A Contrast of the Sociological Systems of Merton, Parsons and Marx (Szymanski, 1975)

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COMPETING SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS: A Contrast of the Sociological Systems of Merton,Parsons, and MarxAuthor(s): Albert SzymanskiSource: Humboldt Journal of Social Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (SPRING/SUMMER 1975), pp. 57-65Published by: Department of Sociology, Humboldt State University

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COMPETING SOCIOLOGICAL PARADIGMS:

A Contrast

of the

Sociological

Systems

of

Merton,

Parsons,

and Marx*

Albert

Szymanski

UNTIL

recently

two modes of

sociology

were

hegemonic

in the United States.

These were what C.

Wright

Mills

called

Grand

Theory

and Abstracted

Empiricism

(1959).

The

major proponent

of

the first has been Talcott

Parsons,

and the

major

theorist of the

second,

Robert

King

Merton. The

leading

social

science

perspective

outside

of the

United States in the

last

generation,

however,

has been

that

originally developed by

Karl Marx.

Each

of these

three men

articulated systematic approaches to doing sociology, which,

following

Thomas

Kuhn

(1964),

can

justly

be

referred

to as

scientific

paradigms. Although

the relative

pre-eminence

within

non-Marxist American

sociology

of the

perspectives

articulated

by

Parsons

and

Merton

has,

in recent

years,

diminished

considerably

in

favor of formal

mathematical

sociology

in

some

circles,

and numerous versions of

voluntarist

and idealist

modes of

sociology

such

as

ethnomethodology,

critical

theory,

phenomenology,

and

symbolic

interactionism

in

others,

the

paradigms

of

Merton and Parsons remain

important.

Further,

the

systematic

examination of these two

paradigms

and their

contrasting

to Marxism can throw

considerable

light

on the more

general

question

of the role of

sociological paradigms.

The

central thesis of this

paper

is that

sociology

is not

a

theoretically

unified

discipline,

and

further,

that its

development

is not

cumulative.

Instead,

the

position

I

hold is

that

sociology

involves a

struggle

between

competing

paradigms,

and

that

the

development

of

sociology

consists of a

discontinuous

replacement

of some

paradigms by

others.1

In this

paper,

I

will first

develop

a

modified version of

Thomas Kuhn's notion of a

scientific

paradigm,

adapting

his

original

schema

(which

was

developed

to describe the natural

Volume 2 Number 2

Spring/Summer

1975

sciences)

to the social

sciences.

One of the most

important

innovations in

his

schema

is the introduction

of the notion

of

the inherent values

of each

paradigm.

The natural

sciences,

far

more removed

from social

relations,

do not involve values

in

anything

like

the

degree

to which

they

are imbedded

in

the

social sciences.

Social

science,

because

its

subject

matter

is

social

relations,

cannot

avoid

taking positions

on the nature

of

social

relations.

These existential

positions

will

necessarily

either conflict with, or confirm, the existential assertions of

the various

political

and moral

ideologies

in contention

in

society.

It is

probably

the different value

resonances

of the

various

competing

sociological paradigms

that account for

the

relative

predominance

of

sociological

systems

at

any given

time.

A

paradigm provides

its adherents

with

categories

in

which

to

comprehend

the

flow of social

experience.

It

provides

the

structural

units in

which social

reality

is

perceived

(similar

to

the

linguistic

category

of

semantics),

and the mode of

relating

these structural units

to each other

(similar

to the

linguistic

category

of

syntax).

Each

paradigm represents

an alternative

way

of

looking

at the

social world.

Paradigms

cannot

be

easily

judged

by

criteria taken

from

any paradigm except

the

one

under

consideration,

since each offers its

own rules of

verification.

The

idea of

scientific

paradigms

is

opposed

to

the naive

view of

science in which it is

implicitly

assumed that

there is

agreement

of

what the

key

problems

are

and

how

to test

hypotheses.

According

to

this naive

view,

if

two observers

disagree,

it is

either because the test

was

inadequate,

or

because

at

least

one

of

the observers

was biased. But in

reality,

two observers

will

necessarily

agree only

if

they

subscribe to

57

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the

same

paradigm.

The

notion of a cumulative and

integrated

social science

is a

myth perpetuated

in

good part through

textbooks and basic

sociology

courses

which,

through

a

process

of

selection

and

distortion,

represent

the

previous thinking

and

research

in the

general

idea

of

sociology

as

building up

to the

present.

The

book which has

perhaps

had the

greatest impact

in this

regard

has been Parsons' The Structure

of

Social Action

(1937).

The

Basic

Components

of

a

Sociological

Paradigm

A

sociological paradigm

can be

usefully

considered

to

consist of a

system

of

concepts,

data

ranges,

central

problems,

methods of

verification,

modes

of

thinking,

and values.

We will

discuss each in turn.

A

concept

is the

crystallization

or

reification of

an

aspect

of

the flow of

experience.

It

is

the

smallest unit

in a

paradigmatic

definition of

social

reality.

It

specifies

not

only

what entities the universe

does and does not contain

and the

meanings

attached to

them,

it further

mplicitly

or

explicitly

contains its

relationships

to other

concepts

and

to th

e

paradigmatic system

as a whole.

A

data

range

refers

to the area of

experience

that a

paradigm

defines as

relevant;

that

is,

those

places

that

one

should

look

for

data.

It

should

be

noted that different

paradigms

see

quite

different

things

in the same

places.

For

example,

the

Marxist

problem

of

the source

of

primitive

accumulation

and

the

Parsonian

problem

of what values

motivated the

early

capitalists

are

concerned

with the same

general

data

range.

But bo th of these theories are

counterposed

to the

entirely

different data

range

of small

group

sociology.

The

relationship

of a data

range

to the rest of

a

paradigm

is a

two-way

process.

While the

concepts

and mode

of

thinking

define what is to be

considered relevant kinds

of

data,

the

type

of data considered also effects the kinds of

concepts,

theories,

methods,

and mode of

thinking

to be

applied

to it. For

example,

the

expert

of Latin America tends

to

apply

the

categories

and

theories

developed

from

dealing

with Latin

American material

to

other areas.

