A Compassionate Conservative, A Political Biography of Joseph W. Martin Jr., Speaker of the House -...

A CompassionateConservative

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

A Compassionate Conservative

A Political Biography of Joseph W. Martin Jr., Speaker of

the U.S. House of Representatives

James J. Kenneally

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham Boulder New York Oxford

LEXINGTON BOOKS

Published in the United States of America by Lexington Books A Member of the Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706

PO Box 317 Oxford OX2 9RU, UK

Copyright 0 2003 by Lexington Books

AII rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kenneally, James J. (James Joseph), 1929-

A compassionate conservative : a political biography of Joseph W. Martin Jr., speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives / James J. Kenneally.

p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.

ISBN 0-7391-0676-7 (alk. paper) 1. Martin, Joseph W. (Joseph William), 1884-1968. 2. Legislators-United

States-Biography. 3. United States. Congress. House-Speakers-Biography. 4. Conservatism-United States-History-20th century. 5. United States- Politics and government-20th century. I. Title.

E748.M375K46 2003 328.73’0924~21 2003007650

Printed in the United States of America

eTMThe paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO 239.48-1992.

For my grandchildren:

Stephanie, Matthew, Gregory, Eve, Nicole, James, Joanna, Maureen

and for

the competent and friendly staff at the MacPhaidin Library

Contents

Introduction ix

1 “Drifting Farther and Farther into Politics”: 1884-1938 1 The Martin Family 1 In the Massachusetts Legislature 6 The First Congressional Campaign 8 Elected to Congress 9 Assistant Floor Leader 17 The Election of 1936 21 Following the Middle Road 26 Election as Minority Leader 32

2 “At the Eye of the Hurricane”: 1939-1942 47

Challenging the New Deal 47 Nonpartisan Foreign Affairs 51 Presidential Politics 1940 55 Foreign Policy Further Divides the GOP 71 Wartime Congressional Issues 80 The 1942 Elections 82

3 “Often . . .Like Cobra and Mongoose”: 1943-1946 101

Election of Martin’s RNC Successor 101 The Seventy-eighth Congress 102 Politics and the 1944 Election 109 The Seventy-ninth Congress 112 Republicans Emerge Victorious in 1946 120

vii

... Vll l Contents

4 "The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit": 1947-1948 133

Organizing the House 133 The Speaker and the President 137 Foreign Policy Issues 145 Return of the Democrats: The 1948 Election 150

5 "The Communist Menace . . . More Alarming than . . the Hitler Menace": 1949-1952 171

The Eighty-first Congress 171 War in Korea 176 The Election of 1950 and Domestic Issues in the

Eight-second Congress 179 The Korean Crisis 185 The Election of 1952 188

6 "[Republicans] Shedding the Psychology of Opposition": 1953-1956 199

Enacting the Eisenhower Program: The First Session 199 Enacting the Eisenhower Program: The Second Session 208 In the Minority Again: The 1954 Elections 216 The Eighty-fourth Congress: First Session 21 8 Foreign Policy Issues 223 The Eighty-fourth Congress: Second Session 225 The Election of 1956 230

7 "Minority Leader Meanest Job in the World": 1956-1958 245 The Battle of the Budget 245 The Civil Rights Struggle 248 Foreign Policy and Adjournment 252 Second Session of the Eighty-fifth Congress 254 Martin's Problems 259

8 "The Sting of Ingratitude": 1958-1968 267 Replacing a Legend 1958-1959 267 Back-Bench Congressman 281 With Democratic Presidents Once Again 284 The Last Campaign 294

Abbreviations Used in Endnotes 309

Bibliography 311

Index 325

About the Author 335

Introduction

Findividuals in American political life: Speaker of the United States or twenty years Joseph W. Martin, Jr. was one of the most influential

House of Representatives, Minority Leader, Chair of the Republican Na- tional Committee, Permanent Chair of five Republican National Conven- tions (more than any Republican or Democrat in history), and next in line for the presidency, 1947-1949. Despite an appeal for a Martin biography by Richard 0.Davies at the Truman Library conference in 1966 and the publication of studies chronicling the lives of his major legislative contemporaries, there is still no biography of this onetime powerful figure. * But nor has the caustic prediction of the reporter Robert S. Allen and the journalist/historian William V. Shannon been realized: “Joe Martin, two years, or six months, after he is dead, will be similarly [referring to Her- bert Hoover’s vice-president Charles Curtis] forgotten.”2 His memoir, MyFirsf Fif ty Years in Polifics (New York: McGraw-Hill, reprint, Westport, COM.: Greenwood, 1975), as told to Robert J. Donovan, was first published in 1960, a gossipy anecdotal account vindicating his leadership against those who supported his ouster. In 1986 William Hasenfus completed a doctoral dissertation, a detailed analysis of Martin’s legislative career following the interpretative scheme of his memoir3

Moreover, many works dealing with the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s men-tion Martin usually in an unfavorable and inaccurate light. He has been characterized as not merely conservative but as an “arch-conservative,” an ”ultraconservative,” a ”reactionary,” a “congressional nabob,” whose performance in the Truman years “exemplified Martin’s consistent record of isolation and opposition to the New Deal.”4 Even many students of the

ix

X Introduction

Eisenhower era, when Martin was responsible for shepherding much of the President’s programs through Congress, emphasize his shortcomings. He is sometimes described as one of the conservatives in Congress, part of the “brain dead Republican leadership on the hill,” but cited more often are the alleged difficulties Eisenhower had working with him. The Presi- dent believed him lackadaisical and inefficient, and consequently historians sympathize with Eisenhower for condoning his ouster as leader.5

These views have been shaped to a large extent by contemporary observations of Martin from a liberal and Democratic perspective and from Eisenhower himself, who never felt comfortable with his House spokesman. In Franklin Roosevelt’s reelection campaigns of 1940 and 1944 the President castigated Martin for his opposition to the New Deal and for his isolationism. Harry Truman in his 1948 contest flayed the Eightieth Congress and sometimes attacked Martin, its Speaker, by name. A member of Roosevelt’s “Brain Trust,” Rexford Tugwell dismissed Mar- tin as an “unblemished reactionary and isolationist.’t6 To the journalist/ historian William V. Shannon he was a reactionary obstructionist who ”voted against every New Deal bill” and was the “backbone” of the isolationist cause in the House. Shannon was even more biting when he joined with the reporter Robert S. Allen in criticizing Martin as having ”rarely been right on major issues, foreign or domestic, in thirty years.’” Equally devastating was the pundit Tris Coffin’s assessment of Martin in his popular Missouri Compromise as a party hack with loyal obedience to the Old Guard, a right-wing conservative who would have delighted President Rutherford B. Hayes (1877-1881).8

There is little doubt that Martin was more conservative than all but two of the seven presidents, Coolidge and Hoover, with whom he served. (Martin would never have tolerated “under whom he had served.” Al- though he was not vain and little given to protocol, he bristled when Congress or the Speakership was slighted.) This outlook is not unusual if one accepts James MacGregor Burn’s thesis that there are really four major political parties in the United States. Based on institutional attachment, electoral behavior, and ideological differences, they are Presidential Dem- ocrats, Presidential Republicans, Congressional Democrats, and the most conservative, Congressional Rep~blicans.~ Except for forays into the Pres- idential Republican camp when Eisenhower was President, Martin was in the last category. Nevertheless he was less conservative than many of his House colleagues, the majority of whom would never have tolerated his leadership for twenty years if he were an extremist. Martin was successful in balancing his obligation to the national interest with his responsibilities to 340,000 constituents, his own party, and to 434 other congressmen. He joined with the 1936 Republican presidential nominee Alf Landon to prevent Herbert Hoover from recapturing the party, and

xi lnfroduction

although he fought much of the New Deal, especially when he thought it detrimental to the Northeast, he backed some measures and was conspic- uous in the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act. His election as Mi- nority Leader in 1938 was seen as a victory for younger Republicans against their party’s mossbacks, and in 1939 the Washington press corps voted him the ablest congressman. Criticized by many in his own party for not making opposition to Iioosevelt’s internationalism partisan and leaving those issues to the conscience of individual congressmen, he voted for Lend-Lease and the peacetime draft and supported foreign aid in the post-war years. As Speaker under Truman, rather than attempt to dis- mantle the New and Fair Deals, Martin sought to curb what he believed were their excesses; as Eisenhower‘s floor leader he pushed through legislation which alienated the Republican right; and during his career he compiled a commendable record on civil rights and Jewish concerns.

In his own estimation Martin ”was never a fanatic on any issue.” He was concerned more with the day-to-day running of the House than with an ideology-conservative or liberal. His approach to legislation was pragmatic, grounded in respect for the House’s members of both parties, including even those Republicans who voted against him. At the conclusion of the Seventy-sixth Congress when paying tribute to the Democratic Speaker, his friend Sam Rayburn, Martin explicated his legislative philosophy: “We all come to Congress actuated by but a single purpose, and that is to promote the welfare of the common country. . . . It is through honest differences of opinion and debate we reach the best conclusions. This is Americanism functioning in the American way. This must be continued if the people are to rule.’’10 His political ascendancy then was not the result of any ideology but of seniority, affability, the ability to compromise, services to his constituents, and the power which came from the office he held rather than from any ingrained characteristic. The Speaker was a transitional figure who campaigned in torchlight parades and first saw television revolutionize elections, who toured his district by horse and buggy but was the Senior Republican on the Space Committee and served in an era when congressional politics were generally characterized by comity rather than confrontation.”

Clearly then it is long past time for a reassessment of Martin‘s political life; a traditional biography is not possible. Many of his papers have been lost, they were put into storage for possible housing in a Republi- can library in Washington that was never built, and have not been re-covered. Of those that remain, 107Hollinger boxes and 105scrapbooks, there is no indication of a private life-possibly because he had none. Even his diaries, which resemble appointment books, give no details of conferences or meetings, no description of Washington personalities, and no clues to his thoughts and motivations. He had no deeper existence

xii Introduction

than that conditioned by politics, as he told columnist Joseph Alsop, “All I’ve ever done is work. It’s been my life, the work of the House, and it’s been a good life.”I2 The wife of Senator Hugh Scott (Republican, Pennsylvania) found it hard to believe such a narrow focus. She asked, “’Have you any other life except politics?’ He said, ’No.’ She said, ‘You mean you just practice politics and think politics all the time?’ and he said, ’Yes. . . .’ She said, ’You have no other interests?’ He said, ’None at all.”’ Scott himself added, ”that was true . . . I don’t recall him ever having anybody in for a drink in his office or social life at all. He went out to parties, but apparently I think Joe only went to parties to learn something, pick up what was going on, and strengthen his ties.”13

In preparing this political biography I am indebted to many: among them are the administrators of Stonehill College, archivists in presidential libraries as well as those in depositories holding congressional papers, and the staff of the MacPhaidin Library, Stonehill College, especially the interlibrary loan librarian, Regina Egan. Ellie Arguimbau of the Montana Historical Society and Margaret N. Wetzmann of the Crumb Libraries Archives, State University of New York, Potsdam, were particularly cooperative. I am grateful to Ghanda Di Figlia, biographer of Martha Sharp, who shared her research with me, to Professor Robert H. Ferrell of the University of Indiana for providing me with an oral history of Charles Halleck, and I am most appreciative of lengthy conversations with the late Edward E. Martin, Joseph Martin’s brother. My colleague, Professor Thomas Gariepy, read portions of the manuscript and shared his knowledge of North Attleboro with me. My wife Louise did yeoman service as always; she makes everything and anything a joy.

NOTES

1. Richard 0. Davies, ”Social Welfare Policies,” in Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Period as a Research Field (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1967), 171.

2. Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Triiman Merry-Go-Round (New York: Vanguard, 1950), 187.

3. William H. Hasenfus, ”Managing Partner: Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican Leader United States House of Representatives, 1939-1959” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College).

4. Susan M. Hartman, Truman and the 80LhCongress (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 14; Robert and Leona Rienow, The Lonely Quest: The Evolu-tion of Presidential Leadership (Chicago: Follett Publications, 1966), 86; Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression: America 2929-1941 (New York Times Books, 1984),313,319; James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States 1945-1974 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 142; James MacGregor Bums, Roose-

...Introduction X l l l

velt: The Soldier of Fortune (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 37; Gary A. Donaldson, Truman Defeats Dezuey (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 35.

5. Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 208, 545; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower the President (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 412; Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York, Ran- dom House, 1999), 588; Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisen- hower Administration (New York Harpers, 1961), 26; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhozuer as Leader (New York Basic Books, 1982), 79-80; Chester J. Pach, Jr. & Elmo Richardson, The Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhozuer (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, revised edition 1991), 212.

6. Rexford Tugwell, The Democratic Rooseuelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roose- velt (New York: Doubleday, 1957; reprint, Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), 540.

7. William V.Shannon, “Joe Martin: A Study in the Negative,” The Reporter, November 7, 1950, 17; Shannon and Allen, The Truman Merry-Go-Round (New York: Vanguard, 1950), 187.

8. Tris Coffin, Missouri Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947), 75-77. 9. James MacGregor Burns, The Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in

America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), especially 195-203. 10. Congressional Record, Seventy-sixth Cong., 3d sess., 86 (July 2,1941): 14048. 11. See Eric M. Uslaner, The Decline of Comify in Congress (Ann Arbor, Mich.:

University of Michigan Press, 1993). 12. Alsop column, Washington Post (henceforth WPJ, 11January 1959). 13. Anthony Champagne interview with Hugh Scott, June 23, 1980, Sam Ray-

burn Library, Bonham, Tex.

1

”Drifting Farther and Farther into Po1itics”l: 1884-1938

THE MARTIN FAMILY

There was no doubt that she was the dominant member of the family: her husband, her daughters, and her sons, successful by traditional

American standards-Joseph Jr. even was Speaker of the United States House of Representatives-readily adhered to her authority. Naming the children, owning a racehorse, entering politics, supporting a political party, enlisting in the military, drinking, and smoking were all activities controlled by her. Catherine Keating Martin’s assertiveness was even more pronounced than that of the typical mother in a turn-of-the-century immigrant family, where adult male presence was minimal due to lengthy working hours.

Born in Ireland in 1862, Keating, at sixteen, left her family in Dublin and sailed to New York, and then trekked to an Irish enclave in metropolitan Newark, New Jersey. Her independence epitomized that of the large number of single Irish women who emigrated to the United States alone in what the historian Ellen A. Biddle has described as an early Women’s Liberation Movement.2 Like other Irish newcomers in the Newark area, she found employment as a domestic and in time met Joseph W. Martin, a blacksmith, a few years her ~en io r .~ After a rather easily obtained dis- pensation, a requirement because of Martin’s Presbyterian faith, they were married July 2, 1882.4

Shortly thereafter, the newlyweds left and settled in North Attle- borough, Massachusetts, where Catherine apparently had Irish friends, part of the town’s largest ethnic group. There Martin smithed for

1

2 Chapter 7

William H. Stanley, a blacksmith and carriage manufacturer, who spe- cialized in jewelers' forging.

North Attleborough, which figured so prominently in the lives of all the Martins, shaped and influenced their eldest son Joseph. Except for holi- days at his summer home in Sagamore on Cape Cod and of course his res- idence in Washington during congressional sessions, he resided at his parents' North Attleborough home all his life. Located about fifteen miles outside Providence on the way to Boston, Attleborough was the state's second largest town in area, and shortly after the Martins settled was par- titioned into two separate towns, Attlelborough and North Attleborough.

The growth of North Attleborough was less than expected. Because the newly opened Boston to Providence railroad stopped at Attleborough that area evolved into a city, but by-passed North Attleborough remained a small town with a population of less than eight thousand, and only thirty-nine African-Americans. The economic heart of the area, the jewelry industry, first established in 1780, reflected the disparity in growth. By 1905, Attleborough had sixty-three establishments, employing 2,763 with an annual payroll of $1,386,092 while North Attleborough had but thirty-five firms, with 1558 employees and wages of $854,804. For the better part of its most famous son's lifetime it remained a small town: leafy trees, large houses, peopled by right-thinking folk of modest means, trusting, unsophisticated, and friendly. The major forces in the community were the Board of Trade, the Republican Party, and the Protestant church. North Attleborough's typical leading citizen was a Board of Trade member, who attended the First Universalist Church or Grace Episcopal and voted Republican, in part due to the party's high tariff policies, which it was believed, protected the jewelry industry and preserved jobs. As one student of the region stated, it was common for "a man to be born in North Attleborough, educated in local schools, marry a girl from school, work at a local factory and be buried in the town."5

The Martins always lived near the forge but as the family grew, with the help of the older children, a larger home was purchased on Grove Street in 1907. The Martins were proud of their eight children and especially pleased that all of them except two were high school graduates. George, the most independent spirit of the family, quit school at fourteen rather than comply with a teacher's demand that he deliver a Memorial Day oration, and Nette, the oldest, in order to help support the family left school for employment as a "chair maker" and then as a pieceworker in a jewelry factory.

The family was relatively poor, so much so that according to Martin every Saturday supper consisted of warm beans, and Sunday breakfast of cold beans. As the father never earned more than $18 a week it was necessary for all of the children to contribute to the family larder. Under the

3 “Drifting Forther RnLi Farther into Politics“

watchful eye of the mother who managed all of the finances, the children, as soon as they were able, paid board and when the situation required, special assessments in proportion to their ability to pay. As a result, all bills were paid promptly in cash.

At age six, Joe Martin began a newspaper route delivering the Chron-icle (which he would later own). His natural charm, even at that age, en- deared him to many of his customers who would later support his political career. He also assisted his father at the forge, shooing flies away as the horses were being shod, gathering nails, and generally straight- ening up. Here, too, his winning ways captivated many of the customers and resulted in lifelong friendships with other young boys who gravi- tated toward this male bastion. As he grew, so did his newspaper business, becoming the largest in town. Moreover, he was hired part-time by one of his customers as a copy boy, reporter, and printer’s devil for the NorfhAffleboro Leader; by high school, he was providing about one-third of the family monies.

Martin’s father, a Democrat, had wanted to name his son ”Grover” for Grover Cleveland, who was elected President one day after Joe’s birth in 1884.Catherine Martin, however, a strong Republican, would hear of no such thing. Martin was named for his father. Nevertheless, Catherine could be influenced in naming her children. When Joe was fourteen he persuaded her to name her fifth son Edward Everett after the author of “The Man Without a Country.” Given to him by a customer, the book made him “dizzy with patriotism.” The naming of Edward thus began a special relationship between the older boy and his younger sibling, wherein Joe, who was like another father, would in time confide in and rely on Ed more than anyone else.6

Twelve years after Martin’s birth, his father, influenced by President William McKinley’s advocacy of sound money and high tariffs and by his wife‘s example, became a Republican. From then on the entire family embraced that credo. Catherine Martin maintained such an abiding interest in politics that at age eighty-five she still kept a map of the country’s congressional districts marked with colored pins to show their political com- plexion and with notations of changes in public opinion polls. In addition to mother Martin’s fascination with politics, which was inherited by all her children (Nette helped her brother’s campaigns years before women could vote in Massachusetts), and her control of the household’s finances, she set the tone in all aspects of home life. Her interest in the outside world, her avid reading, and her ethical values were reflected in her offspring. From her they learned almost Puritan precepts: that hard work was a virtue, and alcohol and tobacco were at best unseemly (at forty-six Ed- ward refused to appear in a ”Man of Distinction” whiskey advertisement because she might disapprove). From her, too, they learned ”one man is

4 Chapter 1

as good as another,” which according to her son Edward explained his brother’s early commitment to justice for Jews and African-Americans. Everyone in the household rose early and went to bed early. Her sons, in-cluding the Speaker of the House, were still required to inform her, even in late middle age, where they were going and when they expected to return. As Mrs. Martin would not let her offspring out after supper until they were teenagers and even then they had to be in by 8:30P.M., the home became a gathering place for the Martin children and their friends.’

She raised her children in her Catholic faith, but as they got older, she did not insist that they attend services or follow its precepts. As a result, most of her children did not attend church with any degree of regularity and were, at best, nominal Catholics-except for Joe, who refused to identify himself with any faith. According to a former bishop of Fall River, young Martin attended Mass on Sundays, sat in the rear of the church, and occasionally left before it ended in order to complete his newspaper route. On one occasion his pastor, the Reverend Edward J. Mongan, admonished the lad, insisting that he sit up front and remain until Mass was over. Martin walked out of St. Mary’s, never to return to a Catholic church as an adherent. As a matter of fact, he seldom attended any church and never affiliated with any religious denomination. As Speaker of the House, he was once asked by a colleague to order the House Chaplain to shorten his daily prayer. Martin refused, allegedly replying, “this is the only church I have, you know.“ Maybe this response explains why Mar- tin labored so hard and was so proud of his efforts in getting a prayer room in the House chambers. However, Martin’s sense of values and winning ways overshadowed his secularism and resulted in many clerical friends of all persuasions, including members of the Catholic hierarchy.8 Moreover, he was careful to praise frequently the place of religion in American life and promote the role of churches. On one occasion with New York’s Cardinal Francis Spellman and the bishop of Fall River on the platform, he called for a ”resurgence of Religious faith” for “only the Christian Church and all it stands for can preserve the world.” Moreover he publicly told of his “privilege” as Speaker in having ”called up and passed a bill” adding the words “under God” to the pledge of allegian~e.~

Martin attended North Attleborough High School, a small institution with but 137students and seven teachers, including the principal. Of fifteen graduates in his class of 1902, seven went to college. A marked failure, however, was Martin‘s penmanship, which was nearly indecipher- able. Moreover, a slight brogue, a shyness, and faltering recitations with occasional errors of grammar and pronunciation remained with him throughout his life. Even after several years in Congress his prose was still described as “leaden,” his orations as “undistinguished,” and as he himself admitted “I am not much on speaking.” After listening to a speech by

5 “Drifting Further and Farther into Politics”

Martin the cynical newspaperman H. L. Mencken shook his head and mourned the decline in American demagoguery. Nevertheless, Joe grad- uated with high honors and was selected by his classmates to present at graduation the class history, which was praised by the local newspaper.’O

High school was not all work and study, for Martin starred at shortstop and captained the school’s baseball team. A Dartmouth alumnus, impressed by Martin’s athletic talents, offered to pay his way to that institution so he could play ball for the college. Martin declined the opportunity in order to help support the family and went to work full-time for the Leader. However, he did play local semipro ball at $10 a game, and remained an avid baseball fan throughout his life.

Less than a year later Martin left the Leader for the Attleboro Sun as a $10 a week reporter. In addition to covering court cases, which resulted in his joining with the police in a search for a murderer, he served as the paper’s North Attleborough correspondent and as a stringer for the Boston Globe and Prozlidence Journal.

In 1908 nine businessmen, eight of whom were active in the Republi- can Party, put up $1,000 each to buy the North Atfleboro Chronicle. Founded in 1870, that daily was a typical small-town paper: the voice of the community, Republican in politics, with detailed accounts and editorials on local happenings, telegraph reports of national news, and a job printing department. None of the investors were newsmen; thus Martin was offered the position of editor and partner, if he could contribute $1,000 toward the purchase. It took all of his savings, but at age twenty- four Martin became one of the youngest editors of a daily in the nation. He gradually bought out his partners, becoming owner and publisher. Aided by his brother Charles, who became manager when Joe was elected to Congress and whose local gossip column, “The Roving Re-porter,” was one of the most widely read and influential pieces in the Chronicle, the Martins increased circulation from about eight hundred to four thousand. In 1914 Martin purchased the A. T. Parker Insurance Company, one of the oldest such firms in the area and one whose owner had long been affiliated with Republican politics. Until 1938, when she died, it was managed by his sister Mary. He bought another paper in 1944, the weekly Franklin Sentinel. Both papers, but especially the Chron-icle, became zealous supporters of the Republican Party and shills for Martin‘s career; as one old Chronicle hand reminisced, “My God, the Chronicle treated Joe as if he were the second coming. If you read the issues, objectivity was [only] a word in the dictionary.””

One of the reasons Martin had been approached to join the Chronicle venture was that in addition to his newspaper experience, he had al-ready shown a flare for leadership with strong Republican tendencies. In 1906 at age twenty-one, he along with other young Republicans had

6 Chapter 1

challenged the town committee by dominating the caucus and electing Martin to the state Republican convention, the youngest delegate ever to represent North Attleborough.12

IN THE MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATURE

The following year, Martin ran for public office for the first time. He had joined a group determined to control the school committee and oust the superintendent. After helping persuade two Republicans of like mind to enter the race, he followed the suggestions of Democratic friends and sought the position himself. Although he entered the contest as a "Demo- crat," he campaigned for his "Republican" opponents and, as he expected, lost the election. However, he amazed everyone by the size of his vote and to his surprise enjoyed the experience.13

Martin then organized the Young Republican Club of North Attlebor- ough, whose members in 1911urged him to seek the Republican nomination for the state legislature. Wearing a derby to make himself look older, and aided by his sister Nette, Martin campaigned vigorously in all the towns of the district, reaching the outlying areas by interurban streetcars or horse and buggy. Martin ran extremely well and was nominated. Al- though the district was safely Republican and nomination was tantamount to election, Martin continued a spirited campaign, extolling the Re- publican Party and insisting that prosperity was due to the productive GOP tariff, which was especially beneficial to the jewelry industry. Fur- thermore he claimed that the entire nation was watching the Massachu- setts election as a referendum on this policy. The result was a triumph for Martin. His lengthy legislative career had begun with a commitment to a protective tariff and the Republican Party, both of which were to be his benchmarks for the next fifty years.14

Martin served three consecutive one-year terms in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, followed by three consecutive terms in the state senate, the youngest senator in the 1915 session. His legislative record in both houses presaged his forty-two years in Congress. As a results-oriented politician, he compromised and compiled a relatively moderate record, supporting some liberal programs and enough conservative ones so that later critics would sometimes describe him as an old-fashioned, outdated, mossback.I5 The assignment of which he was most proud was chairing the special recess commission (1917) on the problems of street railways. This committee enabled him to become known throughout the state as hearings were held in the Commonwealth's major cities. Martin's conservatism was shown in his majority report, which called for a sliding streetcar fare suffi- cient to pay the cost of service. The minority recommended public ownership and/or a freeze of the five-cent fare if necessary.I6

7 “Drifting Farther and Farther into Politics” In those six years, in which Martin never missed a legislative day, he re-

flected a belief which would remain with him throughout his Congres- sional years-the supremacy of the legislative branch. Although a relatively junior solon, he had no hesitation in voting to override gubernatorial vetoes: out of 48 vetoes he voted to override 40 times-with no sharp distinction between overriding Democratic or Republican governors.

Martin, personable and loyal, advanced rapidly into the legislature’s power elite. When his brother Ed, a superb baseball player, planned to attend Brown University, the Republican Speaker of the House, a graduate of Dartmouth, urged Joe to send him to Dartmouth, which he did. In his own words Ed became ”chattel to Joe’s political career.” Martin was appointed by the President of the Senate, Calvin Coolidge, to chair the Com- mittee on Election Laws, he also served as Secretary to the Joint Rules Committee chaired by Coolidge and was selected as chair of the Republi- can State Legislative Committee in 1917, where he headed the campaign to elect Republicans to the legislature. Through these positions he developed a personal friendship with Coolidge, which became a “great help to me politically when I came to C~ngress.”‘~

A congenial Martin also cemented an alliance with Congressman John W. Weeks. Once Martin decided to support Weeks in his bid for the United States Senate, Weeks appointed the newly elected state representative as one of his floor leaders. This controversial and lengthy election took place in the Massachusetts legislature in 1912, one year before a con-stitutional amendment required the popular election of senators. Senator Weeks, later secretary of war in the Harding and Coolidge cabinets, and his son, a force in the Massachusetts State Republican Committee and secretary of commerce in the Eisenhower Administration, remained Martin intimates for years.

At the same time, Martin displayed his loyalty to party regulars. De- spite the sentiment of his district in 1912, he resisted the maverick bland- ishments of the Progressive Party and ex-president Theodore Roosevelt. He not only supported the Republican nominee, William Howard Taft, but also stumped the district for him, appearing with the president before a crowd of eight thousand, at a railroad-stop rally in Attleborough. In 1916, he was an unpledged delegate to the Republican National Conven- tion and avoided identification as a Progressive or regular Republican by joining his colleagues in voting for Weeks as the state’s favorite son, until the Massachusetts delegates turned to Charles Evans Hughes, the eventual nominee.

Martin’s rapid advance in the General Court and in Massachusetts politics was paralleled by increased popularity in his district. His constituent services, membership in a variety of fraternal and civic organizations, as well as his newspaper’s promotion, contributed to his reputation. He was unopposed for the Republican nomination for representative in 1912 and

8 Chapter 2

1913, and for state senate in 1914 and 1915. Moreover, he faced only token opposition in the general elections and was even singled out by the state’s leading Republican paper as “able, active, energetic, clear thinking, and honest.” Nevertheless, in each year he campaigned fervently, stumping for Republicans and linking the prosperity of his district and the state with that party’s tariff policy.’*

THE FIRST CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN

Although Martin prided himself on never losing an election and in his autobiography states that he left politics after the close of the 1917 session to devote himself to his newspaper business, he did seek the Republican nomination to Congress in 1918. His objective, as a columnist for the N e w Bedford Standard reported, may very well have been an attempt to make the voters of the Fifteenth District familiar with his name in preparation for a serious campaign when the incumbent retired.I9 William Steadman Greene, seventy-seven years of age, had first been elected to the House in 1898 after serving as mayor and postmaster of Fall River, the area’s foremost city, whose voters outnumbered those of the rest of the district put together. Although a standpatter, Greene had directly or indirectly left many Republicans indebted to him. Unlike potential challengers, who were overawed by Greene’s strength and bided their time awaiting his retirement, Martin announced for the seat in July 1918.

Martin obviously had contemplated a run sometime in 1917, for in that year he carefully pasted two items in his scrapbook: a speech of Greene’s supporting local option rather than prohibition because it would not work (this despite the fact that Attleboro and North Attleboro had been dry for years) and more importantly Greene’s anti-woman suffrage response to the Fall River Minister’s Association. In all probability this answer explains Martin’s shift from what one observer described as a “woman hater on suffrage. ..woman’s place is in the home” to his attacks on Greene’s anti-position.*O But the major emphasis on Martin’s bid for Congress was the need for youth, energy, and new blood in the Republi- can Party and for a representative who would support the administration’s war policies only when they were right, rather than follow Demo- cratic leadership blindly.

Although an article in the Boston Globe referred to him as a strong candidate, a popular and efficient legislator who “knew enough not to talk too much or take himself too seriously,” Martin had difficulty getting his message across. He ran extremely well in the Attleboros, fairly well in the towns, but lost the city of Taunton and was trounced in Greene’s Fall River. The final tally, an unusually light one, was Martin 2109, Greene 3532.21

9 "Drifting Farther and Farther iiito Politics"

After his defeat, Martin remained active in Republican and town affairs. He was elected president of the North Attleboro Board of Trade, led a community fund drive, served as an officer in the North Attle- boro Republican League, maintained his party contacts, including his relationship with Coolidge, and raised needed money for the Republican State Committee.22

As a result of the ratification of the seventeenth amendment requiring the direct election of senators, Henry Cabot Lodge had to seek popular support to retain his office. The first time he had done so in 1916 he was at the peak of his popularity and faced a badly divided Democratic party, but in 1922 he was handicapped by his perceived arrogance, the possibility of a challenge from the party's left, and the threat of a strong Demo- cratic opponent. In an effort to paper over party divisions and reelect the senator, the party turned to Martin. Frank H. Foss of Fitchburg, Chairman of the State Committee and a Coolidge man, persuaded a reluctant Mar- tin to accept the position of Executive Secretary of the State Committee, which had been vacant for a year, and direct the Lodge campaign. The appointment had the blessing of Coolidge, Lodge, Governor Charming Cox, and Secretary of War Weeks.

Aided by Martin's assistance, shrewd advice, and joint tours of the state, Lodge handily won the Republican primary. Martin worked all the harder in the general election, raising money, reinvigorating local party organizations, campaigning with Lodge, and arranging rallies. His paper ran editorials on Lodge's behalf, publicized his appearances and speeches, and, typical of Martin's party loyalty, also endorsed Greene's congressional reelection bid, asserting that Greene and the senator both were committed to protecting the jewelry ind~stry.2~ A grateful Lodge, who barely won, sent Martin a diamond stickpin in acknowledgment of his efforts, which many thought were responsible for the victory.24

ELECTED TO CONGRESS

Inspired by his part in the election victory of 1922, buoyed by his success in the state committee, and convinced that the eighty-four-year-old incumbent Greene was vulnerable, Martin decided once again to seek the Republican nomination for Congress in 1924. Many Republicans who feared the party might lose the seat if the octogenarian Greene were the nominee hailed his entry. Martin's announcement underscored four themes which he emphasized throughout the contest: (1) "reformation of Congress . . . through the infusion of new Republican blood"; (2) youth, vigor, and health (ironically forty-two years later this issue would defeat his bid for a twenty-second term); (3) unswerving support for his friend

10 Chapter 1

President Coolidge; and (4) his experience in the state legislature. Greene's only comment to this proclamation was, "He has the right of every citizen to seek office if he wants Most observers believed that Martin had an excellent chance of unseating the incumbent. Indicative of his support from jewelry manufacturing circles was the circulation of his nomination papers at the Balfour Company, where they were signed by Lloyd G. Balfour himself as well as top executives before being circulated to employees.26

Running under the slogan "Let's go forward with Joe Martin," he stressed time and again the themes of his announcement, championed GOP tariff policies, and, in what would become characteristic of his congressional career, adjusted his ideological principles to the welfare of his district. Despite his previous opposition to legislation restricting the hours of employment of women and children in Massachusetts, now that such reforms were state law, he advocated a national forty-eight-hour law for women and children to protect New England mills from Southern competition. Martin's youth and vigor, however, were no match for Greene's experience and decades-long constituent service. Although Mar- tin outpolled Greene in most cities and towns he trailed badly in Greene's stronghold, Fall River, and lost once again, 10,361 to 13,185.27

Shortly after the election, Greene was hospitalized with a fractured hip as a result of a fall while fending off a large dog. He caught pneumonia and died a few days later, weakened, according to intimates, by the bruising primary. The GOP State Committee, of which Martin was still executive secretary, called a convention of state and town committees to select a Republican nominee. There was little doubt Martin would be their choice, since politicians who had been biding their time for an open seat with Greene's retirement had waited too long. With the enthusiastic support of women delegates, Martin was chosen by acclamation. To attract Greene partisans he immediately paid tribute to the late congressman. "If I serve as well and as faithfully as Uncle Billy Greene did," he proclaimed, "I am sure that it is all that can be expected. He was a gallant old Republican."28

Although the district was Republican, Martin campaigned assiduously. He purchased a new black touring car and visited every city and town in the Fifteenth, with extensive canvassing in Fall River and Taunton. He emphasized his favorite issues: the tariff and his friendship with Presi- dent Coolidge, and repeatedly aligned the national Democratic Party with southern racists, another step toward his advocacy of African-American rights. Martin won handily, carrying every city and town except his opponent's home city Fall River, but even ran well there, losing that Demo- cratic stronghold by only three thousand votes.

The congressional district, which Martin was to represent for forty-two years, was largely rural, with many farms specializing in dairying, fruit

11 “Drifting Farther arid Farther into Politics”

growing, truck gardening, and poultry. (Although the number of Massa- chusetts congressional districts shrank from sixteen to twelve during Martin’s tenure in office, his district retained the same characteristics.) It also had a heavy industrial base, with three urban manufacturing cen- ters. Attleboro, the jewelry capital of the state, with a population of 20,000, had been chartered as a city in 1914. Taunton, a city of 38,000, fea-tured textile manufacturing and silver production. One of its largest firms, Reed and Barton, employing 650 workers in the production of sterling silver goods, was managed by the Weeks family, friends of Martin’s. Nicknamed ”Factory Land,” the city of Fall River had four million spin- dles and a population in 1924 of 130,000. Martin’s rather sympathetic labor record was attributable in part to his constituency in this heavily Democratic, blue collar, labor bastion. On one occasion when asked his political philosophy, Martin replied, “I’m a red hot liberal,” and pointed to his labor record as proof.29 His attributes and his concern for his constituents and district guaranteed a lengthy career in Congress. Martin claimed he knew his district so well “that if a postmaster writes in for a new canceling machine, I probably know whether he needs it or Before leaving for Washington in 1925, he toured over thirty post offices and general delivery windows to talk to voters in his district as well as Touisset, Rhode Island, where some Massachusetts constituents received their mail. He continued to meet with residents in this fashion even when he was Speaker of the H ~ u s e . ~ ’

The new congressman at age thirty-four had developed the physical characteristics, personal traits, and political approach that would remain with him for the next forty-two years. Unlike the skinny shortstop of the North Attleborough nine, the mature Martin was chunky, described by various observers as stubby, plump, rotund, and sturdy. His height of 5’4“ added to his stocky appearance, and sometimes he resorted to standing on a small platform when presiding at Republican National Conventions. The shock of black hair which hung down over the right side of his fore- head, his bushy eyebrows, dimples, and thick lips made him a cartoon- ist’s delight. He was rather a careless dresser whose clothes were picked out by his sister, Nette, until he went to Washington. Modest, practical, three-piece suits, usually wrinkled, outdated ties, and square-toed bro- gans were his style. A Boston politician described him as ”the humblest looking man in politics. If he appeared at your door and said that he was the plumber, you would not hesitate to let him in.”

Martin neither smoked nor drank except for his favorite lemon and lime at a local drugstore. Fishbait Miller, the congressional doorkeeper, reported that the House hierarchy lamented Martin’s election as Speaker for it meant the demise of the “Board of Education,” a hideaway where political leaders met to discuss problems over libations. “He did not need a

12 Chapter 1

hideaway,” reported Miller. ”He was an angel. He did not drink. He didn’t do anything.” ”Anything” included dancing. He was unable to master that gambol. Furthermore there is no evidence of any romantic relationships, although Martin claimed to have been ”seeing” several young ladies during his service in the Massachusetts legislature. It was reported that “the political game is his best girl” and he “was not known to have a date.”32 His only interests other than his business, politics, and his family were occasional walks and baseball: as the director of the North Attleborough public schools noted, ”Joe’s about the most colorless man you will want to meet.’r33 Colorless or not, he was friendly, easy to know, sincere, and honest. Consequently, he was well liked and respected.

In 1925 the freshman congressman arrived in Washington, a city like Martin himself provincial, somewhat old-fashioned, and with a marvelous propensity for growth and maturity. Although he had crisscrossed the country on behalf of Coolidge delegates in 1924, Martin had been to Wash- ington only twice and as a small-towner was somewhat bewildered about finding a place to live. His friend from the Republican State Committee, Frank H. FOSS, was also newly elected to Congress. More sophisticated than Martin, Foss talked him into taking quarters at the Racquet Club, where Martin resided until 1936, when it was taken over by the University Club and became too noisy for his liking. In many ways the Racquet Club was an ideal location for the new representative: not only did other congressmen live there, but it was a short distance from the Capitol, enabling Martin to enjoy one of his few recreations-walking. Furthermore in case of inclement weather it was on the Washington Rapid Transit Line.

Martin was one of sixty-nine new representatives elected to the Sixty- ninth Congress, among whom was Edith Nourse Rogers (Republican, Massachusetts). Elected in 1925 to fill the vacancy created by her husband’s death, she became a lifelong congressional friend of Martin until her death in 1960. Also entering the House of Representatives for the first time was Edward Eugene “Gene” Cox (Democrat, Georgia), whose political views were often close to Martin’s and with whom a friendship and a so-called conservative coalition would emerge when they assumed the leadership in challenging much of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. In addition to Martin there were five future Speakers of the House: John Nance Garner (Democrat, Texas, 1931-1933), Henry T. Rainey (Democrat, Illinois, 1933-1935), Joseph W. Byrns (Democrat, Tennessee, 1935-1937), William B. Bankhead (Democrat, Alabama, 1936-1940), as famous for his actress daughter Tallulah as for his Speakership, and Sam Rayburn (1940-1946, 1949-1953, 1955-1961), who would alternate the office with Martin (1947-1949,1953-1955).

Martin arrived in Washington “eager to promote the welfare of the Re- publican Party. To me that was synonymous with promoting the national

13 “Drifting Farther and Farther into PoJitics”

welfare.”34 But there were not many ways a freshman could make his influence felt-even one who frequently called at the White House to visit his friend President Coolidge for whom he had toured the country recruiting delegates for the 1924 convention. Not until the Great Depression revolutionized the role of federal government in 1930 was there substantial interest in the national legislature, whose major function seemed to be the enactment of appropriation bills. Occasionally, according to Martin, there would be a “burst of limelight” on a particular issue, but when the emergency was resolved, quiet would prevail once again.35 Nevertheless, Martin was quickly initiated into the intricacies of party politics. Nicholas Longworth of Ohio, the minority leader, challenged Martin B. Madden (Illinois), chair of the Appropriations Committee, for the office of Speaker, even though Appropriations was considered the stepping-stone to that position. At the request of President Coolidge and his friends, Martin supported Longworth and thereby added the new Speaker to his growing list of influential patrons.

Although a freshman, in less than a month Martin introduced his first bill. Ironically for a legislator whose entire career was dedicated to high tariffs, it was a proposal to remit duties on a carillon imported by a church in Fall River, the first of innumerable bills introduced on behalf of particular constituent interests. It wasn’t until 1927, two years later, that he gave his maiden speech, wherein he attacked the McNary-Haugen Bill, a measure designed to guarantee farmers parity. Martin denounced it as a price-fixing political boon to farmers at the expense of the nation, but more particularly New England mills that would be damaged by dumping cotton abroad.36

Martin’s only major committee assignment in those early years was Foreign Affairs, where he began a lifelong friendship with Hamilton Fish (Republican, New York). At that time, according to the Bay Stater, the committee dealt with “inconsequential” problems. For an entire week it even debated, at the expense of all other issues, a $20,000 appropriation for an international poultry show in Tulsa. As a member of the committee he went in 1927 on a two-month tour of Europe to study industrial and economic conditions as they related to tariff and foreign policy. On this, his first trip abroad, much of his time was spent visiting textile and jewelry factories, where he took detailed notes on working conditions and wages. He returned impressed by the strides Mussolini’s Italy was making to “future greatness” but more convinced than ever of the need for increased tariffs, especially to protect jewelry manufacturers from German ~ompet i t ion .~~

In addition to supporting regular Republican programs such as pushing for tax reduction, voting against developing Muscle Shoals, demanding less government, and repayment of war loans, he worked zealously

14 Chapter 1

for his district. To stay in touch he continued his post office visits and spoke frequently at service clubs, the dedication of buildings, and the in- stallation of local officials. He also opened offices in Fall River and Taunton, as well as appointing as his administrative assistant a young political reporter for the Full River News.A product of local schools, whom Martin had met in newspaper circles, James Milne would remain with him until 1963. Moreover, he gladly attended bazaars, clambakes, Rotary and other such meetings, and opened informal offices at the Chronicle and at his insurance company. He would even see constituents at his home any evening except during election campaigns. Additionally he continued his routine of visiting the sixty-two post offices in his district every term. There he would hold court: listen to requests, take notes, and follow up with a letter upon his return to Mornings he would walk from his Grove Street home to the Chronicle, arriving about eight o’clock, after stopping and chatting on a first-name basis with fellow townsfolk along the way. He would work at the paper, sometimes answering correspondence, setting type, or preparing accounts. He also met with district Republican leaders in the back room, listened to their suggestions, and discussed local problems with them.39

Despite his shyness with women, as a middle-aged bachelor in Wash- ington Martin was in demand for social functions due to the shortage of men. Although he attended only those which could serve political purposes, he nevertheless remained quite popular with hostesses. Single, with little financial pressure and a profitable newspaper and insurance business, he began investing in stocks and bonds, especially Sun Oil, Chase National Bank, and Associated Gas. He invested shrewdly his entire life and died a wealthy man.

A personable, likable, party loyalist, Martin advanced rapidly in Con- gress. In 1927, in only his second term, he was named party whip for Massachusetts. The following year, in keeping with the Massachusetts delegation’s recommendation and as a reward for loyalty, the Speaker appointed him to the powerful Rules Committee. As a Rules member he served on Longworth’s so-called cabinet, an informal gathering of advisors where he honed his parliamentary and tactical skills. His rise in the party’s hierarchy had begun4* By 1933he was able to give a newly elected representative, Everett McKinley Dirksen (Illinois), advice based on his experience. ”Take the assignments you can get and work at them. Perfect yourself in committee work, and in due course you’ll start up the ladder. Study the rules. Those who know the rules know how to operate in the House, because you operate under the

Increased responsibilities in Congress led to speaking requests, frequently out of state. During those early years he committed himself publicly for the first time to a Jewish homeland. His interest in this cause orig-

15 “Drifting Farther and Farther into Politics“

inated from this association with Elihu Stone, known as the “Dean of New England Zionism.” Their joint membership on the Republican State Com- mittee led to a thirty-year friendship and to Stone’s service as Martin’s liaison with the Jewish community. In late 1924 as the featured speaker at a Zionist gathering on Cape Cod, Martin praised Jewish achievements in Palestine. A few years later in a fund-raising address for victims of anti- Jewish riots there, he endorsed the “full Zionist aim,” by asserting that Jews were entitled to unrestricted immigration to Palestine as a matter of right, not sufferance. Martin based his position on the Balfour Declara- tion, a public letter written in World War I by Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour pledging the British government to “the establishment in Palestine of a national home for Jewish people.” His commitment to a homeland was reinforced in 1932 when he joined the American Palestine Committee (in 1946 it became the American Christian Palestine Commit- tee), an organization of non-Jews dedicated to political Zionism and erad- ication of

Another indication of a nascent commitment to the oppressed, which like Zionism rendered no poIitical benefit at the time, occurred on the House floor in 1929. Western and southern congressmen voted 183 to 123 to amend a pending bill to exclude aliens from the count determining the number of representatives to which a state was entitled. The effect, of course, would be to reduce the strength in the House of those states with high immigrant populations, primarily the Northeast. Martin recom-mended to the Republican leadership that the bill be further amended by endorsing the perennial resolution of George Holden Tinkham (Republi- can, Massachusetts) to penalize the South for disfranchising African- Americans by requiring representation to be based on the number of voters, not on population. As Democrats attempted to shout him down, Martin rushed up and down the aisles marshaling Republican support for the amendment, which was approved 145 to 118. The following day both amendments were dropped, but for the first time in the history of the House, with Martin’s assistance, so-called force legislation had passed and in some quarters Martin was praised not only for his quick thinking but for providing a victory, albeit temporary, for ”Negroes.”43

Martin’s concern, however, was protecting the interests of his constituents, or in his words, “Vote your district first.” He avidly promoted the well-being of his area’s manufacturers. He introduced (1929) the Federal Silver Marking Act, drafted by silver manufacturers under the leadership of a North Attleboro firm. An unabashed high tariff man, he strongly defended the highest tariff in American history, the Hawley- Smoot Act (1930)) while continuing to advocate increased duties on products which competed with those manufactured in Massachusetts’s Fifteenth District.

16 Chapter 2

On the other hand, Martin fought vigorously and successfully against a tariff on silver ore and increased duties on imported oil. He led a delegation of twenty New England representatives to a meeting where he dared Speaker Longworth to defy oil state representatives who had threatened to bolt on the issue. Furthermore, on the House floor he described the dis- pute as a battle against the "oil interests" and sarcastically suggested that Congress "pass the hat for the Rockefeller family, poor devils."44

Although dedicated to a balanced budget, Martin worked to ensure that it was not balanced on the backs of his constituents, and, once again, the congressman couched his case in terms of the "little people." He assailed a proposed 10 percent sales tax on jewelry as adding to unemployment in the industry and burdening not "the wealthy, but . . . the stenographer, the poor working girl, or the prudent housewife . . . the college girl and the college boy." Before the Senate Finance Com- mittee he asserted that "To assess a tax on the jewelry industry is like going to the poor house and taking a collection for the unemployed." Martin succeeded: jewelry valued at less than $3 was exempted. He also prevailed in overturning a ruling of the collector of internal revenue which would have required back taxes on watch bracelets. After getting them reclassified as jewelry (of less than $3 value and therefore tax exempt), Martin was hailed for again saving the jewelry industry- twice in less than a year.45

During the early years of the depression, he rallied to the administration's unprecedented efforts to relieve the economic plight. He repeatedly praised Hoover for responding so quickly to the crisis and for attempting to maintain wage scales. Among other legislative remedies, Martin advocated and supported public works as a means of easing unemployment and enabling the construction of worthwhile projects at minimum cost (1931), voted for the distribution of forty million bushels of wheat to the Red Cross for relief (1932), and was a champion of the Reconstruction Fi- nance Corporation (1932), which was incorporated to lend money to banks, insurance companies, railroads, and later to self-liquidating public works projects. The scope of this New Deal-sounding pump-priming agency was extended and its policies liberalized through the years (it lasted to 1956), usually with the support of Martin, who frequently met in the 1930s with its officers to ensure that Fall River institutions received their just share of appropriations. To restore public confidence in banks, which were collapsing at a record-setting rate (five thousand by the spring of 1933), he urged a conference between state and federal banking officials for a federal program to aid the states in strengthening banks and in enacting new banking laws.

Martin's hold on his Republican district was so strong that frequently Democrats fielded only a token opponent. His campaigns until 1938 were,

17 "Drfting Farther and Fnrther infoPolitics"

as pundits expected, relatively easy victories. Consequently they were often directed as much toward publicizing Republican achievements and policies on the state and national level as his own reelection.

ASSISTANT FLOOR LEADER

After the 1932 election in which the number of Republicans fell from 214 to 117, Bert Snell, the House minority leader, appointed Martin his assistant. In some ways this was an unusual selection, for in a bitter and close contest for leader following the death of Longworth in 1931, Martin had been a "staunch" advocate for John Q. Tilson (Connecticut) rather than Snell, a colleague on the Rules Committee. Martin's support was selfless. Were Tilson elected, Martin, the junior Republican on Rules, would lose his seat on that prestigious committee, for in losing control of the House, COP representation on Rules would have to be reduced by one. However, if Snell were promoted from Rules to leader there would be one less Re- publican on the committee and Martin could retain his seat. Despite Mar- tin's efforts, on the eighth ballot Snell was chosen.46

The appointment of Martin as assistant was unusual in another way. Martin was more moderate and more willing to listen to others than Snell, who was described as "bound to the mast with deafened ears" and replied when asked why he did not bring forth a particular bill, "I have not seen fit to." Representative of the Old Guard, impeccably dressed, the personification of a typical businessman, he was determined there would be no compromise with the New Deal, which he viewed as "not only unconstitutional but Un-American.'' Martin, by contrast, was the perfect choice: more pragmatic, liked by all, and completely loyal to Sne11.47

The winter of 1932was the Great Depression at its worst. With the business leadership of the 1920s discredited and with government moribund as a Democratic Congress and a repudiated Hoover were at loggerheads and incapable of providing solutions, an anxious populace hopefully awaited the inauguration of the new president. Alf Landon reflected the cautious optimism of the nation when he wrote to President-elect Roo- sevelt, "Even the iron hand of a national dictator is preferable to a para- lytic stroke. . . . If there is any way a member of that species, thought by many to be extinct, a Republican governor of a mid-western state, can aid in the fight, I now enlist for the duration of the war.''4*

However, assistant minority leader and Republican whip Martin was not quite as willing as the Kansas governor to respond to Franklin D. Roosevelt's "bold experimentation." Martin's distrust of large government, his desire to protect the interests of New England, and his fear of expanding presidential power at the expense of Congress curbed his

18 Chapter 1

natural humanitarian instincts. ”Founding fathers envisioned the Presi- dent of the United States as no more than an administrator,” he claimed, “an official of limited powers who would do no more than carry out the instructions of the elected representatives of the people.” Martin saw his relationship to the Democratic president not as an obstructionist but as a “watchman on guard, to protect the rights of the people” and check expenditures as part of “a vigilant, constructive, energetic minority.” Fur- thermore he repeatedly warned his constituents that much of the legislation urged by Washington was detrimental to the interests of their section. Thus he fought programs which appeared to increase executive power in-ordinately, as well as those that seemed to benefit the South at the expense of the Northeast.49

Martin revealed what would be his stance for the entire New Deal era during the ”100 Days,” the special session from March 9 to June 16,1934, when under Roosevelt’s leadership Congress enacted a program of social and economic experimentation. Some legislation Martin supported but frequently he criticized its implementation, cost, and administration. More often than not he voted against Democratic programs, usually after exaggerated rhetorical attacks upon their alleged socialist or dictatorial nature which impinged on American liberties. Nevertheless, he frequently expressed sympathy with the objectives of such measures and if passed often asked his followers to give them a chance. When Congress adjourned he even urged all Americans, of whatever party, to cooperate with the president, although the legislation of the “100 Days” was a “a radical departure from American traditions.” One had to place country above party.50 Years later in his memoirs he confided “That in the depth of the Depression, when the power of the government had to be used somehow to feed, clothe, house, and employ millions of people, the Re- publicans had no strong i s s u e ~ . ” ~ ~

Illustrative of his attitude toward New Deal legislation was his reaction to three of the bills of the “100 Days”: the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA). Martin was one of only ninety-eight congressmen who voted against the AAA farm recovery program, which he assailed for bestowing dictatorial powers on Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wal- lace and for authorizing an “army” of governmental employees. His harshest attacks, like much of his opposition to administration proposals, were upon the bill‘s alleged sectionalism, as manifested most clearly in its provisions for a processing tax on wheat, corn, and cotton. The proceeds of the latter would go to southern growers to compensate for acreage reduction. Until the Supreme Court (United States u. Butler) in 1936 pro-nounced the levy a “means to an unconstitutional end,” Martin objected session after session, claiming that the legislation’s purpose was to “build

19 ”Drifting Further and Further into Politics”

up the South and rural West at the expense of the East.” Its effect, he asserted, was an un-American burden on commerce bringing “poverty, distress, and despair to millions.” He made the tax a major issue in his 1934 reelection bid, and quite untypically filibustered to delay its extension. Martin enlisted in the crusade his friend Bishop James Cassidy of Fall River, a one-time cotton mill worker. ”God save the Northeast and New England,” the churchman intoned, for the administration‘s southern and western interests encouraged industry to move South. Before a meeting of New England representatives arranged by Martin, Cassidy urged an increased tariff and the elimination of processing taxes and of sectional wage differentials

Martin introduced legislation to repeal the levy, and when that failed, a measure providing for one-half the revenues to go to mill workers to increase their purchasing power. The North Atfleboroughianclaimed he was not opposed to farm relief but to having agriculture “climb back to prosperity over the prostrate body of industry.” He endorsed some relief to farmers such as the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act (1933) to refinance farm mortgages at a lower rate. Typically, however, he qualified his approval with the proviso that he trusted such legislation would be followed, as it was, by a similar measure to aid distressed When the Supreme Court declared the AAA unconstitutional, the administration pushed the Soil and Conservation Domestic Allotment Bill (1936) to replace it. Not surprisingly Martin fought this proposal, charging it established too much federal control over agriculture, subjected farmers to ”slavery,” allocated excessive power to Wallace, and kept on the federal payroll 150,000 county agricultural agents whom he dismissed as “political agents.” One of Martin’s most frequent criticisms of the New Deal was that under its aegis the number of federal employees mushroomed from 110,000 in March 1933 to 199,000 one year later.53

Martin’s criticism of the TVA, a means of developing the Tennessee River basin, typified his view of several New Deal measures. For him it was socialistic, a step on the road to Moscow. Scholars cite this as a man-ifestation of his conservatism and of the irrational extreme statements characteristic of New Deal opponents. No doubt Martin’s rhetorical flights were excessive, especially in his tendency to discover socialistic overtones and Soviet similarities in Democratic measures. His rhetorical hyperbole, however, usually obscured more solid arguments that framed his opposition. Like the AAA, Martin’s aversion to the TVA was rooted primarily in sectionalism. He claimed that if the TVA were approved, in all fairness the federal government should appropriate funds to make New England equally attractive to industry. “Would anyone,’’ he asked, “expect me to vote for a measure to put northern money into the development of an industrial empire for the S o ~ t h ? ’ ’ ~ ~

20 Chapter I

One of the most controversial and precedent-setting measures of the ”100 Days” that Martin contested was the NIRA. This legislation guaranteed labor’s right to organize and bargain collectively, created the Na- tional Recovery Administration to supervise the drafting and enforcing of fair competition codes, and under Title I1 established the Public Works Administration to increase employment and business activity by the construction of $3.3billion worth of roads and public buildings. Martin voted to recommit with the recommendation that a 2.5 percent sales tax, with exemptions for food, clothing, and medicine, be substituted for the bill’s excise tax. When that was rejected, he voted against the act and against the conference report. He centered his fire on the public works portion, stating that although a make-work program was needed, one of such magnitude was unnecessary. Not only was it impossible to spend the country into prosperity, he claimed, but these expenditures would “re- tard” business recovery. However, once the measure became law, Martin contended that the time for objections had passed. We must have faith in our national leaders and support this fascinating experiment, he asserted, especially the child labor and wage codes, which would help the textile industry. His advocacy of these provisions, even after the NIRA was found unconstitutional (1935),may have led to confusion in his memoirs, where he asserted he favored the legislation. Although he never ceased chiding public works programs for alleged abuses, his concern for his district was such that he was not averse to taking advantage of such legislation, even successfully appealing personally to Roosevelt to construct new roads in his regi0n.5~ His negative votes and his exaggerated characterizations of the dangers accompanying New Deal reforms led Roosevelt and later historians to emphasize Martin’s opposition.

