persons included in first roll—Omission toinolude in revised roll

ELECTORAL ROLL 167

—Remedy—Application for mandamus to Returning Oficer to conductelection under old roll—-Maintainability—Where the nomination of acandidate for a bye-election was rejected by the Eeturning Officer, andsome of his supporters whose names were included in the electoral rollprepared in 1950 but not included in the revised roll prepared in1952 and who had not objected to the draft revised roll or taken anysteps for the inclusion of their names in the revised roll, applied to theHigh Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Eeturning Officer notto conduct the election on the basis of the revised roll of 1952, on theground that the Election Commission had acted illegally in reprintingthe entire roll with amendments and publishing it as a single roll.Held, that in revising an electoral roll under rule 22 of the Repre-sentation of the People (Preparation "of Electoral Eolls) Eules, 1950, itwas open to the Election Commission either to prepare only a list ofamendments and cause it to be printed and published along with the oldroll or to have the entire roll incorporating all the amendments printedand published as a single roll, and the revised roll was not accordinglyillegal or invalid: POLAKI KOTBSAM v. S. M. PATNAIK AND OTHERS,8 E.L.E. 159.

As the petitioners had not taken the proper steps and pur-sued the proper remedies, which were open to them under the law, toha.ve their names included in the revised electoral roll, they had noright to vote, and they could not claim at this stage that their right offranchise had been taken away arbitrarily ; The petition was alsoliable to be dismissed as it was not a bona fide one but 6nly an attemptto get over the order of the Returning Officer rejecting the nominationpaper of a third person, by indirect means, and also on the ground thatit was filed after an inordinate delay. POLAKI KOTESAM v. S. M. PAT-SAIK AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 159.

Revision—Rule providing for fee for applications—Validity—Publication of roll in Hindi—Whether contravenes Constitution—Powerto regulate and, control preparation of electoral rolls, whether includespower to impose fees—Taxes and fees—Difference—'Where a candidatewho was unsuccessful in an election brought a suit against the ElectionCommission and others for the following reliefs : (1) that the provisoto sub-ruin (2) of rule 20 of the Representation of the People (Prepara-tion of Electoral Eolls) Eules, was ultra vires; (2) that the electoralrails of the constituencies for which the election was held were ultravires and illegal; and (3) that all the acts relating to the election doneby defendants 1 to 4 were ultra vires and illegal: Held, that the suitwas really one to get the election of the successful candidates set aside

i 6 8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

and was therefore barred by article 329(b) of the Constitution. Ponnu-swami v. Returning Officer (l E.L.E. 133 : [1952] S.C.B. 218) and ThebergeV. Laudry (1876, 2 App. Cas. 102) applied. BAMLAKSMAN SHARMA V.

ELECTION COMMISSION OP INDIA AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 364.

Rule 20, sub-r_n!e (2), of the Eepresentation of the People(Preparation of Electoral Bolls) Eules, 1950, which provides that anapplication for revision of the electoral rolls after the final publicationshall not be entertained if it is not accompanied by a fee of Bs, 50 isnot ultra vires. BAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COMMISSION OF

INDIA AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.E. 364.

Even though sub-section (2) of section 28 does not in ex-press words empower the Central Government to make rules providingfor the realisation of fees, sub-section (2) of section 28 does not restrictthe generality of the powers conferred by sub-section (l) of section 28,and under sub-section (l) of this section the Central Government is fullycompetent to enact a rule imposing a fee for applications for revision ofthe rolls. King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee ([1945] P.C.B. 195) reliedon. EAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COMMISSION ON INDIA AND


The imposition of fee for an application for revision of theelectoral roll is not the levying of a tax but merely a provision for regu-lation and control of the preparation of the rolls, and neither rule 20(2)in so far as it imposes a fee, nor section 28 in so far as it empowers theGovernment to make a rule imposing such a fee, contravenes art, 327 ofthe Constitution BAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COMMISSION

AND OTHERS, 7E.L.B. 364.

Eule 6 of the Eepresentation of the People (Preparation ofElectoral Bolls) Eules, 1950, which permits electoral rolls to be /preparedin languages other than English (e.g., Hindi) does not contravene art. 343(2) of the Constitution. BAMLAKSMAN SHAEMA V. ELECTION COM-MISSION AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.B. 364.

Amendment of revised roll—Rule empowering name of voter to beincluded in roll under direction of Election Commission before nomination—Whether ultra vires—Central Government s power to make rules—Inclusion of name in Assembly roll -Duty to enter name in Parliamentaryroll also—Where the petitioner's name was not entered in the roll of theParliamentary Constituency for which he stood, but on the day beforehis nomination was filed, an order was received from the Election Com-mission to include his name in a particular Assembly Constituency andthe Electoral Officer included his name in the Parliamentary Constituency

ELECTORAL ROLL 169

also on the same date: Held, that, under the provisions of rule 23of the Representation of the People Rules, 1950, his name was properlyincluded in the electoral roll of the Parliamentary Constituency also.MEHTA GOBDHANDAS GIBDHABLAL v. CHAVDA AKBAR DALUMIYAN

AND OTHBES, 4 E.L.R. 499.

Validity of ride 20(2).—The general power of the Central Govern-ment to frame rules under section28(l) of the R.P. Act, 1950, is not curtail-ed or in any way limited by the illustrative instances in which such powermay be exercised, mentioned in section 28(2)(h). The Central Government iscompetent to make rules in consultation with the Election Commission forcarrying out the purposes of the R. P. Act, 1950, and since preparationof the electoral rolls was one of the purposes of the R. P. Act, 1950, andthe said Act did not restrict either expressly or impliedly the authorityof the Central Government to make rules on the point, the CentralGovernment had powor to enact a provision like rule 20(2). MEHTAGOEDHANDAS GlEDHAELAL V. CHAVDA AKBAE DALUMIYAN AND


•The provisions of sub-rule (2) of rule 20 of the Representationof the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, which permitamendment of an electoral roll by including the names of new personsin the roll in pursuance of a direction issued by the Election Com-mission, do not conflict with the provisions of section 25 of the R. P.Act, 1950, but, on the other hand, merely supplement section 25(2); andsub-rule (2) of rule 20 is not therefore ultra vires. MEHTA GOBDHANDASGIBDHAELAL V. CHAVDA AKBAB DALUMIYAN AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R.

499.

Omission to prepare draft roll for certain villages—Misdescrip-tion of female voters—Voters deprived of franchise—Validity of election—Jurisdiction of Tribunal to consider these questions—Finality of roll—Publication of rolls—Presumption of due publication—The provisioncontained in rule 3 of the Representation of the People (Preparation ofElectoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, that an electoral roll should be preparedcontaining the names of all persons appearing to be entitled to beregistered therein for every constituency, is mandatory and omission toprepare a draft electoral roll for some villages is, therefore, a non-com-pliance with the rules which would avoid an election if its result has beenmaterially affected by such non-compliance. LAXMIDATTA ANDANOTHER V. MADANLAL DHUPAB>AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 398.

Transfer of village after publication—The transfer of a villageto another revenue division by a notification of the Government after

ELD—33


the publication of an electoral roll prepared in accordance with thedelimitation proposed prior to the transfer would not amount to un-authorised transplantation of that village to a new constituency andinvalidate an election held according to the electoral roll as it was pub-lished before the transfer of the village. BHBBTJSINGH V. PBABHUDAYAL CHAUBEY AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 325.

Finality of roll—An electoral roll published according to therules is final and the validity of an election cannot be objected to on theground that no list of voters was prepared for a particular village.MAHESH DATTA v. MUBLIDHAB AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 154.

Where the particulars against a serial number in an electoralroll were: (Name) Hamid, (Father or husband) Yusuf, and (sex) male,and an application for a ballot paper made by a woman Hamida, wifeof Yusuf, who resided at the address mentioned in the electoral roll,with the help of the candidate's agent was rejected : Held, that the factthat the electoral roll was conclusive did not prevent the candidatefrom proving that the entry really related to Hamida, wife of Yusuf,and the candidate was not guilty of corrupt practice of abetment ofpersonation under section 123(3) of the R.P. Act, 1951. Muzaffarnagar1924 (Hammond 517), Karnal South (Sen and Podda*r 438) relied on.SHIVA DAS AND ANOTHER V. SHEIK MOHAMMAD ABDUL SAMAD ANDOTHERS, 8E.L.R. 265.

As to age—The finality attached to decisions of the .RevisingAuthority under rule 18(1) of the Eules for the Preparation of ElectoralRolls, so far as age is concerned can only be as to the person entered inthe electoral roll being not less than 21 years of age. An entry in anelectoral roll as regards the age of a voter is not conclusive in otherrespects, and it is therefore open to a candidate to adduce evidencebefore the Returning Officer to prove that he was not less than 30 yearsof age when he was nominated, even though according to the age asgiven in the electoral roll he would not be more than 28 years of ageon that date. Aligarh District East (N. M. B.) (Hammond 56) AligarhDistrict, West (Hammond 62) Golaghat [N.M.B.) (Hammond 375) U.P.Anglo-Indian Constituency case (2 Doabia 106) referred to. K. SUBRA-MANYAM v. ABDUL HAMEED KHAN AND OTHEES, 1 E.L.R. 432.

-The Election Tribunal is not bound to take an entry as to agein the electoral roll as conclusive but has power to ascertain and deter-mine the real age of a candidate. The qualifying data so far as acandidate is concerned is the date of nomination. Where the electionof a candidate is set aside on the ground that he was below 25 years ofage and so disqualified, the petitioner who got the next highost number

ELECTORAL ROLL

of votes cannot be declared as duly elected as the votes given for theunqualified candidate are not invalid votes within section 101 (a).PBAKASH NARAIN v. JAGDISH CHANDRA JOSHI AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.E.205.

The entry in the electoral roll relating to the age of the proposeris not conclusive by reason of the provisions of section 36(7)(a) of theK. P. Act, 1951, and notwithstanding such an entry in the electoral roll,the question of age could be enquired into by the Eeturning Officer aswell as the Election Tribunal. K. Subramanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan(1 B.L.E. 432) applied. HAKIKATTTLLAH V. NATHU SINGH AND OTHERS,

6 B.L.E. 10.

Though an electoral roll is final so far as the Eeturning Officerand presiding officer are concerned, the Election Tribunal can inquire intothe question whether a voter was a minor and as such his vote wasinvalid, even though according to the age given in the roll he was amajor. JUJHAR SINGH v. BHAIRON LALL AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 457.

Correction of entry—Time limit—Section 25(b) of the E. P.Act, 1950, does not fix any time limit for correction of an incorrectentry as to age in the electoral roll; the Electoral Eegistration Officer maytherefore correct an entry at any time before the scrutiny of the nomina-tion papers. Even though on the date of the nomination the age of thecandidate as entered in the electoral roll was below 25 years, the nomina-tion cannot be rejected if he was really not below 25 years of age on thatdate and the wrong entry in the electoral roll is corrected by the Elec-toral Eegistration Officer before the date of scrutiny. EAM SlNGH V.HAZARI LAL AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 224.

As to qualification—An entry of a person's name in the rollof a particular village is conclusive evidence that that person was quali-fied to be entered on the roll of that village as a voter and the EeturningOfficer has no jurisdiction at the time of scrutiny of nominations to gobehind the roll and inquire whether he was qualified to be entered as avoter in the roll of that village, and reject the nomination on the groundthat he was not qualified to be entered as a voter in that roll. JoGINDERSINGH V. EAGHBIR SINGH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 81.

——Section 62 of the E. P. Act, 1951, which makes an electoral rollfinal and conclusive does not prevent the Tribunal from inquiring into thequestion whether, owing to a misdescription of the names of femalevoters in the roll, several female voters were not allowed to vote, andalso whether, owing to omission to prepare an electoral roll with regardto some villages, the result of the election was materially affected.


LAXMIDATTA AND ANOTHEB v. MADANLAL DHUPAE AND OTHEBS, 7

E.L.R. 398.

It is settled law that the Election Tribunal can go behind theelectoral roll and determine whether the candidate possessed necessaryqualifications for standing as a candidate. JAGDISH SINGH V. EUDEADEOLAL AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 311.

Injunction against conducting election according to roll—•"Under article 329 (b) of the Constitution the High Court has nojurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus or direction to the ReturningOfficer that he should or should not conduct the election on the basis ofthe revised roll, as it would amount to calling the election in questionotherwise than by an election petition within the meaning of section329(b). POLAKI KOTESAM v. S. M. PATNAIK AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 159.

Certified copy—Where a copy of an entry in an electoralroll bears the seal of the office of the Deputy Commissioner who isalso the Electoral Eegistration Officer and it is signed as a true copyby the Head Copyist of the Deputy Commissioner's Office, it must bepresumed that the Deputy Commissioner, who was the custodian of theelectoral roll had duly authorised the Head Copyist to issue true copies,and the copy must be treated as a "certified copy" of the entry. BrijNaresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 266)followed. H A E I VISHNU KAMATH V. SYBD AHMED AND OTHEES, 5

E.L.R. 248.

'A copy of an electoral roll attested by a First Class Magistrate,who in his official capacity as President of a Town Committee had tokeep copies of the electoral roll under his custody, is a certified copy ;and even if it is not strictly a certified copy" within the meaning ofsection 36(7)(a) of the E. P. Act, 1951, and is not conclusive, it is stillevidence which could be looked into by the Returning Officer for identify-ing the candidate at the time of scrutiny. Shankar Singh v. Thakur MotiSingh (Hammond 95) followed. MATHBA DAS AND OTHBES V. DAEASINGH AND OTHEES, 4 E.L.R. 441.

Presumption of regularity —Under section 114(c)of the EvidenceAct, it must be presumed that the authorities charged with the duty ofpublishing the electoral rolls had duly published them. LAXMIDATTAAND ANOTHER V. MADANLAL DHUPAE AND OTHBBS, 7 E.L.R. 398.

Beturning Officer—Duty to call for electoral roll. See NOMTNA.

TION OP CANDIDATES-

Application for writ of mandamus to Electoral Officer toprepareelectoral roll in a certain manner—Election in progress—Jurisdiction to

ELECTORAL ROLL 173

issue writ—Where, after the publication of a notice calling upon a con-stituency to elect a member and after nominations had been filed and thelist of valid nominations had been published, and the date for the electionhad also been fixed, an application was made for a writ of mandamus againstthe Chief Electoral Officer of the State and the Returning Officer of the con-stituency, for directing the respondents to prepare the electoral roll of theconstituency including certain villages which had been included inanother constituency in the electoral roll as finally published : Held, thatas the writ prayed for would interfere with the process of the electionunder article 329(b) of the Constitution the High Court had no jurisdic-tion to issue any such writ. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal(1 E.L.E. 133) applied. N. CHENCHCEAMA NAIDTJ V. THE CHIEF ELEC-TOEAL OFFICER, ANDHEA STATE, AND ANOTHEB, 10 E.L.E. 268.

See also cases under NOMINATION- ELECTOEAL EOLL.

ESTOPPEL.

——Whether applicable to election disputes'—The principles ofestoppel and approbation and reprobation of parties are not applicable toelection disputes as the proper conduct of elections is a matter of publicconcern in which the whole electorate is interested. MAHESH DATTA V.MUELIDHAE AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 154.

Admission before Beturning officer—The mere fact that thepetitioner conceded before the Beturning Officer, that he was holding acontract with the Government would not estop him from contendingbefore the Tribunal that there was no contract for the supply of goodsto the Government. LUMBA EAM V. BAM NABAIN AND OTHERS, 5E.L.E. 319.

——Omission to raise objection before Beturning Officer—Eight ofobjection to a nomination paper cannot be waived nor is any estoppelcreated against a candidate by his not raising any objection at the time ofnomination to the act of the Eeturning Officer. VAJAYA MOHAN EEDDYv. PAGA PULLA EEDDY AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 414. See also BALBIR

SINGH V. ARJAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E- 341.

Withdrawal of objection before Beturning Officer—The with-drawal of an objection to a nomination before the Eeturning Officer wouldnot prevent the objection from being raised before the Election Tribunalon the principle of estoppel, waiver or acquiescence. AWADESH PRASADSINHA v. PRABHAVATHI GUPTA AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 45.

Bight of person on ivhose objection nomination was rejected tourge that nomination was improperly rejected—A candidate on whoseobjection a nomination paper has been rejected is not estopped from


urging in an election petition that the nomination paper was improperlyrejected as the proper conduct of elections is a matter of concern to theentire electorate and the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot be importedto election proceedings. PREM N A T H V. EAM KiSHAN AND OTHERS, 1B.L.E. 271.

HIGH COURTS.

Jurisdiction to issue writ to Election Tribunal—When writ canbe issued—Article 329(b) of the Constitution and sections 105 and 170 ofthe E. P. Act, 1951, do not entirely oust the jurisdiction of the HighCourts over Election Tribunals. The High Courts are only precludedfrom entering into the merits of a disputed election. Whether an Elec-tion Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or assumes jurisdiction which itdoes not possess, or an order happens to be made by a Tribunal throughmanifest fraud on the part of the person in whose favour it is made, arematters on which the jurisdiction of the High Court is not taken away.Whether the election petition can be allowed to be amended, whetherfresh instances of corrupt practices can be allowed to be added to thosementioned in the list accompanying the petition, whether the allegationsin the petition or the lists purporting to relate to corrupt practices suchas bribery or publications of false statements in relation to the personalcharacter or conduct of the petitioner or in relation to his candidatureor withdrawal would, if believed, constitute such corrupt practices,whether the allegations in the petition falling beyond the purview of theactual relief prayed for in it, could or should be enquired into, andsimilar questions, are matters which the Tribunal alone could decide andabout which the High Court has no right to pronounce upon. Parry £Go. Ltd. v. Commercial Employees Association (A.I.E. 1952 S. C. 179)Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (L. E. 5 App. Cas. 417) andSecretary of State v. Mask and Co. (A.I.E. 1940 P. C. 105) referred to.SlVATHANU PlLLAI V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, TBIVANDBAM, ANDOTHEBS, 2 E.L.E. 263.

Jurisdiction to issue writ against Election Tribunal—Dis-qualification of Member of State Assembly—Reference to Election Com-mission—Jurisdiction of High Court to issue writ against Commission—•The respondent who had been convicted and sentenced to rigorous impri-sonment for seven years, was elected a member of the Madras LegislativeAssembly. At the instance of the Speaker of the Assembly, the Governorof Madras referred to the Election Commission, which had its officespermanently located at New Delhi, the question whether the respondentwas disqualified and could be allowed to sit and vote in the Assembly.The respondent thereupon applied to the High Court of Madras under

HIGH COURTS . 175

article 226 of the Constitution for a writ restraining the Election Commis-sion from enquiring into his alleged disqualification for membership ofthe Assembly and the High Court, accordingly issued a writ against theElection Commission. Held that the fact that the matter referred to itfor decision related to a member's right to sit and vote in the LegislativeAssembly at Madras and the parties to the dispute resided in the Stateof Madras could not give jurisdiction to the High Court of Madras toissue such a writ against the Election Commission. Held further, thatarticles 190(3) and 192(1) of the Constitution of India are applicable onlyto disqualifications to which a member becomes subject after he is electedas such, and neither the Governor nor the Election Commission hadjurisdiction to enquire into the respondent's disqualification which aroselong before his election. The judgment of the Madras High Court inSaka Venkata Rao v. Election Commission (1 E.L.E. 417) reversed.ELECTION COMMISSION V. SAKA VENKATA RAO, 2 E.L.R. 499 (S.C.).

Jurisdiction over Election Tribunal—Gertiorari—Errors of law,whether ground for interference—The High Court has jurisdiction toentertain a writ petition against an Election Tribunal. An error of lawin the decision of the preliminary issue whether a candidate who haswithdrawn his candidature was a necessary party to ' the election peti-tion, is no ground for quashing the order of the Tribunal in the exerciseof the powers to issue a writ of certiorari to subordinate Tribunals. Thequestion whether a candidate who withdrew his candidature should beimpleaded or not is not in the nature of a collateral fact upon the existenceof which the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal depends. SHEOKUMAR AND ANOTHER V. V. G. OAK AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.R. 103.

Jurisdiction over Election Tribunal—Power to issue writs—•When writs will be issued—Excess or want of jurisdiction, necessity of—The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs or orders under articles226 and 227 of the Constitution to quash the orders of an Election Tri-bunal is not taken away by article 329(b) of the Constitution or any of theprovisions of the R. P. Act, 1951, or by any other provision of law. Thisjurisdiction is, however, confined to errors of jurisdiction, that is to say*where the Tribunal has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or refused toexercise its jurisdiction, or there is an error apparent on the face of therecord. Where several nomination papers are filed the Election Tribunalhas jurisdiction to decide whether in such a case all the nominationpapers would be invalid, or the first would be valid and the others alonewould be invalid, and, as there was no excess or want of jurisdiction, orany error apparent on the face of the record, the High Court would notinterfere by issuing a writ under article 226 or 227 of the Constitution,


even if the decision of the Election Tribunal was wrong. The word"election" in article 329(b) of the Constitution does not include theproceedings before the Election Tribunal or the Tribunal's verdict.HAMIEKHA ALABKHA v. BETITRNING OFFICER, JAMNAGAR CITY, AND


Power to issue writ against Election Tribunal—When writ willbe issued—Guiding principles—Delay, effect of—Per TEJA SINGH C.J.and PASSEY J. —An Election Tribunalconstituted to determine an electionpetition after the result of the election has baen declared, is subject tothe superintendence and control of the High Court under article 227 of theConstitution. The High Court would not, however, interfere underarticle 227 in any matter which relates to the merits of the electionpetition. Section 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951, cannot take away the powersof the High Court which were expressly given to it by articles 228 and227 of the Constitution. HUKAM SlNGH AND ANOTHER v. SARDULSINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 162.

If a party aggrieved by an order of tho Election Tribunal seeksto invoke the extraordinary and discretionary remedy of writ to avoidmiscarriage of justice, lie must do so as early as possible. In cases wherethere is other remedy also available, a long and un-explained delay inmaking the petition might render it liable to be dismissed on that score,but if the aggrieved party has no other remedy under the law, the delayin filing" a petition may not by itself be a sufficient ground for rejecting itoutright. HlXKAM SlNGH AND ANOTHER V. SARDUL SlNGH ANDOTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 162.

Jurisdiction to issue writ against orders of Election Tribunal—•"Election", meaning of—Scope of article 329{b)—Jurisdiction of HighCourt over Election Commission—The High Court has no jurisdiction tointerfere with an order of an Election Tribunal, under article 226 or 227of the Constitution, inasmuch as under article 329(b) no election can becalled in question except by an election petition presented to suchauthority as may be provided by the appropriate Legislature, and theParliament has vested the Election Tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction insuch matters. The High Court cannot interfere under articles 226 or227 for the further reason that when an order of the Election Tribunal isadopted by the Election Commission, it becomes the act of the ElectionCommission and issuing an order against an Election Tribunal which hasbecome functus officio would, in effect, be issuing an order against theElection Commission itself and no High Court has jurisdiction to issuean order against the Election Commission as its office is located at NewDelhi. The term "election" in article 329 of the Constitution includes

HIGH COURTS 1JJ

all proceedings commencing with the nomination and ending with thedeclaration of the result and an election must therefore be deemed tocontinue till a final decision, by whosoever it be, is reached, regarding theresult of the poll; that an election petition has been filed and dismissed orallowed does not therefore remove the bar of article 325(b). Ponnuswamiv. Upturning Officer, Namakkal (1 E.L.R. 133) applied. RAMKRISHNAv. TFTAKUK DAOOSING, 6 E.L.R. 186. [Overruled],

Error apparent on the face of the record"—An error of lawapparent on the face of the record" for which the High Court may setaside an order of a Subordinate Tribunal by a writ of certiorari is not aformal or accidental error which can be remedied by means of an amend-ment ; an error in a proposition of law which forms the basis of theTribunal's conclusion is an error apparent on the face of the record.S. KHADER SHERIFF V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS,

7 E.L.R. 471.

-Power of superintendence over Eleetion Tribunal"Interferencewith mere errors of law—The general power of superintendence oversubordinate courts and Tribunals conferred by article 227 of the Consti-tution on the High Courts involves a duty to keep them within thebounds of their jurisdiction—to see that they do what their duty requiresthem to do and that they do it in a legal manner. It does not, however,empower the High Courts to sit as an appellate court and correct mereerrors of law or fact committed by subordinate courts and Tribunals. Ingiving the Election Tribunal the power to dismiss an election petition fornon-complianca with sections 81, 83, or 117, the Legislature has vested theTribunal with the jurisdiction to decide whether a petition or the schedulesattached to it containing the list of corrupt practices have been properlyverified or not, and if it decides that they have not been properly verified,the High Court will not interfere with the decision under article 226or 227 of the Constitution, even though its decision may be erroneous,as the powers conferred by those articles are not intended to be exercisedfor correcting errors ' of law or fact. SHANTILAL CHAUDHARY V.

RAGHURAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 489.

Mere wrong decision—However dissatisfied the High Courtmay be with the judgment of the Tribunal on the merits and howeverdifferent a view it might have taken, it is after all for the authorityset up under the Constitution to decide matters on merits, and if theHigh Court were to interfere on the merits it would be ignoring theprovisions of article 329 of the Constitution. RANCHHODLAL LlLADHARVAYEDA v. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, AHMEDABAD, 8 E.L.R. 59,

E L D — 2 4 • • ••


Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Power to issue writof certiorari—When writ will be issued—Jurisdiction of specialTribunals—General principles —An application under article 226 ofthe Constitution for a writ to quash an order of the Election Tribunalis not an application which calls in question an election withinthe meaning of article 329 (b) of the Constitution and the juris-diction of the High Courts to entertain such an application underarticle 226 is not barred by article 329 (b). The fact that a HighCourt cannot issue a writ against the Election Commission becausethe Election Commission is not located within its territorial juris-diction, cannot deprive that High Court of its jurisdiction to issuea writ to quash an order of an Election Tribunal which was fun-ctioning within its territorial jurisdiction. The High Court does notin such a case do anything indirectly which it cannot do directly.Election Commission, India v. Saha Venkata Bao (2 E.L.E. 499) referredto. Once an election petition is referred to an Election Tribunal fordisposal, the Election Tribunal has full jurisdiction to decide all ques-tions of fact and law, and no writ of certiorari will lie against its decisioneven though it may be wrong in law, except where it offends against theprinciples of natural justice or is clearly in excess of jurisdiction or thereis an error apparent on the face of the record. An Election Tribunal doesnot act without jurisdiction in trying an election petition which has beenreferred to it for disposal by the Election Commission, even though candi-dates who had withdrawn their candidature had not been impleaded asparties to the petition. MADAN MOHAN V. BANKAT L A L AND OTHEBS8E.L.E. 119.

The power of superintendence vested in the High Courts byarticle 227 of the Constitution includes the power to interfere judiciallywith the judgments of subordinate courts. Bimala Prosad Boy v. Stateof West Bengal (A.I.E. 1951 Cal. 258) and Girish Chandra Majhi v.Girish Chandra Maity (A.I.E. 1951 Cal. 574) relied on. SHAHMOHAMMAD UMAIBV. BAM CHABAN SINGH ANDOTHEBS, 8E.L.E. 179.

The High Court will not exercise its powers under article 226of the Constitution to interfere with an order of an Election Tribunal re-fusing to examine a "particular witness. Queen v. Marsham ([1892], 1Q.B. 371) distinguished. SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. ELECTION TRIBU-

NAL, FAIZABAD, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 201.

•Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Power to issue writafter Tribunal has disposed of the petition - Whether Tribunal existsdormantly or automatically revives when its order is set aside—Power toissue direction to Election Commission —Article 329 (b) of the Constitution

HIGH COURTS 179

does not. bar the jurisdiction of the High Courts to exercise theirpowers under articles 226.and 227 over Election Tribunals constitutedto decide disputes connected with the election or arising out of the same.KALYAN SINGH V. ELECTION TBIBUNAL, AJHEB, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E.

207.

-An Election Tribunal constituted to try an election petitionceases to exist as soon as it completes its task and passes final ordersdisposing of the petition. It cannot be deemed to exist thereafter in adormant state or to revive automatically when its order is vacated by aHigh Court. The High Court cannot therefore issue a direction or writto an Election Tribunal after it has disposed of the petition finally. Itcan only vacate the order of the Tribunal. The High Court cannot alsoissue a writ or direction to the Election Commission to cease to takefurther action or to vacate notifications issued by it in pursuance of theorders of an Election Tribunal. KALYAN SINGH V. ELECTION TEIBUNAL,AJMEE, AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 207.

Power to issue writ of certiorari against Election Tribunal—Power of superintendence, scope of—When writ will be issued—Tribunalceasing to exist—The language of article 227 of the Constitution is com-prehensive enough to enable the High Courts to exercise their powersof superintendence over an Election Tribunal appointed under theR. P. Act, 1951. The power of superintendence under article 227 wouldinclude judicial review but this power is not unlimited and cannot beemployed to correct every form of hardship. A writ of certiorari can-not be granted to quash a decision of an inferior court acting within itsjurisdiction, on the ground that inadmissible evidence has been admittedor the decision is wrong. I t is not open to the High Court to canvassthe reasoning of the impugned decision, unless it can be shown that theauthority which passed that order acted without jurisdiction, or in excessof it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice. The correctrule is that there must be an error apparent on the face of the record orof the order impugned ; or the error should be admitted in the face ofthe court; and the error of law must affect the jurisdiction of the Tri-bunal. The mere fact that two views are possible on a question of factwould not be sufficient to hold that the order of the Tribunal is bad andto justify the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash that order. A writof certiorari can be issued only in respect of matters which are withinthe jurisdiction of the High Court. Where an inferior court is one ofcivil jurisdiction, but by statute or custom it administers a law peculiarto its own from in respect of some particular matter and so possesses to

T8O ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

this limited extent jurisdiction which the superior court does not possess,certiorari will not issue to remove proceedings which come within thatspecial jurisdiction. Per NABASIMHAM J.—The limitations imposed onthe High Court in exercising its powers of issuing a writ of certiorariunder article 226 may not apply with full force when the court exercisesits powers under article 227. Article 227 seems to be wide enough toenable the High Court not only to set aside the order of the inferior Tri-bunal in appropriate cases but also to give adequate relief where the circum-stances of the case justify the exercise of this extraordinary power. Thefact that the Tribunal is an ad hoc Tribunal and ceases to exist after givingits decision does not make any difference as regards the exercise of thispower. DANDAPANI DAS V. MOHAN NAYAK AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.B 220.

Delay, effect of—The powers which the High Courts enjoy underarticle 226 of the Constitution are of a discretionary nature, though thatdiscretion has to be exercised in accordance with judicial principles. TheHigh Court will not, therefore, interfere when the application for the issueof a writ of quo warranto is a belated one. [In this case the High Courtrefused to interfere as the application was filed nearly one year after theproceeding before the Election Tribunal had commenced and almost allthe evidence had been adduced.] H A B I SHANKAB PRASAD GUPTA V.

SUKHDEO PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 8 B.L.E. 341.

Mere irregularities—The court will not grant a quo warranto ina case where there is only a mere irregularity which can be cured. HARI

SHANKAR PRASAD GUPTA V. SOTCHDEO PRASAD AND ANOTHER, 8 E.L.E.341.

• Mere wrong decision—The High Court is not a court of appealfrom a decision of the Election Tribunal and it cannot quash or modify anorder made by the Tribunal on the ground it is not an order which theHigh Court itself would have been disposed to make. AUDESH PHATAP

SINGH V. BRIJ NARAIN AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 1.

Against order allowing amendment—The case which a respondenthas to meet is to be found in the petition, and the list; whether that casehas been so radically changed by an amendment of the particulars in thelist must depend on the facts, but the High Court would not be justifiedin interfering with an order of the Tribunal allowing an amendment un-less it is quite clear that the Tribunal has overreached itself. If anamendment causes inconvenience to the respondent, this can be compen-sated by costs. "Where it was alleged in an election petition that electorsin a large number of villages were subjected to undue influence and thatparticulars so far ascertained were given in the list attached to the petition

HIGH COURTS l 8 l

and subsequently an application was made for amendment of thislist by adding the names of two more villages in which undue influencewas practised, and the amendment was allowed by the Tribunal : Held,that, as the application was one for amendment of the list only and not ofthe petition itself and section 83(3) permitted amendment of the list bygiving further and better particulars, and the amendment did not sub-stantially alter the nature of the petition, the Tribunal did not act with-out jurisdiction in allowing the amendment and the High Court wouldnot interfere with the order by issuing a writ. Maude v. Lowley (1874,L.E. 9 C.P. 165) distinguished. AUDESH PEATAP SINGH V. BRIJ NARAINAND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 1.

Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Power to issue writs—Powers of superintendence—• Election," meaning of— Finality" of orders•—Whether excludes power to issue writs-—Writ against Tribunal whichhas ceased to function—There is nothing in article 329(b) of the Constitu-tion which takes away the remedy granted by article 226 to a person whois aggrieved by any decision of the Election Tribunal, or the power ofsuperintendence of the High Court over the proceedings of the Tribunalunder article 227. Finality given to orders of an Election Tribunal bysection 105 of the R. P. Act, 1951, cannot affect the constitutionalpowers of superintendence of the High Court, as no Parliamentary orState Legislatures can abrogate the supervisory powers granted by theConstitution. The proceedings before the Election Tribunal or its orderscannot be regarded as included in the term ' election", and calling inquestion orders or proceedings of the Tribunal is not therefore the samething as "calling in question an election." An order of the ElectionTribunal, when it is adopted by the Election Commission and notified,does not become an order of the Election Commission, and even thoughthe Tribunal has ceased to exist and the Election Commission is notsituate within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, a writ ororder can be issued or made under article 226 or 227. The existence ornon-existence of the inferior court or Tribunal is not a matter of anyconsequence for the exercise of the powers of superintendence, and theyare not taken away as soon as the court or Tribunal ceases to functionor is abolished. The power of superintendence under article 227 of theConstitution does not make the High Court a court of appeal or revisionover the proceedings of the Tribunal. It is only where there is anygrave miscarriage of justice and flagrant violation of law, or where theTribunal has failed to act within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or actscontrary to the provisions of law prescribing the mode of its actingwhich has materially affected its decision, that the High Court mayinterfere to remedy the obvious error or the grave injustice. The question


whether an election petition complies with the provisions of section83 of theB.P. Act, 1951, with regard to the contents of the petition andthe filing of a list containing full particulars of corrupt practices, is amatter which is within the jurisdiction of the Election Tribunal to decideand even if it finds that the petition does not comply with section 83, theTribunal is not bound to dismiss the petition. The High Court will nottherefore interfere with a writ under article 227 of the Constitution toquash an order of a Tribunal refusing to dismiss a petition for non-compliance with section 83. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram(5 B.L.E. 1), Huham Singh v. Sardul Singh and Others (6 B.L.E. 162),Jagdish Chandra v. Prakash Narain and Others (A.I.E. 1953 V. P. 5l)followed. Shankar Nanasaheb Karpe v. Returning Officer, Kolaba (1E.L.E. 13) and N. P. Ponnusivami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal (lB.L.E. 133) referred to. Ramakrishna v. Thakur Daoosing (6 E.L.E. 186)dissented from. TIEATH SINGH V. BACHITAE SINGH AND OTHERS, 9E.L.E. 163.

Mere wrong decision—-However wide the jurisdiction of theHigli Court under article 226 of the Constitution may be, it is notso wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a courtof appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decisions impugnedand decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.TEJ SINGH V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, JAIPUB, AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 193.

Jurisdiction to issue writs against Election Tribunals and Elec-tion Commission—When ivrit will be issued—Errors apparent on the faceof the record and flagrant errors of law— Whether sufficient grounds—Arti-cle 329 (b) of the Constitution does not deprive the High Courts of theirjurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 to issue writs to quash the proceed-ings of Election Tribunals. An Election Tribunal is set up only after anelection is over, and calling in question the order of an Election Tribunalis not calling in question "an election" within article 329(b). The orderof an Election Tribunal does not become an order of the Election Com-mission when it is published by the latter nor is the Election Tribunal amere amanuensis of the latter. Section 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951, whichprovides that the order of an Election Tribunal shall be final and con-clusive cannot prevail over the constitutional powers of the High Courtsunder articles 226 and 227. An Election Tribunal does not becomefunctus officio after it has pronounced its order; even if does become so,this fact cannot affect the effectiveness of a writ that may be issued toquash its proceedings. The High Court can issue a writ against theElection Commission in respect of duties which the latter performs or hasto perform within the jurisdiction of the High Court. Saka Venkata

HIGH COURTS 183

Rao's case (2 B.L.E. 499) distinguished. Apart from questions of jurisdic-tion, a writ of certiorari can also be issued where a Tribunal has com-mitted mistakes apparent on the face of the record or committed flagrantviolation of law. [The order of the Tribunal was set aside by a writ inthe case on the ground that it considered the question of an implied con-tract not alleged in the pleadings and not specifically put in issue, andgave a finding clearly against admitted facts and also committed a flagranterror of law in inferring an implied contract from the mere fact that afirm supplied goods when orders were placed from time to time.]LAKKAPPA v. NAEASIMHE GOWDA AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 201.

Jurisdiction—Power to issue writs against Election Tribunalsand Election Commission—When writ will be issued—Errors apparenton the face of the record and flagrant errors of law—Whether sufficentgrounds —Article 329(b) of the Constitution does not deprive the HighCourts of their jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 to issue writs toquash the proceedings of Election Tribunals. An Election Tribunal is setup only after an election is over, and calling in question the order of anElection Tribunal is not calling in question an election" within article329(b). The order of an Election Tribunal does not become an order ofthe Election Commission when it is published by the latter nor is theElection Tribunal a mere amanuensis of the latter. Section 105 ofthe R. P. Act, 1951, which provides that the order of an ElectionTribunal shall be final and conclusive cannot prevail over the con-stitutional powers of the High Courts under articles 226 and 227. A writcan be issued to an Election Tribunal even after it has pronounced itsorder, for it does not become functus officio after it has pronounced itsorder; even if it does become so, this fact cannot affect the effectivenessof a writ that may be issued to quash its proceedings. T. NAGAPPA V.BASAPPA AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 216.

Jurisdiction to issue writ against Election Tribunal—Article329(b) of the Constitution is no bar to an application for a writ against anElection Tribunal as such application does not call in question any elec-tion. Under article 226 of the Constitution the High Court can issue awrit against any authority within the jurisdiction of the High Court;it is not necessary that the authority should be subordinate to the HighCourt. The correctness of the appreciation of evidence by an ElectionTribunal cannot be questioned in a petition for a writ under article 226.BAWA BACHITTAE SINGH V. ELECTION COMMISSION AND OTHEES, 9

E.L.E. 506.Jurisdiction over Election Tribunals—Writ of certiorari—

General principles—"Errors apparent on the face of the record"—Finding


of fact supported by evidence though erroneous not sufficient for issueof ivrit-—One of the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of awrit of certiorari is that the writ can be availed of only to remove oradjudicate on the validity of judicial acts and the expression "judicialacts" in this connection includes the exercise of quasi-judicial functionsby administrative bodies or other authorities or persons obliged to exer-cise such functions and is used in contrast with what are purelyministerial acts. The second essential feature of a writ of certiorari isthat the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity.In granting a writ of certiorari the superior court does not review orreweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribu-nal purports to be based and substitute its own views for those of theinferior tribunal, but it demolishes the order which it considers to bewithout jurisdiction or palpably erroneous. Certiorari may and isgenerally granted when a court had acted without or in excess of itsjurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of tinsubject-matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminaryproceeding or the court itself may not be legally constituted or maysuffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances, andwhen the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of somecollateral fact, the court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give itjurisdiction which it would f-.ot otherwise possess. A tribunal may becompetent to enter upon an enquiry but in making the enquiry it mayact in flagrant disregard of the rules of procedure or whore no particularprocedure is prescribed, it may violate the principles of natural justice,and a writ of certiorari may be available in such cases. An error in thedecision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of cer-tiorari, but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of theproceedings, e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of theprovisions of law. In other words, it is patent error which can becorrected by certiorari but not mere wrong decision. Where the onlyamendment of the election petition applied for by the petitioner was amodification in the prayer clause by the addition of an alternative prayerand no change in the averments in the petition was sought to be intro-duced and, though the Tribunal allowed the amendment, it ultimatelygranted only the prayer which was originally asked for and did not allowthe alternative prayer which was introduced by the amendment : Held,that the fact that the Tribunal allowed the petition to be amended was inthe circumstances immaterial and the final order of the Tribunal could notbe held to be one passed without jurisdiction. Where there is evidencein support of the findings of fact arrived at by the Election Tribunal, the

HIGH COURTS ' 185

High Court cannot, in an application for a writ under article 226, considerwhether that finding of fact is right or wrong and quash the order of theTribunal merely because in its opinion the finding is wrong. [Their Lord-ships held on the merits that the errors which the High Court held to beerrors apparent on the face of the record were not errors apparent on theface of the record, but were findings of fact based on the evidence adducedin the case, and even though the High Court might on a review havecome to a different conclusion, these were not matters justifying the issueof a .writ quashing the order of the Tribunal]. T. C. BASAPPA V.T. NAGAPPA AND ANOTHER, 10 B.L.E. 14 (S.C.).

-The jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of theConstitution is discretionary and the High Court would not issue a writof certiorari unless the Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or thedecision is palpably erroneous. I t will not constitute itself into a courtof appeal either on questions of fact or on questions of law and a merewrong decision cannot be corrected by a writ of certiorari. T. G. Basappav. T. Nagappa and Another (10 E.L.S. 14) relied on. Audesh PratapSingh v. Brij Narain and 'Others (9 B.L.R. l) referred to. HAEISH

CHANDEA BAJPAI AND ANOTHER V. TRILOK SINGH AND OTHERS, 10

E.L.R. 198.

Application for writ by third person—The rule that no personmay invoke the court's aid in respect of a wrongful act of a publicnature not affecting prejudicially the real and special interest or aspecific legal right of the relator is not applicable to the writ of quowarranto. A member of the public may challenge a public act of theState and apply for a writ of quo warranto in respect thereof, providedhe does so bona fide and is not a man of straw set up by others as amere pawn in the game, and provided it is in the interest of the publicthat the legal position should be judicially declared once for all.V. D. DESHPANDE AND OTHERS V. STATE OP HYDBBABAD AND OTHERS,

10 B.L.E. 203.

Power to issue writs—(i) Article 226 confers on High Courtspower to issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within theirterritorial jurisdiction, in terms absolute and unqualified and ElectionTribunals functioning within the territorial juriedietions of the HighCourts fall within the sweep of that power, (ii) On a plain reading ofarticle 329(b) what is prohibited therein is the initiation of proceedingsfor setting aside an election otherwise than by an election petitionpresented to such authority and in such manner as provided therein. Ifproceedings have been instituted in accordance with article 329(b) bythe presentation of an election petition, the requirements of that article

ELD-25

i86 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

are fully satisfied and thereafter when the election petition is in duecourse heard by a Tribunal and decided, whether its decision is opento attack, and if so, where and to what extent, must be determined bythe general law applicable to decisions of Tribunals, and as they aresubject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under article226, a writ of certiorari under that article will be competent againstdecisions of Election Tribunals. N. P. Ponnuswatni v. ReturningOfficer, Nmnahhal Constituency (1E.L.E. 133) and Durga ShanJcar Mehtav. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.E. 494) followed, (iii) TheHigh Courts have power under article 226 to issue writs of certiorarifor quashing the decisions of Election Tribunals, notwithstanding thatthey have become functus officio after pronouncing their decision, for awrit of certiorari for quashing is directed against the record, and a writcan be issued to the District Judge or the Chief Judge of the Court ofSmall Causes in whose custody the records are kept, to transmit tharecord to the High Court, (iv) The Election Tribunals are subject tothe superintendence of the High Courts under article 227 of the Consti-tution and as that superintendence is both judicial and administrativethe High Court can under article 227 not only annul the decision ofthe Tribunal, but it can also issue further directions in the matter,(v) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as whenan inferior court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it,or fails to exercise it, Certiorari will also be issued when the court orTribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, aswhen it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard,or violates the principles of natural justice. The court issuing a writ ofcertiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdictionand consequently the court will not review findings of fact reached by theinferior court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. A writ of certiorarican also be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that itshould be something more than a mere error ; it must be one which mustbe manifest on the face of the record. Parry & Co. v. CommercialEmployees'1 Association, Madras (A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 179), Veerappa PillaiV. Raman and Raman Ltd. (A.I.E. 1952 S.C. 192), Ebrahim Aboobakerv. Custodian General of Evacuee Property, Neio Delhi (A.I.E. 1952 S.C.319) and T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Another (10 E.L.E. 14), Rexv. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal: Ex parte Shaw([1952] 1 K.B. 338) relied on. (vi) What is an error apparent on the faceof the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being anelement of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature, and it must be leftto be determined judicially on the facts of each case. Batuk K. Vyas v.Surat Borough Municipality (A.I.E. 1953 Bom. 133) referred to. HARIVISHNU KAMATH V. AHMAD ISHAQUB, 10 E.L.E. 216.