The concept problem can only have meaning within a

paradigmatic

framework. A

problem

exists

because

(a)

a

given

paradigm

specifies

it

as

a

meaningful

and

important question,

and

(b)

because

the

given

state

of

a

paradigm

has not

yet

been

able to

explain

satisfactorily

the

phenomena

that it defines as

relevant. For a

problem

to

be selected

as

relevant is must be

both

stateable and

potentially

solvable in terms

of.

the

conceptual

and

instrumental

tools the

paradigm supplies.

For

example,

a

central

problem

for

any

Marxist

is

the cause

of

proletarian

consciousness,

or

false-consciousness. For the

Mertonian

or

Parsonian a central

problem

is the

source of

deviance. Neither

paradigm specifies

the

problem

that

the

other

is

concerned with as an

important

question.

Every

paradigm specifies

what it considers to be

the

relevant

methods.

Research within

normal science

is

based

on

a shared

paradigm

and on a commitment to

similar rules

and

standards of

procedure.

Similar

methods reflect

agreement

on

a

way

of

looking

at the flow of

experience.

The decision to

employ

a

particular

method and to use it in a

particular way

carries with it an

assurance that

only

certain

sorts of

circumstances will occur. For

example,

consider the

consequences

of

accepting only

experimental

methods or

only

survey

research,

or

only

historiography,

on the

range

and

types

of

concepts, problems,

and theories that could

arise.

The modes

of

thinking

are

the

general

and

specific

orientations toward

the

organization

of the

interrelationships

of the flow of

experience. They

consist of such elements as the

focus of

observation

and frame of

analysis,

the

key categories

of

explanation,

the fundamental

organizing

and

dynamic

elements,

the mode of

conceptualization

and

analysis,

the

interrelations

of

elements,

the view

of

change,

the nature of

change,

and the

categorization

of

social

experience.

These

categories

are all

vague

and ill-defined because

of

the

great

difficulty

of

dealing

on

such a

high

level of abstraction with

comparisons among paradigms. It is extremely difficult to

formulate

categories

in

which to

classify

sub-divisions of

paradigms

since

one must

employ

a

paradigm

to

generate

a

relevant

set of

classificatory

concepts.

In the discussion that

follows we have tried to overcome this

problem

by

using

all

the

paradigms

which we will discuss to

generate categories.

This

has

the

advantage

not

only

of

being relatively

objective,

but of

calling

attention to those areas in

opposing paradigms

that are

empty.

In

any

event,

the best

way

to understand what

exactly

is meant

by

our

categories

of modes of

thinking

is

through

illustration.

However,

before

discussing

concrete

paradigms,

we would

like to discuss the standard kinds

of

mechanisms used

by

paradigms

to

account

for alternative

paradigms (alternative

definitions of social

reality).

We will

suggest

three basic kinds

of such defense-mechanisms:

Nihilation:

The denial that

whatever

phenomena

or

interpretations

of

phenomena

that don't fit into a

paradigm

exist or the claim that

they

are

metaphysical

problems.

For

example,

the

Parsonian

view of the

Marxist

problems

of

false-con sciousness and class interest.

Alternatively,

nihilation

is the claim that the adherents

of

another

paradigm

are not to

be

taken

seriously. They

are

naive,

unscientific,

ignorant,

ideological, ignoring

the

facts,

or

rationalizing

their interests at

best,

and

liars at worst. For

example,

the

Parsonian

view of

Marxists,

and the Marxist view of Parsonians.

Segregation:

The

assigning

of a

paradigm

or

part

of a

paradigm

to

another

field. For

example,

the

sociologist's assigning

of

certain

phenomena

and orientations to the

economist,

psychologist, moral philosopher, or politician.

Integration:

Through

a

friendly

selective

perception

of an

alternative

paradigm

it

is

explained

as

a

special

case

of

your

own

paradigm.

For

example,

Merton's demonstration that

Marx was a functionalist.

Or

Parson's redefinition of the

classical

categories

of

social

theory (power, prestige,

state,

religion,

etc.).

The

Application

of

the

Schema

Now let

us

begin

to

discuss concrete

paradigms

in

sociology.

We

will

treat the

two

paradigms

which

until

recently

were the

most

important

within

sociology,

those of

Robert

Merton and

Talcott

Parsons,

and also

that of

Karl

Marx.

Quite

naturally,

as we

will

present

them,

they

are ideal

types, to which few practicing social scientists would adhere

exactly.

Nevertheless,

it is our

feeling

that considerable

numbers

of

sociologists

have

subscribed to

paradigms

reasonably

close to one of

these

three

(and

hence

reasonably

distant

from the

other

two).

Of

course,

a

further

major

problem

is

that

of

interpretation

of the

three

paradigms. Many

will

no

doubt

disagree

with

specifics

of

my

presentation.

I

have,

however,

made

every

attempt

to be

as

objective

as

possible by

trying

to

submerge myself

in

each

paradigm

while

discussing

it.

By

Merton,

we mean the

Merton

of

Social

58

HUMBOLDT

JOURNAL OF

SOCIAL

RELATIONS




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Theory

and Social

Structure

(1961); by

Parsons,

we mean

the

Parsons

of Societies:

Evolutionary

and

Comparative

Perspectives

(1966),

supplemented

by

his

earlier

writings

where

they

are not

in

contradiction;

and

by

Marx,

we

mean

the

Marx

of

Capital {1961), again

supplemented

by

his

earlier

work where

it is not in contradiction.

The General

Modes of

Thinking

The

general

modes

of

thinking

are

the most abstract

and

general

orientations

applicable

to all kinds

of social

phenomena.

The most

elementary aspect

of

our

paradigms

is

their

primary

focus

of

observation

and

frame

of analysis.

Parsons focuses

on the value-orientations

of a social

system

and

analyzes

their

consequences

for social structure.

Merton

focuses

on the network of social

structural

relations

of

individuals. Marx

focuses

on

the

total

societal structure

and

dynamic,

and

analyzes

its

consequences

for the various

component

parts

of the

total

society.

For Parsons the

key

categories of

explanation,

are

value-orientations and

four universal

functions

(especially

integration

and

adaptation).