Martin did vote for the Social Security Act (1935), but the historian William Hasenfus wrote that he did so grudgingly and emphasized his vote to recommit. However, Martin’s position was murky. The recommit proposal included a recommendation to increase from $15 to $20 a month the federal government’s contribution to immediate old-age relief which was to be matched by the state, thus raising the amount received from $30 to $40. In contrast to many Republicans whose recommit vote was obviously an attempt to kill the bill, Martin claimed his motive was to increase the pension. In his 1936 reelection contest Martin, unlike the Re- publican National Committee, proudly defended his vote and proclaimed that he had favored monthly relief payments of $4&twice as much as the Democrats did. (In nearly every election, Martin claimed this vote was used unfairly to paint him as an opponent of social ~ecuri ty . )~~

Martin continued to develop parliamentary skills and enhance his reputation. Meeting daily with Snell and other leaders, he helped plan GOP strategy and often directed opposition from the floor. Increasingly Snell

21 “Drifting Further and Further into Politics”

delegated leadership tasks to him, thereby pleasing most Republicans, who were chagrined by the minority leader’s personal attacks on FDR. Some congressmen, who resented Snell’s reliance on the Old Guard and hoped Martin would replace him as minority leader after the 1936 elec-tions, sought his help in getting assignments to major committees. Martin assumed a major role in contesting “gag rules” which limited debate and prevented the introduction of amendments from the floor. Furthermore, he frequently objected to or had an ally deny “unanimous consent,” thus preventing complex legislation from being taken up out of order.57 Often the New England delegation turned to him as their spokesman on regional issues. Moreover he organized and led the New England Regional Conference of Republican Leaders.58

Despite regional popularity and speculations that the gubernatorial nomination was his if he wanted it, Martin played only a minor role in state politics. He remained focused on the House, where as early as Roosevelt’s first term, he began to aspire to the speakership. In 1935 he was selected vice-chairman of the Congressional Campaign Committee and was of major importance in getting Charles F. Risk, an outspoken anti-New Dealer, to run for Congress from Rhode Island. Martin mapped election strategy and successfully campaigned for Risk in the Ocean State.59 Although his oratorical style was wanting, he began to be in demand as a public speaker throughout Massachusetts. Moreover, he delivered two national radio broadcasts in 1935, which were published and distributed nationally by the Republican National Committee (RNC). Be- fore the entire nation he elaborated on his favorite themes: the cotton processing tax was killing the textile industry and Roosevelt’s tariff program was leading to unemployment and a loss of markets, especially to Japan. Martin was even the featured speaker at a huge Republican gathering in Buffalo, New York, where he described the New Deal as “a cruel series of mistakes,” whose programs, although appearing Santa Claus-like, “cru- cify the poor.” He ended the rally by appealing for Republicans “to build a liberal party pledged to sound

THE ELECTION OF 1936

One of the ways Martin sought to follow this advice was to help Alf Lan- don obtain the presidency. Republicans were reasonably optimistic about their chances in 1936; thus there was no dearth of presidential aspirants, especially on the right: Colonel Frank b o x , publisher of the Chicago Daily Nezus, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (Michigan), and once again Herbert Hoover, who hoped to redeem his reputation by recapturing the White House. On the party’s left was Alf Landon, a former Bull Mooser, who

22 Chapter 1

had entered politics on behalf of Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. During the 1920s he was aligned with progressive forces in Kansas politics, won the governorship in 1932, and in the face of a New Deal landslide was reelected in 1934. His protege, John D. M. Hamilton, with Landon’s assistance was elected to the RNC, chosen state Republican chairman, and opened a national Landon for president headquarters in March 1936.‘j1 About a month later, Martin, who believed Landon the candidate most likely to defeat Roosevelt, threw his support to the Kansan. Although Martin’s decision may have been strictly pragmatic, it further aligned him with the moderate to liberal wing of his party. Backed by Martin, Landon stunned pundits by garnering 83 percent of the write-in vote in Massa- chusetts’s nonbinding presidential primary: 76,710 votes to Hoover’s 7,21P.a victory which demonstrated the governor’s appeal in the industrial East and moved him into the front rank of presidential contenders. Shortly thereafter a bemused Martin received a phone call from Landon asking him to be floor manager at the convention. Having never met the candidate, Martin assumed the request was a joke and before accepting responded, “I guess you made a mistake, this is Franklin D. Roosevelt.1’62

At the convention Martin and Hamilton prepared their strategy and the efficient use of Martin’s eight assistant floor leaders. Their task was eased when Hoover’s efforts to form a stop Landon coalition collapsed.63 The Kansan was nominated on the first ballot. In the early stages of the convention there was a boomlet for Martin for vice president among some Massachusetts, Illinois, and New York delegates. Martin quickly killed such maneuvers by stating they should not be taken seriously. More appropriately with twenty other Republican leaders he was part of a committee to advise the nominee on the selection of Frank b o x as vice- presidential candidate. Divided between Knox and Vandenberg, the committee adjourned at 3 A.M., and then met again a few hours later before settling on Knox.& On leaving Cleveland Republicans optimistically expected to carry Congress as well as win the presidency.‘j5

As had been predicted Martin was appointed eastern campaign manager soon after the convention. He quickly became the subject of several favorable articles in the national press. These emphasized his friendliness and lack of pretense by mentioning how everyone called him “Joe“ and how he loved his mongrel dog Prince, whom the New York Times claimed accompanied Martin for fifteen thousand miles on the campaign. News- men, who predicted he would be the party’s next floor leader, extolled him as a hard-working, old-fashioned politician, who even typed his own speeches, and yet they portrayed him as representative of liberal, younger Republicans.‘j6

Martin established his headquarters in New York’s Liggett Building, where from 8:30A.M. to 12:30A.M. he supervised the eastern campaign,

23 "Drifting Farther and Farther into Politics"

kept a nearly endless schedule of appointments, chaired meetings, and held press conferences twice a day.67 Although at the time of his appointment Martin admitted, "I am not much on speaking,'' he addressed audi- ences in several eastern states, joined Knox for a swing through Con- necticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts, and accompanied Landon on a tour through Maine. In his remarks Martin touched upon his favorite themes: the processing tax, the tariff, Japan, governmental waste, especially in the WPA, and the AAKs plowing under crops and slaughtering pigs. Moreover, he warned of danger to the independence of the Supreme Court if Roosevelt were reelected and able to make appointments.68 His only public testiness was the result of diatribes by Secretary of the Interior Harold A. Ickes, whom Martin labeled "The chief mud slinger of the campaign." The congressman was particularly incensed over Ickes's charge that there was "a community of interest . . . definite connection'' between the Reverend Charles E. Coughlin, the demagogic Catholic radio priest, and the Republican National Committee. Martin, whose newspaper had denounced Coughlin, his Union Party, and its presidential candidate Rep- resentative William Lemke (North Dakota), dismissed the accusation as absurd and ridiculous. The only similarity, he claimed, was they both were against FDR.69

Martin and Landon were eager to prevent further erosion of African- Americans from the Republican Party and even hoped to reclaim those who had bolted to the Democrats in 1932. By 1936 Martin was an acknowledged friend of black Republicans. Not only did he support a federal law to halt lynching, "a relic of ancient days" according to him, but he also responded to an appeal from Georgia delegates when he helped to prevent that state's Republican committee from becoming "lily-white." Moreover, he had promised African-American leaders that Republicans, unlike Democrats, would not require them to barter "their souls and self- respect for the necessities of life.'' To convince young Afro-Americans that the Republican Party was interested in their welfare, the congressman named as director of the Negro division of the eastern campaign Francis E. Rivers, a Phi Beta Kappa graduate of Yale College and Columbia Law School who had served as a lieutenant in France during World War I. Rivers had been responsible for the party platform plank calling for equal opportunity, personal safety, and increased employment for "our colored citizens," a recognition, according to him, of "The New Negro.'' Martin's selection of the New Yorker undercut old-fashioned black and tan leaders on whom the party had frequently relied, men such as Perry Howard, who neither lived nor voted in the state of Mississippi, which he represented on the National Committee.

At New York Republican headquarters Martin introduced Rivers to African-American leaders from the Northeast, West Virginia, Maryland,

24 Chapter 1

and the District of Columbia. The congressman then developed a theme recounted to African-Americans during the campaign: the New Deal had failed them by “consciously and effectively” seeking to make them relief recipients rather than provide employment. Furthermore, the Democratic Party, he charged, had made no effort to integrate Afro-Americans into American life. Martin also met with twenty leading black clergymen and appealed to them to stand by Republicans, stating that unlike Democrats, the GOP did not have a double standard for blacks, one in the South and another in the North. Both parties were anxious to obtain the endorsement of Jessie Owens, the most famous black of the era after his triumph in the 1936Olympics. Robert L.Vann, owner and editor of the largest Ne- gro weekly, the Pittsburgh Courier, Jack Dempsey, the ex-heavyweight champion, and Bill “Bojangled’ Robinson, the entertainer, appealed to the track star to support FDR. However, Martin arranged for his friend the oil magnate Joseph N. Pew to meet Owens, at which time he agreed to pay the Olympic champion to endorse Landon. The speedster then conferred with the Massachusetts congressman, announced his support of Landon, and under Martin‘s tutelage was accompanied by Rivers as he toured thirty eastern cities on Landon’s behalf. He addressed over 30,000 voters, stating that a Republican administration would instill confidence in business and thereby create more jobs for African-Americans,

Hamilton, who was appointed RNC Chair by Landon, tended to rely more on old-line black leaders than did Martin. He appointed Howard as advisor to the RNC and Roscoe Conkling Simmons, a one-time Booker T. Washington prot6g6, to chair the Negro Speakers Bureau. At the conclusion of the campaign young African-Americans praised Rivers for sensing their concerns for civil rights and leading roles in the party, but they censured the RNC for relying on Simmons and Howard, impediments to attracting African-American activists to the GOP. Black suspicions of Hamilton’s policies increased, even as Martin was becoming a champion of their cause.70

Republican fissures widened during the campaign. Landon followed the path of moderation, explaining to Senator William E. Borah (Idaho), “I cannot criticize everything that has been done in the past three years and do it ~incerely.”~~ But Hamilton surrounded himself with conservatives and deferred to Hoover, who believed Landon was only 50 percent Republican and resented the nominee’s failure to defend his administration. At the end of the campaign a disappointed Landon observed, “We have too many stuffed shirts in the Republican organization.” Martin, however, ran well, far ahead of the Republican ticket, carrying the entire district except Fall River and two small towns, thereby fueling speculation that soon he would run statewide. Among those congratulating him were his opponent Arthur Seagrave, counsel of the Home Owners Loan

25 "Drifting Farther and Farther into Politics"

Association, the Democratic Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgen- thau, and his assistant. Martin's assessment of his political career provided an insightful appraisal of this election: "It has been a personal rather than a strictly political following that has kept me in office despite the rising Democratic tide."n

Indicative of the animosity that would haunt the party for the next two decades was the effort to unseat Hamilton by Martin's friend Ham Fish. A disgusted Fish, who considered Hamilton a reactionary, entreated the RNC to oust its chair, charging that his attacks on social security "drove millions of wage earners out of the party." Despite an obsession with anticommunism, Fish, a former Bull Moose progressive, pushed for social and economic reform, even endorsing some of the precedent-setting New Deal proposals and calling on business to provide health, unemployment, life, and retirement insurance for employees. In a national radio broadcast, read into the Congressional Record, he claimed the GOP was "under stupid, antiquated, and reactionary leadership." Moreover, Fish demanded Republicans cease being the party of wealth and reaction, return to the values of Lincoln and Theodore Roosevelt, and become "human- ized and liberalized" by accepting Hamilton's re~ignation.~~

Although untouched by the party discord, Martin was troubled by it. He believed there should be diversity in the GOP, with room for young and old as well as for amateur and seasoned politician^.^^ As a result, despite his differences with Hamilton, he solicited RNC votes on the chairman's behalf. To the Massachusetts congressman there really was no alternative, for although Hamilton had "some defects," little would be gained by change. Furthermore, he had demonstrated "marked ability" during the preconvention and campaign periods. However, Martin contended the office should be reorganized with a strong group of advisors to help make policy. The RNC agreed; it gave the controversial Hamilton a vote of confidence of seventy-four to two. But when several members urged him to consult with party leaders in the future, tension with Mar- tin was exacerbated. Rumors during the campaign that the congressman would succeed Hamilton were followed by reports that to rehabilitate and strengthen the party he would assume an important post in Committee headquarters. These speculations were "blasted" by Hamilt0n.7~

If Martin had assumed such an office, one of the issues he would have had to face was the improvement of Republican prospects in the South. Unlike other Republicans, such as Knox, who had advocated a change of name as a means of attracting conservative southerners, Martin believed such a step would hurt the party in the North while doing little for it in the South. What was needed was a "change of conviction not of name." Furthermore, for such purposes he would never abandon the party's historical commitment to African-Americans. He was convinced change

26 Chapter I

would come: "as poor white and colored people advance economically, they will demand and obtain more political consideration." The one substantial reform which he was willing to entertain was to establish a new national party in the South whose presidential electors would be the same as those of the republican^.^^

FOLLOWING THE MIDDLE ROAD

Notwithstanding an electoral triumph resulting in 76 Democrats in the Senate and 331 in the House, Roosevelt's second term, like that of other twentieth century presidents, was much less successful than the first. Al- though Martin was prominent in presidential reversals, he again espoused some of the administration's measures. One of the most significant was the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which reinforced his reputation as a moderate to liberal Republican. Because the 1937 version calling for a minimum wage and maximum hours included a sectional wage differential, Martin was a most important force in defeating it. As assistant floor leader he had contended that if there were a substantial difference between the cost of living in the South and the North, the disparity should go to southem employees in the form of higher wages, rather than to the manufacturers as increased profits. Moreover, he called for the abolition of child labor and the establishment, not merely of a minimum wage, but of a living wage. His actions were countenanced by the leadership of the AFL and the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), but incongruously criticized by some of the district's textile locals. When the 1938 version, which eliminated the wage differential and included a child labor prohibition, came before the Rules Committee, Martin broke with his Republican colleagues and voted to send the bill to the floor. However, by an eight to six vote (three Republicans and five Democrats under the leadership of his friend Cox) the motion lost: the first notable instance where the so-called conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans op- erated to obstruct a Democratic legislative program. Interestingly enough the "alliance" on this occasion functioned in spite of Martin, who is fre-quently described as a key player in the coalition."

It was impossible to keep such a popular measure bottled up in committee. Martin, who declared, "The greatest contribution we can make to the progress of the Nation is through bringing some of the comforts and happiness of life to the working people," was one of only nine Republi- cans to sign a discharge petition. With heavy Democratic support this step brought the bill to the floor. There it was approved 314 to 97. In 1949,1955, and again in 1961 Martin was part of the majority that amended the act by raising the minimum wage.78

27 “Drifling Farther and Farther into Politics“

Martin was not a leading force in Roosevelt’s major 1937 setback, the presidential effort to reorganize the federal judiciary. This maneuver would have increased the size of the Supreme Court to a maximum of fifteen justices by allowing a president to appoint an additional judge for each justice who declined to resign at age seventy. Congressional Repub- lican strategy was to let Senate Democrats scuttle the proposal, an artifice that shocked and disappointed Hamilton, who wanted vigorous attacks on the bill by Republican legislators. In keeping with the Republican approach Martin’s public denunciations were for the most part after the measure’s defeat by the Senate and during the 1938 elections when he condemned the proposal as another manifestation of FDRs lust for power. If it were necessary to change the composition of the Court, Mar- tin advocated a constitutional amendment.

The Executive Reorganization proposal, a measure designed to promote efficiency and order in the administration, was also seen as part of the president’s efforts to gamer power for himself. This scheme, Martin claimed, would make Congress impotent while enlarging executive branch bureaucracy. Other representatives, too, resenting the growth of presidential power and desiring to embarrass Roosevelt, blocked the bill. When it came up again in 1938, Martin was staying in New York at the side of his dying brother Fred. Ever the dutiful son, Joe reported daily to his mother on Fred’s condition. Mrs. Martin, who had been following the reorganization controversy on the radio and in newspapers, persuaded him to leave Fred’s side and hurry to Washington to rally opposition to the bill and vote against it. In what Joe described as “a victory for constitutional government,” the measure was surprisingly and narrowly defeated in the House, 196 to 204. Like most Republicans Martin was not particularly concerned with the bland version that passed in 1939, al-though he also voted against that bill.79

Among other major administration measures that Martin battled in the Seventy-fifth Congress was the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act establishing the Farm Security Administration and providing for low-interest, long-term loans to farm tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers. Martin confessed to the House, ”I admit this is true [that] I opposed every farm bill brought in by the administration and the fact there is another bill brought in here at this time for the same objective. . . indicates that I was right every time I voted against the previous farm bills.‘”

Not all of Martin’s efforts in that Congress were dissenting: unlike Snell he supported additional appropriations for the CCC and, after recommit- tal failed, a resolution funding relief. He worked unsuccessfully to make lynching a federal crime, to lower postal rates within cities, and to promote economy in government, by reducing appropriations to all departments by 15 percent. As he did throughout his career, he championed

28 Chapter I

freedom of the press, alleging it was endangered by the administration’s proposal to do away with second-class postal rates for small weekly papers. From the floor of the House he once again defended the Hawley- Smoot Tariff and attacked reciprocal trade, which was part of ”the menace to business” that lurks “around every. Corner in Washington” and denounced Japanese imports.s1

Martin struggled not only with Democrats but also with the right of his own party. In January 1937, he was chosen by acclamation to chair the Re- publican Congressional Campaign Committee, the first New Englander to hold this position. To Martin’s surprise, Arthur M. Hyde, Hoover’s secretary of agriculture, conferred with the ex-president and announced in June that the future of the party lay in drafting Hoover to strengthen, revitalize, and make the COP more militant. Furthermore, as there was no hope of leadership from the congressional side, Hyde reported that Hoover advocated a national meeting to promulgate a “fundamental” Republican creed. According to Hyde such a convention might provide an opportunity to draft Hoover for Landonites interpreted Hyde‘s bomb- shell as a Hoover stratagem to seize the titular leadership of the party and position himself for the 1940 presidential nomination. Fuel was added to this fear when Hoover in an article in the September 1937Atlantic Monthly criticized Republicans for trying to outdo the New Deal with its ”Moscow, Berlin, Rome” program of a ”planned economy.” The ex-president, moreover, called for a Republican convention in 1938 to prepare a ”declaration [of]. . . constructive national principles” of free men.83 The proposal was embraced by Hoover’s friends and by thirteen of the sixteen members of the Executive Committee of the RNC, as well as being pushed by Hamil- ton, who claimed authorship in order to allay criticism of Hoover. The ex- president, meanwhile, intensified his party activities by accepting a host of speaking engagements and spending $100,000 on party matters.84

Martin was determined that the 1938 House and Senate campaign remain in the hands of Congress rather than be dictated to by a convention. He conferred with Hamilton and made tentative arrangements for cooperation between the National Committee and the Congressional Cam- paign Committee. Nevertheless, Hamilton continued to promote the ”Hoover plan.” In September after five hours of debate, the Executive Committee of the National Committee, in keeping with Martin’s recommendation, voted to send the proposal to the entire National Committee. This Martin victory provided moderates, liberals, and Landonites with time to bury the Hoover-Hamilton scheme.

While on his way to Hawaii to join a delegation to investigate state- hood, Martin stopped in Topeka to confer with Landon. After a lengthy discussion Martin announced that he expected no change in party leadership and that on his return from Hawaii he would meet with Hoover and


Knox. Upon his return he arranged for Hoover and Landon to meet at the farm of Frank 0.Lowden, former governor of Illinois. No agreement between the two was reached as Hoover insisted that representatives to his proposed midterm gathering be chosen from delegates to the 1932 and 1936 conventions, and Landon maintained that if a midterm convocation be held, it consist of young Republicans, the party’s “new blood,” rather than “ghosts from the boneyard.”85

With the collapse of this summit Landon and Martin now stepped up their opposition to the convention proposal. At Martin’s suggestion Lan- don released a letter to the Bay Stater disapproving the idea. Martin then assumed the leadership in a public campaign against the convention, describing it as “a major political blunder” and “a disaster” which would enable Democrats to escape the defensive and assume the offensive. In so doing they would endanger the Republican opportunity to pick up seventy to eighty House seats.86 Adding to Martin’s distrust for the convention and his conviction that Congress should run its own campaign was his grievance against Hamilton, whom he believed had tried to humiliate him and had minimized his efforts in the 1936 election.87

When it became obvious that the RNC would reject the Hamilton- Hoover move, Martin and Landon planned a study committee as a face- saving device for their opponents. Martin lobbied RNC delegates on behalf of this step and gathered so much support that Hamilton had no choice but surrender. He reluctantly introduced a resolution authored by Martin calling for the drafting of a party platform by a program committee selected by the Executive Committee of the RNC after consulting congressional leaders. The proposal was unanimously adopted, and the former president of the University of Wisconsin, Glenn Frank, a reputed liberal, was appointed chair.88

Comparing the struggle to that between David and Goliath, much of the press praised Martin, whom they credited with a victory for liber- a l ~ . ~ ~Hoover, who was described as “not knowing what hit him,” privately acknowledged Martin’s key role in his defeat but reached out to him in an act of reconciliation. Nevertheless, rancor remained. Martin wrote to one of his constituents that he was not the “right man” to inform the ex-president that Hoover would receive a request to chair the Calvin Coolidge Memorial Fund and to receive an honorary degree from Portia College.9o Furthermore, Bruce Barton, a prominent Republican and congressional friend of Martin, abandoned efforts to have weekly meetings between Charles L. McNary, the Republican Senate leader, Martin, and Hamilton, as the latter two were on the ’’o~ts.’’~’ But once again Martin had added to his reputation as a progressive, moderate-to-liberal Repub- lican, especially in contrast to his leader, Bert Snell, who had backed Hoover during the wrangle.

30 Chapter 1

Martin’s political success had left him unchanged. Typical was his appearance at a Newark dinner, a “G.O.P. big-wig soiree,” where everyone was in formal dress except the press and the featured speaker, Martin, who wore a business suit?* Even his vacations remained unpretentious. About this time he bought a summer home on Cape Cod, where, when Congress was not in session, he would unwind with his mother and widowed sister, Nette. In 1937 he moved out of the Racquet Club to a house on F Street, which he shared with three other representatives, two Republicans and a northern Democrat. The following year he moved to the Hay Adams Hotel facing the White House across Lafayette Park, where he occupied a modest two-room apartment until 1961, when he moved to the Sheraton Park Ho- tel Annex. When at the Racquet Club he became friends with Leo Allen (Illi- nois), whose congressional career Martin furthered. Due to him, Allen was appointed to the Ways and Means Committee and during Martin’s speakership chaired the Rules Committee, as well as being a key member of the Policy Committee. Allen remained loyal to his mentor throughout their years in Congress, supporting Martin for president in 1940 and 1948.

Martin continued to be an outstanding provider of constituent services. He gained so much popularity at home that he had to halt a Martin for governor boom begun by his admirers and encouraged by the press.93 It was fortunate that he remained popular, for in 1938, while chairing the Congressional Campaign Committee and marshaling support to succeed Snell as minority leader, he faced the most serious Democratic challenge of his career. According to Martin, Lawrence Bresnahan, the Massachu- setts WPA director of employment for the preceding eighteen months, entered the race at the urging of Harry Hopkins, the national WPA director, who had promised Bresnahan a new and significant appointment should he be defeated. Several newsmen also asserted the administration handpicked the Democrat to run against Martin.

Frank Manning of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee (CIO) headed Bresnahan’s campaign. Allegedly with White House support, Man- ning created an alliance of New Dealers and workers.94 The local Interna- tional Ladies’ Garment Workers Union as well as labor’s Non-Partisan League, headed by the CIOs JohnL. Lewis, both rated Martin a failing “ D for not supporting organized labor. (The syndicated columnist Raymond Clapper could not understand the organization’s blacklisting of Martin as he was the one Republican in the House who had really worked for the Fair Labor Standards Bill.)95 Local labor groups such as the United Labor Com- mittee of Fall River, the Fall River Central Labor Union, the Fall River In- dustrial Council, the Executive Council of the state AFL, and the Secretary- Treasurer of the state AFL decried Martin’s labor record at rallies, in newspapers, and on the radio. They also criticized William Green, the national AFL president, for endorsing Martin.

31 “Drifting Farther and Farther into Politics”

Grace Howe, widow of Louis McHenry Howe, long-time Roosevelt intimate and White House chief of staff, wrote to the president on behalf of Bresnahan, asking for a “boost” as Martin’s ”little personal favors” for voters overshadowed his ”real record.” Democrats widely publicized portions of Roosevelt’s reply, in which he wrote the only way he could ”put in a personal world for Larry Bresnahan” is to have him come to Washington after the election, win or lose, “so I may congratulate him on his fine record.”96

Bresnahan accused Martin of being responsible for the decline of Fall River and painted him as an obstructionist, a Republican reactionary who was attempting to get more reactionaries elected to Congress. Nev- ertheless, well aware of the affection in which Martin was held, Bresna- han readily admitted “Joe” was “a good fellow” and a personable individual. But more was needed than that in Washington, he stated; it was essential to have the district represented by a supporter of the New Deal and the president.

Martin, unchallenged in the primary, began his campaign early and in response to Bresnahan’s charges moved farther to the left. In ads and rallies he described himself as a nationally recognized ”progressive,” and his own paper often tagged him a “liberal Republican.” In addition to defending his stand against the AAA and the TVA as a means of protecting northern interests, he emphasized his votes for the Norris-La Guardia Act (a 1932 law forbidding injunctions to sustain anti-union employment contracts or to prevent strikes, boycotts, and picketing), wages and hours legislation, and Social Security, as well as reminding voters he championed old-age pension payments higher than those recommended by the administration. Carried away by his own rhetoric, near the end of the campaign Martin exaggerated his commitment to the unemployed when he stated, ”I supported the CWA, the ERA and the WPA.” (Martin voted for appropriations for the CWA-Civil Works Administration-and sometimes for the WPA, but both agencies were created by executive orders, not statutes. The authority for the WPA was in the Emergency Re- lief Act, which Martin voted against.) William Green, President of the AFL, urged its members to vote for Martin as one who was “sympathetic and friendly” toward the Federation’s legislative program. The congressman, moreover, obtained the endorsement of many local unions, denounced labor leaders who opposed him as in ”one way or another con- nected with the WPA,“ and proudly proclaimed, ”I’m a friend of labor.”

Martin exploited the anti-Bresnahan sallies of Mortimer Sullivan, the Progressive Party candidate for Congress. Sullivan dismissed both rivals as conservatives and called for a national liberal coalition with a guaranteed annual wage of $1,500 and a WPA wage of seventy-five cents an hour-but more important he claimed that Bresnahan was a “mattress

32 Chapter 1

voter.” Bresnahan, he charged, was registered to vote in Boston as recently as 1937 and his Medway abode was for political purposes only. In addi-tion to repeating these charges, which he always ascribed to Sullivan, Martin censured Bresnahan for using WPA resources to further his campaign, a charge to which the candidate was vulnerable. The head of the Division of Investigation of the WPA had recommended Bresnahan be fired in 1936 for assigning WPA jobs to political favorites. Martin repeatedly claimed 10,000 new workers were added to the payroll with the expectation they would vote Democratic, that promotions were promised in exchange for votes, and buttons and pledge cards were distributed to workers who addressed circulars, painted billboards, and manned sound trucks. Others, he asserted, were threatened with loss of jobs if they voted for or assisted him. This ”nest of political corruption” was how Martin on a coast-to-coast broadcast described both the local WPA and the national agency, as he demanded a congressional investigation of its political activities. Moreover, he claimed the WPA had relegated workers to “worse serfdom than they have in Russia.”

In what was described as the “fight of his career’‘ observers were reluctant to predict the outcome as the campaign roared to its “sensational finish.” To the surprise of everyone but Martin, he won by a substantial margin. His brother Charlie years later offered an astute observation: “They’ll never lick him. He gets too many Democratic voters. They all like him.”97

As late as 1960 Martin still attacked the WPA‘s involvement in politics, especially in his 1938 campaign. Shortly after his reelection he returned to the capital to gather allies to back his demand for an investigation. Early in 1939 his friend Gene Cox, an embittered Democrat on the Rules Com- mittee who hated FDR, introduced legislation for that purpose. Martin, who took a prominent part in the debate by describing his election tra- vails, was delighted when the resolution passed 351 to 27. The investigation, which focused on Massachusetts and sixteen other states, was not very exhaustive and concluded that there were many past misdeeds, with the worst abuses in Louisiana, but the provisions of the Emergency Relief Act of 1939 had led to an “improvement” of the program.98

ELECTION AS MINORITY LEADER

While Martin was engaged in his reelection bid he was also directing the overall congressional campaign. In January 1938 as chair of the Congres- sional Campaign Committee he began a series of national radio broadcasts from various parts of the country, but rather than attacking the New Deal as such, he called for a GOP Congress as a means of curbing its excesses. As he had for years, he accused Democratic trade policies of con-


tributing to unemployment, claimed the administration was destroying civil service in “a Roman feast of political pie . . . for wealthy henchmen,” and was arousing class hatred. One of his oft-repeated charges was Roose- velt strove to subjugate the legislative as well as the judicial branches of government, thereby endangering the liberties of all. The guarantor of constitutional government, he asserted, was no longer the Supreme Court, as indicated by Roosevelt’s attempt to “pack it,’’ but was the Con- gress. Therefore it was imperative to elect Republicans to preserve liberty. Moreover, the GOP would restore prosperity by reducing taxes, imposing tariffs, and promoting cooperation between labor and industry. As Elec-tion Day approached he also cited FDRs efforts to reshape the Demo- cratic Party by intervening in primaries as an example of “Presidential Purge and Public Liquidation,” evidence of dictatorial ambitions. More- over, he blamed the 1938 recession on the administration and, in a flight of rhetoric, which was inserted into the Coiigresszonal Record, asserted the reason grass was not growing in the streets was because eleven million unemployed were wandering through them in a search for jobs.%

One of Martin’s major problems in running the campaign was a lack of finances, “a great handicap” in his words. The Congressional Com- mittee relied for funds on the National Committee, chaired by Hamil- ton and controlled by banking and industrial interests. Money was not only late in coming into the Congressional Committee but was always less than Hamilton had promised and Martin needed. Consequently with the encouragement of Landon and Knox, the Congressional Com- mittee began to function independently of the National. When Martin toured the East seeking contributions, fragile relations between Martin and Hamilton worsened.100

Hoping to pull together the conservative and liberal wings of the party for the campaign, GOP leaders from thirteen states met at the Indiana farm of Homer Capehart, vice president of the Wurlitzer Company. Twenty thousand attended, 8,500of whom were campaign workers. Chair- ing the gathering were Hamilton, Martin, and Senator John Townsend (Delaware) of the Senatorial Campaign Committee. The event resembled more a carnival or fair than a serious political conclave, and Martin’s speech along liberal lines did little to heal the breach. “Government ex- ists,” he declaimed, “to enable people who are joined together to better advance their spiritual, cultural, and material welfare,” and as a result federal relief is sometimes essential.lo1

Martin must have further antagonized the Hamilton faction by advising state leaders to run young progressives for Congress instead of older reactionaries. He himself was actively engaged in the search for such candidates. The press, describing him as moderate or liberal, praised these efforts to reshape the party and saw them as a step toward replacing Snell.

34 Chapter 1

In an interview with a Boston reporter in which the minority leader was described as "old, tired, and embittered,'' Martin was quoted as follows:

I can see no reason for opposing a measure or a policy just because it is proposed by the other fellow. No political party or any group of men can right-fully claim to be always right. And no political party can, continue to enjoy the confidenceof the country by followingnarrow and limited policies. If the Republican Party is to return to power, it must make a broad, sane, and lib-eral appeal to the people. . . . We can't get anywhere though the mere process of obstruction. Something more positive than criticism is needed.lo2

To achieve satisfactory results with limited funds Martin concentrated on the 100 seats where GOP candidates ran well, but lost in 1936and on the ninety incumbents seeking reelection. Speakers, publications, and money were sent to their districts along with advice and practical tips from the committee. When Martin predicted a gain of eighty seats in the House, resulting in a much more independent Congress, James Farley, chair of the Democratic National Committee, dismissed the prediction "as absurd."1o3 However, as Republicans picked up eighty-one seats Martin's reputation as a prophet was made, and because he was credited with bringing a moribund party back to life, he had climbed another rung on his way to minority leadership. An ecstatic Martin trumpeted that "rubber stamp days are over"; legislation would now be considered on its merits and not be driven through Congress by patronage whips.lo4

Bert Snell, afflicted with increasing hearing problems and despairing of the speakership, had announced his retirement on June 27,1938. Out of a sense of loyalty to his second in command, he probably confided his intention to Martin before the public disclosure, for on the twenty-eighth Martin sent letters to his colleagues soliciting their votes in a bid to succeed the New Yorker. Believing himself the logical successor, Martin expected little serious opposition and hoped by starting early to scare off potential opponents and avoid a contest.lo5 His relative youth and progressivism would appeal to younger members, who in Representative Everett Dirksen's words found him "one of the boys," unlike "prim . . . hard-nosed Snell." Older members would be attracted by his experience as assistant leader and as an organizer of the Buckwheat Republican Club, legislators who met weekly to plan strategy and talk shop. (It received its name because one could march and countermarch over a field of buckwheat whose resiliency would cause it to spring up again.)lo6 Further- more, circumstances dictated the new minority leader should be someone with Martin's easygoing nature. During the Seventy-fourth Congress tempers had reached a heated pitch, with shouts and fist shaking in the midst of debate and with Snell even losing his composure. Little wonder adjournment was marked by huzzahs. Heat and humidity may have con-

35 "DrifffingFarther and Farther into Politics"

tributed to these short fuses, for Congress remained in session during that unusually hot summer of 1937 and as a result voted on air-conditioning the following year.lo7

Martin's most redoubtable opponent, James W, Wadsworth (New York), at the extreme end of the ideological spectrum, has been described by one of his biographers as "the darling of the conservative wing of the Republican Party.'' While serving in the United States Senate he had fought the Eighteenth (Prohibition) and Nineteenth (Woman Suffrage) Amendments and on the basis of state's rights had even disparaged the Fifteenth Amendment (African-American suffrage). More recently in his House service he had condemned efforts to make lynching a federal crime, was one of the founders of the reactionary Liberty League, and pledged, if elected leader, to oppose "without compromise the destruc- tive policies of the New

With the help of Landon, Martin as early as July 11 had over sixty pledges of support, even though he had been unable to reach many vacationing colleagues.109 Veteran congressmen quickly rallied to Martin's side, securing pledges for him. Frank Knox, the vice presidential nominee of 1936, also labored on Martin's behalf, unnecessarily reminding him that the Republican attitude should not be one of general condemnation of everything the New Deal did; some of its programs should be continued in sane, sound, economical ways."O

Many of Martin's colleagues and much of the press viewed the contest as one between the conservative and liberal wings of the party and therefore aligned themselves with Martin. He himself frequently described the encounter in these terms, identifying Wadsworth as "Old Guard" and asserting that the only way to regain control of the House was through liberal leadership. Little wonder young Republicans of New York state were sympathetic to Martin's "liberal" candidacy and that the maverick Usher L. Burdick (North Dakota), whose liberal credentials were un- questioned and who described himself to Martin as the only "dyed in the wool progressive" in the House, asked to second his nomination in the Republican caucus.'11

Among the earliest and most ardent Martin advocates was his friend Ham Fish. In addition to working inside the New York delegation, where Wadsworth's ties to rural values and ideological rigidity under- mined his candidacy, Fish publicly identified Martin with the forces of progressivism. He proclaimed that Martin more than anyone could unite the conservatives and liberals of the party against the radicals of the New Deal while "divorce[ing) the Republican Party from alleged control by reactionary and selfish interests."112 It was he who suggested to Walter White, Executive Secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, that he send a telegram protesting

36 Chapter 2

Wadsworth's candidacy to fifty Republican congressmen from states with a substantial number of Afro-American voters. The wire stated that his election as minority leader would be regarded as a "source of apprehension . . . and affront" by every "Negro" and white opposed to lynching. Charles A. Wolverton (New Jersey) replied to White that he was already committed to Martin, "Whom I understand has always been a friend of your group."l13

Martin formulated a special appeal to newly elected representatives. He began by reminding them that he was congressional campaign chair and had already sent his congratulations on their election. After pointing out he had the backing of 80 percent of his colleagues, he asserted it would be best for the party to avoid a contest. He closed by offering to be of personal service and soliciting suggestions for a party program. In their response several thanked Martin for his assistance in their election and even mentioned that it would be ungrateful not to vote for him."4

By December Martin had pledges from 125 of 180 House Republicans, and as he picked up still others, Wadsworth, heeding the entreaties of his friends, yielded to the inevitable and withdrew. At the Republican caucus on January 2, 1939, Martin was nominated by Allen Treadway (Massa- chusetts) as a fitting leader for "the younger, liberal men who are in step with the times." In what has been described as the final break between the conservative party of Snell and GOP liberals, Martin was chosen by acclamation. To his colleagues and Republicans throughout the nation the new leader announced he would place patriotism above politics and direct a policy of constructive opposition whose primary objective would be to put ten million Americans back to work. During the campaign he had promised "radical change" to enable all members to participate in running the House. It remained to be seen if his moderation, affability, and mastery of congressional procedures would enable him to achieve these goals. 115

NOTES

1. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., as told to Robert J. Donovan, M y First Fifty Years in Poli- tics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975), 30.

2. The data on the Martin family and its early years unless otherwise indicated is from Martin, M y Firsf Fiffy Years; Edward Martin as told to James J. Kenneally,Down Memory Lane (North Easton, Mass.: privately printed, 1980); James J. Ken-neally, Edward E. and Beatrice H . Martin: A n Interpretation (North Easton, Mass.: privately printed, 1987); Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census of Population 1900 (Washington: National Archives Microcopy). For the Irish woman emigrant and her role in the family see Ellen A. Biddle, "The American Catholic Irish Family" in Ethnic Families in America: Patterns and Variations, ed. Charles H. Mindel and Robert W. Habenstern (New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1981), 96, 107-108;


Robert E. Kennedy Jr., The Irish: Emigration, Marriage and Fertility (Berkeley: Uni- versity. of California Press, 1973), 82-84; Carol Groneman, ”Working-Class Immi- grant Women in Mid-Nineteenth Century New York: The Irish Woman’s Experi- ence,” journal of Urban History 4 (May 1978): 255-73. Martin‘s obituary in the (North Attleboro) Evening Chronicle (henceforth Chronicle), 30 December 1969, states she settled in New Jersey with her family as a young girl. However, this is the only indication that she did not come alone, and family lore is inconsistent on the early lives of both parents.

3. Even less is known of Joseph Martin than his wife. His marriage certificate states he was born in Ireland in 1858 the son of William and Ann, the census of 1900 says he was born in 1856 in New York of English parents, his death certificate reports 1860 Union, New Jersey, parents unknown, and family tradition claims he was born near Plainfield, New Jersey, and orphaned early in life. There was an unnamed male born to William and Ann Martin in Elizabeth, N. J., August 31,1860, which is the document closest to verifying any of these assertions.

4. John T. Cunningham, Newark (Newark: New Jersey Historical Society, 1966), states mixed marriages in the diocese were common and dispensations readily granted, as churchmen feared Catholics would marry in a Protestant ceremony, 195-96. Tris Coffin, “A Man of the Good Old Days,” New Republic 16 (February 17, 1947): 28, states Martin Sr. was Presbyterian; however, he was buried from the Universalist Church. Chronicle, 19 May 1937.

5. Michael Kirby and Lawrence Kubilus, North Attleborough: Then and Now (Medway, Mass.: Jostens Printing, 1987), 14. For a history of the town also see Richard L. Sherman, North Attleborough: A n Afectionate History (Attleborough: Bi- centennial Commission, 1976);North Attleborough Board of Trade, The North At- tleborough Book 1697-2923 (North Attleborough: Board of Trade, 1913);Massachu-setts Bureau of Labor Statistics, Census 1905, 3:119. The spelling of Attleborough was officially changed to Attleboro in 1914 when the town became a city. North Attleborough maintained its spelling although commonly, even in semi-official documents, it is spelled “boro.”

6. Joseph W. Martin Jr. wished everyone to call him Joe, which apparently they did except for Calvin Coolidge and his mother. See Martin, First F f ty Years, 39; un-dated clip 1931, scrapbook 9, Joseph W. Martin Papers, Martin Institute Stonehill College, Easton, Mass. (henceforth scrapbooks and henceforth MP for Martin I’a- pers). At a 1958 PTA meeting when asked how he should be addressed, Martin replied, “Just call me Joe.” Chronicle, 9 December 1958.

7. The influence of lrish mothers must have been all-inclusive. James A. Farley, chair of the Democratic National Committee, who would frequently cross swords with Martin in national elections, also claimed that he never drank or smoked due to the influence of his Irish immigrant mother. Notes for Farley Autobiography, dictated February 15, 1938, 5, James A. Farley Papers, Manuscript Division, Li- brary of Congress, Washington, D.C.; A. Lawrence MacKenzie, “JoeMartin-Bay State’s Dark Horse,” Boston Post Feature Section, 17April 1940, 1.

8. James L. Connolly, The Diocese of Fall River (Fall River, Mass.: n.p., 1973), 42. For his statement on the “only church” see Attleboro Sun, March 7,1968; for prayer room see J . George Steward to Joseph W. Martin, May 9,1963, MP. Although Mar- tin, in Current Biography, Who’s Who, and the Congressional Directory, did not list a

38 Chapter I

religious affiliation, the American Catholic Who’s Who, from its first publication in 1934-1935 until his name was dropped after the 1948-1949 issue, identified him as a Catholic. This was probably a reflection of slipshod editing, for from 1936-1937 until 1948-1949 he was identified as an ex-congressman even though he was minority leader and Speaker and did not leave Congress until 1967. He is also identified as Catholic in Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman, eds., Presidential Nominating Politics in 2952 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954), 272. Christian Science Monitor, 23 March 1940, discusses misunderstanding about his religious faith.

9. For ”under God” see Flag Day Speech, June 14,1954; for Christian Church see Speech dedicating Washington Memorial, July 4, 1942; also Rededication of Truro Synagogue, n.d.; Speech on Religion, Faith, and Churches, n.d., 1935; Ad-dress to Dean Club, March 29, 1952, all in MP.

10. North Attleboro Leader, 19 June 1902; the quotation is from the Boston Herald, 21 June 1936. Also see Francis Biddle, In BriefAuthority (Garden City, N. Y.: Dou- bleday, 1962), 273-74; Boston Globe, 14 July 1940. Martin’s teachers found him endearing. Endora Philips to Editor, Chronicle, 30 October 1940.

11. For Martin’s adventures trying to track a murderer see Joseph W. Martin to Clarence Roberts, November 18,1954, MP; for Chronicle see Board of Trade, North Attleboroiigh Book, 4. The quotation is from Richard L. Sherman, Oral History, MP.

12. Column “Twenty-five Years Ago“ in scrapbook 9, MP. 13. In his memoirs Martin states that he cannot remember the issue that led to

the campaign, which took place in 1906, and that he received 535 votes, 25 short of election. However, town records indicate this election was in 1907 and that Mar- tin received 523 votes to the 877 and 688 of the two winners. Furthermore, there is no indication this was a partisan election; see the manuscript in the town office entitled Town Meeting Records 1907,2:258.The important point is Martin ran for office, fared well, further whetted his taste for politics, and, in a town where everyone knew who was who, had courted bipartisan support.

14. Chronicle, 8 August; 11, 26, 27 September; 16 October; 4, 6 November 1911; Attleboro Sun, 27 September 1911.

15. An excellent example of the use of his state record to show him as conservative is in Coffin, “Man of the Good Old Days.” See summary of his House and Senate voting records, MP.

16. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Report of the Street Railway Investigating Commission on the Problems Relating to the Street Railways of the Commonwealth, Febru- ay 2 , 2918, Senate Document #300 (Boston: Wright and Potter, 1918), 56-60,lOO-101.

17. The quotation is from Martin, First Fifty Years, 41; also see Chronicle, 17 Sep-tember 1915 and 7 September 1917.

18. Martin’s campaigns are covered in the Chronicle, July-November, 1912-1916, and flyers in MP. Interestingly enough he avoided any mention of the most contentious issue of 1915, a constitutional amendment on woman suffrage, which after passing two legislative sessions was defeated 162,492 to 295,939.

19. John W. Hawkins, “Has Slim Chance,” Standard, July 14,1918. 20. Hawkins, “Slim Chance.” In 1912 and 1913 he voted against suffrage, voted

for it in 1917 and 1918, and publicly declared for a federal amendment as justified by women’s war work. See Martin to Blanche Ames, September 14,1918, MI?


21. William H. Hasenfus, “Managing Partner: Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican Leader United States House of Representatives, 1939-1959” (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1986), 14-15, relying on Martin’s memoirs in this period, states the congressman retired from politics after the 1917 session to concentrate on business. For the campaign see scrapbook 1, MP; Taunton Daily Gazette, 9 July, 23, 25 Sep-tember 1918; Nero Bedford Standard, 14 July 1918; Leverett D. Bentley Scrapbooks of Boston Globe Clippings on State House Affairs 1911-1938, State Library Boston: July 28, 1918, 1 6 51; Postcard to Voters, and Clarence A. Barnes to Dear Sir, Sep- tember 18,1918, MP.

22. Scrapbook 1,MP; John Weeks to Joseph W. Martin, January 26,1920; List of Officers of League; Congressman Andrew Piatt to Joseph W. Martin, August 21, 1923 and Calvin Coolidge to Joseph W. Martin, August 22,1923, all in MP.

23. Chronicle, 17, 23,30, 31 October; 6 November 1922. 24. Lodge to Martin, n.d. (Probably December 1922) and Channing Cox to

Martin, November 10,1922, both in MI? 25. Taunton Daily Gazette, 24 July 1924. 26. For some reason these nomination papers were never submitted to the sec-

retary of state’s office; they were discovered in the “archives” of the Balfour Com- pany and now are displayed at the Martin Institute.

27. For the primary and general election see scrapbook 1, MI‘; Taunton Daily Gazette, July-September, 1924; Nezo Bedford Standard Times, 23 July 1924; Bentley Scrapbooks, vol. 28; Raymond L. Bridgeman Scrapbooks of Clippings from Various Newspapers 1883-1925, State Library, Boston, Mass., vol. 33; Fall River Evening News and Globe, July-September, 1924; flyers, file 101 MP; and of course the Chronicle.

28. Fall River Evening News and Globe, 29 September 1924.Also Nero Bedford Stan- dard Times, 25 September 1924 and Alonzo Lanson to Martin, September 25,1924, M P.

29. Frank Walcott Hutt, History of Bristol County, Massachusetts (New York Lewis Historical Publishing, 1924), 2:63-301, 302-506; Michael Frost, ”Minority Joe Cracks the Whip,” Ken 4 (April 13,1939): 20.

30. “Speaker of the House,“ Department of State Field Reporter 2 (January-February, 1954): 5.

31. Scrapbook 16, MP; Boston Globe, 27 May 1936. 32. Clem Norton in East Boston Free Press, January 1944, scrapbook 37, MP; Cof-

fin, “Man of the Good Old Days,” 30; Boston Globe, 28 May 1936; William “Fish- bait” Miller as told to Frances Spatz Leighton, Fishbait: The Memoirs ofthe Congres- sional Doorkeeper (New York: Warner Books Edition, 1977), 82; John V. Lindsay, Iourney into Politics: Some Informal Obserwations (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1967), 30.

33. Arthur Watson, “The Number Two Man of the USA,“ New York Sunday News, 17 August 1937.

34. Martin, First Fifty Years, 57. 35. Martin Speech to American Relief Forum, NYT 23 May 1939; Martin, First

Fifty Years, 49-50. 36. Congressional Record, 69 Cong. 2d sess., 1927,68: 3903. 37. Chronicle, 19 November 1928; Martin’s Journal, ”My Travels Abroad,” MP;

Jewelers Circular, October 20, 1927, MI? 38. Hasenfus, “Managing Partner,” 30-31.

40 Chapter 2

39. Coffin, “A Man of the Good Old Days,” 8; Charles E. Hewitt Jr., “Martin- Small Town Big-Towner,“ Scribners Commentator, October 1940, 12; MacKenzie, ”Martin-Bay State’s Dark Horse,” 2.

40. Chronicle, 19 December 1927; Martin, First Fifty Years, 63. In an investigation of the World War I activities of munitions makers and bankers before the Nye Committee (1934), an official of the Electric Boat Company cited a self-serving letter of that firm’s lobbyist to demonstrate that the company had “placed” two congressmen, one of whom was Martin, on the Rules Committee in 1928. Not only was there no evidence to support the braggadocio, but all involved in the assignment, including Martin himself, denied any outside influence and were willing to testify to that effect. Furthermore, the charge resulted in many unsolicited tributes to Martin‘s integrity. See Boston, Providence, and Attleborough newspapers, especially the Boston Globe, 7 September 1934; scrapbook 8, MP; Franklin W. Fort to Martin, September 11; Martin to Fort, September 15 and November 16; Samuel 8. Pettengill to Martin, September 15; Martin to Pettengill, November 11; Allen T. Treadway telegram to Martin, September 7,1934, all in MP.

41. Neil MacNeil, Dirksen: Portrait ofa Public Man (New York: World, 1970), 52. 42. Rabbi J. Freedman, “Congressman Joseph Martin on Israel,” jewish Advocate,

19 July 1962; Emanuel Neumann, In the Arena: An Autobiographical Memoir (New York: Herzl, 1967), 111,114; Martin to Alvin T. Fuller, January 21,1928, and Elihu Stone to Martin, July 30,1936, Elihu Stone Papers, American Jewish Historical So-ciety, Waltham, Mass.; scrapbook 9, MP.

43. Congressional Record, 71 Cong. 1st sess., 1929, 71: 2364, 2458; Martin, First Fifty Years, 52 is rather cynical about this event, however see scrapbook 8, MI?

44. For silver see Wallace D. Kempar to Martin, January 10,1931, MP; scrapbook 9, MP; Congressional Record, 71 Cong. 2d sess., 1930,72: 8206. On oil see scrapbook 9, MP; Republican Caucus, February 26, 1931, MP; Congressional Record, 72 Cong. 1st sess., 1932,75: 6149-51.

45. Scrapbook 10, MP; Congressional Record, 72 Cong. 1st sess., 1932,75: 7233-34, 864445.

46. Hasenfus, “Managing Partner,” 34-35 relying on Robert L. Peabody, “Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives,” American Po-litical Science Review 62 (September 1967): 684, states Martin backed Snell. Peabody’s only source is the New York Times, 1and 8 December, neither of which mention Martin. On the other hand there are clippings from seven different newspapers in scrapbook 10 MP, all of which describe Martin as a Tilson champion.

47. For Snell‘s career see Louis A. Barone, “Republican House Minority Leader Bertrand H. Snell and the Coming of the New Deal, 1931-1939” (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1970), 48; Louis Wood, “The Fighting Lumber- jack-the Statesman’s Corner-Presenting Bertrand H. Snell,” Today 1(February24, 1934): 9; Arthur M. MacMahon, “First Session of the Seventieth Congress December 5,1927 to May 29,1928,”American Political Science Review 22 (August 1928): 650-83; “Four Head-Liners in Congress,” Literary Digest 121 (January 11,1936): 36-37. For Martin and Snell see Martin to Harry L. Englebright, November 30,1934; Martin to Snell, November 8 and Snell to Martin, June 23 and November 17,1934, MP.

48. Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Coming of the Nezu Deal (Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 3.


49. Speech March 1934, scrapbook 12, MP; Lincoln Day Speech, February 13, 1934, MP.

50. Undated clip, 1933, box 86 MP. 51. Martin, First Fifty Years, 78. 52. Congressional Record, 73 Cong. 1st sess., 1933, 77: 669, 1495, 1680; 2d sess.,

1934, 78: 4189-91; 74 Cong. 1st sess., 1935, 70: 2632, 2660-62, 6236-37, 9455-56; speech files 1933-1934, MP; scrapbooks 4, 10, 14, MP; Cassidy is quoted in clippings February (?) and 12 June 1935, scrapbook 14, MP; Henry A. Wallace to Mar- tin, August 4, 1934, MP. For hundreds of constituent letters protesting the processing tax see MP.

53. Congressional Record, 74 Cong., 2d sess., 1936,80: 2362-63; E. Pendleton Her- ring, “Second Session of the Seventy-third Congress, January 3, 1934 to June 18, 1938,“ American Political Science Reuiezu 28 (October 1934): 864.

54. Schlesinger, Coming of the New Deal, 326; Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985), 385; Hasenfus, “Managing Partner,” 36; Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Rooseuelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), 313, and Franklin D. Rooseuelt: A Kendezuous with Destiny (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 103; William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Rooseuelt and the NezuDeal 1932-1940 (New York: Harper & Row, 7963), 55; George Wolfskill and John A. Hudson, All But the People: Franklin D. Rooseuelt and His Critics 7933-1939 (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 210; Congressionnl Record, 73 Cong. 1st sess., 1933, 77: 21787-90; Martin, First Fifty Years, 76.

55. Congressional Record, 73 Cong. 2d sess., 1934,78: 8616-22, 8651-52 and 1st sess., 1933, 77: 490, 4369, 4372-73; speech August 1933, MP; scrapbook 12, MP; Boston Globe, 20 May 1936. By 1935 Martin was criticizing the codes for their inef- fectiveness, clip 25 February 1935, scrapbook 14, MP.

56. All House Republicans, save one, voted to recommit, however, on final passage 77 voted for, only 13 against, Corrgressionul Record, 74 Cong. 1st sess., 1935,79: 6068-69. For a survey of Martin’s New Deal votes see Hasenfus, “Managing Part- ner,” 35-38,497-98; for Martin’s emphasis on his support of $40 old age pensions see Chronicle, 3 September 1935 and political advertisements throughout that paper in September and October 1936. His claim on the use of the vote in campaigns was made July 13, 1955 in President Eisenhower’s Meetings with Legislative Leaders, 1953-1961 (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1986), henceforth Legislative Leaders.

57. Clips, 1933 scrapbook 4, MP; Congressional Record, 73 Cong. 1st sess., 1933, 77: 2694, 2695 and 74 Cong. 1st sess., 1935, 79: 4533-34; Martin, First Fifty Years, 68-71; Cary Smith Henderson, “Congressman John ‘Taber of Auburn: Politics and Federal Appropriations, 1923-1962“ (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1964), 32.

58. Clips, 29-30 April; 1May 1,1935, scrapbook 14, MP. Also see speech of Rep. Francis B. Condon (R.I.), July 13,1934, scrapbook 16, MP; Lloyd Thurston to Mar-tin, November 9, 1936, MP.

59. Clips, 1935, scrapbook 16, MP. 60. 1935 speeches, MP; Bzflalo Times and Bufalo Evening News, 13 September

1935. 61. For Hamilton see Donald R. McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: University

of Nebraska, 1966), 38-43.

42 Chnpter 1

62. Martin, First Fifty Years, 149, writes he was asked by Hamilton. Contemporary press accounts report the conversation with Landon. June clips, scrapbook 9, MI?

63. McCoy, Landon, 255. 64.Martin, First Fifty Years, 150; John D. M. Hamilton, “Notes on the Republi-

can Convention and Campaign of 1936,” 11,21-22; Hamilton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington.

65. Frank P. Litschert, “An Elephant Looks at Congress,” National Republic 24 (September 1936): 6-7.

66. NYT, 28 June 1938; New York Evening Journal, 27 July 1938; Christian Science Monitor, June 1936 and other clips in scrapbook 17, MP.

67. New Bedford Standard Times, August 1938; scrapbook 16, MP. 68. Scrapbooks 18,23; speech October 21,1936, MP; campaign speeches, MP. 69. Chronicle, 15 July 1936; clips 29 August, 8 October 1936, vol. 18, and 28 Au-

gust, vol. 17, scrapbooks, MP; NYT, 5,8,9,10, October 1938. 70. James J. Kenneally, “Black Republicans During the New Deal: The Role of

Joseph W. Martin Jr.,” Review of Politics 54 (winter 1993):120-25. 71. Landon to Borah, August 3,1936, quoted in Harry Wesley Morris, “The Re-

publicans in a Minority Role, 1933-1938” (Ph.D. diss., University of Iowa, 1960)) 184.

72. Martin, First Ff ty Years, 55; Chronicle, 28, 31 October 1936; SpringFeld Repub- lican, 9 December 1936; C. B. Upham to Martin, November 10, 1936, Martin to Henry A. Morgenthau, November 29,1936, Seagrave to Joe, November 4, and Joe to Arthur, November 7,1936 all in MI?

73. Congressional Record, 75 Cong. 1st sess. 1937, 81, appendix: 2126-27 and 331-33 for a reprint of his Liberty Magazine article; Meeting December 17,1936, Re-publican Party Papers: Part I Meetings of the Republican National Committee 1911-1980 (henceforth RNC Papers) (Frederick, Md.: Microfilm Project of Univer- sity Publications of America, 1986); Morris, ”Republicans in Minority,” 216; William E. Leuchtenburg, ”The Election of 1936,” in History of American Presiden- tial Elections 2789-2968, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger,J . (New York: Chelsea House, 1971), 3: 2821. For Fish’s life see Richard Ray Hanks, ”Hamilton Fish and Ameri- can Isolationism, 1920-1944” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Riverside, 1971). For split in the party also see Henry 0.Evjen, “The Republican Strategy in the Presidential Campaign of 1936 and 1940” (Ph.D. diss., Western Reserve, 1950), 72-73; Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover. Forgoften Progressive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 218-20; Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 6044,614-16,619,636.

74. Martin to Charles F. Sprague, November 30,1936, MP. 75. 0.E. Weller to Martin, December 10, 14, and 15, Martin to Weller, Decem-

ber 12,26,1936, MP; Chronicle, 13 November; 5,6 December 1936;Associated Press Report (henceforth AP), 12 November, scrapbook 14 and scrapbook 23, MP.

76. Martin to Theodore Whitney Jr., November 28,1936, MP; interview with New York Sun, 23 January 1937. Also see Morris, ”Republican Minority,” 219; Norton McGriffin, ”Gloomy Old Party” North American Reviezo 239 (March 1935): 250-56.

77. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York David McKay, 1963), 283; John F. Manley, “Conservative Coalition in Congress,” American Behaviord Scientist 17 (November-December 1973): 231; JamesT.Patter-


son, “A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress, 1933-1939,” journal of Ameri-can History 55 (March 1966): 758.

78. Congressional Record, 75 Cong. 1st sess., 1937,82: 1602; clips, 3,12 August; 29 November; 15,19 December 1937 vol. 25 and June 1938 vol. 26, scrapbooks, MP; undated speech 1937, MP; Lewis J. Lapham, Party Leadership and the House Com- mittee on Rules (New York: Garland, 1988), 92-93. From 1936 to 1956 of 198 dis-charge petitions filed only 20 were successful and only this one became law. J. W. Anderson, Eisenhower, Brownell and the Congress: The Tangled Origins of the Civil Rights Bill of 1956-1957 (Kingsport, Tenn.: Kingsport Press, 1964), 62.

79. Scrapbook 25, MI’; Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane, 7 and Notes March 9, 1948, MP: Congressional Record, 75 Cong. 3d sess., 1937, 83: 1485, 1489; Milton Plesur, ”The Republican Congressional Comeback of 1938,” Review of Politics 24 (October 1962): 539-40. For the reorganization struggle see Richard Polenberg, Re-organizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy over Executive Reorganization 1936-1939 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966); Joseph Boskin, “Politics of an Opposition Party: The Republican Party in the New Deal Period 1936-1940” (Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1959), 197; “Revolt, Defeat on Reorganization,” Nenazueek, April 18,1938,13-14.