HIGH COURTS 187

Delay, effect of—After the issue of rule nisi if the court hasexamined the record and is satisfied that the order complained of is mani-festly erroneous or without jurisdiction it is not bound to reject theapplication for a writ simply on the ground that the application has beenmade after great delay. DAMODAE GoSWAMI V. NABNABAYANGOSWAMI AND OTHERS, 10E.L.E. 272.

Application by voter—A writ of certiorari quashing the decisionof an Election Tribunal can be issued at the instance of a voter eventhough the candidate who has been aggrieved does not apply for such awrit. As the High Court has the power to issue a writ under article 227on its own motion, it is not bound to refuse a writ merely because theattention of the court was drawn to the error in the records by a personnot directly affected thereby. In a democratic constitution a voter has notonly a right to exercise his vote, but he is also entitled to see that theconstituency is properly represented and for that purpose to insist thatelections are conducted fairly and in accordance with the rules. DAMO-DAE GOSWAMI V. NARNAEAYAN GOSWAMI AND OTHEES, 10E.L.E. 272.

Writ after Tribunal has become functus officio—The decisionof an Election Tribunal can be quashed by a writ of certiorari even afterthe Tribunal has become functus officio. DAMODAE GOSWAMI V.

NAKNABAYAN GOSWAMI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 272.

Article 329(b) of the Constitution bars only the initiation ofproceedings calling an election in question and does not take away thepower of the High Court to issue a writ to quash the decision of anElection Tribunal. DAMODAE GOSWAMI V. FABNAEAYAN GOSWAMIAND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 272.

The power of the High Courts to issue writs of certiorari underarticle 226 of the Constitution against Election Tribunals is not in anyway curtailed by section 150 of the E. P. Act, 1951. Hari VishnuKamath v. Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.B. 216), Durga Shankar Mehta v.Thakur Baghuraj Singh (9 E,L.E. 494) and Baj Krushna Bone v. BinodKanungo and Others (9 E.L.E. 294) followed. SANGRAM SINGH V.

ELECTION TRIBUNAL, KOTAH, AND ANOTHER, 10 E.L.E. 293 (S. C).

Power to issue writ of certiorari and mandamus againstReturning Officer — Article 329, clause (b), of the Constitutionof India read with the provisions of the E. P. Act, 1951, excludesthe jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs in the natureof certiorari or mandamus under article 226 of the Constitution forquashing the order of a Eeturning Officer rejecting the nomination of acandidate, and directing the Eeturning Officer to include the name ofthat candidate in the list of valid nominations. An election commences

i88 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

at any rate when a candidate is duly proposed and seconded and hisnomination paper is filed with the Returning Officer, and the act of aReturning Officer in scrutinising the nomination takes place after thecommencement of the election and as a part of it. Writs of certiorari andmandamus will be issued only if they would be final and effective andsuch writs not be issued unless the authority whose act is complain-ed of has failed to exercise a jurisdiction vested in him by law or hasacted in excess of Ms jurisdiction or mala fide. D E . JOHN MA THAI v.RETURNING OFFICER, KOTTATAM AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 1.

The term "election" in article 319(b) of the Constitution, whichprovides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution noenaction to the Parliament or to the Legislature of a State shall be calledie question except by way of an election petition, must, in its contextand in juxtaposition with articles 327 and 322, bear a wider meaning thanthe very limited meaning of the result of an election or the counting ofvotes. I t has the same meaning as in articles 327 and 328, namely,matters relating to or in connection with election, and covers everystage from the time of the notification till the declaration of the resultand even perhaps, if there is an election petition, till the decision of theTribunal. The High Courts, have, therefore, no jurisdiction to issue awrit under article 226 of the Constitution against the order of a Return-ing Officer rejecting a nomination paper of a candidate under section 36 (2)

, of the R. P. Act, 1951. A writ of mandamus cannot be issued againsta public officer merely because in discharging his statutory duties he hasdecided wrongly. I t can be issued only to compel him to discharge hisduties if he has failed to do so, and such a writ will not be issued unlessthe court issuing it is satisfied that its decision would be final andeffective. Obiter : As the High Courts have a general power of superin-tendence over all tribunals except those constituted under any law-relating to the Armed Forces, presumably an Election Tribunal set upafter an election would be subject to the superintendence of the HighCourts under article 227, and the High Courts would have power tocompel an Election Tribunal to act within its jurisdiction and not toexceed the powers conferred on it by statute. SHANKAR NANASAHEB

KABPE v. RETURNING OFFICER, KOLABA, AND ANOTHER, 1 E.L.R. 13.

The Constitutent Assembly must be deemed to have used theterm ' election" in article 329(b) of the Constitution of India in its com-prehensive sense, embracing the whole procedure whereby an electedmember is returned. Election activities commence as soon as any personis nominated as a candidate for election and the nomination paper isdelivered to the Returning Officer in the prescribed manner and when -herejects or accepts a nomination paper he takes a definite step towards

HIGH COURTS 189

the election of the candidate concerned, and it cannot be said that such astep does not constitute election. The power of the High Courts to issuea writ against a Eeturning Officer in respect of the rejection or accept-ance of a nomination under article 226 of the Constitution is thereforebarred by article 329(b). The High Court has no power under article226 to issue a writ, also in view of the fact that the same matter maybe dealt with by an Election Tribunal whose orders are final under sec-tion 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951. The Eeturning Officer has a judicialduty to perform at the scrutiny and, as it is his duty to deeide whetheror not a nomination paper should be accepted, if he rejects the nomina-tion paper, even though improperly, he acts with jurisdiction anddischarges a judicial and not a ministerial function, and in such a casethe High Court has no power to interfere with the decision by amandamus or any other writ. Even if it be assumed that the jurisdic-tion of the High Court has not been abridged by article 329(b), this isnot a case in which the High Court should issue a mandamus, or anyother writ, in exercise of its powers under article 226, firstly, becausethere is a possibility of a conflict of decisions between the Election Tri-bunal and the High Court, and secondly, because there is another remedyopen to the petitioner. SUKAB GOPE v. STATE OF BIHAB, 1 E.L.E. 68.

The word "election" in article 329(b) of the Constitution, whichprovides that notwithstanding anything in the Constitution no electionto either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of theLegislature of a State shall be called in question except by way of anelection petition presented to such authority and in such manner as maybe provided for by a law made by the appropriate Legislature, refers tothe entire process of election including the nomination of candidates andscrutiny of nomination papers, and the High Courts have therefore nopower to interfere with an order of a Eeturning Officer accepting orrejecting a nomination paper by issuing writs or directions under article226 of the Constitution. Section 170 of the E. P. Act, 1951, is not ultravires the Parliament inasmuch as under article 246 of the Constitutionread with items 72 and 95 of List I of the Seventh Schedule thereto, theParliament has exclusive power to make laws affecting the jurisdictionof the High Courts in election matters. This section, however does notoust the jurisdiction of the High Courts to interfere with election mattersunder article 226. The real bar is created by article 329(b) Dictum :" i t is eminently desirable that the provisions of the E. P. Act, 1951, besuitably amended so as to provide for the final decision of questions,relating to the rejection of nomination papers before the polling begins,for, otherwise, the returned candidate will be deprived of his succes afterhe has incurred considerable expense and suffered considerable worry in

ELD—26


getting through the election, merely because the Eeturning Officer hadcome to an erroneous conclusion." NRISINHA KUMAR SlNHA ANDOTHERS V. BBTITRNING OFFICER, BUEWAN KHARGRAM AND OTHERS,

1 E.L.E. 23.

-A High Court cannot, in the exercise of its powers under article226 of the Constitution interfere with the order of a Beturning Officerrefusing to receive a nomination paper or accepting or rejecting a nomina-tion paper after scrutiny, or issue orders or directions to him in thematter of nomination of candidates, inasmuch as article 329(b) of theConstitution provides that notwithstanding anything in the Constitutionan election cannot be called in question except by way of an electionpetition, and the term "election" in article 329(b) is not restricted in itsmeaning to the result of an election or the counting of votes but coversthe entire procedure by which a person is elected in accordance with theprovisions of the E. P. Act, 1951, including the nomination of candidates.Quare : Whether the decision of an Election Tribunal or any proceedingsof the Tribunal could be challenged before a High Court by way of apetition under article 226 or article 227. SHANKAR EAO RAMA.TI ANDANOTHER V. T H E STATE OF MADHYA BHARAT, 1 B.L.E. 34.

The High Court will not, in the exercise of its powers underarticle 226 of the Constitution, issue a writ or direction against theacceptance or rejection of a nomination paper by a Eeturning Officerinasmuch as the party aggrieved has a specific and adequate remedy,namely, an election petition under Part VI of the E. P. Act, 1951. Oneof the fundamental principles with regard to high prerogative writs isthat once they are issued they must be final and not subject to inter-ference by any other authority or Tribunal, and the fact that, if anelection petition is filed, the Tribunal with have the power to re-examinethe matter is another reason why the High Court should not issue a writor order in such cases under article 226. The word "election" is used inarticle 329(b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the E. P. Act, 1951,in a comprehensive sense including at least the stage of nomination.Neither article 329(b) of the Constitution nor section 80 or 170 of theE. P. Act, 1951, takes away in express terms the power of the High Courtto issue writs under article 226 and it is difficult to hold that the HighCourt has no power to issue an appropriate writ, or direction underarticle 226 under any circumstances in a matter relating to elections tothe House of the People or any State Legislature. Dr. John Mathai v.Returning Officer, Kottayam (E.L.E. l) discussed. EAM SINGH ANDOTHERS V. EETURNING OFFICER KOT P U T L I AND OTHERS, 1

E.L.E. 52.

HIGH COURTS

The expression "election" used in article 329(b) of the Consti-tution is intended to cover comprehensively all the diverse steps involvedin the process of selecting a representative, from the issuing of a notifica-tion calling upon a constituency or constituencies to elect theirrepresentatives, up to the declaration of the results, and the High Courtshave therefore, no jurisdiction to entertain an application under article226 of the Constitution for cancelling an order of a Returning Officeraccepting or rejecting a nomination paper and to issue directions to himto include the name of the petitioner in the list of valid nominations, or toprevent him from publishing the list of valid nominations. RuDRA PRATAPNABAIN SINGH V. BHAGWANDIN MISRA AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 60.

(i) The word ' election" in art. 329(b) of the Constitution in-cludes all the steps commencing with the notification and ending withthe declaration of the result of the election and nomination of the candi-dates being a part of the process of election, the acceptance or rejectionof a nomination paper by a Returning Officer can be questioned only byan election petition as prescribed in article 329(b). (ii) The words "not-withstanding anything contained in the Constitution" in article 329 arevery wide, and exclude the power of the High Court to issue writs ororders under article 226 in respect of orders of a Returning Officer accept-ing or rejecting the nomination of a candidate, (iii) Article 329(b) doesnot preclude the High Court from issuing a writ of eertiorari on permis-sible grounds quashing the order of the Tribunal made in an electionpetition, (vi) The Parliament has nopower to take away the jurisdictionof the High Court to issue writs under article 226, and section 170 of theR. P. Act, 1951, does not deprive the High Court of its power to issue writsunder article 226. (v) The order of a Returning Officer is a judicial actis liable to be quashed by a writ, if a writ is otherwise maintainable.N. P. PONNUSWAMI v. RETURNING OFFICER, NAMAKKAL, AND OTHERS,

1 E.L.R. 89. (H.C.)

The appellant, who was a candidate for election to the LegislativeAssembly of the State of Madras and whose nomination paper wasrejected by the Returning Officer, applied to the High Court of Madrasunder article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of eertiorari to quash theorder of the Returning Officer rejecting his nomination paper and todirect the Returning Officer to include his name in the list of validnominations: Held by the Full Court, that on a proper construction ofthe provisions contained in article 329(b) of the Constitution and sec-tion 80 of the R. P. Act, 1951, the High Court had no jurisdiction tointerfere with the order of the Returning Officer. The word "election"has by long usage acquired both a wide and a narrow meaning. In the


narrow sense it is used to mean the final selection of a candidate whichmay embrace the result of the poll when there is polling, or a particularcandidate being returned unopposed when there is no poll. In the widesense the word is used to connote the entire process culminating in acandidate being declared elected and it is in this wide sonse that the wordis used in Part XV of the Constitution in which article 329(b) occurs.The scheme 8f Part XV of the Constitution and the E. P. Act, 1951,seems to be that any matter which has the effect of vitiating an electionshould be brought up only at the appropriate stage in an appropriatemanner before a special tribunal and should not be brought up at anintermediate stage before any court. Questioning the rejection of anomination paper is questioning the election" within the meaning ofarticle 329(b) of the Constitution and section 80 of the B. P. Act, 1951.The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil rightbut is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to theli mitations imposed by it. Strictly speaking, it is the sole right of theLegislature tq examine and determine all matters relating to the electionof its own members, and if the legislature takes it out of its own handsand vests in a special tribunal an entirely new and unknown jurisdiction,that special jurisdiction should be exercised in accordance with the lawwhich creates it. Judgment of the High Court of Madras (1 E.L.R. 89)affirmed. N. P. PONNUSWAMI v. BETUBNING OFFICES, NAMAKKAL,

AND OTHEBS, 1 E.L.E. 133. (S.C.)

LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

Nomination for special constituency of Council—Omission togive name of Assembly constituency and number in its roll—Validity ofnomination—Under section 6 of the B.P. Act, 1951, in order that a personmay be qualified to be chosen to fill a seat in the Legislative Council ofa State for a particular special constituency it is not necessary thathe should be an elector in that constituency. It is enough if he is anelector for any Assembly constituency in that State. Where a candidatefor a seat for a special constituency of the Legislative Council of a Stateoave against items 7 and 8 of the form of his nomination paper the nameof the special constituency for which he was standing as a candidate andhis number in its roll instead of the name of the Assembly constituencyin which his name was entered as an elector, and his number in the rollof this constituency : Held, that in the circumstances of the case, and inview of the form of nomination paper and the provisions of sub-sections(5) and (6) of section 33, the candidate had not failed to comply with theprovisions of section 33 in filling the details against items 7 and 8 of thenomination paper. The non-mention of the name of the Assembly

MINISTERS 193

constituency and his number in that roll was at best only a technical defectwhich was not of a substantial character which cannot be made a groundfor rejection of the nomination paper. Bamanugraha Narayan v. SardaPrasad (3 Jagat Narain 232) referred to. THETE GOPAL EAMJI V.AMOLOK CHAND AND OTHEES, 1 B.L.E. 477.

Under article 173 of the Constitution read with section 6 ofthe E. P. Act, 1951, a person*can stand as a candidate for a constituencyof the Legislative Council irrespective of whether his name appears ordoes not appear in the electoral roll of the constituency for which hestands if his name is included in the electoral roll of any Assemblyconstituency of the State. JAWAHAE SlNGH PACHOLI V. HlBDAYNAEAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 495.

Special constituency 0/ Legislative Council—Electoral rollnumber—Number in roll of Assembly constituency given in nomination—Validity of nomination—In the case of an election for a special consti-tuency of the Legislative Council of a State (e.g., the Teacher's consti-tuency) the serial number of the candidate to be given against column 8of the form of nomination is his serial number in any Assembly consti-tuency of the State. JAWAHAB SHANKAB PACHOLI V. HIBDAY NABAIN

SINGH ANDOTHEBS, 6 E.L.E. 495.

MINISTERS.

Bight to address meetings and ask for votes for their partycandidates.—Ministers are prominent members of their party and in thatcapacity they are entitled to address meetings and to tell people whattheir party had done and what its programme was and to ask them tovote for the candidate set up by their party. Such an action of theMinisters cannot be held to amount to "exercising undue influence."Ministers are officers appointed by the Governor but they are in nosense servants of the State Governments, and the rules requiringGovernment servants to refrain from taking part in election propagandaor in any other way assisting a candidate in an election, do not apply tothem. Canvassing by them would not, therefore.be a corrupt practiceunder sub-section (8) of section 123 of the E. P. Act, 1951. Thoughaccording to the law in England, no Minister of the Crown or Crownservant and no member of the police force, should engage in canvassingor be appointed or accepted as a canvasser, there is no law in India pro-hibiting the State Ministers from taking part in canvassing votes forothers. Though they wield considerable influence, and when they


canvass, they use that influence, the influence cannot be called undue in-fluence, as the law does not prohibit canvassing by Ministers and it isnot illegal for,them to use that influence. If a Minister redresses thegrievances of a class of the public or people of a locality or renders themany help, on the eve of an election he would not be guilty of a corruptpractice unless he obtains a promise from such people or imposes a con-dition on them that they should vote for him or any other candidate atthe election. Where the Industries Minister of a State asked the mineowners to send, and the mine owners sent, their ears to be used for pro-moting the election of a particular candidate: Held, such an action onthe part of a person, whether a Minister or not, would not amount to anycorrupt or illegal practice. A candidate, his agent or any other personwith his connivance is entitled to obtain the vote of a person servingunder the Government of India or the Government of any State; andin doing so, if the candidate or his agent, or any other person workingfor him, asks a person serving under the Government of India or theGovernment of any State, to attend any meeting or in any other lawfulmanner induces such person to vote for a candidate, that would not becorrupt practice. There is nothing illegal in a Minister's combining hisnon-official work with his official work and occupying Government restor circuit houses during his tour. AMIRCHAND V. SURENDRA LAL JHA


Undue influence by Government servants—Minister doing elec-tioneering campaign during official tours.—A candidate who is a Ministeris not guilty of a corrupt practice under section 123(8) of the E. P. Act,1951, merely because during the course of his official tours as a Ministerhe conducted his electioneering campaign also. Nor would a DistrictMagistrate's tour just before election, by itself, amount to exercisingundue influence on voters. Habibgang South N.M.B. 1924 (Hammond387) and Gajendra Chandra Ghaudhnri and Others v. P. G. Datta (2Jagat Narain 85) relied on. BAMACHANDRA CHOWDHCJRI V. SADASIVA

IEIPATHY AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 5 B.L.E. 401.

Bight to ask voters to vote for his party—A leader of a politicalparty is entitled to declare to the public the policy of the party, and askthe electorate to vote for his party without interfering with any elec-toral right and such declarations on his part would not amount to undueinfluence under section 123(2). The fact that he happens to be a Ministeror Chief Minister of the State would not deprive him of this right.Lichfield (1 O'M. & H. 26) and Surendra Narayan Sinha v. BabuAmulyadhone Boy and Others (2 Doabia 368) referred to. LlNG-E GOWDAv. SHIVANANJAPPA, 6 E.L.E. 288.

MINISTERS 195

Ministers and Deputy Ministers—Acceptance of office—Disquali-fication—Act removing disqualification—Effect—The respondents whowere elected members of a State Legislative Assembly were appointedDeputy Ministers on the 5th February, 1954. At that time, no emolu-ments, either by way of salary or allowance, were attached to that office,but salary was attached to that office with effect from the 5th February,1954, by an Ordinance passed on the 13th February, 1954. The verysame Ordinance declared in exercise of the powers vested in the Raj-pramukh under article 191(l)(a) of the Constitution that the office of aDeputy Minister would not constitute nor be deemed to have constitutedat any time a disqualification for its holder being chosen or retained asa member of the Legislative Assembly. Certain members of the StateLegislative Assembly applied under article 226 of the Constitution forthe issue of a writ of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ ordirection on the ground that the office of the Deputy Minister was "anoffice of profit" and its acceptance by the respondents disqualified themfor retaining their respective seats in the Legislative Assembly after thedate of their appointment, that the vacancies which thus arose couldonly be filled up by the procedure laid down by section 150 of the S. P.Act, 1951, and that the action of the Eajpramukh and the State Assemblyin removing the disqualification retrospectively by enacting an Ordin-ance and later on, the Hyderabad Act V of 1954, operated in effect tore-appoint the respondents to fill up the vacant seats without holding afresh election as required by law, and, further, that in order that adeclaration contemplated by clause (a) of article 191(1) may be effective,it should be made prior to the occurrence of the vacancy: Held, (i)that when a salary was attached to the office of the Deputy Minister andit became an office of profit, the disqualification envisaged by article19l(l)(a) was also taken away and the two acts being simultaneous, theacceptance of the office of the Deputy Minister did not disqualify anddid not bring about any vacancy, and section 150 of the B. P. Act hadno application ; (ii) that the fact that the members would have enter-tained the hope when they accepted the office of Deputy Minister thatLegislature would ultimately fix a remuneration for the post, and salarywas given to them with retrospective effect from the 5th February,would not make the acceptance of that office on 5th February, 1954,acceptance of an office of profit on that date, so as to attract to itself thedisqualification mentioned in article 191 and to render the respondents'seats automatically vacant; (iii) that, as under article 192 of theConstitution questions of this nature must be referred to the Governoror Eajpramukh1 for decision, it was not a proper case for the issueof a writ of quo warranto by the High Court. V. D. DESHPANKE

T96 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

AND OTHEES v. STATE OF HYDERABAD AND OTHBBS, 10 B.L.E.203.

Minister—Election declared void—Nomination for by-electionmore than six months after first election but within six months from dateof order declaring election void—Exemption of Minister from disqualifi-cation on the ground of holding office of profit—Applicability.—Whenthe election of a candidate who has been returned as a member andsubsequently appointed as a Minister is declared void in an electionpetition, the pariod of six months for which he can continue as a Minis-ter under article 164(4) of the Constitution runs from the date on whichthe order o! the Tribunal is published and not from the date of hiaappointment as a Minister. BRAJ NARESH SINGH V. HUKAM SINGH,9 E.L.R. 80.

Criticism of acts of Ministers—Whether attach on personalcharacter—A statement of opinion, however unjust or harsh it may be,without reference to any concrete fact, does not come within the mis-chief of saction 123(5). The mere statement of a defamatory opinion,unless coupled with the grounds upon which it is formed, is not a state-meat of fact. Further, the statement must relate to the personalcharacter or conduct. A distinction must be drawn between the criti-cism of a candidate as a politician or a public man and statements inrelation to his personal character or conduct. Criticism of his publicor political activities, however ill-mannered, unfair or exaggerated itmay be, is not forbidden. It is only when the man underneath thepolitician is attacked and his honour, integrity or veracity assailed inthe statement, that the statement becomes offensive within the meaningof section 123(5). Statements criticising the public and political acts ofa Minister as such, do not come within section 123(5), however pungentand offensive they may be, if his personal character is not attacked.DEVASHAEAN SINHA v. SHEO MAHADEV PRASAD AND OTHERS, 10 B.L.E,461.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—I.

Sea also, 1. QUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES, 2. ELECTION AGENTand 3. ELECTORAL EOLL.

T . Age of candidate2. Name of candidate3. Name of constituency4. Electoral roll number5. Father's name6. Name of Legislature7. Name ohhf village

8.9-

10 .

1 1 .

1 2 .

13.

Proposer and seconderScheduled castesSeveral nominationsSignatureSymbolsWithdrawal

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 197

1. Age of candidate—Omission to mention age —Whether substantialdefect—Betuming Officer'spower to reject nomination suo motu—Omissionto mention the age of the candidate in a nomination paper is a defect ofa substanhtial character and the Eeturning Officer will not therefore beacting improperly in rejecting a nomination paper on his own motion ifit does not contain the name of the candidate, even without callingupon the party concerned to show cause why the nomination papershould not be rejected. Lewis v. Gibbon (l Doabia 259) and Waswa Singhv. Wary am Singh (2 Doabia 263) distinguished. Queen v. Tugwell (3Q.B.D. 704), Baldwin and Others v. Ellis and Others {[1929] 1 K. B-273) referred to. PRANLAL THAKORLAL MUNSHI V. INDUBHAI BHAILAL-

BHAI AMIN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 182.

Age not entered in electoral roll—A nomination of a candidatecannot be rejected on the ground that his age is not entered in theelectoral roll. JAGANNATH SHARMA AND OTHERS V. S. C. GUPTA AND

OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 8.

Age of candidate— Objection regarding age not taken before Re-turning Officer—Whether can be, raised before Tribunal—Entry inSchool Register—Admissibility — Probative value—Though objection asregards age has not been taken before the Eeturning Officer, that doesnot preclude the petitioner from raising it before the Tribunal in anelection petition; for, being under age is a statutory disqualification forcandidature at an election, and in respect of a statutory disqualificationthere can be no waiver. An entry in a school register is relevantevidence admissible under section 35 of the Evidence Act but the lawdoes not make such entry conclusive nor even presumptive evidence ofthe date of birth. PARTAP SINGH V. NIHAL SINGH AND OTHERS, 3E.L.E. 31.

Entry of age in an electoral roll is not final. It is open tothe candidate to prove his real age. UGAM SINGH V. HARI SINGHAND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 470. See also under ELECTORAL BOLL supra.

Discrepancy as to age between electoral roll and nominationpaver—Where the identity of a candidate is not in doubt and the ques-tion of eligibility is not involved, difference of a few years in the ageas given in the nomination paper and in the electoral roll is of no con-sequence and is not a proper ground for rejecting the nomination paper.The election law does not require that the description of the candidatein the nomination paper must literally agree with the description inthe electoral roll. JASWANT SINGH V. JAGAN NATH AND OTHERS, 10E.L.E. 1.

ELD—27


Wrong entry in roll, effect of. BAM SINGH V. HAZAEI LAL

AND OTHEBS, 6 B.L.E. 224 infra.

2. Name of candidate—Discrepancy in name—Effect of—Wherethe petitioner's name was inserted as "Eaj, Mohan Vithal" in the elec-toral roll, in the nomination paper, and in the list of valid nominations,and the petitioner contended in an election petition that his correctname was "Mohan V. Eaj" and owing to the mistake in the name, theresult of the election was affected : Held, that, as the petitioner hadnot raised any objection to the electoral roll or to the nomination paperand list of valid nominations, it was not open to him to raise this con-tention, and the election could not be set aside for the reason that therewas a misdescription of the petitioner's name in the nomination paper.Mathew v. Brown (1876, 1 C.P.D. 596) distinguished. Dictum.—It is ofthe utmost importance that important papers relating to an election,like nomination papers, should be preserved in the custody of seniorofficers, particularly when an election petition has been filed. MOHANVITHAL E A J V. GANGADHABA SIVA AND OTHEBS, 4 B.L.E. 91.

Name of candidate —Once the identity of the candidate is esta-blished by other evidence, trivial discrepancies in the description of hisname in the electoral roll do not matter and are not sufficent for rejec-tion of a nomination paper. Sardar Harcharan Singh v. S. NarottamSingh {I Doabia 77) relied on. VlJA MOHAN REDDY V. PAGA PxiLLAEEDDY AND OTHEBS, 2 E.L.E. 414.

Where in a nomination paper a candidate's name was given as"Vayeda Eanchhodlal" and his father's name was given as Liladhar"and it was rejected because his name as given in the electoral roll was"Eanchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda": Held, that, as the identity of thecandidate was established the discrepancy in the name was a meretechnical defect and the nomination paper was wrongly rejected. BegumWahidul Hasan V. Amj'adi Bano Begum Mohammad Ali (Sen and Poddar487) referred to. EANCHHODLAL LILADHAR VAYEDA V. SANJALIA

MOHANLAL VlBJIBHAI AND OTHEBS, 4 B.L.E. 493.

3. Name of constituency—Misdescription of name of constituencyby clerical error—Where a candidate whose name was entered as anelector in the Kofc Kapura Constituency and who intended to stand forelection to the Faridkofc Constituency, wrongly mentioned "Faridkot"against column number 7 of the nomination paper, but it was clear fromthe entries against column 8 that he was an elector in the Kofc KapuraConstituency : Held, that the error was nothing more than a clericalerror and the nomination paper could not be rejected on this ground.KESHO RAM V. HAZUBA SINGH AND OTHEBS, 8 E.L.E. 320.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—ELECTORAL ROLL 199

Name of constituency and number in electoral roll—omission tofill in—Whether fatal defect—If a nomination paper contains sufficientparticulars to identify the candidate the provisions of the law are suffi-ciently complied with. A meticulous compliance with the rules is notnecessary. The question whether the particulars are sufficient toidentify the candidate is to be decided on the facts of each case. In thiscase, though columns Nos. 7 and 8 of the nomination paper (thename of the constituency and the electoral roll number therein) wereleft blank, it was held that the rejection of the nomination paper onthis ground was improper as the candidate was a well-known person ofthe locality and by reason of the description given in the other columnsthere could be no doubt at all about his identity. JASWANT SINGH y.MANGAL DAS AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 385.

Name of constituency—Omission in a nomination paper tofill up the particulars as to the name of the constituency, in the elec-toral roll of which the candidate's name appears, is not a mere technicaldefect of an unsubstantial character but a substantial defect for whichthe nomination can be rejected. Baldwin v. Ellis (1929, 1 K.B. 273)relied on. P. N. BALASUBRAHMANYAN V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,VELLORE, AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 496.

4. Electoral roll—number— Where, against column number 14 theserial number of the seconder in the electoral roll was wrongly shownas No. 3 in the electoral roll of Ward No. XIII of Ajmer City whereashis serial number was No. 3 in the electoral roll of Ward No. XVIII ofAjmer City, and, as there were 32 Wards in the Ajmer City, each ofwhich had a separate roll and as no one drew the attention of the Ee-turning Officer to the fact that ''No. XII I" was a mistake for ''No.XVIII" at the time of scrutiny, the Eeturning Officer rejected thenomination paper : Held, that in the circumstances of the case the errorin the description of the electoral roll was a material defect as theidentity of the seconder could not be discovered by the Eeturning Officerwithout a laborious inquiry and the nomination paper was rightlyrejected. HARNAM SINGH V. JWALA PRASAD AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.E. 332.

——Electoral roll—number of proposer and seconder—Per ADITYA

NAHAYAN LAL—A nomination paper cannot be rejected merely becausethe serial number of the proposer or seconder in the electoral roll has notbeen stated in it, without making any summary inquiry about theiridentity. JAMUNA NANDAN PRASAD SINHA V. JAGDISH NARAIN SINGH


-Electoral roll—duty to produce certified copy of entry in roll—Meaning of "certified copy"—In order that a copy of entry in an electoral


roll may be a "certified" copy within the meaning of section 33(6) of theE. P. Act, it is not necessary that it should be a copy certified by theElectoral Eegistration Officer. A copy supplied to the candidate on anapplication made by him to the Deputy Commissioner who is also theDistrict Election Officer and signed by the Head Copyist of the DeputyCommissioner's Officer and certified to be a true copy by him bearing thestamp of the Collectorate is a certified copy within section 33(6). Held,also, if a nomination paper has been improperly rejected the result ofthe election must be presumed to have been materially affected and it isimpossible to lead such convincing evidence as can rebut this presumption.Obiter: The wording of section 100(l)(c) is misleading and requires amend-ment. BELT NAEESH SINGH V. HUKUM SINGH AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 266.

Production of copy of roll—• Where a candidate producedprinted' copy of the Block of the electoral roll for the constituency,wherein his name was entered as a voter, but the Eeturning Officer passedan order calling upon him to produce a certified extract from the electoralroll and rejected his nomination for non-compliance with this order:Held, (i) that by producing the printed copy of the Block of the electoralroll in which his name appeared, the candidate had substantially compliedwith the requirements of section 39(4) of the E. P. Act, 1951; (ii) evenassuming that the provisions of section 39(4) were not complied with, theEeturning Officer had no power under section 36(2)(d), or any ether pro-vision of law to reject the nomination for non-compliance with theproviso to section 39(4). Basti Election Case (Sen and Poddar 106)applied. The purpose of the proviso to section 39(4) is not to prescribeordeals for the intending candidates to undergo, but to provide for guidesto the Eeturning Officer in deciding about the identity of the candidateand of the proposer and seconder. S. K. SAJIBANDAM V. ELECTIONTBIBUNAL, MADBAS AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 341.

Description of part of roll—necessity of—The instructioncontained in note 6 of the nomination form that where an electoral rollis sub-divided into parts, the description of the part of the electoral rollin which the name of the person concerned is entered must be given, isnot mandatory but only directory and a substantial compliance with theprovision is enough. The nature and degree of the defect would dependon the difficulty involved in tracing out the entry. MATHBA DAS ANDOTHERS V. DARA SINGH AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 441.

Omission to state part of roll—Form of nomination —Foot-note(6)—The provision contained in food-note (6) of the Form of nominationpaper given in Schedule II of the Eepresentation of the People (Conductof Elections and Election Petitons) Eules, 1951, that where the electoral


roll is sub-divided into parts and separate serial numbers are assigned tothe electors entered in each part, a description of the part in which thename of the person concerned is entered must also be given in items Nos.8, 10 and 14 of the Form, is not a mandatory but a directory provisionand if the identity of the candidate in question is not in doubt, the mereomission to state the part of the electoral roll in which the candidate'sname is entered would not invalidate the nomination paper. Even ifthere is any doubt about the identity, if it can be cleared by the Re-turning Officer by holding a summary inquiry under section 36, heshould do so. E. Few v. Gibbon (Sen and Poddar 66) and TikarainSharmav. Lalit Bahadur Kharga (1E.L.R. 252) followed. There werenine electoral rolls for a constituency in each of which the serial No.174 occurred. In a nomination paper the serial No. 174 was mentionedwithout mentioning the part of the roll, but along with serial No. 174the number of the embossed leaf in which the candidate's serial No.174 occurred was given and it was easier to identify the candidate fromthis description than from the part of the roll, but the Returning Officerrejected the nomination on the ground that the part of the roll was notmentioned, though he had no doubt about the identity of the candidate:Held, that the nomination paper was improperly rejected. RAM SINGH

v. HAZAEI LAL AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 224.

Failure to mention the name of the zail or sub-division of theelectoral roll in which the names of the candidate, his proposer andseconder are entered is not a fatal defect justifying the rejection of thenomination paper. If the name of the zail or sub-division is not given,the Returning Officer should refer to the relevant zail or sub-division if itis in his possession, or is produced by the candidate at the time of scru-tiny. SHIV DAYAL AND OTHERS V. TEJ RAM AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 346.

Omission to mention in the nomination paper the part and sub-division of the electoral roll in which the candidate's name is entered isonly a technical defect not of a substantial character, where the identityof the candidate can be ascertained without them. UGAM SINGH V.

HARI SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 470.

Non-compliance with the instructions contained in thefootnote (6) to the .Form of nomination paper given in Schedule II doesnot amount to non-compliance with a mandatory provision of law.SHIVA DAYAL AND OTHERS V. TEJ RAM AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 346.

Electoral roll—Production of copy—Under section 33(5) it is theduty of the Returning Officer to satisfy himself that the names andthe electoral roll numbers of the candidate and his proposer andseconder as entered in the nomination paper are the same as those


entered in the electoral roll, and under sub-section (6) if he finds thatthe name of the candidate is not registered in the electoral roll, he shallfor the purposes of sub-section (5) require the person presenting thenomination papers to produce either a copy of the electoral roll in whichthe name of the candidate is included, or a certified copy of the relevantentries of such roll. If, therefore, the Eeturning Officer rejects a nomi-nation paper without discharging his duty under section 33(6) suchrejection is improper. The Eeturning Officer has power to make asummary inquiry in deciding objections as to nomination. Whilescrutinizing nominations he performs a judicial function and should actjudicially. He should not mechanically reject a nomination if anyobscurity in nomination can be cleared up by summary inquiry. If anomination paper is improperly rejected the presumption is that theresult of the election has been materially affected and the onus is on therespondent to rebut this presumption. Tar a Prasad v. Rat BahadurDevi Char an Baruah (2 Jagat Narain 83), S. B. Lewis v. G. E. Gibbon(Sen and Poddar 883), Kalap Baj v. Bishambhar Nath Tripathi (Sen andPoddar 106) relied on. KANAUJI LAL SHUKLA V. BHAG-WAN DIN ANDOTHERS, 3 B.L.E. 1.

Copy issued by Head copyist whether "certified copy"—Therebeing no definition of the expression "certified copy" in the E. P. Act,1951, or the rules thereunder the production of a copy of the electoralroll issued by "any public officer having custody of the same is sufficientcompliance with the requirement of section 33 of the Act. A copy ofthe electoral roll issued by the Head Copyist of the Collectorate indischarge of his public duties is a certified copy within the meaning ofthe Act. KANAUJI LAL SHUKLA v. BHAGWAN D I N AND OTHEBS, 3

E.L.E. 1.

—•—'A candidate filed two nomination papers, one for Jalore A con-stituency and the other, for Jalore B constituency, at the same time.He attached a certified copy of the electoral roll of Jodhpur constituency,in which his name appeared, with the nomination paper for Jalore A, andrequested the Eeturning Officer to treat it as evidence for both the con-stituencies. The Eeturning Officer who held the scrutiny of the nomina-tions on the same day, accepted the nomination for Jalore A and rejectedthat for Jalore B on the ground that a certified copy of the electoral rollor entry therein was not produced with i t : Held, (i) that, as the Eeturn-ing Officer was in possession of the certified copy of the electoral roll atthe time of the scrutiny, though it was attached to the nomination forJalore A, it was his duty to look into it and he acted improperly in reject-ing the nomination for Jalore B ; (ii) if the Eeturning Officer has evidence


other than a copy of the electoral roll to decide the question of identity andeligibility he can proceed on that evidence. He is not bound to rest hisevidence on the electoral roll alone and reject a nomination if a copy of theroll is not produced. UGAM SINGH V. HAEI SINGH AND OTHEES, 6 B.L.E.470.

Non-production of certified extract of roll—Whether groundfor rejection The non-production of a certified extract of therelevant entry in the electoral roll which has been called for by a Be-turning Officer is not a ground for rejection of a nomination under sec-tion 36(2)(d) of the E. P. Act, 1951, especially in the case of electionsto the Legislative Councils. In the case of electoral rolls first preparedunder the Act of 1950, the production of a copy supplied by the ElectoralEegistration Officer of the part of the electoral roll in which the nameof the candidate appears is sufficient compliance with the requirementsof section 22-A read with section 26 of the E. P. Act, 1950. Thoughunder section 36(7) of the Act a certified copy of an entry in the electoralroll is conclusive evidence of the candidate's right to stand for election,it is open to the candidate to produce other evidence to show that he isqualified to stand, if this is questioned, and an order rejecting a nomi-nation paper for non-production of a certified extract of the roll cannot,therefore, be justified under section 32(2)(a) where the question whetherhe is qualified to stand has not been considered at all by the EeturningOfficer. Basti District North-East General Rural Constituency case(Sen and Poddar 106) followed. StTBRAHMANYA BHATT V. ABDULHAMEED KHAN AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 225.

A nomination paper cannot be rejected because the name of theconstituency in which the proposer and seconder were enrolled as voterswas not stated but only their numbers in the electoral roll. As theproposer and the seconder should belong to the constituency from whichthe candidate is seeking his election the numbers in the electoral rollmust be presumed to belong to the constituency mentioned in item No.1 of the form. SHAKTI PAESHAD SHUKLA V. BALWANT SINGH AND

OTHERS, 4 B.L.E. 301.

(1) Sections 33(6) and 36(7)(a) do not preclude a Eeturning Officerbefore whom an electoral roll containing the name of a candidateis produced at the time of scrutiny of nominations from making anenquiry as to whether the name of the candidate was in any electoralroll the date of his nomination and from rejecting his nomination if hisname did not appear in any roll on the date of the nomination. (2) Thestatutory provisions regarding the insertion of the constituency and


number in the electoral roll as prescribed in columns 7 and 8 of thenomination are matters of substance and not of mere form, and omissionto fill in these particulars is a proper ground for rejecting a nomination,though mistakes in the insertion of particulars may be a ground foramending the form at a later stage with the consent of the ReturningOfficer. (3) A revised electoral roll does not speak from the date ofthe original roll and nomination of a person who was not in a roll atthe time of nomination cannot be validated by a subsequent amendmentor revision of the roll. P. N. BALASUBBAMANIAN V. C. E. NARASIMHANAND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 461.

Electoral roll number—Giving number scored out by supple-mentary list—Candidate's number in another list pointed out duringscrutiny—Rejection of nomination, whether proper—Duty of ReturningOfficer to make summary inquiry—Where the electoral roll number ofof a candidate was given in a nomination paper as No. 342 in village Ain ignorance of the fact that the entry relating to this number has beenstruck off by a supplementary list, but at the time of scrutiny of nomina-tions, the candidate pointed out that he was also registered as a voterin village B against serial No. 3241, but the Eeturning Officer rejectedthe nomination on the ground that the candidate had given an electoralroll number which did not exist, without making any summary inquirywhether the candidate was entered as a voter at serial No. 3241 invillage B : Held, that there was only a bona fide mistake in enteringthe serial number of the candidate in the electoral roll, as the candidatewas not aware of the fact that entry No. 324 had been struck off by asupplementary list, and as there was no doubt about the identity of thecandidate, the Eeturning Officer was bound in the circumstances to makean enquiry into the allegation of the candidate that he was entered as avoter against serial No. 3241 of village B and to come to a decision onthe point, and the rejection of the nomination was in the circumstancesof the case, improper. Case law reviewed. GUBNAM SlNQ-H AND ANO-THER v. PABTAP SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 338.

Electoral roll subdivided into par Is—Omission to state part of roll—Whether fatal defect—The instruction given in Note (6) of the form ofnomination paper requires that where the electoral roll is sub-dividedinto parts and separate serial numbers are assigned to the electors en-tered in each part, a description of the part in which the name of theperson concerned is entered must also be given in item Nos. 8,10,14 ofthe form. If this instruction has not been complied with in any nomi-nation paper, it cannot be said to have been completed in the prescribed


form within the meaning of section 33(l) of the R. P. Act, 1951, andthe Returning Officer would be acting improperly in accepting it. DESAIBASAWAEAJ v. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4 B.L.R. 380.

Omission to state part of roll—Where a constituency wascomposed of two towns, Sirsa and Dabwali, each of which was dividedinto several wards, and in a nomination paper, against column number 8the candidate simply mentioned " 1400, Ward No. 1 " without addingSirsa also, but it appeared that in Ward No. 1 of Dabwali therewere not more than 800 voters and there would have been no difficultyin tracing out the entry against 1400, Ward No. 1 in Sirsa, but theReturning Officer rejected the nomination on th9 ground that the nameof the part in which the candidate's name was entered was not given,though he was satisfied about the eligibility of the candidate to stand forelection. Held, per MAHARAJ KISHORB and T. G. SETHI (G. S. GYANI,dissenting) that there was only a technical defect not of a substantialcharacter and the nomination paper was improperly rejected. AjAYABSINGH AND ANOTHER V. KARNAIL SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 B.L.R. 388,[Affirmed by Supreme Court in 10 E.L.R. 189 infra.]

Omission to state part of roll—Where a nomination was rejectedon the ground that it did not mention the parts of the sub-divisions ofthe electoral roll in which the name of the candidate, the proposer andseconder appeared, but the Tribunal found on the facts that no difficultycould arise in finding out the correct entries relating to the candidate,the proposer and seconder if the Returning Officer had looked into theelectoral rolls of their respective sub-divisions and the electors also couldnot have found any difficulty in ascertaining their identity and eligibility :Held, that the defect was only a technical defect which was not of asubstantial character within the meaning of section 36(4) of the R. P.Act, 1951, and the Returning Officer acted improperly in rejecting thenomination paper. Held also, that where a nomination paper has beenrejected improperly there is a xn'esumption that the result of the electionhas been materially affected, inasmuch as the entire electorate is deprivedof the right to vote fora candidate who is entitled to stand. TlKARAMSHABMA v. LALIT BAHADUR KHABGA AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.R. 252.

Omission to state part of roll—Where the name of the part of theelectoral roll in which the name of the candidate appeared was not filled upagainst column No. 8 of the nomination paper, but there was no difficultyin identifying the candidate, and the entry of his name in the roll waspointed out to the Returning Officer, but the nomination form was reject-ed on the ground that it had not been duly filled up: Held, affirming thedecision of the majority of the Tribunal, that the defect was only a

ELD-28


technical defect not of a substantial character and the nomination wasimproperly rejected. Ajayah Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh andOthers (6 B.L.E. 368) affirmed. KAENAILSINGHV. ELECTION TBIBUNAL,HISSAB, AND OTHEBS, 10 E.L.E. 189 (S. C).