For

Merton,

they

are

individual

roles

and statuses and

to a lesser

degree

collective

goals

and

norms. For

Marx

the

key categories

of

explanation

are

class,

power,

and interest.

What these first two classifications mean, taken together, is

that in

looking

at

the

same data

range,

all

three

paradigms

see

different

things.

For

example,

let us consider an

industrial

conflict within a

factory.

Merton would tend

to see the

situation

in

terms

of role and status

strains

acting

on

the

individual workers

and

managers,

and

would

analyze

the

situation

accordingly, perhaps

prescribing

such remedial

action

as the reduction

of

conflicting

role

expectations.

Parsons

would

see the

same

phenomena

in terms

of the value

system

of

the

factory

and

the

relevant

sub-groups.

He would tend

to find

that the workers' or

managers'

values and

norms are

not

adequately

adjusted

to the

functional

needs of

industrial

organization. Perhaps

the workers

are new recruits

from rural

areas,

or

the

managers

have

an

obsolete

19th-century

managerial ideology.

Education,

understanding,

and

time

are

thus

the

natural remedies.

Marx

would tend to see

the

situation as a

specific

instance of class

struggle

within

the

whole

society,

and

analyze

it in terms of

opposing

class

interests and relative

power

positions.

Marx would

suggest

that

only

the

revolutionary

transformation of

all

society

would

eliminate

such

industrial

conflict.

The

overall

organizing

and

dynamic

element

in the

Parsonian

paradigm

is the

system

of

value-orientations

which

determine

the

general

outline

of the structure

and

change

of

all

major

social elements.

In the Marxist

paradigm

the same

role

is

played

by

the mode of

production

and

the resultant

relations

of

production

(class

structure).

The Mertonian

paradigm

denies the existence

of

any

such overall

organizing

element: each element is assumed to be more of less

autonomous.

The mode

of

conceptualization

and

analysis

varies

greatly

in the

three

paradigms.

For Parsons all social

systems

are

treated

in the

same

way:

a universal

set

of abstract

concepts

are

interrelated

by analytical

formulations.

All

analysis

is

either

of

analytical

or

of concrete

social

systems,

with

emphasis being

given

to

the

analytical.

Discussion of

contemporary

U.S.

society,

and of

analytical

social

systems,

is

largely

in

static,

ahistorical and

non-comparative

terms, i.e.,

they

are

viewed as

developing

toward the

fully

articulated

analytical

model of advanced

industrial western

society

(the

U.S.A.).

For Merton

likewise,

all social

systems

are treated in the

same

way.

However,

only

small-scale social

systems,

not total

societies,

are considered

relevant.

Similarly,

a universal set of

abstract

concepts

are

related,

but

by

small-scale

(middle-range)

theory.

All

analysis

is

of

either

analytic

or concrete

systems

with stress

being given

to the concrete. The

analysis

is

ahistorical, static,

and

non-comparative.

The mode of conceptualization and analysis of Marx is

quite

different from either that of Parsons or Merton. For

Marx,

there are interrelated levels of abstractness-concreteness

of

concepts,

related

by

large

scale

theory.

Some

analysis

and

conceptualization

is on the

level

of

all

societies,

some on

the

level of all

class

societies,

some on the level of

particular

kinds

of

class societies

(esp. Capitalism),

and some of

the level of

historically specific

concrete societies. The

analysis

is

in

general

historical and

comparative.

For

Parsons,

there is a

high degree

of

interrelationship

between elements.

All

social

phenomena

are seen as

organized

into semi-autonomous

subsystems

which nevertheless have

important

interrelations

(through

common and

complimentary

values and

functions).

Social

phenomena

are

analyzed

accordingly by

the

separate

academic

disciplines

of

history,

economics,

political

science,

sociology,

etc.,

each

corresponding

to a

given

aspect

of

the flow of

social

experience.

For Merton all social

phenomena

are

viewed as

autonomous

until

proven

otherwise. The flow of

social

experience

is broken

into

certain

categories

corresponding

to

the various academic

disciplines:

economics,

political

science,

sociology,

etc.

According

to the

Marxist

paradigm,

all social

phenomena

within a

given society

are viewed as

integral

parts

of one

overall

system

or whole.

Separate

disciplines

such as

history,

philosophy,

economics,

sociology, anthropology,

political

science,

etc.,

are

viewed as

artificial

categories

that

only

hinder

the

understanding

of this whole.

According

to the Parsonian view

of change,

organization

and change are considered as analytically distinct although

interrelated

categories

which can be

analyzed

separately.

For

Merton this

is

true

to an even

greater

extent. He sees

change

and

organization

as

basically

separate

phenomena.

For

example,

change

should be studied

by

a

separate

subfield

of

sociology

called social

change.

The

Marxist view

of

change

is

totally

opposed

to the

Mertonian notion.

Change

and

organization

are viewed as

parts

of

a

single process,

not as

distinct

categories

to be

analyzed

separately.

All

aspects

of

class societies

are

viewed

as in a

continuing process

of

development.

The

Parsonian

paradigm

maintains that ail

societies have

in

varying

degrees

an

inherent

internal

tendency

leading

to

systematic

change.

This

tendency

is

caused

by

increasing

differentiation in order

to

increase

adaptation,

and

by

the

increasing

generalization

of

the

value

system

in order

to

integrate

the

increasingly

differentiated structure. Thus

change

is

seen as

evolutionary

and

moving

towards

gradually

increased

adaptation

and

integration

of the social

system.

Nevertheless,

contemporary

Western

society

(esp. U.S.A.)

is seen in

largely

static

terms,

as

more

or

less

the

end

of

history.

For

Merton,

there is

no

inherent

tendency

towards

systematic

change.

The

question

of

change

is

a

problematic

and

empirical

matter.

Volume 2

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Spring/Summer

1975

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5/10

For

Marx,

again

completely opposed

to the

Mertonian

view,

all

class societies

have,

in

varying degrees,

an inherent internal

dynamic

tending

to

systematic

societal

change.

This

tendency

stems from the structure

of

class

relations

(these

are

referred

to

as

contradictions). Change

tends

to

be

evolutionary

within a

type

of

class

society.