80. Congressional Record, 75 Cong. 3d sess., 1938, 83: 1649. 81. Congressional Record, 75 Cong. 1st sess., 1937, 81: 5621-22; 3d sess., 1938,83:

4698-99 and annex 319-21,3354-55; speech April 12,1938, MI? 82. NYT, 27 June 1937. 83. Herbert Hoover, “The Crisis and the Political Parties,” Atlantic Monthly 160

(September 1937): 257-68. 84. Scrapbook 25, MP; McCoy, Landon, 332. 85. Buffnlo Evening News, 12 October 1937; Karl A. Lamb, ”Republican Strategy

and the Congressional Elections of 1938”(Ph.D. diss., Oxford University, 1957), 83. 86. Executive Committee Meeting, September 23,1937, RNC Papers; Landon to

Martin, October 25,1937, Landon Papers, Kansas State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas; clips, 23 September; 13,19 October; 3 November 1937 scrapbook 25, MI?

87. Draft of Albert T. Reid to Editor New York Herald Tribune (henceforth NYHT), 29 April 1942. The letter was never sent but was reviewed and approved by Mar- tin, MP.

88. Hoover to Spangler, November 2,1937, Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Li-brary, West Brach, Iowa; clips 3,5 November 1937, scrapbook 25, MP; RNC Meet- ing, November 5, 1937, RNC Papers; Evjen, “Republican Strategy,” 203-12. The committee accomplished little due to inadequate financing and didn’t report until 1940. See Ronald Bridges, “The Republican Program Committee,” Picblic Opin- ion Quarterly 3 (April 1939): 299-305.

89. The best examples are James Wright‘s column for the North American Newspaper Alliance November 5 and Ray Tucker’s syndicated column “The Na- tional Whirligig,” November 13, 1937, scrapbook 25, MP.

90. Claudius Huston, Memo to Hoover, December 6, 1938, Hoover Papers; Anna Tillinghast to Martin, November 23, 1938, and Martin to Tillinghast, No- vember 25,1938, MP.

91. Barton to Robert A. Taft, May 1,1947, Robert Taft Papers, Manuscript Divi- sion, Library of Congress, Washington.

44 Chapter 1

92. Newark Ledger, 13 April 1938. 93. Scrapbook 25, MP. 94. T.R.B., “Washington Notes,” Nezo Republic, November 9, 1938,16. 95. Column August 26, 1936 scrapbook 26, MP. Unless otherwise indicated

this account is based on clippings in scrapbook 26, Martin‘s 1938speeches, and the Fall River News and the Chronicle, July-November 1938.

96. Howe to FDR, n.d., FDR. to Howe, October 22,1938, PPF-22095, Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. It appears Roosevelt never knew Bresnahan; furthermore he ignored a request for a ”last minute word on Bresnahan.” Joseph F. Titte to FDR, November 8, 1938, OF 300, Massachusetts, Roosevelt Papers. However, it is possible the president’s son, James, was acquainted with him, for James forwarded a job request on his behalf to Hopkins in 1935, congratulated him on his 1938 primary victory, and in 1940 was listed as a reference on Bresnahan’s WPA application. See Roosevelt to Hopkins, June 7, 1935, box 82, Roosevelt to Larry, September 6,1938, box 7, James Roosevelt Papers, Roosevelt Library, and U.S. Congress, Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 76 Cong. 1stsess. under House Resolution 130, Investigation and Study of Works Progress Administration (Washington: GPO, 1940), 4 840.

97. “Mr. Speaker,” Time, November 18,1946, 25. 98. NYT, 12 November 1938; Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess., 1939,84:

3368-75. There may have been a basis to Martin‘s charges. Although there was no evidence of WPA political corruption in 1938 in Martin’s district, the 1936 investi-gation of Bresnahan was rehashed with the implication that only a cover-up allowed him to retain his position. After his defeat for Congress he was hired as a WPA labor consultant in Washington and in January 1940 promoted to chief regional supervisor district 1, Boston. See Hearings, Investigation, 3:14-15,4: 814-40 and United States House of Representatives, Committee on Appropriations, 76 Cong. 3d sess., investigation of Works Progress Administration (Washington: GPO, 1940, report 2187).

99. Congressional Record, 75 Cong. 3d sess., 1938, 83: A319-321; speech files 1938, MP; Joseph W. Martin, Jr., ”Wanted: Republican Congressmen,” Young Re- publican, April 1939, 3-14.

100. C. B. Godspeed (Treasurer RNC) to Martin, May 31,1938, Hoover Papers; Landon to Martin, January 12, June 21, July 11, August 1,September 14,1938, Lan-don Papers; Martin to James W. Mott, July 19,1938, MP; McCoy, Landon, 398.

101. The speech is in the lndianapolis News, 27 August 1938. Also see NYT, 27, 28 August 1938 and Plesur, “Republican Comeback,” 542, for a notable analysis of this election.

102. Interview with Robert L. Norton, Boston Post, June or July 1938, scrapbook, 26, MP; also see Nezo York Post, 28 June; 15 December 1938; New York World Telegram, 28 June; 5 December 1938, NYHT, 28 November; 3 December 1938.

103. ”The Congress: Elephant Boy“ Time, April 11,1938,13-14; Address CBS radio November 5, 1938, MP; Telegram Martin to Ernest Lindsey Newsweek colum-nist, n.d., MP; Farley Press Release, 7 November 1938, Farley Papers.

104. NYT, 10 November 1938. James Farley believed one of the major reasons for the Republican revival was dissatisfaction with the WPA, a sentiment Martin


had capitalized on in both his reelection bid and in the Congressional campaign. Farley Diary, December 28,1938 and Memo, January 10,1939, Farley Papers.

105. Martin to Leo Allen, July 2 and to Francis Case, July 12,1938, MI? 106. MacNeil, Dirksen, 51; Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Dirksen of

Illinois: Senatorial Statesman (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 25; Alden Hatch, The Wadsroorths of the Genesee (New York: Coward-McCann, 1959), 245.

107. Floyd M. Riddick, ”Leadership in the House,” South Atlantic Quarterly 36 (January 1937): 3, 5; David Brinkley, Washington Goes to War (New York Knopf, 1988), 193-94.

108. Hatch, The Wadsworths, 211-12,243; NYHT, 8 December 1938. 109. Martin to August H. Anderson, July 11, 1938, MP; telegram to Landon,

June 28 and Landon to Martin, July 1,1938, Landon Papers. 110. Form letter to these supporters and replies, MP. 111. For support of Martin based on his liberalism see correspondence with fol-

lowing congressmen in MP, Kean (New Jersey), Carter and Englebright (Califor- nia), Brewster (Maine), and Culkin (New York). For sympathetic press accounts viewing Martin as liberal see Buflalo Evening News, n.d.; Boston Post, n.d.; Boston Herald, 29 November; Boston Globe, 25 March; Washington Daily News, 28 June; Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen syndicated column ”Washington-Merry-Go- Round,” WP, 31 December 1938 (henceforth, Pearson, column); Indianapolis Star, 24 November 1938; Kenneth Crawford column New York Post, 5 December 1938, all in scrapbook 87. Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1960), 31-32.

112. NYT, 28 November 1938. 113. White to Hamilton, November 28; Fish to White, December 4; White to

Martin, December 5 and 12; White to Fish, January 3; Wolverton to White, De- cember 6, 1938, all in MP. Martin had met with White for the first time a year earlier and agreed to persuade as many Republicans as possible to sign a discharge petition and to support anti-lynching legislation once it got to the floor. Further- more, by 1938 they corresponded on a first-name basis and met from time to time in Martin’s Washington office. Kenneally, “Black Republicans,” 126-27.

114. Undated form letter to newly elected and replies from ‘Thomas E. Martin, John C. Kunkel, Charles Hawks, and John Z. Anderson, all in MP.

115. NYT, 3 January 1938; Donald H. McLean (New Jersey) to Martin July 1and Martin to McLean, July 2, 1938, MP; Martin L. Fansuld, James W. Wadsworth, jr., The Gentleinan fvoin New York (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975), 295-96.

2

”At the Eye of the Hurricane’% 1939-1942

CHALLENGING THE NEW DEAL

Sure that this was the first step toward the party’s revival, Republicans throughout the country celebrated the 1939 election of Martin as mi-

nority leader. For many of them he symbolized new directions for the GOP, abandonment of obstructionism, and a return to a tradition of cooperation.2 The new congressional leader was well liked and admired on both sides of the aisle. He had already demonstrated to Republican colleagues that he believed in open consultation and consensus building, rather than imperious leadership. He described the process: “We [Repub- licans] get together and we work things out and then we all go a10ng.”~ An unusual manifestation of the affection in which both parties held him occurred in July when Martin went to the well for one of his rare speeches. As he stood there blushing, the minority leader received a two-minute standing ovation from the entire body.4

One of the reasons Democrats respected Martin was that he had curbed the wildly partisan speeches and attacks that were a hallmark of the Snell years. Not only was this in keeping with Martin’s moderation but it was also essential if he were to solicit support from conservative Democrats. The point of contact between Martin and Southern Democrats was his friend Gene Cox, a lawyer and states rights advocate, who dominated the Rules Committee. They became such political allies that at the close of the 1939 session Cox privately referred to his ”service with” and ”devotion to” Martin, while the latter promised to help the Georgian in his reelection if neces~ary.~ The two often conferred, occasionally soliciting votes

47

48 Chapter 2

from one another’s forces. With other Southern and Republican leaders they encouraged Democrats to join the New Deal opposition and to participate in floor fights under Republican auspices if denied that opportunity by their own party. The result was a shifting group, generously described by some as a coalition of from 40 to 110 Democrats who would join Republicans on crucial roll calls: not because of conferences and quid pro quos, but because of a shared ideology. Never formally organized or meticulously planned, the combination was effective and praised by House Republicans for restoring representative government and checking the New Deal.6

But the cooperation between Martin and the majority leader (soon to be Speaker) Sam Raybum was even closer. Commenting on Martin’s election Rayburn observed, ”I think Joe is a fine fellow, and he and I can work together all right. He’s got a lot of common sense and he’s a patriotic man.”’ Thus began twenty years of collaboration and trust between the two, ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the House. Martin attended strategy meetings with other Democratic and Republican leaders in Ray- bum’s office to keep abreast of the schedule, to search for common ground and avoid needless floor debate, to allot time for necessary debate, and to help with patronage problems in minor staff positions. Typi- cal of the relationship was Martin’s warning to Rayburn not to bring up a housing bill because it would be defeated and Rayburn’s response to Mar- tin’s floor comment about orderly debate. “I may say to the distinguished minority leader that it is my purpose us he knows [italics author’s]-and he and I should always take the House into our confidence. . . that the time for debate be controlled equally.” On another occasion in 1940 Martin pointed out from the floor that FDRs request for military appropriations meant either lifting the statutory debt limit or levying new taxes and then asked which the Democrats planned to do. Rayburn replied that “the gentleman from Massachusetts was kind enough to let me know he was go-ing to make a statement at this time.”8

What began as a professional relationship developed into a warm friendship based on mutual trust and shared interests. Neither of them played cards, liked dining out, or was an impressive speaker. They both were baseball fans, slightly shy, devoted to their mothers, and married to politics. Representative Omar Burleson (Democrat, Texas) noted that he did not know of two men who had a closer relationship; one didn’t go to the bathroom without the other knowing it. Little wonder that when Ray- burn was asked to go to Massachusetts and campaign against Martin, he snapped, “Hell, if I lived up there, I’d vote for him.” In 1939 when King George VI and Queen Elizabeth visited the United States, Martin was a member of the welcoming committee that greeted them at the Capitol. In order to save his friend Rayburn from embarrassment because he did not

49 "At the Eye of the Hurricane"

have a topper, Martin appeared in morning coat, striped trousers and a derby. The others, including Rayburn, who had managed to obtain a silk topper, were dressed according to protocol. Martin was hooted by the crowd outside the Capitol, but his photograph, which appeared throughout the country, resulted in letters praising this man of the people who refused to yield to useless ~eremony.~

Martin's minority leadership, as well as his friendship with Democrats, contrasted dramatically with Snell's approach. Shortly after assuming office Martin enlarged the Steering Committee from six to seventeen in order to provide for the party's different talents and more accurately reflect its geographical balance. To encourage freshmen to express and share their views the leader chaired weekly "skull drills" and get acquainted sessions. Furthermore, he revived the GOP caucus in order to discuss legislation and encourage opposition to Democratic initiatives. But his leadership remained low key: he dealt directly and informally with his colleagues, relied on the Committee on Committees to select members for the important Rules Committee, and did not pressure Republicans to vote against their convictions. As a matter of fact, it is reported he never told them how to vote on a bill. If the vote on a major measure appeared to be close, he would try to persuade recalcitrants to follow party policy but on the other hand would remind them to vote their district-"We realize that you are answerable to your constituents."1° According to Martin his style of leadership was both popular and effective. "The boys like it. It gives them a feeling of power and responsibility.""

Nevertheless several observers believed Martin was the strongest leader in years. There is little doubt that as a former whip himself he brought new discipline to Republican ranks through the institution of an elaborate "whip" organization which provided Martin with an accurate count of voting strength and a means of rapidly getting his forces to the floor for votes.12 In the first session of the Seventy-sixth Congress the sharpest division on a major piece of legislation was when 8 Republicans failed to join with the other 137 in defeating the Housing Bill. After only two months a dismayed JohnMcCormack (Massachusetts), the Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus, alarmed by Martin's well-disciplined minority, which frequently outnumbered his forces on the House floor, read the "riot act" to his party. McCormack castigated them for their absence from roll calls and for "voting with the republican^."'^

To Martin the road to recovery was by curbing spending, providing tax relief, and checking governmental "excesses"-a policy which meant halting New Deal reforms.I4 The first successful revolt against domestic spending occurred when 119 Republicans and conservative Democrats slashed $150 million from the administration's request for a WPA deficiency appropriation of $875 million, a request triggered by

50 Chapter 2

the 1938 recession. A few months later, Congress limited employment on WPA projects to six months and abolished one of the favorite targets of conservatives, the WPA Federal Theatre Project.I5

One of the measures of which Martin was very proud was the Hatch Act for which Republicans voted 157 to 0. Opposed by the administration, but driven by WPA political abuses, it prohibited political activity by federal employees and was hailed by a jubilant Martin as the “most progressive political reform in a decade.’’ When eighty-two Democrats joined with the GOP to enact it, the Rules Committee Chair, Adolph Sabath, was prompted to comment that Martin was ”leading” the whole House.16

The minority leader also played a major role in one of the most significant House victories over Roosevelt-the rejection of the so-called Lend to Spend bill, a way to finance self-liquidating projects. Roosevelt’s pressure for $4 billion to finance this program as a means of fighting the 1938 recession was interpreted by Martin as getting around congressional refusal to lift the debt limitation. According to Martin the defeat of the initiative (167Republicans voted no) and the enactment of Hatch restrictions were among the most important accomplishments of the Seventy-sixth Congress.” But he was also pleased when the House, with nearly 100 per-cent Republican support, sliced $17 million from TVA funding and killed a housing bill as adjournment neared.

The administration was further rocked when the Lower Chamber voted 241 (157 Republicans) to 134 to continue the Dies Committee. Established in 1938 to investigate un-American propaganda in the United States, the committee was due to expire with the Seventy-fifth Congress. In an un-usual move, Martin took the floor to argue for appropriations to continue Dies’s work-exposing those forces trying to destroy America at home. In several speeches he conceded that the committee may have exceeded its jurisdiction and admitted that he did not agree with all that it did. How- ever, he asserted, it represents the will of the people, had exposed subversives such as Harry Bridges, the West Coast labor leader, and others who were able to obtain “important berths“ in our govemment.I8

The nearest approach to a Republican agenda was Martin’s “Twelve Point Program” of April 24,1939, an appeal to Congress to commit to a dozen specific steps designed to promote economic recovery and prosperity. Although widely circulated by the National Committee, the document was seen as a ”slap” at RNC chairman Hamilton and denigrated as a ”private act of faith.” Martin justified promulgating this agenda by claiming that since the administration was torn by conflict it was incumbent upon Congress to provide national leadership. As a result all members of Congress should unite to keep the United States out of war, curb unnecessary spending, reduce taxes, eliminate the ”paralyzing discord” in the NLRB, reject experimental legislation, and restore American markets.19

51 "At the €ye offlie Hurricane"

Though much of his program was not enacted, Martin believed the session, which recessed August 5, 1939, was a success. He wrote to ranking GOP members of each committee, asking for a list of achievements, such as dangerous legislation headed off and spending bills stopped or reduced. Responses added to his conviction that Republi- cans had ended the era of "rank and reckless experimentation," saved the nation from socialism, and had launched true business recovery. Among the specific accomplishments he hailed were the Hatch Act, reform of the WPA, tax revision, strengthening of deportation laws, and improvements to Social SecurityG20

As early as February 1939 and continuing throughout the year, Martin received accolades for his leadership.21 He was most proud of his selection by the Washington Press Corps as the ablest congressman in the House and Senate. On integrity, intelligence, influence and industry, he outpolled all other

NONPARTISAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Martin's interest in domestic issues was soon overshadowed by the dete- riorating world situation. Roosevelt called a special session of Congress in September 1939 to revise neutrality legislation when England and France declared war on Germany after the Nazi attack on Poland. The president hoped legislators would repeal arms embargo provisions and apply a "cash and carry" policy to munitions as well as other war materiel. This would enable belligerents to pay cash for goods and ship them in their own vessels-a boon to the allies because of British naval supremacy.

On the eve of the new session, Roosevelt met with legislative leaders of both parties as well as the GOP national nominees of 1936, Landon and Knox. In a conference marked by occasional clashes FDR, who feared Martin would play politics, not only failed to get bipartisan endorsement of his requests but according to Martin was thwarted by him in attempting to get a press release implying there was a common policy. As result the purpose was then defined as a discussion on the repeal of the embargo, a return to international law, and keeping the nation neutral and at peace.23

Roosevelt did not know Martin as well as he thought. The congressman's opposition was ideological not political, and in keeping with long held views. As early as 1929 Martin maintained one must always think in terms of peace, for modern war was unthinkable and would destroy civilization as we know it.24 One way of preserving peace was to have a strong navy; another way, Martin insisted, was to avoid being dragged into war by the "unneutral" acts of supplying ammunition and

52 Chapter 2

armaments to belligerents. In 1928, despite opposition from the War and Navy Departments, he was outspoken in his support for a resolution calling for an arms embargo on warring nations. Not only would this policy keep the United States at peace and prevent arms profiteer- ing, but it might possibly restrain others from war.25

Although that measure was never enacted, Martin remained optimistic and trusted that the Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy would initiate an era of world peace.26 This optimism was short-lived. Despite conflicts in Latin America and Asia no final action was taken on the 1933 Hoover administration request for neutrality legislation. The new President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, asked for discretionary powers to apply an arms embargo against those whom he designated as aggressors. Martin argued against this grant of presidential power, asserting that unlike a nondiscriminatory embargo it could lead to foreign entanglements and war, while providing profits for arms manufacturers. He was one of 109 congressmen who voted against a discretionary embargo; 254 were for it.*’

The measure, however, died in the Senate. But national interest in embargo legislation was renewed when hearings of the Senate Munitions Investigation (Nye) Committee and revisionist historians convinced many Americans that the United States was dragged into World War I by unscrupulous, profit-hungry munitions makers. Moreover, in 1935 Hitler repudiated the Versailles Treaty, the League of Nations floun- dered, and Mussolini openly prepared for an invasion of Ethiopia. Mar- tin was determined to use his influence to keep the United States away from the Ethiopian conflict, which he feared could develop into a major European war. He even criticized the idea of a “moral embargo” selec- tively applied against Italy. Involvement in a European war, he believed, would add to American economic woes and increase unemployment. As Martin wrote in his scrapbook, “War & depression unseparable twins- one always follows the other.”**

As expected, several neutrality proposals were introduced in the 1935 session with the administration again lobbying for a presidential discretionary embargo on ammunition and instruments of war. Along with many others, Martin continued to assail discretionary power, asserting that “Instead of a move for peace [as the administration claimed], it would be a possible breeder of war.” Legislation was passed providing for a nondiscriminatory embargo of implements of war following immediately upon a presidential recognition of a state of war.29 To Martin’s satisfaction these provisions were extended in 1936.

The following year, after passing special legislation embargoing arms for both sides in the Spanish Civil War, the Congress once more turned to permanent neutrality legislation. Again several widely varying proposals

"At the Eye oftlie Hurricane" 53

were introduced. The administration urged as broad a discretionary power as possible and encouraged enactment of cash and carry provisions. The minority report of the Foreign Affairs Committee, signed by Martin and his friends Fish, Edith Nourse Rogers, and Leo Allen among others, asserted that delegating power to the president to implement a discretionary embargo was "unwarranted," detracted from the war-making authority of the Congress, and was liable to involve the United States in a war to defend profiteers. The proper policy, they insisted, should be a complete embargo on all contraband goods. The compromise between House and Senate versions was considerably more restrictive than Roo- sevelt and many representatives wished. Its major provisions, carefully crafted to avoid a repeat of the World War I experience, required a non- discretionary embargo on implements of war, prohibited loans and credits to belligerents, banned Americans from traveling on belligerent vessels, and proscribed the arming of American merchant ships. Moreover, it authorized nonarmament exports only on a cash and carry basis.30

Despite these provisions Martin still feared that the United States might be drawn into war, especially after Japan attacked China in 3937. Refer-ring to a proposal requiring a national referendum before Congress could declare war, Martin commented that he knew of nothing that would ever compel him to vote for war. However, during the short-lived bellicosity following the Japanese sinking of the American gunboat Pmuy, he was willing to resort to an "economic boycott,'' but was cautious about pro- voking Japan. As a result he opposed the dredging of the harbor at Guam, a first step toward fortifying that island.31 During a lengthy house debate Martin criticized that as an unwise waste of public money, especially as Guam could not be held in case of war, and as needlessly enflaming tensions with Japan. "Our people don't want to get too close to where the bricks are flying." Despite extensive administration efforts, the appropriation, due primarily to Martin's opposition, was defeated 168 to 205.32

As the West drew closer to war Martin continued to hope for peace. One month before the outbreak of the European phase of World War 11, he contended that the greatest force for peace was the moral power of the United States strengthened by clearly defined principles of ne~trality.3~ Despite this sentiment Martin remained a realist. He released a statement that there could be no greater contribution to the America of tomorrow than the National Moral Rearmament movement (an offshoot of the Ox-ford group, one of whose goals, by means of brotherhood and traditional morality, was "to keep the peace and make it permanent"). However, he commented cynically, "Sure, I'm for Moral Rearmament, whatever that is. It's just like being against Sin."34

Roosevelt also endorsed Moral Rearmament, but in January 1939 asked Congress once again to revise neutrality legislation. Before the legislature

54 Chapter 2

acted, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia and threatened Poland, and Italy seized Albania. The administration then pressed for a repeal of the arms embargo as a means of preserving peace by containing aggression. To offset administration insistence, Martin’s friend Fish founded the Na- tional Committee to Keep America Out of Foreign Wars. This organization of fifty congressmen and former congressmen advocated taking the profit out of war by a nondiscriminatory embargo and urged a national referendum before conscription could be legislated. Martin, although sympathetic to the committee’s views, did not

Because other Republicans agreed with the administration’s stance, the minority leader announced there would be no party policy on the issue: ”Every man will have to speak for himself.” Nevertheless, House Repub- licans, fearful the measure was a step toward war, voted 150 to 7 to weaken severely the administration’s proposal. A diluted bill providing for a limited embargo on arms and ammunition, but excluding other implements of war, passed the House, but the Senate adjourned without a vote on neutrality revision. (Martin was paired to recommit and then voted against the measure.)36

During the special session called after the outbreak of the European war, Martin announced, as he did in the regular 1939 session, that Re- publicans would approach embargo repeal in a nonpartisan fashion. He himself would decide the question strictly on the basis of the best means of keeping the United States out of war. But before committing to a specific proposal he would await Senate action.37 An indication of Martin‘s efforts to remain noncommittal until required to vote was his refusal to attend a luncheon explaining the purposes of the newly established Non- Partisan Committee for Peace through the Revision of the Neutrality Laws. Its founder, the prominent Republican newsman William Allen White, who admired Martin, agreed with the minority leader that embargo repeal should be nonpartisan, but on the other hand, advised Mar- tin that it would be good strategy for a number of Republicans to vote for it, so that the GOP could not be blamed if the measure were defeated. If this politically pragmatic assessment did not convince Martin to support repeal, White exhorted him to do so in moral terms.38 He was also urged by his friend Landon to vote for repeal so that it would not be an issue in the 1940 campaign.39

Martin was convinced an allied victory was ”necessary,” but also believed “the minority party was the peace party.” Nevertheless, he resisted “the great temptation to make a speech . . . I remembered my agreement with the president, no politics, and I contented myself with voting no on lifting the embargo.” As he told Landon, “I don’t trust the president in the foreign field any more than I do at home.” Furthermore, he explicated, cash and carry will hurt employment, as the allies will obtain credit to


purchase wheat and other goods in non-American markets.40 Years later Martin wrote he would vote the same way again: "Peddling arms around the world is an invitation to war."41 However, the administration was victorious. By a vote of 243 to 172 in the House and 55 to 24 in the Senate, embargo provisions were dropped from the new neutrality legislation. It remained unlawful for American vessels to carry passengers or any other articles to belligerent nations, for United States citizens to travel on belligerent ships, and for loans to be made to warring parties-but now cash and carry applied to all goods. With the issue resolved Martin hoped that the nation's attention would revert to domestic issues.

PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 1940

As early as April 1939, Martin's name began to emerge as a possible presidential candidate. That spring a prominent Fall River Republican opened a Martin for President More meaningful were the activities of his congressional colleagues. Among his early endorsers were Senator Arthur Capper (Kansas) and Representatives Francis Case (South Dakota), Owen Brewster (Maine), and Martin's friend Leo Allen (Illinois). Before the year was out, Allen had so promoted Martin's candidacy that Illinois's thir- teenth district had already instructed its delegates to vote for him.43 But of greater importance was the enthusiastic backing of Landon. The Kansan, who wanted "a liberal or moderate" nominee, a "good progressive," turned to Martin, whom he had deemed reliable and sensible.

In May 1939 Landon began advancing Martin's candidacy among Kansas Republicans and by June told Martin his nomination was quite possible. To provide for maximum exposure before key Republicans, Lan- don arranged for Martin to be the featured speaker at the celebration of Kansas Day, January 1940, in Topeka. The four-day event, which drew over five thousand Republican activists from nine states as well as members of the National Committee, was one of the earliest political gatherings of the year and was seen as a sounding board for Midwestern sentiment. Consequently, an engagement there was much sought after by presidential hopefuls. Despite asserting that his greatest aspiration was to be Speaker, Martin must have been thinking seriously of the presidency, for he never forthrightly rejected its possibility and while in 'Topeka uncharacteristically accompanied Landon to church services. Martin broadcast nationally from the Kansan's home and also addressed a crowd of five thousand. His theme was that the greatest danger to American peace and security was not from abroad, but from allowing pressing problems at home to go unsolved-especially the unemployment of nine million Americans. "Our front line is not the Rhine, nor is it anywhere in France,"

56 Chapter 2

he proclaimed. “It’s at the farm gate and the factory door.” The speech, widely praised in Republican papers throughout the country, raised his presidential stock considerably.u

Also in Topeka, where he was described as a Martin advisor, was Ken- neth Simpson, a liberal national committeeman from New York, who had worked with the Bay Stater in the 1936 presidential campaign. Simpson anointed Martin as the “uncrowned leader” of the Republican Party, a first-rate choice if the convention deadlocked. In nationally publicized remarks he praised him for his lack of enemies and liberal rep~tation.4~ More firmly committed to Martin in 1939 was Mrs. Hamilton (Toody) Wright, wealthy president of the Women’s Republican Club of Niagara Falls. Wright toured the country promoting Martin’s candidacy among Republican women and reported to him on the political scene in various states.46 Helen Clay Frick, daughter of the steel magnate, informed Mar- tin she would raise $125,000 for his campaign with the first $15,000 com-ing whenever he wished.47 More and more frequently the press mentioned the minority leader as a presidential possibility, often in flattering terms citing his liberalism, and on November 19,1939 he received his first newspaper endor~ement .~~

Columnists, too, began to speculate favorably on his candidacy. Among them were Richard Strout, Washington Bureau Chief of the Chris-tian Science Monitor; Sam Pettengill, former Democratic congressman turned columnist for the Gannett chain; Mark Sullivan of the New York Herald Tribune, who was syndicated in over 100 papers; Bruce Catton, Washington correspondent of the Newspaper Enterprise Association; Raymond Clapper, political commentator of the Scripps-Howard chain; and William Allen White, whose tribute in the Emporia Gazette was reprinted throughout the country. In Newsweek magazine former New Deal “Brain Truster” Raymond Moley lauded Martin for stopping silly, unfair, windy attacks on Democrats and described him as a man of keen judgment, rare and genuine modesty, and quick responsiveness to public opinion, with the capability of getting along with others-qualities one desires in a president.49

Other national magazines including Country Gentleman, Life, the Sat-urday Evening Post, and Readers Digest featured sympathetic profiles of Martin, some of which were reprinted and distributed to political supporters. Newspapers also began to feature personality stories about him. What might have been eccentricities under other circumstances now became attributes. His disorderly appearance and contempt for conventional norms of dress, and even his inability to enunciate properly, ”a little man with a tongue that at times twists itself around words as he seeks to express himself,” became qualities endearing him to the common man. Martin’s assertion that he liked to read “but I haven’t

57 “At the Eye of the Hurricane”

read a book in a couple of years“ became evidence of his hard work and service to his party and constituent^.^^

Nevertheless, Martin still avoided committing himself as a candidate: he established no organization, did little publicly or directly to advance his chances, and in March when a national headquarters of Martin for President opened in Washington, he claimed he opposed the effort, but could not prevent it.5’ However, his speaking engagements throughout the country, ostensibly for the purpose of a Republican Congress, served to promote his candidacy. These tours, his visits to his chief supporter Landon, and the activities of his congressional colleagues seeking backing for him if the convention deadlocked made it apparent he was hoping lightning would strike. As the announced candidates Dewey and Sena- tors Robert A. Taft (Ohio) and Arthur H. Vandenberg (Michigan) failed to catch fire, increased attention focused on Martin as a serious, “progressive” candidate. In February Martin’s resignation from the RNC because of the ”increased burden of minority leader” was further interpreted as a move toward the presidential

Allegedly to show a “united national sentiment” Roosevelt invited Martin and Charles L. McNary, as Republican leader in the Senate, to a $100 a plate Democratic Party Jackson Day Dinner in January 1940. Both refused, with Martin making political capital of the invitation, stating that if the money raised by the affair was for a nonpartisan cause such as the Red Cross or Finnish War Relief, rather than the 1940 Democratic campaign, he would be glad to attend. He delighted Kansas Republicans by telling them, “I was afraid I might not know how to act in the presence of political royalists who can afford to spend $100 a plate for a

The third session of the Seventy-sixth Congress, with Martin as minority leader, convened January 3, 1940. For the first five months it concentrated upon routine appropriations, which to Martin’s satisfaction were considerably reduced from the administration’s requests. On major matters Republicans were nearly unanimous: their widest division was on a bill to make lynching a federal offense; even then 141 of the 168 House Re-publicans favored the measure (it died in the Senate). As many as 156 Re-publicans voted to extend the Dies Committee and 151 to investigate the NLRB. Martin was nearly as successful in achieving party unity for the two major measures he viewed as ”must,” the extension of the Hatch Act to state and local workers whose activity was financed in whole or part by the federal government (152 Republicans for, 1 against) and the Walter- Logan Bill, which subjected decisions by administrative agencies to court review (150 Republicans for, 2 against). From Martin’s perspective a presidential veto of the latter measure was unfortunately sustained s

Also unfortunate for Martin were cracks in his Massachusetts support for the presidency. Although he had maintained an interest and involvement

58 Chapter 2

in state politics and continued to be a presidential possibility and to speak on national and international issues, he finished last in the state committee's delegate-at-large slate in the state election in A~ri l .5~ Former governor Alvan T. Fuller, a Dewey advocate, blamed Martin for the defeat of a presidential preferential primary bill that year, blasting him as a state boss who was "willing to sell out voters of Massachusetts for [his] own personal advantage." Fuller's continuing attacks, many believed, were responsible for Martin's poor finish, fourth out of

Despite the disappointing result, Martin was still considered an ideal fusion candidate with strong dark horse possibilities. To the delight of Alf Landon, the arrangements committee selected Martin in April as permanent convention chairman. Now even if Martin thought it the best strategy, he could hardly campaign for the nomination. He continued to deny his candidacy but at the same time attempted to bind the Massachusetts delegation to him and sought second ballot strength from other states.

The greatest challenge to his ambition came not from the result of the state primary but from the emergence of a new contender, the president of Commonwealth and Southern Corporation (a utilities holding company), a former Democrat who had voted for Roosevelt in 1932, Wendell Willkie. In April when he began to actively pursue the nomination, Willkie did not have a single delegate. However, aided by astute eastern politicians and capitalizing upon the European war, he began attracting supporters. When the Germans conquered the Lowlands and France, Taft and Vandenberg's isolationism and Dewey's youth and inexperience were no longer assets but handicaps." After a lengthy confab with Mar- tin in Washington, wherein the congressman refused an endorsement, Willkie conferred with leaders of the Massachusetts delegation. He won over not only several Bay State delegates who had become increasingly reluctant to commit themselves to more than a single roll call for Martin, but also Sinclair Weeks, who had succeeded Martin on the National Com- mittee. An old friend of Martin's, the son of former Senator Weeks, Sin- clair, and Sam Pryor, a Republican committeeman, flew to Washington for a lengthy dinner parley with Martin. Unable to persuade him to resign as convention chair and nominate Willkie, they urged him to release his Massachusetts delegates as the "times demand a man of Willkie's type." Still convinced that Willkie had no chance, Martin refused as he persisted in his belief the convention would deadlock and turn to him. Conse- quently, he continued to try to secure commitments from his home state for at least two ballots.58

On the eve of the Republican convention in Philadelphia, Roosevelt unveiled a master political stroke by announcing that two Republicans, Frank Knox, vice presidential nominee in 1936, and Henry L. Stimson, Hoover's secretary of state, had accepted appointments to his cabinet.

59 ”At the Eye ofthe Hurricane”

Not all in Philadelphia were surprised; a month earlier Landon, with the approbation of Martin, refused a cabinet appointment. At that time Martin had observed this would be a step toward one-party government when two-party government was needed more than ever with the president contemplating a third term. Moreover there was no need for such action as Republicans were patriotic and in time of war would support the admini~tration.~~ Now that Roosevelt had succeeded in appointing two Republican internationalists, Martin made the best of the maneuver by remarking that in a real crisis the president found it nec-essary to turn to Republicans for help. “Why not Republicans in all cabinet posts . . . and a Republican president, too? That is the logic of these appointments.”60 John Hamilton, the RNC chair, was not so sanguine and his explosive remarks would come back to haunt his political ambitions. To a meeting of the Republican National Committee he read these two men out of the party, proclaiming they were “no longer qualified to speak as Republicans. The Democratic Party now, by their appointment, has become the war party.”61

The Massachusetts delegation grew increasingly restless, several members pledged themselves to Willkie as soon as they would be released, and two days before the convention Weeks joined the Willkie team as floor manager. Martin arrived in Philadelphia still hoping against hope that the nomination would be his. But his strategy to increase his votes with each roll call was frustrated when this own delegation rejected a resolution to stick with him for at least two ballots. A disheartened Martin, believing his fellow Bay Staters had betrayed him, now declined offers of support from other delegations. On the first ballot he received thirty-three votes from Massachusetts (there were forty-four all told) to one for Willkie; on the second ballot he dropped to twenty-one. Martin sent an emissary to the delegation, thanking them for their support, and instructing them to vote without any thought of him. On the third ballot he received no votes at

Martin’s opening speech, described as one of his best, gave no indication of the uncertainty he felt about a Republican victory due to the war situation.@ Republicans, who had consistently supported the nation’s military and economic defense, would not, he claimed, let such issues become partisan, nor would they oppose appropriations for relief when necessary. He then called for a crusade to protect liberty, fight political propaganda, reduce taxes and waste, prevent one-man government, and preserve peace.6q At the conclusion of his address, Mrs. James P. Winnie, wife of a committeeman from Hawaii, placed a lei around Martin’s neck and “planted” a kiss on the cheek of the shocked and blushing fifty-five- year-old bachelor. Martin ignored shouts begging him to let her do it again for the cameramen and seemed puzzled when asked by reporters if he preferred blondes or brunettes. His brother Ed, who assisted him at the

60 Chapter 2

convention, was at his side and answered for him, “The truth is he doesn’t know the differen~e.”~~

Although not enamored of Willkie’s candidacy, Martin officiated with such fairness that one New York Times reporter even interpreted him as presiding in a pro-Willkie manner.66 When Representative Charles A. Halleck of Indiana, Willkie’s native state, was asked by chairman Hamil- ton to nominate Willkie as a means of emphasizing the Hoosier’s Mid- west origins rather than his New York business ties, Halleck asked Mar- tin for advice. The minority leader urged Halleck to do so. When states were called for presidential nominations, by mistake Indiana passed. To be helpful, Martin asked the chairman if he were sure that was what he wanted and the pass was changed to a notice of intent to nominate Willkie. As Halleck began his nomination speech, angry Taft and Dewey delegates booed. Martin went over, put his arm around a rattled Hal- leck, calmed him down, and encouraged him to continue.67 Several delegates charged that Sam Pryor, chair of the Committee on Arrangements and a staunch Willkieite, disproportionately distributed gallery tickets in favor of his candidate. Martin persuaded Taft’s floor manager not to bring this accusation before the entire convention on the grounds that such an indictment would damage the party’s image.68 At any rate the galleries with their chants for Willkie proved to be a rather unruly force, frequently disrupting proceedings and drowning out delegates. The clamor was so great during the fourth ballot, that according to Martin his repeated gaveling “blended in with other sounds like a kettledrum in a symphony orchestra.” When in a moment of exasperation he reminded the galleries they were guests of the convention, the retort was, “Guests, hell. We are the convention.”69

With Dewey’s support eroding and Willkie gaining on each roll call, Landon conferred with Martin at the conclusion of the fourth ballot, asking whether the convention should be recessed to prevent a Willkie stampede. Martin, who responded, “Alf, we agreed that this would be an open convention,” then suggested Kansas join the Willkie caravan. On the fifth ballot Landon cast the state’s eighteen votes for Willkie. Emotions ran high as Willkie approached the 501 magic margin. On the fifth roll call, a bitter state chairman announced that Washington ”casts sixteen votes for a real Republican, Senator Robert A. Taft.” Despite the applause, Martin admonished the delegate that ‘’characterizations of this kind are out of place here . . . all the candidates before the body are Republicans,” and required the vote to be recast in acceptable terms.’O

About midnight, Willkie was only seventy-two votes short of nomination, fifty-two votes ahead of Taft, his nearest competitor. Anti-Willkie forces headed by Senator John Bricker (Ohio) urged Martin to adjourn and reconvene in the morning so they could coalesce behind a stop-Willkie

61 “At the Eye of the tfurricnne”

candidate. Alf Landon told Martin that undoubtedly he would be that man. However, the congressman had earlier agreed to the only request Willkie made: “If the tide is running my way, you will not recess.” Martin kept his word, noting that a nomination under the circumstances proposed by Bricker “wouldn’t be worth anything to anybody,” and commenting to his brother, who had assisted him, ”God, I hope I have done right.” On the sixth ballot, a tired but spirited convention proceeded to nominate the former Democrat, while the galleries repeatedly chanted, “We want Willkie,” forcing a frustrated Martin to shout, “Well, if you’ll be quiet long enough, maybe you‘ll get him.”71

Although it was by then well past midnight, the nominee consulted several party leaders about the selection of a vice presidential candidate. This done, he asked Martin to come to his suite. As dawn broke, the congressman met with Willkie and enthusiastically championed Charles McNary (Oregon), the Senate’s Republican Leader, who had been suggested by COP chieftains. Martin, who believed McNary would balance the ticket, attract the farm vote, and please the Senate and House, was delighted to phone the Senator with news of his selection. When offered the vice presidential nomination on behalf of Willkie, whom he had never met but criticized, McNary at first replied, “Hell, no” and had to be persuaded by Martin to accept the offer.72

Willkie, the ex-Democrat, shattered tradition not only by winning the nomination, but also by being the first Republican to address the body that had nominated him. To the chagrin of Martin and many others, Willkie in his remarks referred to the delegates as “you Republicans.” He promised an ”aggressive, fighting campaign,’’ and praised the convention’s permanent chairman. ”I doubt in all the history of American political conventions, any convention has ever been presided over with more impartiality and more fairness and ability that this one has been presided over by Joe Martin.” Many observers showering accolades upon Martin shared this assessment.”

I n addition to selecting the vice presidential candidate, it was also traditional for the nominee to choose the Chairman of the National Committee. Despite his ideological differences with Willkie, Hamilton eagerly sought another opportunity to manage a presidential cam-paign. In violation of his trust as RNC chair, he had secretly organized a group of Willkie supporters on the eve of the convention and advised the candidate during the sessions. He expected, not without reason, that Willkie would retain him as chair.7* However, liberal Republicans, especially upset over Hamilton’s reading Stimson and Knox out of the party, were joined by the conservatives Taft and Hoover in urging Willkie to bypass Hamilton. After considerable thought and consultation, Willkie decided to appoint Martin.75

62 Chapter 2

Meanwhile Martin had arrived in Boston and announced he did not expect to take an active part in the contest, maybe a speech or two. Congress was still in session and he considered his duties as minority leader more important than any contribution he could make to the campaign. With that said he went to Cape Cod to rest. After days spent searching for him, Willkie emissaries found Martin, offered him the appointment, but were rebuffed. Helen Reid, wife of the publisher of the New York Herald Tribune, Colonel Robert R. McCormick, publisher of the Chicago Tribune, and Mar- tin’s old friend Landon urged him to reconsider. He was the only one, they argued, who could unite a party severely divided between Willkie amateurs and professional politicians. At their bequest Martin visited Willkie’s New York apartment, where he was cornered by Sam Pryor, Sin- clair Weeks, and the candidate himself. Having “never known a man so hard to say no to,” Martin finally capitulated with the condition that he pass a physical and gain the approval of his congressional

Martin passed the physical and met with twenty-five leading congressional Republicans who enthusiastically favored his accepting. They were as eager for him to assume the office as was Willkie and for the same reason-to bridge the gap between Congress, where the nominee was weakest, and the rest of the party. An enthusiastic Willkie informed the press that he had appointed “a man whom I had in mind from the start of my campaign seven weeks ago. . . I feel like a member of the Northwest Mountain Police, I got my man.” The choice was equally popular with the Republican press. A bitter Hamilton was offered and accepted a consola-tion prize, executive secretary at $25,000 a year, a solace which in no way curbed his growing animosity toward Martinn

According to the political scientist James MacGregor Burns each major party has a presidential and a congressional wing, virtually separate parties in themselves, with their own ideology, organization, and leadership.78 Such a division certainly existed in the Republican Party in the fall of 1940 a conservative and professional congressional wing, which dis- trusted the more liberal, amateurish, and brash presidential wing headed by the former Democrat and his followers, who had seized the party’s nomination. Some members of the House even hated Willkie more than Roosevelt, and according to the columnist Marquis Childs “could hardly be restrained by Martin from expressing openly their resentment and bit- t e r n e ~ s . ” ~ ~It has been claimed that a troubled and somber Martin also had divided loyalties; however, there is no indication of that. Martin’s devotion to the GOP transcended any allegiance to House politics.

Immediately after his appointment as RNC chair, Martin arranged for a Willkie unity dinner in Washington’s Hotel Willard with House and Senate leaders and with Senators Taft and Vandenberg as special guests. In what had been scheduled as an affair without speeches, the


audience began to chant "We want Willkie" and a proud nominee rose and incongruously thanked the legislators for the support they had given him. But one of the minority leader's most surprising achievements occurred in October, when he persuaded House Republicans unanimously to commend Willkie and McNary for their work and pledge allegiance and loyalty to them.80

While Martin was organizing headquarters in Washington, Willkie flew to Colorado Springs on July 9 for a working vacation. There he made Martin's reconciliation tasks all the more difficult by releasing a list of prominent leaders whose advice he trusted-the only professional Republicans on the roll were Martin and McNary. It soon became necessary for Martin to join the profusion of visitors flocking to see the candidate. Willkie had been expressing to reporters his personal convictions on pending legislation, instead of awaiting party positions arrived at af-ter conferences and concessions. Martin hurried to Colorado to urge the nominee to stop embarrassing fellow Republicans in Congress by issu- ing statements on every issue. In sensitive areas, which were the president's responsibility, Martin advised him to be even more cautious. He especially emphasized silence on selective service, an issue on which even Roosevelt had not yet committed himself. They also discussed and believed they had straightened out the confusion between the various Willkie campaign groups. However, the lack of coordination was never resolved. Moreover, as soon as Martin was back in Washington, Willkie "cavalierly ignored" the chairman's appeal and once again began answering every question posed by the press.8*

This was the last campaign in which the convention chairman officially informed the candidates of their nomination at their homes. The ceremony took place August 17 in Willkie's hometown of Elmwood, Indiana, whose normal population of 10,000mushroomed to 150,000for this ritual. On a blistering hot Saturday, with the temperature 103 degrees in the shade, the tireless Willkie drove Martin on a tour before the rites began. Thinking of the custom that limited a president to two terms as well as the notification ceremony itself, Martin opined when officially notifying the Hoosier of his nomination, "It is well for the nation to cling to some of its traditions." Quietly he slipped Willkie a note reminding the nominee, who was known to sleep late on Sunday mornings, to attend church the next day. Willkie may have followed that advice as he returned to his farm in Rushville, but he ignored Martin's admonition on the draft and other controversial issues. In his acceptance address, he agreed with the president that the United States should extend to the opponents of force the material resources of the nation and that some form of selective service was needed. In a concession to his more noninterventionist supporters he did imply the president was deliberately inciting the nation to war by his

64 Chapter 2

inflammatory statements.82 A little more than a week later, Martin flew to Salem, Oregon, which was crowded with 50,000 visitors, for the McNary notification. There Martin described the campaign in his favorite metaphor, as a battle to save America, and hailed McNary as the ”undic- tated choice’’ for vice p re~ iden t .~~

Martin’s problems were not merely with the candidate’s reluctance to avoid alienating congressional Republicans but, more importantly, with Willkie’s failure to organize properly his campaign. The Willkie entourage lacked central direction, strategy, and order, due primarily to decisions made by the nominee himself as well as his tendency to be his own campaign manager and press secretary. The major elements of his entourage, characterized by confused lines of authority and jealousies, were the RNC headed by Martin, the Eastern States Division under Pryor, the Midwest and West supervised by Hamilton, and lastly Willkie’s personal representative to the campaign, Russell Davenport, the managing editor of Fortune magazine. Each was given a title suggesting he was in charge. Further- more, the Willkie clubs had not dissolved. Oren Root had taken a leave of absence from his law office to organize these societies of nonpartisan amateurs, who now believed Willkie owed his nomination to their efforts. Another autonomous entity was Democrats for Willkie under Allen Valentine, president of the University of Rochester; completing the organizational chaos was Harold Stassen, the boyish thirty-three-year-old governor of Minnesota who had been appointed by Willkie as his personal campaign advisor and floated from one group to the other. Party regulars’ resentment of these amateurs increased as the newcomers attempted to control patronage and ignored the ”professionals” in the belief they had no place else to go.

Martin, who described himself as a salesman managing earnest but amateur workers, asserted that “two-thirds of my time was devoted to making peace among quarreling factions.’’ The difficulty of this task was com- pounded by Willkie’s failure to recognize Martin as the last word in determining policy. This omission was resented by organizational types, who would have overlooked being ignored by Willkie, if they could turn to Martin, whom they trusted.84

The rancor between amateurs and professionals and the organizational disarray became so serious that in September Willkie called a conference of 100 party leaders at his Rushville, Indiana farm. To this gathering of national committeemen, state chairmen, and advisors he asserted that there would be no victory unless mutual cooperation overcame confusion and bitterness. To reassure the professionals, he announced that patronage would follow the regular channels. How- ever, and somewhat typically, no speaker represented the National

65 “At the Eye of the Hurricarte“

Committee or state committees, and equally as serious was Martin’s absence due to congressional business.85

The disorder stemming from overlapping authority was exacerbated by personal animosity. An embittered Hamilton, who claimed Martin’s appointment to be a mistake, resented the minority leader’s authority and sometimes undercut him. At a press conference Hamilton announced the selection of Pryor as eastern campaign manager, before chairman Martin had a chance to do so. Stassen spent much time trying to smooth over the differences between the two.86

Lack of coordination not only led to confusion but also contributed to fi-nancial turmoil. Both the Republicans and the Democrats circumvented Hatch Act limitations on contributions and spending. The GOP was so successful its National Finance Committee finished the campaign with a small surplus as well as paying off old debts.87 Nevertheless, during the contest the RNCwas frequently short of funds and Joe Martin’s brother Ed would resort to begging donations from the well-financed Willkie Clubs. When John L. Lewis, president of the CIO, needed $5,500 to fund a national broadcast on behalf of Wendell Willkie, the RNC turned to Hamil- ton for the money, who in turn received it from William Rhodes Davis, a wealthy oil magnate with Nazi connections. As one observer noted, what was lacking was not money, but coherence.88 Even the way it was decided to accept Lewis‘s offer to broadcast on behalf of Willkie was peculiar. The nominee met with the flamboyant CIO leader in Pryor‘s apartment from midnight until 2 A.M. discussing an endorsement, while Martin, the nominal campaign manager, was asleep in the next

Some critics believe Willkie‘s selection of Martin was a mistake for it saddled the internationalist nominee with the noninternationalist record of the Massachusetts legislator. Roosevelt, in all likelihood, did not see Martin as much of an isolationist as the minority leader’s critics did. In the middle of August when the president concluded it was “perfectly clear” that Willkie had no desire to cooperate and was playing politics with the draft, Roosevelt thought of going around him with an ”appeal to

Such a step was not the patriotism of Joe Martin and Charlie M ~ N a r y . ” ~ ~ necessary; not only did Willkie come to support the draft, but Martin announced that the party would take no official stand on selective service, that each congressman would be encouraged to vote his conscience. His friend Fish offered an amendment to the selective service bill to defer its implementation by sixty days, during which time there would be an in-tensive recruiting drive to reach manpower needs of 400,000. The amendment was approved 207 to 200, with Martin and the Republicans voting for it 140 to 22. The measure as amended passed 263 to 249, with Martin and fifty-one other Republicans endorsing it.

66 Chapter 2

Three days later, despite pressure from many of his partisans, Willkie publicly announced, “I hope that as a result of the conference between House and Senate conferees on the selective service bill the Fish Amend- ment is eliminated.” The following day Martin and McNary hurried to In- dianapolis to confer with Willkie, who convinced them the amendment should be killed in conference committee. At the press briefing following the meeting, Martin announced he was sure selective service would be enacted without the Fish Amendment and that they had coordinated the activities of the various Willkie groups. He then responded to the Demo- cratic National Committee’s chairman Ed Flynn, who had been exploiting the foreign policy differences among Republicans: preparedness, cash and carry, and the Fish Amendment. In his rejoinder, which was read into the Congressional Record, Martin asserted the Indianapolis meeting had been harmonious and that there was no need for anyone to worry about cooperation between Willkie and a Republican Congress, for all Republicans agreed on fundamental issues. The Fish Amendment was killed in conference, and selective service was then approved by the House 232 to 186, with only 51 of the 163 Republicans, including Martin, supporting it. Mar- tin claimed that if it were not for him, additional Republicans would have voted against it and years later wrote as ’,national chairman I simply could not hand the Democrats any such plum as a vote by me against the issue.” This statement is sometimes cited to show that he voted yes only because of Willkie’s position, but does not necessarily mean he would have voted no if he had not been chairman. In the belief that the situation in Europe had become so grave that it was obvious the United States had to prepare for an emergency, Martin had advocated mobilization of the National Guard and Reserve despite significant GOP opposition?’

As the draft proposal was winding its way through Congress, En- gland’s situation was becoming desperate as she was losing the Battle of the Atlantic to German submarines. In response to Winston Churchill’s May 1940 appeal for assistance Roosevelt planned to ask Congress for authority to exchange fifty overage destroyers for English bases in the West- em Hemisphere. To ensure bipartisan support for such action he asked William Allen White to obtain Willkie’s approbation and have him get the support of Martin and M ~ N a r y . ~ ~ But when the cabinet convinced the president he did not need congressional authority he executed the exchange by means of an executive order. The unprecedented trade, which even Churchill described as a ”decidedly unneutral act,” was accepted, albeit warily, by Republican leadership. Willkie regretted that Roosevelt did not deem it necessary to secure legislative approval or permit public discussion, and Martin, always on the alert for excessive presidential power, untypically refused comment, thereby missing an opportunity to criticize Roosevelt’s action while reenforcing his nominee’s observation^.^^


The president may have been grateful for Martin’s stance on the draft and destroyer exchange, but as part of his reelection bid did not hesitate to attack the minority leader by name. Martin was a vulnerable target because of his long tenure in the House and a most desirable one in his capacity as minority leader and RNC chair. Moreover, he had been hailed by Willkie as representative of all that was finest in American public life. In gathering names of Republicans who had opposed neutrality revision, Roosevelt’s speechwriters linked Martin’s name with that of Bruce Barton and Ham Fish. A delighted president caught the meter in the three names. Consequently at a Madison Square Garden rally broadcast nationally on October 28 he assailed by name some of the Republicans voting against cash and carry and alerted the audience to the euphonious trio. “Now wait, a perfectly beautiful rhythm-congressmen Martin, Barton and Fish.” The crowd applauded, cheered, and laughed.

Two days later in Boston in a national broadcast Roosevelt with his voice dripping with irony referred to Martin as “that peerless leader, the farmer’s friend,” who because of his outstanding support of farmers would make an ideal Republican secretary of agriculture. As he listed measures against which Martin had voted, a voice from the au-dience cried out, “Barton and Fish.” The president jovially replied ”wait a minute,” and then went on to state, ”He is one of that great his- toric trio, which has voted consistently against every measure for the relief of agriculture,” and here the delirious crowd joined in with him, chanting, “Martin, Barton, and Fish.”94 Robert E. Sherwood, playwright and FDR speechwriter, in a passage frequently cited from his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, wrote that Willkie claimed when he heard Roosevelt ”lay the isolationist votes of Martin, Barton and Fish on me . . . I knew I was licked.” However, Sherwood also wrote he doubted that statement. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that Willkie expressed such thoughts and Martin contends that Willkie never mentioned the phrase to him.95

Martin felt no ill will toward the president over these sallies, dismissing them as “just politics.” Allegedly Roosevelt told him his name was included only because it rhymed with Nevertheless, in two different speeches Martin responded to the president. In the first he defended his agricultural record by claiming that the administration’s farm measures would do as much harm as good. In the second address he asserted his votes were in the interests of farmers and assailed the processing tax, “the orphan child of Henry Wallace.” He avowed that although he always supported relief and would continue to do so, he would also oppose “blank checks“ for the poor. Additionally he accused Roosevelt of ”shadow boxing” with the GOP in Congress and like every candidate facing defeat of descending to personal attacks?’ Bruce Barton attributed the

68 Chapter 2

line to Roosevelt's loathing of Fish and wrote to Martin, "you and I got plastered with the overthrow of his hatred."98

For one who originally had planned only a speech or two, Martin campaigned extensively. In addition to addresses throughout the East, he toured the West, delivering eighteen major speeches in ten days. (The New York Times claimed the western trip was an excuse to flee Washing- ton during the House conscription debate because Martin was caught between Willkie's support of the draft and his constituent's objection to it. However, Martin had already announced there was no party position on the bill and returned in time to vote for it.) Occasionally the minority leader's speeches dealt with the need for a Republican Congress, but for the most part he concentrated on one if not all three of the issues that he thought would win-"No third term, no Roosevelt, and no war." He accused the president of trying to cover up New Deal failures by a war scare and of campaigning under the guise of defense inspection trips financed by the government. He demanded a federal investigation claiming the "inspections" were a violation of the Hatch Act for which Willkie should be given compensatory free radio time. Before eight thousand in Peoria, Illinois, he described the contest as "responsible liberalism versus irresponsible radicalism" and called for an administration that "will speak softly and carry a big stick, rather than talk big and carry a swag- ger stick." In attacking the failures of the New Deal, Martin emphasized the unemployment of industrial workers and the lack of protection of domestic markets for farmers and called for lowering taxes and driving subversives from government. Privately he expressed his major fear, Roosevelt's efforts to "gain more power."y9

At a fund-raising dinner in New York City Martin met for the first time the beautiful actress and playwright, the former managing editor of Vanity Fair, Clare Boothe, wife of Henry R. Luce, publisher of T i m , Life,and Fortune. Thus began a warm and cherished friendship. It was she who suggested to Martin that he end the campaign with a national broadcast of leading Americans, including Taft, A1 Smith, the heavyweight champion Joe Louis, Dewey, and Martin himself, explaining why they were for Willkie.loO

Another interesting woman with whom Martin became acquainted during the 1940 contest was Perle Mesta, a wealthy widowed society hostess who was credited with having the Equal Rights Amendment plank incorporated into the Republican platform. In the belief that Willkie was moving too far to the right, she left the campaign train, flew to New York, and met with Martin at his hotel at 6:30 A.M. After a purposeful discussion, he phoned Willkie about her concerns. Mesta then left Martin's room a little after 8:OO A.M. and joshed, "If anyone sees me coming out of your apartment at this hour of the morning, what will they say?" He replied,


"And to think we wasted our time talking politics." After she switched her allegiance to the Democratic Party in 1944, she nevertheless retained her relationship with Martin, whom she described as "one of the best friends I have in the world." The minority leader was a frequent guest at her dinner parties "her favorite extra man." He was honored at a special dinner when he was Speaker and was invited to visit her when she was minister to Luxembourg.'o'

In 1940 she helped arrange meetings between Martin's brother Ed and representatives of the African-American preacher Father Divine, whom Joe Martin was anxious to have endorse Willkie as part of his effort to win the black vote.'02 Martin was in an auspicious position to attract African-Americans to the Republican Party. His candidate had promised to end discrimination in the federal government including the military, to push for anti-lynching legislation, and to create jobs for blacks. Mar- tin, himself, was viewed by many African-Americans as their champion. He had been one of the leaders in forcing the House Accounts Commit- tee to change its rules excluding "Negroes" from the House Dining Room. His vigorous support for federal legislation against lynching had resulted in a first-name relationship with Walter White, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Having continued to make his party attractive to blacks and to espouse issues of concern to them, his appointment as RNC chairman was hailed by many African-Americans. This was especially so when he bypassed "old line" blacks for those who were younger, more outspoken, and less conservative. He appointed Rivers, by then an assistant district attorney for New York County, as director of the Eastern Negro Division of the campaign, Sidney Redmond, graduate of Harvard and president of the National Bar Association, to head the Western Negro Division, and Sara Speaks, who had been pressing for the federal government to advance racial equality, to chair the Women's Bureau, Colored Division. He was instrumental in getting the heavyweight champion Joe Louis to tour the Northeast on Willkie's behalf and in obtaining a de facto endorsement from Harlem's Divine. At the same time he frequently raised issues of concern to black Americans. In analyzing the campaign Walter White predicted the black vote could go either way, but wrote "if the majority of Negroes vote the Republican ticket it will be because they are convinced that the sincerity of Republicans like Joseph W. Martin, Jr., represents the dominant attitude of the party."103

As Martin's own reelection campaign was one of the easiest in his career he devoted little energy to his reelection. He seldom appeared in his congressional district, although he joined Willkie in an Attleboro rally, and turned his campaign over to friends, relatives, and staff. As usual he was endorsed by William Green, president of the AFL, who wrote,

70 Chapter 2

“since you have been minority leader you have been especially helpful.” Martin won with ease.lo4

Despite his public prediction of a Willkie victory, as the election drew near, Martin privately concluded there was little possibility of defeating Roosevelt. Nevertheless, as campaign manager he was not entirely candid with an exhausted Willkie, telling him they still had a chance, that the election hung in the balance, because there were twelve to fourteen states which were close and could go either way-but he did not tell Willkie he knew Republicans had to take them all.lo5 They failed to do so and Roose- velt won 449 to 82 electoral votes. Willkie, however, polled the largest popular vote in Republican history until the 1952 election of Dwight Eisenhower and slashed by 50 percent Roosevelt’s winning margin of 1936. On election night Martin told newsmen Willkie lost because “he wouldn’t take my advice and go all out for keeping America out of the war.”1o6 In his memoirs he claimed no Republican had a chance once France fell, due to the electorate’s reluctance to switch horses in mid- stream. Nonetheless, he asserted the third-term issue could have been used more effectively. Shortly after the election, Martin told his Demo- cratic counterpart, Ed Flynn, that Willkie would have won if the campaign had lasted another month.’07

Some observers and scholars have blamed the loss on Willkie’s choice of Martin as RNC chairman and his failure to retain Hamilton.’OB Willkie, however, was completely satisfied with Martin’s performance, attributing his defeat to defense industry prosperity and ”the Republican congressional record on conscription, international affairs, and defense.” As the campaign drew to a close he praised Martin’s effectiveness to the associated Willkie clubs. A few months later the Hoosier was instrumental in convincing Martin to retain the RNC chairmanship, and in 1943 inscribed his book One World “To Joe Martin Jr. with affectionate regards and gratitude for having conducted a campaign for me with great skill and complete fidelity.”10g Others, too, thought Martin performed competently and, if blame were to be assigned, singled out Willkie for alienating regular Re-publicans and disordering his own organization.”O Man in the street Re- publicans, state and national committeemen, and prominent office holders sent Martin thousands of letters and telegrams congratulating him on his management of the contest and urging him to remain as RNC chair.