If in addition to his being enrolled as a voter in a constituencyof the Assembly which is a necessary qualification for a candidate to theLegislative Council, he is also enrolled as a voter in the special consti-tuency of the Council for which he intends to stand as a candidate,omission to state in column 7 of the nomination paper the particulars ofthe constituency of the Assembly in which he is enrolled as a voter wouldnot invalidate the nomination paper when the candidate in question hasstated as against column 7 the particulars of the special constituency ofthe Council in which he is enrolled as a voter, and has also statedcorrectly his number in that roll. The defect, if any, is only a technicaldefect not of a substantial character. MANEKLAL AMOLAKCHAND V.

THETE GOPAL EAMJI AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.E. 36.

-Name of Parliamentary Constituency —Omission to mention ina nomination for the House of the People the name of the relevantParliamentary Constituency in which the name of the candidate isincluded and the serial number of the candidate in the electoral roll ofthat constituency are grave errors and irregularities which materiallyaffect- the validity of a nomination and afford a sufficient ground forrejection of the nomination paper. The fact that the name of an AssemblyConstituency which formed one of the units of the Parliamentary Consti-tuency and the number of the candidate in the electoral roll of thatAssembly Constituency were mentioned in the nomination paper willnot cure this defect or impose upon the Eeturning Officer a duty to findout the relevant Parliamentary Constituency from the DelimitationOrder and ascertain from its roll whether the candidate's name is includedin it. Though there is a presumption that a person whose name is enteredin the roll of an Assembly Constituency is a Parliamentary elector, acandidate cannot rely on this presumption alone : he must comply withthe requirements of section 33 of the E. P. Act, 1951, with regard toparticulars to be stated in a nomination paper. Saharanpur DistrictN. M. B. case (4 Jagat Narain 96), Punjab North East Town case (2 JagatNarain 143), Baipur North case, (2 Jagat Narain 146) and AmbalaDivision case (Hammond 77) referred to. BADDBUDDTIJA SYED V,

MOHAMMAD KHODA BUKSH AND OTHEBS, 2 B.L.E. 189.

Where a voter's name is entered in an electoral roll of a Legis-lative Assembly Constituency, a Eeturning Officer may accept thenomination of a candidate for a Parliamentary Constituency on produc-


tion of a copy of an entry from the electoral roll of the correspondingAssembly Constituency. HAEI VlSHNU KAMATH V. SYED AHMED ANDOTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 248.

Where the Beturning Officer of the constituency for which acandidate is nominated is also the Beturning Officer of the constituencyin the electoral roll of which the proposed candidate's name is entered as avoter, it is the duty of the Beturning Officer to call for the electoral rolland satisfy himself that the names and electoral roll numbers of thecandidates and the proposer and seconder as entered in the nominationpaper are the same as those entered in the electoral rolls. He cannotcall upon the candidate to produce a certified, copy of the roll and rejectthe nomination paper if the candidate fails to do so. Section 33(6) of theB. P. Act, 1951, which empowers the Beturning Officer to call upon thecandidate to produce a copy of the roll applies only to a case where theBeturning Officer of the constituency in the electoral roll of which thecandidate's name is entered is a different person. LAXMAN BAO V.LAXMINIVAS GANERIVAL AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 2 E.L.B. 20.

Supplementary rolls—Where, against column 10 a candi-date merely stated, 94, Ward No. 1, Sadulgarh" Avithout stating thatthe number 94 referred to the number in the supplementary electoral rolland not number 94 in the main roll, and, as the Beturning Officer'sattention was not drawn to the fact that there was a supplementary roll,even at the time of scrutiny, he rejected the nomination paper : Held thatomission to state that number 94 was the number in the supplementaryroll was a substantial defect and the nomination paper was rightly reject-ed. Malhar Bao v. Vishnu Pant (1 Doabia 206) and Bameshwar PrasadSingh v. Krishna Gopal Das and Others (4 E.L.B. 112) relied on. MOTIBAM v. BAMOHANDAR OHOWDHARY AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.B. 135.

Electoral roll number—Order of Election Commission to includename in roll—Order passed before nomination—Nomination filed withoutelectoral roll number oiving to want of knowledge of order—Validity ofnomination—Where the Election Commission had passed an order forincluding a candidate's name in the electoral roll on the 23rd of Novem-ber, 1952, but, as this fact was not known to the candidate or theproposer or seconder, a nomination paper was filed on the 24th November,1952, leaving column No. 8 (against which the serial number of the candi-date has to be stated) blank and the rejection of the nomination was upheldby the Tribunal on the grounds (i) that a nomination would not be validunless the proposer and seconder had knowledge on the date of nominationthat the candidate was qualified to be chosen as member and (ii) there wasa non-compliance of section 33(2): Held (i) that the view that knowledge


of the proposer arid seconder that the candidate was qualified to stand isnecessary for a valid nomination was wrong; but there was a non-com-pliance with the provisions of section 33, and the Returning Officer hadjurisdiction to reject the nomination on this ground ; (ii) the ElectionTribunal should have carefully considered the question whether thedefect was an unsubstantial one with reference to the provisions of sec-tion 38(4); (iii) it must however be assumed that tha Election Tribunalwas of the opinion that the defect was not a mere technical one not of asubstantial character within section 36(4) and the High Court would notinterfere under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution even if it was ofopinion that the defect was a substantial one, as it was a question on themerits. RANCHHODLAL LILADHAR VAYEDA V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL,

AHMEDABAD, 8 E.L.R. 59.

Where information that a candidate's name was included in theroll by the Election Commission under rule 20(3) of the Representationof the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, was receivedonly on the day on which the nomination papers were filed : Held, thatthe nomination of the candidate could not be rejected merely on theground that columns 7 and 8 thereof were left blank in the nominationpaper. Provisions with regard to the filling up of nomination papersare not mandatory and need not be fulfilled exactly; substantial com-pliance is enough. Rule 20 of the Representation of the People (Prepara-tion of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950, is not ultra vires. The CentralGovernment has ample power to make such a rule under section 28 ofthe R. P. Act, 1950. Where the direction for the inclusion of a candi-date's name in the electoral roll was issued by the Election Commis-sion on the date on which nomination papers had to be filed and there wasno evidence as to the exact time at which the direction was issued onthat day : Held, that the direction must be presumed to have beenissued at a time when the order would be effective, that is to say, beforethe expiry of the time fixed for filing nominations on that day. RAMA

KRISHNA REDDY V. KAMALA DEVI, 5 E.L.R. 173.

Unless a candidate is a qualified elector to the knowledge of hisproposer and seconder when the nomination is presented, the nomina-tion cannot be regarded as nomination of a qualified elector. Where acandidate whose name was not in the electoral roll, applied to theElection Commission to include his name and submitted a nominationpaper in which against column No. 7 it was stated : I have applied tothe Secretary, Election Commission, for including my name in theelectoral roll -.-and instructions are expected in due course" andcolumn No. 8 was left blank, and the nomination was rejected even


though the Eeturning Officer received before the date of scrutiny athe name of the proposer in column No. 9 of the nomination paper sinot a mere technical defect of an unsubstantial character, but a sub-stantial defect for which a nomination can be rejected. The fact thatthe name of the proposer could be ascertained from his signature andhis electoral roll number which was given in the nomination paper, isimmaterial and cannot cure this defect. Per JAGJIT SlNGH.—Thedetails to be filled up in the nomination paper are intended to ensuredirection from the Election Commission that the Commission hadagreed to the inclusion of the candidate's name in the electoral roll andallotting him a certain number in the roll. Held, that a nominationpaper has to be scrutinised as it stood when it was presented; andnotwithstanding the provisions of rule 20 of the Eepresentation of thePeople (Electoral Eolls) Eules, 1950, the nomination could be rightly,rejected on the ground that it did not comply with the requirements oflaw. EANCHHODLAL LILADHAR VAYEDA v. SANJALIA MOHANLAL

VlRJTBHAI AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 493. [Affirmed in 8 E.L.E. 59 suprap. 208.]

See also cases cited at pp. 94, 95 supra.

5. Father's name—Minor discrepancy—Where the name of thecandidate's father was given in the nomination paper as ' PrabbuDayal"instead of "Prabhu Lai" and, though the Eeturning Officer had no doubtabout the identity of the candidate and no one objected to the nomina-tion on this ground, he rejected the nomination on the ground that therewas a discrepancy between the father's name in the nomination paperand the electoral roll: Held, that the defect was only a technical defectnot of a substantial character, within the meaning of section 36(4) andthe nomination paper was improperly rejected. SATISH CHANDEB V.

GANGA SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 38.

When there is no doubt about the identity of the candidate,errors in the description of his father's name are immaterial. H A E I

DAS v. HIRA SINGH PAL AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 466.

6. Name of Legislature—Assembly described as " West Bengal State "—Where, in the nomination papers of a candidate for the West BengalLegislative Assembly, the heading in respect of the Legislative Assem-bly was filled up as "West Bengal State" and the Eeturning Officerrejected them suo motu at the time of scrutiny on the ground that thename of the Legislative Assembly was not properly described : Held,that the addition of the word 'State" was not a defector irregularity,and the rejection of the nomination on such a frivolous ground was


grossly improper and unjustifiable. Held also, it is settled law that ifthe nomination paper of a candidate is improperly rejected the result ofthe election must be presumed to have been materially affected therebyinasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived of its right to vote for acandidate who was qualified to stand. This presumption would requirethe most conclusive evidence for rebuttrl. NBISINHA KlTMAB SlNHA v.SATYENDEA CHANDBA GHOSH MOULIK AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 121.

Where the particular Legislature for which the candidatestands has been indicated in writing in the nomination form, omissionto strike out the names of the other three Legislative bodies printed inthe nomination form is only a technical defect of an unsubstantialcharacter. LALLU CHANP V. TEJ SINGH AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.E. 28.

Where in a nomination paper of the Eajasthan LegislativeAssembly the words "Lok Sabha", "Vidhan Parishad" and "ElectoralCollege" in the printed form bad been scored out and the words"Vidhan Sabha" (Legislative Assembly) were alone retained, but theword "Eajasthan" was not added before the words "Vidhan Sabha",and the nomination paper was rejected on the ground that the omissionto specify the Legislative Assembly for which the candidate proposedto stand by adding the word "Eajasthan" before "Vidhan Sabha" wasa fatal defect: Held, that the defect in the nomination form, if any,was only a technical defect of a non-substantial character as therecould no doubt about the Assembly for which the candidate intended tostand and the rejection was improper. EOOP CHANDBA SOGANI ANDANOTHEB v. EAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHEES (NO. 3), 9 E.L.E. 21.

7. Name of village—Where there were 400 to 500 villages in a cons-tituency and each village had a separate electoral roll having a sepa-rate set of serial numbers and in a nomination for election to a con-stituency, the name of the village, in the roll of which the candidate'sname appears, was not given in column No. 8, though the serial numberof the candidate was correctly given, and the Eeturning Officer rejectedthe nomination paper on the ground that the village was not stated :Held, that the omission to state the name of the village was a substan-tial defect and the nomination paper was rightly rejected. There isnothing in law to debar a Eeturning Officer from rejecting a nominationpaper on account of a mistake of a substantial character even thoughhe had failed to notice the defect and draw the attention of the candi-date or his agent to the defect at the time of the presentation of thenomination paper. Malhar Bao v. Vishnu Pant (1 Doabia 206) reliedon. EAMESHWAE PBASAD SINGH V. KEISHNA GOPAL DAS ANDOTHEBS, 4 E.L.E. 112.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—PROPOSER & SECONDER 211

8. Proposer and seconder—Omission of name—Per S. G. MATHUR

and DALIP SiNGH JAIN (JAGJIT SINGH dissenting).—The total omissioneither the ideatity or the eligibility of the candidate and the proposerand the seconder, and a meticulous accuracy in filling up the entries inthe nomination form is not to be insisted upon. A substantial com-pliance is all that is required. Where, in spite of any omission, thenecessary particulars can be ascertained from the other entries in theform, the defect is more or less formal and not of a substantial charac-ter, and judged in this light the omission to fill the name of the pro-poser in column No. 9 is not a defect of a substantial character wherehis name is evident from the signature appearing against column No. 12and the electoral roll number given in the nomination paper. NAKOTAM

SINGH V. D E S E A J AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 309.

Omission of name of proposer—Where, the electoral roll numberand the signature of the proposer were legibly given but his name was notinserted in column No. 9, and the nomination was rejected by the Ee-turning Officer: Held, that the omission of his name was a defect of atechnical character and the rejection of the nomination was improper.Under the provisions of section 33(5) it is the duty of the EeturningOfficer to satisfy himself whether the names and the electoral roll num-bers of the candidate, the proposer and the seconder as entered in thenomination paper are the same as those entered in the electoral roll andthe duty cast upon the Eeturning Officer by this sub-section is not of aformal nature. Held also: In case of improper rejection of the nomina-tion paper of a candidate there is a very strong presumption that theresult of the election has been materially affected. This' presumptionis not irrebuttable but very strong evidence is required to rebut it.The question whether the candidate whose nomination paper has beenrejected would have succeeded or failed cannot be the criterion todetermine whether the result of election has been materially affectedby improper rejection of the nomination paper, as a decision on thisquestion can be based only on speculation and guess work. BANKATLAL v. MADAN MOHAN AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 375.

Proposer standing as candidate —A nomination cannot berejected merely because after filing the nomination, the proposer alsostands as a candidate. H A E I VISHNU KAMATH V. SYED AHMED AND


Omission of proposer's constituency. See 4 E.L.E. 301, p. 203supra.

Wrong electoral roll number. See 8 E.L.E. 332 and 7 E.LE.14, p. 199 supra.


Signature of proposer—See SIGNATURE infra p. 214ff.

9. Scheduled Castes—Description as " Harijan "—A nominationpaper of a candidate, who is admittedly an Adi Dravida, for a seatreserved for the Scheduled Castes cannot be rejected merely because hehas described himself as "Harijan"; at the most, it is only a technical defectnot of a substantial character within section 36 (4) of the R- P. Act,195.1. LAKSHMANA PILLAI v. CHEN GAM PILLAI AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E.103.

Declaration—Additional District and Sessions Judge, 'whether"magistrate"—Art additional District and Sessions Judge is a "magis-trate" within the meaning of rule 6 of the Representation of the People(Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, and canattest the verification of a declaration made under section 33 (3) of theR. P. Act, 1951. A defect in the verification required under rule 6 is nota technical defect not of a substantial nature within the meaning of sec-tion 36(4) of the Act. Per CHIPLONKEB and MANDLEKAR (PANDE

dissenting) :—'When a nomination paper has been improperly rejected theresult of th3 election must be presumed to have been materially affected: astatement by one of the respondents that hewas only an alternative candi-date and would have withdrawn his candidature in favour of the otherscannot rebut this presumption. Per PANDB :—Under section 100 (l) (c)of the Act an election can be declared void on the ground that a nomi-nation has been improperly rejected, only if the Tribunal is furthersatisfied that the result of the election has been materially affectedthereby. RAMLAL V. SUJANIRAM AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 27.

10. Several nominations by same proposer—Section 33 (2) of theR. P. Act, 1951, does not mean that a proposer cannot subscribe to morethan one nomination paper of the same candidate ; and the nomination ofa candidate cannot therefore, be rejected merely on the ground that thesame person has subscribed to more than one nomination paper for him.In such a case the first nomination paper can be accepted and it is notnecessary to consider the others. HANS R A J V. RAM SlNGH AND OTHERS,

2 E.L.R. 12.

There is no contravention of section 33(2) of the Act, where theproposer and seconder of a candidate file as proposer and seconder twonomination papers for the same candidate. Hans Raj v. Bam Singh (2E.L.R. 12) relied on. VIJAYA MOHAN RBDDY V. PAGA PULLA RBDDY


The provision contained in footnote No. 6 of the Form of Nomi-nation Paper prescribed in Schedule I I of the (Conduct of Elections and

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SEVERAL NOMINATIONS 213

Election Petitions) Rules, 1951, that if more than one nomination paperin delivered by or on behalf of a candidate the name of the election agentappointed shall be specified in each such nomination paper even if theagent so appointed is the candidate himself, is mandatory and nomina-tion papers which do not comply with this provision are invalid. Thedefect is not a merely technical one but goes to the root of the matter.BEJAYSINGH v. NAEBADA OHAEAN LAL AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.R. 426.

Under section 36 (7) (b) of the R. P. Act, 1951, nominationpapers subscribed by the same proposer or seconder in excess of thenumber of vacancies, are not valid. Such nomination papers need notba considered at all and no question of their rejection under section 36(2)arises. Hans Baj v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) dissented from.Where there was only one vacancy and two nomination papers werefiled on consecutive days for the same candidate in which the seconderwas the same: Held, that the second nomination was invalid. LAKHANLAL MISHRA V. TRIBENI KUMAR AND OTHERS, 3 E.L.R. 423.

-The nomination of a candidate cannot be rejected merelybecause he has filed several nomination papers in which the same personshave signed as proposer and seconder respectively. Hansraj v. BamSingh (2 E.L.R. 12) and Vijaya Mohan Beddy v. Paga Pulla (2 E.L.R.414) followed. BHAIRON V. THAKUR GANPAT SINGH AND OTHERS, 6

E.L.R, 409.

Under section 36(6) of the Act, the Returning Officer mustscrutinis6 all the nomination papers filed on behalf of a candidate andendorse on each of them his reasons for accepting or rejecting the same,The practice of not scrutinising the remaining nomination papers if one isfound to be valid is contrary to law. NlHARENDU DUTT MAZTJMDAB V.SCDHIR CHANDRA BHANDARI AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 197.

Section 33(2) of the R. P. Act, 1951, which provides that anelector can subscribe as proposer or seconder as many nomination papersas there are vacancies to be filled and no more, does not mean that thesame proposer or seconder cannot subscribe to more than one nominationpaper of the same candidate if there is only one vacancy. The sectiononly means that if there is only one vacancy to be filled, a person cansubscribe as a proposer or seconder to the nomination of one candidateonly and if there are two vacancies, to the nomination of two candidatesonly, and so on. A nomination of a candidate cannot, therefore, berejected merely because he has filed more than one nomination papersigned by the same persons as proposer and seconder. Hans Raj v. BamSingh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) followed. Lakhan Lal Mtshra v. Tribeni

Kumar and Others (3 E.L.R. 423) and Bejaysingh v. NarbadaELD—29


Charan Lai (2 B.L.R. 426) dissented from. JAMUNA NANDAN PRASAD

SlNHA V. JAGDISH NARAIN SlNG-H AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 14.Where a candidate filed two nomination papers, and in one

of them he mentioned his father's name as "Garibdass" and in theother as ' Chhiraulia" and Returning Officer rejected both nominationpapers as both came up for scrutiny on the same day : Held, that theReturning Officer should not have mixed up the two nominations andrejected both on the ground of this inconsistency, and, as it was provedthat Garibdass' was the father's name and Ohhiraulia" was the sur-name of the family, both nominations were valid. BALCHAND V.LAXMINARAIN MATEH, 8 B.L.R. 465.

Where the same proposer and seconder have subscribed morenomination papers than one, all the nomination papers cannot be rejectedon the ground that there was only one vacancy. The Returning Officershould accept one of them and reject the others. MANEKLAL AMOLAK-CHAND V. THETE GOPAL RAMJI AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.R. 36.

11. Signature—A nomination paper is not necessarily bad merelybecause the particulars therein were filled in only after the candidate hadsigned the same. Gox v Davies (2 Q.B. 202), Midnapur South case (2Hammond B.P. 185) and Mahant Digvijai Nath v-. Sri Prakash (Sen andPoddar 147) relied on. Harman v. Park (Q.B. 369) distinguished.SHANTA DEVI VAIDYA V. BASHIE HITSAIN ZAIDI AND OTHBES,

8 B.L.R. 300.The first proviso to section 33(3) does not require a declara-

tion signed by the candidate but only a declaration verified in theprescribed manner. Want of the signature of the candidate below thisdeclaration is therefore not a sufficient ground for rejecting a nominationpaper. GANGA PBASAD SHASTEI V. PANNA LAL AND OTHERS, 8E.L.R. 448.

A candidate filed his nomination paper with a form of appoint-ment of agent (Form 5-A) which was duly signed. In the nominationpaper he omitted to put his signature after the declaration of the appoint-ment of election agent, though he had signed at the end, that is, after thedeclaration of the symbols. His nomination was rejected b3r the Return-ing Officer on the ground that it did not comply with the provisions ofsection 33(3) of the R. P. Act, 1951, as the candidate had not subscribedto the declaration of appointment of election agent. The Election Tribunalheld that the nomination paper was improperly rejected. Held,(i) that the subscription at the end of the nomination form after thedeclaration of symbols must be held to relate not only to the declarationof the choice of symbols but also to the declaration which occurred beforeit relating to the appointment of the agent; (ii) even assuming that there

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SIGNATURE 215

was non-compliance with the provisions of section 33(3), the defect wasonly a technical defect not of a substantial character within the meaningof section 36(4), and it was not a ground for rejecting the nominationpaper, as the name of the election agent had been filled up in the nomina-tion paper and an appointment paper in accordance with Form 5-A dulysigned by the candidate had been filed with the nomination paper ; andthe order of the Tribunal was right. Gaton v. Caton (L.E. 2 H.L. 127)distinguished. Obiter.—The more fact that the nomination paper wasaccompanied by the document by which the candidate had appointed theagent in Form 5-A duly signed, was not a sufficient compliance with sec-tion 33(3), for, what section 33(3) requires is not the appointment of anagent (for which provision is made in section 40) but a declaration thatthe candidate has already appointed himself or some other person as hiselection agent. A. K. SUBBAEAYA GOUNDAB v. MUTHUSAMI GOTJNDAE

AND OTHEES, 7 B.L.E. 465.

Signature—Illiterate persons—A nomination paper cannot berejected merely because the thumb-marks of the proposer and seconderwere uot put in the presence of and attested by the Returning Officer.MADAK SINGH v. KALYAN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.R. 405.

Attestation of a thumb-mark for the purposes of the E. P. Act,1951, and the rules thereunder, can be made only by theEeturning Officeror the presiding officer or such other officer as may be specified in thisbehalf by the Election Commission, and such officer must be satisfied asto the identity of the person concerned. Attestation by an AdditionalDistrict Magistrate not authorised in this behalf by the Election Com-mission is not valid. Want of proper attestation is a substantial defectand would invalidate the petition. DHAEAM V I E V. BHALA RAM AND


For the purposes of the E. P. Act and the Eules thereunder athumb-mark put by a person by way of signature should be attested inthe manner prescribed by rule 2(2), and signature" includes subscriptionto a nomination paper. Consequently, if the proposer is an illiterateperson and he subscribes to the nomination paper by putting a thumb-mark and the thumb-mark is not duly attested as laid down in rule 2(2),the nomination paper would be invalid and can be rejected by theEeturn-ing Officer. The Eeturning Officer is not bound in such a case to verifythe identity of the proposer by making an enquiry at the time of presenta-tion of the nomination paper or at the time of scrutiny. Moreover, asthe nomination paper is invalid on presentation it could not be validatedby attestation at a subsequent stage. RATAN SINGH AND ANOTHEB V.

PADAM CHAND JAIN AND OTHEES, 7 E.L.R. 189.

2 l 6 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

—The term "subscribed" in rule 2(2) of the R. P. (Conduct ofElections and Election Petitions) Eules, 1951, includes signatureand the signature of the proposer and seconder is a necessary require-ment of a valid nomination paper, and in the case of an illiterateperson his thumb-mark requires attestation within the definition ofrule 2(2). Mere presence of the Returning Officer at the time when tincandidate's nomination papers were written and thumb-marked by th-jproposer or seconder is not enough. His conscious presence at the timeis necessary for complying with the requirement of rule 2(2) of the R, P.Rules for the purpose of the attestation of those thumb-marks by thoReturning Officer. Moreover, section 33 of the S. P. Act, 1951, contem-plates that nomination papers complete in all respects should be presentedto the Returning Officer on the date notified and nomination papers whichdid not comply with the rules relating to the filling in of the nominationpapers and attestation of the thumb-marks of illiterate proposers andseconders cannot be said to be complete. The defect of the non-attestationof the thumb-marks could not be remedied by the Returning Officersubsequently on the date of scrutiny by calling upon the proposer andseconder to admit their thumb-marks before him. MULAI AND ANOTHEI;

v. LAL DAN BAHADUR SINGH AND OTHEBS, 9 E.L.R. 8.

The definition of "sign" in section 2(l)(k) of the R. P. Act,1951, shows that the Legislature has attached special importance to tbofact that in the case of illiterate persons unable to write their names itis necessary to guard against misrepresentation and fraud by requiringthat their signatures should be formally authenticated in tha mannerprescribed in the Rules, and the court is bound to give full effect to thispolicy. The word ''subscribing" in section 33(l) of the Act imports"signature", and under rule 2(2) a person who is unable to write andputs a mark instead can be deemed to have signed an instrument only ifit is attested by an officer in the manner prescribed in that rule. Wherea nomination is proposed or seconded by a person who is illiterate andis unable to write his name, the mark which he puts instead of hissignature must be duly attested by an officer in the manner prescribedby rule 2(2). "Want of due attestation in such a case is not a technicaldefect of an unsubstantial nature within section 36(4). The substanceof the matter of attestation is the satisfaction of the Returning Officerat a particular moment of time, i.e., at the time of putting the markabout the identity of the person making the mark in place of writing asignature and this satisfaction cannot be dispensed with altogether eventhough, if the Returning Officer was satisfied at the proper tim.6 aboutthe identity, but by some slip on his part he omitted formally to recordhis satisfaction, the omission could probably, in a case like that, be

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SIGNATURE 217

regarded as an unsubstantial technicality. The defect of want of attesta-tion cannot be remedied by adding it at the time of scrutiny. RATTAN

ANMOL SINGH AND ANOTHER V. ATMA RAM AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.E. 4!.(S. C.)

Discrepancy as to signature of proposer—If it is reasonably clearon a scrutiny of the nomination paper that the proposer did not subscribehis signature thereto, the Eeturning Officer will be justified in rejectingthe nomination paper under section 36(2)(d) of the E. P. Act, 1950. Wherethe name of the proposer was written as "JutthadaVenkata Ramanayya"and the signature clearly read as Jutthada Venkataramaiah" and thenomination paper was rejected by the Eeturning Officer, and on thefacts the Tribunal found that the signature was not genuine: Held,there was a discrepancy on the face of the nomination paper and it wasrightly rejected. P. NARASINGA EAO V. SURYANABAYANA AND OTHERS,

2 B.L.R. 83.

12. Symbols—Omission to specify symbols—Eule5(2)of theRapre-sentation of the People (Conduct of Elections etc.) Eules with regard tothe symbols is not a mere rule of procedure and omission to specifythree symbols as required by that rule is not a mere irregularity or tech-nical defect not of a substantial nature within section 36(4) of the R. P.Act, and if a Eeturning Officer has rejected a nomination paper on thisground the Election Tribunal cannot interfere with his order. PEEMNATH v. RAM KISHAN AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 271.

Candidate changing party after nomination—-Allotment ofsymbol not mentioned in nomination paper—A candidate who intendedto stand for the Socialist party at the time of his nominationand had chosen as his symbols a tree, a ladder and a pair of scales inhis nomination paper, finding that the nomination of the Congress candi-date had been rejected, joined the Congress party and at his requestthe Eeturning Officer assigned to him the symbol of the Congress, viz.,two bullocks with a yoke. It was contended in an election petition that theReturning Officer acted illegally in assigning to him a symbol which hadnot been mentioned in his nomination paper. Held, that, under rule 10of the Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions Rules the ultimatediscretion in the matter of assignment of symbols rested with the Eeturn-ing Officer. Neither the candidate nor the Eeturning Officer was boundby the first choice of symbols made by the candidate in his nominationpaper and the Eeturning Officer did not act illegally in assigning theCongress symbol to the candidate. SUBYAJI EAMA RAO V. BHIKATEIMBAK PAWAR 2 E.L.R. 205.

Wrong choice—Whether vitiates nomination—As the finalallotment of symbols is left to the discretion of the Returning Officer,

2l8 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

the mere fact that a declaration regarding choice of symbols was notcorrectly made in a nomination paper is not a material irregularity andis not a sufficient ground for rejection of the nomination paper. BHAN-WAELAL SOGANI V. DAMODAE LAL VTAS AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R. 407.

The petitioner filed a nomination specifying the followingsymbols as chosen b3r him in the order of preference: (l) Weighing Scale(2) Bicycle (3) Elephant. Under notifications issued by the electionauthorities all the three symbols chosen by the petitioner, namely,"Scales",'"Cycle", and "Elephant", were allotted or reserved symbolsand were not free symbols available to the petitioner on the relevant date.Consequently the petitioner wras required to choose three symbols out ofthe list of "free symbols", which he failed to do: Held, (l) that the wrongchoice of symbols in contravention of the Rules was not a mere technicaldefect but a material irregularity which rendered the nomination paperinvalid and liable to be rejected ; Amir Ali Khan v. Shamsul Huq (Senand Poddar 1043) relied on. Gouri Shankar Prasad v. Thahur Hanu-man Singh (1 Jagat Narain 9) referred to. (2) The defects in naming thesymbols (such as "Bicycle" for "cycle", "Weighing Scale" for "scale")were only of a technical nature and cannot invalidate the nominationpaper. The power of imposing restrictions on the choice of symbols isnot a legislative power, but an executive power, and a delegation of suchpowrer by the Election Commission to the Electoral Officer is valid. Thelaw does not enjoin that the restrictions imposed on the choice of symbolsshould be published in the official gazette and their non-publication in theofficial gazette does not therefore render the imposition of the restrictionsnull and void. BISHNL' KUMAE SINGH V. RAM BILAS SINHA AND

OTHEES, 3 E.L.R. 60.

The Election Commission can delegate to a Chief ElectoralOfficer its power to impose restrictions on the choice of symbols. Thelaw does not enjoin that the restrictions imposed on the use of symbolsshould be .published in the Gazette. The provisions relating to thedeclaration of preference of symbols are mandatory and a nominationpaper in which these provisions are not observed can be rejected. A can-didate filed some nomination papers as an Independent candidate andmentioned "camel, cart and pitcher" as his symbols in the order of pre-ference. Subsequently, he filed other nomination papers as the officialcandidate of the Kisan Janta party in which also he put the symbols inthe same order of preference. As cart' was the symbol officially allottedto the Kisan Janta party by the Chief Electoral Officer, the candidatestated that that party had been dissolved and "cart" should be allottedto him as his first preference, even though he had not put it as the first in

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—SYMBOLS

his declaration: Held, that the rules relating to the declaration of prefer-ence of symbols were mandatory, and as the candidate had not compliedwith the provisions of rule 5(2) of the E. P. Eules, 1951, and section 33(3)of the Act, there was a substantial defect and the nomination of thecandidate could be prop9rly rejected. MOTIRAM v. BAMCHANDAU

CHOWDHARY AND OTHERS, 7 B.L.E. 135.

The choice of symbols to be stated by a candidate in his nomin-tion paper is more or less a matter of directory procedure, and as thesymbols have to be allotted finally by the Eeturning Officer irrespectiveof the choice of the candidates, a nomination paper cannot berejected on the mere ground that the candidate had chosen a symbolwhicn he had no right to choose without the permission of the EeturningOfficer. EATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 234.

The mere fact that previous permission of the Eeturning Officerwas not obtained by a candidate for choosing a symbol specified in items1 to 14 of the list of symbols published by the Election Commission,would not invalidate his nomination if the Eeturning Officer allots thatsymbol to him without any objection. BALCHAND V. LAXMINARAIN

MATEH, 1 E.L.E. 465.

Symbols—Unrecognised party. See 10 E.L.E. 246, pp. 99-100supra.

13. Withdrawal—Withdrawal of nomination—The mere omission ina withdrawal notice of the name of the person who presented it is not aground for holding that the withdrawal is ineffective. In such a case, ifthe Eeturning Officer has accepted it, it must be presumed to have beenpresented by a duly authorised person. HARI DAS V. HIEA SINGH PAL

AND OTHEES, 4 E.L.E. 466.

Delivery of notice of withdrawal by proposer—Authority of can-didate, whether necessary —The words "who has been authorised in thisbehalf in writing" in section 37, govern not only the words "electionagent" but also "proposer" and seconder" and so, even when the pro-poser himself presents the withdrawal notice to the Eeturning Officerhe must have authority in writing from the candidate to do so. Wherethe withdrawal notice is presented to the Eeturning Officer by a personwho is not authorised by the candidate to do so and his name is conse-quently excluded from the list of validly nominated candidates publishedunder section 38, the result of the election must be presumed to havebeen materially affected and the election must be set aside. K ALT ANCHANDRA MOHILB V. BISHAMBHAB NATH PANDEY AND OTHEES, 3

E.L.E. 125,


NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—II.Improper rejection or acceptance.

1. Improper rejection of nomination—Effect ©/—Where there hasbeen an improper rejection of the nomination of a candidate, the electioncan be set aside without any affirmative proof that the rejection of the thenomination has materially affected the result of the election. PEABHTJDASEAMJIBHAI MEHTA v. LALLUBHAI KIRORDAS MANIAR, 1 E.L.E. 154.

Improper rejection of a nomination paper is a material irre-gularity affecting the result of the election and is sufficient to avoid itinasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived of its right to vote for acandidate who was qualified to receive their vote. Held also, that ifthe ground for setting aside the election was the improper rejection of anomination paper, the case was covered by section 100(l)(c) of the Actand the election can be declared void only as a whole, and the prayerfor declaring the election of the returned candidate alone void could notbe granted. NAGJIBHAI GOVINDHBAI ARYA V. MITHABHAI EAMJI

CHAWAN AND OTHEES, 1 B.L.E. 162.

-Where a nomination paper has been rejected improperly thereis a presumption that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected inasmuch as the entire electorate is deprived of the right tovote for a candidate who is entitled to stand. TlKARAM SHARMA V.LALIT BAHADUR KHARGA AND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 252.

The improper rejection of a nomination paper does not standon the same footing as an improper acceptance thereof. In the formercase there is an initial presumption that the result of the election hasbeen materially affected. It is doubtful whether oral evidence to theeffect that in the opinion of the witness, even if the nomination ofcertain persons had been accepted the result of election would nothave been affected is admissible under the Evidence Act; in any eventit is not of any value. EAMACHANDRAN NAIR V. EAMACHANDRA DASAND OTHERS, 1 E.L.E. 442.

The improper rejection of a nomination paper must necessarilylead to the conclusion that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected. There is no difference between the English and the Indian lawin this respect. Section 100 (l) (c) of the E. P. Act, 1951, does notmean that before declaring an election void on the ground of improperrejsction of a nomination paper, the Tribunal must also find as a questionof fact that the result of the election has been materially affected by theimproper rejection. Evidence consisting of opinions and conjecturesregarding the merits of the candidates is entirely valueless for determin-ing whether the result, of an election has been materially affected bythe improper rejection of a nomination, Bohtak case (l Hammond 183),

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER REJECTION 221

Davies v. Kensington (1874, L. E. 6 C. P. 720), Mayo case (1874, 2 O'M.and H. 191), Hackney case (1874, 2 O'M. and H. 77) referred to. HANSE A J v. BAM SINGH AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 12.

It is settled law that if the nomination paper of a candidateis improperly rejected the result of the election must be presumed tohave been materially affected thereby inasmuch as the entire electorateis deprived of its right to vote for a candidate who was qualified tostand. This presumption would require the most conclusive evidencefor rebuttal. NEISINHA KUMAR SINHA V. SATYENDBA GHANDEA GHOSH

MOULIK AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 121.

It is well settled that when the nomination of a candidate isimproperly rejected by the Eeturning Officer there is a strong presumptionthat the result of the election has been materially affected. TBAMBAK-LAL MANISHANKEB v. PEABHULAL BHIMJI AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 245.

If a nomination paper has been improperly rejected the resultof the election must be presumed to have been materially affected and itis impossible to lead such convincing evidence as can rebut this presump-tion. BELT NABESH SINGH V. HUKUM SINGH AND OTHEES, 2 E.L.E. 266.

If the nomination paper of a candidate is improperly rejectedthere is in the very nature of things the strongest possible presumptionthat the result of the election is materially affected as no one canpossibly forsee what could have been the result if the candidate hadbeen allowed to fight the election, and the strongest and most conclusiveevidence is required for its rebuttal. VlJAYA MOHAN EEDDY V. PAGAPULLA EEDDY AND OTHEES, 2 B.L.E. 414.

——Whenever a nomination paper has been improperly rejectedthere is a presumption that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected and the burden is heavily upon the successful candidate to rebutit. ASEAE AHMAD V. NIHAL UDDIN AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 81.

There is a strong presumption that in the case of improperrejection of a nomination paper the result of the election is materiallyaffected, but no such presumption arises in the case of improper accept-ance, as in the first case the whole electorate is deprived of its right toexercise franchise in favour of the rejected candidate and in the second,there is no denial of such right to the electorate; but this presumption is arebuttable one and it is a question of fact in each case, depending upon theevidence led by the parties, whether this presumption has been rebuttedor not. On the facts the Tribunal held that the presumption was rebuttedand the result of election had not been materially affected. CHANDEENATH v. KUNWAE JASWANT SINGH AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 147 andBANKATLAL v. MADAN MOHAN AND OTHEES, 3 B.L.E. 375 supra p. 211,

ELD—30


Where the nomination of a candidate is improperly rejectedthere is a presumption that by shutting him out the results of the electionare materially affected, and the party which alleges that they are not soaffected will have to establish by evidence that the contest by the candi-date which was thus prevented would not have mattered. BAKAEAM

SUKAEAM KONKANI V. SHANKAE RAO CHINDTTJI BEDSE AND OTHEES,3 E.L.E. 409. . ,

——Oral evidence to prove that even if the nomination of a parti-cular candidate had not been rejected and he had been allowed to standfor the election, the result of the election would not have been affected,is mere speculation and valueless. Hackney case (2 O'M. & H. 77) andHans Baj v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) followed. SHAKTI |,PAESHAD SHUKLA v. BALWANT SINGH AND OTHEBS, 4 E.L.R. 301. ]

• -Where a nomination of a candidate has been improperly rejectedthe result of the election must be presumed to have been affected. I t isnot necessary for the rejected candidate to show that he had a goodchance of success. Pyare Lai v. Amba Prasad (Hammond 27), Hans Bajv. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) and Suraj Bhan v. Hem Ghandand Others (2 E.L.R. l) referred to. HAEI DAS V. HlEA SlNGH PAL ANDOTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 466.

The improper rejection of a nomination paper raises a strongpresumption that the result of the election has been affected. It isdifficult to rebut this presumption. Consideration of the • chances ofsuccess or failure of the rejected cannot be a criterion in the matter andall attempts to probe into the the minds of the electorate through oralevidence must be avoided, as it would be mere speculation to do so.Hans Baj v. Bam Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 12) and Bankat Lai v.Madan Mohan and Others (3 E.L.R. 375) approved. Chander Nath v.Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 147) explained. MATHEADAS AND OTHEBS V. DABA SINGH AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.R. 441. j

Where a nomination has been improperly rejected there is a jstrong presumption that the result of the election must be materiallyaffected, but this presumption is a rebuttable one. The view that thewords the result of the election has been materially affected" in section100(l)(o) relate only to "acceptance" of a nomination and not to"rejection" and in the case of an improper rejection the election must in allcases be set aside, is not correct. The difficulty of proving that the electionhas not been materially affected, in the case of an improper rejection, isno reason to ignore the clear words used in section 100(l)(c) and their plainmeaning. Where the contesting respondent, a member of the Bharatpurruling family who stood as an Independent candidate, secured 24, 752 votes

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER REJECTION 223

out of a total of 32,690 votes polled, (the total being 44,000) and respondentNo. 3, who stood with the petitioner for the Kisan party and for whomthe petitioner was only a covering candidate, got only 2,093 votes, andthere was evidence to show that the petitioner had agreed to withdraw ifboth the petitioner and respondent No. 3 were nominated for the Kisanparty: Held, that this was a case in which the Tribunal could hold thatthe result of the election was not materially affected by the rejection ofthe petitioner's nomination. Obiter : If the intention of the Legislaturewas that the improper rejection of a nomination paper by itself renderedthe election void, section 100(l)(c) should have been split into two partsas follows, viz., "(i) that nomination has been improperly rejected,(ii) that the result of the election is likely to have been materially affectedby an improper acceptance of any nomination. Even if that is not theintention, it would be very advisable that this .clause is so split becausethere can be no doubt that it is very difficult to prove that the improperrejection of a nomination paper had not materially affected the result ofthe election, as the electorate had no chance in such a case to vote for therejected candidate. PANDIT HABISH CHANDRA v. RAJA MAN SINGHAND OTHERS, 5 E.L.B. 129.

The question whether the result of an election has been materiallyaffected by the improper rejection of a nomination within the meaning ofsection 100(l)(c) is a question of fact which the Election Tribunal hasexclusive jurisdiction to decide and the High Court will not interfere withthe finding of a Tribunal on this question. SlTJANIRAM v. LAL SHTAM

SHAH AND OTHERS, 5 E.L.E. 183.

Though a strong presumption that the result of the election hasbeen materially affected arises when a nomination is improperly rejected,the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. Observations to the contraryin Brijnaresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh and Others (2 E.L.R. 266),dissented from. [On the evidence the Tribunal found that the presump-tion was rebutted.] Ghander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others(3 E.L.E. 147) approved. TJGAM SING-H v. HARI SINGH AND OTHERS,

6 E.L.R. 470.

The view that the decision of a Returning Officer accepting orrejecting a nomination can be deemed to be improper" within the mean-ing of section 100(l)(c) only if it is perverse or violates the principles ofnatural justice, and that it cannot be deemed to be improper merelybecause on the materials placed before it, the Tribunal comes to an oppo-site conclusion, is not correct. If the Tribunal is of opinion that theacceptance or rejection was not right, the order of the Returning Officerwould be ' improper" for the purposes of section 100(l)(c). Bam Murti


v. Sumba Sadar (2 B.L.E. 330) and Prem Nath v. Ram Kishan andOthers (l E.L.R. 271) dissented from. Ramachandran Nair v. Rama-chanda Das and Others (1 E.L.E. 442) referred to. MoBESHWABPABASHKAM v. OHATUBBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI AND OTHBBS,

7 E.L.E. 428.

The presumption that the result of the election has beenmaterially affected which arises from the improper rejection of a nomina-tion is not irrebuttable, though it may require strong and conclusiveevidence to rebut it. Hans Raj v. Ram Singh and Others (2 E.L.E. 12),and Brij Naresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh and Others (2 E.L.E. 266)dissented from. BHANWABLAL SoGANl V. DAMODAB LAL VYAS ANDOTHEBS, 7 E.L.E. 407.

Where a nomination paper has been improperly rejected there isa very strong presumption that the result of the election has been materi-ally affected, but this presumption is a rebuttable one. The view that thepresumption is irrebuttable is not correct. EOOP CHANDBA SOGANI ANDANOTHEB v. RAW AT MAN SINGH AND OTHEBS (NO. 3), 9 E.L.E. 21.

-Under the Indian law there is no irrebuttable presumption thatthe result of the election has been materially affected when a nominationpaper has been wrongly rejected. Under section 100(l) of the E. P. Act,1951, the Tribunal has to form an opinion in each case on its own facts, asto whether the result of the election has been materially affectedMANEKLAL AMOLAKCHAND v. THETB GOPAL EAMJI AND OTHEBS,

9 E.L.E. 36.

When a person whose nomination paper has been wronglyrejected makes no protest by filing an election petition or otherwise, noinference can arise that'the election has been materially affected.Shankar Rao Raniaji v. State of Madhya Bharat (A.I.E. 1952 M. B. 97)explained. MANEKLAL AMOLAKCHAND V. THKTE GOPAL EAMJI AND


An election held in circumstances in which one or more quali-fied candidates are prevented from contesting the same by reason of theimproper rejection of a nomination paper is not an election as contemp-lated by law and consequently, must, in the words of section 100 of theE. P. Act, 1951, be declared "wholly void." In such cases it is as irrele-vant to raise the question of the chance of success of the rival candi-date before the Tribunal as it would have been before the ReturningOfficer. The law does not contemplate the substitution of the opinionof the Tribunal for the verdict of the electorate and there is also in suchcases no legally admissible data on which the Tribunal can base a

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER ACCEPTANCE 225

conclusion as to the probable chances of success of a particular candidateas against another. Hans Raj v. Ham Singh and Others (2 E.L.E. 12)followed. Brij Naresh Singh v. Thahur Hukam Singh (2 B.L.R. 266)and other cases referred to. JASWANT SlNGH V. JAGAN NATH ANDOTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 1.