However,

a basic

discontinuity

(revolution)

is

likely

to occur on the level of the

relations

of

production

in

the

transition

between

types

of

societies

(e.g.,

feudalism to

capitalism).

Parsons

tends

to see

societies as

fundamentally

harmonies

of

interest. Societies tend to function to the benefit of all their

members

(given

the

restraints

of the

situation).

Equilibrium,

integration,

function,

and

maximum

adaptation

are

centrally

important.

Marx,

on the other

hand,

sees societies as structures of

overt

conflict and

struggle,

and

of covert conflicts of

interest.

The

questions

of in whose

interest and

who has

power

are

central. For

Marx,

societies

tend

to

benefit some at

the

expense

of

others,

the

antithesis of the Parsonian view.

The

Specific

Modes of

Thinking

In

addition to

the

above

general

ways

of

observing

and

analyzing

social

phenomena,

we

can

compare

our

paradigms

in

terms of the

ways they

observe and

analyze

specific

types

of

social experience. I will call these specific modes of thinking

(or

specific

orientations).

View of

Man's Nature:

Parsons and

Merton both

agree

in

conceiving

personality

as

a

product

of

internalization of

culture. Men

are socialized

into

role-expectations.

Innate

psychological

factors

other

then

plasticity,

sensitivity

to

sanctioning,

and tension

reduction

are

viewed as

nonexistent

or

not

important

for the

analysis

of

social

phenomena.

Marx

sees the

individual as

highly

malleable and

socializable

into a

wide

variety

of

social

structures.

Nevertheless there are

certain innate ahistorical

human needs which are

satisfied

in

varying degrees

by

different

types

of

societies. The frustration

of

these needs

has

an

important

effect on

social

phenomena.

The

most

important

of these are the

needs

for

creative

work,

dignity,

and

community.

View

of

Deviance: For

Parsons,

deviation

from a

system

is

caused

by

unsuccessful

socialization

or

sanctioning,

or

alternatively by

conflicts between values.

According

to

the

Mertonian

paradigm,

deviation from the norms is a

product

of

role

or status

strain,

or

alternatively

is a

response

to the

divergence

between common

goals

and

differentially

distributed means.

Marx,

on

the other

hand,

has no

concept

of

deviance.

The

notion

of

deviance

implies

a

concept

of

system,

equilibrium,

or

common

goals

that

is

alien

to

Marxism.

The

behavior

referred to as

deviant in

the

other

paradigms

is

explained

as is

any

other

in terms

of

class,

interest and

power.

View

of Social Structure:

Parsons sees

society

as a

self-sufficient

social

system,

all

the

parts

of which

function

towards the maintenance and advance of all other parts of the

system

as a

whole.

Stratification makes

possible

an

increase in

societal

efficiency

and

integration

.

For

Merton,

social

structure is

nothing

more

than the summation

of

individual

roles and

statuses.

He

has

no

overarching

view

of social

structure.

And for

Marx,

social structure is the

composite

of

unequal

but

integrally

related

classes

ordered

by exploitation,

power,

and

privilege.

View of Values and

Beliefs:

For

the Parsonian

paradigm,

values

are

central to the

analysis. They

are the

ultimate

determinants of

personality,

and of

the

organization,

integration,

and

dynamics

of

societies. Merton's

paradigm

has

no

systematic

approach

to

values and beliefs

other

than

that

they

tend to

correspond

to roles

by way

of

role-expectations.

For

Marx, however,

values and

beliefs

are

basically

determined

by

class

interests

and,

ultimately,

by

the mode of

production.

View

of the

State:

For

Parsons,

government

is the

institution

(analytical

or

concrete)

that

specializes

in

goal

attainment.

Government,

further,

is seen as

serving

the

interests of the system as a whole. Merton does not have a

view of

the

state. For him the

state is the

proper

subject

matter

for another

discipline,

i.e.,

political

science. And of

course,

for

Marx,

the state is

seen as

an

oppressive

instrument

serving

the interests of the

ruling

classes.

View

of

Economics: For

Parsons,

the

economy

is

the

institution

(analytic

or

concrete)

that

specializes

in

the

function

of

adaptation

of the

society

to

its

environment

through

the maximization of

production.

Merton

does not

have a

view

of

economics.

Economic

phenomena

are

the

subject

matter of another

discipline.

For

Marx,

however,

economic

phenomena

are

central to

the

understanding

and

analysis

of societies. Economic

principles

determine the

overall

organization

and

dynamics

of societies.

Further,

the

divergences

of

economic

interests

and economic

contradictions

are

the focus of

conflict

and

change.

Concepts

We

have listed the

major

concepts

of our

three

paradigms

in

Table 1.

As is

apparent,

the

concepts

of each

system

are

found

to mesh

very

well

with each

system's

mode of

thinking.

The

Parsonian

primary

concepts

are all built

up,

for the

most

part,

around the

central ideas

of

order,

system,

adaptation,

and

integration.

The

whole

set of

primary

concepts

are

logically

interrelated

and

complement

one

another.

Together they

provide

a

comprehensive

categorization

of

that

part

of

the flow of

experience

concerning

social

phenomena

that the Parsonian

paradigm

considers

relevant. The

Parsonian

paradigm

also

contains

another

set

of

concepts,

which

we

refer to as

secondary

concepts.

These

were

developed by

Parsons after his

original

system

was

advanced,

and are

all

complex concepts

built

up

from his

primary

set.

They

are

meant to

redefine and

integrate

into his

paradigm

terms that

have

been

at

the heart of

classical

social and

political

theory.

Merton's list

of

concepts

is

similarly

integrated

with

his

general

mode of

thinking.

They

are

primarily

built

around the

key

ideas

of

role,

group, goals,

and

functions. It should

be

emphasized

that both

Parsons'

and Merton's sets of

concepts

are

universally highly

abstract and

meant to

apply

to

all

societies

at

all

times.

The

Marxist mode of

conceptualization

is more

refined

than

either the

Parsonian or the

Mertonian. Like

them,

it

has a

set of universal and abstract concepts meant to apply to all

societies

at all

times,

e.g.,

forces

of

production,

relations of

production,

use

value,

etc.