As expected, Martin put the best face possible on the defeat, interpreting it as only a temporary setback in a “great crusade,” whose results would have been different with but a small shift in the popular vote. He called on Republicans to prepare for the elections of 1942 and 1944 and pledged his party to national unity, a strong national defense, and support of the president, “when not in conflict with the great principle for which we fought the crusade.” Moreover, Martin announced

"At the Eye of the Hurricme" 71

that shortly he would resign the chairmanship-and then he departed for a brief vacation in Florida."'

After his holiday Martin was as busy and pressured as ever, for as he himself wrote, ',The most difficult period for me in the conduct of Repub- lican affairs was the two and a half years following the nomination of Wen- dell Willkie.""* This was such a demanding period because despite his oft- repeated intention to resign the RNC chairmanship in January 1941, Martin continued to hold that office until the 1942 elections, while also serving as minority leader at a time when one crucial issue followed another.

FOREIGN POLICYFURTHER DIVIDES THE GOP

Until the 1942 elections "much of my [Martin's] time was taken up me- diating between the so-called isolationists and the Willkie intemational- ists," a continuation of the discord that had developed during the presidential ~ampaign."~ In an Armistice Day national broadcast, shortly after his defeat, Willkie hoped to put the division to rest in one of his most famous addresses-the Loyal Opposition Speech. Without mentioning the Republican Party by name, an omission criticized by his dis-paragers, he maintained it was a partisan error to oppose for the sake of opposing; "our" opposition should be opposition for, not opposition against, a vigorous, loyal, and public-spirited opposition. He concluded by endorsing many of the New Deal aims and calling for aid to Britain "to the limit of our ability."

Democrats praised the address, but Republican leaders said little. Mar- tin, however, was enthusiastic, insisting that although democracy meant the existence of an opposition party, in the present crisis it also meant up- holding the president on national defense. However, indirectly he cautioned Willkie by declaring that Congress and governors will be looked to for advice in the political and legislative process. Nevertheless, he stated there was no disposition to deny Willkie his say in party councils.114

In December 1940 Martin conferred with Willkie in New York discussing RNC successors and agreeing that his ideal replacement would be someone who could devote all his time to the committee and be "a good liberal, forward looking fellow, with energy and drive and capacity. . . re-actionaries are definitely out." Willkie thought Martin was such a man, telling the press "nothing would please me more than to have Joe serve on. . . I don't want to see the chairmanship get into the hands of some re- a~tionary.""~The closer Willkie drew to the foreign policy of the Roose- velt administration and alienated the Republican right, the more he needed Martin. The chairman was reasonable, respected by all elements in the party, and one of the few congressional friends he had. In May 1941

72 Chapter 2

John Hamilton noted, "Out of the 190 odd Republican members of the House and Senate, Willkie couldn't dig up 10 friends if his life depended on it.rr116 That Martin's chairmanship might be able to prevent an ir- reparable rupture with Congress was manifest when House Republicans let it be known they hoped he would retain the office. His old friend Lan- don met with him personally to persuade him for the good of the party to continue in both positions and plotted with Henry P. Fletcher, the RNC's General Counsel, to have the Committee refuse Martin's resignation. Nevertheless Martin announced he would resign at the RNC March meeting. By that time he hoped the party would have found a successor and that his resignation would be acted on quickly-preferably the next day. "I want to be relieved as early as po~sible."~~'

If there were any semblance of unity in the Republican Party, Lend- Lease shattered it. On December 7,1940 in a lengthy telegram, Churchill informed Roosevelt that a desperate Britain needed "a gift, loan or sup- ply" of war vessels, as well as aircraft and munitions. Due to cash-carry they were running out of funds to buy war materiel just when their need was the greatest. The doughty Prime Minister concluded by leaving the problem "with confidence to you and your people." After a "Fireside Chat" in which he disclosed the crisis and the need for an imaginative and dramatic solution, Roosevelt requested Congress appropriate funds and authority for the manufacture of war equipment to be lent to the opponents of aggression with repayment after hostilities concluded."*

An administration measure (H.R. 1776), euphemistically titled "An Act Further to Promote the Defense of the United States," was introduced Jan- uary 8 in both houses. It allowed the president to lend war materiel to nations whose defense he deemed vital to the United States, with repayment at war's end. Martin immediately objected that although defense proposals should be bipartisan, no Republican was consulted in the preparation of the proposal.119 A few days later he arranged for Alf Landon to broadcast nationally the first Republican response to this controversial measure. The Kansan attacked it for delegating too much power to the president, "a blank check" he called it, and suggested an outright subsidy to the En- glish so the cost would be known. His words were still echoing when Willkie endorsed the bill and urged Republicans in Congress "not to ren- der the president impotent." An exasperated Landon responded there was no difference between the positions of Willkie and Roosevelt, which amounted to getting "into the war, if necessary, to help England win." The two most recent Republican presidential nominees had publicly stated ir- reconcilable positions.lZ0

The president, anxious to obtain as large a positive vote as quickly as possible, invited McNary and Martin to a bipartisan White House legisla-


tive conference. There he announced he was willing to accept any amendments that were desirable, including periodic renewals of presidential authority, the prohibition of American vessels escorting convoys, and the approval of army and navy chiefs before materiel could be transferred. The latter two concessions had been pushed by Martin.12*

As with cash and carry legislation Martin told Republicans to vote their conscience and did not announce his opposition until the Foreign Affairs Committee reported. He championed the minority recommendations, which had been signed by eight of the ten Republicans on the committee. Their proposal, designed to preserve congressional power while assisting Britain with “all aid short of war,” would grant her $2 billion in credits.I2*

On February 8 an attempt to recommit the bill with instructions to substitute the credit was defeated 160 (149 Republicans including Martin) to 263. The measure was then approved 260-165 (25 Republicans for, 135 against), and Martin, despite the fact over 60 percent of his district approved Lend-Lease, voted The minority leader announced he acted with regret, that if he had been guided by his emotions he would have voted “yes“ because he wished to help the British. But Lend-Lease, a step toward direct involvement, delegated too much power to the executive. ”I am unwilling to give any president control of the public purse, which

under the Constitution belongs to Congress. . . . If our form of government is to be preserved that power should not be delegated to any one man. . . . Our task is to save Americanism.” He expressed the hope that the Senate would so amend the bill that when it returned to the House, “there can be an expression of national unity on what should be the chief objective of the proposed legislation-prompt and practical aid to Britain.”124

Shortly after the House vote Willkie returned from England, where he had inspected conditions himself, met with FDR, and testified before the Senate Committee on behalf of Lend-Lease. He suggested the British be given five to ten destroyers a month. Noninterventionist Republicans were infuriated by his pronouncements. Although Martin refused requests from U.S. News and Newsweek to comment on Willkie‘s stance, the party chairman publicly defended Willkie’s Republicanism. He told the press the GOP was big enough to have two opinions on any nonpartisan question. Moreover, Martin intervened to prevent sixteen state chairmen from criticizing Willkie’s Lend-Lease position and was publicly criticized for this “gag” by the Illinois state chairman. That same weekend the minority leader also stifled anti-Willkie resolutions at the Young Republican National Federation meeting. Furthermore, at the March RNC meeting he prevented a discussion on foreign policy and suppressed a resolution commending him for his vote against Lend-Lease. Lastly Martin wrote to Republicans throughout the country defending Willkie’s right as an

74 Chapter 2

American to speak out, and declaring that the party, which would be united once the Lend-Lease issue was resolved, was big enough for dissenting views.Iz5

The bill passed the Senate with a few minor amendments and was then returned to the House. In keeping with the desires of the administration and the English government, legislative leaders, including Martin, has- tened final passage. Instead of appointing a conference committee and re- opening debate, they presented a resolution to the House agreeing to Sen- ate changes. In an address supporting the resolution, Martin set the tone for all speakers who had previously opposed the legislation. Though not fully convinced that Lend-Lease was the best path to follow, he called for speedy implementation of its provisions, expressed his hope that the president would use his powers wisely, and pleaded for national unity. An ovation from his colleagues followed his conclusion, “We stand united for liberty at home and we share in a common desire to see liberty preserved in every part of the world.” The measure was enacted 317 to 77, Republi-cans for 94, against 54.lZ6

It is incorrect to characterize Martin as an isolationist in this period; nor is the title noninterventionist quite accurate. He vigorously championed credit for the British, voted for selective service, was criticized by “isolationists” for insufficient opposition to Roosevelt‘s internationalism, told Republicans to vote their conscience on foreign policy, and encouraged his party to appropriate funds for Lend-Lease.lZ7 At the Republican caucus to deal with FDRs request for $7 billion to implement Lend-Lease, Martin snapped at two isolationists, Harold Knutsen (Minnesota) and William P. Lambertson (Kansas), who accused the GOP of following a “me-too” line. “This is not a party matter,” he vented, “that is why I asked for national unity after the Lend-Lease bill passed and I urge it just as strongly now.” Republicans then voted the funding 105 to 45. Seven months later in October, fifteen members of the Appropriations Commit- tee met in Martin’s office, where he told them he expected them to head off Republican opposition to administration appeals for further financing, which they did.128

The bitter division over Lend-Lease made it all the more imperative that Martin, with a foot in both camps, retain the chairmanship after March. Willkie called upon him at his rooms in the Hay Adams, urging him to stay for at least a year for the sake of party harmony and telling reporters, ”Joe is one of the best friends I ever had.” Believing him the one man acceptable to all elements of the GOP, Landon, Dewey, Taft, and Mc- Nary in a series of lengthy phone calls appealed to Martin for the greater good to sacrifice his own desires and retain the office. A poll of seven thousand Republican leaders preferred Martin for the chairmanship, twelve governors asked him to stay on, as did Will H. Hays, party chair-

75 “At the Eye of the Hurricnne“

man in 1920. Martin reluctantly agreed to remain until 1942, if the Na- tional Committee approved and authorized him an executive assistant, which it did.’29

Martin’s decision to remain in office was welcomed by Republicans throughout the country. Among scores of newspapers hailing his change of heart and praising his reasonableness, sound judgment, and ability to bring unity to the party were the Washittgton Star, Washington Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, New York Herald Tribune, Christian Science Monitor, and Boston Herald. No one was more delighted than Willkie, who believed Martin’s retention made his position in the party more secure.130

Martin’s hope that the passage of Lend-Lease would provide an opportunity to restore some semblance of unity to the party was dashed, for the dissension between Willkie-led internationalists and his critics, primarily in Congress, continued unabated. One historian has even described the clash as a “civil war.”131 Martin tried to balance his obligations as House Republican leader with his responsibilities to the RNC and the party’s titular leader Willkie. He pleased neither. Congressman Charles Plumley castigated him for failing to provide internationalist leadership. “The time has come to assert yourself not as a compromiser but as a leader,” complained the Vermonter. “They say you are all things to everybody. . . wa-vering Republicans need order.” On the other hand ex-President Hoover wrote, ”Martin is privately not an internationalist, but he is trying to walk a tightrope which is about as di~gusting.”’~~

On July 6 when American troops relieved British garrisons in Iceland, United States convoys, joined by British merchantmen, began sailing to that island. An enthusiastic Willkie assured the president an “overwhelming number” of Republican rank and file supported the move. Moreover, the Hoosier suggested the establishment of American bases in Ireland and Scotland. Republican opposition was moderate, Martin’s only comment was “a step that draws us nearer to war-we’re closer to the However, the isolationist wing was determined to put additional pressure on the internationalists and on the minority leader, before any more dangerous steps could be taken. On August 5, fifteen elder statesmen of the party, including former Illinois Governor Frank 0.Lowden, Landon, and Hoover, issued a manifesto demanding that Congress stop the administration from leading the country into an undeclared war. The following day a secret meeting of fifty noninterventionist Republican congressmen, led by Fish, censured Martin for failing to take a more aggressive stand against FDR’s foreign policy. This gathering was immediately followed by a Republican House conference called by the same leaders, who read to at-tendees the Lowden declaration of policy. Under the direction of Fish, Karl Mundt (South Dakota), and Dewey Short (Missouri), the dissidents denounced those administration acts which might lead to war, demanded

76 Chapter 2

Lend-Lease be administered in a nonwarlike fashion, and reaffirmed the 1940 GOP platform that ”the party is firmly opposed to involving the nation in a foreign war.” A beleaguered Martin, upon whom these resolutions were “virtually forced,” explained to the press that party conferences were not binding. However, he went on to state that a majority of Repub- licans would probably vote against extending the draft.’34

The Selective Service Act of 1940 had provided for drafting men for only twelve months. As a result the administration, facing a massive demobi- lization in the fall of 1941, requested that Congress extend the length of service and repeal the prohibition against sending draftees overseas. While the issue was before the legislature, Roosevelt met with Churchill on August 9-12 off Argentia, Newfoundland, and issued a joint declaration of postwar principles. This ”partnership” hardened even further the attitudes of administration critics. Years later Martin wrote of the pressures on him from a large number of House Republicans to resist the draft extension legislation, to which they were “violently opposed.” Although he desired the bill’s passage, if he ignored their clamor and voted for it “the Republican organization in the House would have been torn to pieces.” Consequently, Martin made no great effort to defeat it, saying little publicly on the measure, taking no part in the congressional debate, privately advising those looking for guidance to follow their conscience. He then voted against it. Draft extension barely passed, 203 to 202 (Republicans 21 for, 133 against). Parliamentary tactics designed to turn this vote and to force reconsideration were led, not by Martin, who uncharacteristically took a back seat, but by Short, thereby giving credence to Martin’s later contention that despite his no vote, he wanted the measure to pass.135

As the foreign situation worsened with a submarine attack on the U.S.S. Greer on September 4 and “shoot on sight” orders from FDR on Septem- ber 11,Willkie continued to inflame COP isolationists by strongly backing the administration. But even more provocative was the announcement he would take an active part in the ‘42 elections, campaigning for the nomination and election of GOP internationalists, but not those Republicans who opposed Roosevelt’s foreign policy.*36 In an effort to keep the party from breaking apart and to organize for the 1942 elections, Martin, accompanied by George Norton, Secretary of the National Congressional Committee, undertook a speaking tour in the West, where he met with GOP leaders. One of the points he repeatedly emphasized was ”foreign policy is definitely not a partisan issue. It has nothing to do with party lines or politics but rather it is up to individual members of Congress to stand for what they personally believe.”137

If the tour did any good, it was quickly undone. On October 9 the As- sociated Press published a photo of Martin and Rayburn leaving the White House under the caption “Helped Frame Neutrality Message.” Ac-

77 "At the Eye of the Htirricane"

cording to the account they met with FDR and recommended changes in the neutrality act. The implication that Martin favored revisions was clear but inacc~rate. '~~ On that same day the president asked Congress to repeal section six of the neutrality act prohibiting the arming of merchantmen. Although he described sections two and three (prohibiting Ameri- can vessels from sailing into combat zones and belligerent ports) as "crippling provisions," he did not request their abrogation. GOP isolationists were absolutely enraged at Willkie, who went further than the president by urging Republicans in Congress to try to repeal the entire act.

Once again Martin sought to heal the divide. He toured the country, traveling eight thousand miles in eighteen days, meeting with governors and other state, county, and local party officials. As in his western tour, he held a press conference in every city, dined with potential contributors and party activists, expressed optimism about 1942, and followed up with personal letters to those whom he met. By this time the animosity in the party was so great that it was affecting the National Committee's ability to perform its function. Martin was forced to curtail many committee activities as well as to pay his own hotel bills on the tour, because of the "squabble" over foreign policy.'39

On October 12 in a letter to Martin which was released to the press and praised by the New York Times, Governor William H. Wills (Vermont) expressed his dismay over the Republican foreign policy division and called for the creation of a "positive, vigorous, well knit, patriotic position." He urged Martin to assemble a party caucus of congressmen, governors, ex- presidents (there was only one, Hoover), and former presidential nominees to provide foreign policy leadership. The chairman's response, which went through several drafts, contended that diversity was natural and wholesome, but that the proper place for policy debate was in the two houses of Congress. Furthermore, a gathering such as Wills proposed might contribute to further disunity, as Wills was seen as a Willkie disci- ple. Martin concluded by stating that other Republican leaders agreed with him." Despite the reproach, Martin had not moved into the isolationist camp. When asked by Click magazine to submit fifty words on the most important duty of "Uncle Sam" in 1942, he mentioned three tasks, the first of which was to "get full defense industrial production to carry out the adopted policy of aid to Britain and for our own preparedness." (The other tasks were to preserve the American way of life and to solve the unemployment problem.)I4'

On October 17 the House voted 239 to 138 to repeal section six of the Neutrality Act, thereby authorizing armed merchantmen. Willkie was irritated because Republicans, including Martin, voted against the change 39 to 113. A few days later he persuaded three GOP senators (Styles Bridges, New Hampshire; Warren Austin, Vermont; John Gurney, South

78 Chapter 2

Dakota) to introduce a measure repealing the entire act-a proposal critics quickly dubbed the Willkie amendment. The following day he made public a letter to GOP congressmen drafted by him and signed by 124 Re-publicans, claiming that the act “in effect constituted aid to Hitler . . . it is both hypocritical and degrading.” According to Martin’s brother Ed, who came to know and respect Willkie during the campaign, that letter more than anything else completed the alienation with Congress.’@

Frank Gannett’s idea to have prominent critics meet to discuss Willkie’s pro-Roosevelt pronouncements was quashed by Alf Landon, who suggested, ”let the boys on the Hill take care of him.”143 Halleck and Short, allegedly backed by 80 percent of House Republicans, took steps to do so. They began a movement to read Willkie out of the party and designate Martin GOP spokesman. However, the minority leader‘s response made it nearly impossible to implement their scheme. Pri- vately, he attempted to dissuade them from such a step and publicly made the calling of such a caucus difficult by announcing, “We ought to be tolerant of one another.”*44 Less diplomatic than Martin, Willkie demanded the party purge itself of isolationists. An infuriated Short in a lengthy House speech, frequently interrupted by applause, assailed the former presidential candidate as a ”bellowing, blatant, bellicose, belligerent, bombastic blowhard who is above the Republican Party and its platform’’ and who was never really in the Party.145 Martin denied approving the speech, stating he had always tried to adjust party differences. Furthermore, he pointed out a member of Congress has the right to speak freely on the floor. “No one in this country,’’ he wrote, “has protected Mr. Willkie from attacks any more than I have.”146

Meanwhile the Foreign Relations Committee recommended and the Senate approved the repeal of sections two, three, and six of the neutrality bill. Witnesses in opposition were described by the distinguished columnist Walter Lippman as “Mr. Martin‘s Republicans.” The bill was then returned to the House, where after lengthy, impassioned debate, in which Martin took no part, the Senate additions were approved 212 to 194 (Republicans voted 22 to 137), enabling armed American merchantmen to sail into combat zones and belligerent ports. Martin’s observation to his constituents that these changes drew the nation into “direct participation in a shooting war’‘ was not released to the press. Nevertheless the minority leader’s balancing act was not playing well in Massachusetts. The Re- publican State Committee rejected Martin’s leadership by passing a resolution endorsing the policies advocated by Willkie, Leverett, Saltonstall, and Weeks as a means of defeating Hitler. Martin, however, believed, ”I have done what I think is for the best interests of the United States.’’l4’

Less than a month later, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor succeeded temporarily in doing what Martin had been unable to do: unite

79 “At the Eye ofthe Hurricane”

internationalists and isolationists. While attending a Washington Red- skins football game at Griffith Stadium on December 7, Martin was informed of the bombing and of a White House conference scheduled for 9:OO P.M. That evening Martin was perturbed for he ”cooled feet- corridor-thirty minutes” before meeting with the president, the cabinet, and other legislative leaders. After a briefing by Roosevelt the minority leader pledged 100 percent Republican support to the war effort and told reporters upon leaving, “In the hour of great danger there is no partisanship. In that hour we all stand as one people in support of America.” An enthusiastic Willkie telegraphed congratulations to Mar- tin on his comments. The following morning, December 8, Martin met with Speaker Rayburn and Majority Leader McCormack about parliamentary procedures to be followed on declaring war and, most likely, on the maneuvers necessary to prevent a speech from Representative Jeanette Rankin (Republican, Montana), a well-known pacifist, who had voted against American entry into World War I.148

That afternoon the president entered the House chamber on Martin‘s arm and requested a declaration of war against Japan. The minority leader was the first to speak at length. His remarks, emphasizing national unity, were cheered and applauded as he expressed the hope that there would not be a single dissenting vote.149 However, there was one- Rankin. Following adjournment she was jostled in the House cloakroom by angry, unauthorized men. Fearing for her safety, she retreated to a telephone booth and phoned for help. Martin stood guard until the Capitol Police arrived and escorted Rankin to her office.150

On December 10, the day before Germany and Italy declared war on the United States, Ed Flynn, the Democratic National Chairman, telegraphed Martin. (’In face of war politics are adjourned,” he wrote, and then suggested that Republican and Democratic facilities be made available for the sale of bonds and civil defense activities. A wary Mar- tin replied that the Republican Party would contribute to the war effort in every way possible, would answer any presidential requests, and would not let politics enter into national defense issues. Martin’s cau- tion was justified, for a politically shrewd Roosevelt telegraphed both men, thanking them for their “patriotic action’’ and stating “in time of war there can be no parfisan domestic [italics author’s] politics . . . the political truce is for the period of the emergency. My own thought,” he continued, “is that the two political party organizations can function to the best advantage in the field of civilian defense.’’ Suspecting that the president was trying to get him to agree to discontinue regular party ac-tivities, an interpretation shared by anti-FDR newspapers, which even charged Roosevelt with planning to cancel the 1942 elections, Martin publicly responded that both parties should cooperate in the common

80 Chapter 2

cause and "go on with their steady job of promoting their respective principles" as they prepared for the 1942 congressional election^.'^^

As a result of Pearl Harbor, Martin postponed a January meeting of Re- publican state chairmen to plan for the 1942 campaign. Furthermore, he urged that Lincoln Day be celebrated with patriotic demonstrations rather than GOP rallies. But so there would be no misunderstanding, he announced that Republicans, notwithstanding their refusal to capitalize upon the war for political purposes, "would fight to win elections in 1942 and uphold the great principles for which the party stands."lS2

WARTIME CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES

The closer the United States had drawn to war the more difficult it had become to maintain the impetus for the New Deal. Roosevelt himself believed Willkie would have been elected in 1940 if not for the European ~0nfl ic t . l~~The attack on Pearl Harbor a year later made further liberal programs nearly impossible. The president didn't push wartime congresses for new domestic measures until 1944, when victory was in sight. If he had attempted to do so, he probably would have failed. Congress was becoming increasingly jealous of the "swelling, expanding, hydra- headed executive."lw Martin cooperated with the administration in enacting defense measures and approving appropriations with dispatch but aided by conservative Democrats, used expanding defense expenditures as justification for attacking, reducing, and sometimes eliminating domestic ~ r0grams . I~~ Under his leadership the House Republican Confer- ence adopted a Declaration of Policy to heal the pre-Pearl Harbor foreign policy division by uniting the party behind general principles. The document rejected the idea of any negotiated peace by demanding that the United States and its allies "dictate the peace terms." In phrases sufficiently vague so that all factions could uphold them, it called for postwar cooperation by urging the United States to work with other nations for world understanding but without endangering American independence. More traditionally it condemned unnecessary taxes, unnecessary censor- ship, excessive profits, and restrictions on free enterprise, and urged a reduction in nondefense spending.y56

From January to March 1941 the debate on Lend-Lease had dominated the first session of the Seventy-seventh Congress. Martin had hoped with the resolution of that issue the House would return to more typical concerns; however, foreign policy overshadowed all other matters until adjournment on January 2, 1942. All-time high appropriations for defense provided a perfect opportunity for Martin and his allies to reduce funding for agricultural programs, the NLRB, and the wages and hours divi-

81 ”At the Eye of fheHurricane”

sion of the Department of Labor and to terminate the CCC, and WPA, which the president had hoped to continue into the postwar era.157 More- over, after failing to enact a sales tax, Martin and the Republicans with the help of conservative Democrats were able to include a regressive 5 per-cent flat income tax as part of the Treasury’s revenue ~ r 0 g r a m . l ~ ~

One of the ways Martin sought to reemphasize domestic issues was by the appointment of Republican study committees. One on price control was to monitor the Office of Price Administration, which Martin believed was a “dangerous step“ that could “destroy American industry.” Another was to protect small business from being “wiped out” by red tape and the way government contracts were let.159

In April 1942 Martin ”stole a march on the [House] Democrats” by introducing a bill providing for absentee voting for military personnel, a measure considered by many, especially Southerners, as a violation of state’s rights. Senate amendments to the House bill included provisions for voting in primaries, extending its applicability to those overseas, and enabling the military to vote without meeting state poll-tax requirements, which had kept about ten million poor white and blacks from voting. With Martin‘s powerful backing the House accepted the Senate amendments, but it was so late in the year that only 28,000 took advantage of the opportunity.

Martin’s relationship with the new Democratic leadership was superb and would remain so for the next two decades. The Majority Leader, McCormack, a fellow Bay Stater, was a treasured colleague, who often coordinated the House calendar with Martin and sometimes concluded his correspondence with the phrase ”If you have no objection.’’ (Their friendship was such that Martin had even intervened at McCormack‘s request to get a ticket fixed for one of the Democrat’s constituents who was caught speeding in Martin’s district.)16’ Martin and his friend Rayburn began a Rules Committee cooperation that lasted nearly twenty years. Fre- quently Martin would intercede to have one or two moderate Republi- cans vote with the six administration Democrats and prevent a coalition of two Southern Democrats and four Republicans from killing in committee wartime measures and important domestic legislation.162

Martin’s friendship with Democratic leaders did not prevent him from attempting to lessen the number of followers they had in Congress. In a special Texas election in 1941three candidates, Governor W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel, Congressmen Lyndon B. Johnson, and Martin Dies vied for the Democratic senatorial nomination, which was tantamount to election. Martin intervened to get a prominent Republican to support O’Daniel in an effort to defeat the New Deal devotee Johnson. After the election Mar- tin sent word to the victorious O’Daniel to come and see him any time in Washington, for he would not have many friends among New Dealers.163

82 Chapter 2

Martin‘s cooperation was rooted not merely in his personal friendship with several Democrats and in his belief in compromise and adjustment, but also in his perception of the role of the minority party in wartime. Al- though it was the duty of Republicans to keep the two-party system alive, they were obliged, he asserted repeatedly, to collaborate in rearmament, winning the war, and keeping their criticism constructive. The historian Isaiah Berlin, reporting on American affairs to the British government, was so moved by one of Martin’s addresses that he categorized the minority leader as like Willkie, one of the ”responsible” Republican leaders.’@ Moreover Martin began to speak out on postwar planning, proclaiming that the United States ”must prepare to take up our full part in helping to readjust the affairs of the world to an enduring peace. . . . We must help the other peoples of the world to help themselves.”16

As the war progressed and the Soviet Union fended off the German invasion, Americans became increasingly sympathetic with the Russians. Martin, on the other hand, became increasingly critical of this change in attitude, for he believed American Communists, aligned with Moscow, posed a danger to the country. He seldom criticized the “strange alliance” which drew the United States and the Soviets together, but charged wartime efforts to popularize Communism were dangerous. Domestic Communists, he claimed, had been coddled and allowed to flourish in our schools, labor unions, and the government itself. Their presence might mean the overthrow of our constitutional government and our Bill of Rights.166

THE 1942 ELECTIONS

Pearl Harbor may have temporarily united Republicans and Democrats behind the war effort, but it did little to unify the factional GOI? As RNC chairman one of Martin’s major goals was to restore party harmony in order to win the 1942 congressional election^.'^' However, the party was so badly divided that contributions had dropped to a perilous level. Many Eastern financial interests ”gunning” for Martin because he had refused to let them control the party withheld donations. Willkie commented, “The thing I like about Joe Martin is he has the guts to tell those fat cats to go to hell.” He did just that at the April RNC meeting, when Martin admitted, “They want me to go around asking two or three big fellas for money. I’m not going to do it. .. .This is a good time to put the party back in the hands of the common people. Perhaps we can win this year without spending a lot of money.” In addition to alienating donors because of this attitude, Martin’s role in anti-poll tax legislation also alienated wealthy Texan contributors, including the millionaire oilman Hugh Roy

83 “At the Eye ofthe Hurricane”

Cullen. Still others failed to donate, as they believed the RNC, under his direction, was unnecessarily antagonistic to Willkie, while anti-Willkie contributors wanted to force Martin out as chairman.168 Publicly Martin proclaimed the party was never in better financial condition; privately he confessed the RNC was “just one step ahead of the sheriff,” and that the situation was “desperate.” The committee payroll was met with great difficulty, and Martin often resorted to paying office help out of his own pocket. Expenses were slashed, and the RNC was forced to move out of its quarters when the CIO purchased the building.’69

One of Martin’s major considerations when selecting staff was budget- ary, and although his appointees may have been willing to serve without pay, as was Clarence Buddington Kelland, their selection created other problems. On January 4, 1942 Martin named Kelland publicity director, but in reality his task was to “breathe life” into state organizations. It was estimated that Kelland, a former newspaperman, editor of the Arnericari Boy, and author of movie scripts, would lose about $100,000 a year because of time and services donated to the party.170 He had actively campaigned in 1940 for Willkie but after a few months became critical of the Hoosier’s internationalism and especially his “loyal opposition” policy. To the publicist there could be loyalty and there could be opposition, but not in the ”same phrase.” In May of 1941 Kelland had urged Americans to rid the nation of those whose “gross antics, intolerance, inefficiency and social scheming brought the country to its present crisis”-to wit Secre- tary of Labor Frances Perkins, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes, and Roosevelt’s troubleshooting Lend-Lease administrator Harry Hopkins.

One of the few prominent Americans to congratulate Martin on his Kelland choice was Thomas E. Dewey. Willkieites, on the other hand, nettled that their leader had not been consulted on the appointment, interpreted the selection as an affront to their wing of the party. The Re- publican N e w York Herald Tribune published a scathing editorial criticizing Kelland and implying that Martin should resign because of this blunder. Protests were so many and so incisive that Kelland, afraid that he had embarrassed Martin, offered to resign. Refusing to give up “under fire,” Martin rejected the offer, publicly stated his respect for Kel- land, and declared that Pearl Harbor had ended the controversy between isolationists and internationalist^."^

Kelland also irritated Democrats. His first public pronouncement after taking office was to entreat every citizen to exercise the right, duty, and obligation to “engage vigorously in politics,” an indispensable activity in time of war. The administration, he promised, would be criticized whenever necessary for “when political unity comes in the door, human liberty goes out the window“; after all it had been political unity which plunged the world into war.172

84 Chapter 2

A short while later in a national radio address sponsored by the RNC, Martin too provoked Democrats. After vowing to maintain party organization, to monitor nondefense spending, and to protect private industry, he called for support of the commander-in-chief, without regard to race, color, religion, politics, or party. He went on to state that as a manifestation of unity, Roosevelt should use .the talents of men such as Hoover, Willkie, Dewey, Landon, and A1 Smith. He then named Hoover a second time-as possible head of the price control agency. Two weeks later in Cleveland he repeated essentially the same speech.173 As a result of that address and the appointment of Kelland, Ed Flynn, the Demo- cratic chairman, claimed Martin was playing politics and proclaimed there were dangers inherent in a 1942 Republican victory. In words that left little doubt the political truce was over, he declared, "No misfortune except a major military defeat could befall the country to the extent involved in the election of a Congress hostile to the president .. . vast confusion would inevitably result if we had a president of one party and a House of Representatives, for example, of the opposition party." To Flynn, Republicans appeared less interested in winning the war than controlling the House. An angry Martin accused the Democrat of desiring to liquidate the GOP, but Republicans, he said, despite the unfair- ness of Flynn's attack, would remain above partisanship and would continue to give Roosevelt 100 percent support for the war. One of the few things on which Martin and Flynn agreed was that the political truce was shattered-if ever there had been

Some of Martin's other appointments were also influenced by financial constraints. In March he selected Kenneth W. Wherry, Nebraska state chairman, as western director of the RNC and bade him to establish a special congressional committee for GOP candidates and to start raising money immediately. Martin warned Wherry finances were such that he was unable to guarantee reimbursement for expenses.175 In August Mar- tin persuaded Samuel B. Pettengill to accept the chairmanship of the GOP National Finance Committee, an office that in the past had been vacant between presidential elections. Pettengill, who had led the fight against Supreme Court reorganization and a third term, had also been a prominent isolationist lecturing for the America First Committee. Like Martin he now believed "all pre Pearl Harbor arguments must be dropped by all hands." Nevertheless, as with Kelland, Martin was again forced to defend his choice to Republican internationalists. Pettengill, who agreed to serve without pay as long as the chairman understood he was still a Democrat, described the party's financial straits as forcing Martin to be "like a beggar with a tin cup." He claimed that defeatism was as "thick as fog" at the RNC when he assumed his office, which had been on the verge of closing.'76To help solve these financial problems, in

85 ”At the Eye of the Hurricane”

September Martin appointed the publisher Frank E. Gannett as assistant RNC chairman. His main task was to raise money from the ”big contributors” to whom he had access.’”

In addition to trying to hold the party together on foreign policy issues and resolve the financial crisis, Martin was preparing for the 1942 cam-paign. In June he appointed seven subcommittees to advise and consult with him: organization, Negro activities, rural vote, southern states, large city problems, publicity, and women’s a~tivities.’~~ For years Martin had courted the women’s vote, priding himself on advocating rights for women. As early as 1934 he claimed to have voted for an equal rights bill.179 A few years later in an address honoring assemblywomen in New Jersey he stated, “I don’t enthuse over the success women have made as legislators because I always expected they would be successful.” Women, he affirmed, were just as able and responsive as men in taking on the hardest tasks-one doesn‘t speak of women’s work but of work that needs to be done; they do their fair share. By 1942 in appealing for women to vote he stated they “face the greatest challenge since their enfranchise- ment . . . the major burden of conducting and preserving the orderly process of free

Martin was even more determined to win blacks to the party. On sev-eral occasions he called for Republicans to increase opportunities in em-ployment and public service for African-Americans and repeatedly demanded that industry and government stop discriminatory hiring. He championed many African-American causes, for which he was commended by the head of the St. Louis chapter of the NAACP and described as “most friendly” to our goals by that organization’s national executive secretary, with whom Martin maintained close contact. He pushed for NAACP legislation prohibiting racial discrimination in enrollment, assignment, and promotion in the Woman’s Army Corps. His efforts on behalf of African-Americans may have contributed to an increase in the number of blacks voting Republican in 1942.18’

A challenge to Martin’s skills even greater that that of attracting the votes of blacks and women was the April 1942 RNC meeting. On the eve of that gathering the Young Republicans of New York, motivated in part by anger at Kelland’s appointment, called for the chairman’s resignation. Furthermore, rumors circulated in Republican circles that Willkie himself wanted Martin out. On the other hand, Taftites were distressed by what they perceived as Martin’s pro-Willkie stance, which was all the more obvious, they believed, when he defended the Indianan as “titular head of the party” against the Chicago Tribune charge Willkie was a “political turncoat.” Tensions were exacerbated when Willkie aiinounced he would have a resolution introduced at the meeting repudiating “anti- isolationism.” To Martin’s chagrin Willkie had ignored his request that

86 Chapter 2

the resolution be submitted to him before releasing it. Martin’s brother has speculated that maybe Willkie wanted the resolution defeated so that he could make an issue of it with the RNC. If so, Martin’s sagacity must have frustrated him.’@

Although Martin had appointed a committee of seven to rewrite, substitute if necessary, and then report on all resolutions, he planned to have the Willkie proposal pledging GOP support to a world organization accepted without going to committee. An angry Taft drew up his own proposal, which like Willkie’s called for total victory, but unlike his ignored postwar relationships. Taft persuaded Martin to send them both to committee. Hoping to prevent a public confrontation between these opposing ideologies, Martin convinced the committee to base its recommendations on the Willkie proposition. To Taft’s disappointment the committee’s resolution enjoining world cooperation as “an obligation” was unanimously approved. Ironically while Martin, behind the scenes, was advancing the Willkie perspective, the internationalist Herald Tribune was urging him to resign. According to the editorial, his duties as minority leader clashed with those as RNC chair and his votes gave the ”appearance” of isolationism and failure to represent the rank and file of the party. The Na- tional Committee ignored the denunciation and unanimously tendered a vote of confidence in its chairman.lE3

A pleased Wendell Willkie proclaimed that the resolution, which he called a victory, meant the abandonment of isolationism and required 1942congressional nominees to adhere to its precepts. Although the press, too, described the result as a Willkie triumph, Martin, nearly as elated as Willkie, claimed the resolution could not be called a victory for any one man. However, he announced that its provisions for uncompromising support of the war and its pledge for postwar cooperation with other nations were binding on the party and its representatives. The National Committee, he asserted, the party’s only legal authority, was the means by which the GOP declared policy and repudiated isolationism.lM

This announcement was most likely directed at John D. M. Hamilton, who had moved into the anti-Willkie camp and was trying to reassert his authority in party councils. In a letter addressed to all members of Con- gress and released to the press, he asserted that only the party’s representatives in the House could clarify the Republican position on the war effort. He urged a caucus be called and outlined principles which he thought should be approved by it-none of which dealt with postwar is- s u e ~ . ~ * ~Martin’s endorsement of the RNC resolution, a virtual denunciation of Hamilton’s suggestion, indicates that Taft may have been correct in his belief the chairman was sympathetic to the Willkie group. Another intimation that Martin may have been more an internationalist than is commonly thought was his advice to Willkie. For over a year he had


urged the Hoosier to position himself for a presidential runin 1944. When Willkie asked Martin to help recruit a good candidate for governor of New York in 1943, one who would eliminate Dewey, his potential rival for the Republican presidential nomination, Martin exhorted Willkie to run himself. He pointed out that Willkie could win and would therefore be unstoppable in 1944.18('

Those who believed Martin too much of a Willkie man contended the minority leader was destroying Republican confidence by not backing congressional Republicans. He was even accused of subordinating national welfare to his personal interests. Some of the isolationists, conservative on domestic issues, also faulted him for being too liberal in this area, having voted for social security, minimum wage, low farm loan rates, and an investigation of radio monopolies.*87 To still others his effort at nonpartisanship was offensive. When he advocated "cooperative opposition" in an address at the Michigan Republican Convention, the idea was condemned as not being "snappy enough." What was called for in-stead was "dynamic" opposition, which he was not providing. Further- more, he was chastised for failing to head a fighting minority and for not calling enough caucuses to promulgate policy. One congressman dismissed him as too nice for the job.'88

Many others were struck by Martin's congeniality, describing him as well liked, friendly to all, and a small-town boy with traditional values. Indicative of the latter was his devotion to professional baseball, a sport he defended as a morale booster against those who would cancel the sea- son because of the demands of essential wartime travel. Much was made of the fact that Martin did not smoke, drink, gamble, or stay up late.189 His press coverage was so favorable that according to his brother he received many marriage proposals in the mail.

That Martin ignored the marriage proposals, if he ever saw them, does not mean he ignored women. Although there was no special one in his life, he enjoyed female companionship. In 1941-1942 he met frequently with Helen Lombard for lunch. The beautiful daughter of the former president of the Washington Board of Education and wife of the prewar French military attache, she was the author of a syndicated Washington column and of the book Washington Waltz: Diplomatic People nnd Policies (1941). It appears from diary entries that he continued to see her the rest of the decade and may have been the source for many inside accounts in her columns as well as much of the gossipy Republican perspective in her While They Fought: Behind the Scenes in Washington 1941-1946 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947).

More lasting was his growing friendship with Clare Boothe Luce. Al- though their correspondence remained formal, addressing one another as "Mrs. Luce" and "Mr. Martin," it was obvious their relationship was

88 Chapter 2

becoming closer. Martin invited her to sit on the platform during the 1940 convention, where he would look over, wink, and then share convention insights with her. She sent her "admirer" a copy of Clarence Street's Union Now,which contended that all aid short of war leads to war. Martin, from whom she sought "moral comfort and practical advice," believed her one of the "stars" of the 1940 campaign and invited her to drop in and see him whenever she was in Washington. Furthermore, he urged her to run for Congress and wrote letters on behalf of her candidacy once she decided to do so. Their relationship entered a new phase when she defeated the Democratic incumbent and was elected as one of Connecticut's representatives to the Seventy-eighth Congress in 1942.I9O

Martin had a much easier time in the 1942 elections than did Luce. Re- districting had resulted in severing one of Fall River's Democratic wards from the congressional district while adding three Republican towns, which more than offset charges he was antilabor and an isolationist. Em- phasizing his national stature, the AFL support, and personal obligations he had built up over the years, Martin coasted to victory.191

In addition to electing Luce and reelecting Martin in 1942, the Republi- cans reduced the Democratic majority in the House to thirteen seats, an off-year party gain far above average. Voter resentment of government bureaucracy, especially the office of price administration, the alleged cod- dling of labor, discontent over farm prices, and anger about a war policy concentrating on Europe rather than the Japanese, had provided Republi- cans with gainful issues.192 However Martin, with only $145,000 to spend, was given much credit for the victory, especially as the controversial titular party head Willkie had maintained a low pr0fi1e.l~~

The election resulted in substantial Republican gains, but not a majority: the responsibility of controlling the House would not be theirs, but in cooperation with Southern Democrats, Republicans could check the New Deal. Consequently Martin interpreted the results as giving him as much "power" as Rayburn, if not more, for "my boys will hang together and his won't.'' In a postelection news conference he announced he would resign his chairmanship an RNC meeting on December 7. But despite the election optimism, the next month would be as politically contentious for Re- publicans as any month in the past two years. 194

NOTES

1. JosephW. Martin, Jr., as told to Robert J. Donovan, My First Fifty Years in Poli- tics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960, reprint; Westport, Corn.: Greenwood, 1975), 66.

2. William Allen White in Emporia Gazette, scrapbook 87, MP; NYT, 3 January 1939. 3. NYHT, 3 January 1939. 4. Clip, 28 July 1939, scrapbook 88, MI?

89 “At the Eye o f fhe Hurricane”

5. Cox to Martin, August 29,1939 and Martin to Cox, September 6,1939, MP. 6. See Allen Treadway’s speech in Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess.,

1939, 84: 4070-74; James T. Patterson, “A Conservative Coalition Forms in Con- gress, 1933-1939,” Iournal of American Hisfory 52 (March 1966): 758,769; Neil Mac- Neil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York McKay: 963), 283-84, 327; John F. Manley, ”Conservative Coalition in Congress,” American Be- havioral Scientist 17 (November-December, 1973): 231; Martin, First Fifty Years, 84-85. Hugh Scott stated the “coalition” was quite different under Martin than under his successor Charles Halleck, for then it became an obstructionist end in it-self. Anthony Champagne interview with Hugh Scott, June 23,1980, Sam Rayburn Library, Bonham, Tex.

7. Boston Herald, 2 January 1939. 8. Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 2d sess., 1939,85 1103 and 3d sess., 1940,86:

6457; Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975), 194; William S. White, ”Then Martin, Now Rayburn, and So On,” New York Times Magazine, 6 February 1955, 38; Hubert Kay, ”Joe Martin and the People,” Life, January 1,1940,50.

9. Quote is from “Mister Sam,” Time, October 13, 1961,27. See Hugh Scott and Burleson interviews with Anthony Champagne and the Allan Clary interview with W. H. Kamp and Mr. Dulany, Rayburn Papers; Floyd M. Reddick, ”Sam Ray- burn: He First Tries Persuasion,‘‘ ed. J. T. Salter, Public Men [n and Out of Office (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946), 157; Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, “Never Leave Them Angry,” Saturday Evening Post, January 18, 1941,23;Martin, in Firsf Fiffy Years, writes Rayburn had already borrowed the hat from someone and Martin, because he was already there, did not return to his apartment to get his. Contemporary accounts allege Martin swapped hats with Rayburn. See World Wide Photo Caption, Photo File, MP. Charles L. Clapp, The Congressman: His Work as He Sees I t (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1963; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980), 290. Clapp was legislative aid to Senator Saltonstall (Mass.); his book was endorsed by Martin. See Congressional Record, 89 Cong. 1st sess., 1965,110: 1920.

10. E.H. Taylor, “The Man Who Believes We Can,” C o u n t y Gentleman, August 1939,9; MacNeil, Forge, 109; “The Republican Party,” Fortune, August 1939,97;Leo Allen to Karl Mundt, November 21, 1939, MP; Randall B. Ripley, Party Leaders in the House of Representatives (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1967), 45; Charles E. Hewitt, Jr., “Martin-Small Town Big-Timer,” Scribner’s Commentator, October 1940,22; Scott Interview with Champagne.

21. Kay, ”Martin and People,” 51. 12. Martin, First Fifty Years, 82. 13. Clip, 6 March 1937, scrapbook 87, MP; ”GOP Tide Jars Democrats into

Study of New Deal Rift,” Nezosweek, February 27, 1939, 11-12. 14. Speech “Out of the Red to Recovery,” May 27,1939, MP. 15. David I,. Porter, Congress and the Waning of the New Deal (Port Washington,

N.Y Kennikat Press, 1980), 63-83. 16. Martin speech, C.B.S., Aug. 14, 1939, MP; clip, 12 June 1939, scrapbook 29;

clip 28 July 1939 scrapbook 88, MP. The following year the prohibitions were extended to state employees paid with federal funds.

90 Chapter 2

17. Patterson, “Conservative Coalition,” 761; clip, 24 August 1939, scrapbook 28, MP; NYT, 7 August 1939; and Press Release July 26,1939, MP.

18. Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess., 1939, 84: 1290; Fall River Herald News, 15 December 1939; Speeches December 2, 1939, May 27 and June 8, 1940, scrapbook 24, MP.

19. “Twelve Point Program“ and correspondence thereon, MP; NYT, 23 May; 6 July; 7 August 1939.

20. Martin to Congressional Leaders, July 22, 1939, MP; Speech on C.B.S., Au- gust 14,1939, MP.

21. New York Journal American, 17 February 1939; New York World Telegram, 10February 1939; New York Sun, 7 August 1939; NYHT, 8 August 1939; “Review of Seventy-sixth Congress,” Newsweek, August 14,1939,lO; Michael Frost, “Minority Joe Cracks the Whip,” Ken, April 13, 1939,19. The vice-chair of the Small Business Association of New England believed that “young liberals” such as Martin were providing the opportunity for a Republican comeback in 1940. Alfred C. Gaunt to Martin, March 21, 1939, MP.

22. “Washington Correspondents Name Ablest Congressmen in Life Poll,” Life, March 20,1939,12-13.

23. Samuel I. Rosenman, Working With Roosevelf (New York Harpers, 1952), 189; Martin, First Fifty Years, 94; Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, American White Paper: The Story of American Diplomacy and the Second World War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1940), 72, 75; NYT, 21 September 1939; David L. Porter, The Seuenty- sixth Congress and World War I1 1939-1940 (Colombia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1979), 57-58.

24. Memorial Day Speech, 1929, MI? 25. US. Congress, House of Representatives, To Prohibit Exportation of Arms, Mu-

nitions or Implements of War to Belligerent Nations, 70 Cong. 1st sess., Report #492 (Washington: GPO, 1928); Martin to Ralph A. MacGilyra, October 24,1934, MI’; El-ton Atwater, American Regulation of Arms Exports (Washington: Carnegie Endow- ment for International Peace, 1941), 176-84; Albert C. F. Westphal, The House Com- mittee on Foreign Aflairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), 178-84.

26. Christmas Greetings, 1929, Ml? 27. Congressional Record, 73 Cong. 1st sess., 1932, 7 7 1683-84; Atwater, Regula-

tion of Arms, 184-92. 28. Clip 1936, scrapbook 17, MP; Speeches April 1936, MP; October 12, 1938,

scrapbook, 26, MP. 29. Congressional Record, 74 Cong. 1st sess., 1935,77: 1435-37. 30. U.S.Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on American

Neutrality, 75 Cong. 1st. sess. 1937, Minority Report (Washington: GPO, 1937), 174-77; Robert A. Divine, The Illusion ofNeutrality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 162-98.

31. Undated speech, scrapbook 25, MP. 32. Martin to William S. Howe, February 2, 1939, to Walter Buck, February 27,

1939, to Horace Woodbury, February 27,1939, MP; Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess., 1939: 84 1074-1724, 1748-82, 1833-43 and 78 Cong. 2d sess., 1944, 90: 7380-82. In the 1944 elections nonfortification was used frequently against Re- publican candidates. Newsweek, August 14, 1944:3, printed extracts from official


publications to prove the issue really had been harbor improvement, ”The Truth About Guam . . . A Search of the Records.”

33. Clip, 3 August 1939, scrapbook 88, MP. 34. “M.R.A. in Washington,” Time, June 12, 1939, 54-55; National Moral Rear-

mament Program, June 4,1939, MP; Stanley High, “What Is Moral Rearmament,” Saturday Evening Post, August 12,1939,23,34, 36, 38-39.

35. Richard Ray Hanks, “Hamilton Fish and American Isolationism, 1920-1944” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Riverside, 1971), 147; Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess.,1939,84: A1396-1397.

36. Westphal, House Committee, 218-27; Francis Wilcox, “The Neutrality Fight in Congress,” American Political Science Review 33 (October 1939): 811-25; Gannett to Martin, April 14, 1939, MP; Martin, First F i fy Years, 92; Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess., 1939,84: 8512-8514.

37. Martin to Dawes Eliot, October 16, 1939, MP; NYT, 20 September 1939. 38. White to Martin, October 23, 1939 in Walter Johnson, ed., Selected Letters of

William Allen White 2894-2943 (New York: Holt, 1947), 399; Joseph Barnes, Willkie: The Events He Was Part Of-The ideas He Fought For (New York Simon & Schuster, 1952), 223.

39. Landon to Martin, October 24 and 31,1939, MP. 40. Martin to Landon, November 4, 1939, Alfred M. Landon Papers, Kansas

State Historical Society, Topeka, Kansas; NYT, 29 30 October 1939. Interview with Boston Globe, 19 November 1939.

41. Martin, Firsf F f ty Years, 94. 42. Martin to B. A. Acornley, April 12, 1939, MP. 43. John M. Shakeen to Francis Case, attached to Case to Martin, March 10,

1939; Brewster to Martin, November 20,1939; Arthur Capper to Martin, Septem- ber 6, 1939; Leo Allen to Martin, November 20 and 24,1939; all in MP.

44. Landon to Martin, June 21, August 29, September 8, 1939, MP; Donald R. McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska, 1966), 424-30; clips, January 1939, scrapbook 28, MI?

45. Clips, January 1939, scrapbook 28, MP; “GOP Grooms Its Dark Horses,” Neruszueek, February 12, 1940, 15-16; Richard Norton Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times (New York Simon & Schuster, 1982), 290-93; Donald B. Johnson, The Re- publican Party and Wendell Willkie (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960), 31-32,71.

46. Martin to Marian Martin, October 21,1939, MP. 47. Frick offered her father’s gold-plated railroad car for the use of the eventual

1940 nominee Wendell Willkie. Martin, his campaign manager, rejected the offer on the grounds that the candidate was “a man of the people.” Martin, First Fifty Years, 86-87, 113, 123; Edward Martin, 1940 Notes, MP.

48. For examples see Providence Bulletin, 20 December; Rock Island Argus, 8 Au-gust; Syracuse Herald, 9 April; Portland (Me.) Press Herald, 23 August; Nezu York Mir-ror, 1 December 1939 and endorsement in the Hudson (N.Y.) Daily Star, 19 No-vember 1939.

49. Moley, ”Perspectives: Martin of Massachusetts,” Newsweek, August 21,1939, 44.

50. Scrapbooks 29 and 30, MP.

92 Chapter 2

51. Clip, 23 March 1940, scrapbook 29, MP. 52. Dewey to Martin, February 20, April 7 and 25, May 12, and September 10,

11, 1939, Thomas E. Dewey Papers, University of Rochester Library, Rochester, New York; Martin to John D. M. Hamilton, February 24,1940, Hamilton Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; NYT, 16 February 26 1940; WP, 29 February 1940; clip, 5 March 1940, scrapbook 29, MP.

53. Homer Cummings to Martin, December 29,1939, Martin to Cummings, Jan- uary 2, 1940, Roosevelt Papers, PPF 1069, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.; James A. Farley, ]im Farley’s S toy: The Roosevelt Years (New York McGraw-Hill, 1948), 196,211; Kansas City Star, 29 January 1940.

54. Floyd M. Reddick, “The Third Session of the Seventy-sixth Congress Janu- ary 3, 1940-January 3, 1941,” American Political Science Review 35 (April 1941): 284-303; Sidney M. Milkis, The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System Since the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 139; Richard N. Chapman, Contours ofPublic Policy, 2939-2945 (New York Garland, 1981), 94; scrapbook 29, MP.

55. For interest in Massachusetts politics see Martin to William H. Doyle, De- cember ll, 1939, MP; and to B.H. Bristow Draper, June 20, 1931, MP; Speeches McKinley Day Dinner, March 30, 1940 and ”The Victory March of 1940,” April 1940, MP.

56. Although Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and Governor Leverett Saltonstall, who were elected on the same slate with Martin, were sympathetic toward his candidacy, they were vying with Martin for GOP leadership in the state. NYT, 2, 5 May 1940; Boston Post, 3 May 1940; clip, 29 April, scrapbook 28, MP. Martin had antagonized Saltonstall in 1938 by trying to get him to withdraw from the contest for nomination as governor in favor of Martin‘s friend Congressman George Bates. Leverett Saltonstall as told to Edward Weeks, Salty: Recollections ofa Yankee in Politics (Boston: Boston Globe, 1976), 60.

57. Smith, Dewey, 306-7. 58. Sinclair Weeks, Notes on the Willkie Campaign, Hamilton Papers; Martin,

First Fifty Years, 151. 59. Edward Martin as told to James J. Kenneally, Down Memory Lane (North

Easton, Mass.: privately printed, 1987), 40; Joseph Martin, First Fifty Years, 152; NYT, 21 May 1940.

60. Radio broadcast, June 22,1940, MP. 61. ”Hearings of Contests for Making up Temporary Roll of the Convention

Proceedings of the Meeting of the Republican National Committee,” Philadelphia, June 20,1940, Republican Party Papers, Series A: 1911-1960 (Frederick, Md.: Uni- versity Publications of America, 1986), 488-90.

62. Boston Herald, 26-27 June 1940; scrapbook 29, MP. For reports of a large block of congressman leaning toward Martin as a stop Willkie candidate, see Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, 24 June 1940.

63. Carlisle Bargeron, Confusion on the Potomac: The Alarming Chaos and Feuds of Washington (New York: Funk, 1971), 23.

64. Twenty-second Republican National Convention, Oficial Proceedings (Washing-ton: Judd and Detweiller, 1940), 94-100. Martin often referred to the campaign as a “crusade.” See his speeches of October 31, November 3,1940, MP.


65. "Planted" is the description in Oficial Proceedings, 101; scrapbook 88, MP; according to the NYT, 26 June 1940, when bussed Martin quipped, "Business is picking up."