2. Improper acceptance—The improper acceptance of a nominationpaper cannot be placed on the same footing as improper rejection because,in the case of improper rejection, the constituency is deprived of the rightto make a choice between the candidates whose nomination papers havebeen accepted and the candidate whose nomination paper has been impro-perly rejected. If the number of votes secured by a candidate whosenomination paper has been improperly accepted is lower than the differencebetween the numbers of votes secured by the successful candidate andthe candidate who has secured the next highest number of votes, it cannotpossibly be said that the result of the election hag been materiallyaffected. On the other hand, it is impossible to foresee the result if thenumber of votes secured by the candidate whose nomination paper hadbeen improperly accepted is higher than the difference. The Tribunalneed not consider whether the result of the election would have beenaltered but only whether the result has been materially affected. Whenwe are not in a position to say what would have been the result of theelection if the votes secured by a candidate who has been wrongly deemedto be a duly nominated candidate had been made available to the othercandidates including the petitioner, there is no escape from the conclusionthat the result has been materially affected. MANDAL SUMITEA DKVI

v. SUEAJ NARAIN SINGH AND OTHRES, 4 E.L.R. 136. [But see 9 E.L.E.494 and 10 E.L.E. 30, p. 227 infra].

The result of an election has to be deemed to be materiallyaffected if the nomination paper or papersiof a candidate are held to havebeen improperly rejected or accepted by the Returning Officer. Thequestion whether or not the result has been materially affected wherea nomination paper has been improperly accepted must always be aquestion of fact to be determined on the facts of each particular case;no hard and fast rules for determining this can possibly be laid down.If the number of votes secured by the candidate whose nominationpaper has been improperly accepted is lower than the difference bet-ween the number of votes secured by the successful candidate andthe candidate who has secured the next highest number of votes, it iseasy to find that the result has not been materially affected. If, how-ever, the number of votes secured by such a candidate is higher thanthe difference just mentioned, it is impossible to foresee what theresult would have been if that candidate had not been in the field. I t


will neither be possible to say that the result would actually havebeen the same or different nor that it would have been in all probabilitythe same or different. LAKHAN LAL MlSHEA V. TRIBENI KUMAE ANDOTHERS, 3 E.L.E. 423. [See 9 E.L.R. 494 and 10 E.L.E. 30, infrap. 227.

• If the improper acceptance of the nomination was of a personwho was not returned as duly elected, the question whether the improperacceptance has materially affected the result of the election might bedifficult to decide. But, when the improper acceptance of a nominationpaper is that of the returned candidate himself the result of the electionmust be materially affected by the improper acceptance. DESAIBASAWABAJ v. DASANKOP HASANSAB AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 380.

The result of an election cannot be "materially affected" by animproper acceptance of a nomination, within the meaning of section100(l)(c) of the E. P. Act, 1951, unless the improper acceptance hasactually turned the scale in favour of the returned candidate.Consequently, an election of a candidate cannot be declared void on theground of improper acceptance of the nomination of another candidateunless it is proved that the returned candidate would not have succeededin the election if the nomination of the latter had been rejected. If theevidence on both sides is useless and the petitioner cannot discharge hisonus in a legal way, the election cannot be set aside ; merely because itis difficult or even impossible for the petitioner to discharge this onus,he cannot be deemed to have discharged it. Patna West N. M. B.(Hammond 533), Bengal Legislative Council Case: Singha v. B. A. Boy(2 Doabia 368) and Hoshiarpur West General Constituency Case 1946 (Senand Poddar945) followed. Bellary M. B. (1 Doabia 169) disapproved.Lakhan Lal Mishra v. Tribeni Kumar and Others (3 E.L.E. 423) dissentedfrom. The usual manner of distributing the votes in the case of animproper acceptance of a nomination is to act on the percentage of votesobtained by the other candidates. The theory of "votes thrown away"cannot be applied except where the disqualification of the candidate forwhom the votes were cast had wide publicity or notoriety or the voterhad knowledge of the disqualification. In any event this theory is notapplicable for determining whether the result of an election has beenmaterially affected. Beresford Hope v. Lady Sandhurst [1889] 23 Q.B.D.79 distinguished. "UDAINATH SINGH V. JAGAT BAHADUR SINGH AND

OTHERS (NO. 2), 5 E.L.E. 199.

An election cannot be said to said to have been materiallyaffected by an irregularity unless the irregularity has actually turned thescale in favour of the returned candidate. LAXMIDATTA AND ANOTHERv. MADANLAL DHUPAR AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 398.

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES—IMPROPER ACCEPTANCE 227

The fact that the result of an election has been materiallyaffected by the improper acceptance of a nomination paper is a questionof fact to be proved by the petitioner by affirmative evidence and to bedecided in each case on the material on record and not on the basis ofmere probabilities. It cannot be presumed that the votes given to thedisqualified candidate would have come to the patitioner and the verdictof the electorate cannot be set aside on the basis of such probabilities.JAOTDISH SINGH V. RUDRA DEOLAL AND OTHERS, 8 E.L.R. 311.

If the want of qualification of a candidate does not appear onthe face of the nomination paper or the electoral roll, and no objectionis raised to his nomination, the Eeturning Officer has no other alternativebut to accept the nomination and the acceptance of the nomination can-not in such a case be held to have been "improper" within the meaningof section 100(l)(c), even though the Election Tribunal finds subsequen-tly after enquiry that the candidate whose nomination was accepted wasnot really qualified under the Constitution to be chosen as a member ofthe Legislature. The election cannot be declared wholly void in suchease on account of the improper acceptance of a nomination under sec-tion 100(l)(c), but the case is one of ' non-compliance with the provisionsof the Constitution" referred to in section 100(2) (c) and the election ofthe returned candidate alone can be declared void. Where in a doublemember constituency, the nomination of the candidate for the reservedseat was accepted by the Returning Officer as on the face of the nomi-nation paper and electoral rolls he was not disqualified and no objectionwas raised by any one, but in an election petition it was found that hewas below 25 years of age at all material times and the whole electionincluding that of the candidate for the general seat was declared voidunder section 100(l)(c) by the Election Tribunal: Held, that the casewas not one of an "improper acceptance" of a nomination within sec-tion 100(l)(c) but one of non-compliance with the provisions of theConstitution within section 100(2)(c), and the election of the candidatefor the general seat cannot be declared void. Stowe v. Joliffe(9 O.P. 734)referred to. DURGA SHANKAR MBHTA V. THAKUR RAGHURAJ SINGH

AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 494 (S.C.).

In the case of the improper acceptance of a nomination : (a)if the nomination accepted was that of the returned candidate, the resultmust be materially affected ; (b) if the difference between the numberof votes is more than the wasted votes the result cannot be affected atall; (c) if the number of wasted votes is greater than the margin ofvotes between the returned candidate and the candidate securingthe next highest number of votes it cannot be presumed that the


wasted votes might have gone to the latter and that the result of theelection has been materially affected. This is a matter which has to beproved and. though it must be recognized that the petitioner in such aease is confronted with a difficult situation, he cannot be relieved of theduty imposed upon him by section 100(l)(c) and if the petitioner failsto adduce satisfactory evidence to enable the court to find in his favouron this point, the inevitable result would be that the Tribunal would notinterfere in his favour and would allow the election stand. Lakhan LaiMishra v. Tribeni Kumar (3 E.L.E. 423) and Mandril Sumitra Devi v.Surajnarain Singh (4 E.L.E. 136) dissented from. It is impossible toaccept the ipse dixit of witnesses coming from one side or the other tosay that all or some of the votes would have gone to one or the otheron some supposed or imaginary ground. The question is one of fact andhas to be proved by positive evidence. If the petitioner is unable toadduce evidence the only inescapable conclusion to which the Tribunalcan come is that the burden is not discharged and that the election muststand. The language of section 100(l)(c) is too clear for any speculationabout possibilities.

Quaere : Whether a case in which a nomination is prirna facievalid and is accepted by the Eeturning Officer without objection or whenthe objection is not pressed or proved before him, falls within section100(l)(e) or section 100(2)(e). Order of Election Tribunal, Allahabad,in Deo Ghand v. Vashist Narain and Others (6 E.L.R. 138) reversed,VASHIST NAEAIN SHABMA v. DBV CHAND AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 30.(S.C)

The result of the election cannot be held to be materiallyaffected by an improper acceptance of the nomination unless it is provedthat if this nomination had not been accepted the result of the electionwould have been substantially different from what it was, i.e., that thereturned candidate would not have been returned, and a different candi-date would have succeeded at the election. The result should not bejudged by the mere increase or decrease in the total number of votessecured by the returned candidate but by the fact that the wasted voteswould have been distributed in such a manner between the contestingcandidates as would have brought about the defeat of the returned can-didate. DEVASHABAN SINHA v. SHBO MAHADEV PEASAD AND OTHERS,10 E.L.R. 461.

Where the petitioner got 15,511 votes, respondent No. 1, (the re-turned candidate) got 15,995 votes (that is 484 votes more than thepetitioner) and the respondent No. 2, whose nomination was stated tohave been improperly accepted, got only 510 votes; Held, that the

NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES 229

result of the election could not be held to have been matarially affectedby the improper acceptance and the election of respondent No. 1 couldnot be set aside unless the petitioner could prove that out of the wasted510 votes, he (the petitioner) would have got at least 484 plus 14, i.e.,498 votes. DEVASHAEAN SINHA V. SHBO MAHADEV PRASAD AND

OTHEES, 10B.L.E. 461.

NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULES.

Non-compliance with rules— When vitiates election—Necessityof proof that the result of election was materially affected—Burden ofproof—English and Indian Lav)—When result of election is materiallyaffected. See the cases cited at pp. 126 to 130 under the heading BURDENOF PROOF.

——Improper acceptance and non-compliance with Wules—DifferenceSee DUEGA SHANKAR MEHTA V. THAKTJB RAGHURAJ SINGH AND

OTHERS, 9 B.L.R. 494 (S.C.)

PARTC STATES.

Disqualifications laid down in section 7 of the B. P. Act—Whether apply to Part G States—Per S. N. VAISH and L. N. MlSHA(P. LOBO dissenting).—The disqualifications laid down in section 7(d) ofthe R. P. Act, 1951, apply to candidates standing for election to Assembliesof PartC States also. BALCHAND V. LAXMINAEAIN M A T E H 8 B.L.R. 465.GANGA PEASAD SHASTRI v. PANNA LAL AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 448.

Under section 17 of the Part G States Act, 1951, read witharticle 102 (e) of the Constitution what would be a disqualification for acandidate for being chosen to either House of Parliament under article102, would be a disqualification to be chosen for the Legislature of aPart 0 State. The omission in section 8 of the Part G States Act)1951, of Part I I of the R.P. Act, 1951, in which section 7 of the latterAct occurs, does not lead to the conclusion that the disqualificationsreferred to in section 7 do not apply to Part G States. A contract withthe Chief Commissioner of aJPartC Stats would, under section 9 of thePart C States Act, read witn section 3 (8) of the General Clauses Act,be a contract with the Central Government and would operate as adisqualification for election to either House of Parliament under sec-tion 7(d) and 9 of the R. P. Act, 1951, and it would be a disqualifica-tion under section 17 of the Part 0 States Act, 1951, for election to theLegislative Assembly of the State. SATYA DBV BIJSHAHRI V. PADAMDEV AND OTHEES, 10 E.L.R. 103 (S;C). See also MAHENDBA KTJMAR

p. VlDYAWATI AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 216 (S. C.)ELD—31

230 ELECTION LAW REPORTS PIGEST

POLICE.

Interference by 'police—When proper—Section 127 of the E. P.Act only creates a new offence and it is not a substitute for other stepswhich can be taken under the ordinary law for maintaining peace andorder, e.g., under section 144, Criminal Procedure Code or arrests. PerSHOMB—The power of the police in connection with election meetings isextremely limited and circumscribed. The option of taking any actionagainst a person for disturbance at an election meeting is laid by theLegislature on the Chairman, and the police can act only if the Chair-man requests them to do so. ElKHAB DAS v. ElDlCHAND PALLIWALAND OTHERS, 9 B.L.E. 115.

Promulgation of an order under section -144, Criminal ProcedureCode, and arrests of the workers of a candidate do not by themselvesconstitute any ground for setting aside an election as these are notdirectly covered by any of the grounds mentioned in section 100 of theAct; nor do they, by themselves, constitute any corrupt or illegal prac-tice under sections 123, 124 or 125 of the Act. If prohibitory ordersand arrests of workers are made male fide by the police authorities itmay constitute undue influence. RlKHAB DAS V. RlDICHAND PALLIWALAND OTHBES, 9 E.L.R. 115.

POLLING.

[See also BALLOT BOXES and BALLOT PAPERS].

Polling—Extension of time without fresh notification—Legality —Where the scheduled time for commencing and closing of polling wasunder orders notified by the Government, 8 a.m., and 6 a.m. respectively,and, as the polling in some of the booths was started late, the time forclosing the poll was extended up to 7-30 p.m., under fresh orders issuedby the Government on the polling day without any fresh notification inthe Gazette, and the polling was continued till 7-30 p.m. : Held, thatthe procedure was contrary to law as the Government had no powerunder the Act or the Rules to extend the time beyond that originallyfixed, and such extension was, further, contrary to rule 16 which requiredthat the hours fixed shall be published bv, notification in the OfficialGazette; but the election cannot be set aside on this ground alone in theabsence of any proof that this illegality had materially affected the resultof the election. P. K. ATRE V. T. R. NAEAVNE AND OTHERS, 1-B.L.R.355.

There is no provision in the R. P. Act, 1951, or the Rules,which authorizes the Government to extend the time of polling beyondthat originally fixed. Section 57 which provides for adjournmentof the poll in certain emergencies to another date could not be availed ofto extend the hours of polling on the day originally fixed. An election

POLLING 231

cannot be declared void merely because the polling was started andclosed later than the notified time without a further notification, unlessthis irregularity is proved to have materially affected the result of theelection. MoiNTJBDiN B. HARRIS v. B. P. DlVGi, 3 B.L.E. 248.

Commencing polling late—Commencing polling at 8-25 a.m.,instead of at 8 a.m., as notified, is a contravention of section 56 of theAct and if the margin of votes by which the successful candidate waselected as against the petitioner is vory small, this contravention of therules may be a sufficient ground for setting aside his election under section100(2)(c). Dibrugarh N. M. B. 1927 (Hammond 337) relied on.T. C. BASAPPA v. NAGAPPA AND OTHERS, 3 B.L.R. 197.

Polling started late and not continued for full statutory period—Where it was found that in several polling booths polling started late andclosed at 5 p.m., instead of continuing for the full statutory period of8 hours provided by section 56 of the E. P. Act, 1951, that a largenumber of votes were not polled, and further, that there was refusal torecord votes of certain registered electors, and that there was a differenceof only 92 votes between the two principal contestants : Held, (i) that,in the circumstances, the refusal to record votes of certain registeredelectors coupled with the non-compliance of the law by starting late andnot continuing for the statutory period must be deemed to have mate-rially affected the result of the election, and the election should bedeclared to be void ; (ii) that when an election is declared void on theground that there has been no proper election at all, the petitionercannot- be declared duly elected. SUDHANSU SEKHAB GHOSH V.

SATYENDRA NATH BASU AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 73.

The electors have the statutory right to cast their votes andopportunity must be given according to law to exercise their right offranchise. Denial of such opportunity is a grave irregularity amountingto infraction of the rules relating to the election. SUDHANSU SEKHAE

GHOSH V. SATYENDRA NATH BASU AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 73.

Change of time—The mere opening or closing of a poll sometime later than the time fixed is not a ground for setting aside an electionunless it is proved that the result of the election has been materiallyaffected thereby : Akyab West (Hammond 51), Limerick (1833, P. and K.373), Drogheda (1874, 2 O'M. and H. 201) relied on. EADHAKBISHNAN

v. MASILAMANI CHETTIAR AND OTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 148.

• Postponing counting of votes—Fixing date for counting beforepoll is complete—Legality—Under section 58(2) of the E. P. Act, 1951,the Eeturning Officer can postpone the counting of votes without explain-ing the reasons therefor to the candidate. Notice of re-poll may be


published in such manner as the Ejection Commission directs and it neednot necessarily be published in the Gazette. Rule 44(1) does not meanthat the dates for counting of votes can be appointed only after the pollis complete. SHANKAB TEIPATHI V. RETUBNING OFFICES, MIBZAPUE


Omission to give 8 hours per day—The provision in section 56of the R. P. Act, 1951, that the total period allotted on any one day forpolling at an election in a constituency shall not be less than 8 hours isnot a merely directory provision and omission to give 8 hours is a non-compliance of the rules for which the election of the returned candidatecould be declared void under section 100(2)(c) if it has materially affectedthe result of the election. KANDASAMI KANDAB V, SUBBAMANIAGOUNDAE ANDOTHEES, 5 E.L.R. 156.

Duty to record all votes before closing —A Presiding Officer of apolling station is bound to record the votes of all voters who have enteredthe compound of the booth before the hour of closing. He would beacting illegally in asking them to stand in a queue and preventing thosewho stand in the quetfe outside the gate from entering the compound.BALCHAND v. LAXMINABAIN MATEH, 8 E.L.R. 465.

Providing for special booths for women and larger number ofbooths in urban areas alone—Whether discriminatory—Providing forspecial booths for women voters in urban areas but not in rural areasdoes not amount to illegal discrimination between voters and does notcontravene article 15 of the Constitution. Nor is there any illegaldiscrimination in providing for a larger number of booths in urbaiis areasthan in rural areas as proportionately a larger number of electors cometo the polling stations in urban areas to cast votes than in rural areas.In any event, an election cannot be held invalid on these grounds unlessit is proved that the result of the election has been materially affectedthereby. SEI RAM V. MOHAMMAD TAQI HADI AND OTHKRS, 8

E.L.R. 139.

Preventing candidate from entering booth —Preventing the entryof a candidate to the polling booth is non-compliance with the rules, butan election cannot be set aside on this ground unless it is further provedthat the result of the election was materially affected thereby. RlKHABDAS v. RIDHICHAND PALLIWAL AND OTHEBS, 9 E.L.R. 115.

POLLING AGENT.[See also COEBL'PT PRACTICE].

If a polling agent produces a copy of the letter of appointmentto the Presiding Officer and makes a declaration in the manner prescrib-ed in Eorm 6, he has a right to be admitted to the polling booths before

POLLING AGENT 233

the commencement of the election. The Presiding Officer cannot refuseadmission merely because he had not received any authority or com-munication from the Beturning Officer in this behalf. If it is establishedby the evidence that the petitioners' agents were not allowed access tothe polling booths before the start of the election, then, the consequ-ences, whatever they are, under the law must follow, even though thisgrievance was common to other candidates as well. Under the provi-sions of section 51 of the Act, however, absence of the polling agentswould not invalidate acts done in their absence if they are otherwiseduly done. MAEUTBAO BHAUBAO AND OTHEES v. GULABBAO DADA-

SAHEB AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.E. 303.

Letter of appointment must be produced—The letter appointingpolling agents in Eorm VI must be sent to the Eeturning Officer atleast 3 days before the commencement of the poll as laid down in rule 12.If they are not delivered to the Eeturning Officer within the prescribedtime, so as to give him 72 clear hours to forward them to the Presid-ing Officers, the Eeturning Officer would be justified in refusing toreceive them. SHIBBAN LAL SAKSBNA V. HABISHANKEB PBASAD AND

OTHEES, 9 B.L.E. 403.

• The mere appointment of a polling agent by a candidate is notenough to enable the polling agent to gain admission to polling stations.Notice of such appointment should also be given as prescribed by sec-tion 46 at least three days before the commencement of the poll to theEeturning Officer, and unless a duplicate copy of the letter of appoint-ment is presented to the Presiding Officer of the polling station and adeclaration is signed before him as prescribed in rule 12, the PresidingOfficer would be justified in refusing to admit him inside the pollingstation. DB. K. N. GAIBOLA V. GANGADHAB MAITHANI AND OTHERS

(No. 2), 8B.L.E. 105.

Appointment of government officer as polling agent—Whethercorrupt practice. See CORRUPT PRACTICE.

POLLING OFFICERS.

Appointment of— The Eeturning Officer must appoint pollingofficers at least 7 days before the date of poll and communicate thesame to the employees. 'If in any circumstance, he is compelled to makeany deviation from this ordinary procedure, a heavy and onerous duty iscast upon him to make a proper arrangement under which these officersmight have the full opportunity to. cast their votes yet with expedition,and notice that such an arrangement has been made should be given soas to enable them to take the opportunity of casting their votes in postal


ballots. JYOSTNA CHANDBA AND ANOTHER V. MBHEABALI AND

OTHKBS, 3 E.L.E. 488.

Voting by polling officers—Necessity to make early arrangements—Omission to afford facility to vote—The petitioner applied to set asidethe election of the respondent on the grounds, inter alia, that a number ofGovernment servants who were electors of the constituency were em-ployed on duty on polling stations other than those where they wereordinarily to cast their votes, and that this was done at a very latestage, and these electors therefore had no opportunity to cast theirvotes in postal ballot papers. A number of voters amounting to about49 were thus practically dis-enfranchised. I t was found that in 47 outof the 49 cases the voters had not had a proper opportunity to exercisetheir right to vote as their orders of employment on polling dates weremade too late, and only a narrow majority of 44 was found on analysisto stand in favour of the respondent. Held, that, in the circumstances,the result of the election was materially affected and the election wastherefore void. JTOSTNA CHANDBA AND ANOTHKH V. MBHBABALI AND


-As the decision of a Eeturning Officer accepting or rejecting anomination paper is only a summary one, the tribunal has power to allowthe parties to adduce fresh evidence and urge new gronnds and to cometo a decision on the legality of the order of rejection or acceptance uponall the materials placed before it. The view that the order of the Eeturn-ing Officer should not be »set aside unless it is perverse is incorrect.Observations in Prem Nath v. Bam Kishan and Others (1 E.L.E. 271)dissented from. GUENAM SiNGH AND ANOTHBK V. PAETAP SING-H

AND OTHBBS, 7 E.L.E. 338.

Then is nothing in law to debar a Eeturning Officer fromrejecting a nomination paper on account of a mistake of a substantialcharacter even though he had failed to notice the defect and draw theattention of the candidate or his agent to the defect at the time of thepresention of the nomination paper. EAMBSWAK PRASAD SiNGH VKEISHNA GOPAL DAS AND OTHBES, 4 E.L.E. 112.

RETURNING OFFICER.

See also BALLOT BOXES, BALLOT PAPBBS, ELECTORAL BOLL, andNOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.

Scrutiny of nominations—Enquiry by Beturning Officer—nature of—The Eeturning Officer's enquiry under s. 36 of the Act being ofa summary nature, the scope of which is limited to his own discretion,his acceptance or rejection of a nomination paper is open to review by the

POLLING OFFICERS 235

Tribunal which has full power to go behind the decision of the EeturningOfficer and decide the impropriety of rejection or acceptance and itsconsequence on the result of the election. VlJAYA MOHAN REDDY V.PAG A PULLA BEDDY AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.B, 414.

-Power to adjourn—Duty to make enquiry—The word "adjourn-ment" in section 36(5) of the E. P. Act, 1951, means adjournmentto another date, and the section does not prohibit the Eeturning Officerfrom giving some time to a candidate to produce a copy of the electoralroll on the date of scrutiny itself. A Eeturning Officer cannot reject anomination on the mere ground that the candidate has not porduced theelectoral roll in which his name is entered. He is bound to make asummary enquiry and though under section 36(7) the electoral roll is con-clusive evidence of the candidate's right to stand for election, this doesnot mean that other evidence is not admissible to prove the age of thecandidate etc. if a copy of the electoral roll is not available at the timeof the scrutiny. BAI.TNATHPB.ASAD VBBMA V. CHANDBESHWAR NARAIN

PBASAD SINGH AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 88.

——Duty of Returning Officer to make summary enquiry—-A nomin-tion should not be rejected merely because there are minor discrepanciesbetween the nomination paper and the electoral roll. In the copy of theelectoral roll produced by a candidate, the name, the serial number andhouse number of the proposer tallied with those given in the nominationpaper but the name of the constituency was left blank, and with regardto the seconder, all the descriptions tallied but the electoral number waswrongly printed as 729 in the roll while it was shown as 728 in thenomination paper. The Eeturning Officer, without looking into the elec-toral roll or making any enquiry, rejected the nomination paper on theground that the proposer and seconder were not identifiable: Held, thatthe Eeturning Officer acted improperly in rejecting the nominationpaper without making an enquiry as to the identity of the proposerand seconder. It was his duty to satisfy himself by looking into theelectoral roll of the constituency (which was before him) and by makingenquiries from the candidate and the proposer and seconder as to how themistake in the electoral roll number of the seconder occurred. ThakurMohendra Nath Sahi Deo v. Devaki Prasad Sinha (3 Jagat Narain 228)

' and Bamanugraha Narain Singh v. Sarda Prasad Singh (3 Jagat Narain232) referred to. SURAJ NARATN V. R A M NATH AND OTHERS,3 E.L.R. 305.

• Power to adduce more evidence before Tribunal—The scope ofthe inquiry by the Eeturning Officer at the time of scrutiny of nomina-tions is of a summary nature and consequently limited and the object of


the Act is to ensure that everything connected with the election proceedaccording to the time schedule, postponing all disputes to be raised bypetition after the elections are completed. The Tribunal's enquiry, there-fore, cannot be limited only to the material that was placed before theEeturniug Officer. The petitioner is entitled to explain the descriptionsin the nomination paper by adducing more evidence before the Tribunal.Shankar v. Returning Officer, Kolaba (l E.L.R. 13) referral to. BAKA-

BAM SUKAEAM KONKANI V. SHANKAR RAO CHINDUJI BBD3E ANDOTHERS, 3 B.L.R. 409.

The rejection of a nomination paper by the Returning Officer canbe supported before the Tribunal on grounds other than those on whichthe Returning Officer made the order. HARNAM SINGH V. JWALAPRASAD AND OTHEES, 8 E.L.R. 332.

Power to review —A Returning Officer has no power to review anorder rejecting a nomination paper which he has made on scrutiny of thenomination papers and to accept a rejected nomination paper on review.NATWAB LAL v. BHABTENDBA SINGH AND OTHEES, B.L.R. 408.

Power to allow rectification of defects—The Returning Officerlias no power to allow rectification of defects in the nomination, whetherthey are substantial or unsubstantial, at the time of scrutiny. If thedefects are substantial, the nomination has to be rejected. If not, theyara immaterial. RATTAN ANMOL SlNQH AND ANOTHER v. ATMA RAMAND OTHEES, 10 B.L.R. 41. (S.C.j

Duty to record acceptance or rejection, not reasons--Tibs direc-tion in section 36(8) of the R. P. Act that the endorsement of acceptanceor rejection of a nomination paper should be made on the nominationpapar itself applies only to the first requirement and has no connectionwhatsoever with the second requirement, i.e., recording a brief statementof the reasons for the rejection. BEJAYSINGH V. NARBADA CHARANLAL AND OTHERS, 2 B.L.R. 428.

——Whether "Court"—Sanction for prosecution, whether necessary—See 6 B.L.R. 338, pp. 153-164 supra.

•Whether necessary party to election petition—Costs—See 2 B.L.ii.315, p. 130 supra.

Whether High Court can issue writ against Returning Officer —See HIGH COURTS, pp. 187-192.

" Power to allot symbols —Bee pp. 217ff,

r

SCHEDULED CASTES 237

SCHEDULED CASTES.

[See also DOUBLE MEMBER CONSTITUENCIES].

-The description of a candidate as a 'Harijan, Hindu" in theelectoral roll is conclusive evidence to show that he belongs to theScheduled Caste, and evidence cannot be admitted in an election petitionto prove that he is a Sikh Harijan and does not therefore belong to aScheduled Caste. EATTAN SlNO-H V. DEVINDEB SlNGH AND OTHEBS,7 E.L.E. 234.

Adding the word reserved' in brackets after the name of theconstituency in the nomination paper of a candidate who stands for theseat reserved for the Scheduled Castes in the constituency is not a groundfor rejecting his nomination. HAEI DAS V. HlEA SINGH PAL ANDOTHEBS, 4 E.L.E. 466.

' Jatava" is a Scheduled Caste, being included in the casteChamar" mentioned in Part X of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)

(Part C States) Order, 1951. BALCHAND V. LAXMINAEAIN MATEH,8 E.L.E. 465.

A person who is born as a member of a Scheduled Caste does notcease to be a member of the Scheduled Caste by joining the MahanubhavaPanth without becoming a sanyasi. Held also: If the nomination of acandidate for the House of the People has been improperly rejectedand the result of the election has been materially affected thereby,the election must be declared void even though the candidate has sub-sequently been returned as a member of the Council of States or has diedafter the election. MOBESHWAE PAEASHEAM V. CHATUEBHUJ VITHAL-

DAS JASANI AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 428.

Conversion of a Mahar into a Mahanubhava imports only anintellectual acceptance of certain ideological tenets and does not alter theconvert's status as a member of a Scheduled Caste, at any rate, so faras the householder section of the Mahanubhava Panth is concerned.CHATUEBHUJ VITHALDAS JASANI V. MOEESHWAE PAEASHBAM AND

OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 301. (S.C.)

Attestation of declaration—An Additional District and SessionsJudge is a "magistrate" within the meaning of rule 6 and can attest theverification of a declaration made under s. 33(3) of the E. P. Act, 1951.Held also: A defect in the verification required under rule 6 is not atechnical defect not of a substantial nature within the meaning ofsection 36(4) of the Act. EAMLAL V. SUJANIEAM AND OTHERS,2 E.L.E. 27.

ELD—32


As the word "magistrate" is not defined in the E. P. Act, 1951, I.or the rules made thereunder, it has to be interpreted in the light of the 1idefinition contained in section 3(32) of the General Clauses Act, and notin the sense in which that word is used in the Criminal Procedure Code,and since this definition in the General Clauses Act is not exhaustive (thewords iised in the definition being shall include" and not means") theword magistrate" in section 33(3) of the R. P. Act must be given itsordinary dictionary meaning of a civil officer charged with the adminis-tration of laws." An Additional Sessions Judge is therefore a magistratewithin the meaning of section 33(3) of the R. P. Act, and can validly jattest a declaration made under that section. A Subordinate Judge whohas been invested with the powers of a Magistrate under section 12 of theCriminal Procedure Code does not cease to be a magistrate" when he isappointed as an Additional Sessions Judge. SUJANIRAM v. LAL SHYAM,

SHAH AND OTHERS, 5 B.L.R. 183.

SCHEDULED TRIBES.

If the Tribunal is satisfied that in the name of a particular Tribethat is adopted or mentioned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order,1950, there are included certain castes, groups or communities, it is notbeyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to hold that the particular castecommunity or group comes within the Tribe mentioned in that Order; itwould not amount to amendment of the Constitution Order or rewritingof it. BAKABAM SUKAEAM KONKANI V. SHANKAE RAO CHINDUJI

BEDSB AND 0THEE9, 3 B.L.R. 409.——Gonds and Raj Gonds of Rewa State did not become Kshatriyas

by the Royal Proclamation of the Ruler of the State, as the proclamationwas not a law or regulation but only an act of social reform, and evenif they did become Kshatriyas, they did not thereby lose their status asScheduled Tribes. Though change of religion of a member of a ScheduledCaste would deprive him of his status as a member of the ScheduledCaste, change of religion of a member of a Scheduled Tribe does not affecthis status as such. MULAI AND ANOTHER V. LAL DAN BAHADUR

SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 8.

SECRECY OF VOTING.

—Statements volunteered by voter—Whether admissible in evi-dence—Though section 94 of the R. P. Act, 1951, prohibits puttingquestions to a voter who appears as a witness as to for whem he hasvoted at an election, if a voter, waiving this privilege of secrecy,voluntarily states that he has voted for a certain person, his statementneed not be expunged from the record. BlSWANATH ROY v. TARAKDASBANEBJEE AND OTHEBS, 5 E.L.R. 223.

SUPREME COURT 239

Scope of exemption—Section 94 of the E. P. Act must bestrictly construed as it curtails the right of a -witness to statea fact. The prohibition in the section is only against a statement as tohow a witness or other person has voted at an election. The marginalnote cannot be used to widen the scope of the section. There is noobjection to a witness stating that he belongs to a particular politicalparty and that party obligations required him not to vote for a personnot chosen by his pa r ty Statements of witnesses that they have notvoted for a particular candidate are admissible in evidence. Such evi-dence is not excluded by section 94 of the E. P. Act, 1951. A personwho is ostensibly a member of a political party can be asked whetherhe belongs to that party. It is only when his political opinions areconfined to his own mind that the question is inadmissible. NorthDurham case (3 O'M. & H. 1) and Harwich case (3 O'M. & H. 61) follow-ed. MANBKLATi AMOLAKCHAND V. THETE GOPAL EAMJI ANDOTHEES,9 B.L.E. 36.

SIKHS.

As there is no concrete test for determining whether a personis or is not a Sikh, the qualification for being a Sikh prescribed in theSikh Gurdwaras Act, viz., that he should be prepared to give a declarationthat he is a Sikh and believes in the Guru Granth Sahib and the tenGurus, and that he has no other religion, may be adopted as the test.RATTAN SINGH V. DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 234.

SUPREME COURT.

Power to grant special leave to appeal from orders of ElectionTribunal—Article 136 of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court aplenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and hearing appealsby granting of special leave against any kind of judgment or order madeby a court or Tribunal in any cause or matter, and powers could beexercised in spite of the specific provisions for appeal contained in theConstitution or other laws. Neither article 329(b) nor section 105 of theE. P. Act, 1951, can therefore in any way cut down or affect the over-riding powers which the Supreme Court can exercise in the matter ofgranting special leave to appeal under article 136 against au order ofan Election Tribunal. DURGA SHANKAR MBHTA V. THAKUR BAGHU-

RAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.E. 494. (S.C.).

The provision contained in section 105 of the E. P. Act, 1951,that the orders of the Tribunal shall be final and conclusive cannotabrogate the powers of the Supreme Court under article 136 or of the High

24O ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Court under article 226 of the Constitution. RAJ KRUSHNA BOSE V.BINOD KANUNGO AND OTHERS, 9 B.L.B. 294.

Interference with findings of fact—The Court does not, whenhearing appeals under article 136 sit as a court of further appeal onfacts, and does not interfere with findings given on a consideration ofthe evidence, unless they are perverse or based on no evidence. This isparticularly so, when the findings under challenge are those of ElectionTribunals. DINABANDHU SAHIT V. JADUMONI MANGABAJ AND OTHERS,

9 E.L.R. 30.

-Respondent s right to support appeal on grounds found against him—In an appeal by special leave under article 138 from the decision of aTribunal it is not open to the respondent to support the decision of theTribunal on grounds which had been found against him by the Tribunal.VASHIST NARAIN SHARMA v. DBV CHAND AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 30.

VOTING.

—See also BALLOT BOXES, BALLOT PAPERS, POLLING.

Voting—Proportionate representation—The very object of ]voting by 'single transferable vote" is to ensure that, so far as practic- jable, no vote should go waste. This is the chief and characteristic meritof election on proportionate representation" basis, which is the namegiven to this method of voting. SOHAN LAL V. ABINASH CHANDER ANDOTHERS, 4 E.L.E. 55.

"Votes thrown away"—Votes cannot be rejected as "thrownaway votes" unless the disqualification of the candidate for whom thevotes were given was widely known to the electorate and the voteswere given perversely after such notice. Tayebuddin Ahmed v. Khur-ram Khan Panee and Others (Sen and Poddar 790) and Moola Singh v.Mangu Bam and Others (Sen and Poddar 945) referred to. EATTANSINGH V. DEVINDER SINGH AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.E. 234.

WAIVER.[See also ESTOPPEL].

Where a Tribunal declared the election of the applicant to be ,void and the applicant, without taking steps to set aside the order of the [Tribunal, filed his nomination paper at a fresh election and when he was iagain defeated he filed an application under article 226 against the fTribunal's decision : Held, that the applicant had waived his right of jchallenging the decision of the Tribunal by acquiescing in it. Devi Dayal Iv. State of Pepsu (A.I.E. 1953 Pepsu 9) referred to. GANGADHAR V. f

ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VINDHYA PRADESH, AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.R. 183. :

WORDS AND PHRASES 24I

WORDS AND PHRASES.

"Amendment". AUDESH PEATAP SINGH V. B R I J NAEAIN AND

OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 1.

"At all elections". BAM SINGH v. GHASI EAM AND OTHERS,

9 B.L.E. 183.

"At the election". BATTAN ANMOL SINGH V. ATMA EAM

AND OTHERS, 10 E.L.E. 41 (S.C.).See also oases cited at .pp. 112, 113 supra.

"Attestation". MULAI AND ANOTHER V. LAL DAN BAHADXJR

SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 8.

"Authorised for use". H A R I DATT V. MADAN MOHAN AND


"Canvassing". ABDUL RAUF V. GOVIND BALLABH PANT AND


"Certified copy". KANAUJI LAL SHUKLA V. BHAGWAN DIN


"Community". SHIV DUTT AND OTHERS V. BANSIDAS

DHANGAR AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 324.

"Conclusion of the trial". MUKTI NATH E A I V. UMA SHANKER

MISRA, 3 E.L.E. 109.

"Duly nominated".See oases cited under ELECTION PETITION—PARTIES, pp.142 ff. supra.

"Election". SUKAR GOPE v. STATE op BIHAR, 1 E.L.B. 68.N. P. PONNUSWAMI V. EETURNING OFFICER, NAMAK-KAL (H.C.), 1 E.L.E. 89.N. P. PONNUSWAMI V. EBTUBNING OFFICER, NAMAKKALAND OTHERS (S.C.), 1 E.L.E. 133.EAM SINGH v. GHASI RAM AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E. 183.TIRATH SINGH V. BACHITAR SINGH AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.E.163.See also cases cited under " H I G H COURTS" pp. 174 £f. supra.

"Employ". ELAYA PILLAI V. K. PARTHASARATHT AND


"Error apparent on the face of the record". S. KHADER

SHERIFF V. ELECTION TRIBUNAL, VELLORE, AND OTHERS,

7 E.L.E. 471,


T. C. BASAPPA v. T. NAGAPPA, 10 E.L.R. 14 (S. C).HABI VISHNU KAMATH V. AHMED ISHAQUE, 10 E.L.R.216 (S.C.).

-"False return". MAST RAM V. HARNAM SINGH SETHI AND


"Financial interest". HOREN JONES V. MOHAN SINGH AND


"Gratification". DAULAT RAM V. MAHARAJA ANAND GHAND


"improper acceptance of nomination". DuRGA SHANKAB

MEHTA v. THAKTJR RAGHURAJ SINGH AND OTHERS, 9

E.L.R. 494 (S. C).

"in connection with election". RAM SINGH V. GIIASI RAM AND


SHEO NABAYAN VAIDYA V. SARDABMAL, 4 E.L.R. 401.M. R. MEGANATHAN v. K. T. KOSALRAM, 9 E.L.R. 242.

-"Materially affected". LAXMIDATTA AND ANOTHER V. MADAN

LAL DHUPAB AND OTHEBS, 7 E.L.R. 398.

"May". MAHESH DATTA V. MUBLIDHAR AND OTHERS, 7

E.L.R. 154.AUDESH PRATAP SINGH V. BBIJNARAIN, 9 E.L.R. 1.

"Office of profit". HANS RAJ JIVRAJ MEHTA V. INDUBHAI

B. AMIN, 1 E.L.R. 171.

CHANDER NATH v. K. JASWANT SINGH, 3 E.L.R. 147.YOGRAJ SINGH SHANKAR SINGH PARIHAR V. SITABAM

IIlBACHAND BlRLAAND OTHERS (No. 2.), 3 E.L.R. 439.

KISHEN LAL LAMBOR V. MADAN SINGH, 10 E.L.R. 49.

VINDHYA PRADESH LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MEMBERS,

In re, 4 E.L.R. 422.

See also other cases cited under "OFFICE OP PROFIT" pp.179 ff. supra.

-"Prospective candidate". LiNGE GowDA'». SHIVANANJAPPA,

6 E.L.R. 288.

"Relating to candidature". KRISHNAJI BHIMBAO ANTBOLIKAR

v. SHANKER SHANTARAM MORE AND OTHERS, 7 E.L.R.100.

"Service". NYALCHAND VIRCHAND SHETH V. VITHALBHAI

RANCHHODBHAI PATEL AND OTHERS, 9 E.L.R. 451.

WORDS AND PHRASES 243

-"Shall". JAGAN NATH v. JASWANT SINGH AND OTHBBS, 9E.L.E. 231. (S.C.).SHAH MOHAMMAD UMAIE V. EAM CHAEAN SINGH AND

OTHEES, 8 E.L.B. 179.

-"Sign", "subscribe". MULAI AND ANOTHER V. LAL DAN

BAHADUE SINGH AND OTHEES, 9 E.L.B. 8.EATAN SINGH AND ANOTHER, V. PADAM CHAND JAIN


EATTAN ANMOL SINGH V. ATMA EAM AND OTHEBS, 10

E.L.E. 41, (S.C.).

-"Systematic appeal". SHIV DUTT AND OTHEES V. BANSIDAS

DHANGAR AND OTHERS (NO. 2), 9 E.L.E. 324.

-"Tampering". PEADIPTA KISHOEE DAS V. MOHAMMAD

ATAHAR AND OTHERS, 2 E.L.E. 467. See also 10 E.L.E. 162.-"Trial". See pp. 118, 120, 122 supra.-"Void". BRAJ NARESH SINGH V. H U K A M S I N G H , 9 E.L.E. 80.

-"Within a week". EOOP CHANDRA SOGANI AND ANOTHER V.

EAWAT MAN SINGH AND OTHERS (NO. 3), 9 E.L.E. 21.

-"Working for a candidate". JAWAHAE SHANKAR PAGHOLI ».HIKDAY NARAIN SINGH AND OTHERS, 6 E.L.E. 495.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna Rao and Others, 1 E.L.R. 384.Yograjsing Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hiraehand Birla

and Others, 1 E.L.R. 389.

Or. I, r. 3.

Fida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others. 4 E.L.R. 1.

Or. I, r. 6.

Eida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 1.

Or. I,r. 9.

Eida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 1.Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others, 9 E-L.R. 231.

Or. I, rr. 9,13.

Jagajeevandas Shetty v. Sanjeeva Shetty and Others, 3E.L.R. 359.

Or. I, r. 10.Eida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others., 4 E.L.R. 1.Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh and Others, 9 E.L.R. 231.

Or. I, r. 13.

Jagan Nath v, Jaswant Singh and Others, 9 E.L.R. 231.

Or. IV, r. 1.Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra.-Bhanu Gupta and Others,6 E.L.R. 123.

Or. VI,r.l7.Sheo Mahadeo Prasad v. Deva Sharan Sinha and Others,

10 E.L.R. 144.

Or. VI, rr. 14, 15,16.

Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Naseer and Others, 3 E.L.R. 137Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahadeo and Others, 3 E.L.R. 473.

Or. VI, r. 15.

Radhey Shyam Sharma v, Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others,6 E.L.R. 123.

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO 245

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (contd.)

Or. VI, r. 17.K. T. Kosalram v. M. E. Meganathan and Others, 9 E.L.E. 278.A. S. Subba Eaj v. Muthiah (No. 2), 1 E.L.E. 290.

Or. IX r. 6.Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another,

10 E.L.E. 293.

Or. IX, r. 7.Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another

10 E.L.E. 293.

Eadhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta andOthers, 6 E.L.E. 123.

Or. IX, r. 8.Eoop Chandra Sogani and Others v. Eawat Man Singh and

Others (No. 2), 5 E.L.E. 327.Or. IX, r. 13.

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another10 E.L.R. 293.

Or. XII, r. 6.Shantilal Chaudhary v. Eaghuraj Singh and Others (No. 2),

9 E.L.E. 93.

Or. XVII, r. 2.Eoop Chandra Sogani and Others, v- Eawat Man Singh and

Others (No. 2) 5 E.L.E. 327.

Or. XVIII, r. 3.Eoop Chandra Sogani v. Eawat Man Singh and Others.

5 E.L.E. 327.

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, and Another,10 E.L.E. 293.

Or. XVIII, r. 2.Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 403.

Constitution of India.

Art. 4.Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 203.

Art. 7.

Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.ELD—34


Constitution of India (contd.)

Art. 14.

Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others, 7 E.L.E. 171Sant Singh v. Shamsher Shigh and Others, 7 E.L.B. 203Maharaj Singh v. Bafcan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.B.320. Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Election Tribunal, Paizabad,and Others, 8 E.L.B. 201. Mathai Mathew Manjuran v.K.O. Abraham, 10 E.L.B. 376.

Art. 15.

Sri Bam v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others. 8 E.L.B. 139.

Arts. 15, 16, 19{l).Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.B. 248.

Art. 19(l){a).Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi Bam and

Others, 10 E.L.B. 120.Art. 19(2).

Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others,9 E.L.B. 149.