However,

in

addition,

it has a

second

set of more

specific

concepts

meant to

apply only

to

class

societies,

e.g., private

property,

alienation,

exchange

value.

And

further,

Marxism

provided

a still more

specified

set

of

concepts

for each

type

of

class

society

with

which

it

deals,

e.g.,

for

capitalism: capital,

free

labor,

organic

composition

of

capital.

The Parsonian

and

Mertonian

paradigms

are forced

to

60

HUMBOLDT

JOURNAL OF SOCIAL

RELATIONS




6/10

observe

and

analyze

phenomena

on

either a

highly

abstract

or

on a

concrete

empirical

level.

The Marxist

paradigm,

however,

provides

two intermediate levels of observation

and

analysis,

thus

permitting

a

greater degree

of refinement

by providing

for

movement

between

many

levels of

abstraction.

On each level of Marx's

conceptualization

we can see

the

internal

integration

of the set of

concepts

and

the relation to

the

general

mode

of

thinking.

On the most abstract

level the

concepts

are interrelated

by

the

central idea of

production.

On

the intermediate level

they

are

organized by

the central ideas

of power and the division of labor. Finally, on the level of

capitalist

societies,

the

concepts

are

organized

by

the central

idea of

capital (as

opposed

to

wage

labor).

Further,

the levels

of

conceptualization

are related

to each

other.

The

concepts

of

the

highest

level

plus

the

concept

of

the

division of labor

generate

the

concepts

of the intermediate level. S

imilarly

the

set of

concepts

specific

to

capitalism

can

be

generated

from

the

concepts

of

the intermediate level

and the

concept

of

wage

labor.

Problems

For Parsons

three

of the most

important

kinds

of

problems

that his

paradigm

generates

are:

1)

How is a

given

social

system

integrated? 2)

What is the function of a

value-pattern

for a given structure? 3) Why did some societies and not others

develop incresingly

better mechanisms

of

adaptation

and

integration?

Specifically,

what was

the source of

the value

orientations

that motivated the

early capitalists,

and

why

was

this factor

lacking

in

other societies?

We should be able

to

see

the

relation

of

these

kinds of

problems

considered critical

by

the Parsonian

paradigm

to its

concepts

and

mode of

thinking:

value-orientations,

adaptation, equilibrium

integration,

and

function

are

the

key

ideas in which his

problems

are

posed

and

his

answers

given.

For the Mertonian

paradigm,

similarly,

the

problems

are

generated

by

the mode of

thinking

and the

set

of

concepts.

Some of the

major problems

with which

Merton deals are:

Why

does a

group

choose

a

particular

response

to anomie?

Why

does

an individual

choose

a

given

reference

group?

What

are the

latent

positive

functions of an

element?

What is the

cause of deviance? What is

the

source

of

influence?

Or for

some more

specific examples:

Why

do liberals accommodate

to

bureaucracies?

What is the

function

of

the

political

machine?

What is the cause of racial discrimination?

Why

was

morale

higher

in some

army

units than

in others?

Likewise,

with

the

Marxist

paradigm,

the Marxist mode

of

thinking

and

conceptualizing

generates

the

key

problem

areas.

For

Marxists,

some of the most

important problems

are: What

are the laws

accounting

for the transformation

of class

societies? What is the relation

between a

given ideology

and

social

structural

interests?

How does an underclass

develop

class consciousness? What is the

origin

of alienation? Some

more

specific

kinds of

problems

follow:

Why

isn't

the

working

class class-conscious? Why does capitalism seem to have

stabilized

itself? What was

the

source

of

primitive

accumulation?

Why

didn't

capitalism develop

in China

or

India? What

are the laws that

govern

the accumulation

of

capital?

What are

the causes

of

crises,

unemployment,

and

wage

fluctuations?

A

number

of

additional

observations

can

be

made

concerning

the kinds of

problems

generated

by

each

paradigm:

1)

The Parsonian

paradigm

seems to

generate

fewer

relatively

specific

(and

hence

empirically testable)

problems

than do the

Mertonian or Marxist.

2)

The

Mertonian

paradigm

seems

to

generate

problems

that

are less

systematic

and interrelated

than do the other two

paradigms. 3)

From the

point

of view of

the Mertonian and Parsonian

paradigms

all of the

Marxist

problems

are

unreal

(nihilation), wrongly

stated

(integration),

or irrelevant

(segregation).

Further,

it should be noted that

although many

of

the

problems generated by

the

separate paradigms

bear

a

superficial relationship

to those

generated

by

other

paradigms,

the relation is more apparent than real. This apparent but

unreal

similarity

is a result of the

treating

of the same data

range

by

different

concepts

and modes

of

thinking.

For

example,

the Marxist

problem

of the

source

of

primitive

accumulation and

the

Parsonian

problem

of the source of the

value-orientations of the

early

capitalists

are

not

the same

problem.

The

Marxists

look

for

interests,

free

labor,

and

expanded

commerce,

while

Parsonians look for

religious

innovations.

This distinction is borne witness to

by

the

existence of

two

separate, largely

unrelated,

and

ever

growing

bodies

of

literature

on

the

origins

of

capitalism:

one

growing

from the work of Karl

Marx,

and

lately

from that of Maurice

Dobb

(1963),

and the

other

growing

from the work of Max

Weber

(1930)

as

interpreted by

Talcott Parsons

(1937).

Theories

The central theories of each of the three

paradigms

correspond

to the kinds of

problems

each

generates.

Indeed,

they

are

nothing

other than

attempts

to

provide

answers

to

these

problems.

Thus,

the

Parsonian

paradigm

provides

a

theory

of the

function of

the

value-orientations involved in the

doctor-patient relationship,

a

theory

of the

relationship

of

Calvinism

to

the rise of

Capitalism,

a

theory

of

the

mechanisms

of

social

control,

and

a

general theory

of the

development

of world

history (with

special

sub-theories for

each

major

society).

Likewise,

the Mertonian

paradigm

has theories of

reference

groups,

influence,

bureaucracy,

anomie,

and

deviance

corresponding

to the

problems

generated by

the

paradigm.

Similarly

for the Marxist

paradigm.