66. Warren Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), 66.

67. Henry Z . Scheele, Charlie Halleck: A Political Biography (New York: Exposi- tion, 1966), 93-94; Joseph Martin, First Fifty Years, 152; Edward Martin, Down Mem- o y Lane, 43; Republican Convention, Oficial Proceedings, 158-61.

68. Steve Neal, Dark Horse: A Biography of Wendell Willkie (Lawrence, Kans.: Uni- versity Press of Kansas, 1989), 105-6; Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie Fighterfor Freedom (Marquette, Mich.: Northern Michigan University Press, 1966), 181; Her-bert s.Parmet and Marie B. Hecht, Never Again: A President Runs for a Third Term (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 149; Martin, First Fifty Years, 154, states the tickets were counterfeited by an unknown culprit.

69. Republican Convention, OficiaI Proceedings, 211, 283, 293, 299, 307; Martin, First Fifty Years, 155-56.

70. Republican Convention, Oficial Proceedings, 305. 71. Edward Martin, Dorun Memory Lane, 44; Joseph Martin, First Fifty Years,

155-59; Parmet, Never Again, 154;Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 98; Bamard, Willkie, 545.

72. Martin, First Fifty Years, 159, 161; Parmet, Never Again, 159-60; clip, 14 July 1940, scrapbook 30, MP.

73. Republican Convention, Oficial Proceedings, 353-54; NYHT editorial, 7 July 1940; Could Lincoln column Washington Star, 11July 1940; Parmet, Never Again, 161; clips, scrapbook 88, MI?

74. Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 64-65; Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 79. Among the scholars who state that Willkie had promised the chairmanship to Hamil- ton are: Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 111; Neal, Dark Horse, 123; Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 135; McCoy, Landon, 446. Bamard, Willkie,548-49, avers that it is likely Willkie never made the promise, but someone made it in his name.

75. Barnes, Willkie, 92; Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 137. 76. Providence Evening Journal, 30 June 1940; Henry 0.Evjen, "The Willkie Cam-

paign: An Unfortunate Chapter in Republican Leadership," lournu1 of Politics 14 (May 1952): 246.

77. Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 111-13; Neal, Dark Horse, 124-25; Mar-tin, First Fifty Years, 104-8; "Busy Willkie," Newsweek, July 22, 1940, 17.

78. James MacGregor Burns, Deadlock of Democracy: Four-Party Politics in Amer- ica (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968), 195-203.

79. Marquis Childs, I Writefrom Washington (New York: Harpers, 1942), 205. 80. NYT, 9 July; 8 October 1940. 81. Wilfred E. Binkley, "Wendell Willkie the Party's Embarrassing Conscience,"

in Salter, Public Men, 66; Neil, Dark Horse, 131, Martin, First Fifly Years, 110. 82. Martin, First Fifty Years, 110-11; the church note, MP; clip, 17 August, scrap-

book 30, MP; Neal, Dark Horse, 134-37. 83. NYT, 17 August 1940. 84. Joseph Martin, First Fifty Years, 107-9; Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane,

51-52; Samuel J. Woolf, 'Stage Managers of the Big Political Show," New York 7imes

94 Chapter 2

Magazine, 15 September 1940, 15, 22; Evjen, "Willkie Campaign" 244-53; Neal, Dark Horse, 149; Parmet, Never Again, 206-8; Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 120,158-59; Robert L. Norton column, Boston Post, scrapbook 30, MP.

85. Christian Science Monitor, 5 September 1940; Evjen, "Willkie Campaign," 250 and "Republican Strategy," 302.

86. Hamilton later claimed that Willkie asked him to take over the campaign, for Martin was "doublecrossing" him by concentrating on congressional elections. Hamilton asserts he refused, because if Martin became Speaker and Willkie president it would be impossible for them to work together. The only evidence for this contention is Hamilton's word, which is dismissed in Barnard's Willkie with the charge Hamilton is not a reliable witness and writes fiction, 543, 549. There is no doubt that for years Hamilton resented the Martin appointment. See Hamilton, "Willkie: First Trip," 14-16, and the draft of his memoirs, 1-6 (where he makes the claim), and marginal notes on Karl Lamb, "John Hamilton and the Revitalization of the Republican Party 1936-1940," all in Hamilton Papers.

87. "Finance Report," November 26, 1940, MP. 88. Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane, 50-51; 0.John Rogge, The Oficial Ger-

man Report: Nazi Penetration 1924-1942, Pan-Arabianism 1939-Todny (New York, Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), 256; Ladislas Farago, The Game of the Fox (New York: David McKay, 1971), 383; Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 149.

89. Parmet, Never Again, 233-34; Moscow, Roosevelt and Willkie, 149; John Hamilton, "The John L. Lewis Broadcast," Hamilton Papers.

90. Roosevelt to Edward Taylor, August 12, 1940 in F.D.R.: His Personal Letters, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New York Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1948-1950), 2:1055.

91. J. Garry Clifford and Samuel B. Spencer Jr., The First Peacetime Draj (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 193-96; Martin, First Fifty Years, 111; Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 133-34; NYHT, August 24, 1940, NYT, September 8,11,13,1940.

92. Memorandum, August 2, 1940 in Roosevelt, Personal Letters, 2:1051. 93. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation (New

York, Harpers, 1952), 749-72; NYT, 4 September 1940. 94. Speeches of October 28, 30, 1940, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin

D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I . Rosenman (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), 9:506, 523.

95. Robert E. Shenvood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: A n Intimate History (New York: Harpers, 1948), 189-90; Martin, First Fifty Years, 117-19.

96. "Mr. Speaker," Time, November 18,1945,25. 97. Clips, 31 October; 1 November 1940, scrapbook 31, MP; Boston Globe, 4 No-

vember 1940. 98. Barton to Martin, September 20,1960, Bruce Barton Papers, State Historical

Society of Wisconsin, Madison. For an account of the origin of the phrase see John Kenneth Galbraith, A Life in Our Times: Memoirs (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 19-120, which contrasts with that of another speechwriter, Samuel Rosenman, in "Where Are They Now?" Nezosweek, September 25,1961,20.

99. Martin to Basil Brewer, September 13,1940, Brewer Papers, Joint Collection University of Missouri Western Historical Manuscript Collection-Columbia and State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Mo..; NYT, 2, 3, 4, September;


24 October 1940; Fall River Herald Nezus, 4 November 1940; scrapbook 30, MP; Evjen, “Republican Strategy,” 308.

100. Edward Martin, “Notes on 1940,” MP; Alden Hatch, Ambassador Extraordi- nary: Clare Boothe Luce (New York: Holt, 1955), 120.

101. Perle Mesta with Robert Kahn, Perk M y Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), 114,120; Mesta to Martin, January 22,1951, MI’; Robert S. Allen and William V. Shannon, The Truman Merry-Go-Round (New York: Vanguard, 1950), 154.

102. Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane, 53. For Divine see Jill Watts, God, Harlem U.S.A.: The Fafher Divine Story (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) and Robert Weishot, Father Divineand the Struggle for Racial Eqiiality (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983).

103. It is estimated about 50°/0 of blacks voted for Willkie; James J. Kenneally, ”Black Republicans During the New Deal: The Role of Joseph W. Martin, Jr.,” Re-view of Politics 54 (winter, 1993): 128-34.

104. Chronicle, July-November 1940; scrapbook 30, MP. 105. Martin, First Fifty Years, 119-20. 106. Tris Coffin, “A Man of the Good Old Days,” New Republic, February 17,

1947,30. 107. Martin, First F i fy Years, 120; NYT, 7 December 1940. 108. Years later Halleck, who had broken with Martin, claimed Martin quit

three or four times during the campaign and that Willkie could not have made a worse selection, for his choice may have been the difference between victory and defeat. Halleck Oral History, 28, in possession of Professor Robert H. Ferrell, Uni- versity of Indiana.

109. Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U. S . Presidential Elections 1940-2948 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1974), 81; Neal, Dark Horse, 177-78; Moscow, Roose-velt and Willkie, 136-37; Martin‘s copy of One World in the Martin Papers.

110. Edward J. Flynn, You‘re the Boss (New York: Viking, 1947), 168; Binkley, ”Willkie,” 66; Philadelphia Record, November 12,1940.

111. Boston Post, 8 November 1940; United Press International (henceforth UPI) release 8 November 1940, scrapbook 30, MP.

112. Martin, First Fifty Years, 163. 113. Martin, First Fifty Years, 92. 114. NYT, 12, 13 November 1940; Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 167. 115. NYT, 12 December 1940; clip, December 1940, scrapbook 30, MP. 116. Quoted in Neal, Dark Horse, 189. 117. Fletcher to Landon, January 31, 1941, Henry D. Fletcher Papers, Manu-

script Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., henceforth FP; clip, 15 De-cember 1940, scrapbook 31, MP; NYT, 31 January 1941.

118. Churchill to Roosevelt, December 7, 1940, in Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence, ed., Warren F. Kimball (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 1969), 1: 102-9. ”Annual Message, January 6,1941,” Rosenman, ed., Roosevelt Public Papers, 9: 663-72.

119. Congressional Record, 77 Cong. 1st sess., 1941,87:101-2. 120. McCoy, Landon, 456-57; NYT, 19 January 1941. 121. Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-2942 (Balti-

more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 199.

96 Chapter 2

122. NYT, 31 January; 1February 1940; scrapbook 31, MP. 123. Boston Transcript Poll, scrapbook 31, MP. 124. Congressional Record, 77 Cong. 1st. sess., 1941,87: A522; "Joe Martin Says,"

The Republican, March 1941,3; Boston American, 9 February 1941; Martin, First Fifty Years, 95.

125. Martin to Willkie, March 19,1941, MP; NYT, 1-3,12,13 February; 15-16, April 1941; NYHT, 26 February 1941; Martin to Constituents February and March 1941, scrapbook 33, MP; Clarence Berdahl, "Political Parties and Elec- tions," American Political Science Review 37 (February, 1943): 72; Martin, First Fifty Years, 129-30. Martin's anti-Willkie mail from "ordinary" Republicans grew in volume during 1941.

126. Congressional Record, 77 Cong. 1st sess.,1941,87 2167; NYT, 12 March 1941. 127. For criticism from isolationists see Martin, First Fifty Years, 92. For an in-

terpretation that those labeled isolationist were really anti-Axis, see Manfred Jonas, "Pro-Axis Sentiment and American Isolationism," The Historian 29 (Febru-ary 1967): 221-237. Justis D. Doeneche, "The Strange Career of American Isola- .tionism, 1944-1954," Peace and Change 3 (summer fall, 1975): 79, believes it would be more accurate to abandon the term "isolationist" and substitute instead opponents of Roosevelt's and Truman's version of collective security.

128. Pearson column WP, undated and 16 October 1941, scrapbook 31, MP. 129. Martin to Charles F. Dickinson, February 20,1941, MP; "Who Is Your Per-

sonal Choice for National GOP Chairman," The Republican, March 1941, 11;Mar-tin, First Fifty Years 126-27.

130. Chronicle, 31 March 1941; scrapbook 31, MP; Mrs. Victor N. Remley to Mar- tin, March 29,1941, MP.

131. Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 181. 132. Plumley to Martin, May 27, 1941, MP. Plumley's letter of September 18

makes it apparent that he was searching for internationalist leadership. Hoover to Mott, September 12, 1941, Herbert Hoover Papers, Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa.

133. Scrapbook 32, MP. 134. The "secret" meeting is reported in Pearson WP column of 15 August 1941.

Inside information on Republican congressional activities was frequently reported in his column. The meeting was also mentioned in Ray Tucker's column in the New Bedford Standard Times, 18 August, as a Washington rumor in the Boston Herald, 23 August 1941, and is not inconsistent with Martin's remarks in First F f f y Years, 96.

135. Martin, First Fifty Years, 96-98; Congressional Record, 76 Cong. 1st sess., 1941,87 7074-77.

136. Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 192. 137. Clips, 27-29 September, scrapbook 32, MP. 138. Scrapbook 33, MP. 139. Scrapbooks 33, 90, MP; Martin to Gordon Allot, October 18, 1941 and to

Jack B. Zahniser, October 22,1941, MP. Contributing to the shortage of funds was Martin's refusal to woo wealthy donors who wanted a say in party affairs because of their contributions; see below pages 82-83.

140. Wills to Martin, October 12 and Martin to Wills, November 3, 1914, MP. 141. Martin to Click, October 22, 1941, MP.


142. Edward Martin, Diary, July 31,1945, MP. 143. Landon to Gannett, October 23, 1941, enclosed in Gannett to Hoover,

October 27,1941, Hoover Papers. 144. Washington News, 13 November 1941. 145. The speech as reported in the NYT, 7 November 1941, is more vitriolic than

that in the Congressional Record, which was probably edited. Congressional Record, 77 Cong. 1st sess., 1941,87 8587-8589.

146. Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 197-98, claims Martin cleared the speech. Martin wrote many letters denying that and calling for tolerance in the party, MP. Earlier Martin had been criticized for not preventing an anti-Willkie speech in Congress by Lambertsen and gave essentially the same reply. See Mar- tin to Harry L. Bums, October 27,1941, MP. For additional pressures on Martin to make Republicans the peace party see Ronald Radash, Prophets on the Right: Pro- files of Conservative Critics of American Globalism (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1975), 227.

147. Martin to Constituents, November 1941, MP; late November clips, scrapbook 33, MP; Martin to Hoover, November 19,1941, Hoover Papers.

148. Martin Diary, December 7, 8, 1941, MP; telegram Willkie to Martin, De- cember 8, 1941, Wendell Willkie Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloom- ington, Indiana; Martin, First Fi fy Years, 99.

149. Congressional Record, 77 Cong. 1st sess., 1941, 87 9766. 150. Kevin S. Giles, Flight of the Dove: The Story of Jeanette Rankin (Beaverton,

Ore.: Touchstone, 1980), 124, 180-81. No source describes Martin‘s role in this affair, but a photograph in the NYT, 9 December 1941, shows him standing outside the booth while Rankin phones.

151. Flynn to Martin and Martin to Flynn, December 10; Roosevelt to Martin and Flynn, and Martin to Roosevelt, December 11,1941, MP. ‘meearliest report of rumors about canceling 1942 elections was in Arthur Krock’s NYT column, 18 Sep-tember 1941.

152. Letters to State Republican Leaders, December 1941, MP; scrapbook 33, MP; Berdahl, “Political Parties,” 75.

153. Chapman, Contours, 79. 154. Press Conference, December 28, 1943, Rosenman, ed., Roosezdt Public

Papers, 12: 570-71. 155. Martin to Henry Hazlett, January 12,1942, MP. 156. Press Release, September 22,1943, MP. 157. Chapman, Contours, 71,73-75,160-65; Floyd M. Riddick, “The Second Ses-

sion of the Seventy-seventh Congress, January 6-December 16, 1942,” Arnericnn Political Science Review 37 (April 1943): 297-99.

158. Scrapbook 33, MI? 159. Press Releases, August 4 and 11,1941, MP. NYT, 11 August 1941; speeches

in scrapbook 32, MI? 160. Congressional Record, 77 Cong. 2d sess., 1942,88: 6314,7006-7, 7064; scrap-

book 30, MP; Gilbert J. Steiner, The Congressional Conference Committee: Seventieth to Eightieth Congresses (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951), 115-16.

161. Telegram, McCormack to Martin, September 22,1934 and letter to Martin, same date, MP.

98 Chapter 2

162. Earl C. Michner to Bertrand W. Gearhart, August 4,1942, MP; Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964), 74.

163. Dick Tullis to Martin, May 27, 1941, Martin to Tullis, May 28, 1941, Tullis to Martin, July 16, and Martin to Tullis, July 22, 1941, MP. 164. Washington Despatches 1941-1945: Weekly Political Reports from the British

Embassy, ed. H. G . Nichols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), despatch of February 1942,19-20.

165. Speech to Boston Masons, September 18,1942, MP. 166. Clips, scrapbooks 32,33, MP. 167. Martin to Raymond Moley, February 10,1942 and to Albert T. Reid, May 4,

1942, MP. 168. Martin, First Fifty Years, 121-26; Thomas Stokes column, April 22, 1942,

scrapbook 33, MP. 169. Sinclair Weeks to Martin, January 7, 1942; Alf Landon to Martin, October

29, 1941, MP; Martin to Landon, July 18, 1942, Landon Papers; George H. Rock- well to Martin, October 17,1941, Martin to Rockwell, October 20, 1941; Martin to Warren Shroeder, June 27, 1942; Address to RNC, April 1942; Martin to Colonel Robert R. McCormack, October 17, 1942, all in MP; Washington News, 24 Septem- ber 1942; Martin at RNC Meeting, September 29, 1942, Republican Party Papers.

170. Bruce Barton to Warren R. Austin, March 17,1942, Barton Papers. 171. Kelland to Martin, January 19, 1942; Martin to Kelland, January 21, 1942;

Martin to Albert T. Reid, May 4, 1942, MI? 172. NYT, 9 January 1941. 173. Speeches January 12, and 30, MP. 174. Scrapbook 33, MI? 175. Martin to Wherry, March 10,October 14,1942, Wherry to Martin, March 11,

1942, MP. 176. Pettengill to Martin, August 17, 1942, and George W. Simmons to Martin,

August 15, 1942, MP; Helen M. Pettengill, ed., M y Story by Samuel B. Pettengill (Lebanon, N.H.: Whitman Press, 1979), 225-26.

177. Gannett to Members of RNC, September 18, 1942, MP; Washington News, 20 September 1942.

178. Press Release, June 9,1941, MP. 179. Martin to Mrs. Celine M. Deumar, October 6, 1934, MP. Martin was not

quite accurate; a constitutional amendment was introduced and sent to committee, where it died.

180. N.J. Speech, August 29,1941, MP; clip scrapbook 34, MP. 181. Kenneally “Black Republicans,” 133-38; Walter White to Martin, February

2, 1942; Martin to White, February 3, 1942, White to Martin, February 4, 1942, NAACP Papers, Part 9, Discrimination in the U.S. Armed Forces 1918-1955, series A (Frederick, Md.: University Publication of America), 234-35, 24041.

182. NYT, 15, 16 April 1942; A. J. Anderson to Taft, April 21, 1942, Robert Taft Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington; Joseph Martin Press Conference, April 19,1942, MI’; Edward Martin, Notes, July 31,1945, MP.

183. Scrapbook 34, MP; Minutes RNC Meeting, April 20, Republican Party Pa- pers; one of the best inside accounts of the meeting is Robert Taft to Hulbert Taft, April 21, 1942, Taft Papers. Also critical of Martin, accusing him of keeping the


GOP the party of isolation and clinging to old party prejudices, was Time. See ”The Congress,” May 25,1942, 13-15.

184. Roscoe Drummond interview in Christian Science Monitor, 23 April 1942. 185. Hamilton’s Press Release, April 18, MP. 186. Martin, First Fi fy Years, 13. 187. Walter Karig, “What Happened to JoeMartin,” Liberty, November 22,1941,

64-65. 188. NYT, 16 September 1942; clips, scrapbook 34, MP; Samuel Crowther to

George Peek, February 24, to Roy Woodruff, March 4, Woodruff to Peek, May 8, Peek to Woodruff, May 17 and June 15 all in 1942 in Peek Papers at joint Collec- tion of Missouri Western Historical Manuscript Collection, Columbia and State Historical Society of Missouri; Ernest M. Morris to Martin, March 20, 1942, MP; Charles A. Plumley to Martin, April 28, July 24, 1942, MP; Usher L. Burdick to RNC Survey 1942, MI?

189. W.M. Kiplinger, Washington Is Like TIznt (New York: Harpers, 1942), 405. 190. Luce to Martin, April 4 and Martin to Luce, April 9,1941, MP; Luce to Mar-

tin, September 5 and Martin to Luce, September 29, 1942, Clare Boothe Luce Pa- pers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, henceforth LI’; Stephen Shadegg, Clare Boothe Luce: A Biography (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970), 119.

191. Chronicle, July-November, 1942; scrapbooks 34, 35, MP; “A Congress to Win the War,“ Special Issue Nezo Republic, May 1942,685-97.

192. John Morton Blum, V was for Victory: Politics and American Culture During World War ZZ (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 233. For an interesting summary of this election see Donald R. McCoy, “Republican Opposition During Wartime, 1941-1945,” Mid America 49 Uuly 1967): 174-89. Postelection analysis revealed the election was more a Democratic loss than a Republican victory as the bulk of the electorate voted as in the past, but in 1942 fewer Democrats voted. See Hadley Cantril and John Harding, ”The 1942 Congressional Elections,” American ZJolitical Science Review 38 (February 1944): 49-56; Richard L. Polenberg, War and Society: The United Stutes 2941-1945 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1972), 189.

193. Chicago Tribune, 11 October 1942, cited in Johnson, Republican Party and Willkie, 221; John Chamberlain, “Herbert Brownell,” Life, April 9, 1945, 115; Ed Martin claimed Willkie did not become involved as he believed only a miracle could bring about Republican gains. Martin, Notes March 8,1948, MP.

194. Martin to R.H. Hubble, December 12, 1942, MP; NYT, 8 November 1942. Quote is in Frank McNaughton Interview, November 6, 1942, McNaughton Pa- pers, Harry s.Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

3

"Often. . . Like Cobra and Mongoose"l: 1943-1946

ELECTION OF MARTIN'S RNC SUCCESSOR

For fourteen months Chairman Martin had prepared for the 1942 elections, dedicating his weekends and congressional recesses to traveling

19,000 miles, delivering 111 speeches, and presiding at innumerable political gatherings. Consequently, when he announced he would resign at the December RNC meeting in order to concentrate on his duties as minority leader, no one doubted his resolution. As early as October Illinois committeemen had begun soliciting votes for their colleague Warren W. Schroeder as the new chairman. A prewar "isolationist," supported by Taft and Colonel McCormick, Schroeder's candidacy immediately provoked opposition from the party's internationalist, liberal, Willkie wing. The New York Herald Tribune, the voice of the eastern establishment, criticized the candidate as an isolationist, and Willkie pledged to "repudiate the committee and all its works" if Schroeder were chosen. It was readily apparent unless Schroeder withdrew the December meeting would turn into a factious battle, further dividing the Republicans and endangering their chances for 1944.

Martin publicly expressed his hope for a less controversial candidate who would bridge both wings of the party. However, as no viable moderate emerged and the anti-Schroeder forces failed to rally behind a single contender it appeared, even to Martin, that Schroeder might win.

The evening before the meeting, Martin, still searching for a less divisive choice, tried to convince Schroeder to withdraw. That same night McCormick, whose Chicago Tribune was touting Schroeder 's candidacy,

101

102 Chapter 3

warned Martin of “a third party in America,” if the Illinoisan were not elected. Taft, more subtle, merely appealed to the chairman to endorse Schroeder.2 Meanwhile Willkie forces caucused and finally rallied around Frederick Baker, national committeeman from Seattle. Martin continued to search for a centrist, finally settling upon Harrison Spangler of Iowa.

The following day the RNC accepted Martin’s resignation and nominated five candidates to succeed him. At the conclusion of the first ballot Schroeder and Baker were tied at forty, with fifteen for Spangler and four for others. A second ballot resulted in Baker increasing to forty-three, Schroeder dropping to thirty-eight, and Spangler remaining at fifteen. Optimistic Bakerites opposed a recess notion offered by Schroeder forces. Nevertheless the motion carried fifty-eight to thirty-eight. (Martin claimed he moved for the recess, which he could hardly do as presiding officer. Although he may have been behind the motion, the record shows a Schroeder delegate made it.)

During the lengthy two-hour recess, Martin huddled with party leaders and the nominees. When the session resumed Schroeder and Baker withdrew their candidacies and asked their supporters to vote for Span- gler. The latter, unanimously elected, was escorted to the platform by Schroeder and Baker as the delegates sang the “Iowa Corn Song” in honor of the new chairman.

Although disappointed, Schroeder found solace in his belief that Baker’s withdrawal prevented “New Deal Republicans” from controlling and then wrecking party ma~hinery.~ Other Republicans, however, saw the defeat of Schroeder as a Willkie triumph. The Hoosier himself when asked about the results replied, ”a person should not boast after a victory,” and then stated, “My fight was to prevent the masthead of the Chicago Tribune from being implanted on the Republican Party. I am happy that the result prevented that ~alamity.”~ Martin, who again received accolades for preventing a Republican fiasco, merely stated, “we selected the best man available.” To several correspondents he confided that Willkie had nothing to do with the election; Spangler was chosen by the committee as someone who could unite the party.5

THE SEVENTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

One of the ways the Bay Stater hoped to capitalize upon new GOP congressional strength was to increase the number of Republicans on House Committees. He publicly promoted the slogan “twelve to thirteen or fight,” meaning that if the Democratic leadership did not agree to have twelve Republicans to thirteen Democrats on every committee of twenty- five, with the same proportion on other committees, he would initiate a

103 “Often . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose”

floor fight on the issue. To Democrats, who objected to his demand on the basis that the present proportion was the same as the most recently GOP-controlled House, Martin replied precedent was irrelevant. Wartime situ- ations, which require both parties to work together, changed everything, he claimed. Following his public challenge, Martin met privately with friends in the Democratic leadership, Rayburn and McCormack, and hammered out a compromise. The proportion of Republicans to Democrats was increased on nearly every committee, not quite to the same extent as Martin originally insisted, but enough to satisfy the wily Republican.6

Each of the twenty-nine new Republicans dreamed of filling a vacancy on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, an assignment seldom given freshmen. Clare Luce, whom Martin helped elect, publicly announced that as her first choice. Some observers expected her wish to be fulfilled due to her friendship with the floor leader. But Martin‘s position was complicated by the presence of two women already on the Committee-both Re-publicans. Thus, he appointed Luce to her second choice, the Military Af-fairs Committee, the first woman so honored. Margaret Chase Smith (Maine), who had been elected in 1940, was appointed the first female to serve on the Naval Affairs Committee. These two appointments, Martin asserted, were made in recognition of the important role women were playing in the war effort. He then advised Luce to work hard on committees and say little. She abided with the first half of his advice and complied with the second only during her frequent absences from the House. (Ac- cording to his friend state senator John F. Parker, Martin’s warning words to all new members of Congress were “a closed mouth gathers no feet.”)’

Failure to obtain a Foreign Affairs seat did not affect their friendship. Luce was the only freshman assigned quarters in the new House Office Building, and when Democrats, after her much publicized trip to Europe, tried to purge her from the Military Affairs Committee, Martin stood by her.8 As a matter of fact their friendship grew. They saw each other at several parties (at one Luce described herself as having “fun” with Martin), met for lunch, made a wager on Soviet entry into the war, and wrote to each other when apart. Their correspondence was now on a first-name basis; nevertheless it remained quite formal even though Martin kept an autographed photograph of her on his bureau in Washington, which he removed when his brother stayed overnight.y

As Martin was wrestling with organizational problems, he spelled out the Republican agenda for the new Congress: a policy of all-out support for the war, but a halt to New Deal experimentation. More specifically he called for a reduction in bureaucracy, protection for small business, cuts in nondefense spending, the restoration of congressional prerogatives, and the cessation of ”blank checks” to the executive branch. Martin invited Democrats to join “with us in these American objectives for the

104 Chapter 3

common good.”I0 This invitation was more than perfunctory for it appeared as if there was an increased opportunity for crossovers. At the Democratic caucus Speaker Rayburn had proclaimed a “declaration of independence” from the executive department in order to make Con- gress an “independent branch” of the government. Little wonder Re- publicans sang ”Happy Birthday” when Martin presented a bemused Rayburn to the Seventy-eighth Congress as Speaker. Later the same day Martin was one of the few Republican guests at Rayburn’s surprise birthday party hosted by Roosevelt.”

Martin was able to accomplish many Republican goals and took pride in having “clipped the wings of bureaucracy.”I2 The Seventy-eighth Con- gress liquidated the Natural Youth Administration, the National Resource Planning Board, and the WPA, as well as slashing the budget of the Farm Security Administration and appropriations for the domestic branch of the Office of War Administration. Furthermore both Houses overrode FDRs veto of the Smith-Connally Act, which weakened the National La- bor Relations Act of 1935 by limiting the right to strike and outlawing political contributions by union^.'^ Congress was seen as so antilabor that the CIO in July 1943 organized Political Action Committees to elect in 1944 those friendly to 1ab0r.l~ An even more dramatic rebuff to the administration occurred when, for the first time in the nation’s history, Con- gress passed a revenue measure over a presidential veto, prompting a presidential advisor to comment, ”for all practical purposes we have a Republican Congress

Absentee voting for the military was another setback for the Democrats in which Martin’s part was prominent. He denounced as unconstitutional an administration proposal to provide military personnel with ballots in which the names of candidates for federal office, president, senator, and congress would be entered. The minority leader, who had been responsible for bringing absentee voting to the fore two years earlier, called for a ”full ballot,” one that would be provided by the state and allow an op-portunity to vote for state candidates as well as national ones. In time a compromise was adopted whereby states were encouraged to provide an absentee ballot, but a federal ballot would be provided if a state expressly requested it, or if a service person were refused a state ballot. Over 4,000,000 members of the military voted, about 112,000 on federal ballots requested by twenty states.I6

Another divisive issue concerned a new method of collecting taxes. The Revenue Act of 1942 had dramatically increased income tax rates and the number of individuals subject to this tax. As part of the legislation the Trea- sury Department had recommended a pay-as-you-go system based on payroll deductions. This would have the effect of not only ensuring collec- tions but of combating inflation by reducing take-home wages. But as it

105 ”Often . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose“

would also mean paying two years‘ taxes in one, it was fought by Repub- licans. Early in 1943 Beardsley Ruml, chair of the New York Federal Re- serve Bank, urged a cancellation of 1942 taxes as an inducement to enact pay-as-you-go. This plan, he claimed, simply moves “the tax forward, and cost the Treasury nothing until Judgement Day.“ Republicans, led by Mar- tin, eagerly seized upon his recommendation and championed what the House leader dubbed the pay-as-you-earn plan. In time the House compromised with the administration and provided for a 50 percent cancellation of 1942 taxes, but the Senate surprised many by approving a 100 per-cent cancellation. An exasperated Roosevelt exhorted the Conference Committee to reject the Senate version, “a windfall for upper income taxpayers,” and report a bill he could approve. However, the president reluctantly signed the final version calling for a 75 percent waiver for those whose tax was over $50, a 100 percent on $50 or less, and withholding or pay-as-you-go beginning July 1944.Martin, who had been instrumental in obtaining waivers, was elated at the result.”

Martin challenged the administration on other domestic issues. He ob-jected vigorously to the absence of congressional representation at the Bermuda conference on refugees and at the UN Food Conference in Vir-ginia, to which he sent two unofficial representatives. He was instrumental in defeating Roosevelt’s attempt to cap wartime income at $25,000 and succeeded in limiting reciprocal trade to two years, instead of the three the administration requested. Despite their differences Martin’s relationship with the president did not seem to deteriorate or become personal. When Representative William P. Lambertson (Republican, Kansas) charged from the House floor that Roosevelt’s sons were being “coddled” and given assignments away from combat areas, FDR was ”hurt” rather than angry with Martin for not taking the podium and protesting. More typically, Martin admonished Lambertson outside the chamber, ordering him to “lay off.”18

Like most of Congress, Martin encouraged the work of the House Com- mittee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). On February 1, 1943 its chair, Martin Dies (Democrat, Texas), in an address cheered by both sides of the House, named forty government employees as ”irresponsible, unrepre- sentative crackpots, and radical bureaucrats,” whose salaries should be withheld by agencies employing them. Several representatives were concerned because the accused had no opportunity to defend themselves; others were opposed because thirty-nine of those named were employed by agencies other than the Treasury Department whose appropriations were being debated. By a standing count of 163 to 111the House refused to fund the salary of William Pickens, the only Treasury employee named by Dies. Continuing debate over Pickens, especially when it was discovered he was an African-American, and concern over enforcing HUAC

106 Chapter 3

recommendations without trials or hearings, jeopardized passage of the entire Treasury bill. Even Dies’s claim that Pickens was associated with twenty-one Communist or Communist-front groups failed to allay growing opposition. Consequently, House leaders of both parties met and proposed to restore Pickens’s salary and to establish a special subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee to investigate Dies’s charges. Martin, who already had demonstrated his sympathy for African-Americans, defended this proposal at length, lecturing the House on justice. “We must give every man and every woman his day in court; justice must be administered fairly and with equality,” he proclaimed. The minority leader went on to defend HUAC’s impartiality, but warned, “It would be far better to let one man escape than create the impression [of discrimination]” and concluded his remarks by pointing out he had voted against termi- nating Pickens’s salary in the first place. Some of Martin’s southern friends were critical of his role in this affair, when by a vote of 267 to 136 the leader’s suggestions were approved, temporarily pleasing HUAC foes with this apparent weakening of the committee’s authority, Nevertheless, the House voted its continuance 302 to 94.19

Martin’s status as a defender of African-Americans was enhanced by this episode. His photo with Pickens was published in black newspapers, and as the “man who saved Pickens” his ”liberalism” was praised in other African-American publications. Tributes from blacks were quite appropriate, for the minority leader was responsible for a GOP petition forcing an anti-poll tax bill to the floor (despite Republican backing it was defeated), and once again he had championed an antilynching measure. African-Americans believed it was his leadership that made the Republi- can Party responsive to their

Martin’s leadership had been so effective that as the session came to a close in 1944 one observer described him as forging ”the strongest and most cohesive political unit that congress has seen in this generation . . . [he] has all but controlled . . . the House action on taxes, subsidies, and soldier vote legislation. . . .It was only recently that the Democratic leadership realized how far the minority has progressed in their moves.N21 His effectiveness did not adversely affect his friendship with the Democratic Speaker, Rayburn. Their cooperation continued and quite typically they decided that even though it was unfortunate, there was too much unfinished business for a Christmas-New Year recess in 1943. When Thomas Jenkins (Republican, Ohio) chided them, “Don’t you old bachelors realize that some of us are old enough to have children and many of them are in the service and some are coming home for visits we have looked forward to for months?” Martin and Rayburn huddled, admitted they had no answer to the question, and agreed to a two-week recess.22

107 ''Often. . . Like Cobra rind Mongoose"

In keeping with his promise at the opening of the session Martin was a vigorous supporter of those engaged in the conflict. He urged as a "matter of justice" the Servicemen's Readjustment Act (GI Bill of Rights), a measure which transformed higher education and contributed substantially to postwar prosperity. He singled out for particular praise the features providing for educational benefits, home loans, and aid to small businesses and farmers. Furthermore, he pressed for a 20 percent increase in government contribution to servicemen's allotments and pushed to extend to enlisted personnel accrued leave pay provisions which had been applicable only to officers. As a result of these acts veterans held him in high regard for many years.23

Although his effort to have a joint congressional committee on war activities came to naught, he was privy to the nation's most secret military endeavor. With Speaker Raybum and Majority Leader McCormack he was briefed by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Director of Scien- tific Research on the need to develop an atomic bomb before the Germans did. The necessity of complete secrecy was stressed even though Congress would be required to fund well over $1 billion. In what McCormack praised as an example of Martin's being "a great American" and an illus- tration of how "broadminded men will not let partisan politics interfere with their judgement" the minority leader conspired with his Democratic colleagues to have a hidden transfer clause in war materiel appropriations. As has been pointed out Martin would have been subject to vehe- ment criticism from his own party if this risky project failed.24

On those foreign policy issues calling for internationalism Martin usually continued his prewar policy of leaving recommendations to the Re- publican members of the Foreign Relations Committee rather than the Steering Committee chaired by him. In the long run then, foreign policy was really left to the conscience of the House republican^.^^ His own record was internationalist. William Allen White, one of the nation's leading exponents of world cooperation, criticized the application of the discredited tag "isolationist" to the minority leader, describing him instead as "collaborationist."26 Indicative of his approach to foreign policy was his approving the appointment of his old rival, one of the party's most outspoken internationalists, James Wadsworth, to replace Hamilton Fish on the Foreign Affairs Committee.27 Moreover Martin encouraged the extension of Lend-Lease, favored a vetoless United Nations Organization, and supported the Bretton Woods agreement for postwar economic cooperation.** He continued to champion the United Nations Relief and Rehabil- itation Administration (UNRRA). After meeting with the president and other legislative leaders Martin publicly endorsed the necessity of providing relief to Axis-occupied areas. FDR attempted to use the conference

108 Chapter 3

and such statements as a means of bypassing Congress and implementing the policy by executive agreements. Arthur H. Vandenberg (Michigan), the Senate Republican leader, assisted by Martin and McNary, objected to Roosevelt's gambit, and forced the executive branch to submit relief measures to Congress. There, despite attacks on UNRRA by some of his Re- publican colleagues who claimed it a worldwide WPA and "pinko" project, Martin joined a minority in his party in backing the creation and funding the organi~ation.~~

His leadership on postwar international issues surprised many. To prepare for the 1944 presidential campaign Spangler, after consulting with McNary and Martin, appointed them and forty-seven other elective office holders to a postwar advisory council. Their task was to draw up a declaration of party policy including the most divisive issue of all-foreign policy. Delegates met in September 1943 at Mackinac Island, Michigan and prepared a draft whose foreign relations portion was unanimously approved. It called for "responsible participation by the United States in postwar cooperative organization among sovereign [an adjective inserted to please the nationalists] nations to prevent military aggression and to obtain permanent peace with organized justice in a free world." Believing all Republicans could unite behind this provision Martin left Mackinac quite pleased.30

When the House convened after the Republican conference it faced the Fullbright Resolution (J. William Fulbright, Democrat, Arkansas): "That the Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation of appropriate international machinery with power adequate to establish and to maintain a just and lasting peace, among the nations of the world, as favoring participation by the United States therein." Democratic leaders, desirous of as large a vote as possible and anxious to win over about fifty recalcitrant Republicans, had deferred action on it until after Mackinac. Now in order to expedite voting the House, including Martin, approved a suspension of the rules prohibiting amendments to the resolution. Mackinac or not, many Republicans were angry at the suspension of rules and what they thought was the resolution's failure to protect American interests. Heated opposition developed in the House. Moreover, Senator Vandenberg urged Martin to insist on the insertion of the word "sovereign'' before nations and the inclusion of a statement on "constitutional processes." Under Martin's leadership the Republican Steering Commit- tee succeeded in adding the phrase "through its constitutional processes" to the resolve, but ignored the recommendation on "sovereign." The emotional and heated debate was all out of proportion to the strength of its opponents. The resolution was approved overwhelmingly 360-29. For the first time in the nation's history a branch of Congress had formally proposed the basis for a future peace ~ettlernent.~'

109“Often. . . Like Cobra and Mongoose”

Nationalist Republicans were dismayed by Martin’s stance. The Chicago Tribune criticized his role in both the Mackinac Declaration and the Ful- bright Resolution. Martin, it declared, was unfit for the position he holds. ”His behavior was that of a leader of the sheep in the slaughter house. His colleagues have reason to be wary of him . . . some brand him a secret agent of Wendell Willkie.”32

POLITICS AND THE 1944 ELECTION

In his effort to keep the party together, Martin continued reaching out to the ever-controversial Willkie. They met and corresponded fairly often; the minority leader arranged for the Hoosier to address freshman Repub- lican congressmen and even suggested speaking opportunities for him. On the other hand, Willkie praised Martin’s fight for pay-as-you-go taxes and hailed his Lincoln Day 1943 speech promoting postwar planning and acknowledging the necessity of American assistance to a war-torn world. Willkie also sent him an autographed copy of the best-selling One World, the account of his 1942 round-the-world trip which had been planned with Roosevelt and was viewed by conservative Republicans as another example of his sellout to the Democrats. More damning in the eyes of some, he publicly praised Martin for following his advice on issues such as Lend-Lease and labor legi~lation.~~

Nevertheless, some claimed that Willkie believed the minority leader was doing nothing to help his presidential bid because Martin too har- bored presidential ambitions.% If true, Martin still respected Willkie as titular leader of the party and a possible president in 1945. He berated some House Republicans for applauding one of the many tirades John Rankin (Democrat, Mississippi) directed against Willkie. “If you want to be against Willkie that‘s your business, but no good will be served by making an ex- hibition of it. Whether you like him or not, Willkie is still the titular head of our party, and he may be the Republican nominee again in 1944. That’s something to remember.’r3s This type of loyalty was probably a factor in Willkie‘s request that Martin runhis campaign for the 1944 nomination.%

Martin did fancy the presidency. As in 1940 he hoped a deadlocked convention would turn to him.37 This ambition was fostered by much of the Republican press which praised his qualifications and by Republican Congressmen whose favorite he was, if the convention dead l~cked .~~ Nevertheless, as in 1940, Martin again denied his candidacy, stating, “I’m not looking for any more headaches than already appear to be in sight.”39

His presidential possibility rested upon his reputation as a healer for a fractured party. Seeking the nomination were Willkie and Ohio’s Gover- nor John Bricker of the party’s nationalist conservative wing and New

110 Chapter 3

York's Governor Thomas E. Dewey, a "moderate liberal" who was not clearly identified with either party faction. The contest quickly became a race between Willkie and Dewey, although the latter was more interested in a 1948 nomination than a 1944 one. He neither announced his candidacy nor left the Empire State until the convention. The only meaningful primary was in Wisconsin, where, except for Bricker, all major candidates and favorite sons were entered. Despite two weeks of barnstorming by Willkie, Dewey won with ease. It was all over except for the convention. With no hope of a deadlock, Martin's chances faded into insignificance.

Preparations for the convention, where he would serve as permanent chairman, did not bring Martin's limited social calendar to an end. With an election coming up he was somewhat reluctant to attend a dinner at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel presided over by Elsa Maxwell, a well-known professional party giver. However, tongue in cheek, he told the gossip columnist Leonard Lyons he decided to risk it, when he discovered there was a huge victory garden on the hotel's roof and he could tell his constituents he was moving in agricultural circles.@ In June he attended a party hosted by his friend Pearle Mesta in honor of Mrs. James Farley and the cast of the musical Oklahoma, only to be told by the guest of honor that he should be busy getting a vice president lined up for the Republican ticket.4l It was sometime after the election that Martin received a most unlikely reputation around the capital as an expert handicapper of race- horses. Charlie Martin, who had invested in several horses that ran in tracks throughout New England, New York, and the Midwest in 1943 and 1944, was proud to let everyone know that Joe's brother owned these steeds. When a House page, referring to Charlie's racehorse Believe, asked the minority leader, "Mr. Martin, what chance do you think we have today?" Martin, thinking of a special by-election (probably that of Chester 0.Carrier of Kentucky), replied, "Son, I think we're a cinch." Be- lieve won and paid $12.40 and for a while Martin was besieged with phone calls looking for tips."

The 1944 convention was dull and listless; delegates were sure the nominee would be Dewey even if they doubted he would be elected.43 Meeting with only perfunctory applause was Martin's speech emphasizing domestic issues and calling on Jeffersonian Democrats to join the Republicans in ensuring that the United States did not win abroad while losing at home. Among the more energizing moments was Clare Luce's address. Hoping to attract additional women to the party; Martin had promised to support an Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution (crediting himself with getting the proposal into the 1940 platform) and called upon women to ful- fill their political responsibilities. More significantly he was instrumental in arranging this major address for Luce, which he probably helped draft." Martin introduced her as a symbol of the new Republicans, one of

111 "Often . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose"

the nation's most able and brilliant women. Her emotional declamation, concentrating upon dedicating the Republican Party to the memory of "G.I. Jim," the "heroic heir of the unheroic Roosevelt decade,'' was followed by the chairman urging the delegates to stand and serenade this "wonderful lady" with "Let Me Call You Sweetheart."

The most curious episode had to do with the intransigence of General Douglas MacArthur's supporters. After Dewey's name was placed in nomination each of the candidates or their surrogates mounted the dais and withdrew. When one delegate insisted on nominating MacArthur, Vandenberg kept him in conversation while Martin rushed through the call for nominations. However, no amount of pleading or chicanery could prevent another MacArthur delegate from holding out and refusing to make the selection of Dewey unanimous. The New York governor was nominated 1056 to l.45

Ignoring the pall that hung over the convention, Martin expressed routine optimism about the presidential election, but genuine enthusiasm about the congressional contests. Convinced the results would be determined by domestic issues, he predicted a majority of at least ten if not fifty seats in a new Republican House.46 Even the Democrat's old war-horse Jim Farley thought the Republicans would carry the House.47 Martin, consulted by Dewey, campaigned as usual for the ticket, speaking in Penn- sylvania, New York, and New Jersey as well as in Massachusetts and over radio networks.48 Repeatedly he assailed the failures of the New Deal, claiming that it took a war to produce jobs, attacked Democratic ties to "radicals," especially the Political Action Committee of the CIO and its leader Sidney Hillman, and predicted that with the help of Democrats there would be a GOP House "to direct the return to peace time econ- my."^^ On one occasion Roosevelt banged away at Martin's prewar record, reminding a national audience of his sallies against Martin, Bar- ton, and Fish in 1940, and gleefully pointed out that one of the trio was no longer in politics (Barton had been defeated in New York's 1942 senatorial contest). He went on to warn that if Congress went Republican, isolationists would be in positions of power and the Speaker would be "another friend of mine [Martin]" who had voted against the repeal of the arms embargo, Lend-Lease, extension of selective service, arming merchant ships and reciprocal trade."50 In response Martin immediately telegraphed Dewey, "When elected President, you can count on the enthusiastic support of the Republican House of Representatives to carry into effect your plan for the United States leadership in [an] organization to cooperate with other nations for peace. I shall personally be very pleased to follow your splendid leadership in bringing this plan into reality."51

In his own campaign Martin again was aided by his national stature. He introduced Clare Luce at a Dewey rally in Boston and accompanied

112 Chapter 3

the presidential nominee on a swing through Massachusetts. Martin spent $3,945 on his reelection, an unusually large amount for him and the third highest of any Massachusetts congressional candidate that But for the minority leader it was money well spent. Martin received the largest tally in his political career and even came close to carrying Fall River. He lost that city by only 1,635 votes while Dewey lost it by 17,000 and the Re- publican gubernatorial candidate by l!J,000?3

Although Martin won handily, Republicans failed to carry the House, dropping twenty-two seats: the Democrats, as had been expected, retained the White House. Many attributed Democratic gains to the CIO's PAC, but Martin claimed Republican expectations had been too high and the populace was unwilling to change leadership in wartime. He took solace, as control of the House would still rest with southern Democrats and Republicans rather than with administration followers. Consequently he expected Republican victories in 1946 and 1948 but in the meantime pledged his party to support the war effort and cooperate with Democrats in building a lasting peace.54 Dewey went even farther. He called a meeting of Republican legislative leaders, including Taft, Vandenberg, and Martin, in his suite at the Hotel Roosevelt to plan for a vigorous opposition party. The agenda drafted by the governor included such liberal items as the extension of social security, anti-poll tax legislation, federal aid to education, and a permanent Fair Employment Practice Commis- sion. However, even though Martin was sympathetic to several of these proposals, nothing came of the program for, according to legislators, it would shatter their coalition with southern Democrats and prevent an effective challenge to the New

THE SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

At the convening of the Seventy-ninth Congress, Martin, like most of the House leadership, was taken aback by a parliamentary maneuver to make permanent the House Un-American Activities Committee. With the retirement of committee chairman Martin Dies, the leadership had planned to let the Committee gradually die. But on a routine resolution to adopt the rules of the previous Congress, Representative John E. Rankin (Dem- ocrat, Mississippi) introduced an amendment to make the committee a standing one. This demarche, which had not been used in 150 years, in Rankin's words caught the leadership "flat-footed and flat-headed" for it required action if the House were to organize and conduct its business. On a standing vote Rankin's amendment was defeated 136-146, however, when the Mississippian demanded a roll call, House members, fearful of


not being seen as American enough, reversed themselves; a vote of 207 to 186 made the committee permanent.

Although Martin voted for the amendment it appears he was not enthusiastic about it and probably would have preferred the committee's discontinuance. (Martin explained the Republican vote to Herb Brownell, Chair of the RNC: "we have been out of office so long that they [Republi- cans in the House] like to take a sock at the president any time they get a chance.")56 He publicly disavowed the charge that he punished Clare Luce and Christian Herter (second-term congressman from Massachu- setts) for voting against HUAC by refusing them a place on the Foreign Affairs Committee. According to the minority leader, Luce had not renewed her request for a seat on Foreign Affairs. He also fought the Dem- ocrats' attempt to dump her from Military Affairs by reducing its size, in-tervened with the White House when President Truman refused to see her, and read into the Congressional Record a very flattering syndicated column about her.57

However, no matter what his stance on HUAC, Martin had little tolerance for alleged leftists in government. Although acknowledging their constitutional right to "propagandize," he urged the administration to "clean out Communists, fellow-travelers, and parlor pinks from high positions in government." He sought to do his part by arguing against the confirmation of Aubrey Williams as director of the Rural Electrification Agency and former Vice President Henry Wallace as secretary in a commerce department with increased powers. Martin denounced their fitness for office, claiming the United States could not remain half socialist and half free with appointees who would further divide the nation. Wallace, he asserted, would "go far to impose state socialism." Although Republi- cans succeeded in preventing the department of commerce from absorb- ing other agencies, they failed to muster enough Senate support to prevent the confirmation of Wallace (fifty including ten Republicans for, thirty-two against, twenty-seven of whom were Republicans). Williams was another matter. A former deputy administrator of the CWA and WPA and head of the NYA, he was an outspoken liberal who appeared radical to anti-New Dealers and was therefore a favorite target of southern racists and Martin Dies. Remembering his election challenge by a WPA administrator in 1938, at a time when Williams was urging relief workers "to keep our friends in power," Joseph Martin assailed the nominee as a "happy spender" who threatened to implement a regulated state and some form of bureaucratic socialism. When the Senate by a vote of 36 to 52 (36 Re-publicans, 19 Democrats) refused confirmation Williams blamed Martin, stating the congressman was "certainly the real leader of the Republican Party . . . [who] unquestionably told the Senate what to d ~ . ~ ' ~ ~

114 Chapter 3

As the first order of Republican business after the House’s reorganization, Martin, in keeping with the party platform, proposed a constitutional amendment limiting a president to two terms and providing a pension of $25,000 and a Senate seat for ex-presidents. More than a rejoinder to Roosevelt’s fourth term, the measure was in keeping with Mar- tin’s long-held views on congressional supremacy and limitations on executive authority. All during the Seventy-ninth Congress he pushed for this amendment, claiming that it was nonpartisan, in keeping with ”our traditional freedoms under representative government,” and was especially needed in the twentieth century, when oppression “is perpetuated in [the] name of democracy.” In addition to urging Congress to act and thereby “restore popular government in America” he appealed to the public to support this reform and even recommended that states bypass Congress by calling constitutional conventions and by that seldom-used method, amend the con~titution.~~

In making his case Martin even referred to the death of Roosevelt as evidence that there was no such thing as an indispensable man. FDR, who had died suddenly April 12,1945, was succeeded by Harry S. Truman. It appeared as if Martin’s personal relations with the new president would be as congenial as with the former one. Martin, the only Republican invited to Truman’s swearing in, first met the president sometime before World War I1 and got along well with him whenever they had met each other. Shortly after assuming the presidency, Truman, in a precedent- shaking gesture, unexpectedly visited the House, where he lunched with Democratic leaders and Martin in what the minority leader described as “a friendly gesture and it leaves a good feeling.”60 Nevertheless Martin continued to push term limitation and expenditure reduction. When Tru- man requested legislation on government reorganization to promote efficiency and economy, Martin was responsible for adding to the measure that it is the ”expectation of Congress that the [reorganization] under this act shall accomplish an overall reduction of at least 25 percent in the administrative costs of the agency or agencies affected.”61

Martin had begun the session appealing for a delay on Universal Military Training (UMT) legislation-an idea so popular that it appeared as if it would be enacted with little difficulty.62 Then to the surprise of the nation, in the summer of 1945, he called for a worldwide ban on universal conscription. Response to the proposal was emotional and sharply divided and crossed ideological lines. Martin was accused of falling into the same ideal- istic state of mind, which followed World War I and led to the disastrous isolationism of which he was a part.63 On the other hand he received thousands of supporting letters as well as public accolades, including those from the perennial Socialist presidential candidate Norman Thomas, Clare Luce, Congressman Louis Ludlow (Democrat, Indiana), leader of the 1930smove-

115 “Offen. . . Like Cobra and Mongoose“

ment to require a national referendum before a declaration of war, and a host of religious leaders from all faiths.@ Martin asserted that abolition would be a step toward abandoning war as an instrument of settling affairs, a necessity in the atomic age, and further, according to him, it would enhance the moral leadership of the Big Three and reinforce the San Francisco Charter.@‘

Despite repeated requests from Truman for some form of UMT legislation, hearings on it were halted by Chairman Andrew May of the Military Affairs Committee. He then announced a new series of hearings on the minority leader’s proposal, including testimony from Martin himself, and declared that the committee before reporting out a UMT measure would urge the president to make every effort to banish conscription. Truman labeled Martin’s proposal impractical, but the congressman announced he would continue his campaign.66

Before the committee Martin described his resolution as a first step in reducing armaments ”to a reasonable level.” In response to Truman’s charge, he asserted one would not know if such an effort were impractical without trying it and testing the good faith of the world’s powers. “We cannot assume there is a nation that will not cooperate,” he contended, for “if we assume that, we have nothing-no UNO, no Bretton Woods, no At-lantic Charter, nothing at all.”67 He even reached out to the Soviet Union, averring that Russia and the United States must work together in the United Nations for the cause of peace. We want to be friends, he asserted, and though we fight Communism in this country, Russia has a right to embrace that ideology and we have no right to complain.68 When Truman began to push for a peacetime draft at the expense of UMT, backing for Martin’s plan began to wane. Despite considerable committee sympathy for the Martin resolution, May never permitted a committee vote on it; on the other hand a UMT bill was not reported The issue was renewed in 1947 when Truman again urged UMT and once again was challenged by Martin and his Republican following.

In response to the threat of union leader A. Philip Randolph (Brother- hood of Sleeping Car Porters, CIO) to lead a march on Washington protesting racial discrimination, President Roosevelt had created a Fair Employment Practice Commission (FEPC) in 1941. Its function was to oversee compliance with a new executive order outlawing employment discrimination in federal civil service, war industries, and businesses with government contracts. Thirteen congressmen introduced permanent FEPC bills in January 1945. In February the House Labor Commit- tee favorably reported a measure. All that was needed to get the bill to the floor was scheduling by the Rules Committee. However, that committee did nothing until June, when by a vote of six to six it voted not to report the bill. Two Democrats, whose party sponsored the measure, and four Republicans, who at least were nominally in favor of FEPC, were

116 Chapter 3

checked by six Southern Democrats who opposed it. (Ironically on the same day the committee refused to submit the FEPC bill to the House, that chamber overwhelmingly approved another type of civil rights legislation by outlawing the poll tax 251 (105 Republicans) to 131 (19 Re-publicans). Without a change in the negative committee vote the only way the measure could reach the floor was a discharge petition requiring 218 signatures, a process which was rarely successful, or by having the committee chairman call up the bill on Calendar Wednesday. (The latter seldom-used procedure allowed committee chairs on Wednesday to call up bills from the calendar to be considered by the House meeting as a Committee of the Whole.)

During debate on FEPC Martin challenged the Democrats to get one more committee vote to release the measure. Albert A. Gore (Democrat, Tennessee) then charged Republican committee support was a “ruse.” Ac- cording to him, on days when there was an opportunity to vote the bill favorably because one of the Democratic opponents was absent, Republi- cans either delayed or left to prevent a quorum.70 Some substance was given to the charge when Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat, New York), one of the measure’s leading proponents, accused the House of “double dealing on both sides of the ai~le.”~’ On the other hand, several committee members claimed that because FEPC was so controversial, there was an informal understanding not to vote unless all committee members were present, a procedure denied by the chairman.”

Even if Gore’s charge was true, Martin apparently played no part in the charade.73 Publicly he called for a strong FEPC; privately he conferred on the proposal with two of its champions, Vito A. Marcantonio (American Labor Party, New York) and Powell, who reported the minority leader ”would marshal his forces to help.” He also met with his old friend Wal- ter White of the NAACP to discuss FEPC and poll tax legi~lation.7~ Hop-ing for enactment before Congress adjourned, he broke with his traditional practice, signed a discharge petition, asked Republicans to do likewise, and predicted FEPC passage. However, not enough of his party followed his example, and the bill remained bottled up in committee as Southern Democrats frustrated Calendar Wednesday efforts to release it (not until the 1964 Civil Rights Act was job discrimination outlawed by the federal go~ernment ) .~~ The Executive Secretary of the National Coun- cil for a Permanent FEPC praised Martin for signing the petition and for his concern for a permanent FEPC. His friend Luce described him as having “worked indefatigably” for it.76

At the opening of the session, Martin had called for tax reduction and, to prepare for such legislation in January, appointed a postwar tax revision committee with subcommittees assigned to income, corporation, excess profits, sales, and reconversion taxes. According to him it was im-

117 "Ofen . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose"

perative to revise and simplify the entire system. But before any major tax legislation was enacted the issue of taxes became even more politicized than ordinarily. If there had been a honeymoon between Congress and Truman following Roosevelt's death, it ended on September 6,1945 when the president outlined a reform program to be implemented by twenty- one legislative initiatives including a full employment bill, increases in minimum wage and unemployment compensation, an extended housing program, price supports for agriculture, and a public works agenda. Mar- tin, who declared that not even Roosevelt asked for as much in one sitting, described the president as "out New Dealing the New Deal" and predicted the increased cost and bureaucracy of the president's program would lead to a "sure-fire" Republican victory in 1946. He hired a staff of fiscal and research experts to determine the costs of the president's program and appointed eight congressional Republicans to draft a party agenda for submission to the RNC."