Arts. 25,39.

Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.E. 248.

Art. 101.Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members. In the

matter of 4 E.L.E. 422.

Art. 101{3).

Maharaja Anand Chand, In re, 5 E.L.B. 197.

Art. 102.Daulat Bam v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others, 6 E.L.B.

87. Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others(No. 2), 6 E.L.B. 104. Gulabchand Chordia v. ThakurNarain Singh and Others, 6 E.L.B. 397. Kishenlal Lamrorv. Madan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E. 49.

Art. 102{e)

Satya Dev Bhushahri v. Padam Dev and Otheis, 10 E.L.B.103.

Art. 102{l).Harnam Singh v. Jwala Prasad and Others, 8 E.L.E. 332.



Art. 102(l){a)Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indtibhai B. Amin and Others,1 B.L.E. 171.Krishnappa v. Narayansingh and Others, 7 B.L.E. 294.Govind Malaviya v. Murli Manohar and Others, 8 E.L.E. 84.

Art. 103.Maharaja Anand Ohand, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197.

Art. 113.Mathai Mathew Manjuran v. K. C. Abraham, 10 E.L.E. 378.

Art. 133{1).Mathai Mathew Manjuranv. K. C. Abraham, 10 E.L.E. 376.Shantilal Ohaudhary v. Baghuraj Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.

489.V. V. Eamaswmi v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli, and

Others, 8 E.L.E. 233.Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members In the

matter of, 4 E.L.E. 422.Art. 136.

Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj and Others,9 E.L.E. 485. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur EaghurajSingh and Others, 9 E.L.B. 494.

Art. 164{4).Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh, 9 E.L.E. 80.

Art. 17l{3){d).Kalika Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hayat Chand and Others

4 E.L.E. 118.Art. 173.

Beni Madho Eai v. Bhola and Others, 6 E.L.E. 308.Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh andOthers, 6 E.L.E. 495.

Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.

Arts. 190{3), 193(1).Saka Venkata Eao v. Election Commission (High Court)

1 E.L.E. 417.

Art. 191.Daulat Earn v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others, 6 E.L.E.

87. Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta and Others,(No. 2), 6 E.L.E. 104.

Maharaja Anand Chand, In re, 5 E.L.E. 197.



Art. 191 (eonta).Mahendra Sahu v. Dutia Eaul and Others, 3 B.L.E. 117.

Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others,3 B.L.E. 147. Shivarama Karanth v. VenkataramanaGowda and Others, 3 E.L.E. 187. Lahri Singh v. AttarSingh and Others, 3 B.L.E. 403. Yograjsingh Shankar-singh Parihar v. Sitaram Hirachand Birla and Others,(No. 2), 3 E.L.B. 436. Shibban Lai Saksena v. HarishankerPrasad and Others, 9 E.L.E. 403. Thakur Daoosing v.Eamkrishna Eathor and Others, 4 E.L.E. 34. VindhyaPradesh Legislative Assembly Member. In the matter of,4 B.L.E. 422. Kishenlal Lamror v. Madan Singh andOthers, 10 E.L.E. 49.

Art. 19l{l).Beni Madho Eai v. Bhola and Others, 6 E.L.E. 308.

Art. 19l(l){a).Balbir Singh v. Arjan Singh and Others, 6 E.L.E. 341.Sahi Earn v. Manphool Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 47.

Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 90.Faqir Chand v. Pritam Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 119.Mahesh Datta v. Mtirlidhar and Others, 7 E.L.E. 154.Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others, 7 E.L.B. 203.Maharaj Singh v. Eatan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.320. Kesho Earn v. Hazura Singh and Others, 8 B.L.E.320. Deshpande, V. D. and Others v. State of Hyderabad andOthers, 10 E.L.E. 203.

Art. 191{1){C).

In re T. Siddalingaiya, Member, Mysore Legislative Assembly7 E.L.E. 416.

Art. 191(1) (d).Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.

Art. 191(2).Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh, 9 E.L.E. 80.

Art. 192.Deshpande, V. D. and Others, v. State of Hyderabad and

Others, 10 E.L.E. 203.Art. 193.

Aslam Khan v. Pazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.R. 341.Arts. 226, 227. See HIGH CoUETS, pp. 174-192 supra.


Constitution of India {contd.)

Art. 330(3).Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and

Others, 9 E.L.B. 301.Art. 245(l).

Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi Earn andOthers, 10 E.L.E. 120.

Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram Eatanlal Jain andOthers, 5 E.L.E. 1. Hamirkha Alarkha v. EeturningOfficers, Jamnagar City, and Others, 5 E.L.E. 230.

Art. 299.Sankar Pandia Nadar, A.S.S.8. v. V. V. Eamaswami and

Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.

Art. 299(1).Chatiirbhuj Vithaldas Jasani v. Moreshwar Parashram and

Others 9 E.L.E. 301.Moreshwar Parashram v. Chaturbhuj Yithaldas Jasani and


Art. 310.Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 403.

Arts. 324, 327. See H I G H COUETS, pp. 174-192 supra.

Art. 324.Polaki Kotesam and Others v. S. M. Patnaik and Others,

8 E.L.E. 159.

Art. 325.

Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.E. 248.

Art. 326.Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E, 341.

Art. 327.Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and

Others, 7 E.L.E. 364.Art. 327.

Nagendra Mahto v. The State, 10 E.L.E. 140.Art. 341.

Bakaram Sukaram Konkani v. Shankar Eao Chinduji Bedseand Others, 3 E.L.E. 409.

Art. 343(2).Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India and




Art. 361.Saka Venkata Eao v. Election Commission (High Court)

1 B.L.E. 417.

List I, Item 72.Nagendra Mahto v. The State, 10 E.L.E. 140.

List I, Item 93.Nagendra Mahto v. The State, 10 E.L.E. 140.

Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946.

Sec. 4.V. V. Ramaswami v. Election Tribunal, Tirunelveli, and

Others, 8 E.L.E. 233.' A. J. Arunachalam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,

9 E.L.E. 471.Chiranjit Singh v. Mam Raj and Others, 7 E.L.E. 1.

Evidence Act, 1872.

Sec. 10.Sri Eam». Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others, 8 E.L.E. 139.

Sec. 14.Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji and Others

9 E.L.E. 36.Sec. 91.

Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others, 6E.L.R. 247.

General Clauses Act, 1897.

Sec. 3{33).Sujaniram v. Lai Shy am Shah and Others, 5 E.L.E. 183.

Government of Part C States Act, 1951.

Prakash Narain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi and Others,4 E.L.E. 205.

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others, 10 E.L.E. 103.Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others, 6 E.L.E. 414.

In the matter of Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly.Members, 4 E.L.E. 422.

Mahendra Kumar v. Vidyawati, 10 E.L.E. 214.Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others, 8 E.L.E. 448.Balchand v. Laxminarain Mateh, 8 E.L.R. 465.


Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Sec. 29.; Jwala Prasad Misra v. Mahdeo and Others, 3 E.L.E. 473.

;• Sec. 35.: :' Pratap Singh v. Nihar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 31.

Sec. 63.Eama Eeddi v. Chidanandam and Another (No. 2) 3 E.L.E.

i'.' , 42.k Sec. 76.V ' Kanauji Lai Shukla v. Bhagwan Din and Others, 3 E.L.E. 1v Limitation Act, 1908.\ . ' Sec. 4. """, Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 17.•t Sec. 22.n Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan Mohan and Others, 3 E.L.E."[ 375.jjt Maharaj Singh v. Eatan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.\ 320.•̂ S. Khader Sheriff v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,

7 E.L.E. 471.

Iron and Steel Control Order, 1941.

Prabhudas Eamjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas Maniar1 E.L.E. 154.

Madhya Bharat Abolition of Zamindaries Act, 1951.1 Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sita Earn and Others, 5 E.L.E. 48.

Jagdish Singh v. Endra Deolal and Others, 8 E.L.E. 311.Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others, 7 E.L.E. 154,

> Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietory Rights Act, 1951.'!; Thakur Daoosing v. Eamakrishna Eathor and Others,

...̂ 4 E.L.E 34. Jagannath v. Pandtirang and Others,6 E.L.E. 167.

Madhya Pradesh Offices of Profit (Removal of Disqualification(PartC States) Order, 1951.

Prakash Narain v. Jagdish Chandra Joshi and Others,4 E.L.E, 205.

Madras Essential Articles Control-and Requisitioning Act, 1949.

A. J. Arunachalam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,9 E.L.E. 471.


Madras Foodgrains (Intensive Procurement) Order, 1951.

Sankara Pandia Nadar A.S.S.S. v. V. V. Eamaswami andOthers, 5 E.L.E. 417.

Madras Motor Vehicles Rules, r. 160-B.Satyanathan, N. v. K. Subramanyan and Others, 10 B.L.B.

311.

Madras Yarn Dealers' Control Order, 1948.

A. J. Arunachalam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,9 E.L.E. 471.

Punjab State Legislature (Prevention of Disqualification) Act, 1952.

Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others. 7 E.L.R 171.Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 203.Maharaj Singh v. Eatan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E.320. Balwant Singh and Others v. Devilai and Others,8 E.L.E. 1.

Representation of the People Act, 1950, sec. 16.

Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.E. 341.

Sec. 80(2).P. N. Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and


ss. 22 A, 26.

Subrahmanya Bhatt v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others,2 E.L.E. 225.

Sec. 25.Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyan

and Others, 4 E.L.E. 499; 4 E.L.E. 500.P. N. Balasubramaniyam v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and


Sec. 25(a).

Chinna Malla Eeddi and Others v. The Eevenue DivisionalOfficer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.E. 361.

Sec. 25(b).Earn Singh v. Hazari Lai and Others, 6 E.L.E. 224.

Sec. 28.

Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India andOthers, 7 E.L.E. 364.


R. P. Act, 1950—{oontd.)

Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyanand Others, 4 B.L.E. 499; 4 E.L.E. 500.

Ramakrishna Reddy v. Kamala Devi. 5 E.L.E. 173.

Representation of the People (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950.

r. 3.Laxmidatta and Another v. Madanlal Dhupar and Others,

7 E.L.E. 398.r. 6.

Kamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India andOthers, 7 E.L.R. 364.

r. 7.Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E.

441.r. 10.

Gayaprashad v. Krishnachandra Sharma and Others, 10E.L.E. 6

r. 11.Chinna Malla Reddi and Others v. The Revenue Divisional

Officer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.E. 361.r. 14{2).

Chinna Malla Eeddi and Others v. The Eevenue DivisionalOfficer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.R. 361.

rr.11, 18.K. Subrahmanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others,

9 E.L.R. 432.r. 18.

Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh and Others, 6 E.L.R. 10.r. 19.

A slam Khan v. Faziul Haq and Others, 4 E.L.R. 341.

r. 20.Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh and Others, 6 E.L.R. 10.Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayedav. Sanjalia Mohanlal Virjibhai

and Others, 4 E.L.R. 493.Awadhesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta and Others,

8 E.L.R. 45.

r. 20(2).Chinna Malla Reddi and Others v. The Revenue Divisional

Officer, Guntur, and Others, 9 E.L.E. 361,:ELD—35


R. P. (Preparation of Electoral Rolls) Rules, 1950—(contd.)

Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavda Akbar Dalumiyanand Others, 4E.L.R. 499.

Eamlakshman Sharma v. Election Commission of India andOthers, 7 E.L.R. 364.

Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar Yadav andOthers, 5 E.L.R. 296.

r. 20(3).Ramakrishna Eeddy v. Kamala Devi, 5 E.L.R. 173.Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar Yadav

and Others, 5 E.L.R. 296.r. 22.

Gayaprashad v. Krishnachandra Sharma and Others, 10E.L.R. 6.

Polaki Kotesam and Others v. S. M. Patnaik and Others,8 E.L.R. 159.

r. 23.Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar Dalumiyan

and Others, 4 E.L.R. 499.r. 24(1).

Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R.441.

Representation of the People Act, 1951Sec. 2(e).

P. N. Balasubramanyam v.. Election Tribunal, Vellore, andOthers, 7 E.L.R. 496.

Sec. 2(k).Ratan Singh and Another v.. Padam Chand Jain and Others,

7 E.L.R. 189.Sec. 3.

Ram Singh v. Hazari Lai and Others 6 E.L.R. 224.

Sec. S(c).Ramayan Sharan Singh and Another v. Rameshwar Yadav and i

Others, 5 E.L.R. 296. jSec. 6. |

Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and Others6 E.L.R. 495, 1 E.L.R. 477.

Sec. 7.Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others, 8 E.L.R. J

448, 1 E.L.R. 417. \


R. P. Act, 1951—(conid.)Sec. 7{b).

Ganda Singh v. Sampuran Singh and Others. 3 E.L.E. 17,Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others,3 E.L.E. 26.

Sec. 7{c).

Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalani, 3 E.L.E. 347.

Sec. 7{d).

See DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES pp. 59-79 supra.

Sec. 7{e).See DISQUALIFICATION OF CANDIDATES •. Office of Profit pp.

79-92 supra.Sec. 7 (/).

Mehta Gordhandas Girdharlal v. Chavada Akbar Dalmniyanand Others, 7 E.L.E. 374.

Sec. 8.Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others. 3 E.L.E.26.

Sec. 9(2).Sankara Pandia Nadar, A.S.S.S. v. V. V. Eamaswami and

Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.Sec. 17.

Joginder Singh v. Eaghbir Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 81.

Sec. 18.S. K. Sambandam v. Surya Eao and Others, 2 E.L.E. 61.

Sec. 18(l){b).Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.Kalika Prasad Singh v. Abdul Hayat Chand and Others,

4 E.L.E. 118.Sec. 19.

K. Subrahmanyam v. Abdul Hameed Khan and Others,1 E.L.E. 432.

Sec. 25.Niharendu Dutt Mazuiiidar v. Sudb.ii1 Chandra Bhandari and' Others, 6 E.L.E. 197.

Sec. 30.

Pida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E. 1.Sec. 32.

P. N. Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, andOthers. 7 E.L.E. 496.


R. P. Act, 1951—(contd.)Sec. 33.

See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.

See. 33(2)See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: Proposer and seconder.

Sec. 33(3).See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES : Election agent.

Sec. 33(5).

See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: Election roll.

Sec. 33(6). ' _ .See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: Electoral roll. !

Sec. 33(7).Bhairon v. Thakur Ganpat Singh and Others, 6 E.L.E. 409.

Sec. 36.See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: QUALIFICATION OF

CANDIDATES.

Sec. 36, 40.

See ELECTION AGENTS.

Sec. 36(2). ~~

Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and Others, 9 E.L.R.193.

Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Earn Bilas Sinha and Others3 E.L.E. 60. Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others|(No. 2). 3 E.L.E. 102. Lakhan Lai Mishra v. TribeniKumar and Others, 3 E.L.E. 423.

Sec. 36(2).Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others,

6 E.L.E. 138.Sec. 36(2)(d)

S. K. Sambaudam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,5 E.L.E. 341. f

See. 36(4). \Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das and Others, 9 E.L.R. 385 \

Shakti Parshad Shukla v. Balwant Singh and Others *\4 E-L.E. 301. Narotam Singh v. Des Eaj and Others, 4E.L.R' j309. Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others ? 'j4 E.L.R. 441. Eanchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Sanjalia |Mohanlal Virjibhai and Others, 4 E.L.E. 493. Jamuna jNandan Prasad Sinha v. Jagdish Narain Singh and Others; |7 E.L.R. 14. Satish Chander v. Ganga Singh and Others, t


R. P. Act, 1951 (contd.)7 B.L.E. 38. Battan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others,7 B.L.E. 234. Gurnam Singh and Another v. Partap Singhand Others, 7 B.L.E. 338. Bhanwarlal Sogani v. DamodarLai Vyas and Others, 7 E.L.E. 407. A. K. SubbarayaGoundar v. Muthusami Goundar and Others, 7 B.L.E.465. P. N. Balasubrahmanyan v. Election Tribunal,Vellore, and Others, 7 E.L.E. 496. Earn Singh v. HazariLai and Others, 6 E.L.E. 224. Shiv Dayal v. Teg Earn,6 E.L.E. 346. Ajayab Singh and Another v. Karnail Singhand Others, 6 E.L.E. 368. Bishnu Kumar Singh v. EarnBilas Sinha and Others, 3 E.L.E. 60. Lallu Chand v.Tej Singh and Others, 8 E.L.E. 28. Eanohhodlal LiladharVayeda v. Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad, 8 B.L.E. 59.Kesho Earn v. Hazura Singh and Others, 8 E.L.E. 320.Eamakrishna Eeddy v. Kamala Devi. 5 E.L.E. 173.

Sec. 36(6).Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari and

Others. 6 E.L.E. 197.Sec. 36(7).

See NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES: SEVERAL NOMINATIONS.

Sec. 37.

See NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES : WITHDRAWAL.

Sec. 38.Pida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others. 4 E.L.E. 1Thakur Daoosing v. Eamkrishna Eathor and Others, 4 E.L.E.

34.Sec. 39(2).

Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha, 5 B.L.E. 40.Sec. 39(4).

Hari Nishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others, 5 E.L.E.248. S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, andOthers, 5 E.L.E. 341. .

Sec. 40.See ELECTION AGENTS.

Sec. 44.Linge Gowda v. Shivananjappa 6 B.L.E. 288. Shankare

Gowda v. Mariyappa and Another 9 E.L.E. 101.Sec. 46.

Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (No. 2).8 E.L.E. 105.


R. P. Act, 1951— (contd.)

Sec. 52.Paida Hussain v. Sheo Bahajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 1.

Sec. 53.Paida Hussain v. Sheo Bahajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E. 1.

Sec. 54.Bakaram Sukaram Monakani v. Shankar Rao Chinduji Bedse

and Others, 3 E.L.E. 409.

Sec. 54(2).Bhan Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another, 4 E.L.E. 212.

Sec. 56.Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,4 E.L.E. 73.Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and Others,5 E.L.E. 156.

Sec. 56, 57.P. K. Atre v. Dr. T. E. Naravine and Others, 1 E.L.E. 355-

Sec. 57.Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and Others,

5 E.L.E. 156. Moinuddin B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi3 E.L.E 248.

Sec. 58.Shankar Tripathi v. Returning Officer, Mirzapur and Others,

2 E.L.R. 315.

Sec. 62.Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal and Others, 8 E.L.R. 311.

Mathesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others, 7 E.L.R. 154.Laxmidatta and Another v. Madanlal Dhupar and Others,7 E.L.E. 398. Jujhar Singh v. Bhairon Lall and Others,7 E.L.R. 457. Jyostna Chandra and Another v. Mehrabhaliand Others. 3 E.L.E. 488.

Sec. 63.Naranjan Singh v. Brish Bhan and Others, 3 E.LE. 179.

Sec. 63(1).B. R. Ambedkar and Another v. S. A. Dange and Others,

1 E.L.R. 364.Sec. 70.

Nyalchand Virohand Sheth v. Election Tribunal, Abmedabad,and Others, 8 E.L.R. 417. 1 E.L.R. 34.


R.P. Act, 1951— (contd.)

Sec. 76.S. Khader Sheriff v. Election Tribunal, Vellore, and Others,

7 E.L.R. 471.Sec. 77.

See ELECTION EXPENSES.

Sec. 79.Salig Ram Jaiswal v. Sheo Kumar Panda and Others,

9 E.L.R. 67. Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kammgo andOthers, 9 E.L.R. 294.

Sec. 79{a).Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.

Sec. 80.See ELECTION PETITION.

Sec. 82.See ELECTION PETITION: Parties.

Sec. 83.See ELECTION PETITION : Contents.

Sec. 83(2) and (3).See ELECTION PETITION : List of Corrupt Practices.

Sec. 84.See ELECTION PETITION : Reliefs.

Sec. 85.See ELECTION PETITION : Limitation.

Sec. 86.

See ELECTION TEIBUNAL.

Sec. 88(1).K. T. Kosalram v. M. R. Meganathan and Others, 9 E.L.R.

278.Sec. 90.

See ELECTION PETITION : Amendment, Limitation, PartiesSec. 92.

See ELECTION PETITION : Amendment of Petition.Sec. 94.

Murlidhar v. Kadam Singh and Others, 10 E.L.R. 135.Sec. 94.

Maneklal Amolakchand v. Thete Gopal Ramji and Others,9 E.L.R. 36.

Biswanath Roy v. Tarakdas Banerjee and Others, 5 E.L.R. 223.


R. P. Act, 195l—{co>itd.)

Sec. 97.Baghtmath Singh v. Kampta Prasad Saxena, 8 E.L.R. 424.Satya Dev Bushahri v. Ghanshyam and Others, 4 B.L.E.

67.Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v. Lachhiram Eatanlal Jain and

Others, 5 B.L.E. 1

Sec. 98.Faida Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 .B.L.E. 1.

T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Others, 3 B.L.E. 197.Manmohani Sehgal v. Sucheta Kirpalatii, 3 B.L.E. 347.Braj Naresh Singh v. Hukam Singh 9 E.L.E. 80. HanumanPrasad Misra v. Tara Ohand and Others, 5 E.L.E. 446.Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 496.

Sec. 98(a).Mukti Nath Eai v. Unia Shanker Misra and Others, 3 B.L.E.

109. Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan and Others, 3 E.L.E,375.

Sec. 99.See COEBTTPT PRACTICE.

Sec. 100.B. E. Ambedkar and Another v. S. A. Dange and Others,

1 B.L.E. 364. Sivathanu Pillai v. Nesamony and Others,1 B.L.E. 312. Padmanabha Menon v. A. M. Thomas andOthers, 1 E.L.E. 404. Prem Nath v. Earn Kishan andOthers, 1 B.L.E. 271. Eamaohandran Nair v. Eama-ohandra Das and Others, 1 E.L.E. 442. Dr. JohnMathai v. Returning Officer, Kottayam, and ThreeOthers. 1 B.L.E. 1. N. P. Ponnuswami v. EeturdingOfficer, Namakkal and Others, 1 E.L.E. 89. N. P. Ponnu-swami v. Eeturning '• Officer, Namakkal, and Others,(S.C.) 1 B.L.E 133. 1 B.L.E. 461. Jaswant Singh v.Jagan Nath and Others, 10 E.L.E. 1. Gangadharv. Election Tribunal, Vindhya Pradesh and Others,10 E.L.E. 183. V. K. John v. Vasantha Pai and Others,& A. Srinivasan v. Vasantha Pai & Others, 10 E.L.E.345. T. G. Basappa v. T. Nagappa and Others, 3 E.L.E.197. Madan Pal v. Eajdeo Upadhya and Others, '6 E.L.E.28. Jaswant Singh v. Mangal Das and Others, 9 E.L.R.385. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Isak andOthers, 8 E.L.E. 350. Ram Murtbi v. Sumba Sadar and


R. P. Act, 1951—(cowfe*.)

Others, 2 E.L.B. 330. Brij Naresh Singh v. HukumSingh and Others, 2 E.L.E. 266. Vijaya Mohan Beddyv. Paga Pull a Reddy and Others, 2 B.L.R. 414. HansBaj v. Bam Singh and Others, 2 E.L.B, 12. 2 E.L.B. 401.

Sec. 100{l).

Roop Chandra Sogani and Another v. Bawat Man Singh andOthers (No. 3), 9 E.L.B. 21. Salig Bam Jaiswal v. SheoKumar Pande and Others, 9 E.L.R. 67. Sucheta Kripalaniv. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 E.L.R. 145. Maharaj Singhv. Ratan Amol Singh and Others, 7 E.L.R. 320. BhanSingh v. Krishna Kant and Another, 4 E.L.R. 212.

Sec. 100(l)(a).

Battan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others, 7 E.L.R. 234.Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others(No. 2), 8 E.L.B. 105.

Sec. 100(l){c).Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand and Others, 10 E.L.R.

30. Devasharan Sinha v. Sheo Mahodev Prasad and Others,10 E.L.R. 461. Jagannath v. Pandurang and Others,4 E.L.R. 167. Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansaband Others, 4 E.L.R. 380. Maneklal Amolakchand v.Thefce Gopal Bamji and Others: 9 E.L.B. 36. DurgaShankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others,9 E.L.R. 494. Dharam Vir v. Bhala Ram and Others,7 E.L.R. 64. Battan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others,7 E.L.B. 234. Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyasand Others, 7 E.L.B. 407. Moreshwar Parashram v.Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani and Others, 7 E.L.B. 428.Jagdish Singh v. Rudra Deolal and Others, 8 E.L.R. 311.Chander Nath v. Kunwar Jaswant Singh and Others,3 E.L.B. 147. Naranjan Singh v. Brisk Bhan and Others,3 E.L.R. 179. Bakaram Sukaram Konkani v. Shankar RaoChinduji Bedse and Others, 3 E.L.R. 409.

Sec. 100{2).Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 B.L.B. 145.

M. B. Meganathan v. K. T. Kosalram and Others, 9 E.L.R.242. Maharan Singh v. Ratan Amol Singh and Others,7 E.L.R. 320.

ELD—36


R. P. Act, 1951— (contd.)

Sec. 100{2){a).Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others v. Lachhi Earn and

Others, 10 B.L.E. 120. Sardul Singh Caveeshar v.Hukum Singh and Others, 6 E.L.R. 316. JawaharShankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and Others,6 E.L.E. 495. Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir HusainZaidi and Others (No. 2), 8 E.L.E. 300.

Sec. 100{2){c).

Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand and Others, 10 E.L.E.30. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad lshaque and Others,10 E.L.E. 216. Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra NathBasu and Otheis, 4 E.L.E. 73. Prakash Narain v. JagdishChandra Joshi and Others, 4 E.L.E. 205. Keshau Prasadv. Brijraj Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 77. Laxmidattaand Another v. MadanlaT Dhupar and Others, 7 E.L.E.398. K. S. Subramanjya Goundar v. Election Tribunal,Vellore, and Others, 8 E.L.E. 66. Sri Earn v. MohammadTaqi Hadi and Others, 8 E.L.E. 139. Abdul Eauf v.Govind Ballabh Pant and Others, 8 E.L.E. 240. ShantaDevi Vaidya v. Bashir Husain Zaidi and Others (No. 2),8 E.L.E. 300. Dnrga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur BaghurajSingh and Others, 9 E.L.E. 494. Kalicharan Singh»,Eamaoharitar ' Eai Yadava and Others, 5 E.L.E. 98.Kandasami Kandar v. Subramania Goundar and Others,5 E.L.E. 156. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed andOthers, 5 E.L.E. 248.

Sec. 100(3)(b).Sankara Pandia Nadar, A.S.S.S. v. Y. Y. E am as w ami and

Others, 5 E.L.E. 417.Sec. 701.

John V. K. v. Vasantha Pai and Others & Srinivasan v.Vasantha Pai and Others, 10 E.L.E. 345.

Sec. 101.Earn Murtbi v. Sumbar Sadar and Others, 2 E.L.E. 330. Vijaya

Mohan Eeddy v. Paga Pulla Eeddy and Others,2 E.L.E. 414Sec. 10l{a).

Kali Charan Singh v. Eamacharitar Eai Yadav and Others,5 E.L.E. 98.

Sardul Singh Oaveeshar v. Hukum Singh and Others,6 E.L.E 316.


R. P. Act, 1951—(contd.)Sec. 10l(b).

Jamuna Prasad Mujhariya and Others v. Lachhi Ram andOthers, 10 E.L.E. 120.

Sec. 102{2){c).Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Zayed Isak and Others,

8 E.L.E. 350.Sec. 105.

Sivathanu Pillai v. Election Tribunal, Trivandrum, andOthers, 2 E.L.E. 263. Sangram Singh v. Election Tribu-nal, Kotth, and Others, 10 E.L.E. 293. Hukam Singhand Another v. Sardul and Others, 6 E.L.R. 162. TirathSingh v. Bachitar Singh and Others, 9 E.L.E. 163.Lakkappa v. Narasimhe Gowda and Others, 9 E.L.E. 201.T. Nagappa v. Basappa and Others, 9 E.L.E. 216. EajKrushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo and Others, 9 E.L.E.294. Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Eaghuraj Singhand Others, 9 E.L.E. 494. Jamna Prasad Mukhariya v,Lachhiram Eatanlal Jain .and Others, 5 E.L.E. 1. SheoKumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others, 5 E.L.R.103. Hamirkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, JamnagarCity, 5 E.L.R. 230.

Sec. 107.Braj Natesh Singh v. Hukam Singh, 9 E.L.R. 80. Lakkappa

v. Narasimhe Gowda and Others, 9 E.L.R. 201. T. Nagappav. Basappa and Others, 9 E.L.E. 216.

Sec. 110.Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others, 3 E.L.E. 403. Shiv

Dayal and Others v. Teg Earn and Others, 6 E.L.R. 346.Marutrao Bhaurao and Others, v. Giilabrao Dadasaheb and


Sees. 113,119.Thete Gopal Ramji v. Amolok Chand and Others, 1 E.L.R. 477.

Sec. 117.ELECTION PETITION: Deposit of Security.

Sec. 122.Nathulal Mantri and Another v. Vindrawan Prasad Tiwari

and Others, 9 E.L.R. 375.

Sec. 123.M. Muthiah v. A. S. Subbaraj and Others, 7 E.L.R. 165.


R. P. Act, 1951— {contd.)Sec. 123.

See CORRUPT, PRACTICE pp. 16 to 57 supra.

Sec. 124(1).Mathai Mathew Manjuran v. K.C. Abraham, 10E.L.E. 376.

Sec. 124,(3).Sri Earn v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi and Others, 8 E.L.E. 139.

Sec. 124(4).See CORRUPT PRACTICE 11. False Eeturn of Election

Expenses pp. 26 to 31 supra.Sec. 124(5).

See CORRUPT PRACTICE 2. Appeal on the ground of religionetc. 16 to 19 supra.

Sec. 125.Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hiraehand

Birla and Others (No. 2). 3 E.L.E. 439.

Sec. 125(1).Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Vithalbhai Eanchhodbhai

Patel and Others, 9 E.L.E. 451.Nyalchand Virchand Sheth v. Election Tribunal, Ahmedabad,

and Others, 8 E.L.E. 417.

Sec. 127.Bikhab Das v. Eidhiohand Paliwal and Others, 9 E.L.E.

115.

Sec. 128.Biswanath Eoy v. Tarakdas Banerjee and Others, 5 E.L.E.

223.Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.L.E, 140.

Sec. 130.'Bikhab Das v. Eidhiohand Palliwal and Others, 9 E.L.E.

115.Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hirachand

Birla and Others, (No. 2). 3 E.L.E. 439.

Sec. 131 (l) (b).Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.L.B. 140.

Sec. 132(3).Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.LE. 140.

Sec. 136(l)(f).Nagendra Mahto v. The State 10 E.L.E. 140.


R. P. Act, 1951—(con**.)Sec. 140.

Jawahar Shankar Pacholi v. Hirday Narain Singh and Others,6 E.L.E. 495.

Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 496.Sec. 148.

Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 E.L.E. 145.Sec 143.

Sucheta Kripalani v. S. S. Dulat and Others, 9 E.L.E. 145.Manmohani Sehgal v. Suoehta Kirpalani 3 E.L.E. 437.Eaqir Chand v. Pritam Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 119.Shivdev Singh v. Dara Singh and Others, 5 E.L.E. 496.

Sec 150.Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha 5 E.L.E. 40.

Deshpande, V.D. and Others v. State of Hyderabad and Others,10 E.L.E. 203.

Sec. 151.Amin Ahmad v. Nand Lai Sinha 5 E.L.E. 43.Sec. 168.

Daulat Earn v. Maharaja Anand Chand and Others, 6 E.L.E-87.

Sec. 170.Ham irkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, Jamnagar City,

5 E.L.E. 230 Sivathanu Piilai v. Election Tribunal.Trivandrum, and Others, 2 E.L.E. 263. Dr. John Mathaiv. Eetirning Officer, Kottayam, and Three Others, 1 E L.E.1. Nrisinha Kumar Sinha and Others v. 'Returning Officer,Burwan Khargram, and Others, 1 E.L.R. 23. ShankarBao Eamji and Another v. The State of Madhya Bharat1 E.L.R. 34. Rudra Pratap Narain Singh v. BhagwandinMisra and Others, 1 E.L.E. 60. Sukar Gope v. State ofBihar. 1 E.L.E. 52. 1 E.L.E. 68. 1 E.L.E. 1. 1 E.L.E.89.

Representation of the People (Conduct of Eectionsand Election Petitions)Rules, 1951,

r. 2.Kda Hussain v. Sheo Bhajan Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E. 1.

r. 2{d).Eameshwar Prasad Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das and Others,

4 E.L.E. 112.


R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951 — (contd.)

r.Mathra Das and Others v. Dara Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R.

441.

r. 2(2).

Mulai and Another v. Lai Dan Bahadur Singh and Others,9 E.L.E. 8.

Sahi Earn v. Mauphool Singh and Others, 7 B.L.E. 47.Dharam Vir v. Bhala Earn and Others, 7 E.L.E. 64.Eatan Singh and Another v. Padam Ohand Jain and Others7 E.L.E. 189.

r. 4.

Surat Singh v. Jang Bahadur Singh and Others, 4 E.L.E,306. Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab and Others,4 E.L.E. 380.

Tikaram Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga and Others,1 E.L.E. 252.

r. 5.

Mohinder Singh v. Mihan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E. 426.

r. 5.Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Earn Bilas Singh and Others,

3 E.L.E. 60.

r. 6(2).Motiram v. Eamchandar Chowdhary and Others, 7 E.L.E.

135. Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others,7 E.L.E. 407.

Prem Nath v. Earn Kishan and Others, 1 E.L.E. 271.

r. 6.Sujaniram v. Lai Shyam Shah and Others, 5 E.L.E. 183.

r. 10.

Mohinder Singh v. Mihan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E. 426.Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others,

7 E.L.E. 407.

r. 11-A.

Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh and Others, 7 E.L.E. 90.7 E.L.E. 471.

Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others, 2 E.L.E. 136.


R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules 1951 —{contd.)

r. 12.Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker Prasad and Others,

9 B.L.E. 403. Dr. K. N. Gairola v. Gangadhar Maithaniand Others (No. 2), 8 B.L.E. 105. T. Prakasam v.U. Krishna Eao and Others (No. 3), 2 E.L.E. 376.

r. 16.Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,

4 E.L.E. 73.

r. 16, 17.P. K. Atre v. Dr. T. E. Naravine and Others, 1 E.L.E. 355.

r. 17(2).Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,

4 E.L.E. 73. Eadhakrishnan v. Masilamani Ohettiar andOthers, 4 E.L.E. 148.

r. 18(2).Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari and


r. 19.Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari anj

Others. 6 E.L.E. 197.

r. 20.Marutrao Bhaurao and Others v. Gulabrao Dadasaheb and


r. 21.Keshau Prasad v. Brijraj Singh and Others. 7 E.L.E. 77.

Eatan Singh and Another v. Padara Chand Jain and Others,7 E.L.E. 189.

r. 21(1).Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others, 8 E.L.E. 429.

r. 21(5).Eadhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E.

148.Abdul Eauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant and Others, 8 E.L.E.

240.

r. 22, 47(c).Seshaiah v. Koti Eeddi and Others, 3 E.L.E. 39. Moinuddin

B. Harris v. B. P. Divgi, 3 E.L.E. 248,


R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—(contd.)

r, 23.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others,

10 B.L.E. 216. Damodar Goswami v. NarnarayanGoswami and Others, 10 B.L.E. 272.

r. 23.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Isak and Others,

8 E.L.E. 350.

r. 23(2).Sudhansu Sekhar Ghosh v. Satyendra Nath Basu and Others,4 B.L.E. 73.

r. 25(1).Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others, 8 E.L.E. 429.

r. 28.Balaiial Das Mohapatra v. Trilakya Nath Prodhan and

Others, 4 B.L.E. 221. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. AhmadSayed Isak and Others, 8 B.L.E. 350. Damodar Goswamiv. Narnarayanan Goswami and Others, 10 E.L.E. 272.Hari Datt v. Mad an Mohan and Others, 7 B.L.E. 25.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others, 5 B.L.R.248. Marutrao Bhanrao and Others v. Gulabrao Dadasaheb

• and Others, 5 B.L.E. 303.

r. 29.Kalicharan Singh v. Ramacharitar Eai Yadav and Others

5 B.L.R. 98.


4 P.L.E. 73.

r. 33.Eatan Singh and Another v. Padam Chand Jain and Others,

7 E.L.E. 189.

r. 34.T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 3), 2 B.L.R.

376.r. 37.

Sohan Lai Abinash Chander and Others, 4 B.L.E. 55.r. 37, 38.

Jyostna Chandra and Another v. Mehrabali and Others,3 E.L.R. 388.


R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951—{contd.)

r. 44.

Shankar Tripathi v. Beturning Officer, Miraapur, and Others,2 E.L.E. 315.

r. 46.T. Prakasam v. U. Krishna Eao and Others (No. 3), 3 E.L.E.

376. E. Swaminafcha Mercondar v. S. Eamalingam2 E.L.E. 51. Pradipta Kishore Das v. Md. Atahar andOthers, 2 E.L.E. 467.

r. 46(l)(iii).Shah Umair Sahib v. Eamohar an Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E

162.r. 46(l)(vi).

Shah Umair Sahib v. Eamoharan Singh and Others, 10 E.L.E.162.

r. 46(6).Badhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E.

148.

r. 47.Naranarayan Goswami v. H. D. Chaudhury and Others

2 E.L.E. 253. Nurul Islam v. Muhammad Bafique andOthers, 2 E.L.E. 70. GovindMalaviya v. Murli Manoharand Others, 8 E.L.E. 84. Kalicharan Singh v. Bama-oharitar Eai Yadav and Others, 5 E.L.E. 98.

r.Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Others,

10 E.L.E. 216. Damodar Goswami v. Nararayan Goswamiand Others, 10 E.L.E. 272. Eadhakrishnan v. Masila-mani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E. 148. Balailal DasMohapatra v. Trailakya Nath Prodhan and Others,4 E.L.E. 221. Bari Datt v. Madan Mohan and Others,7 E.L.E. 25. Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed andOthers, 5 E.L.E. 248. Marutrao Bhaurao and Others, v.Gulabrao Dadasaheb and Others, 5 E.L.E. 303. HariVishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Ishaque and Others,8 E.L.E. 350.

r. 47 (l){c), 82, 119.Gidwani Choithram Pratabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Chuhar-

mal and Others, 1 E.L.E, 294,

ELD-37

2/0 ELECTION LAW RERORTS DIGEST


r.49.Eadhakrishnan v. Masilamani Chettiar and Others, 4 E.L.E.

148.

r. 51.Pranlal Thakorlal Munshi v. Tndubhai Bhailalbhai Amin and

Others, 1 E.L.E.". 182.


4 E.L.E. 73.

Naranarayan Goswami v. H. D. Chaudhury and Others,2 E.L.E. 253.

r. 58.Pradipta Kishore Das v. Md. Atahar and Others, 2 E.L.E.

467.Shah Umair Sahib v. Eamacharan Singh and Others,

10 E.L.E. 162.

rr. 90 to 96.S. K. Sambandam v. Surya Eao and Others, 2 E.L.E. 61.

r. 91.S. PL. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.E. 341.

r. 92 (l)(d).Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.

r.96.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. of).S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.E. 341.

r. 97.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.E. 341.

r. 98.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.S. K. Sambandam v. Eecfcion Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.E. 341.

r.99.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E. 55.

S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,5 E.L.E. 341,

INDEX TO STATUTES REFERRED TO


r. 100.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 B.L.R. 55.S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.R. 341.

r. 101.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.E, 55.S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.R. 341.

r. 102.Sohan Lai v. Abinash Chander and Others, 4 E.L.R. 55.S. K. Sambandam v. Election Tribunal, Madras, and Others,

5 E.L.R, 341.

r. 111.Shankare Gowda v. Mariyappa and Another, 9 E.L.E. 101.

6 E.L.R. 288. S. Khader Sheriff v. Election Tribunal,Vellore, and Others, 7 E.L.R. 471. Linge Gowda v.Shivananjappa 6 E.L.R. 288.

r. 112.Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.

r. 117.Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh and Others, 4 E.L.R. 124.Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.

Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh and Others, 10 E.L.R.129.

r. 118.See CORRUPT P R A H C E : Employing more persons, pp. 23-25

supra.

r. 119.See ELECTION PETITION : Limitation pp. 132 to 140 supra.

Form 26, Parts D and F.

Ram Singh v. Ghasi Ram and Others, 9 E.L.R. 183.

Sch. I Form 5A.

See NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES.

Sch. II.See NOMINATION OP CANDIDATES.

Sch IV.Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57*


R. P. (Conduct of Elections and Election Petitions) Rules, 1951— {contd.)

Sch. VI.Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani, 4 E.L.E. 401.Earn Singh v. Ghasi Earn and Others, 9 B.L.E. 183.Amirchand v. Surendra Lai Jha and Others, 10 E.L.R. 57.

University of Baroda Act. 1949.

Sees. 10, 63.Hansa Jivraj Mehta v. Indubhai B. Amin and Others,

1 E.L.E. 171.

U. P. Land Utilization Act, 1948.

Sec. 3.Bholanath v, Krishna Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others

(No. 2) 6 E.L.E. 104.Sec. 104.

Bholanath v. Krishna Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others,.6 E.L.E. 105.

U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947.

Sec. 48.

Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishanker Prasad and Others,9 E.L.E. 403.

r. 61-A.Madan Pal v. Eajdeo TJpadhya and Others, 6 E.L.E. 28.

Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others,6 E.L.E. 138.

r. 6Beni Madho Eai v. Bhola and Others, 6 E.L.E. 308.

U. P. Sugar Factories Control Rules, 1948.

r. 4-A.Madan Pal v. Eajdeo Upadhya and Others, 6 E.L.R. 28.

A DIGEST

OF THE

ELECTION LAW REPORTSVOLS. I TO X.

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWEDREFERRED TO ETC.

Abdul Hayat Choudhari v. Zahur Ahmad Choudhari (2 Doabia 10)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 48

Abdul Jabbar v. Azizur Rahman (3 Jagat Narain 215)—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 165

Abdul Majid v. Sayed Ahmed (1 Doabia 229)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 194 ; 5 E.L.R. 248

Abdul Qadir Siddiqi v. Syed Abdul Hasan (3 Jagat Narain 127)— ref. 2 E.L.R. 426

Abdul Rahim v. Abu Mahamad (30 Bom. L.R. 774)—ref, 9 E.L.R. 36

Abdul Rauf v. Govind Ballabh Pant (8 E.L.R. 240)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Abdul Razack Sahib v. Hajee Mohammad Ismail (1 Doabia 169)See Bellary M. R.

Abdul Rouf v. Makhtar Ali (2 E.L.R. 340)— ref. 6 E.L.R. 138 ; 8 E.L.R. 480 ; 9 E.L.R.; 115

Abdul Wajid v. Sayed Ahmed (Sen and Poddar 610)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 25

Abdul Zabbar Palwan v. Azizur Rehman Mea (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 425)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375 *

Aberbrothock (25 Journ 667)— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 330

Abraham v. Abraham (9 M.I.A. 199)—ref.g E.L.R. 301

Achbay Lai Singh and Others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1947 Pat.90)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Agha Mir Ahmad, K. S. v. Mir Mudssir Shah (71 LA. 171)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 162


Agra City case (N.M.U.) (Hammond 9)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 312

Agra District (N.M.R.) Case (4 Jagat Narain 4)— ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Ahamad Thambi Maracayar v. Basava Maracayar (I.L.R. 46 Mad. 123)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 156; 8 E.L.R. 66

Ahmad v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 27

Ajayab Singh and Another v. Karnail Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 368)—affirmed 10 E.L.R. 189

Akyab (Indian Urban), 1928 (Hammond 46)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 288 ; 8 E.L.R. 265

Akyab West (Hammond 51)— relied on 4 E.L.R. 148

Alam Singh v. Gokal Singh (I.L.R. 35 All 484)— ref. 3 E.L.R. 162

Alcock Ashdown and Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority (50 LA. 227)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480

Aldridge v. Hurst ([1876] 1 C.P.D. 410)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144

Aligarh District, East (N.M.R.) (Hammond 56)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 6 E.L.R. 346

Aligarh District, West (N.M.R.) (Hammond 62)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432

Ali Muhammad Khan v. Ishaq AH Khan (I.L.R. 54 All. 57 F.B.)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123

Allah Dad Khan v. Sardar Mohammad Azam (2 Doabia 314)See Dera Ghazi Khan case

Allah Dad Khan v. Soofi Abdul Hamid Khan (1 Doabia 63)See Ambala and Simla 1937 *

Amazai case, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 1)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121

Ambala and Simla 1937 (Sen and Poddar 6 ; 1 Doabia 63)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 447 ; 5 E.L.R. 173, 199 ; 6 E.L.R. 28 ; 8 E.L.R 66

Ambala Division case (4 Khanna 22)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252 ; 6 E.L.R. 346

Ambala Division case, 1930 (Hammond Jj)r-ref. 6 E.L.R. 346; 2 E.L.R. 189 ; distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. lii

Ambala North Sikh Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 10,i Doabia 13)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252, 442 ; 5 E.L.R. 48, 173 ; 6 E.L.R. 346—relied on 2 E.L.R. 414

Ambala North Sikh Rural Constituency (2 Doabia 290)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301

Ameer Ali v. Yakub AH Khan (I.L.R. 41 Cal. 347)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247

Ameerunnissa Begum and Others v. Mahboob Begum and Others (A.LR.1953 S.C. 91) ref. 7 E.L.R. 203.