Its theories

of

the rise

of

the

bourgeoisie,

the

development

of

proletarian

class

consciousness,

the

source

of

primitive

accumulation,

the

theory

of

crises,

and

of

imperialism

and

monopoly

all

attempt

to answer

the

problems

generated

by

the

paradigm.

It should

be noted that the

only

parts

of the Marxist

paradigm

that have

been

proved wrong by

the course

of

history

are

some

of

the

specific

theories and statements

put

forth

by

Marx

himself

or

by

his students to

attempt

to

answer the

questions

raised

by

the

overall

paradigm, e.g., perhaps,

the law of the

falling

rate

of

profit

or

the

iron law

of

wages.

Data

Ranges

Parsons' data

range aspires

to

comprehend

all social

systems

everywhere

and at all times.

However,

he

focuses

heavily

on

contemporary

middle class America.

Merton's data

range

is restricted

(except

for

some

of his

very early

writings)

to

small-scale

contemporary phenomena,

not

whole

societies.

Further,

he also tends to

focus

on

the

world

of

contemporary,

middle class

America.

Marx's data

range

is all

societies at

all

times,

but

mostly

his

analysis

deals with

Capitalist

societies. Much more

than the

other two

paradigms,

the

Marxian

paradigm

is

comparative

and

Volume 2

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Spring/Summer

1975

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7/10

historical.

However,

in Marx's

own work

he

tended to

focus on

the

study

of

England

for economic

phenomena,

on the

study

of France for

political phenomena,

and

on

Germany

for the

study

of

ideological phenomena.

These

focuses were

generated

by

his

paradigm

which

depicted

each

of the three countries

as

being

the

most

developed

in each of the relevant

aspects.

Methods

Parsons

himself relies

principally

on

secondary

sources and

common sense to

give

illustration to the models he

develops

through

rationalistic methods

(similar

to the method of

marginal utility

economics).

However,

but to

a

lesser

extent,

his

paradigm

is

compatible

with

survey

methods

(to

acquire

information

of values and

beliefs),

experimental

small

group

research

(for

data

on

adaptation, integration,

etc.),

and,

most

recently,

historiograph

y (to

illustrate his

evolutionary

schema).

Merton's

paradigm

is most

compatible

with

experimental

small

group

research

(for

the

analysis

of individual

role

sets

and

group

structures)

and

survey

methods

(for

data

on

attitudes and their structural

correlations,

e.g.,

cross

cutting

cleavages).

This fit of the

Mertonian

paradigm

with

the

method of

survey

research makes

it most useful to and

resonant with

what C. W. Mills called the Abstract

Empiricists.

These researchers, who are committed to survey research alone

as a

method,

need

simple

and

practical

theory

to

interpret

their data to maximize

its

practical application

for those

who

pay

their salaries.

They

shun

high-level theorizing

(of

either

the

Parsonian

or

Marxist

variety)

as

irrelevant,

since

it

does

not

normally help

in

the

interpretation

of their data

for

practical

application.

Survey

research

fits

well

with

the Mertonian

concepts

and mode of

thinking.

Marx

relies

principally

on

historiography,

statistical

analysis,

and

the use of official documents

(e.g.,

factory

reports).

The use of these methods

naturally

stems from the

Marxist

paradigm's

central

concern

with

overall

societies

in

the

process

of

development (emphasizing

economic

phenomena).

Small-scale

experimental

research

is irrelevant for the

treatment

of

the

kinds of

problems

the

paradgim

generates.

Survey

research,

because

of its nature as a recorder

of

conscious

opinions,

because

of

its limited

temporal

and

spatial

application,

and because of its

inaccuracy

in

controversial

matters

(which

are of

special

concern

to

Marxism),

is

only

of

marginal

use in

answering

the

questions

generated

by

the

paradigm.

(However,

its use as a

supplementary

tool

is

probably

more

compatible

with the Marxist

paradigm

than

most Marxian critics

of

survey

methods

realize.)

Values

An

integral

part

of our

paradigms

is

the

implicit

set of

values that are a

part

of all

of them

equally.

For

Parsons,

and for Merton in a lesser

degree,

the

whole

mode

of

thinking

and

conceptualizing

reflects a

b asic

commitment to the maintenance of the status

quo.

The

central

ideas

of

equilibrium,

order,

system,

and function

all

imply

that

everything

contributes

to the

working

of

society,

i.e.,

there

is a

natural

harmony

of interests and

the

present

order

of

things

is

basically good. (Merton's

theoretical

concept

of

dysfunction

does not absolve him

from

this

evaluation.)

The

Marxist mode of

thinking

and

conceptualizing implies

the

exact

opposite

evaluations.

Permeating

the entire

paradigm

is a

fundamental

hostility

to all

class

societies as

producers

of

the

suppression

of man's

inner

potential

and

the

exploitation

of the

majority

in the interests

of the

ruling

class.

The Marxist

concepts

of

power,

class,

and interest

all

imply

that social

structures

suppress

the individual

and are therefore

bad.

For Parsons and

Merton social control

is

basically good.

The individual

is born as

a

tabula

rasa,

and needs to be

socialized

and

sanctioned

if

society

is to be

possible.

For

Marx,

on

the

other

hand,

social control is

basically

bad.

The

individual's needs

are

suppressed

by

socialization and social

structure. For

Marx,

man

ought

to be liberated from societal

suppression (which can occur only in a classless communist

society).

For

Parsons,

evolutionary change

or

progress

is

good.

Whatever

is

wrong

with societies is

gradually

being

corrected

through

the

process

of

increasing adaptation

and

integration.

Any

drastic radical or

revolutionary

action would therefore be

unnecessary,

foolish,

and bad.

For

Marx,

on the other

hand,

revolutionary change

is both

necessary

and

good.

The

only way

a

society

compatible

with

human

potentiality,

and without

exploitation

of

man

by

man,

can

be

brought

into

being

is

through

the

revolutionary

destruction of the

existing exploitative

class structure

together

with all the muck of the

ages.

For

Parsons deviance

is

basically

bad. The

deviant

should be

resocialized into the

dominant

values and norms.

Briefly,

the

individual

ought

to be

readjusted

to

society.