The final draft, primarily Martin's, was described by him as "constructive conservatism" in its rejection of the "socialism" of the New Deal and its call for a program "refreshed and revitalized, vigorous yet restrained, responsible yet humane.'' More specifically it advocated simplified and reduced taxes, economy in government, federal aid to states for subsis- tence, shelter, and medical care, and recognition of labor's right to organize and bargain collectively. Moreover it called for a United Nations Or- ganization with a strong general assembly, and a program of international relief and rehabilitation through UNRAA. It also urged arms control and open diplomacy-the latter a criticism of the Yalta agreement^.^^

Old guarders dissatisfied with Martin's stewardship claimed the document lacked fire. Even before the program had been drafted John D. M. Hamilton had attacked the party's leaders as being too liberal, claiming its last three presidential nominees and its congressional spokesman had left sixteen million Americans without a champion. What was needed, he asserted, was a return to real constructive conser~atism.~~ Others claimed a third, conservative party was necessary. However, the most noteworthy rebuff came in Governor Dwight Green's remarks welcoming the RNC to Chicago. He claimed the recommendations did not go far enough and demanded that expenditures be reduced to the level of tax receipts. Fur- thermore, he claimed the record of defeats in Poland and the Baltic were glossed over for fear of offending Russia's followers in the United States. These congressional recommendations, he asserted, give the appearance of expecting Communist votes "to fall into our laps." In an effort to ap- pease critics such as Green without alienating the document's authors, the RNC unanimously endorsed the proposals but only after agreeing to send them to a subcommittee to be supplemented.80 In April the subcommittee overwhelmingly approved the document but because of "recent

118 Chapter 3

developments abroad” made four specific recommendations: only loyal Americans to be employed in the State Department (the first official party questioning of the loyalty of State Department employees), the United States should demonstrate trust in the UN and “our own hemispheric organization,” Americans working there should be known for their devotion to the United States’ form of government, and the administration should demonstrate “The same zeal on nations such as Poland” which it does with “oil rich Iran.”81

While the Republicans in Congress were preparing their rejoinder to Truman’s September initiative, Martin condemned the administration’s tax plan for not providing enough relief, especially to the middle class, and called for a 20 percent tax reduction for corporations and individuals to stimulate the economy and create jobs. Although tax reduction as finally passed, a compromise between these two proposals, was $629 mil-lion more than the administration proposed, Martin maintained the reduction was insufficient and destroyed rather than encouraged private initiative.82

Congressional preparations for the first postwar election in 1946 domi-nated the second session, the shortest since 1939. Martin attempted to reduce every appropriation bill, convinced that even if he failed, this effort would be popular with the voters by demonstrating Democratic refusal to save money and balance the budget.83 More directly on January 18he appealed on a national radio broadcast for the election of a Republican Con- gress. According to him a GOP legislature would promote equal opportunity for all races and religions, lower taxes, and create a partnership between management and labor while maintaining an adequate defense. It would, he stated, support the UN, provide international relief, and promote the rights of small nations.@

In anticipation of the campaign Truman’s advisors suggested he reject bipartisan cooperation and through an aggressive use of the veto lead the nation against an imperious legi~lature .~~ Consequently, he vetoed some major legislation while Congress rejected several presidential recommendations and changed others, all of which contributed to rancor in the House. Personal privilege issues were raised frequently, denunciations were hurled at colleagues, and at times representatives came close to fistfights.86

Martin led the House Republicans in opposition to the president on two of the most divisive issues of the second session: labor and the availabil- ity of luxury goods and food, especially meat, at a noninflationary rate. As a result of an outbreak of unpopular, crippling, postwar strikes Truman submitted a labor bill providing for the use of fact-finding bodies during which time strikes would be prohibited. After much contentiousness Re- publicans substituted an antilabor measure weakening the power of

119“Often . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose”

unions and providing for federal mediation. Strikes continued unchecked when Truman’s controversial veto ended any possibility of labor legisla- t i ~ n . ~ ’The wartime Office of Price Administration administered rationing and price controls. With peace, many sought to end it in order to make products more readily available; others, including the administration, feared the effect its demise would have on inflation. Rancorous Republi- can opposition resulted in a seriously weakened agency extended for only a year. Truman reluctantly signed the measure.88 Both OPA and labor would be major issues in the 1946 campaign.

Martin was much less belligerent on foreign policy issues. Although he often criticized past decisions, he frequently assented to administration initiatives. As a result there was overwhelming support in the House for most major policy programs; only on rare occasions did a number of Re- publicans ignore Martin’s example and buck the admini~tration.~~ One such instance was the loan to Britain. In what one scholar has called the “principal legislative expression of administration foreign policy in 1946,” Martin sought to continue bipartisanship despite criticism that there should be no loan as the British defaulted on World War I debts. Moreover critics charged that the president and the British exaggerated the serious- ness of the crisis, while still others contended that the United Nations should provide the relief. The loan was approved, but House Republicans voted against it 122-61; among those abandoning Martin was his leadership team of Halleck and Allen, as well as his friend Everett D i r k ~ e n . ~ ~

Martin was also a strong supporter of UNRRA. Sometimes he joined in Republican charges that its administration was mismanaged, over- staffed, overpaid, and controlled at key points by non-Americans. More- over, he enthusiastically championed an amendment, introduced by Dirksen, denying funds to those nations that interfered with the free access of American correspondents reporting on expenditures. Neverthe- less, in January 1944 he was one of a minority of Republicans who voted to defeat efforts reducing UNRRA appropriations. In June, when on a point of order a large number of Republicans with conservative Demo- crats eliminated a provision transferring funds from Lend-Lease to UNRRA, he joined with the Democratic floor leader, in asking the Sen- ate to put the transfer authority back into the bill. Moreover, in keeping with a GOP policy statement, which he helped prepare, calling for bipartisanship in foreign policy and defining international relief as a hu-manitarian obligation, he continued to vote appropriations for UNRRA as requested by the admini~tration.~’

The one foreign policy area in which there was substantial disagreement between Martin and the administration was over an independent Jewish homeland. Martin had long acknowledged Jewish rights to a state of their own, repeatedly objecting to British restrictions on immigration to

120 Chapter 3

Palestine as a violation of the Balfour Declaration. Like many he interpreted this British pronouncement of 1917 as a pledge for both unrestricted immigration and an independent state. By 1939 Zionist leadership had twice praised him for his concern in establishing Palestine ”as a home for homeless people.”92

At the outbreak of World War 11, when the American Palestine Com- mittee was reconstituted “to destroy anti-Semitism” and support a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Martin accepted the position of vice president, holding that office for the next decade and a He denounced the mass murder of Jews by Nazis, pushed for legislation to try those killers as war criminals, and advocated the creation of a War Refugee Board to assist the rescue and relocation of European Jews. Defying administration wishes, he continued to advocate a Jewish state and fought for a congressional resolution calling for the United States to support unrestricted Jew- ish immigration to Palestine and for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth. In a rare appearance, he testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee on behalf of that resolution.

When the measure was killed by the administration, he introduced a similar bill the following year, and again testified before the House committee. Moreover, he championed it from the floor, lobbied for its passage with Democrats as well as with fellow Republicans, and joined conservative rabbis in a demonstration for the immediate admission of ten thousand German Jews to Palestine. In what many considered a rebuke to the State Department, the resolution calling for the United States to support an independent Jewish state passed the House on a voice vote.94 Although the administration took no action, Martin continued to advocate immigration and a national state. When the United Nations in 1947 recom-mended the partition of Palestine and the creation of an independent Jew- ish nation, Martin publicly endorsed the report and called on the administration to approve it.95 Little wonder that a few years later he described himself as “a pioneer in the historical effort which brought about the state of Israel” and in 1961 in a tribute to “Israel’s Bar-Mitzvah” was the recipient of the New England Israel Freedom

REPUBLICANS EMERGE VICTORIOUS IN 1946

In addition to his duties as minority leader, Martin focused on the forthcoming congressional elections, for as he told Landon, “if we do not win this time, I guess the jig is up.” For two years on national broadcasts, in speeches around the nation, and at meetings with party leaders to plan strategy, he promoted the Republican agenda?’ Martin repeated frequently his favorite political theme: it was necessary to elect a Republican


Congress to protect a free enterprise system that was endangered now as never before?* On many occasions he promised a Republican legislature would reduce taxes, government spending, and the bureaucracy as well as balance the budget. However, as Election Day approached, in a theme injected into several congressional campaigns, he underscored the dangers posed by "subversionists who bored from within and who would be driven out by a Republican victory."* Although Martin raised the issue frequently, it never became the central focus of his own campaign or of his forays into the national scene. In most of his national addresses, there was no mention of driving Communists from government.

As he did in other campaigns Martin reached out to African-Americans, asserting the Republican Party would assist them in attaining complete freedom of opportunity by removing racial barriers to employment. Fur- thermore, he contended they could not advance by means of a southern- dominated Democratic Party, but only through the GOP, which would combat segregation and prejudice. Moreover, by stimulating small business Republicans would create jobs at higher wages and thereby make the "Negro" family more independent and prosperous.100 He even told the assistant secretary of the NAACP that in those states where African- Americans were not allowed to vote, representation in the House should be decreased proportionately.Io1

Martin's 1946 campaign was in many ways similar to his earlier ones. The major difference between this and his other races was that he made his "Americanism" and the "liberalism" of his opponents a major issue. Although he promised that a Republican House would promote security and protect the constitution by driving "Communists, pinks and fellow- travelers from the high places they occupy in Washington," his appeals more frequently were for loyalty rather than attacks on disloyalty, His only direct reference to his liberal opponent was a one-time dismissal of her as "a little girl.'' On the other hand, his critics, more so than at any time in the past, denounced him for being conservative, thereby blurring the line between Martin and Republican reactionaries.'02

His Democratic opponent, Martha Sharp, little known in the district un-til the primary, was the survivor of a bitter contest for the nomination. A young, intelligent, and attractive mother of two, she had gained an international reputation as a food and relief expert. As emissaries of the Uni- tarian Church, she and her husband, a former Unitarian minister, conducted rescue and relief operations in Czechoslovakia in 1939 and in southern France in 1940.Furthermore, in 1945 she was director of the Uni- tarian Service Committee in Lisbon providing assistance to Spanish Re- publicans. Sharp, a graduate of Pembroke (Brown University) with a master's degree from Radcliffe, was fluent in French, Italian, and Portuguese and frequently addressed voters in these language^.'@^ To her, Martin was

122 Chapter 3

a reactionary, a “negative obstructionist” whose record on the OPA, veterans, and labor was an intolerable defiance of the interests of the district.Iw

Some of the labor movement agreed. At a convention of the Amalga- mated Clothing Workers, Sidney Hillman, director of the CIOs Political Action Committee (PAC), whose function was to mobilize organized labor for political purposes, marked Martin and twenty-two House members for defeat and began to cooperate with other liberal organizations for that end. He even promised a full-time PAC representative to assist Sharp.Io5 Philip Murray, president of the CIO, in a national election-eve broadcast, appealed for the defeat of reactionary Republicans, asserting that the “forces of greed are symbolized by Old Guard Republicans, the Robert Taft and Joseph Martin Republicans who have adopted Herbert Hoover’s program and who, in concert with Southern poll-taxers, are seeking to tighten reaction‘s grip on our economy.”106.

However, over the years Martin had provided favors and services for thousands of constituents. As a Democratic leader told a New York Times reporter who accompanied the minority leader on a tour of his district, “Until the liberals around here find out they can’t fight him on the issues and get down to earth with some candidate who can get votes, they’d just as well relax and wait for the next depression.”107 Organized labor’s criticism of Martin evaporated with the exposure of Sharp’s alleged radicalism. Furthermore, despite their endorsement, unions provided neither money nor manpower for her campaign.108

The appearance of HUAC’s counsel in Boston to investigate the Unitar- ian Service Committee with which Sharp had been affiliated led to rumors about Communist affiliations. Despite her denial she was a Communist, a veteran’s organization at the request of Father Ambrose Bowen, a former navy chaplain, resolved to investigate her “qualifications” for office and her work on behalf of the Service Committee and the Joint Anti-Fascist Committee against which HUAC had instituted contempt proceedings. A few days later at a closed hearing HUAC’s counsel reported that officers of the Service Committee repudiated Sharp’s views as ”too international- ized” and revealed she was no longer with the organizati~n.’~~ Shortly thereafter Bowen, who chaired the investigation, ”presented certain evidence” that there was a Communist element active in the campaign. At that time he denied he was involved in a political contest, asserted he never met Martin, and stated he would continue to research the truth about Sharp.”O On the election eve he and his committee reported that their fact finding in Washington had demonstrated that Sharp, as representative of the Service Committee in Spain and Portugal, had dispensed funds to the Anti-Fascist Committee-a Communist front group.”’

Again denying she was a Communist, Sharp accused Bowen without the knowledge of his bishop but with the knowledge of HUAC, of twist-


ing relief efforts in a smear campaign.112 When Father John F. OBrien, a nationally recognized "Catholic expert" on Communism, lectured on its evil in Fall River and demanded that Communists be driven from government and congressional candidates take a stand on Communist issues, Sharp attempted to turn his speech to her advantage. She ran several large advertisements whose caption read, "Fr. Cronin Was Right and Martha Sharp Meets His Every Test Proving She Is a Reliable Foe of Commu- nism." The ad quoted Cronin as stating no Communist would publicly attack Communism or the Soviet Union and then cited various statements of Sharp censuring C~mmunism."~

All along Martin continued campaigning in his usual fashion: pointing out all he had done for the district, identifying himself as the next Re- publican Speaker, and emphasizing his endorsement by veteran's groups and trade associations, as well as his support for a Jewish state. He hardly mentioned Sharp, but underscored his Americanism, attacked Commu- nism, the PAC and pinks, and claimed the campaign against him was running true to the methods of Communists and fellow travelers. Unlike in earlier elections, he did not dwell on his own "liberal" achievements. By the middle of October, political observers predicted Martin's victory, and as the campaign drew to a close, he was endorsed by most of the small papers in the district, as well as the Boston Traveler, the Aftleboro Sun, and the Fall River Herald News.The latter described his opponents as a "collection of misguided Liberals, Opportunists, Reds, Pinks, and Fellow Travelers who band themselves together as Progressives."114 The pundits were correct; Martin won with ease, carrying every city and town in the district, with the margin of victory the largest in his career to date, 71,566 to 40,999.

The chairman of the state Democratic Committee believed that Com- munism was a major factor in GOP congressional victories throughout the nation, as many Democrats and Independents voted Republican in the mistaken belief this was a vote against Although Martin surely would have won without the Communist issue, it certainly helped him and gave credence to the chairman's assessment. According to Sharp and her followers, the major reason for her defeat was HUAC "painting me Red." She claimed she was a victim of a "Gestapo technique": her office was burglarized, materials taken, her phone tapped, and secret testimony before HUAC distributed to make her appear a Communist.'*6 Moreover, she alleged there was a deal between Congressman Rankin, the de facto HUAC chairman, and Martin, whereby the minority leader had permitted HUAC to become a standing committee of the House and Rankin rewarded him by attacking her and enabling Bowen to get advance knowledge of the Committee's plans. As evidence, Sharp quoted a Drew Pearson broadcast of October 20 that Rankin would go to Martin's

124 Chapter 3

rescue with a probe of USC. In accounts published after the campaign, her supporters repeated the charge, but with no supporting data.”’ Other ac- cusations by a Harvard student who worked on her behalf were that her Fall River campaign manager resigned under clerical pressure, that priests told parishioners to vote against Sharp, and that a whispering campaign among wealthy Jewish shoe manufacturers claimed that if donations were made to Sharp, Martin would “take it out” on Palestine.118

Martin himself was not overtly involved in efforts to damage Sharp’s reputation and may not have been involved at all. Sharp, however, was not adverse to unprincipled attacks on the congressman.119 She proclaimed on several occasions that Martin although a “young bachelor” (he was thirty-two) failed to enlist in World War I and blackened him with guilt by association by claiming he was praised and quoted in KKK pub-lications, in writings of “apostles of Fascism,” and by those ”who hate democracy.”120 During the campaign one of her advocates reflected the pa- tronizing attitude of some of her elite supporters when he described the central part of the district as poor, dominated by the Catholic Church, and politically primitive, the “ideal territory for a politician of unlimited cyn- icism and limited scruples, in short for Joe Martin.”’21 This campaign calls into question those studies which attribute the ”Had Enough” slogan and mind set as instrumental in the Republican victory of 1946 and seems instead to foreshadow some of the irresponsible charges levied in the 1948 and 1952 elections.’22

In addition to Martin, 245 other Republicans were elected to the House, giving the GOP control of that body for the first time since 1931. Immedi-ately after the election, Speaker-to-be Martin announced Republicans planned to reduce taxes, promote economy in government, reunite Amer- ica, and lead a return to lower prices.Iz3 A few days later, he stated that international affairs must be kept nonpartisan and that he would be glad to cooperate with the Democratic president and patriotic congressional Democrats to achieve progress and security in the American way. An in-dication of the type of progress he sought was revealed in a widely publicized Washington press conference when he called for a 20 percent across-the-board tax cut made possible in part by a reduction in the cost of g0~ernrnent.I~~ The battle line had been drawn between a feisty president and a politically savvy Speaker.

NOTES

1. JosephW. Martin, Jr., as told to Robert J. Donovan, My First Fifty Years in Pol-itics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1975), 176, on his political relations with President Truman.

2. Martin, First Fify Years, 125-32.

125 “Often . . , Like Cobra and Mongoose”

3. Schroeder to Henry P. Fletcher, December 9,1942, Henry P. Fletcher Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

4. NYT, 8 December 1942; Ellsworth Barnard, Wendell Willkie: Fighterfor Free- dom (Marquette, Mich.: Northern Michigan University Press, 1966), 383-84.

5. Martin to Eunice Martin, December 12,1942 and to Niel B. Allen, December 10,1942, MP; RNC Meeting, December 7,1942, RNC Papers; Barnard, Willkie, 384; Steve Neal, Dark Horse: A Biography of Wendell Willkie (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 278-79; NYT, 1-8 December 1942.

6. Boston Globe, 22 November 1942; Pearson column, WP, 23 December 1942; NYHT, 6 January 1943; Richard N. Chapman, Contours of Public Policy, 2939-2945 (New York: Garland, 1981), 140.

7. John F. Parker, The Fun and Lnughter of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Double- day, 1978), 97.

8. Alden Hatch, Ambassador Extraordinary: Clare Boothe Luce (New York: Henry Holt, 1956), 155,172; Stephen Shadegg, Clure Boothe Luce: A Biography (New York Simon & Schuster, 1970), 166; clips January-February 1943, scrapbook 35, MP.

9. Interview with Ed Martin, January 12,1994; Martin-Luce Correspondence 1943-1944, especially Clare to Joe, March 11,1944 and Joeto Clare, March 13,1944, LP.

10. Congressional Record, 78 Cong. 1st sess., 1943, 89: 46-47; interview, Novem- ber 6, 1942, McNaughton Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.; Boston Globe, 22 November 1943; NYT, 6 January 1943.

11. NYT, January 6, 7, 1943. 12. Undated clips, scrapbook 36, MP. 13. Mary H. Hinchey, ”The Frustration of the New Deal Revival, 1944-1946”

(Ph.D. diss., University of Missouri, 1965), 38-39; John M. Blum, Vfor Victory: Pol-itics and American Culture During World War ZZ (New York Harcourt Brace Jo-vanovich, 1976), 3941,234-44.

14. Hinchey, “Frustration New Deal Revival,” 129. 15. Richard L. Polenberg, War and Society: The United States 2942-1945 (Philadel-

phia: Lippincott, 1972), 199. 16. Polenberg, War and Society, 195-97; Blum, V for Victory, 250-52; NYT, 14-15

February 1944. 17. A good summary of this issue is found in Kevin Murphy, “Child of War: The

Federal Income Withholding Tax,” Mid America 78 (summer 1996): 203-29. 18. Roosevelt to Fritz G. Lanham, March 9, 1943 in F.D.R. His Personal Letters,

ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce), 2: 1407-1408; clips, scrapbook 35, MP.

19. The recommendations of the special committee, which ignored charges against Pickens, were thrown out by the courts. NYT, 2-10 February 1943; Con-gressional Record, 78 Cong. 1st sess., 1943, 89: 735-37, 742; Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extraordiizary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activi- ties (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1968), 139-44.

20. Afro-American, 13, 20 February 1943; Washington Tribune, 22, 24 July 1943; WP, 10 February 1943; clip 3 June 1943, scrapbook 36, MP.

21. Charles Hurd, ”Congress Minority Plans to Graduate,” NYT, 19 March 1944. 22. Kansas City Star, 26 December 1943.

126 Chapter 3

23. Congressional Record, 78 Cong. 2d sess., 1944, 90:4326; clips, scrapbooks 36 and 37, especially those of December 5,1943 and March 3,1944, MP; John Stelle to Martin, May 22,1944, MP.

24. John W. McCormack, Oral History, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass.; Martin, First F i fy Years, 100-101.

25. H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Ko-rea (Hartford, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955; reprint, New York Octagon Books, 1972), 95; Holbert N. Carroll, The House OfRepresentatives and Foreign Affairs, revised ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 267-69.

26. White interview, Boston Globe, 9 October 1942. 27. Martin L. Fausold, James W Wadsworth, Jr.: The Gentleman from New York

(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1975), 354-55. 28. For UN see “Notes on Conference-March 16,1945,” The Diaries ofEdward R.

Stettinius, Jr., 2943-2946, eds. Thomas Campbell and George C. Hering (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), 301.

29. Milton 0.Gustafson, “Congress and Foreign Aid: The First Phase, UNRRA, 1943-1947” (Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, 1966), iii-iv, 28-29.36-40,70.

30. Martin to William Allen White, September 14, 1943, White Papers, Manu- script Division, Library of Congress, Washington; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 148-53; Richard E. Darilek, A Loyal Opposition in Time of War: The Re- publican Party and the Politics of Foreign Policyfrom Pearl Harbor to Yalta (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), 111-19.

31. Congressional Record, 78 Cong. 1st sess., 1943,89: 7705-7729,7655-7682; Dar-ilek, Loyal Opposition, 119-20; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 153-56; clip 16 September 1943, scrapbook 36, MP.

32. Chicago Tribune, 22 September 1943. 33. “Willkie Hopes,“ Newsweek, March 22, 1943, scrapbook 35, MP. 34. Robert Norton in Boston Post, 21 February 1943. 35. WP, 22 November 1943. 36. Martin, First Fifty Years, 235. 37. Hap Hazard to Martin, n.d., 1941, MI? 38. P.M. 13 April 1943; NYT, 18 February 1944; Mt. Vernon Herald, 22 January

1944; scrapbooks, 35,36, MP. 39. UP release, 18 February 1944, scrapbook 36, MP. 40. Lyons column, 26 May 1944, scrapbook 36, MP. 41. Telegram, Mesta to Martin, June 27, 1944, MP. Martin’s brother Ed stated

that Joe and Mesta became such good friends that it was rumored they were about to marry, stories that may have contributed to a chilling of the relationship on Martin’s part. Edward Martin Interview, October 3, 1968, MP.

42. In response to pressure from Joe and his mother, Charlie sold his interest in the horses. See unidentified, undated clip in scrapbook 50, MP: mutilated clip in file 64.8 Edward Martin papers; Edward Martin as told to James J. Kenneally,Dozun Memory Lane (North Easton, Mass.: privately printed, 1980), 19-20.

43. Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane, 72. 44. Clips, 14 April 1944, scrapbook 37, MP; Luce to Martin, June 29, 1944, LP;

Martin speech to National Federation of Women’s Clubs, NYT, 12 March 1944; Equal Rights, July-August, 1943.

127 "Offen . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose"

45. In addition to works already cited and biographies of the candidates see Leon Friedman, "1944" in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., History of American Pres- idential Elections 2789-2968 (New York, Chelsea House, 1971), 4: 3009-3038.

46. Chicago Sun, 17 April 1944; WP, 18 September 1944. 47. Diary August 7,1944, James A. Farley Papers, Manuscript Division, Library

of Congress, Washington, D.C. 48. In the Dewey Papers, University of Rochester Library see especially Dewey

to Martin, April 22,1941 and Martin to Dewey, October 1,1942. 49. Upton Close broadcast, June 25,1944 and speeches in June-Dec. file, MP;

NYT, 18 September; 24 October 1944. 50. Address October 21, 1944, Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roose-

velt, ed., Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Russell & Russell, 1969), 13: 348. 51. Chronicle, 25 October 1944. 52. Attlebom Sun, 2 January 1945. 53. For the election see Chronicle, August-November, 1944 and scrapbooks 37,

38, MI? 54. AP release, 15 November 1944, scrapbook 38, MI'. 55. Robert Taft to Dewey, December 13,1944, MP; Richard N. Smith, Thomas E .

Dezuey and His Times (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 43940; James R. Boy-lan, "Reconversion in Politics: The New Deal Coalition and the Election of the Eightieth Congress" (Ph.D. diss. Columbia University, 1971), 254-55; John Cham- berlain, "Herbert Brownell," Life, April 9, 1945,103.

56. Quotation from Pearson column, WP, 10January 1945. Robert E. Stripling, who drafted the resolution for Rankin, implies that Martin was not in sympathy with the maneuver (The Red Plot Against America [Drexel Hill, Pa.: Bell Publish- ing, 19491, 50-51), and during the debate Martin denied charges of Herman Eberharter (Democrat, Pennsylvania) that there was a bipartisan leadership agreement to let the committee expire, but did not deny Eberharter's charge he had no objection to its doing so. Congressional Record, 79 Cong. 1st sess., 1945,91: 10-15.

57. Pearson column, WP, 11January 1945; Washington Times Herald, 15 January 1945; Eben Ayers, Truman in the White House: The Diary of Eben A. Ayers, ed.Robert H. Ferrell (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri, 1991), 144; Congressional Record, 79 Cong. 2d sess., 1946,92 A 3769.

58. AP release, 24 March 1945, scrapbook 39, MI? 59. NYT, 9 April; 9 July 1945; undated clips, scrapbook 40, MP; Joseph W. Mar-

tin Jr., "Lock the Door Against Dictators," The Republican, September 1945,3. 60. WP, 2 May 1945. 61. Press Release, October 4,1945, MI? 62. NYT, 7 December 1944. 63. For example see Bartley G. Crum, "Proposal for a Liberal Republican

Party," Christian Science Monitor, 1December 1945, 18-19. 64. See clips 17, 23, 31 September 1945 scrapbook, 39, MP; "Greatest Act of

Statesmanship," Commonrueal,July 27, 1945, 348. 65. Martin, "Worldwide Abolition of Conscription," journal of the National Edu-

cational Association 34 (December 1945):180-81. 66. WP,and NYT, 22 February 1946.

128 Chapter 3

67. Statement before House Committee on Military Affairs, February 27,1946, MP.

68. Clip, 12 March 1946, scrapbook 40, MP; Speech to Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, March 18, 1946, MP.

69. Martin to Alf Landon, May 17, 1946, Landon Papers, Kansas Historical So-ciety, Topeka. For a good political survey, see Robert D. Ward, "The Movement for Universal Military Training in the United States, 1942-1952" (Ph.D. diss., Univer- sity of North Carolina, 1957).

70. Congressional Record, 79 Cong. 1st sess., 1945,91: 11780. 71. NYT, 26 June 1945. 72. NYT, 7 June 1945. Reporting the Gore accusation uncritically are Louis

Ruchames, Race, Jobs and Politics: The Story ofthe FEPC (New York Columbia Uni- versity Press, 1953; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Negro University Press, 1971), 200-202, and Lewis J. Lapham, Party Leadership and the House Committee on Rules (New York: Garland, 1988), 153-55.

73. PM.13 June 1945, not in the least bit sympathetic to Martin, claimed the failure to release the bill was in apparent defiance of House leadership.

74. Clip, 15 March 1945, scrapbook 40, MP; Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., Adam by Adam: The Autobiography of Adam Clayton Pozuell, 1r. (New York: Dial Press, 1971), 81; Martin diary, June 12,1945, MP; Fall River Herald News, 16 March 1946.

75. Clip, 14 December 1945 and INS release, 24 Decemberl945, scrapbook 40, MP; Washington Star, 16 December 1945. For an excellent summary of FEPC politics see Will Maslow, "FEPC-A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver," Uni-versity of Chicago Law Review 13 (June 1946): 407-44.

76. NYT, 8 February 1946; St. Louis American, 19 May 1946. 77. NYT, 8 September 1945; Boylan, "Reconversion," 72-73. 78. Scrapbook 40, MP; NYT, 14 September 1945; Charles J. Graham, "Republi-

can Foreign Policy, 1939-1952" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1955), 12141. 79. John D. M. Hamilton, "What the COP Needs," Liberty, August 15, 1945,

17-19. 80. NYT, 8 December 1945; Patrick E. McGinnis, "Republican Party Resurgence

in Congress 1936-1946" (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1967), 149-51. 81. RNC Meeting, April 1, 1946, RNC Papers. 82. NYT, 21 September; 2, 12 October 1945; Hinchey, "Frustration of the New

Deal Revival," 169-71. 83. Martin to Raymond Moley, January 31, 1946, Raymond Moley Papers,

Hoover Institute for War and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 84. The speech, which was based on congressional recommendations to the RNC,

can be found in the Congressional Record, 79 Cong. 2d sess., 1946,92: A130-132. 85. Sidney Milkis, President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American

Party System since the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press), 135. 86. Floyd M. Riddick, "The Second Session of the Seventy-ninth Congress, Jan-

uary 14-August 2, 1946," American Political Science Review 41 (February 1947): 12-27.

87. Hinchey, "Frustration of the New Deal Revival," 208-10. 88. Hinchey, "Frustration of the New Deal Revival," 221-25; Boylan, "Recon-

version," 138-91, passim.

129 "Oj'ten . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose"

89. Althan G. Theoharis, The Yulta Myths: A n Issue in US.Politics, 1945-1955 (Columbia: University of Missouri, 1970), 5; Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983), 228.

90. Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 215; Graham, "Republican Foreign Policy," 129-30.

91. Clips, 14 September; 1, 29 October 1945, scrapbook 40, MP; Gustafson, "Congressional Foreign Aid," 231, 259, 327-29; Congressional Record, 78 Cong. 2d sess., 1944,90 684,5260-5261,79 Cong. 1st sess., 1945,91: 10306,11594.

92. For a sampling of Martin's support see Martin to Morris Rothenberg, Oc- tober 20, 1934, MP; New Palestine, November 4, 1938, 11; Martin to Cordell Hull, October 17, 1939, US. Department of State, Records Pertnining to International Af- fairs of Palestine 1933-1934; Jewish Adzlocute, March 8, 1940. For praise see Isadore Breslau of the American Zionist Bureau to Martin, May 4, October 24,1939, MP.

93. Emanuel Neumann, In the Arena: An Autobiogruphical Memoir (New York: Herzl, 1974), 151-55; Terry Wolf to David Delman, January 24, 1945, Robert F. Wagner Papers, Georgetown University Library, Washington, D.C.

94. 78 Cong. 2d sess.,Heurings Before Committee on Foreign Affnirs on House Res- olution 418 and 419 Relating to a Jewish National l fome in Palestine (Washington: GPO, 1944), 6; Leo Sacks, "Hearings on Palestine Begin," New Palestine, February 18, 1944, 258; 79 Congress, 1st sess., Resolution for Establishment of a Jewish Home- land, Hearings on House Con. Res. 113 (Washington: GPO, 1945), 303; CongressionalRecord, 79 Cong. 1st sess., 1945,91: 1239; "News Reports Issue," Nezu Pulestine, De-cember 31, 1945, 19; American Zionist Emergency Council Report on Martin in "Past General Attitudes," AZEC Papers, Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem; author's interview with Rabbi Baruch Korff, June 10,1992.

95. NYT, 22 September 1947. 96. Martin speech to thirty-fourth convention banquet of New England Zion-

ist Region, June 20, 1954 as in Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 2d sess., 1954, 100: A4950.

97. Martin to Landon, June 24, 1946, Landon Papers; clips, 8 August 1945, scrapbook 40, MP.

98. Philadelphia Inquirer, 25 April 1945 and Speech to Norfolk County GOP Dinner, January 20,1945, scrapbook 40, MP.

99. National broadcast for a Republican Congress, June 2,1946, MP; KnoxvilZe Journal, 2 June 1946; Address to Massachusetts Republican Convention, Chronicle, 21 July 1946.

100. Martin, "COP Program Pledges Equal Opportunity to Negro Citizens," Negro Statesnrun, October-November 1946,3. It is interesting to note some of these remarks were also addressed to congressional Republicans. See Lincoln Day Speech, February 7,1946 to Republican Members of the House and the Women's Republican Club of Washington, MP.

101. Ray Wilkins to Martin, February 15, 1946, Martin to Wilkins, February 20. 1946, NAACP Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

102. "Election Story," Nezu Republic, November 11, 1946,614. For an account of the campaign from Sharp's perspective see the forthcoming biography by Ghanda Di Figlia, who had access to the Sharp papers which were denied to me. In many

130 Chapter 3

instances Di Figlia relies on Arthur H. White, "Campaign Martha Sharp for Con- gress 1946:A Case Study" (Honors Thesis, Harvard University, 1947), which was based on research conducted under the direction of Sharp supporter Jerome S. Bruner, a lecturer at Harvard. The study, which often lacks documentation and sometimes cites sources that do not reflect the assertions in the text, has several errors of fact, such as repeatedly identifying Martin as Catholic. It often cites an article by David Nussbaum in P.M., 21 October 1946, that also has several errors, such as claiming Martin was Catholic, represented the fifth congressional district, and voted against the British loan. I want to thank Di Figlia for calling the White paper to my attention and providing me with a draft of the appropriate sections of her book. 103. Fall River Herald News, 21 March 1946. 104. Clips, scrapbook 40, MP. 105. NYT, 11-12 May 1946; Robert Bendinger, "Pre-Elections U.S.A.-Bay State

Prospects" Nation, October 12,1946,402. 106. NYT, 2 November 1946. 107. Gilbert Bailey, "Field Study in American Politics," New York Times Maga-

zine, 28 September 1947,45. 108. White, "Sharp," 4546. 109. Boston Traveler, 22,24 October 1946. 110. Providence Journal, 28 October 1946; Boston Post, 29 October 1946. 111. Fall River Herald News, 19 October 1996. Author's phone interview with

Ladiera, September 26,1966, Oral History, MP. Ladiera, who referred to Sharp as "from the extreme," had difficulty remembering the details of the trip but was adamant that Martin was not involved in the effort and expenses were not paid by his campaign. Apparently the entire affair was more anti-Sharp than pro-Martin. However, Bowen in a radio broadcast questioning Sharp's loyalty thanked the Martin campaign for making the time available. White, "Sharp," 67

112. 26,28 October 1946, scrapbook 42, MP; Fall River Herald News, 30 October 1946.The author was refused access to the archives of the Fall River Diocese, but it is incomprehensible that the bishop would be unaware of Bowen's charges.

113. Fall River Herald News,2 November 1946. Her supporters later claimed that Cronin had planned to mention her work with the NCWC, but was forbidden to do so by Bishop Cassidy. Nevertheless, they asserted Cronin designed parts of his speech to help her. White, "Sharp," 70. There is no material in the Cronin papers dealing with this campaign.

114. Providence Journal, 3 November 1946; Boston Traveler, 28 October 1946; WP, 6 October 1947; Fall River Herald News, 26 October 1946.

115. John F. Cahill to Harry S. Truman, December 21,1946, Truman Office Files, Part I, Political File (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1989).

116. Aftleboro Sun and Christian Science Monitor, 8 November 1946.She reported to the police that her Fall River Office was entered by means of a key, and papers stolen. September clip, scrapbook 40, MP.

117. Clip, 26 October 1946, scrapbook 40, MP; Bufalo Courier, December 1946, scrapbook 43, MP; Irving M. Engel, "Rankin and Republicans," Nation, October 24, 1946,465-66; White, "Sharp," 69.

131 ”Ofen . . . Like Cobra and Mongoose”

118. White, ”Sharp,” 49, 77. The only evidence for the Palestine charge, which if true would be a repudiation of Martin’s twenty-year-long backing of an independent Jewish state, was a citation to P.M. and an interview with a Boston shoe manufacturer. For another account very sympathetic to Sharp, see “Election Story.“

119. Boylan, “Reconversion in Politics,” 334, states Martin did nothing overtly to damage her, and Ladiera asserts Martin was not involved at all in the Bowen affair.

120. Fall River Herald News, 22 October 1946; clips, scrapbook 40, MI? 121. Bendiner, ”Pre-Election,” 402-6. 122. For “Had Enough” see Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade-und After:

America 1945-1960, enlarged ed. (New York: Vintage, 1956), 44-45; Boylan, “Re- conversion,” 382, contends the slogan has been overstated as an explanation for the Republican victory as it was not used widely nor was it as well known as later writers contend. It was not used at all in the Martin campaign. On the other hand Sean Savage, Truman and the Democriitic Party (Lexington Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1997), 96-97, interprets the slogan as maximizing voter appeal.

123. Providence Journal, 6 November 1946; Boston Herald, 9 November 1946. In these early press conferences, Martin made no mention of driving Reds out of the government.

124. Proziidence \ournal, 11 November 1946; AP and UP1 Clips, 13 November 1946, scrapbook 40, MP.

4

”The Speaker . Grand Strategist and

Guiding Spirit’? 1947-1948

ORGANIZING THE HOUSE

he Washington to which Martin came as Speaker in 1947 had changed Tconsiderably since his arrival as an untried congressman in 1925. The New Deal, World War 11, and the onset of the Cold War had resulted in a population explosion, a construction boom, and the District’s emergence as an international military, economic, and political center. However, the city had not yet broken free of its small-town limitations. Although the Washington Post, under new ownership, compared favorably with most metropolitan dailies, the largest circulation was that of the Times Herald, with its reactionary columnists and gory stories. The only hometown cultural activity, the National Symphony Orchestra, struggled yearly to meet its budget, and the National Theatre, recently air-conditioned, was the sole professional playhouse. In 1948, when the Actors Equity Association refused to perform there because African-Americans were excluded, the National became a movie house. With neither a concert hall nor theatre, and relying primarily on private galleries for art, the city suffered from a cultural vacuum. More embarrassing for the capital of the “free world” was an absence of change in racial policies. In 1945 the District Recreation Board rescinded its nonsegregation regulations. Moreover, new construction forced African-Americans into a remote section of Anacostia as the National Capital Housing Authority ruled segregation “the accepted pat- tern of the community.”2

Martin had changed even less than the city. He continued to live in his two-room apartment at the Hay-Adams and walk to the Capitol about

133

134 Chapter 4

715 each morning. Over breakfast in the House dining room he would discuss policies with senior Republicans, parliamentary procedures with Democratic leaders, or local issues with New England representatives of both parties. Usually he would remain in the House until 5:45, walk back to his rooms, dine, go for a stroll, and, if there were no commitments, retire about 9:30 or 1000. If on weekends Martin did not return to his district or to Cape Cod, or deliver a major speech somewhere in the nation, he would usually work on Saturday and Sunday except for an occasional football or baseball game. In a city where cocktail soirees and dinner parties were major social events, as both a bachelor and Speaker, Martin was in frequent demand. He attended as many of these having political significance as possible, about three or four a week, in order ”to get a good word in here or there.” But he followed his own set of rules-arrive early and see the host, drink nothing but ginger ale, make a quick circuit of the room and leave, and if a dinner party, get away as near 10:30 as possible so as ”to be fresh” the next day.3 Occasionally Martin would be seen and photographed with an attractive woman, providing gossip columnists an opportunity to speculate on his personal life. Tabloids enjoyed publishing a picture of him and Polly Guggenheim, while the columnist Walter Winchell reported that Martin and the movie star Myrna Loy were a “number.”* The Speaker’s female interest continued to be Clare Luce, whom the scholar Robert E. Herzstein describes as able to mesmerize men.5 This was certainly true as pertains to Martin, who wrote, “after all, you know I love you deeply.” They corresponded regularly in this period; Martin visited at her South Carolina plantation, and often sent flowers. Moreover, they exchanged gifts and met frequently for lunch.6

Despite the social whirl, Martin was no Beau Brummell; his suits were rumpled, his ties outdated, his shoes boxy. One reporter described him as making “Harry Truman look like a Broadway playb~y.”~ He retained his small-town unpretentiousness, inviting two hundred friends from home to his swearing in as Speaker. Continuing his yearly custom of visiting the sixty-three post offices in his district, Martin discussed local doings with his constituents and listened to complaints or suggestions, which were followed up by his staff when he returned to Washington.6

The Speaker’s district of manufacturing plants and truck farms also remained relatively stable and safely Republican-even when redistricting was controlled by a Democratic state legislature. (Massachusetts’s sixteen congressional districts had shrunk to twelve by the time Martin left Con- gress, necessitating periodic increases in the size of each.) Martin’s approach to politics also continued unchanged. Never strong on ideology, he continued to advise freshmen representatives that their first obligation was to themselves and their district rather than their party. To Martin politics, the art of the possible, was characterized by compromise, adjust-

135 ”The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit“

ments, accommodation, and a commitment to American value^.^ How-ever, the good of the nation and the good of the Republican Party, to him, were inseparable. Shortly before assuming the speakership he wrote to a Life reporter, “We have a hard job but I think we are going to discharge it in a way that will redound to the benefit of the country and, of course that means the party.”l0 His friend Luce accurately summarized Martin’s philosophy when she described him as ”candid, patient, flexible, determined, and liberal in his judgement.” Unlike some Republicans, she noted, he did not want to return to 1932 but believed we should “turn neither to the right nor the left. Let us go forward.””

Martin later described himself and Truman as carrying on politically ”like cobra and mongoose,” nevertheless each respected and recognized the admirable qualities of the other. Concerned about being the first Dem- ocratic president with a Republican Congress since Woodrow Wilson, Truman on New Year’s Day 1947 phoned Martin. After the Speaker assured him of his cooperation and desire to help run the country for the good of the general welfare, the president recorded in his diary, “I am inclined to believe he meant what he said” and occasionally was able to count on Martin for a helping hand.’* This conversation made it easier for Truman, once again, to request legislation placing the Speaker next in succession for the office of president after the vice president. When the measure, which would elevate Martin to that position, was debated in the House, he turned the chair over to his Floor Leader Charlie Halleck and left the chamber.

Martin’s management of the speakership was based on personal qualities that helped elevate him to that office and on his experience as minority leader. His integrity, loyalty, and good fellowship according to several witnesses left him without an enemy. Even further endearing him to his colleagues were his jumbling of words, such as recognizing “the gentleman from Rayburn, Mr. Texas” and announcing a committee to welcome Korean President Syngman Rhea as the president of India, which he corrected to Indiana.I3 Martin attributed his success as leader to his affability and consensus building. “They like me; they know I try to be fair. We’ve got to stick together. . . . But you can’t drive them.”14 Consequently, he did not demand lock-step obedience to party dictates. He never objected when “liberal” Republicans on the Rules Committee voted with the Dem- ocrats, and at times as minority leader even urged them to do so in order to get a Democratic-sponsored bill to the floor. Characteristically he suggested during the Eightieth Congress that Representative Louis E. Gra-ham (Pennsylvania) vote against one of the party‘s major measures, the controversial Taft-Hartley labor bill. “We’ve got plenty of votes. If I were you I‘d think it over. You’ve got a bad district. If you decide to go the other way, I’m not going to hold it against He advised Jacob Javits,

136 Chapter 4

a self-described "maverick who represented a liberal New York district, to vote Republican on House organization but from then on to do "whatever it takes" to get reelected. Javits heeded his advice and broke from the party on many major issues. Nevertheless, the Speaker continued his friendship and mentoring even after Javits was elected to the Senate.I6

Martin's method of establishing party consensus relied primarily on the committee system. In keeping with his belief that the Speaker is the "grand strategist and guiding spirit" he himself would enunciate traditional party principles often at the weekly Republican caucus. However, as chair of the Committee on Committees he exercised a great deal of authority; we "didn't give a damn whether the other states [those unrepre- sented on the committee] were there or what they wanted. We would make up a slate and push it through." The Steering Committee (after 1949 the Policy Committee), consisting of the floor leader, the whip, the congressional campaign chair, seventeen elected members, and those invited by the Speaker, would meet at Martin's call and under his chairmanship develop general legislative guidelines. In keeping with these norms, bills would be reported by the appropriate legislative committee, whose chairs would meet weekly with Martin to resolve party differences. As a rule Martin would support committee drafts, which in the case of major measures would be sent to the floor from the Rules Committee under a "closed" rule (no amendments allowed). Nine bills were reported under closed rules, in contrast with the years 1935 to 1946, when there were no more than two closed rules in any single session. Once a measure reached the floor a newly streamlined whip system was responsible for securing attendance and indicating leadership voting desire^.'^ Charlie Halleck, with the backing of Martin and Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York, was elected majority leader.Ia

This system did not preclude cooperation with Democrats in running the House. For example, early in the session because of a "gentleman's agreement" with Raybum that there would be no controversial legislation for a week, Martin prevented Harold Knutson (Minnesota), chair of Ways and Means, from obtaining unanimous consent to bring up a measure preventing the automatic reduction of wartime luxury taxes.19 This was not the only time Martin squelched Knutson because of an understanding with Rayburn. When the Ways and Means chief requested unanimous consent for the House to consider amendments on a reciprocal trade bill, "Mr. Sam'' objected as the request came without warning. "It is advis- able," Martin lectured Knutson, "in fact it is imperative that members submitting such requests first confer with both majority and minority leaders." A disgruntled Knutson replied, "Mr. Speaker, I was not aware of the fact it was necessary to consult . . .and if I have offended in the matter, I apologize.'t20

137 ”The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist mid Guiding Spirit”

Among the new congressmen sworn in by Martin were three young, re-cently discharged veterans, whose political careers would be intertwined with his and each of whom would become president: John F. Kennedy (Democrat, Massachusetts), Gerald R. Ford (Republican, Michigan), and Richard M. Nixon (Republican, California). Through his appointive powers Martin was in many ways responsible for Nixon’s rapid rise to national prominence. Congressional reorganization had resulted in a reduction of major committees from forty-eight to nineteen, theoretically limiting each representative to membership on one major committee. For- tunately for Nixon he had the Speaker as mentor.

While still in the navy Nixon had written to Martin seeking an interview, at which time the Bay Stater promised to assist Nixon in a campaign for Congress. After the election, an old family friend and a leading Republican in Nixon’s district asked Martin to look after and take a personal interest in the young man.21 The Speaker appointed Nixon to the Labor and Education Committee, a coup for the Californian, as ”labor reform” had been a national issue in the 1946 election. Moreover, Martin chose him for the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), a position Nixon used to help promote himself into the vice presidency. Nixon’s first administrative assistant and press secretary, as well as Mar- tin himself, asserted the latter appointment was at the Californian’s request, and according to the Speaker it was furthered by lobbying from Californian party leaders.22

THE SPEAKER AND THE PRESIDENT

Despite assurances of goodwill on the part of both the Speaker and the president it was apparent as early as January 2, as reflected in Martin’s speech to congressional Republicans, that partisan differences would limit cooperation. At first the Speaker endorsed bipartisanship, stating, “It is not how we [Congress and the president] differ on party matters, but how we unite on high principles for great causes which will set the patterns for the new age to come,” and then quoted George Washington, ”Let us raise standards of conduct to which both the wise and just may repair.” However, he warned the administration that cooperation was a duty of the executive branch as well as Congress and after attacking the growth of federal power under Roosevelt and Truman, invited congressional Democrats to join with Republicans to restore constitutional guarantees of liberty.23 The following day his address to the entire House was a Republican clarion call. He asked for an across the board tax reduction, a balanced budget, a cut in governmental expenditures-a necessity if taxes were to be reduced without increasing the national debt. By putting the tax cut first Martin

138 Chapter 4

hoped to force an immediate reduction in governmental programs even before a budget was approved, a procedure he did not follow in the Eisen- hower years. He went on to call for legislation to settle labor disputes without strikes and, without violating freedom of speech, to remove from government those who preferred the Communist system. He emphasized that government does not support the people and concluded by warning the president that as the American concept of government rested upon a dominant legislature, Congress's power must be rest0red.2~

Truman's State of the Union Address on January 6 was quite placatory. Although he acknowledged disagreement on domestic issues and called for public housing, he played down controversial specifics and emphasized bipartisanship in foreign policy. Martin responded that the president's program would be studied in "the same fine cooperative spirit in which it was pre~ented."~~ However, any euphoria was chilled a few days later by Truman's budget of $37.5billion, which he claimed was "rock bottom." Moreover, he averred that due to the danger of inflation, taxes should not be reduced at this time-and if and when the time was right, cuts should benefit lower income groups. Republicans denounced the budget message as "astounding." The House slashed the request by $6 bil-lion, including $120 million in defense, and realigned $76 million of the remaining amount to the air force. Martin, an advocate of strategic power, was delighted with this increase and began a lengthy battle with the president for a seventy-group air force rather than the fifty-five considered adequate by the administration.26 Because the Senate restored $1.5billion, the budget went to Conference Committee. Praising the House's "patriotic efforts" and attacking those "willing to sacrifice the welfare of the nation for petty partisan political advantage," Martin, untypically, refused to compromise. House conferees followed his admonition to stand firm and not jeopardize a tax cut by approving the Senate versi~n.~' Consequently an impasse followed and the session adjourned with no action on the budget.

Although intransigent on the budget, Martin disregarded the right wing of his own party and became an accommodationist on taxes. When some of the Republican liberals in the House and Senate expressed concern over the size of the proposed 20 percent cut and/or its retrogressive nature, Martin met with the Ways and Means Committee and announced 20 percent was only a goal: other objectives such as a balanced budget and reducing the national debt must also be considered. The meeting so in-censed Chairman Knutson that he refused to see reporters at its conclusion.28 Martin, backed by his Steering Committee and Rules Committee Chairman Allen, forced Knutson to accept changes which provided additional relief to small taxpayers at the expense of the r i ~ h . 2 ~ The measure passed the House 273-137 (only three Republicans against) and with the following changes was approved by the Senate: effective date from Janu-


ary 1, 1947 to July 1, 1947, a 30 percent reduction for the lowest wage earners, and an extra exemption for those over sixty-five, a cut of between 20 and 30 percent, with the larger percentage going to those with the lesser income. Martin praised the bill, hailing its progressivity and asserting it would stimulate the economy and thereby increase revenue.3O

Truman’s veto, only the second in history of a tax decrease, charged that the legislation was inflationary and “neither fair nor equitable.” It was sustained-but by only two votes in the House. Confident he would se-cure additional backing, Martin pushed through a second bill shortly before adjournment. Taking the floor, he charged the president with invali- dating the 1946 election and defying congressional prerogatives. Furthermore, the nation could have both a balanced budget and a tax cut, one that would remove nearly a million poorest citizens from tax rolls and still stimulate business. Claiming he spoke as a “nonpartisan,” Martin accused the president of violating his pledge to cooperate with Congress and choosing instead “to continue the old New Deal policy of tax and tax and spend and spend.” A new effective date of January 1, 1948, he asserted, would assuage critics of the bill and enable passage of this progressive measure.31 The revised bill passed 302 to 112, as 29 Democrats switched votes. Again Truman vetoed it, and although the House voted to override 299-108, the Senate by a margin of 5 votes sustained the veto.

When Truman called a special session of Congress to deal with foreign aid, Martin once again overruled Knutson, who wanted tax legislation taken up at that time. Instead the Speaker announced it would be the first order of business in the 1948 session.32 By that time Truman, fearing that another tax veto could not be sustained, proposed a reduction of his own, calling for a $40 abatement for each taxpayer and dependent and an increase in the excess profits tax to compensate for lost revenue, and announced his opposition to income splitting for married couples. That this was more a political attempt to discredit a Republican Congress rather than a bonafide proposal was reflected in his failure to consult Democratic congressional leaders before unveiling the program in his State of the Union Address.33

Rejecting the proposal as “political buncombe,” Martin asserted it would result in higher prices and inflation by transferring the “load of excessive taxes” to business.% The Speaker made another rare appearance on the House floor and argued for a revised Republican bill increasing personal exemptions by $100, cutting taxes from 10 to 30 percent, providing an additional exemption to the aged and the blind, and allowing split incomes for the married.35 This measure passed the House 297-120. A con-ference committee agreed to the only Senate change-reducing the size of the cut to between 5 and 12.6 percent. This time, in what Martin described as Republicans triumphantly forcing tax reductions on a reluctant president, Truman’s veto message was ~ve r r idden .~~ A pragmatic Martin had

140 Chapter 4

displayed two of his leadership qualities: determination, in pushing through the tax cut, and flexibility, in order to achieve that end.

Labor legislation of the Eightieth Congress illustrated the difficulties faced by a Republican leader more moderate than much of his party. With strikes, inflation, and a seeming arrogance of labor leaders, alleged labor excesses had become an issue in the 1946 election. Even Truman in his 1947 State of the Union Address called for restrictions on unions. Martin, who made labor legislation a priority after tax revision, appealed for ”intelligent legislation” to deal with the ”confused state of labor management relati~nship.”~~ That such legislation would restrict union activities was apparent when Martin persuaded Richard Welch (California), who was considered too sympathetic to labor, to take the Public Lands Com- mittee and replaced him as chair of the Labor Committee with Fred A. Hartley, Jr. (New Jersey).38

On January 3,1947, the first day of the session, seventeen bills dealing with unions or revising the Wagner Labor Relations Act were introduced. Frequent conferences in the office of Howard W. Smith (Democrat, Vir- ginia) with Martin, Halleck, and Hartley led to a House bill of sixty-six pages. Martin, believing union shops were necessary to collective bargaining, used these meetings and the Steering Committee to ensure they were not prohibited in the proposed legislation. (However, the final version did not prevent states from outlawing them.) An angry Clare Hoff- man (Republican, Michigan) stormed out of one such meeting dealing with the preservation of union shops, muttering, ”This bill isn’t being written by the Labor Committee, but by a bunch of. . . politician^."^^

The House version passed by a coalition of anti-union Southern Demo- crats (of the ninety-three Democrats who voted for the measure, eighty- two were from the South) and Republicans was so repressive that several Republican moderates, including Martin, hoped and expected the act to be modified in the Senate. The Speaker suggested specific changes to Taft, the Senate’s cosponsor, and even publicly announced that the final version would be modified by the House after a Senate conference.40

The Taft-Hartley law provided for an eighty-day cooling-off period, outlawed the closed shop and secondary boycotts, and required a non- communist oath from labor leaders. It was enacted with ease over Tru- man’s veto when more senators and representatives voted to override than supported the original bill. Moreover, a majority of Democrats in both Houses opposed the president‘s action. Martin, who in a few months would enable the nation’s most unpopular labor leader, the United Mine Workers’ John L. Lewis, to avoid its punitive provisions, hailed the measure and astutely observed to his friend Luce that workers were not as angry at the legislation as were labor leader^.^' Hartley later claimed that some of the most restrictive portions of the bill had


been included by the House to enable the Senate to eliminate them and thereby make the law appear more moderate and thus more acceptable. Dissatisfied with the final version because it did not sufficiently reduce labor’s power, Hartley was bitter when Republican leaders determined that there would be no further legislation to which unions could object until after the presidential election.42

Martin’s moderation was also revealed in the reciprocal tariff controversy. Industrial and agricultural interests supporting high tariffs and opposing reciprocity had powerful advocates in the House, Martin among them. In addition to his life-long ideological opposition to tariff reductions the Speaker further resisted reciprocity for it increased presidential power by delegating negotiating rights to the chief executive. Neverthe- less, he intervened with Ways and Means to prevent legislation restricting tariff reductions and thereby undermining the forthcoming Geneva trade meeting. Furthermore, Martin met with Senators Vandenberg and Eugene D. Millikin (Republican, Colorado), a bitter foe of reciprocity whose committee had jurisdiction over tariff bills. They agreed not to amend existing legislation, if the president would issue an executive order incorporating minor changes-which he did. The following year, 1948, when the law lapsed, both houses extended reciprocity for one year rather than the three requested by the administration and limited the amount duties could be reduced by without congressional approval. Acclaiming those changes as a good compromise, Martin disarmed conservative critics by explaining that the world owed the United States too much money for this nation to shut off foreign trade, and on the other hand, he pointed out to liberals that the law provided a trial period to see if low tariff policies damaged American industry.43

One of the congressional achievements of which he was most proud was the passage and ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment to the Constitution, restricting a president to two terms. The limitation, part of the Republican platform of 1944, had first been introduced by Martin in January 1945 and was not so much “a posthumous attack on Franklin D. Roosevelt,” as Hasenfus states, but a means of curbing presidential power, which Martin believed had grown excessively.u

For one who had espoused African-American rights, Martin’s record in the Eightieth Congress was disappointing. Although he had signed an FEPC discharge petition in 1946, as Speaker he failed to push such legislation. Privately he told black GOP leaders the party could not afford to antagonize New England and Midwestern industrialists, party donors who opposed such legislation because of its religious and racial provisions. We can do a lot, he stated, but cannot afford an FEPC. Republican priority, he informed these leaders, would have to be an anti-poll tax bill, which under his leadership passed the House 290-112.45At the National

142 Chapter 4

Anti-lynch and Prayer Day rally held on the Capitol Steps, where he accepted an antilynching petition from the National Negro Council, Martin pointed out that he had advocated such legislation for twenty years and would sponsor their petition before the Steering Committee. However, he did not intervene to get an antilynching measure to the House floor, as he assumed it would be a waste of time unless the Senate gave some indication of support by passing the less controversial poll tax bill. Nothing happened, antilynching died in

Congressional inaction on Displaced Persons (DPs) was equally inadequate. There were over a million homeless in Europe; many were Jewish Holocaust survivors whose situation became more desperate when Pales- tine closed immigration. Legislation providing for the admission of 400,000 DPs over a four-year period in addition to existing immigration quotas was introduced in the House at the request of the Citizen’s Com- mittee for Displaced Persons. There it languished awaiting action from a more conservative Senate, which finally approved a measure allowing 200,000 admissions over two years. Its restrictions on skills, country of origin, and requirement for registration as a DP prior to December 22, 1945 excluded virtually all Jews and led to charges that these provisions were deliberately anti-Semitic. The House measure for 200,000 with a cutoff date of 1947 and no restrictions on country of origin and skills was much more generous. However, Senators at the Conference Committee presented an ultimatum: only minor changes or no bill at all. Conse- quently the final version, passed by a voice vote in both chambers, retained nearly all the restrictive features. Further efforts to liberalize the law during the special session of 1948 died in the Senate Judiciary Com- mittee, and in 1949 the Senate killed a House bill extending the cutoff date, removing the restrictions, and increasing the quota. The legislation nevertheless did set important precedents for asylum and the relaxation of quotas despite its anti-Semitic overtones and was in sharp contrast to Martin’s attitude toward Jews.47 He continued to hold office in the Amer- ican Christian Palestine Committee and was one of the first prominent politicians to endorse the United Nations Committee Report on Palestine. A Jewish state was a solution delayed too long, he averred, as he called upon the United States to redeem its pledge for a homeland by supporting the Committee’s recommendations for an independent Jewish nation, a position which he had held for decades48

In some instances Martin intervened to kill measures, the most significant of which were housing and educational bills. With his approbation the House Education and Labor Committee would not report out a Sen- ate bill for education grants to the states. Martin claimed the nation could not afford such legislation. Halleck, representing himself and Martin, advised Republicans to follow their conscience on the measure, but then

143 “The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit“

warned them that the leadership did not want them to undermine the Committee by signing a discharge petition. Martin ignored appeals from seventy national organizations and prominent Americans, including Tru- man and Dwight Eisenhower, and let the bill die in committee. Among charges leveled at him was the use of “dictatorial. .. astonishingly outrageous and discouraging” tactics.49

Comprehensive housing legisla tion was also killed by the Speaker. Tru- man’s 1945 message called for a public housing program, slum clearance, and aid to private developers. Known as the Taft-Ellender-Wagner Act after its three sponsors, a bill incorporating the president’s plan was introduced in November 1945.Although the housing industry fought the public housing provisions, the Senate approved the plan in 1946 but the House committee led it die.