Amir Ali Khan v. Shamsul Huq (Sen and Poddar 1043)—relied on 3 E.L.R. 60 ;—ref. 7 E.L.R. 135

Amirchand v. Raoji (A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 714)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 276; 3 E.L.R. 162, 375

Amir Mohammad Khan v. Atta Mohammad Khan (1 Doabia 98)See Dera Ghazi Khan North case 1946.

Amir Mohammad Khan v. M. Ata Mohammad (Sen and Poddar 284)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305See Dera Ghazi Khan North case 1946

Amritsar and Sialkot General Rural Constituency case (2 Doabia 94)ref. 9 E.L.R. 101

Amritsar Central (Sikh) case 1937 (1 Doabia 332 ; Sen and Poddar 15)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121, 414; 5 E.L.R. 48, 116, 129, 408; 7 E.L.R. 407

Amritsar City (M), 1924 (Hammond 83)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 288—followed 1 E.L.R. 312—relied on 2 E.L.R. 163

Amritsar City (2 Hammond E.P. 17)— ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Amirtsar City case (2 Hammond's E.P. 26)— ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Amritsar City case (Sen and Poddar 28)dissented from 8 E.L.R. 265—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28, 414

Amritsar City Muhammadan Constituency, 1938 (Sen and Poddar 34)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 316 ; 7 E.L.R. 374; 8 E.L.R. 265 ; 9 E.L.R. 101—relied on 3 E.L.R. 71

IV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Amritsar South (Sikh) case 1937 (1 Doabia 92 ; Sen and Poddar 58)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 6 E.L.R. 316 ; 7 E.L.R. 100—relied on 7 E.L.R. 457Ananda Chandra v. Panchilal Sarma (5 Bom. L.R. 691)— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 109

Anandrao Rege v. Kailash Chandra Giri (1 E.L.R. 211)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 48

Anglo-Indian Constituency, Bengal, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 61)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 103

Anglo-Indian Constituency, Punjab, 1947 (Sen and Poddar 883 ;1 Doabia 259)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 162 ; 4 E.L.R. 341 ; 5 E.L.R. 48, 81, 129, 173 ;

7 E.L.R. 154, 338, 407—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 182—relied on 3 E.L.R. 1

Anglo-Indian (Punjab) case, 1946 (Sen and Poddar 66 ; 1 Doabia 247)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252 ; 2 E.L.R. 121; 3 E.L.R. 305; 4 E.L.R. 309;5 E.L.R. 48, 129, 173, 408 ; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346, 368 ; 7 E.L.R.407; 8 E.L.R. 320, 332—relied on 4 E.L.R. 441

Anglo-Indian (U.P.) case (2 Doabia 106)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 4 E.L.R. 341; 5 E.L.R. 81 ; 7 E.L.R. 154

Appaswami Padayachi v. Ethirajulu Naidu (A.I.R. 1926 Mad.1043)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144—relied on 1 E.L.R. 373

Apurba Krishna v. Emperor (I.L.R. 35 Cal. 141)-ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Arthur v. Commissioners of Sewer (8 Mod. 331)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 361

Ashutosh Sigdar v. Behari Lai (11 C.W.N. i o n )—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1 ; 8 E.L.R. 179

Ashworth v. McGuirk & Co. Ltd., ([1944] K.B. 1)—distinguished, 8 E.L.R. 20

Aslam Khan v. Fazlul Haq (4 E.L.R. 341)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 470

Asrar Ahmad v. Nihaluddin and Others (3 E.L.R. 81)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Athikesavalu Naidu v. Ekambara Mudaliar (1939, 1 M.L.J, 420)—followed 3 E.L.R. 42

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. V

Atre, P. K. v. Naravne (i E.L.R. 365)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 240—followed 9 E.L.R. 115

Attar Singh v. Thakar Singh (12 C.W.N. 1049)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467

Attock case (1 Jagat Narain 1; 1 Hammond's E.P. 1)—followed 3 E.L.R. 347

Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant Co. [1935]A.C. 532—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133 ; 8 E.L.R. 159, 350

Attorney-General v. Wilts United Dairies Ltd (1921) (37 E.L.R. 884)— distinguished 7 E.L.R. 364

Awadhesh Prasad Sinha v. Prabhavathi Gupta and Others (8 E.L.R.45)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480

Azamgarh Case (Hammond 95)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 88 ; 6 E.L.R. 470

Audesh Pratap Singh v. Brij Narain and Others (9 E.L.R. 1)—relied on 10 E.L.R. 345—ref. 10 E.L.R. 198

Baba Gurdit Singh's case (1 Doabia 92)—ref. See Amritsar South (Sikh) case 1937

Baba Khalel Ahmad's case (Sen and Poddar 166)Babu Chhail Behari Lai Kapoor v. Thakur Moti Singh (2 Jagat Narain

17)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Babu Gajendra Chandra Chaudhury and Seven Others v. The Hon'bleRai P.C. Datta Bahadur (Hammond 387)ref. 10 E.L.R. 57See Benares-cum-Mirzapur Cities

Babu Jagan Nath Prasad v. Raja Maheshwar UayalSeth (2 Doabia 217)See Sitapur District (East) General Rural Constituency

Babu Jyoti Bhusan v. Babu Shiva Prasad Gupta (A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 205)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

Babu Lai v. Jagat Narain (A.I.R. 1953 V.P. 51)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207

Baddrudduja Syed v. Mohammad Khoda Buksh (2 E.L.R. 189)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309 ; 6 E.L.R/368; 7 E.L.R. 338

Badri Prasad v. Sheo DossDaga (2 Khanna 321)—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441

fVI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bagaram Tulpude v. State of Bihar (I.L.R. 29 Pat. 401)—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272

Badri Prasad v. Sheodas Daga (2 Jagat Narain 146)See Raipur North case

Bafan Juma v. State (A.I.R. Kutch 91)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

Bahu Vyankatesh, In re (A.I.R. 1925 Bom. 433)—followed 6 E.L.R. 388

Baijnath Prasad v. Chandreshwar Narain Prasad Singh and Others(2 E.L.R. 88)—ref. 3 E.L.R.147, 375 ; 4 E.L.R. 309; 5 E.L.R. 353

Balailal Das Mohapatra v. Trailakya Nath Prodhan and' Others (4E L.R. 221)—ref. 5 E.L.R 248—considered 7 E.L.R. 25

Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar (I.L.R. 40 Mad. 793)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

Balakrishnan v. State of Madras (1952, 1 M.L.J. 514)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 7 E.L.R. 1

Balaraman v. Corporation of Madras (1952, 1 M.L.J. 655)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Balasore South case (3 Jagat Narain 93)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197 ; 9 E.L.R. 324

Balasubramanian P. N. v. C. R. Narasimhan and Others (1 E.L.R. 461)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309 ; 5 E.L.R. 81, 386; 6 E.L.R. 224,368, 470;7 E.L.R. 338, 496

Balbir Singh v. Arjan Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 341)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 90, 119; 10 E.L.R. 49

Balchand v. Laxmi Narain and Others (8 E.L.R. 465)—relied on 9 E.L.R. 403

Baldwin and Others v. Ellis and Others [1929] 1 K.B. 273—ref 1 E.L.R. 182, 461; 6 E.L.R. 346—relied on 7 E.L.R. 338, 496

Ballia case (Hammond 27)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247— ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Balwantrao Anantrao Rege v. Kailashchandragiri (1 E.L.R. 211)•—ref. 10 E.L.R. 450, 461

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. VH

Bama Charan Chakraburty v. Nimai Nandal (A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 114)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Banarsi Stores v. President of the Indian Republic (A.I.R. 1953 All. 318)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Banbury v. Fuller (9 Exch. 111)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 14

Banerji, D. N. v. P. R. Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1953 S.£. 58)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489 ; 9 E.L.R. 201

Bangalore Woollen, Cotton and Silk Mills Co., Ltd. v. Labour AppellateTribunal (I.L.R. 1953 Mys. 287)—followed 9 E.L.R. 201

Bank v. Turner (30 L.J. Ch. 379)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1

Bankat Lai v. Madan Mohan and Others (3 E.L.R. 375)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309; 6 E.L.R. 470 ; 7 E.L.R. 338—approved 4 E.L.R. 441

Banwarilal Roy, In re (48 C.W.N. 766)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53

Bapu Vithal Rajput v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1932 Bom. 370;—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Barabanki cum Fyzabad General Rural Constituency: Babu RupNarain v. K. Rajendra Singh (2 Doabia 347)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341 ; 7 E.L.R. 457

Bareilly City (N.M.U.), 1924 (Hammond 127)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 211; 6 E.L.R. 414

Barindra Kumar Ghose and Others v. Emperor (I.L.R. yj Cal. 467)- ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Barlow v. Teal (15 Q.B.D. 403)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68

Barret, T.M. v. African Products Ltd. (A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 261)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

Barrow-in-Furness (1886) 4 0 ' M. & H. 78—ref. 2 E.L.R. 426 ; 9 E.L.R. 242

Basant Singh v. Ratan Singh (1 Dobia 80 ; Sen and Poddar 313)— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 426See Ferozepore East (Sikh) case 1946

Basappa v. Nagappa and Others (3 E.L.R. 197)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 216

Viii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Basappa, T.C. v. Nagappa (10 E.L.R. 14)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 272, 345, 376—relied on 10 E.L.R. 198, 216

Basavanagoudara Reddi v. Ijari Sirsappa (Election Case No. 3 of 1952)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 374

Basdeo v. John Smidt (I.L.R. 22 All. 55)—ref. 2 E.L.R, 109 ; 5 E.L.R. 21 ; 9 E.L.R. 403

Bashir Ahmad v. Akhtar Husain Khan (2 Doabia 341; Sen and Poddar

564)See Moradabad District North-West Muhammdan Rural Constituencycase of 1937

Basti District North-East General Rural Constituency case, 1937 (Senand Poddar 106 ; 2 Doabia 355)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 20, 88, 121, 225, 414 ; 3 E.L.R. 305 ; 5 E.L.R. 129,446 ; 6 E.L.R. 470 ; 7 E.L.R. 301, 407— applied 5 E.L.R. 341—relied on 3 E.L.R. 1

Basu Sinha v. Rajandhari Sinha (3 Jagat Narain 80)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 30

Batala Sikh case, 1946 (Sen and Poddar 122; 2 Doabia 263)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252, 271, 442 ; 2 E.L.R. 27, 103, 121, 225, 426 ;4 E.L.R. 118 ; 5 E.L.R. 173, 446 ; 6 E.L.R. 346 ; 8 E.L.R. 311—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 182—relied on 4 2 E.L.R. 414; E.L.R. 441

Batala Sikh 1937 (Sen and Poddar 115)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 116

Batuk v. Surat Municipality (A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 133; 10 E.L.R. 216—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Bavalal v. Jivanlal (A.I.R. 1951 Sau. 43)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

B. B. L. Railway v. District Board (I.L.R. 30 Pat. 287)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68

Begum Wahidul Hasan v. Amajdi Bano Begum (Sen and Poddar 487)See Lucknow City M.U.W. case 1946

Bsjay Singh v. Narbada Charan Lai and Others (2 E.L.R. 426)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 200; 6 E.L.R. 138,341; 7 E.L.R. 90, 119;8 E.L.R. 320—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 14—followed 7 E.L.R. 203

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. IX

Belfast Borough Western Division case (4 O'M. & H. 105)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 240

Belfast case (4 O'M. & H. 108)•:' —ref. 6 E.L.R. 2881 Belgaum District (N.M.R.) case (2 Jagat Narain 31 ; 2 Hammond E.P

' 45)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52 ; 3 E.L.R. 423 ; 4 E.L.R. 234 ; 5 E.L.R. 446; 6E.L.R. 414 ; 7 E.L.R. 234

Bellary M. R. (Sen and Poddar 136 ; 1 Doabia 169)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 271; 7 E.L.R. 234 ; 9 E.L.R. 324—relied on 1 E.L.R. 312—disapproved 5 E.L.R. 199—followed 6 E.L.R. 138

Benaras and Mirzapur Districts Mohammadan Rural Constituency case.1937 (Sen and Poddar 154 ; 2 Doabia 197)—dissented from 2 E.L.R. 301—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230; 6 E.L.R. 247—followed 2 E.L.R. 234—approved 1 E.L.R. 330

Benares~cum-Mirzapur Cities (Sen and Poddar 166)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 274; 5 E.L.R. 173, 199—relied on 2 E.L.R. 276

Bengal Legislative Council case: Sinha v. B. A. Roy (2 Doabia 368)—followed 5 E.L.R, 199—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Bengal Marwari Association case (Hammond 157)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330

B. N. Railway Co. v. Moolji Sicka (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 815)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467

Beni Madho Rai v. Bhola and Others (6 E.L.R. 308)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480

Beohor Singh Raghubir Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax (A.I. R.1948 Nag. 228)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Beresford Hope v. Lady Sandhurst ([1889] 23 Q.B.D. 7 9)—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 199 ; 7 E.L.R. 234

Besant's case (46 I.A. 76)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 499

Betual District case (1 Doabia 211) (sic.)—ref. 4 E.L.R/309; 7 E.L.R. 338; 8 E.L.R. 332

X ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Beverley (i 0 ' M. & H. 147)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 71

Beverley (1 O' M. & H. 143)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Bewdley case (3 O' M. & H. 145)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

Bhagalpur case (3 E.L.R. 423)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Bhagalpur North (N.M.R.) 1921 (Hammond 165)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81

Bhagwan Das's case (4 Jagat Narain 12)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 147

Bhagwati Das v. Thakur Bishambhar Singh (2 Jagat Narain 62) (sic)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305

Bhaishankar v. The Municipal Corporation of Bombay (I.L.R. 31 Bom.605—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68, 89

Bhalwal Mohammedan Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 230)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73; 8 E.L.R. 105

Bhandara cases (4 Khanna 55)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 346

Bhandara case (4 Jagat Narain 22)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252; 2 E.L.R. 414; 4 E.L.R. 309; 7 E.L.R. 338

Bhan Singh v. Krishna Kant and Another (4 E.L.R. 212)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320

Bhanwarlal Sogani v. Damodar Lai Vyas and Others (7 E.L.R. 407)—-ref. 9 E.L.R. 21

Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank, Delhi (A.I.R.1950 S.C. 188; [1950] S.C.R. 459)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179; 9 E.L.R. 494 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

Bhola Nath v. Krishna Chandra Gupta (3 E.L.R. 288) f—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55; 9 E.L.R. 403

Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narain (A.I.R. 1942 Cal. 498)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 414

Bibhabati Devi v. Ramendra Narain (A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 19)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220

Bibi Kunda v. Onkar Nath (A.I.R. 1939 Lah. 63)•—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC XI

Bihar case (Sen and Poddar 746)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Bihar and Orissa Landholders' Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 129)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265

Bijoy Singh v. Narbada Charan Lai (2 E.L.R. 426)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55

Bijoy Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Calcutta (35 Bom. L.R. 811)

—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Bhikaji Keshao v. Brijlal Biyani and Others (6 E.L.R. 53)—reversed 10 EL.R. 357

Bimala Prosad Ray v. State of West Bengal (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 258)—relied on 8 E.L.R: 179

Birch v. Wigon Corporation [1953] (1 Q.B.D. 136)

—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179

Biman Chandra v. Governor, West Bengal (A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 799)

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Bishanlal v. Kisan Vithoba (A.I.R. 1937 Nag. 108)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Bishembardas v. Brijalal (A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 590)

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Bishnu Kumar Singh v. Ram Bilas Sinha and Others (3 E.L.R. 60)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 135

Deo d. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges (1 B. & Ad. 847)— ref. 8 E.L.R. 159

Board of Education v. Rice (1911) A.C. 179—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Bobby v. Crosbie (1915) 85 L.J.K.B. 239—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railwaj' Company Ltd. v. SiyajiMills Company Ltd. (A.I.R. 1927 All. 514)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 137.

Bombay Central Division (M.R.) 1935 (Hammond 201)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81; 7 E.L.R. 100

Bombay City case (Hammond 181)

- not followed 1 E.L.R. 384

Bombay City, 1924 case (Hammond 173)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265, 448

Bombay City North N.M.U. 1924 (Hammond 185)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197

Xll ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Bombay City South (Hammond 191)—re}. 8 E.L.R. 105 ; 10 E.L.R. 461

Bombay City (M.U.) i924Mohamedally Allabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdulla-bhoy Lalji and Others (Hammond 175)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 288, 447

Borough of i Evesham case (3 O'M. & H. 94)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197

Bowman v. Lewis (11 Otto 22 ; 25 Law Ed. 989)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Bradlaugh, Ex parte (3 Q.B.D. 509)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Bradely v. Sylvester ([1872] 25 L.T. 459)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 341

Bradshaw v. Foster (5 O'M. & H. 37)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23

Braja Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Gobinda Pradhana (Sen andPoddar 82)—relied on 3 E.L.R. 17 ;— distinguished 3 E.L.R. 26

Brazee v. Michigan (60 Law Ed. 342)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471

Breedlove v. Suttles [(1937) 302 U.S. 277]—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Bridgewater case (1 O'M. & H. 116)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105

Brij Bhukhan Lai v. Moti Lai (4 Khanna 147)—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441

Brij Kishore Ram Sarup v. Sheo Charan Lai (A.I.R. 1938 All. 69)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Brij Naresh Singh v. Thakur Hukum Singh (2 E.L.R. 266)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 147, 375 ; 4 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 129 ; 6 E.L.R.470 ; 7 E.L.R. 234, 407 ; 9 E.L.R. 21; 10 E.L.R. 1—followed 5 E.L.R. 248

Brindaban Prasad Tiwari v. Sitaram and Others (5 E.L.R. 48)—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 154 ; 8 E.L.R. 311—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Broad v. Perkins (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 533—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

t

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Xlii

Brojo Lai Sahu v. Budh Nath Pyari Lai (A.I.R. 1928 Cal. 148)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722—ref. 10 E.L.R. 162

Buckman v. Button [(1943) 1 K.B. 405]—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55

Budhram v. Returning Officer, Bhandara (Miscellaneous Petition No1779 of 1951, decided on 18th December, 1951)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186

Bulandashahar case (1 Hammond's E.P. 85)—dissented from 5 E.L.R. 156

Bulandshahar District (East) 1921 (Case No. XVII) : Chaudhuri AmarSingh v. Pandit Nanak Chand (Hammond 219 ; 1 Jagat Narain 27)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248, 280, 288 ; 5 E.L.R. 446 ; 6 E.L.R. 138 ; 8E.L.R. 66—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442

Bulandshar District M.R. Constituency case 1940 (Sen and Poddar 243)— ref. 2 E.L.R. 340; 5 E.L.R. 116

Bulandshar East case (2 Doabia 180)—ref. 8 E.L.R, 105

Burdwan Central General Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar 249)— ref. 5 E.L.R. 327

Burdwan North-East General Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar 251)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 327

Bushell v. Hammond [1904] 73 L.J.K.B. 1005ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Butler v. Manchester Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry. (21 Q.B.D. 207)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471

Calcutta North Muhammadan Urban Constituency case 1537: Muham-mad Siddique v. Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin (Sen and Poddar 253;2 Doabia 322)—followed 2 E.L.R. 461; 8 E.L.R. 240—ref. 2 E.L.R. 54; 7 E.L.R. 301

Calcutta North (N.M.U.) 1924 (Hammond 253)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280

Calcutta South case (Hammond 261)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Calcutta South case (2 Khanna 98)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252

XIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Camden (Marquis) v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ([1914] 1 K.B. 641)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Carter v. Mills (9 C.P. 117)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 496

Caton v. Caton (L.R. 2 H.L. 127)—distinguished 7 E.L.R. 465

Cawnpore District (N.M.R.) 1931 (Hammond 271)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81

C. P. Commerce and Industry case (Hammond 282)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Chabot v. Lord Morpeth (15 Q.B. 446)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 216

Chairman of the Howrah Municipality v. Khetra Krishna Mitter (I.L.R.33 Cal. 1290)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 397

Chakkarai Chettiar, In re (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 96)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Champaran North case (2 Khanna 104)—relied on 2 E.L.R. 70

Champsey Bhara & Co. v. Jivraj Bhallo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.(44 M.L.J. 766)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Chandernath v. Jaswant Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 147)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 375; 5 E.L.R. 129; 6 E.L.R. 368; 7 E.L.R. 47; 234,407; 9 E.L.R. 21—explained 4 E.L.R. 441—approved 6 E.L.R. 470

Chandra Nath Bagchi v. Nabadwip Chandra Dutt and Others (A.I.R.1931 Cal. 478—ref. 3 E.L.R. 397

Charanjitlal Chowdhury v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1951 S.C, <r>—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203— distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272

Charan Singh's case (2 E.L.R. 276)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Chartered Bank of India v. Imperial Bank of India (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 534)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197

Charu Chandra v. Snigdhendu Prosad and Others (A.I.R. 1948 Cal. 150)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480

I

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XV

- Chaturbhuj Vithaldas v. Moreshwar Parashram (9 E.L.R. 301 ; [1954]S.C.R. 817)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 103, 376

Chaudhri Allahdad Khan v. Safi Abdul Hameed Khan (1 Doabia 63)—-See Ambala and Simla 1937

Chettiar. A. v. Thevar (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 12; 2 D.L.R. 298 P.C.)- ref. 9 E.L.R. 375

Chhail Bihari Lall v. Motisingh (Hammond 125)—See Bareilly City (N.M.U.) 1924

Chhail Behari Lall Kapur v. Shyam Sundar Lall (3 Jagat Narain 59)ref. 6 E.L.R. 288; 9 E.L.R. 324

Chhotalal Aditram Trivedi v. Rai Mahakore (I.L.R. 41 Bom. 466)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247

Chhota Nagpur Division case (2 Hammond E.P. 99)— ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Chichester and Wife v. Cobb (14 L.T. 433)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Chidambaragauda v. Channappa (A.I.R. 1934 Bom. 329)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Chifford and O'Sullivan, In re ([1921] 2 A.C. 570)—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 216

Chingleput case (Hammond 310)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105

Chinnappa Reddi v. ThomasuReddi (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 265)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Chiraghdin and Another v. Ch. Jehanghir Khan (2 Doabia 144)—See Okara Muhammadan Constituency case

Chiranjit Lai Chowdhuri v. The Union of India and Others ([1951] S.C.R.869; A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 41)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 171, 203

Chitale R.B.G.K. and Another v. Nandevarao and Another (Ahmeda-nagar) (3 Jagat Narain 180)

Chittagong case: Haji Badi Ahmad v. Md. Anwarul Azim (Sen andPoddar 261)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57—ref. 9 E.L.R. 324—followed 3 E.L.R. 347

Chocklingam Chetty v. Seethai Achi ([1927] I.L.R, 6 Ran. 29 P.C.)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

XVI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Choudhari Amarsingh v. Pandit Nanak Chand (Hammond 219)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

City of Londonderry Election Petition, i860, R.E. (E.E, Digest Vol. 26275)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 406

Cladow v. Pinnel (1877, 2 C.P.D. 562)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 47

Clay v. Yates (25 L.J. Ex. 237)—distinguished r E.L.R. 339

Cockermouth case (5 0 ' M. & H. 155)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248

Coconada General Rural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 267)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 470—not followed 2 E.L.R. 20

Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Venkata Narrainappah (8 M.I.A.529 at 554)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Colonial Bank of Australasia v. Willan (App. Cas. 417 P.C.)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68, 89; 2 E.L.R. 263; 5 E.L.R. 1; 8 E.L.R. 350

Commissioner of Income-tax v. Ekbal & Co. (A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 316)— ref. 9 E.L.R. 21

Commissioner of Income-tax, Bengal v. Shaw Wallace & Co. (34 Bom.L.R. 1033)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 16)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53; 8 E.L.R. 84

Cooper v. Slade (1858) 6 H.L. Cas. 746-ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Rameshwar Prasad Varma (A.I.R. 1942 Pat.452)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330

Countess of Rothes v. Kirkcalady and Dysart Water Works Commis-sioners (7 A.C. 694)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104

Cowper-Essex v. Acton C.B. (1889) 14 App. Cas. 153, 169—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

Cox v. Davies (2 Q.B. 202)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 300

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. XV11

Cox v. Truscott (1905) 21 T.L.R. 319; (1905) 92 L.T. 650—distinguished and doubted 9 E.L.R. 301—ref. 3 E.L.R. 42; 7 E.L.R. 428

; Cumberland (Cockermouth Division) case (5 0 ' M. & H. 155)•i —ref. 6 E.L.R. 288

•; Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 193)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489.

' Dartmouth case (1845) B. & Arm. 460•—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 417

Das Gupta P. K. v. C. Das (2 Hammond E. P. 185)—See Midnapore South case

Dattatraya Trimback Aradhye v. Shamrao Pandurang Legade andOthers (3 Jagat Narain 193)ref. 3 E.L.R. 403

Dattatreya Moreshwar Pangarkar v. State of Bombay [1952] S.C.R. 612—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Davies v. Kensington (1874, L.R. 9 C.P. 720)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 12,266; 5 E.L.R. 48

Dawson v. African Consolidated Land and Trading Company (1898)1 Ch. 6—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417

Debi Prasad v. Mohammed Nazeer (3 E.L.R. 137)—relied on 6 E.L.R. 123, 288, 414—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55—followed 5 E.L.R. 93—not followed 8 E.L.R. 240

Debi Prasad Sri Krishna Prasad Ltd. v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1941All. 377; I.L.R. 1941 All. 741)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 428; 9 E.L.R. 301

Delanev. Hillcoat (9 B. & C. 310; 109 E.R. 115)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 171; 2 E.L.R. 325; 6 E.L.R. 414 ; 10 E.L.R. 203

Deo Chand and Others v. Vashist Narain and Others (6 E.L.R. 138)—explained 8 E.L.R. 265—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480—dissented from 9 E.L.R. 403—reversed 10 E.L.R. 30

Dera Ghazi Khan case (Sen and Poddar 275; 2 Doabia 314)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73; 8 E.L.R. 105•—distinguished 9 E.L.R, 93

iii

XV111 ELECTION LA.W REPORTS DIGEST

Dera Gazi Khan North case, 1946, (Sen and Poddar 284; 1 Doabia 98)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 3 E.L.R. 305; 5 E.L.R. 48,327—distinguished 9 E.L.R. 93

De Silva, E. v. Attorney-General, Ceylon (A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 262)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186

Desai Basawaraj v. Dasankop Hasansab and Others (4 E.L.R. 380)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 461

Desi Chettiar v. Chinnaswami Chettiar [1928] (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 1271;1928 M.L.J. 162)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133: 2 E.L.R. 167

Deveshwar Verma v. Deoraj Sethi (Sen and Poddar 504)—See Lyallpur and Jhang General Constituency case 1938

Devi Dayal v. State of Pepsu (A.I.R. 1953 Pepsu 9)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 183

Devidas v. Nilkantharao (I.L.R. 1936 Nag. 73)—ref. 6 E.L.R. r

Dharendra Krishna Mukherji v. Nihar Ganguli and Others (A.I.R. 1943Cal. 266)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1; 8 E.L.R. 179

Dharwar Urban Bank Ltd. and Another v. Krishnarao Anantrao Konur(30 Bom. L.R. 203)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Dibrugarh N.M.R. (Hammond 337)—relied on 3 E.L.R. 197

Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps [1899] A.C. 99—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (9 E.L.R. 485)—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 245—followed 10 E.L.R. 357

Dinesh Chandra v. Rajendra Chandra (A.I.R. 1938 Cal. 324)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Din Shah and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others (6 E.L.R. 247)—ref 10 E.L.R. 450, 461

Dinshaw Shroff v. Income-tax Commissioner (I.L.R. 1943 Bom. 152)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Din Singh and Others v. Kapil Deo and Others (6 E.L.R. 247)—followed 8 E.L.R. 28

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC.

Director of Public Prosecutions v. Lamb [(1941) 2 K.B. 89]—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55

District Magistrate, Trivandrum v. Mammen Mappillai (I.L.R. 1939Mad. 708)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Ditcher v. Dension ([1857] 11 Moore P.C. 325)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

Drougheda case (1 O'M. & H. 256)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105

Drogheda case (2 O' M. & H. 202)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73;—relied on 4 E.L.R. 148

Durga Prasad Mutsaddi Lai v. The Firm Rulia Mai Doogar Mai (A.I.R.1922 Lah. 100)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339.

Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others (9 E.L.R.494)—followed 10 E.L.R. 376, 426—relied on 10 E.L.R. 345

Durham case (2 0 ' M. & H. 152)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 6 EX.R. 197; 8 E.L.R. 240

Dwijendra Narain v. Joges Chandra (A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 600)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

East Clare case (4 0 ' M. & H. 162)—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442

East Cork (6 0 ' M. & H. 318)— ref. 6 E . L.R. 414

East Cork (6 O'M. & H. 340)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

East Dorset (6 0 ' M. & H. 22)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283; 9 E.L.R. 101

East Kerry (6 0 ' M. & H. 85)-ref. 4 E.L.R. 73

East Nottingaham (6 0 ' M. & H. 292)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 101

Ebrahim Aboobakar v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property ([1952]S.C.R. 696; A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 319)—ref. 5 E.L.R. i, 103, 230; 6 E.L.R. 162; 7 E.L.R. 489; 8 E.L.R.119, 207, 220—relied on 10 E.L.R. 216

XX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Ebrahim Saheb v. Regional Transport Authority, Tanjore [1950] 2M.L.J. 592—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Edye v. Robertson (112 U.S. 580)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 364

Election Commission, India v. Saka Venkata Rao (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 210;2 E.L.R. 499)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186; 7 E.L.R. 301; 8 E.L.R. 119, 159, 341, 350;

10 E.L.R. 14, 272—followed 5 E.L.R. 197

Electric Company Ltd. Province of Bombay (A.I.R. 1947 Bom. 276)-ref. 6 E.L.R. 53

Elgin and Nairn case (5 O' M. & H. 1)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283; 7 E.L.R. 301

Eli Vadapalli v. Bayya Suryanarayanamurthi (Sen and Poddar 267)See Coconada General Rural Constituency, 1937.

Emmens v. Elderton (4 H.L.C. 624)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 188 ; 6 E.L.R. 414—applied 8 E.L.R. 20

Emmens v. Pottle ([1885] 16 Q.B.D. 358)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Emperor v. Ali (5 I.C. 915)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Emperor v. Bhawanidas (A.I.R. 1916 All. 299)—followed 6 E.L.R. 338

Emperor v. Hemendra Prosad Ghosh. (I.L.R. (1939) 2 Cal. 411)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Emperor v. Kuchal Pal Singh (A.I.R. 1931 All. 443)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Emperor v. Mallappa Tejappa (A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 14)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Emperor v. Rachappa (A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 221)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Emperor v. Savalaram Kasinath (A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 156)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 156)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Emperor v. Sohrai Koeri and Another (A.I.R. 1938 Pat. 550)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 339

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. XXI

Enatulla Basuniav. Jiban Mohan Roy (I.L.R. 41 Cal. 956)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 327

England v. Inglis [1920] 2 K.B. 636—ref. 7 E.L.R. 416

Estate and Trust Agencies (1927) Ltd. v. Singapore Improvement Trust[1937] A.C. 398—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417.

Evesham ([1880] 3 O'M. & H. 95)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Exeter case (6 0 ' M. & H. 228)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 496

Fairchild v. Hughes (258 U.S. 126)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Fakir Mahomed Ramzan v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 Bom. 151)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Faqir Chand v. Pritam Singh (7 E.L.R. 119)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320

Faroqui v. Maulvi Mohammad Habib Ullah and Others (2 Doabia 24 ;Sen and Poddar 202)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 205 ; 341

Farquharson v. Morgan ([1894] 1 Q.B. 552)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Farrukhabad case: Sarup Narain v. Raja Durga Narain (3 JagatNarain 22)—followed 3 E.L.R. 347—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28

Fateh Singh v. Suraj Mai (2 Doabia 47)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197

Feldman, Re (97 L.T. 548)—distinguished 8 E.L.R. 20

Feni Muhammadad Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar 310)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 116, 327

Ferozepore Central Mohammadan Constituency, 1946 case (Sen andPoddar 903)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265

Ferozepore East (Sikh) case 1946 (1 Doabia 80 ; Sen and Poddar 313)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 162, 211; 2 E.L.R. 121 ; 3 E.L.R. 60 ; 4 E.L.R.

118; 5 E.L.R. 48, 129; 7 E.L.R. 407— distinguished 2 E.L.R. 426

XX11 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST "

Few, v. C. E. Gibbon (i Doabia 247 ; Sen and Poddar 66)—See Anglo-Indian (Punjab) case

Fida Hussain v. Sheobhajan Singh and Others (4 E.L.R. 1)-ref. 9 E.L.R. 33

Firm Durga Parshad v. Firm Fuliamal (A.I.R. 1922 Lah. 100)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Firm of Shriram Narayandas (34 Bom. L.R. 236)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339

Ford v. Newth ([1901] 1 Q.B. 683)—ref. 3 E.L.R 42—relied on 5 E.L.R. 417

Forster v. Forster (32 L.J.Q.B. 314)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 361

Gadilingana Gowd, Y. v. H. Sitarama Reddi and Others (Gaz. of IndiaExtra. Part II, sec. 3, No. 62, 9-3-1953, page 767)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28

Dr. Gairola, K. N. v. Gangadhar Maithani and Others (3 E.L.R. 162)—followed 5 E.L.R. 116—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Gajendra Chandra Chaudhuri and Others v. P.C. Datta (2 Jagat Narain85 ; Hammond 387)—See Habibganj South N.M.R. 1924

Galbdoo Kalloo v. S. Rajan and Another (1953 N.L.J. 7)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 34 ; 6 E.L.R. 53

Galway case (1 0 ' M. & H. 307)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 404; 10 E.L.R. 376

Ganesh Krishna v. Nandevrao (3 Jagat Narain 180)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 271; 7 E.L.R. 234; 9 E.L.R. 324

Ganga Prasad Shastri v. Panna Lai and Others (8 E.L.R. 448)—relied on 9 E.L.R. 403—ref. 8 E.L.R. 465

Gaura Telin v. Shriram Bhoyer and Others (A.I.R. 1926 Nag. 265)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Gauri Shankar Prasad v. Thakur Hanuman Singh (1 Jagat Narain 9)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 60

George Edmund DeSilva v. Attorney-General of Ceylon (A.I.R. 1949P.C. 261)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

1

I

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. XX111\

Gethard v. Clarke (L.R. 5 C.P. 223)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 461.

Ghasi Ram v. Ram Singh and Others (4 E.L.R. 124)—explained 7 E.L.R. 320,—dissented from 6 E.L.R. 414,—affirmed 9 E.L.R. 183,—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28 ; 9 E.L.R. 115, 242, 403; 10 E.L.R. 57

Gian Chand v. Sriram Bansal and Others (2 E.L.R. 136)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 1, 171; 10 E.L.R. 450—followed 5 E.L.R. 128,—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 386

Gidwani Choitahram Partabrai v. Agnani Thakurdas Chuharamal(1 E.L.R. 194)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 221 ; 7 E.L.R. 25, 189; 10 E.L.R. 272— dissented from 5 E.L.R. 248,—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 214 ; 2 E.L.R. 70,—followed 2 E.L.R. 253,—relied on 2 E.L.R. 398

Gill, H.H.B. and Another v. The King (A.I.R. 1948 P.C. 128)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Girish Chandra v. Ram Saran (I.L.R. 1929 Cal. 591)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Girish Chandra Majhi v. Girish Chandra Maity (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 574)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 179

Gobardhan Das v. Rao Bahadur Ch. Lai Chand (1 Jagat Narain 57)— See Rohtak case.

-Gobindjee Madhwajee and Co. Ltd. v. C.J. Smith and Another (A.I.R.1928 Pat. 568)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Gobind Ram v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1942 Sind 62)—followed 6 E.L.R. 388.

Gokaldas Hirjee v. Zaveri Vallabhadas Valji and Others (2 E.L.R. 234)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 245 ; 5 E.L.R. 129 ; 6 E.L.R. 247

Gokul Chandra Das v. Manager of Baniachong Mozumdari WardEstate (A.I.R. 1939 Cal. 720)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480

Gokul Prasad v. Mr. K.M. Dharmadhihari (4 Jagat Narain 32)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247

Golaghat case (Sen and Poddar 10)—ref, 6 E.L.R. 346

XXIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Golaghat (N.M.R.) 1924 : Tara Prasad v. Rai Bahadur Devi CharanBaruah (Hammond 375)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 4 E.L.R. 341

Gold v. Essex C.C. ([1942] 2 K.B. 293)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Golghat case (Hammond 378)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Gondia General Rural Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 326; 1Doabia 206)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 306, 309; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346 ; 7 E.L.R. 135, 338 ;

8 E.L.R. 332,- relied on 4 E.L.R. 112—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441

Goolbai Motabhai Shroff v. Pestonji Cowasji (37 Bom. L.R. 410)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 374 ; 9 E.L.R. 451

Goonesinha v. O.L. De Krester (A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 83)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1 ; 8 E.L.R. 350

Gopalakrishnan, J.T. v. H.S. Raja Iyengar (A.I.R. 1953 Mys. 8)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 201

Gopalan, A.K. v. State of Madras ([1950] S.C.R. 88)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 34T; 10 E.L.R. 376

Gopalan Saran v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bihar (37 Bom. L.R. 817)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Gopeshwar Prasad Sahi v. State of Bihar (I.L.R. 30 Pat. 735)—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272

Gorakhpur case : Suraj Narain v. Shri Ram Nath (3 E.L.R. 305)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 338, 8 E.L.R. 332

Goree v. Casill (Ann. Cas. 1914 D. 549)—ref. 5 E.L.R, 156

Gosling v. Veley (16 L.J.Q.B. 201)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 199; 7 E.L.R. 234

Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lai v. Madho Prasad and Others (A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 147)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Govindappa v. Hanumanthappa (A.I.R. 1916 Mad. 745)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Govindaswami Pillai v.Ramalingaswamy and Others (A. I.R. 1932 Mad. 321)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52

Govind Prasad Srivatsava and Another v. State of Bhopal (A.I.R. 1952Bhopal 1)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXV

Grant v. Overseers of Pagham (1877) 3 C.P. 100—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Great Western Railway v. Bater ([1952] A.C. 1)-—ref. 8 E.L.R. 84

Great Yarmouth case (5 O'M & H. 176)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 100, 471

Guardians of the Poor of the West Derby Union v. The MetropolitanLife Assurance Society and Others ([1897] A.C. 647)—ref. 3 E.L.R.318

Gudiyattam case (E.A. No. 109 of 1952)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Gulabchand Chand Chordia v. Thakur Norain Singh and Others6 E.L.R. 397)

—ref. 10 E.L.R, 49Gurbaksh Singh v. Baldev Singh (1 Doabia 13)

•—See Ambala North (Sikh) Constituency caseGurdaspur North (Sikh) Constituency case (1 Doabia 341; 10 E.L.R. 1)

— ref. 10 E.L.R. 376Gurnam Singh v. Partap Singh (7 E.L.R. 338)

—ref. 8 E.L.R. 332Gyee, U.M. v. Y.B. Tin (A.I.R. 1928 Rang. 245)

— ref. 9 E.L.R. 375Habibganj case (Hammond 391)

—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105Habibganj South N.M.R. 1924 (Hammond 387)

—relied on 5 E.L.R. 401—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Habib Shah v. Debi Bax Singh (14 I.C. 221)—relied on 9 E.L.R. 361

Habibur Rahman v. Nawab Sir K.G.M. Faroqui (Sen and Poddar 802)—see Tipperah North case

Hackney case ([1874] 2 O'M. & H. 77; 31 L.T. 69)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 12, 121, 266; 3 E.L.R. 248; 4 E.L.R. 441;5 E.L.R. 156, 195; 7 E.L.R. 234; 8 E.L.R. 66—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442; 7 E.L.R. 77—followed 4 E.L.R. 301

Haflzabad Mohammadan Constituency case : Ahmad Khan and Anotherv. Raja Mohammad Chowdhry (1 Doabia 265)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280

XXVi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Haggerston case (5 O'M & H. 69)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301

Haji Bibiv. H.H. Sir Sultan Mohd. Khan (I.L.R. 32 Bom. 599)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 403

Haji Nasimuddin and Another v. Dandi -Ram Dutta and Others(1 E.L.R. 412)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 409—followed 6 E.L.R. 247; 8 E.L.R. 28

Hakikatullah v. Nathu Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 10)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 470

Haider, S. N. v. Malik (A.I.R. 1924 Cal. 454)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52

Haldar, S. N. v. Malik (Hammond 257)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 171; 2 E.L.R. 325

Hamirkha Alarkha v. Returning Officer, Jamnagar City (East) (A.I.R1954 Sau. 5 E.L.R. 230.)—followed 9 E.L.R. 201, 216,

Handandass v. Mohori Bibi (8 I.C. 602)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339

Hangu Mohammadan Rural Consituency (Sen and Poddar 987)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

Hansa Jivraj Mehta(Dr.)v. Indubhai B. Amin (1 E.L.R. 171)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28, 397; 7 E.L.R. 374.—applied 7 E.L.R. 294—distinguished 3 E.L.R. 187; 4 E.L.R. 466

Hans Raj v. Ram Singh (2 E.L.R. 12)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 1, 8, 136, 414; 3 E.L.R. 147, 305, 375; 4 E.L.R. 466—dissented from 3 E.L.R. 423—approved 4 E.L.R. 441—followed 4 E.L.R. 301; 6 E.L.R. 409; 7 E.L.R. 14,407; 9 E.L.R.