For

Merton,

similarly,

deviance

is

basically

bad. Institutional means

ought

to be

spread

around

more to alleviate the structural causes of

deviance.

The

goals

of

any society

are

as

acceptable

and as

good

as those of

any

other.

For

Marx,

the behavior that Parsons and Merton call

deviant is

not

bad,

it is rather

a

natural

reaction

to

suppressive

social

structure and

exploitive

class relations.

In

brief,

for

Marx,

the

society ought

to

be

adjusted

to

the

individual.

In the

Parsonian

paradigm,

the idea of the

necessity

of

social control mechanisms

as a

secondary

line of

defense

against

deviance

implies

that the use of force

by

the state is

basically good.

For

Marx,

on the

other

hand,

since the use of

force by the state is fundamentally in the interests of the

ruling

class

that controls the

state,

it is

basically

bad

(except,

of

course,

as a tactical mechanism to

destroy

the

repressive

structure).

Parsons' definition of

power

as the

ability

to

accomplish

collective

goals

implies

that its

exercise

is

good.

While

for

Marx,

on the other

hand,

the definition of

power

as the

control of some

by

others

implies

that

power

is

fundamentally

bad

(although again tactically necessary

to

destroy

a

system

of

institutionalized

violence).

The

division

of

labor,

in the

Parsonian

paradigm,

is

defined

in terms of

increasing

adaptation.

This

definition

again implies

that the

division

of

labor

is

good.

For

Marx the

opposite

is

true. For

him the division of labor is the

first cause of

alienation in

all its

forms,

and is therefore

fundamentally

bad,

and to be

supplanted

by

communal

production

in

communist

society.

Parsons'definition

of

religion

as

an

integrating

force in

society

is

consonant with the idea that it is

good.

For

Marx,

religion

is

false-consciousness,

and

therefore

bad;

again,

the

opposite

evaluation

from Parsons.

Parsons' definition

of stratification as

increasing

a

society's

effectiveness of course

implies

that stratification

is

good.

For

Marx,

since class structure

is defined in terms of

exploitation

62

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8/10

and domination

of the

weak

by

the

strong,

it is seen as

fundamentally

bad.

Lastly,

Parsons' definition of

the state as the

mechanism

of

collective

goal

attainment

implies

that it is a

positive good.

And

naturally,

Marx's definition

of the state

as the

dictatorship

of the

ruling

class

implies

that the state is

innately

bad.

The most

outstanding

observation

to be made about

the

above

comparison

is

the total and

complete polarization

of

implicit

values in the Parsonian and Marxist

paradigms.

This

point has of course essential ideological significance which

cannot be

further

dealt with

here.

However,

it is

enough

to

summarize

by noting

that the

Parsonian

system

is

overwhelmingly

conservative-liberal in

its

value

implications,

while

the

Marxist

system

is,

of

course,

overwhelmingly

radical-revolutionary.

The

mode

of

evaluation

in the Mertonian

paradigm

is more

subtle than

that

of the other two.

The

Mertonian

paradigm,

by

studying

only

small-scale

problems

and

omitting

an

overall

analysis

of

total

societies,

is consonant with the

acceptance

of

the status

quo

as

good.

Because

sociology

has

nothing

to

say

about total

societies,

the

field is left

open

to common

sense,

apologists

for the status

quo,

and

politicians.

That

is,

the

abdication

by

sociology

of a

systematic

view

of

social

phenomena

is conservative

by

omission. This is of course

strongly

reinforced

by

the

Mertonian

claim that the scientific

study

of total societies is not

yet,

if

ever,

possible,

thus

giving

legitimacy

to

the utterances

of

the

apologists

and

politicians.

Further,

the claim

that

economic and

psychological

variables are not relevant for

the

study

of

society

has

a

similar

effect

by

omission. If

these

factors

are

not

relevant,

they

cannot be used as

the

basis

for

criticism

of

society.

This

again

is consonant with the evaluation of the status

quo

as

good.

In addition

to these fundamental evaluations

implicit

in the

Mertonian

paradigm,

there

are a

number of

more

specific

evaluations

implicit

in his various theories.

The

idea

of

self-fulfilling

prophecy

as

a

cause of racial discrimination

and

bank

failures

(which

are

interpreted

as

stemming

from the

social definition

of

reality

rather than

from

social

structure)

is

consonant with the evaluation of the social structure as

basically

good

(since

these are

problems stemming

from

faulty

education, communication,

or social

control,

and not social

structural

interests or

dynamics).

The idea

of

anomie as a

response

to

the

disparity

of

common

goals

and institutional means

implies

the

fundamental

acceptability

of the

goals,

and that

everything

would

be

all

right

if

only

adequate

means

were available

(or

alternatively,

if socialization and communication

were

controlled so that

people

would not learn

goals

they

could

not

satisfy).

This

again

is consonant

with the evaluation of

the

social structure and the

system

of

goals

as

basically good.

But,

above

all,

the

Mertonian

paradigm

is

fundamentally

conservative in that its innate denial

of the

possibility

and

legitimacy

of all

attempts

at

developing

a

systematic theory

of

society

hinders the

comprehension

of the overall

workings

of

the

social

system

and its dominant

institutional-class structure.

Summary

and Conclusions

An

integrated

and

cumulative

sociology

does not exist.

Incompatible sociological systems

compete

with

one another

for

predominance.

During

the 1950's and 1960's the two

major

contenders

within American

sociology

were the

paradigms

best articulated

by

Talcott

Parsons and Robert

King

Merton.

Throughout

that time

and

since,

the

leading

perspective outside of the U.S. has been Marxism. This paper

has drawn out the

systematic

differences

among

these

three

paradigms

in order to demonstrate that

an

integrated

and

cumulative

sociology

did not exist

during

this

period

and

that,

instead,

incompatible sociological systems competed

with one

another for

hegemony. Beginning

in the late

1960's

and

increasingly during

the 1970's numerous

other

sociological

paradigms

have

entered

the

sociological

scene as

serious

contenders for

predominance.

Formal and mathematical

sociology

have

gained

considerably

at

the

expense

of both

Grand

Theory

and

middle-range theory among

more

prestigious sociologists,

while

a

wide

variety

of idealist and

voluntarist

approaches,

such as

ethnomethodology,

phenomenology,

critical

theory,

and

symbolic

interactionism

have become current

among younger sociologists.