In April 1948 the Senate again passed the measure, this time by acclamation; it was reported out of the House committee by a narrow margin of fourteen to thirteen. However, ignoring an outpouring of criticism, Martin had it bottled up in Rules. When he entered the Senate chamber Charles W. Tobey (Republican, New Hampshire) castigated him and his leadership for arrogance, and Taft, a fellow aspirant for the presidential nomination, backed Martin against the chamber’s wall, demanding “in no uncertain terms that the House accept the bill.”50

At the special session called by Truman during the Democratic convention, Martin made it nearly impossible for a discharge petition to blast the bill from committee. He ruled it could be signed only when the House was in session and then called a long weekend reces~.~’ The nearest he came to explaining his stance was contending that private enterprise was solving the housing shortage by building ten thousand new units a month, twice as many as under the “police state methods” when the Democrats were in power in 1946?*

Even more frustrating to the president was his defeat on Universal Mil- itary Training (UMT), first asked for in 1945, and killed with Martin’s assistance in 1945 and 1946. Hoping to influence its passage, Truman appointed an advisory committee of academics, clerics, industrialists, and public servants and submitted its favorable recommendation to Congress in the spring of 1947. Martin was censored by many critics and organizations for keeping the proposal in committee. Allegedly concerned with holding expenditures to a minimum, he called for a cost analysis; “if we acted now,“ he proclaimed, “we would act blindly.” With other Republi- cans he advocated reliance on air power and increased reserve forces for cheaper and equally effective pro tec t i~n .~~

As the European crisis intensified the president in a hawkish speech in March 1948 assailed the Soviet Union for its ”ruthless course of action,” denounced atheistic Communism, and concluded by urging Congress to

144 Chapter 4

restore the draft temporarily until UMT was enacted. Martin immediately pledged his cooperation and canceled Easter recess so the Congress could begin action immediatel~.~~ However, his cooperation did not mean blindly following the administration's lead. Martin called once again for an increase in air power and the National Guard, postponement of UMT, and a bill that would prod reserve enlistments and make selective service unneces~ary.5~The law as finally enacted provided for twenty-one-month service with members of the reserves and National Guard draft- exempt. Martin was one of a handful of congressmen who attempted to have an antisegregation provision in the legislation, but had to be content with an antidiscrimination Frequently dismissed as an isolationist by contemporaries and historians, Martin had been a major factor in the passage of the first two peacetime draft laws in the nation's history- even as he labored to kill UMT.

Martin had been concerned for decades over the threat posed by domestic Communists and early in the session pledged House Republicans "to remove the Red menace from America . . . a minority [that] has set out to destroy the American system and replace it with Communi~m."~' Con-gress, he asserted, was "a special target" of Communists who hoped to destroy that legislative body before it crushed their plan to overthrow the American way of life and free enterprise. Participating in this insidious campaign, he charged, were leftist radio The Constitu- tion and the Bill of Rights, he asserted, were not intended as a "cloak for those who would undermine and destroy the very instruments in whose protection they seek refuge."59 With his support the appropriations for HUAC soared from $50,000 in 1945 to $200,000 in 1948.

Despite what proved to be an exaggerated fear of subversion, the Speaker was apprehensive that excessive vigilance might undermine basic freedoms. In a 1947 Gridiron Speech he warned that the nation must remain the stronghold of liberty: "We will have gained nothing if we resist a police state abroad by setting up a police state at home."@ He was careful to follow procedural safeguards for the accused and on occasion faulted others for being too zealous. To prevent the abuse of subpoena powers by House committees, he required the committee chair as well as the Speaker to sign all subpoenas.61

Moreover, he made a ruling cheered by attorneys for the Hollywood Ten-writers, directors, and producers whom HUAC wanted to cite for contempt for unsatisfactory answers as to whether they were Commu- nists. To the surprise of the Committee, rather than invoke the Fifth Amendment, the deponents had aggressively argued freedom of speech and denounced the proceedings. When Congress was not in session, committee requests for contempt citations routinely went to the Speaker for certification; he would then submit them to the United States District

145 "The Speaker. . . Grand Strdtegist and Guiding Spirit"

Attorney for action. Counsel for the Ten met privately with Martin, contending that since Congress would convene in a week and that HUAC members were polled on the citation by phone rather than at a meeting, the rights of the accused would be protected only if Martin refused certification. The Speaker then met with HUAC chair J. Parnell Thomas (New Jersey) and reached an understanding. Martin would not certify the citations: each individual case would be presented to the entire House, allowing debate before voting on the citation-thus providing a forum for the congressional defenders of the accused.'j2 Despite this action Martin defended HUAC's investigation of Hollywood leftists.63

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Although Martin was a staunch advocate of congressional rights and prerogatives, the Eightieth Congress followed presidential leadership in for-eign affairs-often because it had little choice. Consultation in advance was rare. Martin, who publicly objected to these slights, claimed in his memoirs that from July 18,1947 until January 20,1949, during which time he was first in line of succession to the presidency, there was no attempt to keep him informed.&4

The first foreign policy crisis during the Eightieth Congress occurred when the British ambassador informed the United States in February 1947 that his government would end aid to Greece and Turkey in six weeks and hoped the United States would assume this burden. For two years British troops had supported a conservative, royalist Greek government against Communist guerrillas and had financed modernization of the Turkish army as a means of checking the Soviets in the eastern Mediterranean. Truman was anxious for the United States to assume this responsibility, but because it would require additional appropriations there was no way he could initiate such a sweeping change in policy without obtaining the approval of the budget-conscious Republican Con- gress. After a briefing called to inform congressional leaders of the crisis, the president, Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Undersecretary Dean G. Acheson, and the congressmen concluded that if assistance was justified in broad policy terms, Congress would approve it.65 Martin then warned the Republican Steering Committee that there was a severe crisis in international relations necessitating the speeding up of foreign aid and increasing American air supremacy.66

Two days later in a nationally broadcast address to a joint session the president asked for $400 million in economic assistance and military supplies and authority to send armed forces and civilians to assist Greece and Turkey with reconstruction and military training. To meet

146 Chapter 4

congressional recommendations that the policy be inclusive, he announced this was part of a program “to support free peoples who are re- sisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure” and concluded by asserting the executive and legislative branches must work together on this matter. Martin refused to be hurried, telling the press that such “a radical departure from our traditional American foreign policy” must be examined by Congress with care and delibera- t i ~ n . ~ ’However, when the Rules Committee unnecessarily delayed action with open hearings, Martin and his team prevailed upon two ”swing votes” to get what became known as the “Truman Doctrine” to the floor. In so doing the Speaker assured the GOP that passage of the measure was not a test of party loyalty-foreign policy was still nonpartisan. With over half the Republicans voting in favor, the House approved the Doctrine 287 to 107. Two months later when the chair of the Appropriations Committee declared only $100,000 of the $400 million was justified, Martin intervened on behalf of the full amount.68

As Congress debated the Truman Doctrine, Europeans, cold, hungry, and homeless, faced a bleak future, for UNRRA aid was due to expire in 1947.On the very day that Britain informed the United States of her plans to withdraw from Greece and Turkey, Truman had requested $300 million for the essentials of life for Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, and China. The House, after divisive interparty debate, approved $200 million-the Senate the entire amount. When the Conference Committee accepted the Senate version, the House manager refused to sign the report. A bitter floor fight followed; a motion to recommit was defeated only when thirty- three Republican opponents switched and voted for the conference report. The Appropriations Committee later cut relief by $18 million, the amount destined for the Communist nations of Poland and Hungary. As a result of this imbroglio a chagrined Martin abandoned his ”hands-off” leadership policy on foreign affairs.‘j9 His new approach contributed substantially to passage of the European Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the Marshall Plan.

Early in 1947 the administration began to explore a more comprehensive foreign aid policy as a means of stopping the spread of Communism. At a commencement address at Harvard a new program was outlined when Secretary Marshall called for the United States “to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world . . .so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can ex- ist.” He challenged the countries of Europe to agree on their needs and their role “to give proper effect” to American action. Despite backing the interim aid bill, Martin frequently expressed reservations about foreign aid and the necessity of Congress relying on the administration for information on European needs and American resources. As a result he

147 “The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit”

appointed a special committee to study foreign aid and report by March 1,1948. On it were nineteen members under the de facto chairmanship of Christian Herter (Massachusetts), a future Secretary of State. Martin‘s appointees, primarily from committees concerned with foreign aid, represented a cross section of internationalists and isolationists. The internationalist Harold Cooley (Democrat, Minnesota) described the committee as the “damnedest conglomeration you‘d ever want to see; isolationists, conservatives, liberals, and internationalists trying to come to common gro~nd.’”~Among those whom Martin appointed to this ”real plum” was Richard Nixon, who now began his odyssey into the internationalist wing of the party.”

At the Speaker’s request, committee members were warned to be cautious in public statements. Martin reminded them that the information they gathered would shape Republican action in Congress and might determine the 1948 election. Therefore he urged “discreetness” until the leadership had an opportunity “to look over questions of policy.”72

Long before the committee could report, the European economic situation deteriorated further, leading to speculation that a special congressional session was needed. Martin denied the necessity of such a step, asserting that ”private sources” informed him there was no danger of starvation and that Congress must be provided with facts before it would legislate relief.73 At a congressional conference on the world food crisis Truman again mentioned the possibility of a special congressional session. Martin again questioned the need for a special session, stating it would be unwise to convene before the Herter Committee reported.74 The Speaker also continued to express reservations about the need for foreign aid. On one hand he feared a Marshall Plan might become a “perpetual, gigantic world W.P.A.” that by ”drain[ing] ourselvesN would result in ”sky-high” prices. Frequently he asserted American resources were over- committed in wasteful foreign aid programs whose recipients must do more to help themselves. On the other hand, he acknowledged the United States could not ”walk out on Europe.” What was needed was the greatest system of cooperation between nations “the world ever saw.“75

Late in October Truman informed congressional leaders that he was go-ing to call Congress into session on November 17, at which time he would request $597 million in stop-gap European aid until March 1948, when a permanent program could begin. While Martin’s assistants Halleck and Jessie Wolcott, the House Banking Committee Chairman, accused Truman of playing politics with this request, the Speaker’s only comment was that he had no commitment “to railroad through” emergency aid appropria- t i o n ~ . ~ ~But by the time Congress convened much of the Herter Report had been released, convincing Martin of the need for foreign aid, if effi- ciently administered on “a sound intelligent basis.” To the praise of many,

148 Chapter 4

he promised to defer until the regular session attempts to force through a tax cut and concentrate instead on interim aid. However, unlike the administration, the Speaker wanted funds to assist China: “it’s just as essential to fight Communism in Asia as in Europe.”” It was propitious that Martin’s reservations about the need for aid had been resolved by Herter’s report, for John Taber and a group from the Appropriations Committee after touring Europe concluded there was no great need for foreign aid; Europeans were not working hard enough.78

The administration’s request of $597 million was reduced in the House to $590 million, $60 million of which as a result of the Speaker’s influence was earmarked for China. When Martin and his team killed further amendments, Democrats accused him of using a “fast gavel” to cut off debate, to prevent Republican isolationists from slashing the amount, and to avoid a recorded vote. By preserving a semblance of party unity, unlike the earlier interim aid measure, Martin had prevented Republicans from being embarrassed over the Conference Committee report. Its recommendations, approved by the House, increased funding to $597 million; however, the amount was reduced later by the Appropriations Committee to $540 million, $18 million of which was for China. Martin’s role was not only crucial in the passage of this bill but in compelling a reluctant administration to embrace China, a policy many Republicans, including former isolationists, would force upon the administration throughout the Truman years.79

Shortly after enactment of the recovery bill Congress met in regular session, its major issue the Marshall Plan. In a special message on December 19, Truman requested $17 billion for European recovery from April 1948 to June 30,1952. Martin, still committed to a tax cut, announced Congress would apply “a microscope” to the project as the United States must avoid bankruptcy, but on the other hand he recognized the need to spend billions in aid, stating that Congress would do all it could to help friendly nations. Moreover, he endorsed Herter recommendations for a massive aid program administered by an independent bipartisan board and funded on a yearly basis. Martin claimed a four-year grant as requested by the administration was impossible: each Congress was sovereign and one could not bind another; furthermore, yearly appropriations would lead to greater cooperation from recipient nations. With other Republi- cans, he once again insisted on including aid to China.80

Convinced that an extensive aid program was needed, Martin now found it necessary to moderate a bloc of about forty aggressive House opponents, led by Allen, Halleck, and Clarence Brown, presidential campaign manager of Senator Taft. The latter, who described the Marshall request as “lavish,” declared himself against any program of the size proposed.81 To make the plan more acceptable to a badly divided GOP, the

149 "TheSpeaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit"

administration followed the advice of Senator Vandenberg and deleted specific amounts from its proposal, withdrew its management from the State Department, and submitted to Congress a separate request for $570 million in economic aid to China. After a meeting with Marshall and other administrative leaders, Martin promised the House would act as rapidly as possible in order to meet an April 10 deadline, the latest date by which Europe could be assured of aid if timetables were to be met.82 Herbert Hoover's response to Martin's request for the ex-president's views was read to the chamber and helped overcome Republican resistance. The former president asserted the plan had "a good chance of success'' and should be tried. Moreover, he endorsed the full amount of European aid recommended by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.83 By a vote of 329 to 74 (Republicans in favor three to one) the lower chamber approved $6.8 billion in aid for one year with assurance that more assistance would be forthcoming. The measure was signed by Truman on April 3.

International tension having subsided by the end of May, the Taber-led Appropriations Committee in effect slashed the amount of aid by extending the period covered from twelve to fifteen months. By limiting debate to one day and preventing a recorded vote, Martin obscured sharp Re- publican divisions as he rammed through the Taber cuts. Years later he wrote that he backed the reduction as nearly $6 billion in aid was ade- q ~ a t e . ~ ~In the Senate, in a move supported by all presidential hopefuls except Martin, full funding was restored. A House face-saving compromise by the Conference Committee, endorsed by Republicans in both chambers, left it to the president to determine if it was necessary to spend the appropriations in twelve months.85 Martin continued to be committed to ERP, but repeatedly called for better management and careful supervision of expenditures.86 Republicans supported this "liberal . . . even radical line in foreign policy," the Speaker claimed, in part because the Com- munist menace with its possibility of subversion was more dangerous than the threat of Hitler; it also placed the party "in a strategic position to champion conservatism at home.'@'

The administration's China bill, whose purpose was to obtain Republi- can backing for ERP, ran into difficulty in the House. Although Marshall announced his opposition to any of the requested $570 million being designated for military aid, the House earmarked $150 million for that purpose. A Conference Committee compromise between the Senate (administration version) and House versions was enacted into law: $125 million would be available for military assistance at the discretion of the president or at the request of China.88 Martin, who was proud of his role in forcing the administration to again provide military assistance to China, after the collapse of Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist government, berated Democrats for insufficient military support and for abandoning that nation.89

150 Chapter 4

RETURN OF THE DEMOCRATS: THE 1948 ELECTION

Although much of the second session of the Eightieth Congress dealt with foreign policy, its major thrust was political, as Truman was more concerned with developing a campaign issue than in domestic legislation. His "message a week proposals, designed to keep the Congress off balance, were not even cleared in advance with the Democratic leadership.g0 In what Martin admired as a "devilishly astute piece of politics" the president used the Democratic National Convention as a weapon against the Republican Congress. His confidant, Clark Clifford, had advised him to embarrass the Republican nominee, Thomas E. Dewey, by a "bold and daring step"--calling Congress into special session and challenging it, under control of its "Neanderthal reactionaries" such as Martin and Halleck, to enact the Republican Party platform. Truman did so, and in what one scholar has described as the nearest thing to a campaign speech ever delivered before a joint session urged passage of just about every major proposal that he had made since January 1947.91

When the session was announced Martin asserted it would be like the Battle of Bunker Hill, "plenty of However, his views were not to prevail. Herb Brownell, Dewey's campaign manager, met with congressional leaders, urging them to pass two or three measures in the party's platform that had been requested by Truman. Taft, adamant about doing anything to acknowledge the legitimacy of Truman's stratagem, refused. None of the others were willing to challenge the Ohioan, although Harold Stassen has claimed Martin was willing to follow Dewey's lead on a handful of liberal issues. Nevertheless at the conference's conclusion the Speaker declared that the session would not "rubber stamp left-wing schemes for more spending and more government

Martin attacked Truman's address to the joint session, condemning the president's partisanship and his abuse of power and concluded by hailing the achievements of the Eightieth C0ngress.9~ Nevertheless, he overruled Halleck's suggestion to adjourn the session immediately. Instead Con- gress met for eleven days, passing some minor legislation, the most im-portant of which was a loan to the United Nations for its New York headquarters. If the Senate, as Dewey wished, had liberalized the displaced persons law, Martin would have had it passed in the H0use.9~ Left little choice the Speaker praised the session, singling out the passage of a curb on credit buying, and an emasculated housing bill as well as the UN loan.96As Truman hoped, Congress by doing little had provided him with more ammunition for his campaign, which increasingly focused on the Republican Party and the legislature rather than Dewey.

The Eightieth Congress was denounced by the president as the worst in history, a "do-nothing" body, a perception apparently shared by

“The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit” 7 51

many Americans who elected him. However, it was certainly far from ”do-nothing”; as a matter of fact it passed over nine hundred public laws, more than any Congress since the Seventy-sixth. Others, too, have been quite critical of the Eightieth, yet it was more moderate than most pundits and many historians believe, a quality attributable in no small part to Martin. Until his death the Speaker delighted in that Congress, which he described as “particularly constructive and progre~sive.”~~ De-spite the presence of several outspoken reactionaries, some of whom held key positions because of seniority, this first Republican Congress in sixteen years did not attempt to repeal the New Deal. Although it restrained unions in the Taft-Hartley Act, it did not emasculate the Wagner Act-much to the disappointment of conservatives of both parties. The president may have assailed its tax reduction as disproportionately helpful to the rich, but nevertheless it was progressive-the dis-pute was over the degree of progressivity. In what must have dismayed Republican veterans of 1937, it even increased social security benefits for the aged, blind, and children.98

A perceptive assessment by Ernest K. Lindley, Newsweek columnist, described the major struggle of the Eightieth as not between the Re- publican majority and the Democratic president as one might expect, but between GOP isolationists and internationalists, and also between reactionaries in domestic affairs and intelligent conservatives. The record, he wrote, shows that the leadership was of the “more forward outlook.”99 Other observers such as radio comrnenta tor and former director of the Office of War Information, Elmer Davis, and Frank McNaughton, Truman’s comrade and Tivie reporter, also recognized and praised the Speaker’s moderation.100 At the conclusion of the first session a reluctant Truman had acknowledged that Congress’s record was not entirely negative. In response to a reporter’s question whether cooperation had been realized to a “large degree,” the president answered ”to some extent.”’”’ Carl Albert (Democrat, Oklahoma), Speaker of the House 1971-1976, praised Martin’s affability and effectiveness and his putting partisanship aside to work with Democratic leaders in order to have a “do-something Congress”-a judgment which he claimed Truman shared when speaking off the record.’02

Nevertheless, as early as June 1947 Martin found it necessary to defend the Eightieth against Truman’s “do nothing” charges-but on a personal level their relationship was marked by respect and admiration-a civility characteristic of both men.’03 At a Gridiron Dinner in December 1947 Mar- tin professed his respect ”for the kindly, distinguished President of the United States, for whom I have deep personal affe~tion.”’~~ Not long after the dinner, Truman, in a letter addressed Dear Joe and signed Harry, sent Martin a model elephant for his collection. A company had inadvertently

152 Chapter 4

sent it to the president thinking they had forwarded a model donkey. In a humorous notation in his diary dealing with Martin’s role in settling a coal strike, the president noted, “I am fond of Joe you know.” When Tm- man complained by name about the “far right” in the Eighty-first Con- gress, Martin was not included, unlike several years later when he described the Bay Stater as far right as Herbert Hoover.Io5

On the other hand, in 1949 Martin sent the president a belt buckle with a donkey on it, which was acknowledged in a Joe-Harry letter. A few years later the Speaker was thanked by Truman for his role in the passage of the presidential retirement bi11.1°6 Moreover, Martin was invited by Tru- man to attend ceremonies at the dedication of his library and was asked to appoint a young man to the Military Academy’s Prep School, and the former president expressed the hope that when he was in Washington they could get together and discuss “the times we met in the White House in days gone by.”Io7 Truman’s attitude was summarized in a letter to Speaker John McCormack in which he described Martin as fair and able, “a great Speaker’’ who was “courteous and kind on my trips to Massa- chusetts as Senator and President.“1o*

The 1948 presidential campaign had begun during the first session of the Eightieth Congress. It is impossible to know when Martin first thought seriously of pursuing his party’s nomination, but early that year the press began to speculate about his candidacy, and by April it was apparent he was interested. That month, at the invitation of Hugh Roy Cullen, a wealthy Houston oilman, and H. J. Porter, a well-known Texan businessman, he toured the Lone Star State, meeting prominent oilmen and civic leaders-allegedly to reinvigorate the state’s GOP. In what the press described as the ”kick-off in his bid for the nomination,’’ Martin was introduced by Cullen to a national radio audience as having all of the necessary attributes for president. During his tour, the Speaker hailed free enterprise, lauded the achievements of Congress’s first session, and declaimed on the need for a Texas GOP. Cullen was so struck by the New Englander that he began a drive to win him the Republican nominat i~n.’~~

Martin, who obtained his first newspaper presidential endorsement in July 1947, was convinced the foreign situation would advance Republican chances. He also undertook a fall western speaking tour to whip up party sentiment for 1948’s anticipated victory.110 Although financed by the RNC, there was no doubt the trek had presidential implications for the Speaker, especially as it followed hard upon a Taft and a Dewey excursion. His friend Landon, fully aware of the possibilities, worked to insure the tour redounded to Martin‘s advantage. The trip increased speculations that he was a candidate, especially as the longer it lasted the more he talked and acted like one.”’

153 "The Speaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit"

Before setting out the Speaker was lionized at a huge Joe Martin Day in Fall River. Stores and mills closed as an air show, bands, a motorcade, and clambake participants paid tribute to the Congressman. Politicians from New England and other eastern states, Democrats (including John F. Kennedy) as well as Republicans, extolled his virtues. The featured speaker, Senator Owen Brewster (Republican, Maine), acclaimed his presidential qualities. Although Martin once again denied he was a candidate, his carefully crafted remarks left the door open.112

His speaking tour, which lasted five weeks, brought Martin into seven western states, where he delivered sixty speeches, allegedly reached an audience of 65million, and met hundreds of local party stalwarts, most of whom received follow-up letters when he returned to Washington. Re- peatedly the Speaker proclaimed 1948 a Republican year, but cautioned against lethargy from overconfidence. He hailed the achievements of Congress as he emphasized his favorite issues: balanced budget, retirement of the national debt, and tax reduction. Moreover, he endorsed foreign aid with the proviso that Europeans help themselves and expressed faith in the United Nations despite the multiplicity of Soviet vetoes. Mar- tin concluded his tour with a brief vacation joined by his fellow teetotal- ing, nonsmoking friend Francis Case (Republican, South Dakota) with whom he shot and killed a buffalo. (A photo of Martin posing with his ri-fle and the carcass was featured on his Christmas card that year.)113

Martin was sure the tour was a success. In Kansas he conferred with Landon, one of his chief adherents, and although repeatedly stating he was not a candidate professed that no man could refuse a nomination. Furthermore, he confided to some his belief that a Taft-Dewey deadlock would make his nomination p~ssible."~ By September, with the apparent approbation of the Speaker, his congressional friends under the leadership of the party's Whip, Leo Allen, had begun openly soliciting delegates on his behalf. Allen proudly proclaimed, "I'm for Martin for president first, last and all the time." Gene Cox, his Democratic friend, commended Martin and even joined the congressional bandwagon, declaring as early as January 1947, "if fate should mistakenly decree that the next president of the country must be a Republican . . . I hope it will be the very able and very popular occupant of the [Speaker's] chair."Il5

Martin hoped for and became increasingly optimistic that the convention would deadlock. Although he wrote to his friend Luce that he was content "to let destiny make the decision," he was perfectly willing to give destiny a push in the right direction.lI6 One way was hiring a new speechwriter whose eloquent style and clarity of argument were improvements on the old. Another was the acceptance of weekend speaking engagements throughout the East. During these he praised the Eightieth

154 Chapter 4

Congress, attacked the Democrats, and argued that a Republican Con- gress and Republican president were necessary for the good of the nation."' Fearful that his presidential chances would he hurt by the belief he was a Catholic, Martin informed the Washington Times Herald in March that he had no religious affiliation: "I was never even in a Sunday school once in my life." Nevertheless, belief in his Catholicism died hard; his biography was still included, as it had been for years, in the American Catholic Who's Who. It was necessary to reassure the Kansas delegation he was not Catholic, after which one of the state Supreme Court Judges suggested additional quick publicity to dispel "the Catholic question.""*

The most dramatic episode in his bid for the nomination was his intervention in a national coal strike. Over 200,000 miners struck March 14, 1948 after John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, and Ezra Van Horn, industry representative, failed to agree on the selection of a third trustee to determine the pension paid to retirees from coal royalty payments. Because he ignored a court order under Taft-Hartley to call off the strike, Lewis was scheduled to "show cause" to a federal judge why he should not be held in contempt of court. Suddenly he and Van Horn met in Martin's office at the Bay Stater's request. Claiming he "had a responsibility" as Speaker and as a patriotic American to intervene, in a brief thirteen-minute meeting Martin got them to agree on Senator Styles Bridges (Republican, New Hampshire) as the third, impartial member. In less than twenty-four hours a settlement quite favorable to the union was approved and Lewis ordered the men back to work. Martin, a champion of the Taft-Hartley law, had enabled an unpopular labor leader to escape its punitive provision, while a president, who had vetoed the measure, was frustrated in his efforts to enforce it. At any event, party leaders and Eastern industrialists who wanted coal were pleased at the Speaker's intervention, as were many of his colleagues who, after a standing ovation in the House, congratulated him from the floor and described his action as both courageous and pre~idential."~ One of the few outspokenly critical Republicans was Hartley, who claimed that Martin, "bedazzled by the presidency," was courting the labor vote-"the presidential bug bites hard when it bites."lZ0 Martin attempted to capitalize upon the affair. Al- legedly he had prepared a statement urging Nebraskans not to vote for him in the primary, but now changed his mind and did not release it, even though unlike other hopefuls he had not campaigned in the state. To his chagrin he finished seventh out of seven with less than one thousand votes. He also attempted to apply his success at mediation to foreign affairs. After describing his intervention as a sincere effort to preserve industrial and economic peace, he offered to meet with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin if that would end a rush toward war. The speech and idea of a Martin-Stalin summit received a mixed reaction.I2' Nevertheless, he

155 "The Speaker . . . Gmnd Strategist and Guiding Spirit"

continued his offer to join the Soviet leader in a conference where he would extend the hand of fellowship, peace, security, and trade.122

Despite some criticism of the coal settlement, Martin was seen increasingly as a serious contender for a presidential nomination. His strategy like that of 1940 was to wait until early balloting created a deadlock and then make his move. Consequently, he continued to state he was not a candidate, but was willing to serve.lZ3 His followers sought second ballot commitments from favorite sons and from other delegates in case of a stalemate. Martin even urged his Massachusetts colleagues to back Sen- ator Leverett Saltonstall as a favorite son, telling them he did not want first ballot support. "I am not a candidate," he averred, "but if it devel- ops on late ballots that the party and country want me I would appreciate your Despite this low-keyed approach, which his most prominent supporter Landon urged him to scrap, some expected the Speaker to gamer as many as seventy votes on the first bal10t.l~~

His protestations meant little. Martin worked as many as eighteen hours a day, including weekends, running the House, conferring with advisors and party regulars, delivering speeches often in distant cities, and expressing confidence about his dark horse possibility. As the Republican picture became more complicated with an infusion of candidates, he became increasingly optimistic.'26 The Speaker rejected the advice of some supporters that he give a "dramatic speech" from the House floor focus- ing on his qualification^.'^' Yet if anyone could have gotten away with such a ploy it would have been he, for as the New York Times's Arthur Krock wrote, Martin's chief strength was his relationship with congressmen. "If any President can get along with Congress he can. He is actually beloved by the House on both sides of the aisle. Its bitterest political and personal divisions have not touched him. He is respected in the Sen- ate."12* This affection was reflected in the increasing number of congressmen who rallied to his side. Allen was joined by Case, Bridges, and Dirk- sen.'29 Although some of the more prominent columnists such as Joseph Alsop, Walter Lippman, and Roscoe Drummond were critical of Martin's candidacy, especially after he joined with Taber to cut Marshall Plan appropriations, other prominent Americans favored him.130 In addition to Landon and his congressional supporters, William Hutcheson, vice president of the AFL and the labor movement's leading Republican, endorsed him (by the time the convention started he had switched to Dewey), and John L. Lewis and the UMW Public Relations Department were active in preconvention maneuvering on his behalf.131 Margaret Chase Smith predicted he might win, while Clare Luce praised him as a marvelous man, a fine leader.132 Hugh Roy Cullen, a wealthy Texan who believed the nation needed a Republican who knew Washington and the political situation, commissioned a biography of Martin and began

156 Chapter 4

soliciting second choice promises from Taft delegates. Cullen wrote to Martin, “As far as I know, you are not obliged to anyone in the world. If you are nominated and elected president, the only thing I will seek of you is that you make a worthy president, which I know you

Congress adjourned early Sunday morning June 20 and shortly thereafter an exhausted but confident Speaker departed for Philadelphia, where the convention was to open the following day. Before leaving, Mar- tin urged representatives to return to their district and refute Truman’s charges against the Eightieth Congress. Martin was still optimistic, for he was supported by many Eastern industrialists, elder statesman, and state and local party leaders, as well as his congressional contingent. Further- more, he believed neither Taft nor Dewey could win without the vote of Pennsylvania, whose delegation was committed to its favorite son Sena- tor Edward Martin, but favored the Speaker as its second choice. Despite talk of his candidacy, the Republican National Committee had selected Martin in April as permanent convention chairman because of his reputation for fairness, personal popularity, and experience-the very qualities he hoped would lead to his n0minati0n.I~~

Like other Republicans the Speaker was sure he had come to select a president, not merely to nominate a candidate. On his arrival, after promising to be a fair chairman, he told the press, once again, that he was not a candidate, but that no one could refuse a nomination. The day before balloting began he met with Dewey and with Taft. The latter told him that with over six hundred stop Dewey votes there was no need for a compromise candidate, the nomination was surely his. This assurance, however, did not stop Martin or his supporters. His congressional colleagues and his brother worked the delegates for him. Jack Porter, representing Cullen, arrived early and, despite advice from the Martin camp to do nothing until there was a deadlock, hired space in the Benjamin Franklin and Bellvue Stratford Hotels to entertain the press and visitors, who were plied with food and drink. On behalf of Cullen, Porter worked for a Taft-Dewey stalemate, promised to raise $5 million in Texas if Mar- tin were nominated, advertised the Speaker’s candidacy in newspapers, and distributed to delegates Carlisle Bergeron’s campaign biography, Joe Martin-An American Story. Also widely disseminated was an eight-page pamphlet, “Yes, You Know Him,” extolling Martin’s leadership, common sense, and ability to unite the party.

Some thought Martin’s speech accepting the convention’s chairmanship would be of major importance in obtaining the nomination. The Speaker must have thought so too, for although painfully fair and objective during the convention and praised by scholars and delegates for not using his office to promote a deadlock and advance his chances, his convention address was in many ways self-serving. His major theme was the

157 “TheSpeaker. . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit”

achievements of the Eightieth Congress; however, in order to complete the task at hand he asserted a Republican Congress needs a Republican president.135 Despite an enthusiastic response to his remarks, Martin’s chances for nomination had decreased substantially. At the last minute Saltonstall withdrew as Massachusetts’s favorite son, enabling the Bay State’s vote to go to the major contenders. Governor Robert F. Bradford, who earlier had promised to stay with Saltonstall for two ballots, now announced for Dewey and solicited votes on his behalf, while Cabot Lodge marshaled support for Vandenberg. In what the Worcester (Mass.) Telegram described as ”shabby treatment,” Martin on the first ballot received only three of the state’s thirty-five votes and two on the second ballot. More damaging for the Speaker’s ambition, the day before balloting began Ed Martin of Pennsylvania withdrew his favorite son candidacy in behalf of Dewey. The New Yorker picked up much of that delegation when he promised to appoint Congressman Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania) RNC chairman.

The anti-Dewey forces were unable to coalesce behind one candidate and stop the New Yorker’s “blitz.” Even when the governor fell only thirty-three votes short of nomination on the second ballot, they could not agree on a stop Dewey compromise. Martin, who refused to ally himself with the group, had once again followed a strategy that had proved ineffective. His disappointed brother wrote, ”I believe if Joe had really wanted to play his cards he could have had the nomination. . . . An objective analysis disclosed he was altogether too humble to promote himself in the cold-blooded and ruthless fashion necessary to win.”136 Before returning to Massachusetts for a rest, Martin was consulted about the three candidates on Dewey’s “short list” for vice president. He recommended Earl Warren of California, whom the New Yorker selected. Halleck, who believed, and probably rightfully so, that the Dewey camp had promised him that office for bringing Indiana into line, thought that Martin should share the blame for his being passed over. However, Halleck was not even on Dewey’s short list.137

The fall campaign had begun in earnest even before the Republicans had nominated their candidate. In a thinly disguised election bid, Truman had spent two weeks in June lambasting the Republican Congress. In city after city from the rear of his special railroad car, as he traveled to the Uni- versity of California commencement, he assailed the legislature. Those harangues were continued during the Democratic convention, the special session, and into the fall. As he later wrote, “I staked the race for the presidency on that one issue.“138 He blamed “reactionaries” such as Martin, Taber, Wherry, Taft, and Halleck for that ”do-nothing” legi~lature.’~~ Even those who favored Dewey feared the negative effect a conservative Re- publican Congress could have on the New Yorker’s administration. When

158 Chapter 4

the New York Times endorsed him, it did so despite the "self-satisfied provincialism typified in the Martin-Taber-Halleck leadership," the strongest argument against Dewey.lm

Immediately after the convention Dewey wrote to Martin congratulating him on the manner in which he fulfilled his difficult task as chairman. The nominee also sought the Speaker's advice and suggested a meeting.141 It was probably at this time that Martin phoned Dewey, stating it would be a mistake to let the president get away with Congress bashing and urged him to assume the offensive by hailing congressional achievements.'" At an Albany meeting in August the two discussed the record of Congress. Afterward the Speaker briefed the press: the Eightieth needs no defense; he asserted, "We are going to brag about it.'' In sentiments he would repeat frequently during the fall, Martin continued, "I am one who believes we have to see the European Aid Program through," but as it contributes to inflation, "more vision," better management, and the elimination of waste are e~sentia1.l~~

In September he acceded to the governor's request to stump for the ticket even though he was most likely miffed at Dewey's failure to extol Congress. Like most Americans, Martin assumed the governor would carry the Electoral College with ease while Republicans maintained their House majority. Nevertheless he undertook a tour of seven states and broadcast nationally. He emphasized the need of electing Dewey as well as local congressional candidates, hailed the achievements of Congress, and committed the party to foreign aid.'44 But he found the campaign lacking in excitement, concluded Massachusetts was overconfident, and predicted Truman would pull more popular votes than expected.'45 The tour provided the Speaker with an excuse to miss the Massachusetts state convention. Still smarting at his treatment by the state delegation, he was the only prominent Bay State Republican not present. Commenting on his absence, his friend the Democratic Whip, John McCormack, noted how "jealousy'' had led the delegation to desert him at the convention, leaving scars in the party.'46

Among those candidates whom the Speaker enthusiastically championed was Margaret Chase Smith, senatorial aspirant from Maine. With Martin's encouragement and assistance she had been elected to her husband's congressional seat in 1940 and because of her strong streak of in-dependence, became known as something of a maverick. During the Eightieth Congress she was one of the few Republicans to hold out against the Speaker's drive for unanimity on the $6 billion budget reduction. Furthermore, she criticized HUAC and advocated both UMT and federal aid to education. Nevertheless, Martin rallied to her side, even intervening in a bitter primary. Smith's major opponents were Maine's governor, a former governor, and the state Republican organization. The


object of a smear campaign, she was labeled pro-Communist and her voting record compared to that of Vito Marcantonio, the only American- Laborite in Congress. (This was the same tactic used by Nixon two years later in his Senate race against Helen Gahagan Douglas.) In a widely circulated letter, Martin testified to her Republicanism, her Americanism, and her ability and resisted pressure from the state's senators, Brewster and Styles Bridges, and the RNC to repudiate his endorsement of Smith. On June 23, two days after her bruising primary success, the Speaker arranged for her to address the Republican National Convention. Not only did he introduce her in glowing terms, but appointed Brewster, among others, to escort her to the platform. To a great extent Smith, who remained indebted to him until his death, attributed her triumph to Mar- tin, writing him, "My victory is in part your ~ictory."'~'

As Martin's opponent for reelection was inexperienced, under- financed, and uninspiring, the Speaker was able to devote his energy to other issues and races. With a minimum of campaigning Martin carried every city and town in the district except Taunton and Bellingham, amass- ing his largest plurality to date-32,847.'48

Martin's renown as a national figure was enhanced in his district when he joined Dewey's Massachusetts tour and welcomed him to North Attleborough. Occasionally the governor had perfunctorily praised the Eightieth Congress but for the most part was silent about that body, which was more conservative than his campaign promises and the party's platform-a difference critics enjoyed trumpeting. Pundits publicly predicted Dewey's relations with a Republican Congress would, at best, be strained. Consequently, many observers eagerly awaited his appearance with Martin. After being introduced by Governor Bradford before a large crowd in the Boston Arena, Dewey, with Martin sitting on the same stage, not only failed to applaud the achievements of Congress, but for all practical purposes, as his biographer pointed out, made "a public plea that the next Congress change its ways." The candidate called for improved public health programs and increases in social security and the minimum wage.149

On the following day, despite Martin's advice that he should campaign in larger cities such as Fall River and New Bedford, Dewey directed his presidential special to go to North Attleborough to pay his respects to the Martin family matriarch, Catherine. By so doing, according to her son Ed, he would "ingratiate" himself with the Speaker and smooth over any animosity about his lackluster defense of the Congress. Dewey's arrival was the biggest event in North Attleborough in decades. It was necessary to repair the roadbed for his thirteen-car special, the first passenger train to stop there in twenty years. The whole town turned out: schools and stores closed from 10:30 to 11:30, factories shut down as workers were

160 Chapter 4

released to greet the future president and Speaker. The high school band, a fife and drum corps, and boy scouts paraded through streets crowded with vendors, and Main Street store windows were festooned with special decoration^.'^^ When the train carrying the state’s leading Republicans pulled into the station, Martin mounted the steps to meet and welcome Dewey. According to some, bitter words about Congress were exchanged at this time.151 If so, differences were quickly resolved. After that initial meeting, in what the WushingfonPost dubbed the “North Attleboro Com- pact,” the candidate and Speaker pledged cooperation and harmonious relations. They then led a cavalcade to Martin’s home, where the gover- nor met Mrs. Martin, who told him she was praying for him and that she wished he could stay longer and discuss politics. After Mrs. Dewey presented Catherine Martin with a bouquet the entourage stopped at the Chronicle office and then proceeded to the municipal grounds, where Martin presented the candidate to a crowd of ten thousand. In his introduction the Speaker praised the Eightieth Congress, mentioning some of its achievements: a balanced budget, tax reduction, aid to Europe, increased social security, and the fight against Communism. In remarks not in his prepared text, Martin praised Dewey‘s speech of the night before, specifically mentioning his social security program. The congressman went on to state that he and Dewey saw eye to eye: “I am sure in the next Congress we will get cooperation between Congress and a Republican President. ...The Republican Party keeps its word. The Republican Party will be loyal to our platform.” The latter comment must have surprised many, for the platform, a product of the liberal wing of the party, was frequently interpreted as a repudiation of Congress. Dewey, for his part, asserted that the day was really Martin’s, that the Speaker represented “a solid, progressive, and sound America,” and promised that after the election there would be teamwork between the legislature and ”a Presi- dent who respects the opinion of members of Congress.” Despite the new- found amity there was no mention of the achievements of the Eightieth Congress by the G0vern0r.l~~

Surface harmony, however, was marred when the departure of the Dewey train was delayed so that Martin’s newspaper, the Chronicle, could be distributed to the passengers. That issue contained a boilerplate editorial criticizing speeches of Truman and Dewey. The latter’s were described as ”designed for tonal effect,” filled with maxims old and new, which sound good but promise nothing. Ignoring the barbs directed against Tru- man, Democrats publicized the editorial as a deliberate poke against Dewey by the Speaker’s paper. Before embarrassed Republicans could re- act, this view was circulated throughout the country. A disconcerted Mar- tin accused Democrats of a “cheap propaganda trick,” the result of a newspaper “accident,” responsibility for which lay with a new emp10yee.l~~


To the astonishment of nearly everyone except Truman, the president was elected, and with a Democratic Congress. Privately Martin described Washington as blue and discouraged but full of fight for 1950. In sentiments practically identical to those he would express in 1959 when he was defeated for minority leader, he appraised the setback as leaving him free from responsibility-”a blessing in disguise.”’54 Publicly he stated, ”We must all accept the will of the majority and cooperate with the President. . . .This is no time for either sulking or reprisals. . . . As far as I am concerned, I shall be glad to cooperate.”155 A day later he was more analytical, stating that Republicans must reorganize in cities and towns and get new blood. ”The Party digressed too far from the people. We offered them too many Brahmans; too many plutocrats . . . no personality, no appeal to the people.” In its more successful days, he claimed, “there were men of moderate means on the ticket.”156 A few days later Martin backtracked-but only slightly. When asked what he meant by too many Brahmans, he replied he was referring to Massachusetts Republicans. (The state ticket had been headed up by a Bradford, a Coolidge, and a Saltonstall, with only the latter victorious.) However, he continued, the “notion” could be applied to the GOP generally; Republicans must get closer to the people and bring ”newer races and groups” into party councils. In the interview he again committed his party to loyal opposition and bipartisan cooperation- when it was in the interest of the nation. Although he attributed a “better campaign” as a significant factor in Truman’s victory he refused to criticize Dewey’s efforts and made no mention of Congress as an election issue.lS7 A few weeks later, probably still piqued over his convention rebuff, he reiterated his belief that the party in Massachusetts needed to be shaken up and appeal more to youth and varied racial groups.158

A decade later Martin assessed the loss as an even greater calamity than he did in 1948. ”Some Republicans, ” he wrote, ”turned to extremes because, as the Dewey defeat seemed to prove, the cause of moderation [of which Martin saw himself a part] failed. .. . If Dewey had been elected in 1948, we would never have experienced the McCarthy era because Re- publican energies would have been working in a different direction, dis- charging the responsibilities of administering the g~vernment.”’~~

NOTES

1. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. as told to Robert J. Donovan, M y First Fifty Years in Poli- tics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 1975), 183.

2. Constance Green, Washington Capital City: 1879-1950 (Princeton, N.J.: Prince- ton University Press, 1963), 489-501; Charles Hurd, Washington Cavalcade (New York Dutton, 1948), 230-35,247, 286.

3. Isabel K. Griffin interview with Martin, Boston Globe, 29 January 1956.

162 Chapter 4

4. This would have been a most unusual liaison, given her liberal Democratic views. See Karyn Kay, Myrna Loy: A Pyramid Illustrated History of the Movies (New York: Pyramid, 1977), 14,16,114,116,122.

5. Robert E.Herzstein, Henry R . Luce: A Political Portrait ofthe Man Who Created the American Century (New York Macmillan, 1994), 68.

6. The quote is from Martin to Luce, January n.d., 1948,LP. See also the rest of the correspondence in the same file. There is no indication that his "love" ever resulted in a physical relationship.

7.Arthur Watson, "Joe Martin, Nation's Heir Apparent," New York Sunday News, 17August 1947.

8. Frank McNaughton to Don Bermingham, September 5,1947,McNaughton Papers, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

9. In addition to sources already cited see Attleboro Sun, 4 January 1947;Tris Coffin, "A Man of the Good Old Days," New Republic, February 17, 1947, 30; "Who's Who in the GOP," Time, May 3,1948,20;Neil MacNeil, Forge ofDemocracy: The House of Representatives (New York: McKay, 1963),93. 10. Martin to Robert Sherrod, December 2,1946,MP. 11. Congressional Record, 80 Cong. 1st sess., 1947, 93: A625. 12. Longhand Personal Memos, New Year's 1947,Office Files, Truman Papers

(Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1989),henceforth Truman Pa- pers University Publications. Alonzo L. Hamby, Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 420. 13. These slips were frequently reported with affection. Other jumbles included

adjourning "the National Republican" at the 1952 convention and announcing that the nominee, Eisenhower, would be happy to see delegates at the "Blackstone Hell''' rather than Blackstone Hotel. See Ted Lewis, column, New York Daily News, 8January 1959.

14. William V. Shannon, "Joe Martin: Study in the Negative," The Reporter, November 7, 1950,14-16; Doris Fleeson in the Boston Globe, 12July 1947. 15. Anthony Champagne, Sam Raybrtrn: A Bio-Bibliography (New York Green-

wood, 1986), 89; Martin, First Fifty Years, 185. 16. Jacob K.Javits, The Autobiography ofa Public Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1981), 134, 136. 17. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "Interview with Rep. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., March

1963," Center for Legislative Archives, update February 11, 1998,http://www.nara.gov/nara/legisaltive/f63-13.html(10May 1999).Also Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hop- kins Press, 1990), 126-27; Lewis J.Lapham, Party Leadership and the House Commit- tee on Rules (New York: Garland, 1988), 163, 165; H. Bradford Westerfield, ForeignPolicy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (Hartford: Yale University Press, 1954;reprint, New York: Octagon, 1972), 93. 18. David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 2945 (Lexington: University

Press of Kentucky, 1983), 18; Neil MacNeil, Dirkson: Portrait o f a Public Man (New York: World, 1970), 76-77; NYT, 3 January 1947.Halleck in the privately owned Robert H. Ferrell Oral History, 39-40,claims Martin was of no help and mentions three rivals for the office, including Carroll Reece, who was not in Congress at the time, but fails to include Brown.


19. NYT, 19 January 1947. 20. Congressional Record, 80 Cong. 2d sess., 1948,94: 8323; Stephen K. Bailey and

Howard D. Samuel, Congress at Work (New York Holt, 1952; reprint, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965), 447.

21. Martin to Nixon, December 5, 1945, Richard M. Nixon Papers, Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Miguel, California; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Education of a Politician 2913-1962 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 121,142.

22. Martin, First Fifty Years, 194; William H. Arnold, Back When It All Began: The Early Nixon Years (New York: Vantage, 1975), 5. Among the historians accepting Martin’s version are Roger Morris, Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician (New York: Holt, 1990), 342-43, and Ambrose, Nixon, 143, who points out there were many more applicants including young lawyers than their were HUAC vacancies. Nixon, on the other hand, stated he was reluctant to accept the appointment and did so only as a personal favor to Martin. Richard Nixon, RN: The Memories of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 44-45. Agreeing with Nixon are Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1990), 141; Tom Wicker, One of Us:Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York: Random House, 1991), 49; James Keogh, This Is Nixon (New York: Putnams, 1956), 39; and Jonathan Aitken, Nixon: A Life (Wash-ington: Regnery, 1993), 137-38, who nevertheless interprets Martin as Nixon’s political patron. Irving F. Gellman, The Contender: Richard Nixon the Congress Years 1946-1952 (New York: Free Press, 1999), 103, who supports Nixon’s account, states that more than a decade elapsed before Martin claimed the appointment was a result of Nixon’s lobbying, but as early as 1955 Martin told a reporter Nixon “must have asked to be on the House Committee on Un-American Activ- ities. There was always great competition to get on that one. He wouldn’t have got on it if he didn’t ask.” John Harris, ”Life Story of Vice-president Nixon,” Boston Globe, 3 November 1955.

23. Speech to GOP Caucus, January 2,1947, MP. 24. The original draft included comments about government responsibility to

promote the welfare of the greatest numbers and mentioned specific contributions could be made in education, rebuilding cities, and fighting juvenile delin- quency. The entire draft was much less partisan and more conciliatory than the final version, MP.

25. NYT, 7 January 1947. 26. Among many speeches by Martin praising the air force increase and calling

for seventy groups see that to the Congress of American Industry, December 13, 1947, MP. The administration’s opposition was not to seventy groups as such but the resulting imbalance in the “unglamorous” forces. See The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York: Viking, 1951), 396.

27. NYT, 9 March; 11May 1947. 28. NYT, 31 January 1947. 29. Undated clip, February 1947 scrapbook 43, MP; Pearson column, WP, 8 Feb-

ruary 1947; Christian Science Monitor, 6 February 1947; AP release, 18 March 1947, scrapbook 47, MP.

30. NYHT and NYT, 22 March 1947.

164 Chapter 4

31. Congressional Record, 80 Cong. 1st sess., 1948, 93: 8459-60; Frank Mc- Naughton, Harry Truman-President (New York: Whittlesey House, 1948), 183; clip, 9 July 1947, scrapbook 47, MI?

32. NYT, 7 November 1947. 33. Susan M. Hartman, Truman and the 80th Congress (Columbia: University of

Missouri, 1971), 132-33. 34. AP release 9 January 1948, scrapbook 50, MP. 35. Congressional Record, 80 Cong. 2d sess., 1948,94: 918. 36. For a survey of the tax reduction struggle see William I? Hasenfus, "Joseph

W. Martin, Jr. and the Individual Income Tax Reduction, 1947-1948" (M.A. thesis, Rhode Island College, 1976).

37. NYT, 7 February 1947. 38. R. Alton Lee, Truman and Tuft Hartley: A Question of Mandate (Lexington: Uni-

versity of Kentucky Press, 1966), 55. 39. Quoted in Pearson column, WP, 19 April 1947. 40. Bruce J. Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W. Smith of Vir-

ginia (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1987), 112-15; Bailey, Con-gress at Work, 430; Attleboro Sun, 9 May 1947. The original House version, among other restrictions, would have abolished the National Labor Relations Board.

41. Martin to Luce, September 1947, LP. 42. Fred A. Hartley, Jr., Our New National Labor Policy: The Taft-Hartley Act: The

Next Steps (New York Funk & Wagnalls, 1948), 171-72. 43. WP, 20 July 1947; clips of 5 February 1947 scrapbook 43 and May 17,1948,

scrapbook 45, MP; Hartman, T i m a n and the 80th, 49-53,179-84. 44. William A. Hasenfus, "Managing Partner: Joseph W, Martin, Jr., Republican

Leader of the United States House of Representatives, 1939-1959'' (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1986), 196.

45. An Associated Negro Press Report in the Pittsburgh Courier and Norfolk Jour- nu1 and Guide, 4 January 1947, beginning with the qualification "according to stories" is the source for this conversation which is quoted in William C. Berman, The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration (Columbus: Ohio State Univer- sity Press, 1970), 59, without the "according to." Gary W. Reichard, Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower (Arlington Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1988), 37, with no citation but apparently quoting from Berman puts the Speaker in a particularly bad light by ignoring that part of the account where Martin mentioned that he intended to do a lot for the Negro and may be able to get an anti- poll tax bill through. Even worse is Gary A. Donaldson, Truman Defeats Dewey (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 11,who quotes Reichard and interprets the conversation as a missed golden opportunity to wrap up the African- American vote in 1948.

46. Baltimore Sun, 7 November 1947; Afro-American, 11November 1947; NYT, 17 May 1948; Robert L. Zangrando, The NAACP Crusade Against Lynching, 1909-1950 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1980), 182. For criticism of Martin by blacks at this time see Henry L. Moon, Balance of Power: The Negro Vote (New York Doubleday, 1948), 211.

47. Hartman, Truman and the 80th, 174-79, 184-85; Leonard Dinnerstein, "Anti- Semitism in the Eightieth Congress: The Displaced Persons Act of 1948,"in Uneasy


at Home: Anti-Semitism and the American Experience, ed., Leonard Dinnerstein (New York Columbia University Press, 1987), 200-213. For senatorial Conference Com- mittee stubbornness see Gilbert Y. Steiner, The Congressional Conjierence Committee Seventieth to Eightieth Congresses (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951), 145-51.

48. N Y T and NYHT, 22 September 1948. 49. Robert Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill (New York: McGraw-Hill,

1964), 89-90; NYT, 14,26-27 May; 4, 19 June; 14 July 1948; Hartman, Truman and the 80th, 14748; Pearson column, WP, 26 April 1948.

50. NYT, 28 June 28; 6 August 1948; Ralph E. Flanders, Senatorfrom Vermont (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 221.

51. Pearson column, WP, 5 August 1948. 52. NYT, 31 July 1948. 53. NYT, 7,30 January; 19 February 1948. 54. Chronicle, 7 March 1948. 55. Pearson column, WP, 24 May 1948. 56. Phillip McGuire, Zipsfor a Jim Crow Army: Letters,fiom Black Soldiers in World

War II (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1983), 248; Lapham, Party Leadership and Com- mittee Rules, 179-81.

57. Speech to Small Business Association, NYT, 4 February 1947. 58. Washington Star, 7 February 1948. For additional comments by him on the

efforts of the press and radio to shatter confidence in Congress see speech to Busi- ness Women, NYT, 1February 1947.

59. Speech Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, March 14,1948 and New York Republi- can Group, April 4, 1948, MP.

60. Gridiron Speech, December 13,1947, MP. 61. WP, 9 March 1947. 62. N Y T , 11-12, 14, 21 November 1947. Each of the Ten cited for contempt,

waived a jury trial, and was sentenced from six months to a year in jail. See Wal-ter Goodman, The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1968), 210-23. Only the citations for Albert Maitz and Dalton Trumbo were debated; the others were cited by a voice vote.

63. NYT, 4 November 1947. During the 80th, when Martin was Speaker, HUAC issued 13 contempt citations and 29 when he was Speaker in the 83d Congress. Its record of 56 citations was set during the 81st Democratic Congress. See Congres- sional Quarterly Service, Congress and the Nation 2945-2964 (Washington, D.C.: C.Q., 1965), 1783.

64. NYT, 19 July 1947; NYHT, 24 July 1948; Martin, First Fify Years, 187. The administration publicized its meetings with congressional leaders. With the election of 1946 attendance was changed from six Democrats to four Republicans and two Democrats. However the conferences were few, probably only ten in 1947, less in 1948, and with little genuine exchange except on the Truman Doctrine. That Mar- tin had presidential ambitions complicated this sensitive relationship. Fall River Herald News, 16 January 1947.

65. Dean Acheson, Present at Creation: M y Years in the State Department (New York: Norton, 1947), 217-19; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 956), 102-5; Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency

166 Chapter 4

of Harry S. Truman, 2945-1948 (New York: Norton, 1947), 280-82; Hartman, Truman and the 80th, 58-59.

66. Tom Connally as told to Alfred Steinberg, My Name Is Tom Connally (New York: Crowell, 1954), 318; NYT, 11 1947.

67. WP, 13 March 1947. 68. NYT, 17 July 1947; WP,20 July 1947. 69. Hartman, Truman and the 80th, 65-66; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Parfy

Politics, 273-74. 70. Thomas Parthenakis, "Christian A. Herter: His Influence and Involvement

in U.N.R.R.A., the European Recovery Program, and the Truman Point Four Pro-gram'' (M.A. thesis, Kent State, 1967), 40,46.

71. Wicker, One of Us, and Parmet, Richard Nixon, describe the appointment as a plum. According to Wicker, fm. 22, p. 91, Martin wanted Nixon to reject the appointment as he would lose his Republican credentials with giveaways. On the other hand Ralph DeToledano, One Man Alone: Richard Nixon (New York Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), 71, states Nixon did not learn of the appointment until he read it in the newspaper. Martin simply states he named Nixon at Herter's request. First Fifty Years, 194.

72. Charles Eaton to John A. Vorys, July 30, 1947 with attachment Martin to Eaton, July 29, 1947, John Vorys Papers, Archives of the Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.

73. WP, 19 September and NYT, 18-19 September 1947. 74. NYT, September 25,1947. 75. Boston Herald, 6 August 1947; Milzuaukee Sentinel and NYT, 25 September

1947; Colorado Springs Gazette, 27 September 1947; San Francisco Examiner, 3 Octo-ber 1947.

76. Washington Times Herald and Washington Herald News, 24 October 1947 and AP release, 25 October 1947, scrapbook 48, MI?

77. NYT, 7,lO November 1947. 78. Cary S. Henderson, "Congressman John Taber of Auburn: Politics and Fed-

eral Appropriations, 1923-1962" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1964), 378,341. 79. NYT, 12 December 1947; "Congress," Time, December 22, 1947, 20; "Con-

gress,'' Newsweek, December 22, 1947,5-6; Hartman, Truman and the 80th, 112-20; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 280-81.

80. Fall River Herald Nezus, 31 December 1947; interview in Salt Lake City Desert News, 30 January 1948; Martin to Luce, n.d. 1948, LP; Washington Times Herald, 6 January 1948; Hartman, Truman and the 80th, 165.

81. Doris Fleeson, column, n.d. scrapbook 50, MP; Ernest K. Lindley, "Wash- ington Tides," Newsweek, January 12, 1948,15; Washington Times Herald, 6 January 1948.

82. Chronicle,8 March 1948; Ernest K. Lindley, "The Eighty-first Congress," Yale Review 38 (December 1948): 193-203.

83. Hoover to Martin, March 24, 1948, Hoover Papers, Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa.

84. Martin, First Fqfy Years, 103. 85. Westfieid, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, 287-90. 86. NYT, 19 August 1948; Chronicle,9 September 1948.

167 "The Speaker . . . Grand Strategist and Guiding Spirit"

87. Martin, First Fifty Years, 193. 88. Holbert N. Carroll, The Hoiise of Representatives and Foreign Affairs, rev. ed.

(Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 121-22. 89. For example see speech to GOP State Convention, May 17,1948, MP. 90. Richard E. Neustadt, "Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative Balance

Sheet," Public Policy 5 (1954): 364; Hamby, Man oftlze People, 431-33; Hartman, Tru-man and the 8Oth, 133.