385 ; 10 E.L.R. 1Hanuman Prasad Misra v. Tara Chand and Others (5 E.L.R. 446)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 428 10 E.L.R. 174, 376

Harford v. Linskey ([1899] J Q-B.D. 852)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52, 68, 89, 461; 4 E.L.R. 234; 7 E.L.R. 496

Hari Baksh v. Babulal (5 Lah. 92)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36 • : <•

Hari Das v. Hira Singh Pal (4 E.L.R. 466)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXvii

Hariram v. Pribhdas (A,I.R. 1945 Sind 98)— ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

Hariram Onkar v. Mt. Radha (A.I.R. 1943 Nag. 327)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Harish Chandra v. Rex (A.I.R. 1949 All. 15)—'ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Hari Shanker Bagla v. Kishan Chand Puri (Sen and Poddar 840;1 Doabia 127)—See U. P. Chamber of Commerce

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmed and Others (5 E.L.R. 248)—not followed 7 E.L.R. 25

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Sayed Isak and Others (8 E.L.R. 350)—reversed 10 E.L.R. 216

Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque (10 E.L.R. 216)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 345, 426—follmved 10 E.L.R. 272, 293

Harmon v. Park (7 Q.B. 369)—distinguished 8 E.L.R. 300

Harnandan Prasadv. Kamta Prasad Kakkar (1924 A.L.J. 129)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 84

Harvey v. Facey ([1883] A.C. 552)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 147

Harwich case (3 O'M. & H. 61)—followed 9 E.L.R. 36

Haverford (L.R. 9 C.P. 7)

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 77

Hayat Khan v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1932 Sind 90)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Hayes v. Missouri (120 U. S. 68; 39 Law Edn. 578)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Hazara Ram's case (Sen and Poddar 395)—See Hoshiarpur West General Constituency, 1937

Helby v. Mathews ([1895] A.C. 471)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 101

Hemanta Kumari Devi v. Prasanna Kumar Datta (A.I.R. 1930 Cal. 32)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Hemendra Nath Roy Choudhury v. Jnanendra Prasanna JnanendraPrasanna Bhaduri (A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 732)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467

XXV1U ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Hem Singh v. Basantilal(A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 93)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375

Henrietta Muir Edwards v. Attorney-General of Canada ([1930] A C.124)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Henry v. Galloway (1933) 148 L.T. 453—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Hissar North General Constituency (Sen and Poddar 367)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 374

Hissar North (General) Constituency case: Sheokaran Singh and Anotherv. Sahib Ram (1 Doabia 297; Sen and Poddar 374)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 71, 280; 7 E.L.R. 100; 9 E.L.R. 242—followed 7 E.L.R. 165

Holden v. Southwark Corporation ([1921] 1 Ch. D. 550)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 386

Hollinshead v. Hazleton ([1916] 1 A.C. 428)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417

Horen Jones v. Mohansingh and Others (2 E.L.R. 147)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 428

Hoshangabad case (Hammond 407)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 327

Hoshiarpur West General Consstuency 1937; Hazara Ram v. SardarMula Singh (Sen and Poddar 395; 1 Doabia 316)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 447; 4 E.L.R. 274; 5 E.L.R. 173; 8 E.L.R. 66—relied on 2 E.L.R. 276

Hoshiarpur West General Constituency case : Mula Singh v. ManguRam and Others (2 Doabia 268; Sen and Poddar 945)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 352; 3 E.L.R. 197; 4 E.L.R. 205; 5 E.L.R. 446; 7E.L.R. 234; 8 E.L.R. 105—approved 3 E.L.R. 423—followed 5 E.L.R. 199

Hoshiarpur West Muhammadan Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 399;1 Doabia 267)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248; 7 E.L.R. 301; 9 E.L.R. 242; 10 E.L.R. 461

Howard v. Bodington ([1887] P.D. 203)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1

Hubli Electric Company Ltd. v. Province of Bombay (A.I.R. 1947 Bom.276)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 58

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Xxix

Hukam Sing Sham Singh v. Sardul Singh Kirpal Singh (A.I.R. 1953Pepsu 133; 6 E.L.R. 162—ref. 8 E.L R. 207

) —followed 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216"i Hurdutrai v. Official Assignee of Calcutta (52 C.W.N. 343)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133

Indian Sugar Mills' Association v. Secretary to the Government, U. P.(A.I.R. 1951 All. 1)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272

Insein (2 Hammond E.P. 158)—ref 3 E.L.R. 197

Insein case, 1923: P.D. Patel v. MaungBa Glay and Maung Kyaw Diu(Hammond 411)— ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Institute of of Patent Agents v. Lockwood ([1894] A.C. 347)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

Ipswich ([1886] 4 O'M & H. 72)•—ref. 9 E.L.R. 242

Isher Singh v. Manjit Inder Singh (7 E.L.R. 90)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 119; 8 E.L.R. 320—dissented from 10 E,L R. 461

Iswari Singh v. Province of Bihar (A.I.R. 1949 Pat. 369)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Islington case (5 O'M. & H. no )—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121

Islington case (5 O'M. & H. 120)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248; 5 E.L.R, 156; 6 E.L.R. 197; 8 E.L.R. 240

Islington case (5 O'M & H 126)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 66

Ismail Khan v. State (A.I.R. 1951 Assam 106)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220

J.K. Gas Plant Manufacturing Co. v. Emperor ([1947] F.C.R. 141; A.I.R.1947 F.C. 38)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339 ; 6 E.L.R. 104 ; 9 E.L.R. 301

Jadumani Behara v. Jadumani Sahu (A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 244)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220

Jadumani Mangaraj v. Dinabandhu Sahu and Others (8 E.L.R. 480)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 485

XXX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Jadunandan Mahtoon v. Mosahib Singh (i Doabia 46)—See North Gaya (General) Rural Constituency case

Jagadish v. Rudra Deolal (8 E.L.R. 311)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 30

Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh (A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 210 ; 9 E.L.R. 231)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 485 ; 10 E.L.R. 144, 376

:>. . —followed 9 E.L.R. 403; 10 E.L.R. 357

Jagannath v. Pandurang and Others (4 E.L.R. 167)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446; 7 E.L.R. 428 ; 10 E.L.R. 174

Jagannath v. Mt. Puniya (A.I.R. 1952 Madh. B. 51)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Jagannath Prasad v. Maheswar Dayal Seth (2 Doabia 217)—See Sitapur District (East) General Rural Constituency

Jagannath Sharma v. S.C. Gupta and Others (2 E.L.R. 8)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 414 ; 6 E.L.R. 470

Jagat Chandra N. Vohra and Another v. The Province of Bombay andOthers (A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 144)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

Jagatdar v. Kolte (4 Jagat Narain 22)—relied on 2 E.L.R. 414

Jagdish Chandra v. Prakash Narain (A.I.R. 1953 V.P. 51)—followed 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216

Jagdish Chandra Joshi v. Prakash Narain and Others (1953 D.L.R.V.P. 51)— ref. 8 E.L.R. 207

Jaidev Singh v. Ujagar Singh (Hammond 557)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 499

Jakab Kalak Dana v. Kutch Government (A.I.R. 1951 Kutch 38)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

Jakatdar, R.B.V.M. v. V.D. Kotle and Others (1 Doabia 218 (sic))—ref. 4 E.L.R. 401, 309

Mst. Jamma Kunwar v. Kunk Behari and Another (A.I.R. 1937 All.502)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 162

Jarnna Prasad Mukharia v. Lachhiram Ratanmal Jain and Others(5 E.L.R. 1 ; A.I.R. 1953 M.B. 197)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489, 8 E.L.R. 107, 350—followed 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXi

Janardhan Thakur v. Baldeo Prasad Singh (A.I.R. 1920 Pat. 147)—not followed 6 E.L.R. 388

Jang Bahadur Singh v. Basant Lai and Others (8 E.L.R. 429)—re/. 8 E.L.R. 448

Jaswant Singh v. Jagan Nath and Others (2 E.L.R. 12)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 385

Jatindra Nath Gupta v. Province of Bihar ([1949] F.C.R. 595)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 60

Jay Dayal Madan Gopal, In re (I.L.R. 54 All. 846)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Jennings and Another v. Kelly [1940] A.C. 206—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

Jennings v. Kelly ([1939] 4 All. E.L.R. 464—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Jijibai v. Zabu (30 N.L.R. 18)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 428

Jitendra Nath Gupta and Others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 99)-ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Joginder Singh v. Raghbir Singh and Others (5 E.L.R. 81)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 426

Dr. John Mathai v. Returning Officer, Kottayam (1 E.L.R. 1)—discussed 1 E.L.R. 23, 52—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230; 6 E.L.R. 186; 8 E.L.R. 159

Jones v. Robson [1901] 1 Q.B. 673—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21; 10 E.L.R. 216

Jones v. Scullord ([1898] 2 Q.B. 565)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Joseph Forster Wilson v. Sir Christopher Furness (6 O'M. & H. 1)—relied on 10 E.L.R. 129

Joseph Theberge v. Philippe Laudry ([1876-77] 2 A.C. 102)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186

Joy Chand v. Kamalaksha (A.I.R. 1949 P.C. 239)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 1

Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (5 App. Cas. 214)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 109; 5 E.L.R. 21—distinguished 6 E.L.R. 1

Jullundur North Constituency 1946 case (2 Doabia 223; Sen and Poddar965)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 67

xxxn ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Jwala Prased Mishra v. Mahadeo and Others (3 E.L.R. 473)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 34; 6 E.L.R. 1

Jyostna Chandra v. Mehrabali and Others (3 E.L.R. 488)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 461

Kadir Bux Omer Hayat v. Bakt Behari (A.I.R. 1932 Cal. 1768)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Kalap Raj v. B. N. Tripathi and Another—See Basti District N. E. General Constituency

Kalika Prasad v. Hayat Chand (4 E.L.R. 118)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 353

Kalyan Chandra Mohile v. Bishambhar Nath Pandey and Others(3 E.L.R. 125)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55

Kambar Khan v. Main Ziauddin (Sen and Poddar 716)—See Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency, 1937.

Kanhiya Lai v. Bhagwandas (A.I.R. 1926 All. 30)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Kanaiyalal Durllabhram Bhansali v. Popatlal Mulshanker Joshi (1E.L.R. 244)ref. 3 E.L.R. 288; 5 E.L.R. 93;—Mstinguishad 9 E.L.R. 115

Kandan,Textiles Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras (1949) 2 M.L.J. 789)—relied on 1 E.L.R. 422

Kandasawami Chettar v. Foulkes (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 396)—relied on 1 E.L.R. 373—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Kangra-cum-Gurdaspur (M.R. 1924) Mohammad Fazal Khan v. Chaud-huri Ali Akbar (Hammond 437)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 288followed 1 E.L.R. 311, 341—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 214

Dr. Kannabhiran v. A.J. Arunachalam and Others (2 E.L.R. 167)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 447; 5 E.L.R. 446; 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 1, 171

10 E.L.R. 311, 376—followed 5 E.L.R. 386—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 129—affirmed 9 E.L.R. 471

King v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tribunal; Stubbins, Exparte ([1917]1 K.B. 1)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXX111

C. M. Karale v. B. K. Dalvai and S. N. Angadi (2 JagatNarain 31)See Belgaum District (N.M.R.)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 30

Karansing v. Kartarsing (A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 170)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53

Karkare, CD. v. T.L. Shevde (A.I.R. 1952 Nag. 330)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Karnal South General Constituency case: Pt. Mangat Ram v. ChaudhariAnant Ram (Sen and Poddar 438; 2 Doabia 80)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 239; 3 E.L.R. 447, 4 E.L.R. 274, 5 E.L.R. 173,

199; 8 E.L.R. 66.—relied on 8 E.L.R. 265

Karri Sitaramiah v. Venkadem Surrayya [1944] 2 M.L.J. 121—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 123; [1952]S.C.R. 435)

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203; 8 E.L.R. 139

Kelkar, S. W. v. R. V. Mahajani (1 Doabia 37)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 211

Kensington Division of the Borough of Lambeth (4 0 ' M. & H. 93)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Ker v. Kennedy [1942] 1 K.B. 409—ref. 5 E.L.R. 199

Kerrison v. Smith ([1897] 2 Q.B. 445)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471

Kesab Chandra Patwari v. Gouri Sankar Bhattacharya and Others (2E.L.R. 215)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Kesho Prasad v. Brij Raj Singh and Others (7 E.L.R. yy)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28; 9 E.L.R. 8^-followed 7 E.L.R. 189

Keshavan v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 128)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 80

Kessowki Issar v. G.I.P. Rly. Co. (I.L.R. 31 Bom. 382 P.C.)—explained 7 E.L.R. yy

Khairati Ram v. Malawa Ram (A.I.R. 1925 Lah. 266)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

XXXIV ELECTION LAW REPORTS. DIGEST

Khan Bahadur Shah Muhmmad Yahya v. Choudhrv Muhammad NazirulHasan (Sen and Poddar 549)— See Monghyr North M.R. 1937

Khilumal v. Arjan Das and Others (1 E.L.R. 497)—explained 3 E.L.R. 74—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55

Khwaja Hakim Jain v. Moulvi Shaikh Mohomed Husain (Hammond 311)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 171

Kikabhoy Chandabhoy v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay City(A.I.R. 1950 Bom. 6)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414King v. Assessment Committee of the Metropolitan Borough of

Shoreditch; Ex parte Morgan [1910] 2 K.B. 859—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1

King v. Dibdin (L.R. 1910 Probate 57)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

King v. Nat Bell Liquors Limited ([1922] 2 A.C. 128)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 14

King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee ([1945] F.C.R. 195)—relied on 7 E.L.R. 364

Kingston-upon-Hull (6 O'M. & H. 372)— ref. 4 E.L.R. 283; 9 E.L.R. 101

Kishore Chand v. Narendra Nath (44 C.W.N. 485)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23

Kistna (N.M.R.) 1928: Venkata Seshayya and Another v. MirzapuramRaja Garu (Hammond 447)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280, 288; 7 E.L.R. 165; 8 E.L.R. 265

Klu Klux case ( n o U.S. 651)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Konkani, B.S.v. Shankar Rao Bedse (3 E.L.R. 409)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 174

Krishna v, Chathappan (I.L.R. 13 Mad. 269)—relied on 9 E.L.R. 485

Krishnaji Nilkant v. Secretary of State (A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 449, 451)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Krishnaswami v. Ghulam Muhammad Ghouse (I.L.R. 50 Mad. 86)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Krishnaswami, K. V. v. A. Ramaswami Mudaliar and Another(Hammond 304)—ref. 8!E.L,R. 139

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXV

Krishnaswami Iyer v. Mohanlal Binjani (1948) 2M.L.J. 559—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471; 10 E.L.R. 345

Krishnaswami Panikondar v. Ramaswami Chettiar (I.L.R. 41 Mad.412 P.C.)—explained 3 E.L.R. 74—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471; 9 E.L.R. 485

Kumar Kamalaranjan Roy v. Secretary of State (66 LA. 1)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

Kuppuswami Rao, S. v. The King ([1947] F.C.R. 180)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 499

Labh Singh v. Niranjan Das (2 Jagat Narain 149)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305 .

Lachman Dass Kewal Ram v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 235)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Lachhiram v. Jamuna Prasad Mukhariya and Others (9 E.L.R. 149)—reversed in part 10 E.L.R. 120

Lachman Singh v. Basawa Singh (Election Petition No. 260)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320

Lachmi Chand Suchanti v. Ram Pratap Choudhury (I.L.R. 14 Pat. 24)—ref. 1 E.LR. 68

Ladharam Narsinghdas v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1945 Sind 4)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

La Feuvre v. Lankester (118 E.R. 1241)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 42

Lahore case (1 Khanna 117)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197

Lahore City case (1 Hammond's E.P. 148)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Lahore City M. 1921 (Hammond 467)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105—relied on 8 E.L.R. 240—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442 .

Lahri Singh v. Attar Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 403)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 138, 414; 9 E.L.R. 115•—relied on 9 E.L.R. 403—followed 5 E.L.R. 327

XXXVI ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Lakhan Lai Misra v. Tribeni Kumar and Others (3 E.L.R. 423)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 136; 7 E.L.R. 14—followed 6 E.L.R. 138; 7 E.L.R. 234—dissented from 5 E.L.R. 199; 10 E.L.R. 30

Lakshmana Aiyar v. Rajam Aiyar (58 M.L.J. 118)—followed 3 E.L.R. 39

Lakshmana Pillai v. Chengam Pillai and Others (2 E.L.R. 103)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 313, 447; 6 E.L.R. 28

Lakshmanan Chetti v. Kannappar (I.L.R. 50 Mad. 121)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Lakshmi Chand v. Ladhu Ram Ghodhri and Others (4 E.L.R. 200)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 224

Lai Singh Didar Singh v. Guru Granth Sahib and Others (A.I.R. 1951Pepsu 101)—ref..8 E.L.R. 28

Lala Chaman Lai v. Lala Shadilal (Hammond 621; 1 Jagat Narain 66)—See Saharanpore District (N.M.R.) case

Lala Sohan v. Lala Binda Saran (Sen and Poddar 685)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 117

Lallu Chand v. Tej Singh and Others (8 E.L.R. 28)—affirmed 9 E.L.R. 193

Lanarkshire (2 Doug. 367)•—distinguished 2 E.L.R. 330

Lancashire and Yorks Ry. Co. v. Knowles (20 Q.B.D. 391) '—ref. 5 E.L.R. 199

Lancaster case (5 O'M. & H. 41)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280; 5 E.L.R. 55, 446

Lancaster case (5 O'M. & H. 44)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301

Lapish v. Braithwaite ([1925] 1 K.B. 474)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 386; 9 E.L.R. 471; 10 E.L.R. 311

Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganerival (1 E.L.R. 239)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 20

Laxman Rao v. Laxminivas Ganeriwal (No. 2) (2 E.L.R. 20)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 375, 447—relied on 6 E.L.R. 470

Leek v. Epsom Rural District Council ([1922] 1 K.B. 383)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 417; 7 E.L.R. i, 171:10 E.L.R. 311

I

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC.

Lee v. Griffin (30 L.J.Q.B. 252)—applied 1 E.L.R. 349

•Leominster case (Rog. 429): —ref. 7 E.L.R. 428'Leominster (1827) (2 Rog. 619)

.! —«/ . 5E.L.R. 353

Lewis v. Cattle ([1938] 2 K.B. 454)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

• Lewis (S.R.) v. C.E. Gibbon (1 Doabia 259; Sen and Poddar 883)—See Anglo-Indian Constituency, Punjab, 1947

Lewis v. Shephardson ([1948] 2 All E.R. 503)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

Lichfield(i O'M. & H. 22)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 288, 368; 7 E.L.R. 234

Lichfield case (5 O'M. & H. 26)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283

Lila Sinha v. Kumar Bijoy Protap Deo Singh and Others (A.I.R. 1925Cal. 768)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Limerick (1833, P. & K. 373)—relied on 4 E.L.R. 148

Line and Others v. Warren and Others (14 Q.B.D. 548)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 274—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 162

Linga Gowda v. N. K. Shivananjappa (2 E.L.R. 163)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Linge Gowda v. Shivananjappa (6 E.L.R. 288)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 1

Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner (1861) 30 L.J. Ch. 379—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179

Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Indian Staff Association (Civil AppealNo. 42 of 1952 (S.C.))—explained 10 E.L.R. 216

Local Government Board v. Arlidge ([1915] A.C. 120)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 40

London and Scottish Permanent Building Society, In re (1893) 63L.J.Q.B. 112—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417; 5 E.L.R. 21

XXXV111 ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Londonderry ([i860] W. and Br. 206)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Londonderry (1 O'M. & H. 276)

-ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Longford case (2 O'M. & H. 16)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 408, 3 E.L.R. 358

Longford (2 O'M. & H. 6)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Lord Strickland v. Guiseppe Grima (A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 227)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186 *

Lotus Industrials v. The State of Madras (1952, 1 M.L.J. 532)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167 ; 9 E.L.R. 471

Luchmun Singh v. Shumshere Singh (2 LA. 58)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Louisiana v. Mayor etc., New Orleans (109 U.S. 936)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Lucknow City M.U.W. case 1946 (Sen and Poddar 487)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 4 E.L.R. 493

Lucknow Improvement Trust v. Jaitly & Co. (A.I.R. 1930 Oudh 105)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 93

Ludhiana and Ferozpore General Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 491)•—ref. 1 E.L.R. 442

Ludhiana M.R. (2 Doabia 257; Sen and Poddar 970)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 239, 312; 3 E.L.R. 137; 5 E.L.R. 199

Lwsser v. Garnett (258 U.S. 130)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Lyallpur and Jhang General Constituency case 1938 (Sen and Poddar504; 2 Doabia 243)— ref. 1 E.L.R. 312; 2 E.L.R. 340; 7 E.L.R. 374—relied on 3 E.L.R. 137

Lyallpur Muhammadan Constituency, 1937: Rahmat AH v. Nurullah(Sen and Poddar 526; 1 Doabia 121)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197; 4 E.L.R. 73; 8 E.L.R. 105

Mackonochie v. Penzance ([1881] 6 App. Cas. 424.)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Madan Gopal v. Bhagwan Das ([1888J I.L.R. 11 All. 304)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. XXXIX

Madan Gopal, In re (A.I.R. 1953 All. 444)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Madan Mohan v. Bankat Lai and Others (8 E.L.R. 119)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 193

> Madan Pal Singh v. Rajdeo Upadhya (6 E.L.R. 28)' —relied on 9 E.L.R. 403: —ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

, Madhavrav v. Gulabbhai [(1898) I.L.R. 23 Bom. 177]—ref. 9 E.L.R. 93

Madras and Southern Mahratta Ry. Co. Ltd. v. Bezwada Municipality(A.I.R. 1944 P.C. 71)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

Madras Electric Tramway Co. v. Ranganathan (A.I.R. 1952 Bom. 449)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Magee v. Mark (1861) (11 C.L.R. 449)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Magwe West case (Hammond 505)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197

Mahadeo Damaji v. Govinda Ramchandra (1952 N.L.J. 557)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 34

Mahadeo v. Jwalaprasad (6 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186 ; 10 E.L.R. 135, 144—relied on 10 E.L.R. 345

Mahadev v. Bholanath (I.L.R. 5 All. 86)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 77

Mahadev Parashram Diwan v. Vinayak Pandhari NathThorat (1 Doabia 137)—See Satara South case 1948

Mahadev Prashad v. Emperor (223 I.C. 263)-ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Mahammad Bux v. Mohammed Abdul Baqi Khan (1923 Ind. Cas. 490)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 84

Mahant Digviji Nath v, Sri Prakash (Sen and Poddar 147)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 300

Maharaja Manindra Chandra Nandy v. Pravash Chandra Mitter(Hammond 545)—relied on 7 E.L.R. 496—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

xl " ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Maharaja of Parlakimedi v. Bijay Chandra Das and Others (4 E.L.R.101)

—followed 7 E.L.R. 428—dissented from 6 E.L.R. 104—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376 . ..

Maha Ram and Others v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1918 All. 168)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Mt. Maharup Kuer v. Mahabir Singh (A.I.R. 1928 Pat. 111)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220

Mahboob Khan v. Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, and Others(A.I.R. 1953 Assam 145)— ref. 10 E.L.R. 272

Mahendra Sahu v. Duttia Raul and Others (3 E.L.R. 117)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 397

Mahesh Datta v. Murlidhar and Others (7 E.L.R. 154)—followed 8 E.L.R. 311

Mahesh Ullah v. Abdul Rahman (A.I.R. 1953 All. 193)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Maheshwar Prasad Narain Sinha v. Ramasray Prasad Chaudhury(2 Hammond E.P. 248)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 38

M. M. Mahida v. C. I. Khoda Bhai (1 E.L.R. 330)-ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Mahomed Baksh and Another v. Mohammed Abdul Baqi Khan andOthers (A.I.R. 1924 All. 135)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 426

Mohammed Zaman Khan v. Mohd. Sarwar Khan (A.I.R. 1942 Pesh. 53)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375

Maidstone case (5 O'M. & H. 200)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283

Maidstone case (Rog. 1204)—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 417

Majibar Rahman Chaudhury v. Abdul Barkat Ataul Gani (4 E.L.R. 481)-ref. 7 E.L.R. 374

Makhduman, Mt. v. Syed Altaf Hussain (A.I.R. 1922 Pat. 222)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247

Malcolm v. Parry (1875 L.R. 10 C.P. 168)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283

Maldah North M. R. Constituency Case 1937 (Sen and Poddar 542)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 5 E.L.R. 199

f

1

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. xli

Malhar Rao v. Vishnupant (Sen and Poddar 326; 1 Doabia 206)—See Gondia General Rural Constituency case

•• Malik Barkat Ali v. Maulvi Muharratn Ali Chisti (Hammond 469;• 1 Jagat Narain 43)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 355; 3 E.L.R. 248, 358; 9 E.L.R. 36Mallikarjun v. Satyanarayan (A.I.R. 1953 Bom. 207)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230. Mandal Sumitra Devi v. Surajnarain Singh (4 E.L.R. 136)

—dissented from 10 E.L.R. 30Mangala Goundar v. Ayyathorai Mudaliar (55 M.L. J. 632)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89Pt. Mangat Ram and Others v. Ch. Anant Ram and Others (2 Doabia 80)

—See Karnal South General Constituency caseManindra Chandra Nandi v. Provas Chandra Mitter (I.L.R. 51 Cal. 279)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68, 461Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Pravash Chandra Mitter (2 Jagat Narain

123)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 234Manipuri and Etah District Muhammadan Rural Constituency, 1946

(Sen and Poddar 530)—distinguished and doubted 1 E.L.R. 330—ref. 2 E.L.R. 234, 301; 6 E.L.R. 247

Manjoor Hussain v. Gholam Mohiuddin (Sen and Poddar 746)See Shahabad Mohammadan Rural Constituency

Manmatha Nath v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 132)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Manmathanath Biswas v. Emperor (I.L.R. 60 Cal. 618)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179, 220

Manmatha Nath Haldar v. Girish Chandra Roy (A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 707)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467

Manmohini Sahgal v. Sucheta Kripalani (3 E.L.R. 347)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 145

Mansel Pleydell H. v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1926 Lah. 313)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Maqbulunissa v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1953 All. 477)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Marshall v. James (9 C.P. 702)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 496

Martin v. Mackonochie (1878) (3Q.B.D. 730)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

xlii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Martin White v. Mr. Arthur Fell (5 O'M. & H. 177)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Mason v. The Stokes Bay Pier and Railway Company (1863) 32 L. J.Ch. n o

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Mast Ram v. Harnam Singh and Others (7 E.L.R. 301)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 265

Mathavarapu Ananthramaiah v. B. Venkat Ratnam and Ctl.ers (A.I.R.1953 Hyd. 228)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207

. Mathew v. Brown (1876 I ' C . P . D . 596)—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 91

Mathra Dass v. Dara Singh (4 E.L.R. 441)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81, 496; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346; 7 E.L.R. 338; 8 E.L.R332

Mathura Mohan Saha and Others v. Ramkumar Saha and ChittagongDistrict Board (A.I.R. 1916 Cal. 136)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 47

Maude v. Lowley [1874] L.R. 9 C.P. 165—distinguished 9 E.L.R. 1—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144

Maulvi Tahur Ahmed Choudhury v. M. Humayun Raza Choudhry (2Doabia 17)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81

Maulvi Yaqinuddin Ahmad v. Maulvi Kader Bux (2 Jagat Narain 75)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 288

Maung Sen Tun and Others v. Maung Sen Nyam (A.I.R. 1923 Rang. 76)•—ref. 9 E.L.R. 451

Maung Tun Thein v. Maun Sin (A.I.R. 1937 Ran. 124)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Mayo case ([1874] 2 O' M. & H. 191)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 12

Ma Yon v. Ma Shwe Thin (A.I.R. 1933 Rang. 410)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Mayor of the City of Lyons v. The Honourable the East India Company(1 M.I.A. 175)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 429

Mazir Ahmed v. King Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 P.G. 253)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. , xliii

Me. Pherson v. Appanna (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 184)—relied on 2 E.L.R. 147

Meath case (North) (4 O' M. & H. 185)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121

Mehta Gordhandas Girdharilal v. C. A. Dalumiyan and Others(7 E.L.R. 374) "—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Menghraj v. Bhiman Das and Others (2 E.L.R. 301)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 313, 375; 447, 5 E.L.R. 230; 6 E.L.R. 28, 247—followed 3 E.L.R. 102; 10 E.L.R. 450, 461

Michale, G. v. Venkateswaran (A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 474)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 428

Midnapore South case (2 Hammond E.P. 185; 2 jagat Narain 113)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 309; 6 E.L.R. 346; 7 E.L.R. 338; 8 E.L.R. 332—relied on 8 E.L.R. 300

Midnapur South case (2 Khanna 191)—ref, 1 E.L.R. 252

H.H.J. Mills and Others v. H.G. Walford (2 Doabia 106; Sen andPoddar 75)—See Anglo Indian (U.P.) case

Milner, Ex parte(i85i) 15 Jur. 1037—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1

Minor v. Happerset (1874)21 Wall. 162—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Mohamad Ali Khan v. Ahmad AH and Others (1945 A.L.J. 492)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 162

Mohamad Zia Ullah Khan v. Rafiz Mohammad Khan and Others (A.I.R.1939 Oudh. 213)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Mohamed Hossain v. Mohammed Raffique (A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 130)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247

Kr. Mohammad Abdul Jalil Khan v. K. B. Mohammad Rehmat Khanand Another (Bulandshar East) (2 Doabia 180)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Mohammad Ismail M. v. Haji Akhtar Hussain (Moradabad DistrictSouth East) (1 Doabia 35)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Mohammad Shall v. Mohammad Iqbal Ahmad Khan (Sen and Poddar970)—See Ludhiana M.R.

, ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Mohammad Zakria Kitchlew v. Sheikh Mohammad Sadiq (Sen andPoddar 34)—See Amritsar City Muhammadan Constituency 1938

Mohammedally Allabux v. Jafferbhoy Abdullabhoy and Others (Ham-mond 173; 2 Jagat Narain 48)—not followed 2 E,L,R.i63, 450—relied on 2 E.L.R. 276—ref. 7 E.L.R. 165; 8 E.L.R. 66

Mohan Lai Mandal v. Radhanath Das and Others (Sen and Poddar 388;1 Doabia 111) (Hooghly North-East General Rural Constituency1946)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 301; 414; 5 E.L.R. 81; 7 E.L.R. 154

Mohansingh v. Santokhsingh (1 Doabia 192)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 194; 5 E.L.R. 248

Mohini Mohun Das and Others v. Bungsi Buddan Saha Das and Others(i7Cal. 580 P.C.)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 4S0

Mohomed Baksh v. Muhammad Abdul Baqui Khan (A.I.R. 1924 All. 134)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104

Mohomed Hossain v. Mohomed Raffique (A.I.R. 1941 Cal. 130)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 301

Mohsinali v. State of Bombay (A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 303)•—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Moinuddin B. Harris v. B.P. Divgi (3 E.L.R. 248)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36, 324; 10 E.L.R. 461—followed 9 E.L.R. 115—dissented from 6 E.L.R. 316

Monghyr North M.R. 1937 (Sen and Poddar 549)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 137; 5 E.L.R. 55, 173

Moola Singh v. Mangu Ram and Others (Sen & Poddar 945)— See Hoshiarpur West General Constituency case

Moorthy v. Eli VadapaUi (I.L.R. 1938 Mad. 162)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52, 89

Moradabad District North-West Muhammadan Rural Constituencycase of 1937. Bashir Ahmed v. M. D. Akhtar Hossain Khan andOthers (Sen and Poddar 564; 2 Doabia 341)•—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121, 414 ; 3 E.L.R. 179, 305; 5 E.L.R. 48, 129 ;7 E.L.R. 407

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. xlv

Moradabad District South-East Rural Mohammadan Constituency case(Sen and Poddar 572)—re/. 3 E.L.R. 197 ; 4 E.L.R. 73

Moreshwar Parashram v. Chaturbhuj Vithaldas Jasani and Others (7E.L.R. 428)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Morley v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. (146 U.S. 925)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Morris v. Burdett (105 E.R. 362)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283

Motilal and Others v. Government of U.P. and Others(A.I.R. 1951 All. 527)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52

Motisinghji Mahida v. Iswarbhai Khodabhai and Others (1 E.L.R. 330)—dissented from 2 E.L.R. 301—followd 2 E.L.R. 234—not followed 6 E.L.R. 247

Moulvi Muhammad Ismail v. Haji Akhtar Hussain (Sen and Poddar 572)—-See Moradabad District South-East Rural Muhammadan Con-stituency case

K. T. M. Muhammad Abdul Latiff Routher v. S. M. S. Sheikh IsmailRouther (A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 9)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Muhammad Fazal Khan v. Chaudhari AH Akbar (2 Jagat Narain 103)-ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Muhammad Habibullahv. Bird & Co. (I.L.R. 43 All. 257 P.C.)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Muhammad Siddiqui v. Sir Nazimuddin (2 Doabia 322)—See Calcutta North Muhammadan Urban Constituency case

Muhammad Zamam Khan v. Md. Sarwar Khan (Sen and Poddar 352)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81

Mnkti Nath Rai v. Uma Shanker Misra and Others (3 E.L.R. 109)—followed 5 E.L.R. 93 ; 8 E.L.R. 240—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55 ; 6 E.L.R. 123

Mula Singh v. Mangu Ram (2 Doabia 268)—See Hoshiarpur West General Constituency case

Mullins v. The Treasurer of the County of Surrey [1879-80] 5 Q.B.D.170— ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

xlvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Multan Division case (Sen and Poddar 597 ; 2 Doabia 302)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121 ; 266, 414; 3 E.L.R. 8i, 423 ; 5 E.L.R. 48, 129 ;7 E.L.R. 234, 407 ; 9 E.L.R. 36

Multan Towns Muhammadan Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 583)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55

Muncipal Corporation of Rangoon v. M. A. Shakur (A.I.R. 1926 Rang.25)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Munuswami Gounder v. Khader Shariff and Others (No. 2) (4 E.L.R.283)—dissented from 6 E.L.R. 288—distinguished 7 E.L.R. 301—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Mussumat Jariutool Butool v. Mussumat Hoseinee Begum (11 M.I.A.194)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467—followed 2 E.L.R. 301

Muzaffarnagar 1924 (Hammond 517)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 265

Nagjibhai Govindbhai Arya v. Mithabhai Ramji Chawhan (1 E.L.R.162)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 447; 5 E.L.R. 199, 446; 7 E.L.R. 64, 428; 10E.L.R. 174

—followed 4 E.L.R. 167

Naidu R. S. v. J. Ramier (A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 947)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144

Nairn and Others v. University of St. Andrews ([1909] A.. 147)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Nalini Kanta v. Anukul Chandra (A.I.R. 1918 Cal. 792)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Nanakchand and Mithan Lai v. Rajasthan Revenue Department (CivilWrit Application No. 114 of 1951)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52

Narain Das v. Manohar Rao Jatar (E.P. No. 3 of 1952)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414 ; 7 E.L.R. 320, 374

Naranarayan Goswami v. H.D. Chaudhury and Others (2 E.L.R. 253)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248; 7 E.L.R. 25

Narajan Singh v. Brish Bhan (3 E.L.R. 179)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 167 ; 5 E.L.R. 449 ; 7 E.L.R. 428 ; 10 EL.R. 174—followd 5 E.L.R. 93

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. xlvii

Narasimhe Gowda v. Lakkappa and Another (4 E.L.R. 23.4)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414 ; 7 E.L.R. 428

Narayana Dossju Varu v. Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board(1951, 1 M.L.J. 62)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Narotam Singh v. Des Raj and Others (4 E.L.R. 309)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 368—distinguished 7 E.L.R. 47, 338

Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey (I.L.R. 5 All. 163)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 162

Narsinghdas Tansukhdas v. Chogemull (43 C.W.N. 613)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23

Nasir Ali Khan v. Nawabzada Mohammad Faiyaz .AH Khan (Sen andPoddar 428)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Nasiruddin Ahmed v. Haji Muhammad Yusuf (40 C.W.N. 741)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73

Nasiruddin Ahmad v. Haji Mahammad Yusuf (165 Ind. Cas. 489)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

National Telephone Company Ltd. v. Postmaster General ([1913] A.C.546)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375

Natwar Lai v. Bhartendra Singh (5 E.L.R. 408)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 320; 10 E.L.R. 49

Nawab Major Sir Mohammad Akbar Khan v. Attar Singh (40 C.W.N.997)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247

Nawab Muhammad Sajjad Ali Khan v. Khwaja Ghulam Samad (1Doabia 294)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 14

Nawabshah South Muhammadan Rural Constituency (Sen and Poddar620)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 116, 327Nawab Sir K.G.M. Faroqui v. Maulvi Mohammad Habib Ulla and

Others (2 Doabia 24)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Nawab Talib Mehadi Khan v. Raja Mohammad Akram Khan (1 Doabia240)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 117

Xlviii ELECTION LAW- REPORTS DIGEST

Nazamuddin v. Queen (I.L.R. 28 Cal. 344)—-ref. 5 E.L.R. 401

Nazir Ahmed v. King-Emperor (A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247 ; 8 E.L R. 320

Neath and Brecon Railway, Re (9 Ch. App. 263)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480

Nesamoney v. T.M. Varghese (A.I.R. 1952 Trav.-C. 66)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Neville v. London Express Newspapers Limited ([1919] A.C. 368)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133^8 E.L.R. 350

Nichols v. Baker (44 Ch. D. 262)—relied on 2 E.L.R. 109

Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar v. Sudhir Chandra Bhandari and Others (6E.L.R. 197)—followed 9 E.L.R. 115

Nimar M.R. case (Sen and Poddar 625)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 496

Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury v, Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (A.I.R. 1948Cal. 294)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Nitish Chandra v. Promode Kumar (A.I.R. 1953 Cal. 18)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

North Bhagalpur case (1 E.P. 53)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 457

North Durham case (2 O' M. & H. 156)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105 • '

North Durham case (3 O' M. & H. 2)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 346-•-followed 9 E.L.R. 36

North Gaya (General) Rural Constituency case (1 Doabia 46; Sen andPoddar 641)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 28; 9 E.L.R. 242—followed 7 E.L.R. 119, 301, 374

North Kendrapara G.R. Constituency 1937 case (Sen and Poddar 649; 2Doabia 411)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 271; 2 E.L.R. 121; 6 E.L.R. 87

North Louth (1911, 6 0 ' M. & H. 162)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 242

North Meath case (4 0 ' M. & H. 185)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 442; 5 E.L.R. 55 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

1


North Meath case ([1892] 4 O'M. & H. 187)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

North West Gurgaon Mohammadan Constituency, 1946 case (Sen andPoddar 655; 2 Doabia 332)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 265—relied on 1 E.L.R. 312

North West Punjab Sikh Constituency case (2 Doabia 55; Sen Poddar665)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 312; 8 E.L.R. 105Norwich (1 O' M. & H. 10)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73Norwich [1886] 4 O' M. & H. 84)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 234

Nrisinha Kumar v. Returning Officer (1 E.L.R. 23)— ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Nrisinha Kumar v. Satyendra Chandra Ghosh Moulik and Others (2E.L.R. 121)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 147, 375

Nur Muhamed v. S. M. Sulaiman (49 C.W.N. 10)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252

Nural Islam v. Muhammad Rafique and Others (2 E.L.R. 70)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248, 496

Nutton v. Wilson ([1899) 22 Q.B.D. 744)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 101; 7 E.L.R. 428—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 5 E.L.R. 386

Obala Kondama Naicker v. Kandasamy Goundar (I.L.R. 47 Mad. 181)— ref. 9 E.L.R. 80)

O'Carrol v. Hastings ([1905] 2 I.R. 590)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 42; 5 E.L.R. 417; 7 E.L.R. 428—followed 9 E.L.R. 301

Okara Muhammadan Constituency case (2 Doabia 144; Sen and Poddar681)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 447; 4 E.L.R. 274—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 214—not followed 2 E.L.R. 450

Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distillers Corporation (299U.S. 182; 81 Law Edn. 109)

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203vii


Packet Co. v. Keokuk (95 U.P. 80)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 364

Packet Co. v. St. Louis (150 U.S. 425)—relied on 7 E.L.R. 364

Padrnabati Dasi v. Rasik Lai Dhar (I.L.R. 37 Cal. 259)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 380

Phani Bhusan Sen v. Sanat Kumar Maitra (A.I.R. 1935 Cal. 773 ; 63Cal. 487)

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144Pakuri Viraraghavalu v. Poluri Yettamandu (95 Ind. Cas. 584)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247Palamau case (3 Jagat Narain 228)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252; 6 E.L.R. 346

Panchanathan Pillai, In re (I.L.R. 52 Mad. 529)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Pandit Brij Nandan Lai v. Pandit Moti Lai Bhargava (4 Jagat Narain 96)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 224

Pandit Harish Chandra v.,Raja Man Singh and Others (5 E.L.R. 129)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 224, 470; 8 E.L.R. 28; 9 E.L.R. 21—followed 7 E.L.R. 1, 234, 407

Pandit Krishna Rao v. Trimbak (I.L.R. 1938 Nag. 409)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53

Pandit Lakshmi Chand v. Ladhu Ram Chodhri and Others (4 E.L.R. 200)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 21

Pandit Mangal Ram and Others v. Chaudhari Anant Ram and Another(Sen and Poddar 438)

—See Karnal South General Constituency case

Pandurang Narayan Adha v. Ramachandra R. Pandit Rao (A.I.R. 1930Bom. 554)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 401; 5 E.L.R. 21

Panna Lai v. Haridas (4 Khanna 22)•—distinguished 4 E.L.R. 441

Panna Lai v. Mohan Lai (2 Khanna 227)—ref, 4 E.L.R. 441

Panna Lai v. Mohan Lai (2 Jagat Narain 143)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 189, 414

Pantam Venkayya, In re (I.L.R. 53 Mad. 44)—relied on 5 E.L.R. 417

I

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. li

Panu Nayak and Others v. Chintai Malik (A.I.R. 1948 Pat. 435)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

Parlakimedi case (40 LA. 129)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 499

Parmessar Singh v. Kailaspati (A.I.R. 1916 Pat. 292 F.B.)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179

Parry Ex parte ([1887] 3 T.L.R. 649)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Parry and Co., Ltd. v. Commercial Employees' Association, Madras(A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 179; [1952] S.C.R. 519)

—ref. 2 E.L.R. 263; 5 E.L.R. 1, 103, 230; 7 E.L.R, 489; 8 E.L.R.220, 350; 10 E.L.R. 216

Parsad Mahto and Others v. Mt. Jasoda Koer (A.I.R. 1937 Pat. 328)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Parthasarathy v. Elaya Pillai and Others (4 E.L.R. 18S)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301

Patiala case (6 E.L.R. 316)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 324

Patna University case (4 Jagat Narain yj)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 119

Patna West N. M. R. (Hammond 533)—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442—followed 5 E.L.R. 199—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Pearse v. Morrice ([1834] 2 A. & E. 84, 96)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

Pembroke Borough's case (5 O'M. & H. 135)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 398

Pembroke Election Petition (1908) 2 I.R. 433—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

People v. Suteliffe (7 N.Y.S. (2) 431)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 401

People's Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Rameshwar Prasad Varma (A.I.R.1942 Pat. 452)

—relied on 2 E.L.R. 330Perumal Mudaliar, K. v. Province of Madras (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 194)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446; 6 E.L.R. 104Phillips v. Goft (17Q.B.D. 812)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

Hi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Piare Lai v. Bhagwan Das (I.L.R. 55 All. 216)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123—applied 2 E.L.R. 109—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21; 8 E.L.R. 84

Piarey Lai. v. Munshi Amba Prasad (4 Jagat Narain 4; Hammond 29)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 239; 5 E.L.R. 446

Pickard v. Sears (1837) (6 A. & D. 469)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 221; 7 E.L.R. 154

Pickering v. Startin ([1873] 28 L. T. N. S. i n )— ref. 10 E.L.R. 144

Pigott and the Great Western Railway Co. In re (18 Ch. D. 146)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Pir Zain-ul-Abdin Shah v. Khan Sahib Sheikh Muhammed Amin (Senand Poddar 597)

—See Multan Division casePitman's Shorthand Academy v. B. Lila Ram and Sons (A.I.R. 1950

E.P. 181)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Ponnambala Desikar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras(I.L.R. 1941 Mad. 807)

—relied on 1 E.L.R. 417

Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal (1 E.L.R. 89)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 61, 109, 167

Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer (1 E.L.R. 133)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 124; 5 E.L.R. 1, 40, 173, 183, 230, 248, 341;

7 E.L.R. 364; 8 E.L.R. 119, 159, 207, 350; 9 E.L.R. 163,183, 242

—applied 6 E.L.R. 53, 186; 9 E.L.R. 201; 10 E.L.R. 268—explained 9 E.L.R. 494—followed 10 E.L.R. 216

Pontefract (4 O'M. & H. 202)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 240

Pope In re (5 B. & Ad. 681)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 216

Prabhudas Ramjibhai Mehta v. Lallubhai Kishordas Maniar (1 E.L.R.154)

—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167; 4 E.L.R. 200; 5 E.L.R. 386—relied on 6 E.L.R. 104—followed 8 E.L.R. 465 i

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. liii

Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (i E.L.R. 384)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 1—followed 3 E.L.R. 162

Prakasam, T. v. U. Krishna Rao and Others (No. 2) (2 E.L R. 54)—dissented from 3 E.L.R. 74—ref. 5 E.L.R. 55—followed 5 E.L.R. 93

Pranlal Thakorlal Munshi v. Indubhai B. Amin (1 E.L.R. 182)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 461; 3 E.L.R. 423; 4 E.L.R. 309

Prasad v. Brij Raj Singh and Others (not reported), —ref. 3 E.L.R. 313

Prem Nath v. Ram Kishan and Others (1 E.L.R. 271)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 147, 313, 375, 447; 5 E.L.R. 129; 6 E.L.R. 28, 368;

9 E.L.R. 21—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 338, 407, 428

President, Taluk Board, Hospet v. J. Chandrappa (47 MX. J. 452; A.I.R.1925 Mad. 173)

—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330President, Union Board, Alandur v. Balakrishna Reddiar (A.I.R. 1932

Mad. 508)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Prince Line Ltd. v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay (A.I.R. 1950Bom. 130)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 137, 288; 6 E.L.R. 123; 9 E.L.R. 403

Pritam Singh v. Charan Singh (2 E.L.R. 276)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 109, 137, 447; 4 E.L.R. 1, 274; 6 E.L.R. 28;

7 E.L.R. 64; 9 E.L.R. 231—not followed 3 E.L.R. 162, 313, 375; 4 E.L.R. 34—dissented from 5 E.L.R. 116

Pritchard v. Mayor of Bengor (13 App. Cas. 241)— ref. 1 E.L.R. 461

Province of Bengal v. S. L. Puri (51 C.W.N. 753)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104; 7 E.L.R. 428; 9 E.L.R. 301

Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji (L.R. 74 LA. 103)-ref. 3 E.L.R. 318

Province of Bombay v. Hormusji (A.I.R. 1947 P.C. 200)—ref. 6 E.L.R 414

Province of Bombay v. Kushaldas 3. Advani (A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 222)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53, 388; 9 E.L.R. 201

l iv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Provincial Government v. Haji AH (I.L.R. 1946 Nag. 931)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 167

Pugh, P. E. v. Ashotosh Sen (56 LA. 93)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68

Punjab Anglo-Indian Constituency (No. 1): E. Few v. C. E. Gibbon(1 Doabia 247)

—-ref. 5 E.L.R. 129, 408; 7 E.L.R. 338, 407Punjab Anglo-Indian Constituency (No. 2): S. R. Lewis v. C. E. Gibbon

(1 Doabia 259)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 129; 7 E.L.R. 407

Punjab East Sikh case (Hammond 551)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 312

Punjab Legislative Council (2 Jagat Narain 85)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 105

Punjab North East Town's case (2 Jagat Narain 143)—ref. 1 E.LR. 252; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346

Punjab South East case (Doabia E. C. No. 146)—relied on 7 E.L.R. 457

Puran Chand v. Mohd. Din and Others (A.I.R, 1935 Lah. 291)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 21

Purshottamdas Ranchhoddas Patel v. Shantilal Girdharilal Parikh(1 E.L.R. 223)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 109, 288, 447; 4 E.L.R. 34, 401; 5 E.L.R. 55;8 E.L.R. 84, 265; 9 E.L.R. 231

—followed 1 E.L.R. 244, 389; 2 E.L.R. 295; 5 E.L.R. 93; 6 E.L.R.53- 123

—distinguished 9 E.L.R. 115Pyare Lai v. Amba Prasad (Hammond 27)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 466Pyare Lai v. Amba Prasad (4 Jagat Narain 4)

—distinguished 6 E.L.R. 138

Queen v. Arayi (I.L.R. 7 Mad. 17)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 401

Queen v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income Tax([i888]2iQ.B.D. 313)

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 489; 8 E.L.R. 119, 179, 350

Queen v. Drury (1894) (2 Ir. R. 489)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 361

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. Iv

Queen v. The Judges and Justices of the Central Criminal Court (1883n Q.B.D. 479)

—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

' Queen v. Justices of Surrey (5 Q.B. 466)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 361

Queen v. Marsham ([1892] 1 Q.B. 371)—distinguished 8 E.L.R. 201

1 Queen v. Mathura Prasad (I.L.R. 21 All. 127)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 401

Queen v. The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (21 Q.B.D. 131)— ref. 1 E.L.R. 68

Queen v. Tugwell (3 Q.B.D. 704)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 182

Queen Empress v. Arlappa (I.L.R. 15 Mad. 137)—relied on 9 E.L.R. 361

Qunayat Husain v. Sajidunnissa Bibi (A.I.R. 1949 All. 499)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123

R. v. Board of Education ([1910] 2 K.B. 165)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 201

R. v. Bowers ([1866] L.R. 1 C.C. at p. 45)—t f. 6 E.L.R. 414

R. v. Briggs (1864) 11 L.T. 372—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

R. v. Burdett (4 B and Aid. 95)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 467

R. v. Carmarthen Corporation (1759) 2 Burr. 869—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

R. v. Francis (21 L.J.Q.B. 304)•—ref. 7 E.L.R. 428

R. v. Hodge (1819) 106 E.R. 392—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

R. v. Income-tax Special Purposes Commissioners (1888) (21 Q.B.D. 313)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1; 10 E.L.R. 14

R. v. Loxdale (1758, 1 Burr. 445)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248 .,.

R. v. Negus (L.R. 2 C.C.R. 34)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

lvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal: Ex parte Shaw([1951] 1 K.B. 711)

—ref. 9 E.L.R. 201

R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ([1951] 1 AllE.R. 268)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1

R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ([1952] 1 AllE.R. 122)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 103 ; 8 E.L.R. 220 ; 10 E.L.R. 345R. v. Reason (23 L.J.M.C. 13)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414R. v. Walker ([1858] 27 L.J.M.C. 207)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414; 8 E.L.R 480R. v. White (1836) 5 Ad. El. 613

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

R.v. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison Governor ([1948] 2 K.B. 193)—relied on 10 E.L.R. 216

Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Chandra Bhanu Gupta and Others (E P.256 of 1952)


Raghunath Singh v. Kamta Prasad Saxena (8 E.L.R. 424)—relied on 9 E.L.R. 403

Rahmat Ali v. Nurullah and Others (Sen and Poddar 526)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 461

Rai Bahadur Panna Lai v. Lala Mohan Lai (2 Jagat Narain 143)— See Punjab North East Town's case

Rai Bahadur Pirthi Chand Lai Choudhri v. Babu Ram Pershad (1 JagatNarain 54)

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 38

Rai Bahadur Surendra Narayan Sinha v. Amulyadhone Roy and Others(Sen and Poddar 188)

—followed 10 E.L.R. 30—referred 10 E.L.R. 461

Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S. K. Shaw and Bros. (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 115)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179; 9 E.L.R. 201

Rai P. K. Das Gupta Bahadur v. Chittaranjan Das (2 Hammond E,P,185)

—see Midnapur South case

ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST K'il

Rai Saheb Bhagwan Das's case (4 Jagat Naraia 12}—ref. 2 E.L.R. 147

Railway Union's case 1946, (1 Doabia 211; Sen and Poddar 696)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121; 5 E.L.R. 48; 6 E.L.R. 368

Raipur North case (2 Jagat Narain 146; 2 Hammond E.P. 232)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252; 2 E.L.R. 189; 6 E.L.R. 224, 346; 7 E.L.R. 338

Raj Bahadur v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1947 All. 105)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Raja Harpal Singh v. Pandit Krishna Kant Malaviya (Hammond 419)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57

Raja of Vizianagaram v. Secretary of State for India (I.L.R. 1937 Mad.383)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 109.