Marxism,

on

the other

hand,

which was

taken

seriously by

much of

American social science

in the

1930's

and

1940's

before

it

was

purged

from

the universities with the assistance

of

McCarthyism,

has made

a

significant

comeback.

Although

still

rather weak

in

academic

circles,

the

competition

between

Marxism

and the

other

major

paradigms

within

sociology

is

once

again

real.

Sociology

in the 1970's is more

open

than at

any

time since

the

1940's.

This

paper

has

not

attempted

to deal with

questions

appropriate

to

the

sociology

of

knowledge.

It has not tried to

offer

explanations

of

why

a

given paradigm,

or

paradigms,

are

predominant

at

any

given

time. Neither

has

it dealt with

empirical

questions concerning

which

paradigm

is

in

the

last

analysis

the most

consistent

with social

reality.

Both these

questions

are of course of extreme

importance.

However, the

rapid

changes

in the

positions

of

paradigms during

the course

of the

20th

century suggest

that the

question

of

predominance

has little

or

nothing

to do with the

question

of

correspondence

with

social

reality.

In

order to determine

why

particular perspectives

are

predominant

at

a

given

time we

must

look

to the

value

resonance of each

paradigm.

A careful examination of the

rise

and

fall

of

sociological paradigms, together

with the rise and

decline

of

political

ideologies

and

movements,

and

the

changing

needs of the

corporate upper

class in America

will,

I

believe,

demonstrate that

it

is indeed

paradigmatic

values

which are the

explanatory

link between social

reality

and

sociological paradigms,

and

further,

that

it

is

political

developments

outside of

sociology

which

induce

changes

within

sociology.^

Volume 2

Number

2

Spring/Summer

1975

63




9/10

TABLE

1

CONCEPTS

Parsons Merton

Marx

(Primary)

Value-Orientations

Action Frame

of

Reference

Norms/Beliefs/Goals

Functional

Imperatives

Adaptation

Integration

Goal Attainment

Pattern Maintenance

Pattern Variables

(as

modes of

orientation)

Social

System

Personality System

Cultural

System

Equilibrium

Instrumental

Evaluative

Expressive

Collectivity

Sanction

Socialization

Differentiation

Allocation

Social Control

Mechanisms

Institution

(

Secondary)

Power

-

(ability

to

accomplish

collective

goals

Prestige

-

(allocation

of

generalized

rewards)

Wealth

-

(generalized

capacity

to command

goods

and

services)

Influence

-

(generalized

mechanism of social

interaction)

State

-

(institution

specializing

in

achieving

collective

goals)

Family

-

(institution

specializing

in

pattern

maintenance and tension

management)

Economy

-

(institution

specializing

in

adaptation

to the

environment)

Religion

-

(institution

specializing

in

integration

of the

social

system)

Stratification

-

(differentiation

of

function to

increase

adaptation

and

integration)

Role

(sum

of

role

expectations)

Status

(position)

Role Set (of a status)

Group

(26 dimensions)

Collective

Role

Strain

Status Strain

Values

Common

Goals

Institutional Means

Anomie

Reference

Group

Authority

(pattern

of

influence)

Social Structure

(sum

of roles and

statuses)

Manifest

Function

(intended

and

recognized)

Latent Function

(unintended,

unrecognized)

Positive Function

(toward

system

maintenance)

Negative

Function

(against

system maintenance)

Status Set

(of individual)

I.

(Applicable

to all

Societies)

Forces of Production

(energy, machines)

Mode of

Production

(organization)

Relations of Production

Consciousness

Use Value

Property

II.

(Applicable

to all Class

Societies)

Class

(exploitation

of

A

by

B)

Class Interest

Power

(A

over

B)

Private

Property

Division

of

Labor

Exploitation

State

(A

against

B)

Ideology (false-co n scious

ness)

Superstructure

Alienation

Surplus Value/Profit

Labor/Cost

Commodity/Price

Exchange

Value

Ilia.

(Applicable only

to

Capitalism)

Capital

Free

Labor/Wage

Labor

Primitive

Accumulation

Expanded

Reproduction

Concentration of

Capital

Centralization

of

Capital

Circulation

of

Capital

Realization of Capital

Mercantile

Capital

Industrial

Capital

Money Capital

Productive

Capital

Commercial

Capital

Organic

Composition

of

Capital

IHb.

(Applicable

only

to

Feudalism)

Guild

Manor

Peasant

Lord

IIIc.

(Applicable only

to

Ancient

Societies)

Master

Slave

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FOOTNOTES

*An

earlier

version of

this

paper appeared

in

a

student

journal

circulated at Columbia

University (1967).

This version

was

translated and

published

in The Soviet Bulletin

of

Sociology

(1969).

lln addition to

Kuhn

(1964)

I have drawn

heavily

on

Berger

and Luckman

(1966)

and Horton

(1964, 1966).

Others

who have

dealt with the

general

issues of

competing sociological paradigms

include: Friedrichs

(1970),

Gouldner

(1970),

and Nisbet

(1966).

~

For

documentation

of

this thesis see Baritz

(1960),

Cornforth

(1963), Lange

(1963),

Robinson

(1964),

and

Szymanski (1971).

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Baritz,

Lorenz

1960 SERVANTS

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A HISTORY OF

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Berger,

Peter,

and Thomas Luckman

1966

THE

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

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Garden

City,

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and

Co.

Blackburn,

Robin

1973 IDEOLOGY IN

THE

SOCIAL SCIENCES.

New York:

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Cornforth,

Maurice

1963 THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

New York: International

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Dobb,

Maurice

1963

STUDIES

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Friedrichs,

Robert

1970

A

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Gouldner, Alvin

1970

THE

COMING CRISIS OF

WESTERN SOCIOLOGY.

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Horton,

John

1964 The Dehumanization of

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BRITISH JOURNAL

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Lange,

Oscar

1963

POLITICAL ECONOMY.

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1937

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Robinson,

Joan

1964

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Albert

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Merton and

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ia

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Volume 2 Number

2

Spring/Summer

1975

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