Rajit Ram v. Katesar Nath (I.L.R. 18 All. 396)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 288 ; 5 E.L.R. 21, 55, 446 ; 8 E.L.R. 84, 240, 480

Raj Krishna Bose v. Binond Kanungo (9 E.L.R. 294)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 57—followed 10 E.L.R. 103, 293—ref. 3 E.L.R. 288 ; 5 E.L.R. 21, 55, 446 ; 8 E.L.R. 84, 240, 480

Rajshahi cum Malda Mohammadan Constituency : Maulvi Tahur AhmedChoudhury v. Maulvi Humayun Raza Choudhry and Another (2Doabia 17 ; Sen and Poddar 704)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341.—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 194.

Raleigh Investment Co. v. Governor-General in Council (A.I.R. 1947P.C. 78)—ref. 7 E.L.R, 203 ; 8 E.L.R. 350

Ralla Rai Willaiti Rai v. Bansi Lai Jagarnath (A.LR, 1932 Lah, 239)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Ramachandran Nair v. Ramachandra Das and Others (1 E.L.R. 442)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 200 ; 5 E.L.R. 55, 446; 7 E.L.R. 428; 9 E.L.R. 231;10 E.L.R. 174—followed 2 E.L.R. 401; 3 E.L.R. 162, 447; 4 E.L.R. 91, 167—-dissented from 2 E.L.R. 276

Ramakrishna Reddi v. Kamaladevi (5 E.L.R. 173)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 338

Ramamoorthi, In re (A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 94)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203--explained 10 E.L.R. 272

viii

Iviii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Raman & Co. v. The State of Madras (1952) 2 M.L.J. 544—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Raman Lalji v. Gokul (I.L.R. 39 All. 343)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123

Ramanlal Rathi v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Cal. 305)

—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Ramanugraha Narayan v. Sarda Prasad (3 Jagat Narain 232)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 477 ; 3 E.L.R. 305

Ram Chand v. Wadhawa Ram (5 E.L.R. 386)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 1, 171, 234

Ram Chandra Annaji Khedgikar v. Shivbishalsingh Harpalsingh (1Doabia 211)—See Railway Union's case

Ramchandra Choudhari v. Sadasiva Tripathi (5 E L.R. 194)—ref. 9 E L.R. 403

Ramchandra Govind Unavne v. Laxman Sevleram Ronghe (A.I.R. 1938Bom. 447)

—ref. 9 E.L.R. 21

Ram Das v. Ram Babu (158 I.C. 25)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Rameshwar Prasad Singh v. Krishna Gopal Das and Others (4 E.L.R.112)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 224, 368

—relied on 7 E.L.R. 135

Rameshur Singh v. Sheodin Singh (I.L.R. 12 All. 510)— ref- 3 E.L.R. 423

Ram Ghulam and Another v. The Government of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R.1950 All. 206)

—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Ramgopal Ghose v. Dhirendra Nath Sen (I.L.R. 54 Cal. 380)

—ref. 2 E.L.R. 109 ; 4 E.L.R. 380 ; 9 E.L.R. 403

Ram Jawaya Kapur v. Ganga Saran and Others (Punjab Trade UnionConstituency) (2 Doabia 226)- ref. 3 E.L.R. 197 ; 8 E.L.R. 66

Ram Khelawan Singh v. Maharajah of Benares (A.I.R. 1930 All. 15)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154 ••

.Ramakrishna v. Bapurao (40 Bom. L.R. 390)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 389 ; 9 E.L.R. 36

Ramchand v. Wadhwa Ram and Others (5 E.L.R. 386)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. Hx

Ramkrishna v. Thakur Daoosingh (6 E.L.R. 186)—rej. 8 E.L.R. 350 ; 9 E.L.R. 451—dissented from 9 E.L.R. 163, 201, 216

Ramlal v. Sujani Ram and Others (2 E.L.R. 27)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 147, 375

Ram Murti v. Shumba Sadar (2 E.L.R. 330)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 428

Ram Nath Dube v. The State of U.P. (Civil Miscellaneous No. 7095of 1951)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 138

Ramprasad Chimanlal v. Hazarimull Lalchand (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 458)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 197

Ram Singh v. Shri Hazari Lai and Others (6 E.L.R. 224)--ref. 8 E.L.R. 28 ; 9 E.L.R. 21

Ranchhodlal Liladhar Vayeda v. Sanjalia Mohanlal Virjibhai and Others(4 E.L.R. 493)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 59

Ranganathan v. Madras Tramway Co. (A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 659)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Rangoon West (G.U.), 1926 (Hammond 605)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Rangpur (East) Non-Mohammadan Constituency : Panchanan Varmav. Babu Jatindra Nath Chakraburty (3 Jagat Narain 235)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280

Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana (A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 163)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Ransom & Luck Ltd. v. Surbiton Borough Council ([1949] 1 Ch. 180) •—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471 ; 10 E.L.R. 311—distinguished 9 E.L.R. 394

Rashid, D. S. and Son v. Income-tax Investigation Commission (A.I.R,1954 S.C. 207)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 203

Ratan Singh and Another v. Padam Chand Jain and Others (7 E.L.R.189)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 8

Rathischandra v. Amulyacharan (l.L.R. 58 Cal. 87)—followed 1 E.L.R. 162

Ratilal Abhechand v. Custodian General of Evacuee Property (A.I.R.1952 Sau. 112)•ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Ix . • • "ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Rattan Singh v. Devinder Singh and Others (7 E.L.R 234)—re}. 7 E.L.R. 320

Rawalpindi Division case 1946, (1 Doabia 85 ; Sen and Poddar 712)—re}. 2 E.L.R. 121

Rawat Man Singh v. Shri Roop Chand Sogani and Others (Civil WritPetition No. 153 of 1953)—re}. 9 E.L.R. 193

Razzar Muhammadan Rural Constituency, 1937 (Sen and Poddar 716)—re}. 2 E.L.R. 121, 147, 301 ; 5 E.L.R. 446 ; 6 E.L.R. 247—approved 1 E.L.R. 330—dissented from 2 E.L.R. 234

Reg. v. Commissioners for the Special Purposes of Income Tax (1888,21Q.B.D. 313)—re}. 6 E.L.R. 162

Reg. v. Detners (figoo] A.C. 103)—re}. 4 E.L.R. 101

Reg. v. James Bolton (1841) 1 Q.B. 66—re}. 1 E.L.R. 68 ; 5 E.L.R. 1

Reg v. Lords Commissioners of the Treasury ((1872) 7 Q.B. 387)—re}. 8 E.L.R. 350

Reg. v. St. Olave's Board of Works ((1857) 8 El. & Bl. 529)—re}. 5 E.L.R. 1

Reg v. St. Olave (8 E. & B. 528)—re}. 1 E.L.R. 68

Reg v. Tithe Commissioners (14 Q.B. 474)—re}. 2 E.L.R. 109

Regina v. Burrows ([1892] 1 Q.B. 399)—re}. 10 E.L.R. 203

Rex v. Brown (1789) T.R. 574—re}. 10 E.L.R. 203

Rex v. Electricity Commissioners : London Electricity Joint CommitteeCo. (1920) Ex parte ([1924] 1 K.B. 171)—re}. 10 E.L.R. 14, 216

Rex v, Justices of Kingston, Ex parte Davy (86 Law Times 590)—re}. 1 E.L.R. 68

Rex v. Kemp (1789) 1 East 46—re}. 10 E.L.R. 203

Rex v. Moreley (97 E.R. 696)—re}. 1 E.L.R. 89

TABLE Of CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. Ixi

Rex v. Nat Liquors Ltd. ([1922] 2 A.C. 128)—re/. 8 E.L.R. 220; 10 E.L.R. 216

Rex v. North ; Ex parte Oakey ([1927] 1 K.B. 491)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 21

Rex v. Northumberland Compensation "Appeal Tribunal ([1951] 1 K.B.711)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89 ; 10 E.L.R. 216

Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal ([1952] 1 K.B.338)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471 ; 10 E.L.R. 14—relied on 10 E.L.R. 216

Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee ([1910] 2 K.B. 859)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Rex v. Speyer : Rex v. Cassel ([1916] 1 K.B. 595)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 341, 350; 10 E.L.R. 203

Reynolds and Another v. Attorney-General for Nova Scotia and Others([1896] A.C. 240)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55

Richards v. Pitt ([1915] 84 L.J.K.B. 1417)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Richard Spooner v. Juddow (4 M.I.A, 353)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Ridgway v. Wharton (10 E.R. 1287)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 182

Ripon Housing Order, Re ([1939] 2 K.B. 838)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Robinson v. Graves ([1925] 1 K.B. 579)—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 339

Robinson v. Graves ([1935] 1 K.B. 579) :

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 416Rochester case ((1892) 4 O'M. & H. 156)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 234

Rochester case (4 O'M. & H. 159)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 288

Rohtak case, 1921 : Ch. Gobardhandas v. Ch. Lai Chand (1 HammondE.P. 183 ; T Jagat Narain 57)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 271, 442 ; 2 E.L.R. 1, 12, 121, 266 ; 3 E.L.R. 147375': 4 E.L.R. 3< 9, 466 : 6 E.L.R, 414 ; 7 E.L.R. 338

ELECTION LAW REPORTS t)IGESf

Rohtak Muhammadan Constituency case, 1946 : Mohd. Shaft Ali Khanv. Mohd. Khurshid Khan (Sen and Poddar 728)—followed 2 E.L.R. 461

Rohtak North-West (N.M.R.) case : Ch. Matu Ram v. Ch. Lai Chand(2 Jagat Narain 159)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 280

Roller Flour Mills, Patiala v. Income-tax Officer (A.I.R. 1953 Pepsu 88)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 162

Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton and Bros. Ltd. ([1925] A.C. 445)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Royse v. Birley (1869) (L.R. 4 C.P. 296)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 42

4 E.L.R. 234; 7 E.L.R. 4285 E.L.R. 353, 417

—distinguished and doubted 9 E.L.R. 301

Rudra Pratap v. Bhagwandin (1 E.L.R. 60)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186

Ryots of Garabando v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (I.L.R. 1944 Mad.457; 70 LA. 129)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 417 ; 10 E.L.R. 14

Ryots of Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi (A.L.R. 1943 P.C.164)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Sadananda Pyne v. Harinam Sha (A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 179)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 426; 5 E.L.R. 55

Mt. Sadiqa Begam v. Ata Ullah (A.I.R. 1933 Lah. 885)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Sadler v. Henlock ([1855] 24 L.J.K B. 138)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Saharanpur case (1 Hammond E.P. 196)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 274

Saharanpore District (N.M.R.) case (1 Jagat Narain 66 ; Hammond 621)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 450 ; 3 E.L.R. 176, 288, 447 ; 6 E.L.R. 197 ; 8E.L.R. 265-—relied on 2 E.L.R. 163—not followed 1 E.L.R. 384; 2 E.L.R. 450—followed 1 E.L.R. 312, ; 8 E.L.R. 240~~ distinguished r E.L.R. 214

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxiii

Saharanpur District N.M.R. case (4 Jagat Narain 96)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252 ; 2 E.L.R. 189 ; 6 E.L.R. 224

Saharanpur District (North) Muhammadan Rural Constituency : ZafarAhmad v. M. Munfait Ali and Others (1 Doabia 69)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341; 7 E.L.R. 457

Sahibzada Zeinulabdin Khan v. Sahibzada Ahmed Raza Khan (5 LA.233)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

Saka Venkata Rao v. Election Commission (1 E.L.R. 417)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 461—reversed 2 E.L.R. 499

Saka Venkata Rao's case (2 E.L.R. 499)—distinguished 9 E.L.R. 201, 216—ref. 9 E.L.R. 451

Sambandam, S.K. v. Surya Rao and Others (2 E.L.R. 61)-ref. 4 E.L.R. 55

Sambhunath Mahanti v. Gobinda Prasad Singh (Sen and Poddar 649)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 1

Samuel, In re ([1913] L.R. (P.C.) 515—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah (A.I.R. 1954 Raj. 129)••••ref. 9 E .L .R . 193

Sankara Pandia Nadar v. V.V. Ramaswami and Others (5 E.L.R. 417)—distinguished 7 E.L.R. 1, 171—ref. 8 E.L.R. 233 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

Santosh Kumar Jain v. The State ([1951] S.C.R. 303)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 199

Sant Singh v. Shamsher Singh and Others (7E.L.R. 203)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 320—relied on 8 E.L.R. 1

Saqlain Ahmad v. Emperor (A.I.R 1936 All. 165)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Sarafally Mamooji, In the matter of (I.L.R. 34 Bom. 659)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1

Saran South case (2 Hammond E.P. 250)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301

Sarat Chandra v. Gopal Chandra Laha (19 LA. 203)Sardar Basant Singh v. Sardar Rattan Singh (1 Doabia 80)

See Ferozepore East (Sikh) case 1946

Ix'iv ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sardar Basant Singh v. Sardar Rattan Singh (i Doabia 247)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 407

Sardar Gurbaksh Singh v. Sardar Baldeo Singh (1 Doabia 13)—See Ambala North Sikh Rural Constituency case

Sardar Harcharan Singh v. Narottam Singh (1 Doabia 77)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 121, 414; 5 E.L.R. 48; 7 E.L.R. 38

Sardarni Parkash Kaur v. Rai Bahadur Wasakha Singh (Sen and Poddar15)—See Amritsar Central (Sikh) case 1937

Sardul Singh v. Hukam Singh and Others (6 E.L.R. 316)—followed 7 E.L.R. 234—ref. 9 E.L.R. 324

Sarin, A.R. v. B.C. Patil(A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 423)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 230

Sarju Prasad Namdeo v. Gopal Saran Singh and Others (8 E.L.R. 444)—ref, 8 E.L.R. 424

Sarojihi Dassi v. Hari Das Ghose (A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 12)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Sarvothama Rao v. Chairman, Municipal Council, Saidapet (I.L.R. 47Mad. 585)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89, 133 ; 2 E.L.R. 167

Satara South case 1948 (1 Doabia 137) (Sen and Poddar 741)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252 ; 2 E.L.R. 121 ; 5 E.L.R. 48 ; 6 E.L.R. 405

Satgur Prasad v. Har Narain (I.L.R. 7 Luck. 64)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 80

Satnarain Gurwala v. Hanuman Parshad (A.I.R. 1946 Lah. 85)-ref. 1 E.L.R. 23, 68, 133 ; 8 E.L.R. 350

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others (6 E.L.R. 414)—followed 7 E.L.R. 320—ref. 8 E L.R. 448, 480

Satya Dev Bushahri v. Padam Dev and Others (10 E.L.R. 103)—followed 10 E.L.R 214

Satyendra Kumar Das v. Chairman of the Municipal Commissioners ofDacca (A.I.R. 1931 Cal. 288)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 42; 5 E.L.R. 353, 446 ; 6 E.L.R. 414; 7 E.L.R.428


TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxV

Sawday v. Singha Roy (A.I.R. 1946 Cal. 206)— ref. 9 E.L.R. 361

Sayed Quasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 156)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Scotson v. Pegg (3 L.T. 753)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher [1949] 2 A.E.R. 164—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Secretary of State v. Bhagwandas (A.I.R. 1938 Bom. 168)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Secretary of State v. Madho Ram, (A.I.R. 1929 Lah. 114)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 101

Secretary of State v. Malik Amir Mohammad Khan (A.I.R. 1935 Lah.653)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 21

Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (L.R. 67 LA. 222)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23, 134—ref. 2 E.L.R. 263 ; 5 E.L.R. 1; 8 E.L.R. 159, 350

Secretary of State v. C. Rama Rao (39 Mad. 617)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 375

Secretary of State v. O.T. Sarin & Co. (I.L.R. 11 Lah. 375)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 301

Secunderabad case : Ramakrishna Reddy v. KamalaDevi (5 E.L.R. 173)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 338 ; 8 E.L.R. 332

Selvaranga Raju v. Doraiswamy Mudaliar (I.L.R. 52 Mad. 732)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Seodoyal Khemka v. Joharmull Manmull (I.L.R. 50 Cal. 549)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446

Seshaiah v. Koti Reddi (3 E.L.R. 39)-ref. 5 E.L.R. 353

Seth Gokul Chand v. Government of Rajasthan (1951 R.L.W. 423)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 52

Seth Mathuradas Bulkidas Mohota v. Rao Bahadur D. Laxmi Narayan(3 Jagat Narain 112)— ref. 2 E.L.R. 426

Sethuratnam Ayyarv. Venkatachala Goundar (I.L.R. 43 Mad. 567)ref. 5 E.L.R. 173

Ixvi • ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Sewa Ram v. Misrimal (A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 12)

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

Sahabbir Hussain v. The State of U.P. and Another (A.I.R. 1952 All.

257)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341

Shadwell v. Shadwell (30 L.J. (C.P.). 145)

— ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Shahabad case (1 Jagat Narain 85)— ref. 6 E.L.R. 346

Shahabad Central (N.M.R.) 1927 (Hammond 635)— not followed 7 E.L.R. 203

Shahabad Mohammadan Rural Constituency 1946 ; Manjoor Hussain v.Cholam Mohiuddin (Sen and Poddar 746)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 239 ; 5 E.L.R. 173, 199 ; 6 E.L.R. 316 ; 9 E.L.R.

403Shah Mohammad Umair v. Ram Charan Singh and Others (8 E.L.R.

179)—-followed 9 E.L.R. 33—ref. 10 E.L.R. 144, 357

Shah Muhammad Yahya v. Chaudhuri Muhammad Nazirul Hasan (Senand Poddar 549)

—See Monghyr North M.R. 1937

Shaikh Muhammad Mansoor v. Moulvi Muhammad Shafi Daudi(Hammond 677)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248 ; 10 E.L.R. 461

Shambhu Nath v. Gobind Prasad Singh (2 Doabia 411)

—See North Kendrapara G.R. Constituency 1937 case

Shamrao v. District Magistrate, Thana (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 324); [1953]

S.C.R. 383)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55Shankar v. Returning Officer, Kolaba (54 Bom. L.R. 137 ; 1 E.L.R. 13)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 409 ; 5 E.L.R. 230 ; 6 E.L.R. 162, 186 ; 8 E.L.R.59. 159. 350 ; 9 E.L.R. 163, 451—explained 9 E.L.R. 36—followed 9 E.L.R. 201, 216

Shanker Nanasaheb Karpe v. Maruti Sitaram Sawant and Others (1E.L.R. 302)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 352 ; 6 E.L.R. 104—followed 4 E.L.R. ior—distinguished 5 E.L.R. 319

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxvii

Shankar Rao Ramaji and Another v. State of Madhya Bharat (i E.L.R.34 ; A.I.R. 1952 M.B. 97)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 124 ; 5 E.L.R. 1, 230 ; 6 E.L.R. 186—explained 9 E.L.R. 36

Shankar Singh v. Thakur Singh (Hammond 95)—followed 4 E.L.R. 441

Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India ([1952] S.C.R. 89 ; A.I.R.1951 S.C. 458)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 40

Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga (1 E.L.R. 252)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 224

Sharp v. Wakefield ([1891] A.C. 173)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68

Shanta Devi Vaidya v. Bashir Hussain Zaidi and Others (8 E.L.R. 300)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Sheik Muhammad Sadiq v. Mian Muhammad Sherif (Hammond 83)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 163

Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Mian Muhammad Sharif (2 Jagat Narain10)

—ref. 3 E.L.R. 197Sheikh Mohammad Sadiq v. Dr. Saifud-Din Kitchlew (Sen and Poddar

28 ; 2 Doabia 117)—See Amritsar City case

Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation ([1931] A.C.275)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Sheokaran Singh v. Sahib Ram (1 Doabia 297)—See Hissar North (General) Constituency case

Sheo Kumar and Another v. V. G. Oak and Others (5 E.L.R. 103)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207; 9 E.L.R. 183, 201, 403—followed 8 E.L.R. 119—dissented from 8 E.L.R. 179

Sheonarayan Vaidya v. Sardarmal Lalwani (4 E.L.R. 401)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 461

Sheoshankar v. State Government of M.P. (A.I.R. 1951 Nag. 58)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Shibban Lai Saksena v. Harishankar Prasad and Others (9 E.L.R. 403)—affirmed 10 E.L.R. 126

Shib Deo Misra v. Ram Prasad (I.L.R. 46 All. 637)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 84

Ixviii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Shib Narayan Singh v. Lakshmi Raj Singh (2 Jagat Narain 4)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305

Shibnath Banerjee's case ([1945J F.C.R. 195)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 499

Shiva Dutt and Others v. Bansidas Dhangar and Others (5 E.L.R. 55)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123

Shiva Shankar Singh v. Thakur Moti Singh (Hammond 97)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 20, 88; 6 E.L.R. 470

Shivabai v. Shiddeswar [1920] (I.L.R. 45 Bom. 1009)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Shiv Bahadur Singh v. The State of Vindhya Pradesh (A.I.R. 1953 S.C.394)•—ref. 8 E.L.R. 429

Shiv Dayal v. Teg Ram and Others (6 E.L.R. 346)-ref. 7 E.L.R. 338 ; 8 E.L.R. 332

Shivdeo Misra and Others v. Ram Prasad and Others (A.I.R. 1925 All.79)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 137, 288

Shivubai K. Rajaram v. Siddheswar Martand (I.L.R. 45 Bom. 1009)ref. 1 E.L.R. 389 ; 7 E.L.R. 64

Shri Gian Chand v. The State (Civil Miscellaneous No. 189 of 1951)ref. 6 E.L.R. 162

Shripad v. Harsiddhbhai Divatia (A.I.R. 1948 Bom. 20—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Shyam Chand Basack v. Chairman of the Dacca Municipality (24 C.W.N." 189)

—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73, 401; 6 E.L.R. 197

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 156

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234


Siddik Mohamed v. Mohamed Saran (A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 57)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 352

Simmons v. Heath Laundry ([1910] 1 K.B. 543)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414 ; 7 E.L.R. 874 ; 9 E.L.R. 451


Sitakanta Mahapatra v. Harekrishna Mehtab (3 Jagat Narain 93Hammond 102)—See Balsore South case

Sital Prasad Ray v. Sheo Singh (I.L.R. 2 Pat. 175)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 179

Sitapur District (East) General Rural Constituency : Babu Jagan NathPrasad v. Raja Maheswar Dayal Seth (2 Doabia 217 ; Sen andPoddar 759)— ref. 1 E.L.R. 211: 2 E.L.R. 121 ; 5 E.L.R. 48, 129 ; 7 E.L.R. 407

Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograj Singh Parihar (2 E.L.R. 283)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 313, 409 ; 5 E.L.R. 103, 173 ; 6 E.L.R. 28, 123 ; 8E.L.R. 66, 207, 480; 9 E.L.R. 183, 216, 231-, 283:10 E.L.R. 135,357—followed 5 E.L.R. 116 ; 6 E.L.R. 1; 8 E.L.R. 199 ; 9 E.L.R. 278,4°3—dissented from 8 E.L.R. 179, 240—relied on 9 E.L.R. 242 ; 10 E.L.R. 144

Sivathanu Pillai v. Kumara Pillai and Others (2 E.L.R. 263 ; A.I.R.1953 T.C. 274)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207, 350

Smith v. Bufful (115 N.E. 669)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 189

Sochet Singh v. Thakar Singh and Others (3 E.L.R. 102)—followed 5 E.L.R. 93—ref. 6 E.L.R. 247; 10 E.L.R. 450, 461

Soorajmull Nagarmull v. Asst. Collector of Customs (55 C.W.N. 528)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23

Southampton case ([1869] 1 O'M. & H. 222)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

South-East Gujrat Mohammadan Constituency case (Sen and Poddar764)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 73 ; 8 E.L.R. 105

South-East Punjab Sikh Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 778)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252, 442

Southern Towns (Mohammadan) Constituency (2 Doabia 310 ; Sen andPoddar 975)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 100, 301—relied on 3 E.L.R. 137

South Indian Industrials Ltd. v. Narasimha Rao ([1926] I.L.R. 50 Mad.372)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

1XX ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

South Meath (4 O'M. & H. 132)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 358

South Meath case (4 O'M. & H. 134)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 408 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

South Newington Election Petition Re ([1948] 2 A.E.R. 503)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 216

South-Western Towns General Constituency case (Sen and Poddar 784)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 442

South-West Towns (Punjab) General Constituency case (1 Doabia 105)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 252

Sreemunchunder Dey v. Gopaulchunder Chuckerbutty (21 M.I.A. 28)— ref. 2 E.L.R. 467

Srinivasachariar v. Venkatarama Iyer (47 M.L.J. 762)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Srinivasalu Reddy v. Kuppuswamy Goundar (27 Law Weekly 362)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Srinivasalu v. Kuppuswami (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 253)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 68, 133 ; 8 E.L.R. 350

Srinivasan, A. v. G. Vasantha Pai and Others (10 E.L.R. 245)—affirmed in part 10 E.L.R. 345—overruled in part 10 E.L.R. 345

Sri Ram v. Mohammad Taqi Hadi (8 E.L.R. 139)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

St. George's Division of the Borough of Tower Hamlets (5 O'M. & H.89)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248

St. George's case ([1896] 5 O'M. & H. 104)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 242

Stalybridge case (1 O'M. & H. 72)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 162

Starey v. Graham [1899] (1 Q.B.D. 406)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 55

State Aided Bank of Travancore Ltd. v. Dhrit Ram (A.I.R. 1942P.C. 6)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339 ; 2 E.L.R. 147 ; 6 E.L.R. 414

State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara ([1951] S.C.R. 682A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 318)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 171, 203

State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik (54 Bom. L.R. 869)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 380

i

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED, ETC. lxx i

State of Madras v. V. G. Row (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 196)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta ([1952] S.C.R. 28)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 12)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207

State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh and Others (A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 10)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203—distinguished 10 E.L.R. 272

State of Seraikella v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 253)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 34

State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali and Another (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 75)—ref. 7 E L.R. 203—distinguished 8 E.L.R. 20r

Steamship Co. v. Joliffe (2 Mall. 450)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Stein v. Larkin ([1934] 1 K.B. 196)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Stepney case (4 O'M. & H. 34)ref. 5 E.L.R. 417 ; 6 E.L.R. 288

Stepney case (4 O'M. & H. 178)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 101

Stepney (1892 Day's El. Cas. 119)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 242

Stowe v. Joliffe (L.R. C.P. 734)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 341 ; 7 E.L.R. 374; 9 E.L.R. 494

Strause & Co. Ltd., In re (A.I.R. 1937 Bom. 16)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Strickland v. Giuseppe Grima (A.I.R. 1930 P.C. 227)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 207, 350

Stroud ([1874] 2 O'M. & H. 109)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Subba Raj, A. S. v. Muthiah (5 E.L.R. 21 ; 66 L.W. 908)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 216, 278, 283 ; 10 E.L.R. 141—affirmed 9 E.L.R. 290

Subbaraya Pillai v. Govindaswami (21 L.W. 220)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Subbiah Pillai v. Sankarapandian Pillai (A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 369)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 123

lxxi i ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Subramanyam, K. v. Abdul Hameed Khan (i E.L.R. 432)— ref. 3 E.L.R. 102—followed 5 E.L.R. 93—applied 6 E.L.R. 10, 470

Subrao Hambirrao v. Radha Hambirrao (I.L.R. 52 Bom. 497)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 428

Sudarasana Rao v. Christian Pillai (45 M.L.J. 798 ; A.I.R. 1924 Mad.396)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330

Sujaniram v. Lai Shyamshah (5 E.L.R. 183)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 186

Sukar Gope v. State of Bihar (1 E.L.R. 68)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 40 ; 6 E.L.R. 186 ; 8 E.L.R. 159

Sumer Singh v. Thakur Gurdat and Others (7 E.L.R. 171)—relied on 8 E.L.R. 1—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Sunil Kumar Bose v. The Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal(A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 274)—ref. 10 P2.L.R. 37

Suraj Bhan v. Hem Chand Jain (2 E.L.R. 1)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 301, 414 ; 3 E.L.R. 305, 375, 447; 4 E.L.R. 274 '.7 E.L.R. 428—followed 4 E.L.R. 466, 167

Suraj Narain v. Jhabbulal (I.L.R. 1944 All. 221)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 266 ; 3 E.L.R. 1

Suraj Narain v. Ram Nath and Others (3 E.L.R. 305)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 346 ; 7 E.L.R. 338

Surat Singh v. Jang Bahadur Singh and Others (4 E.L.R. 306)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 224, 346, 368 ; 7 E.L.R. 338 ; 8 E.L.R. 332

Surendra Narayan Sinha v. Babu Amulyadhone Roy and Others (2Doabia 368)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 288

Surendra Nath Roy v. Kedar Nath Bose (A.I.R. 1937 Cal. 87)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Syed Mahamud Shah v. Ghulam Samad and Others (2 Doabia 310 ;Sen and Poddar 975)—See Southern Towns (Mohammadan) Constituency

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. lxxiii

Syed Zain-ul-Abdin Shah v. Khan Sahib Sheikh Mohammad Amin (2Doabia 302)—See Multan Division case

Swaroop Narain v. Durga Narain (3 Jagat Narain 22)—See Farrukhabad case

Tahur Ahmed v. Humayun Raza (Sen and Poddar 704)—See Rajshahi cum Malda Mohammadan Constituency

Tamworth (1 O'M. & H. 75)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Tara Prasad v. Debi Charan (Hammond 375)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 205, 234—relied on 3 E.L.R. 1

Taunton case (2 O'M. & H. 66)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Tayebuddin Ahmed v. Khurram Khan Panee and Others (Sen andPoddar 790)— ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Tebbe v. Smith (1895) 49 Am. St. Rep. 68—ref. 5 E.L.R. 156

Tej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Jaipur, and Others (9 E.L.R. 193)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 450

Templeton v. William Parkin & Co. ([1929] 140 L.T. 519)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Tenishah v. Bolahishah (14 C.W.N. 479)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Thadi Subbi v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1930 Mad. 869)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 388

Thakurain Balraj v. Rai Jagatpal (11 Bom. L.R. 516 P.C.)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 36

Thakur Mohendra Nath Sahi Deo v. Devaki Prasad Sinha (3 JagatNarain 228)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 305

Xhakur Udaya Vir Singh v. Raj Kumar Singh (Hammond 56)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 48

Thanawala, F.B. v. Shahzada Basudeo Singh (1 I.C. 325)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 339 ; 6 E.L.R. 414

lxx iv ELECTION LAW REFORTS DIGEST

Theberge v. Laudry ([1876] 2 App. Cas. 102)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 133; 5 E.L.R. 40; 8 E.L.R. 350—applied 7 E.L.R. 364

\ —distinguished 9 E.L.R. 494

Thete Gopal Ramji v. Amolok Chand (1 E.L.R. 477): — ref. 3 E.L.R. 375 ; 4 E.L.R. 309 ; 7 E.L.R. 338 ; 9 E.L.R. 36

Thomas Bradshah (Mr.) and Mr. Alfred Wilkes Keys v. Colonel Foster(5 O'M. & H. 39)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 471

Thompson v. Pearce (129 E.R. 632)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 167 ; 5 E.L.R. 386 ; 10 E.L.R. 311

, Thornbury (16 Q.B.D. 746)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 248

Thyagaraja Chettiar v. Collector of Madura (I.L.R. 59 Mad. 702)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 89

Tikaram Sharma v. Lalit Bahadur Kharga (1 E.L.R. 252)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 27 ; 3 E.L.R. 375 ; 6 E.L.R. 224 ; 7 E.L.R. 338;8 E.L.R. 332—relied on 4 E.L.R. 441

Tipperah North case (Sen and Poddar 802)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 316 ; 7 E.L.R. 301

Tipperary County case (2 O'M. & H. 31)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 408 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

Tirhut (2 Jagat Narain 180)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 346

Trade Union Labour (North Western Railway Union) Constituency, 1946:R. S. Ram Jawaya Kapur v. R. B. Ganga Saran and Others (Senand Poddar 823)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 446—dissented from 5 E.L.R. 156

Tranton v. Astor (33 T.L.R. 383)-ref. 5 E.L.R. 353—distinguished and doubted 9 E.L.R. 301

Tricum Das Dwarka Das v. Sir Vasanta Rao A. Dabholkar and Others(4 Jagat Narain 40)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 139

Truax v. Corrigan (257 U.S. 312 ; 66 Law Edn. 255)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Tulsha Devi v. Sri Krishna (A.I.R. 1949 Oudh. 59)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

, II

t

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC. l x x v

Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh (3 E.L.R. 26)—re/. 6 E.L.R. 138 ; 9 E.L.R. 403

Udainath Singh v. Jagat Bahadur Singh and Others (No. 2) (5 E.L.R. 199)—dissented from 7 E.L.R. 234

Udrej Singh v. Ram Bahal Singh (A.I.R, 1946 All. 436)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

United Provinces v. Atiqa Begum (A.I.R. 1941 F.C. 16)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 34

United States v. Classic (Fairman's American Constitutional Decisions

—ref. 2 E.L.R. 61United States v. Classic (85 L. Ed. 1368)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 341United States v. Hartwell (6 Wall. 385)

—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414University of Madras v. Shanta Bai (66 L.W. 665)

—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376Uttam Chand v. Crown (A.I.R. 1945 Punjab 238 (F.B.))

—ref. 7 E.L.R. 301U. P. Anglo-Indian Constituency case (2 Doabia 106)

—ref. 1 E.L.R. 432 ; 4 E.L.R. 341U. P. Chamber of Commerce (Sen and Poddar 840)

—ref. 5 E.L.R. 81 ; 8 E.L.R. 105

U. P. Government v. Lala Man Mohan Das (A.I.R. 1941 All. 345 F.B.—ref. 9 E.L.R. 403

Vasant Rao v. Election Commission of India, New Delhi (A.I.R. 1953Nag. 237)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Vashist Narain Sharma v. Dev Chand (10 E.L.R. 30)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 216, 376, 461

Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd, (A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 192)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 1, 230 ; 8 E.L.R. 179, 220, 350; 9 E.L.R. 193, 201;

10 E.L.R. 14—relied on 10 E.L.R. 216

Vellore Tribunal case (2 E.L.R. 167)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 332

Venkatasubba Rao, In re (1943, 2 M.L.J. 658 ; A.I.R. 1944 Mad. 132)—ref. 2 E.L.R. 330

Ixxvi ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST

Venkatasubbiah v. Lakshminarasimham (A.I.R. 1952 Mad. 1274)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 293

Venkatesh Yeshwant v. Emperor (A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 513)— relied on 3 E.L.R. 17

Venkat Rao, B., In re (I.L.R. 36 Mad. 159)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Vijay Mohan Reddy v. Paga Pulla Reddy (2 E.L.R. 414)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 129, 446 ; 7 E.L.R. 90, 407, 428; 10 E.L.R. 174—followed 4 E.L.R. 167 ; 6 E.L.R. 409

Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly Members, In re (4 E.L.R. 422)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 397 ; 10 E.L.R. 49

Vindhya Pradesh Tribunal (5 E.L.R. 199)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 234

Vishinji Goverdhan Das & Co. v. Jasraj Girdharilal (A.I.R. 1918 Sind 1)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 154

Viswambhar Pandit v. Vasudev Pandit (I.L.R. 13 Bom. 37)—distinguished 2 E.L.R. 109

Vithaldasv. Parshottamdas (A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 113)— ref. 3 E.L.R. 137

Vyankatesh Deshpande v. The Crown (I.L.R. 1940 Nag. 1)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 53

Wakeford v. Lincoln Bishop (A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 168)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 28

Wali Mohammad v. Ishaq Ali (I.L.R. 54 All. 57 F.B.)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 480 ; 9 E.L.R. 403

Walker, In re ( n o California 387)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 189

Walsall (Day 107)ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Walsall case (4 O'M. & H. 123)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

Walsall's Overseers v. L. and N. W. Ry. Co. ((1879) 4 App. Cas. 30)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 14, 216

Wamanrao Deorao v. Shrikumar Jaikumar and Another (A.I.R. 1946Nag. 42)—ref. 5 E.L.R. 183

Ward v. Flood (17 Am. Rep. 405)—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Warrington case ( i O ' M . & H . 42)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 368 ; 7 E.L.R. 234 ; 8 E.L.R. 240

TABLE OF CASES OVERRULED, FOLLOWED ETC.

Waryam Singh and Another v. Amarnath and Another ([1954] S.C.R.565)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 216 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

Wasawa Singh v. Waryam Singh and Others (Sen and Poddar 122;2 Doabia 263)—See Batala Sikh case, 1946

Waygood v. James (1870) 21 L.T. (N.S.) 202—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

West Bengal Tribunal case (2 E.L.R. 189)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 332

Westbury (1 O'M. & H. 56)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 240 ; 10 E.L.R. 376

West Derby Union v. Metropolitan Life Assurance Society (1897] A.C.647) '—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Western Towns Sikh Urban Constituency (Sen and Poddar 854)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 242

Weston v. Sneyd ([1857] 1 H. & N. 703 ; 156 E.R. 1384)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 220

Wigan case (4 O'M. & H. 1)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283 ; 6 E.L.R. 414 ; 8 E.L.R. 429

William Temple v. Bulmer ([1943] Canada L.R. (.SC.) 265)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 34, 68, 134

Wilson v. Lord Bury (5 Q.B.D. 519)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 311

Wi Matua's Will, In re [1908] A.C. 448—ref. 8 E.L.R. 350

Windsor (1 O'M. & H. 3)- ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Windsor ([1869] 1 O'M. & H. 7)—ref. 10 E.L.R. 376

Wolseley and Others v. Fulford (5 O'M. & H. 27)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 23

Wolverhampton New Water Works Company v. Hawkesford 18597 W.R. 464; (6 C.B. (N.S.) 336)—ref. 1 E.L.R. 34, 68, 133; 8 E.L.R. 159, 350

Wood v. Leadbitter (13 M. & W. 838)—ref. 9 E.L.R. 471

Ixxviii ELECTION LAW REPORTS DIGEST 1Woodward v. Sarsons (L.R. 10 C.P. 733)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 248 ; 4 E.L.R. 221; 5 E.L.R. 248 ; 8 E.L.R. 24?); 19 E.L.R. 36 ; 10 E.L.R. 216 J—distinguished 1 E.L.R. 442 ; 3 E.L.R. 197 ; 8 E.L.R. 300—relied on 4 E.L.R. 55

Worcester (1892), Day's Election Cases 88)—ref. 8 E.L.R. 240

Worthington v. Jaffries ([1875] L.R. 10 C.P. 379) j—ref. 5 E.L.R. 2t

Yarborough, Ex parte ([1884] n o U.S. 631)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 414

Yarmouth case (5 O'M. & H. 176)—ref. 4 E.L.R. 283 A

Yick Wo v. Hopkins ([1886] 118 U.S. 356) "—ref. 7 E.L.R. 203

Yograjsingh Shankarsingh Parihar v. Sitaram Hirachand Birla (1 E.L.R.389)—ref. 3 E.L.R. 409, 439 ; 6 E.L.R. 104 ; 9 E.L.R. 231 1

Yograjsing Shankarsmg Parihar v. Sitaram Hirachand Birla and Others(3 E.L.R. 439)—ref. 6 E.L.R. 104

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A DIGEST ELECTION LAW REPORTS

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