91. Clifford Memo, Oral History, 461-62, Truman Library; Neustadt, "Con- gress and the Fair Deal," 365; Hartman, Trunian and the 80th, 196-97; Martin, Fivst Fifty Years, 188.

92. Attleboro Sun, 24 July 1948. 93. Brownell was appalled at the unsatisfactory results and Dewey began to

disassociate himself from the congressional wing of his party. Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1968): 136; Richard N. Smith, Thomas E. Dewey and His Times (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982), 574; AP release 31 March 1948, scrapbook 45, MP; James T. Patterson, Mr. Repliblimn: A Biography of Robert Tnft (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 504.

94. National broadcast, July 30,1948, MP. 95. WP, 6 August 1948. 96. NYT, 10August 1948. 97. Martin, First Fifty Years, 199. 98. For a factual summary of the Eightieth see Floyd M. Riddick, "The First

Session of the Eightieth Congress, January &December 16, 1947," American Polit- ical Science Review 42 (August 1948): 677-93 and "The Second Session, January 6-December 31,1948," 43 (June 1949): 483-92.

99. Ernest K. Lindley, "Appraising the 80th Congress," Newszueek, June 28, 1948,23.

100. Elmer Davis, "President Dewey's Strange Bed Fellows," Harpers, Septem-ber 1948,28; McNaughton, Truman, 176.

101. Press Conference, July 24, 1947, Harry S. Truman, Public Papers o f fhe Pres- idents ofthe United States, 1947 (Washington: GPO, 1963), 356. Hamby's, Man ofthe People, 420, states that the greater portion of Republican leadership, unlike Martin, had learned nothing, forgotten nothing, were openly partisan, conservative, and combative as they hoped to move back to the 1920s.

102. Carl Albert with Danney Gable, Little Giant: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), 160-61.

103. For Martin's early defense of Congress see speech to Pennsylvania Mili- tary College, June 3,1947, MP.

104. Speech, December 13,1947, MP. 105. Harry to Joe, January 22, 1948, President's Personal File, Truman Papers,

Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; Longhand Memo 1948 and Personal Memo, November 30,1956 in Truman Papers, University Publications; Truman to Donald H. McSween, February 20, 1956, in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Of the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 324-25.

106. Harry to Joe, May 5, 1949, President's Secretary File, and August 26, 1953, Post Presidential Files in Truman Papers, Truman Library.

168 Chapter 4

107. Harry to Joe, May 8 and 20,1957, and May 19 and 27,1960, Post Presiden- tial Files, Truman Papers.

108. Truman to McCormack, September 4,1962, Post Presidential Files, Truman Papers.

109. "The Texas Trip," scrapbook 104, MP; Houston Chronicle, 16, 18 May 1947; Ed. Kilman and Theon Wright, Hugh Roy Cullen: A Story of American Opportunity (New York: Prentice Hall, 1954), 294.

110. Editorial, Jellico (Tennessee) Advertiser Sentinel, 25 July 1947; Martin to Clare Luce, June n.d., about July 12, and September n.d., 1947, LP.

111. Landon to Martin, July 17, August 11,1947, Alf M. Landon Papers, Kansas Historical Society, Topeka; Frank McNaughton to Tom Bermingham, September 5, October 24,1947, McNaughton Papers.

112. Clips, scrapbook 48, MP; Fall River Herald News, 21 August 1947. 113. See scrapbooks 43,48, MP; correspondence and clippings of Martin's visit

to Black Hills, Francis Case Papers, Dakota Wesleyan University, Mitchell, S. Dak. 114. Martin to Landon, October 23,1947, Landon Papers; Martin to Clare Luce,

September 27(?), 1947, LP; Hasenfus, "Managing Partner," 203-6. 115. Congressional Record, 80 Cong. 1st sess., 1947,93: 309-10. 116. Martin to Clare Luce, January n.d., 1948 and late January 1948, LP; Ben

Jensen to Roscoe S. Jones, February 17, 1948, Ben F. Jensen Papers, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City; undated report to Martin from Louis Mehl, MP.

117. "Speaker's Ghost," U.S. News, January 16, 1948,6; 1948 Speech File, MP. 118. Washington Times Herald, 13 March 1948; unsigned report on Kansas dele-

gation, May 1948, file 31, MP. 119. "People of the Week," U.S.News and World Report, April 23, 1948, 34-35;

Melvyn Dubofsky and Warner Van Tine, Iohn L. Lewis: A Biography (New York: Times Book, 1977), 477-81; clips scrapbook 45, MP; rather sympathetic to Martin were both Newsweek, "Coal Strike Joe Martin's Way," April 9,1948,2627 and Time, "Labor," April 9, 1948, 21. Before the month was out both the union and Lewis were fined for contempt by the federal judge.

120. Wheeling (W. Va.) Intelligencer, 19 April 1948; Philadelphia Inquirer, 26 April 1948; Hartley, National Labor Policy, 172.

121. Speech to New York Republicans, April 10,1948, MP; for reactions see clips in box 86, MP.

122. Speech to Maryland Republican Convention as in Chronicle, 20 May 1948. 123. AP release, 28 May 1948, scrapbook 45, MP. 124. INS and AP releases, 8 June 1948, scrapbook 45, MP. 125. Boston Herald, 3, 5, 21 May 1948; Christian Science Monitor, 15 May 1948;

Chicago Journal of Commerce, 16 April 1948; Donald R, McCoy, Landon of Kansas (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 524-25,539.

126. Martin to Clare Luce, April 29,1948, LP. 127. NYT, 2 June 1948. 128. NYT, 26 May 1948. 129. Edward Martin as told to James J. Kenneally, Down Memory Lane (North

Easton, Mass.: privately printed, 1980), 77; INS, release 21 June 1948, scrapbook 45, MP.


130. WP, 11June 1948; NYHT, undated clip, scrapbook 45, MP; Christian Science Monitor, 18 June 1948.

131. Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane, 62; Edward Martin, 1948 convention notes, MP.

132. Attleboro Sun, 23 April 1948; Fall River Herald Nerus, 22 June 1948. 133. Kilman, Cullen, 256-57. 134. ”People of the Week,” US.Nerus, June 25, 1948, 38; Edward Martin, 1948

Convention Notes, MP, writes that his brother had pretty much given up hope for a deadlock by the time the convention opened; however, the actions of neither Martin at that time indicate this was the case.

135. Convention Address, June 22,1948, MI? 136. Edward Martin, Down Memory Lane, 76-94 and 1948 Convention Notes,

MP; Ross, Loneliest Campaign, 91-109; Smith, Dewey, 494-502. A frustrated Cullen supported the third party Dixiecrats in the fall, hoping to throw the election to the House, which would choose Martin. Cullen to Martin, August 18,1948, MI‘; Kill-man, Citllen, 262. The panic generated by the Red Scare was reflected when Mar- tin received a telegram that the Joe Louis-Jersey Joe Walcott heavyweight cham- pionship fight on June 26 was “a Communist movement to detract the delegates who prefer pleasure to duty,“ Fall River Herald Nezus, 28 June 1948.

137. Martin, First Fifty Years, 162-68. 138. Truman, Trial and Hope, 209. 139. For specific mention of Martin see speeches at Bonham, Texas, September

27 and Elizabeth, New Jersey, October 7, Truman, Public Papers, 1948,593,691. 140. NYT, 3 October 1948. 141. Dewey to Martin, July 7, 1948, Thomas E. Dewey Papers, University of

Rochester, Rochester, New York. 142. Joseph Martin, First Fifty Years, 195; Edward Martin, Convention Notes,

1948, MP. 143. NYT, 19 August 1948. 144. Speech file, Sept.-Oct. 1948, MP. 145. Martin to Clare Luce, September 18 (?) and October 19,1948, LP. 146. Boston Post, 24 September and Fall River Herald Nezus, 25 September 1948. 147. Smith to Martin, September 17,1948, July 22,1954, Margaret Chase Smith

Library Center, The Northwood Institute, Skowhegan, Maine. Also see Smith, Oral History, 42, 65-66, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University; Smith, Declaration of Conscience (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), 457; “A Con- versation in Maine with Margaret Chase Smith, WEBD TV,Channel 10, Smith Li- brary Center; Smith Fall River Speech, June 26, 1966, MP; “Career Woman,” Newsweek, July 5,1948,26. Janann Sherman, No Placefor a Woman:A Life of MmgaretChase Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 85-88, sum-marizes the campaign, ignores Martin’s role, and emphasizes gender smears. Mar- tin was also a supporter of Frances Bolton (Ohio), a feminist, and of the more conservative Edith Nourse Rogers, who used to phone him each morning to ascertain the day’s agenda. See Martin Bolton correspondence, Frances P. Bolton Papers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio; Doris Fleeson, ”They Wear No Man’s Collar,” Nation’s Business, September 1946, 50-52, 70-73. At this time

170 Chapter 4

Martin hoped he could get the Equal Rights Amendment approved and out of the Judiciary Committee by July 1, which he did. However, it never came to a vote. Martin to Lillian A. Burton, May 21, 1948, National Woman's Party Papers, 1913-1974, Microfilm Editions (Sanford, N. C.).

148. Chronicle, 2 July; 9 September 1948; Fall River Herald News, 20 August 1948; clips scrapbook 51, MP.

149. Smith, Dewey, 538. 150. Clips box 86, MP; Attleboro Sun, 30 October and Chronicle, 29 October 1948. 151. Jack Redding, Inside the Democratic Party (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,

1958), 285. 152. N U , WP,NYHT, 30 October 1948; Martin's introduction, MP. 153. AP release 31 October 1948, scrapbook 51, MP; Redding, Inside the Demo-

cratic Party, 285-86. 154. Martin to Clare Luce, November 18,20,1948, LP. 155. NYT, 5 November 1948. 156. AP release, 5 November 1948, scrapbook 45, MP. 157. NYT, 9 November 1948; Frank McNaughton to Don Bermingham,

November 8, 1948, McNaughton Papers, Truman Library. 158. Interview in Boston Herald as reported in Tauntorz Gazette and Attleboro Sun,

29 December 1948. 159. Martin, First Fifty Years, 198.

5

”The Communist Menace. . . More Alarming than. the Hitler Menace”l: 1949-1952

THE EIGHTY-FIRST CONGRESS

The devastating loss of seventy-five seats was among the worst ever suffered by the Republican Party. Attributing the debacle to presiden-

tial assaults on the alleged conservatism of the Eightieth Congress, Re- publican moderates demanded a greater role in policy-making. Some, including Governor Ernest W. Gibson (Vermont) and Senator John s. Cooper (Kentucky), blamed the loss on Martin and Halleck and on their housing, education, and health policies, and hoped the defeat would lead to a more moderate House.* At the same time conservative critics of Mar- tin, equally discontent, contemplated promoting Halleck to leader. The Indianian was reportedly “sulky” over Martin’s compromises with Dem- ocrats. Due to a lack of support this effort petered out, and according to one columnist the malcontents decided instead to challenge Martin on key bills. Fully aware of dissatisfaction, Martin at first thought of resign- ing, but instead moved slightly to the left. He ignored the claims of the abrasive Halleck for the position of assistant floor leader and instead selected half a dozen young, vigorous aids, thereby furthering the rift between himself and Halleck and his partisan^.^

The Speaker further mollified his critics by replacing the Republican Steering Committee with a Policy Committee. Members of the new body would be elected and, it was assumed, would represent younger Republi- cans who by their introduction into party councils would establish a liberal “beachhead” in GOP deliberations! However, the change was more cosmetic than substantive. The Committee was only advisory, seldom met,

171

172 Chapter 5

and had no staff. As Martin’s secretary wrote to the former House leader Bert Snell, ”it all adds up to about the same as we had before, but I guess it makes the members think they have more ~ o i c e . ” ~ After heading the body for three years Martin concluded, “We have found that it is just as easy to get a fairly unanimous opinion on a subject by discussion and expression as by a definite binding commitment.”6 He continued to base his leadership primarily on personal relationships and informal structures.

Although much had changed with the party relegated to minority status, for Martin the task remained the same as that of the Eightieth Con- gress, to ”stem the tide of planned Socialism and reckless federal spending.”’ Such a mission was made more difficult when Democrats curbed the power of the Rules Committee, which often had been used by conservatives to thwart liberal legislation. Martin cast his first roll-call vote in two years in a futile effort to prevent shutting off debate on a Twenty-one Day Rule, which was then passed by a voice vote. This change enabled the chair of a standing committee to call up a bill without the approval of Rules if the measure languished in that committee for twenty-one days. A year later, contending that a return to traditional procedure might slow the trend toward Socialism and bankruptcy and at the same time provide for an orderly process, Martin attempted to repeal the rule. Only sixty- three other Republicans joined him as his effort failed, 183 to 238.*

In keeping with his long-standing commitment to tax reduction, Mar- tin demanded the repeal of wartime excise taxes, especially singling out as unjust the levies on the jewelry industry, so important to his district. In February he introduced a measure to abolish those levies and appealed in a national radio address for the public to back the cut. Insisting his proposal would generate revenue by stimulating business and employment, he introduced a discharge petition when the administration pigeonholed the measure in Ways and Means. This unusual step for a floor leader was resented by Committee members, even those of his own party; nevertheless it was signed by 136 Republicans, but fell short of the 218 required to bring the bill to the floor.y

With the onset of the second session in January Martin redoubled his repeal efforts. With 104 other Republicans he issued a statement denounc- ing the State of the Union Address as the same old political hash and vowed to fight the administration’s efforts to tax the nation into a “state of Socialism.’’1o When the president promised to veto any excise tax reduction without an offsetting increase in other taxes, Martin accused Truman of joining FDR as the only two presidents to usurp the congressional function of determining how revenue was to be raised. Calling for repeal, he asserted that Congress must never surrender its constitutional duty to the executive. Encouraged by much of the business community, Martin introduced a repeal measure as an amendment to a minor tax bill.” He justified

”The Communist Menace. . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace” 173

this unusual step by maintaining there was a need for hasty action because of unemployment and the possibility of a buyer’s strike. The ploy failed: the amendment was ruled out of order because the Ways and Means Committee was about to begin hearings on revenue proposals.12

The Democratic-dominated Committee, in keeping with Truman’s promise to veto any measure with a net loss of revenue, reported out a 1950 tax bill with a $1 billion reduction in excise duties offset by an increase in corporation taxes and by tightening of the tax code. Martin denounced this “phony tax relief bill framed in political panic” and hoped to recommit the measure and have the committee separate its two provisions. Recommital failed 147 to 238. Typical of Martin’s willingness to accept the best possible bill, even if it was not all that he wanted, he then joined the majority of Republicans in voting for the measure (it passed 357 to 14) and expressed his hope that the Senate would also approve it.13

But Martin had not given up on cutting spending in order to justify tax reduction. Consequently on June 30 he presented a joint resolution calling upon the president to reduce expenditures between 5 and 10 percent the next fiscal year. This action was forced upon him, he claimed, because a Democratic Congress failed to pare expenses. If there were any chance the resolution would pass, which was unlikely, the Korean conflict quashed it. Believing the war and foreign aid made increased revenue necessary, the minority leader rallied behind Truman‘s request for a tax increase and reluctantly concluded imposition of economic controls was necessary. But he demanded curtailment of nondefense spending and postponement of unnecessary expenses. “Billions could be saved if there was a will on the part of the administration to do

With the submission to Congress of the President’s Civil Rights Com- mission report and the subsequent revolt by Dixiecrats, the issue of rights for African-Americans became more salient and increasingly divisive. In the first session of the Eighty-first Congress Martin committed his party to anti-poll tax legislation, which, after a Southern induced delay, was passed by the House (273-116) with overwhelming Republican support. This was the first action by either branch on a major feature of Truman’s civil rights program. More controversial, especially in the congressional election year of 1950, was the call for a Fair Employment Practices Commission. When a strong bill preventing job discrimination because of race, color, or creed finally reached the floor a coalition of Southern Democrats and Republi- cans substituted a weakened, voluntary proposal. This measure, which was enacted over Southern Democratic opposition, outlawed racial discrimination in employment, provided for a minimum $500 fine for failing to cooperate with the FEPC, but relied upon public pressure, fact finding, and unions for enforcement instead of the judiciary. For years Martin and other Republicans hailed this law as a Republican achievement.

174 Chapter 5

As in the Eightieth Congress, Martin once again led the opposition to Truman’s housing programs. In place of the president’s request for an expansion of rent controls his coalition substituted a law that each state, county, or city government could decontrol rents and, where controls continued in place, landlords should obtain a reasonable return. A freeze, he contended, would impede private construction. Moreover he objected to Truman’s proposal for low-cost housing and slum clearance, as it would result in an increased deficit and higher taxes, and “cause a crash and plunge us into depre~sion.”’~

Despite his criticism and effort to keep the bill in rules the president’s measure reached the House floor, the first housing bill to do so in four years. In an emotional and heated debate Republicans, led by Martin, claimed the nation could not afford this program. Truman, on the other hand, accused the real estate lobby of being behind GOP opposition in a ”deliberate campaign of misrepresentation and distortion.” Tempers flared as blows were exchanged by the eighty-three-year-old Rules Committee chairman and sixty-nine-year-old Gene Cox, who called the chairman a liar and predicted the bill would make “Socialism our national policy.”16

Martin’s opposition was couched in more rational and liberal tones. The bill, he insisted, would create a grave financial crisis benefiting the few at the expense of the many. Beneficiaries of the legislation would pay $50 to $60 a month rent to get a federal subsidy, which he claimed was un- needed if they could afford to pay that much. ”It is the group that cannot afford to pay half that rent we should worry about.” Moreover, he asserted, this legislation would weaken private enterprise by creating a nation of subsidized tenants in government projects as it forced the ideology of Communism on a free people.” However, Martin was unable to prevail the Republican effort to recommit the bill and remove its slum clearance provisions was defeated. The legislation was enacted 227 to 186. Martin did meet with some success the following year. With the unanimous support of the Policy Committee he succeeded in deleting from a relatively minor and noncontroversial housing bill a provision allowing buyers to organize co-ops and purchase homes at 3 to 3%interest over fifty years. He charged that this was another leftist scheme, a “brick in the structure of Socialism,” as GIs with 4 percent mortgages and FHA buyers at 4.5 percent would be subsidizing co-ops.’*

He also attacked as “government dictation” national compulsory health insurance, which had been advocated by the president since 1945 and was tagged as “Socialized Medicine” by the American Medical Asso- ciation. Large numbers of legislators and Americans apparently agreed with the minority leader that it was not necessary; the ”needs of all people can be properly cared for within the realm of private suppliers” such as Blue Cross.*g

"TheCommunist Mennce . . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace" 175

According to Martin much of his leadership of House Republicans was dedicated to protecting traditional American values from the threats of the Fair Deal; nevertheless, he believed, as always, that accommodation was a better alternative than an impasse. Thus he often compromised by offering alternative propositions or by voting for a measure after modifying its provisions as much as possible. He fought the administration's efforts to repeal Taft-Hartley, but championed the Wood bill to temper its most oppressive positions.20 Rather than battle to rescind reciprocal trade he called for an escape clause for industries threatened by trade agreement.** He also led a coalition to limit the increase in the minimum wage to a $0.65 flexible minimum rather than $0.75as advocated by the administration, but when his effort failed voted for the larger amount.22 Like most Republicans he was not sympathetic to farm programs, especially income maintenance payments to family farms and price supports of 90 percent parity. However, he backed a 2 percent federal loan for rural telephone service and a measure granting broad authority to the Com- modity Credit Corporation to obtain storage facil i t ie~.~~

Moreover he supported a federal highway program (unlike five of Massachusetts's Republican representatives who believed the state was not getting its fair share of funds), announced he favored reducing the retirement age for social security benefits from sixty-five to sixty, and introduced a bill providing $300 million ailnually for three years for school construction on a dollar matching basis. Martin reached out for Southern support, which was essential if that bill were to pass, by providing that monies could go to states that required segregation by law as long as there was a "just and equitable apportionment of funds." (This was of course before the Supreme Court decision in Brozun us. Board of Education invali-dating school segregation.) The measure was killed in committee, in part due to objections it failed to take into consideration the ability of states to match the federal grantsF4

To Martin, the socialist manifestations of the Fair Deal paled when contrasted with the dangers radical subversives presented. The top leaders of the American Communist Party had been recently jailed under the Smith Act for advocating the overthrow of the government; Judith Coplon, a Justice Department employee, had been indicted for espionage; Gerhart Eisler, named by HUAC as America's number one Communist and identified as a Soviet spy, had jumped bail and fled to Poland; and Klaus Fuchs, a naturalized Englishman, confessed that while working on the atomic bomb he provided information to the Soviets. Moreover, a host of former Communists warned that their Red network colleagues had pene- trated the government.

Consequently the minority leader intensified his assaults on the administration's alleged laxness on domestic subversion and frequently

1 76 Chapter 5

identified Democrats with radicalism. Like many Republicans he capitalized upon Truman’s dismissal of charges against Alger Hiss as ”a red herring.” (In December 1948, Hiss, a prominent New Dealer, had been in-dicted by a federal grand jury for perjury, charged with denying that he passed classified papers to the self-confessed Communist Whittaker Chambers.) America, Martin stated, was living in a “red herring era,“ a “special White House dish-served up to the press and radio whenever a protected Communist or fellow-traveler falls unexpectedly into the hands of the law.” In one of his most extreme rhetorical flourishes he accused the New Deal of “flinging open” the doors of government to Socialists and Communists who ”poured into Washington . . . [and] secretly joined the Communist spy appa ra tu~ .”~~ As one might expect he defended HUAC, describing it as “a live, intelligent committee” by the very nature of its duties bound to make enemiesz6

Martin was not content merely to warn of these dangers. He championed the Mundt-Nixon bill, which called for the registration of Commu- nist political organizations, front organizations, and their members. With the United States engaged in a war in Korea he asserted this was ”no time for patty-cake legislation” or allowing Communists “free rein” in this country. Much of Congress must have agreed with his observation that Mundt-Nixon preserved civil liberties rather than infringed upon them, for the bill passed the House 319-58.2’ To make it easier to root Reds out of government Martin with Senator Taft introduced a joint resolution to protect from administration retaliation federal employees who testified before congressional committees. Martin believed this step was necessary, witnesses feared to testify before committees, especially that of Senator Joseph R. McCarthy (Republican, Wisconsin), and executive orders hand- cuffed Congress’s efforts to obtain Martin’s concern about witnesses was shared by the Democratic Eighty-first Congress, which is-sued fifty-nine contempt citations to individuals who refused to answer questions posed by House ~ommittees.2~

WAR IN KOREA

Martin’s fear of Communism also influenced his foreign policy stand and often overcame his commitment to a balanced budget and reduced expenditures. He was one of only fifty-one Republicans who voted $820 mil-lion in military aid to NATO membersM Nonmilitary foreign assistance was another matter. Even when justified as a means of fighting Commu- nism, many Republicans were skeptical about Truman’s Point Four program calling for technical assistance and government guarantees for private investment in underdeveloped nations. Martin insisted it should be

"The Communist Menace. . .More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace" 177

pared substantially before cuts were made in domestic programs. Due to Republican opposition Point Four languished in the House for several months. When it was finally reported, Martin argued that foreign spending contributed to the national debt and tried to get it recommitted. How- ever, when that effort failed, characteristically, he voted for the entire economic aid package of which Point Four was a part. Two months later he also voted for an additional $3.16 million in foreign aid as part of the Eco- nomic Cooperation Act.3l

Of more immediate concern than foreign aid were the dramatic changes in the Far East, which many Americans, especially Martin and Republican leaders, found humiliating and disastrous. Mao Zedong and his Commu- nist followers succeeded in driving Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists out of mainland China to the island of Formosa, where they claimed to be the only legitimate government of China. In a futile effort to justify its Chi- nese policy, the administration had issued a White Paper in August 1949. Its conclusion, that nothing the United States could "reasonably" have done would have prevented the Nationalist defeat, led to vitriolic attacks on American policy and its architects by Republican Congressional extremists, dubbed "the China block." Martin, although more moderate than those colleagues, nevertheless described the paper as a "confession of inexcusable failure" and American policy as an "Oriental Munich." Republicans, he stated, were willing to join bipartisan efforts to strengthen Chiang's China, but if necessary would do so alone. Even Europe's preservation was contingent on not abandoning Nationalist "China" to the communist^.^^

Martin repeatedly blamed the administration for China's defeat and implied "betrayal" from within was at its Other Republicans, more irresponsible than he, but soon joined by Martin, characterized the State Department and Secretary of State Acheson as, at best, incompetent dupes responsible for American failure in Asia. With several other Re- publicans, including future Secretary of State Herter, Martin claimed that the United States, for its own security, must defend Formosan China "against Soviet aggression," continue aid to these forces, and refuse to recognize "Red" China.34

With some of his fellow Republicans Martin capitalized upon the necessity of aid to Korea to obtain additional materiel for nationalist China. After lengthy debate the House by two votes (with 132 GOP negatives) defeated $60 million for Korean assistance. Truman, determined to provide aid, met with congressional leaders. He stated another rejection would be disastrous for American foreign policy, and sent Secretary Ache- son to the Hill to plead for support. But more important, he included in the new administration proposal funds and arms for Chiang's China. As a result a revised Korean bill passed 230 to 134-an indication of Repub- lican leverage in Asian policy.35

178 Chapter 5

On June 24,1950 Communist North Korea attacked the United Nations- sponsored state of South Korea, whose forces, discouraged and confused, retreated rapidly. Martin supported the American-led United Nations appeal for members to help South Korea and the president’s commitment of first air, then naval units, and finally ground forces to stem the tide but resented the administration’s policy of informing Congress of decisions already taken.36 However, as he did during much of the Cold War and had done much earlier on other foreign policy issues, Martin backed the policy but rebuked the decisions that led to it. He flayed the administration for a lack of preparedness in the Far East and asserted that failure to keep American troops in Korea and to sustain the Nationalist Chinese served as an incentive for the invasion. In a joint statement with Senator Taft he pledged Republican cooperation on essential measures but lambasted Truman’s decisions for the past five years and his failure to consult Re- publican leaders on major issue~.~’

As time passed Martin’s criticism became shriller: the USSR had been “stupidly” appeased at conferences at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, allowing it to become the dominant power in Europe. Moreover for entering the war in Asia it had been rewarded with Manchuria, Port Arthur, Outer Mongolia, and Korea, while the United States allowed itself to be pushed into a small pocket in

Sharing similar views was an old Washington acquaintance of Martin, General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in Japan and Commander of the United Nations forces in Korea. In order to limit the war, the administration rejected Chiang’s offer to have Chi- nese Nationalist troops fight in Korea and moreover sought to neutralize Taiwan by having the Seventh Fleet patrol the Formosan Strait and prevent invasions from either side. To the distress of policy-makers MacArthur made the equivalent of a state visit to Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan and at the end of their talks announced a virtual alliance. More outrageous, in August he released a thousand-word statement highly critical of United States policy, describing Formosa as an “unsinkable carrier,” a ”forward submarine base” that was vital to American security. This pronouncement was released to the press without being cleared by the secretary of defense. An angry Truman ordered MacArthur to withdraw it-but too late, it had already been published. Republicans, led by Martin, excoriated the administration. The minority leader, who entered the general’s statement in the Congressional Record, denounced the administration‘s attempted suppression as “another flagrant example of the incredible bungling . . . which culminated in the Korean conflict.” The Bay Stater quoted MacArthur, “If we hold this line [Korea], we may have peace-lose it and war is inevitable.” Moreover Martin scored Sec- retary Acheson, accusing him of bringing on the war by his speech of

"The Communist Menace. . .More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace" 179

January 12, 1950 excluding Formosa and Korea from the Asian defense perimeter which the United States was bound to defend. Republicans, and especially Martin, had found a hero in MacArthur-a villain in the controversial secretary of state.39

On November 25 the Chinese entered the conflict in force and Ameri- cans who had advanced to the Manchurian border were once again pushed below the thirty-eighth parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea. To marshal support for the "new war" Truman and his major advisors, including the much-maligned Acheson, met with congressional leaders. Legislators were given an intelligence briefing and then discussed the need for additional troops, an economic stabilization plan, and a declaration of national emergency. Martin, who was hesitant about the need for an emergency declaration, was, nevertheless, rather sympathetic to the president's plight, asking Truman if he needed any other legislation and urging conferees to "forget politics and work together as Americans." As might be expected, he raised the issue of Na- tionalist China by asking if the United States was doing anything to get additional support from other countries, especially "fighting bodies" from China. After the meeting Truman delivered a radio and TV address on the crisis and proclaimed a state of emergency.40

Despite Martin's support of the United Nations intervention in Korea, the minority leader, as did many Republicans, blistered the secretary of state for decisions he believed led to this latest Communist aggression. Al- most immediately after the White House conference, House Republicans in a closed meeting approved by a voice vote a Martin resolution insisting on the dismissal of Acheson as part of a "thorough housecleaning in the State Department." The resolution, labeled by Dewey "a shameful act," was approved by Senate Republicans (twenty-three to five) and asserted the secretary and State Department had so lost the confidence of the American people it could not be regained. Many Republicans believed the resolution did not go far enough. Martin was criticized by some of his own party for not pressing for impeachment. However, he did continue to target Acheson, leading a renewal of the motion in May 1951 and in July attempting to cut off funds for the secretary's salary?

THE ELECTION OF 1950 AND DOMESTIC ISSUES IN THE EIGHTY-SECOND CONGRESS

A few months after the outbreak of the Korean War the Eighty-first Con- gress, one of the most liberal legislative bodies in the twentieth century, recessed from September 23 to November 27. In the election year of 1950 Martin's leadership had pleased neither extreme of his party. His centrist

180 Chapter 5

position sometimes resulted in his voting contrary to the majority of Re- publicans, and he irked many in his party by voting for measures after failing to get them recommitted. It was even reported in a nationally syndicated column that when his friend Margaret Chase Smith had publicly criticized the ”punitive” legislation of the Eightieth Congress, Martin replied, ‘,I’ve been doing a lot of thinking, and I’ve definitely decided to swing to the more liberal side.“u At any rate he was to the left of Les Arends, the party whip, and more moderate than Charlie Halleck, his former majority leader. One analysis of 173 Republican Congressmen concluded that there were only thirty more liberal than he.O As a result some of the party’s conservatives, still smarting from the 1948 defeat, which they attributed to “me tooism,” sought a more belligerent leader who would frequently challenge the Democrats. If the GOP won in 1950 they hoped to replace Martin with Clarence Brown, Taft’s 1948 campaign manager.&

On the other hand Martin’s conservatism grated on the more liberal members of his party. In what was interpreted as a repudiation of the party’s congressional leadership, twenty-one liberal congressmen, including Massachusetts’s Herter and New York‘s Javits, endorsed the “Repub- lican Advance.” This was a coalition urging a constructive approach to national problems and de-emphasizing the campaign against Socialism and Communists in go~emment.4~

Despite his attacks on the “Socialist” Fair Deal and the “leftist” Eighty- first Congress, Martin delivered fewer speeches and released fewer press statements in 1950 than usual. Even his comments on the Korean War were relatively few, concentrating primarily upon the administration’s failure to prepare properly for the challenge by adhering to the “folly” of appeasement. Nevertheless Truman when pummeling the GOP at a Jef-ferson Jackson dinner berated Martin by name.“6

It is possible that Martin’s role as party spokesman was subordinated to his desire to create a viable two-party system in the South by winning over conservative Democrats. He delivered major speeches throughout that section, extolling the advantages of the two-party system, exposing the dangers of creeping Socialism, and urging grass-roots organization in that area.47 When the Republicans failed to capture the House in 1950, he intensified his efforts by urging every prominent Republican to deliver at least two speeches a year in the South. Moreover, he chaired an RNC Executive Committee meeting, where he was instrumental in establishing a special committee to organize a “forceful and effective” GOP in the

One of his disappointments that election year was the failure of his friend Luce to heed his advice and seek a Senate seat. According to her confidant Wilfred Sheed, in 1949 she developed contempt for politics, concluded politicians were second rate, and treated Martin and Senator

"The Communist Menace . . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace" 181

Brewster as "loveable tradesmen."49 Even if so, she continued her friendship with Martin until his death in 1968, often writing him long, political letters and in 1950 going out of her way when lecturing in Boston to pay homage to his mother and visit his newspaper in North Attleb~rough.~"

Martin's reelection was a foregone conclusion. Although his Demo- cratic opponent was given little chance, the congressman campaigned as vigorously as ever. As in the past he emphasized his national record and high office and urged a Republican congress in order to preserve peace and maintain a strong America. For him the issues were "Confusion, Corruption, and Communism." As a result he praised the GOP for sweeping fellow travelers from government and called for "uncon- trolled" Americans in the legislature. Republicans, he asserted, by ending waste and promoting economy would be able to finance rearmament without new taxes. Once again local newspapers endorsed Martin.51 He won with ease, carrying every city and town in the district with a plurality of 38,611. Although the congressional delegation of six Democrats and eight Republicans remained unchanged, for the first time since 1932 in an off-year election Democrats carried all the state constitutional offices. To "revitalize" the party, Martin convened a three-hour meeting of Republican congressmen, the state chairman, and national committee members. The only word to leak from this select group was that they would force resignations from the "deadwood" on the state committee and that Martin [again] contended it was necessary for Republicans to field candidates of various racial and religious background^.^^ Nation-ally the party fared much better. The Democratic majority in the House was cut from ninety-two seats to thirty-four. Martin predicted that in the new Eighty-second Congress the president could achieve his legislative program only with Republican support.

The forthcoming presidential election and fear that the Korean conflict could lead to World War I11 overshadowed the Eighty-second Congress and the administration's Fair Deal program. Even bipartisan foreign policy began to disintegrate as Republican rhetoric escalated to new heights. A jaunty Martin intensified his assaults on socialist inroads in the Demo- cratic Party and renewed his demands for a balanced budget as well as in-sisting on sharp cutbacks in government expenditures.

After announcing that he would go along with the defense portion of the President's Economic Report, Martin attacked the domestic sections, "the same old tired Socialistic programs aimed at medicine, education, credit, housing, and national resources is dragged forth once more and the money for launching these schemes is brazenly sought amid tri- umphant calls for stronger national affairs." Martin censured Truman for including his "entire Socialistic program" in the budget, and averred the GOP would scrutinize every defense and nondefense item to prevent

182 Chapter 5

those who hold the White House in captivity from diverting funds to so-cialistic ends.53 The House sought to check these alleged Fair Deal excesses by refusing to follow 1950precedent and enact a single appropriations bill to fund the federal government. Consequently it slashed $4.718 billion from presidential requests in twenty-seven different appropriations.% By April the administration was convinced a GOP Dixiecrat coalition led by Martin, Halleck, and Brown was successfully curbing expenditures and appr0priations.5~

The struggle over the budget and taxes continued. Truman’s request for a 12.5 percent tax increase, justified in part as a check on inflation, was dismissed by Martin as ”economic voodoo,” the real root of the evil being government spending. The “Pay-As-We-Go“ tax program is really a pay-as-we-lose, for the more money Congress raises, the more the administration spends, for it is “bent upon taxing us into Socialism.”56 When a compromise measure of an 11%increase along with a raise in excise and sales taxes emerged from Congress’s conference committee, Martin announced that after having voted for every tax bill passed in the last fifteen years, he was drawing the line; he would not support this one. The administration would never economize, he asserted, unless forced to do so. Despite Martin’s “no” vote the conference report was narrowly appr~ved.~’

Martin was successful in turning back an administration proposal to require dispersion of new defense factories, which the Bay Stater saw as a blow to existing industrial areas. When Truman allegedly sought to achieve the same end by refusing government loans to existing plants, Martin scolded him for defying the will of Congress and compared him to Hitler and Mussolini, charging the nation was on the road to dictator-

Despite such rhetoric and Truman’s belief the legislature was among the worst he had ever seen, he still addressed Martin as Joe when corresponding with him about service on a committee to mark the Decla- ration of Independen~e.~~

The minority leader continued to assail the Democratic left, contending that the administration could not tell a Communist from a New Dealer and claiming that the GOP was the only party to oppose both socialism and Communism. He appealed to young Republicans to join the crusade to steer the nation away from those evils and even asserted that British so-cialism and Soviet Communism were ”insidious Siamese twins.”60 Con- sequently, he was reluctant to disassociate himself from the search for Communist infiltration. He praised HUAC for its “splendid work,” re- gretting only that it had slowed down in the early months of the Eighty- first Congress and although acknowledging that Senator McCarthy may have used “rough methods,” insisted such tactics were necessary to dig Communists and “left-wingers” out of government. The Wisconsonite

“The Communist Menace . . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace” 183

sometimes overstated his case, Martin claimed; nevertheless, on the whole, McCarthy was doing a “good job.”61

The Fair Deal fared no better in the second session of the Eighty- second Congress, the shortest session (January &July 7,1952) since 1939. The approaching presidential election and Communist Chinese intervention in the Korean War overwhelmed administration plans. Indica- tive of growing political discord was the issuance by six prominent Re- publicans, led by Martin, of a point-by-point refutation of the president’s State of the Union Address. This document denied the existence of a bipartisan foreign policy, asserting that Republicans had not been consulted on major issues. Furthermore, it praised the record of the Eighti- eth Congress and contended that if Truman had implemented Republi- can recommendations the present crisis would have been avoided. These charges also provided the theme for many of Martin’s 1952 speeches.62 Consequently, there was little favorable action on the president’s requests: no tax measures, no revision of Taft-Hartley, no Saint Lawrence Seaway, military and economic aid was cut, and revisions to the Defense Production Act further weakened wage, price, and rent controls. Fur- thermore, over the president‘s veto Congress passed legislation turning offshore oil resources over to coastal states. Martin’s role in each of these areas was of major significance.

One piece of legislation that came as close as any to being bipartisan dealt with Social Security, but even that was fraught with political overtones. A Democratic measure to increase payments by $5.00 or 12 percent and raise from $50 to $70 the amount a recipient could earn while collecting old age assistance was defeated. Republicans, who were primarily responsible for the setback, immediately introduced their own measure removing controversial provisions on disability and increasing allowable earnings to $100 a month. Martin rallied his party behind this proposal, which he contended was a “matter of simple justice” but without the “jok- ers” that would advance left-wing socialist ideas under the guise of old- age benefits.63 Before action could be taken on the Republican measure, the Democratic bill with minor changes was called up again. According to the American Medical Association the proposed legislation was still the entering wedge of “socialized medicine,‘‘ for the Federal Security Admin- istration would be the agency to determine permanent disability. But no amendments were allowed: Republicans had little choice; the over-whelming majority of them voted in favor, for as Martin explained it was better than no bill at all, and besides the Senate version might improve it. The Upper House raised the wage limit to $100 and deleted the provisions to which the AMA objected, changes hailed by Martin. The conference committee version, acceptable to the AMA, compromised at $75 and was approved by both Houses with election-year ease.&4

184 Chapter 5

However, the sharpest congressional conflict was not over legislation but over Truman’s use of his authority as commander-in-chief to seize steel plants. The president believed he had little choice: a steel strike would adversely affect war production while Americans were dying in Korea, but a settlement granting substantial wage increases could result in exorbitant price hikes in steel and lead to inflation. When management rejected recommendations of the Wage Stabilization Board, Truman acted. A bitter opponent of Taft-Hartley, he was reluctant to use that legislation to avert a strike; consequently he seized the plants, infuriating much of the middle class and congressmen, fourteen of whom called for his im-peachment. Martin probably encouraged such irrationality by raising the issue of impeachment himself and describing the takeover as manifestation of an alien philosophy of government, a violation of due process, and a defiance of the remedy at hand-Taft-Hartley. Under his leadership the Policy Committee condemned the action as a violation of property rights, another step toward dictatorship.

Despite the rhetoric Congress did little as it awaited action by the judiciary. When the Supreme Court invalidated the seizure by a six to three vote, Truman requested legislative authority to seize the plants. Instead, Congress recommended he invoke Taft-Hartley, advice he ignored. The strike dragged on for fifty-three days and finally was settled with the same price increase, $4.50 a ton, and substantially the same union shop provisions and wage and fringe benefits as originally recommended by the Stabilization Board. However, animosity between Congress, especially Republican representatives, and the president had intensified.65

As the session drew to a close Martin and the legislature were denounced by liberals for their lack of achievement on domestic issues.66 However, the minority leader believed there was no need to apologize for the Republican record. The opening line of a document issued jointly with the Senate Minority Leader Styles Bridges (New Hampshire) summarized his view: “The Democrat[ic] Eighty-second Congress muddled to a dis-mal end July 2, 1952 demonstrating conclusively that Democratic Party leadership in Congress, as well as the executive branch, cannot resolve the critical issues of our time.” Specifically the Democrats were accused of failing to bring peace, to secure the nation’s safety, to protect the country from Communist treachery, to stop inflation, to reduce taxes, halt corruption and favoritism, and to keep their promises, especially in civil rights. Only because of overwhelming Republican support, they contended, did FEPC pass. Republican leaders also asserted their record in the Eightieth Congress and recent stands on Communist penetration, taxes, economy, and corruption demonstrated that the GOP kept its promise^.^'

Although little emphasized in this release, foreign policy and preparedness had dominated much of Congress. Martin and Democratic Ma-

“The Communist Menace . . .More Alarming tlmn . . . the Hitler Menace” 185

jority Leader McCormack, two anti-Communist battlers, joined together to warn Guatemala against further Communist penetration when that nation’s trade unions and labor court rulings infringed on the interests of United Fruit.68 But more often the two were on different sides. Martin was a leader in cutting the president’s foreign aid request by nearly $1billion (yet he introduced and testified fruitlessly for a measure to appropriate $150 million for Israel). He reminded the nation once again of the infa- mous “surrender” at Yalta, yet led the Republican opposition which killed Universal Military Training and reduced the length of service and draft- age eligibility. In challenging Speaker Rayburn’s contention that UMT was necessary because of the military emergency, Martin claimed if the situation were as serious as described, Chinese Nationalist troops should be used in Korea and read to the House a letter from General Douglas MacArthur, the United Nations commander, advocating such a step.6y

THE KOREAN CRISIS

The minority leader cosponsored with the Democratic majority leader an administration proposal urging the United Nations to declare the Chinese People’s Republic aggressors in Korea. Martin hailed the resolution as the product of administration consultation with Congress on a major policy decision and expressed the hope it would pass unanimously. Republican extremists warned against it, interpreting a favorable vote as bolstering the United Nations and denigrating American sovereignty. Clare Hoffman (Michigan) was particularly outspoken. To him the resolution was ”tricky- weasel-worded double talk . . . an endorsement of Acheson‘s incom- petency. . .a back-door endorsement of the UN, of the Truman-Acheson policy.” Efforts to delay passage by sending the measure to committee were defeated by a standing vote of 181 to 31; and the resolution passed on a voice vote. However, faultfinding continued. The Chicago Tribune cas-tigated Martin and the House for delegating their responsibility ”to the polyglot collection of foreigners who constitute the UN.” The editorial went on to imply this was a matter for HUAC.70

The minority leader was also censured by the Washington Times Herald, which scolded him for not joining 124 House Republicans in signing a declaration opposing Truman’s foreign ventures, military programs, and the “Dewey-Vandenberg [internationalist] line.” After accusing Martin of sympathizing with the administration’s foreign policy, the paper urged Republicans to caucus for “unless the party leadership accepts the will of the party majority, without reservation, the leadership must be changed.””

Martin, however, had been a harsh judge of the nation’s Asian policy. For months he had urged unlimited aid to Nationalist China, warned

186 Chapter 5

against American recognition of Communist China, which he called the ”expeditionary force” of Soviet Russia, and more significantly had led House Republicans in adopting a resolution calling for a “housecleaning” in the State Department, beginning with the dismissal of Acheson-by impeachment if necessary. The secretary of state, he charged, had lost the confidence of the American people by bringing the nation to the brink of disaster in Asia and jeopardizing American lives and security. It was time for a policy that placed American interests first.”

Possibly as a result of sniping from the right Martin became more contentious. In February and March 1951 he demanded an overhaul of the State Department, pressed for the use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Ko- rea, and advocated courts martial and impeachments if the United States was not in that war to win. One of his most vitriolic addresses was at a February gathering in Brooklyn where he condemned the “fuzzy-minded, pinko officials in our security setups” who allowed the Soviets to steal the secret of nuclear bombs. Moreover, he accused the state department of concentrating upon Europe at the expense of Asia, thereby permitting China to fall into Communist hands and then preventing a Nationalist Chinese second front. After demanding the ouster of Acheson he declared, “If we are not in Korea to win, then the administration should be indicted for the murder of thousands of American boys.”73

Robert Humphreys, RNC publicity director and sometime speechwriter for his friend Martin, appeared at the minority leader’s office with a draft letter addressed to General MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Forces in Korea. That epistle, requesting MacArthur ’s views on American policy “on a confidential basis or otherwise,’’ was sent along with the Brooklyn speech.74 Defying orders from Washington that his pronouncements be cleared, MacArthur replied to Martin on March 20, 1951. Unlike many observers, then and now, who are convinced the general must have known Martin would release the letter unless instructed otherwise, MacArthur claimed to have attached little importance to the correspondence. In his memoirs he states he was puzzled that ”for some unexplained reason and without consulting me” Martin publicized his reply.75 After receiving the letter Martin walked around with it in his pocket for a few days. “Finally I said to myself, ’He don’t give a damn or he’d said This explosive missile, a brazen challenge to the administration’s stance, shattered what remained of Asian bipartisanship. It called for the intervention of Chinese National- ist troops, challenged the administration‘s European policy, endorsed Martin’s speech, and concluded with the injunction that in war, ”There is no substitute for

Martin on April 5 delivered a short speech in the House on the Far East- ern crisis, during which he read MacArthur’s letter, utilizing as justifica-

"The Communist Menace . . . More Alarming than . . . the Ifitler Menace" 187

tion for doing so Speaker Rayburn's comments calling for UMT. After consulting with his military and civilian advisors Truman dismissed the general on April 11,a day Martin called one of the blackest in the nation's history. "Our hearts are tom into tatters at the downfall of a colossal figure." A few hours after the ouster, leading Republican legislators convened in Martin's office. The minority leader then phoned MacArthur in Tokyo and called a press conference where he announced the general had agreed to address a joint session of Congress. Moreover, Martin urged Congress to investigate the firing and revealed that impeachments were discussed at the conclave.

That same afternoon Senator Kenneth S. Wherry (Republican, Ne-braska) and Martin introduced a concurrent resolution stating that as the relief of MacArthur was a blow to national unity and precipitated a situation fraught with danger, he should be invited to present his views and recommendations on Korean and Asian policies in an address to the House and Senate. Martin privately informed the Democratic leadership if no invitations were forthcoming, he would arrange for the ousted general to address a rally in Madison Square Garden, New York. Democrats had been outmaneuvered; they had but little choice to accede. Truman, who was "burned up" over the Martin maneuver, reluctantly described the invitation as "fitting." The first steps had been taken in Martin's dream of a MacArthur presidency, even though his candidate on arriving in San Francisco denied any political

Capitalizing further on the turmoil engendered by the firing, Martin, on April 12 berated Truman for consulting with only one non-European expert before the dismissal. He then gathered the Policy Committee to approve a biting resolution, asking if the United States, in following its policy of appeasement, was preparing a super Munich and planning to abandon Japan. The resolution proclaimed it essential that Congress, which had been denied the views of the military, hear the "full facts" on foreign and military affairs from Asian experts, for if the nation was to be saved it would be by action of the legislative branch.79 The following day Martin was selected to present the Republican response to the president's national address on the firing. As he had done for two days, the Bay Stater reprimanded Acheson and the "appeasers" in the State Department and demanded their replacement. A show of strength, he charged, was necessary to confront the Communist conspirators, stop the Kremlin, and prevent World War 111. The administration, by deserting its friends in Asia, had sacrificed American lives in a costly stalemate. In this day of sorrow all must agree that General Matthew B. Ridgway, the new commander, cannot be shackled as was his predecessor.80

Meanwhile, Martin persuaded MacArthur to abandon his plan to return by ship and instead to fly back, arriving while the nation was still in

188 Chapter 5

an uproar over his removal. The Republican leader arranged that the homecoming hero’s address to Congress would be on April 19-Patriot’s Day in New England. MacArthur was met at the airport by official military and civilian delegations, but pushed his way through the crowd to Martin, who then drove him to his hotel. The minority leader briefed the general on the arrangements he had made for the congressional address, a congressional luncheon, and a speech to the Daughters of the American Revolution. MacArthur ’s “Old Soldiers Never Die” discourse before squirming Democrats and teary Republicans was so emotional that a shaken Representative Dewey Short (Republican, Missouri) informed his colleagues, “We saw a great hunk of God in the flesh. We heard the voice of God.”81 MacArthur, who thereafter was never entirely out of the run-ning as a presidential dark horse, thanked Martin for his wise and sage advice, expressing the hope they would stay in

Martin took advantage of the near hysteria over the MacArthur episode to further castigate administration policy. Apparently he was convinced that the United States, in concert with the British, planned to recognize the government of Communist China and seat that nation in the UN, while it seized Formosa (Nationalist China) and North Korea-in exchange for a Korean cease-fire.83 Consequently, he assailed any speculation on a negotiated peace, denounced appeasement, blamed General Marshall for the loss of China, and demanded that Asia not be abandoned. Continuing to berate the ”fuzzy-minded characters” in the State Department and to demand Acheson’s removal, he went so far as to attempt to have Congress withdraw the secretary’s salary-an effort which failed 81 to 171. Years later Martin denied any personal animosity in this: “We believed that Sec- retary Acheson was largely to blame for the administration’s course. . . . There was no personal vindictiveness on my part. Acheson was simply in the line of fire as I had been in Roosevelt’s when he delivered his ‘Martin, Barton and Fish


As the 1952 election approached Martin hammered repeatedly on the theme that Korea was a failure leaving Americans with no choice other than to vote Republican. He disparaged the administration for botching the war, firing MacArthur, appeasing Communist China, and disgracing the United States. ”Every time you read a casualty list in Korea,” he reminded voters, “remember it was the Truman administration which flirted with Chinese Communists who are now killing Americans boys.” At the Republican Na- tional Convention he even declared that victory in Korea was in America’s grasp but the administration ”decided the best way to win was to lose.”85

“The Communist Menace. . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace” 189

To keep foreign policy in the forefront of the campaign Martin with his congressional friend Len Hall traveled around the world from November 8 to December 19, 1951. The tour, he explained, was to provide information needed for legislation, including data on economic conditions, the will to resist Communism, and the effect and efficiency of American expenditures abroad. Claiming it would give him greater freedom, the minority leader paid his own commercial airfare when not flying on regularly scheduled Military Air Transport Service flights. On his return Martin demanded the administration reverse itself by fully supporting Nationalist China, devote more attention to fascist Spain (one could not be “too choosy” in the conflict between Communism and the “free world”), and abandon the policy of too little, too late, because the Communist conspiracy ”that literally girds the globe . . . [is] an unparalleled threat to peace and human liberty.”86 Despite these jingoistic pronouncements Martin did endorse the Big Three disarmament plan presented by the United States to the UN. According to him the plan was “long overdue” and, although the nation should not be deluded by false hopes, “every reasonable step to avoid the danger of open warfare’’ should be takens7

The trip was allegedly nonpolitical, but politics became directly involved as a result of Martin’s reply to a reporter’s question in Turkey. His comment that Eisenhower would be elected president if he sought and obtained the Republican nomination was interpreted as an endorsement of the general from an unexpected source, for it had been assumed Mar- tin‘s choice would be Senator Taft. To correct this false impression the congressman telegraphed Basil Brewer, soon to be selected as Taft’s Mass- achusetts campaign manager, stating he had made no commitment and would not make a definite decision until sometime in 1952. Ed Martin, his brother, was photographed conferring with Brewer, a picture widely distributed as an indication of where Martin’s sympathy really lay.s8

Despite his protestations, as early as the spring of that year Martin had begun to assist Taft behind the scenes. He had helped the Ohioan‘s friend Brewer, a fellow newspaper publisher, to establish a statewide Massachusetts organization. Moreover, he continued to meet privately with Brewer during the summer and fall of 1951. By April 1952, when the preprimary was to be held, the state’s Republicans, like those throughout the nation, were sharply divided by what proved to be one of the most bitterly contested struggles for a presidential nomination in Amer- ican history. Eisenhower was championed by Massachusetts liberals led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, his national campaign manager, and by the well-respected Senator Saltonstall. More conservative Republicans, who attributed their presidential defeats since 1936 to “me-too” nominees, looked to Senator Taft. To preclude intraparty bloodletting Repub- lican leaders from both camps selected a compromise unity slate to run

190 Chapter 5

unopposed as national convention delegates-at-large. A clear indication of Martin’s leanings was his selection of Brewer as his alternate. The unity slate was elected easily, but despite intensive campaigning by Taft, he lost the presidential write-ins 110,189 to Eisenhower’s 254,895.

Although it became increasingly apparent that Martin preferred Taft to Eisenhower, in actuality he hoped for a MacArthur nomination. The minority leader agreed to meet at the convention with members of the MacArthur Nominating Committee and “steer them.” He reassured a MacArthur supporter he would use all of his influence to have the general selected as the keynoter, and in June at a Waldorf Towers ren- dezvous urged MacArthur to openly enter the race, predicting if he did, he would win easily. However, without a public commitment from the general and an active campaign, there was little chance of his nomination. By the convention’s eve with 694 votes needed to nominate, Taft had 458, Eisenhower 406, with 93 disputed and the rest uncommitted or pledged to favorite sons.

Martin’s reputation for fairness overcame Republican awareness of his sympathy for Taft and MacArthur. In June he was selected by the arrangements committee as the convention’s permanent chairman. At that meeting his nomination was seconded by Ralph Cake, an Eisenhower supporter who described Martin as one of the finest presiders in history. Wearing a button “Jimmy Durante for President” (a movie and TV entertainer), Martin arrived in Chicago denying he was a Taft man and for that matter that he was committed to anyone. His function, he asserted, was to promote harmony and to serve as a peacemaker. (Nevertheless, on the TV program Meet the Press he confessed an emotional bond to MacArthur.) After meeting with the Taft and Eisenhower camps and warning them that continued bitterness could threaten all Republicans, he cautioned the temporary chairman and parliamentarian, both Taftites, about “heavy handed treatment” of Eisenhower forces.

Martin’s address as chairman was a lengthy oration blasting the Korean policy, scolding the administration for allowing A-bomb secrets to be stolen, faulting Democrats for being in power too long, and promising a better day under Republicans. A noisy gathering in front of the rostrum with Governor John S. Fine, representing thirty-two uncommitted Penn- sylvania delegates, and Eisenhower leaders disrupted Martin’s declamation. Twice the temporary chairman had to interrupt the speech, pound for order, and threaten to have the sergeant-at-arms clear the aisles. The following day Eisenhower, Lodge, and Dewey apologized to Martin.

Courting every possible vote, Eisenhower backers planned to demand implementation of the convention rule that an alternate could vote only if his delegate was not in the hall. This rule, seldom if ever enforced against the chairman, would have prevented Brewer voting for Taft while Martin

"The Communist Menace. . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace" 191

presided. A feisty Martin threatened to turn the chair over to someone else, join the Massachusetts delegates, demand a roll call, and vote for MacArthur. Despite the general's inept performance as keynoter, Eisen- hower forces, more fearful of a MacArthur stampede than a Taft nomination, surrendered. They had little to fear: at the end of the first roll call it was Taft 500, Eisenhower 595 (nine votes short). Delegates began to switch from favorite sons and from Taft to Eisenhower. Martin, in what some have interpreted as a deliberate snub, ignored Fine, who stood under the podium pleading for recognition, and instead called upon Min- nesota, whose switch to Eisenhower put the Kansan over the top. At the conclusion of the ballot it was Eisenhower 845, Taft 270, Warren 77, MacArthur 4. When unanimous consent was moved, Martin ignored noes from several Taft delegates and proclaimed Eisenhower the unanimous choice of the 1952 Republican convention.

The one remaining task was the selection of a vice-presidential candidate. Dewey, who had been pushing a Nixon candidacy since April, met with other COP leaders to submit recommendations to Eisenhower. Al- though there is no record that Martin was considered, his brother insisted that one of the participants told him the minority leader's candidacy was discussed: Dewey was averse and Lodge was "violently" opposed. Ed- ward Martin contended that Lodge, and others like him, would not believe a man without "a college degree, inherited wealth, and old Ameri- can lineage" had the stature to be vice p re~ iden t .~~ It appears that Taft might have selected Martin for that office. In his memoirs Martin wrote the Ohioan would have chosen either him or MacArthur, and Brewer has noted that Taft told him Martin would be his choice.

If Martin was disappointed in the convention results, he gave no indication of it. His speech introducing Eisenhower was a plea for unity. Del- egates as well as the nominee praised Martin's fairness and patience. More importantly, he campaigned for the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket, ac-knowledging after the election that the party could not have won with any other nominee."

At the request of the state committee, Martin campaigned from Sep- tember 18-23 in California, delivering two major speeches a day for the presidential ticket and a Republican Congress. While he was there the press broke the story of Nixon's "slush fund," resulting in some Republi- can leaders recommending the Californian be dropped from the ticket, but not Martin. He conferred with Nixon, rallied to his side, vouched for his integrity and ability, and proclaimed his pride in the candidate. At the same time that Eisenhower was mulling over what to do, Martin branded the charges a political smear and announced he saw no reason for Nixon to withdraw from the contest. Just prior to the senator's famous "Check- ers Speech" defending his actions, Nixon received a telegram from the

192 Chapter 5

minority leader telling him to keep his chin up and predicting that with one single broadcast he would win the election.91

In his Golden State addresses Martin emphasized foreign policy, Com- munism, taxes, and mistakes in Korea. Although he hammered relent- lessly at Communists in government, his diatribes were never as extreme as those of several of his Republican contemporaries or his speechwriters. He deleted the most outlandish comments in a draft prepared for delivery in Indiana urging the reelection of his “strong right arm” Charlie Hal- leck. Dropped were the lines “We cannot trust the big clean-up job to the man who began his government career in 1934 in the Agricultural Ad- justment Administration, the socialistic bureaucracy set up by Henry Wal- lace, Rex Tugwell, and Alger Hiss. That’s a point we must never forget, Alger Hiss and Adlai Stevenson [the Democratic nominee] got their start in government in the same spot-A.A.A. Hiss is in jail for perjury: and Stevenson is the captive candidate of the Red Herring Brigade.“ Substi- tuted in Martin’s handwriting were the words, “We cannot trust the big clean-up job to the man who was nominated by the same crowd that created the mess and who is their captive and servant. We must elect Eisen- hower and send a Republican Congress to Washington to clean out the Reds and turn the government back to those who believe in America and who will fight to save the American way of life.”92

In addition to accompanying both Eisenhower and Nixon as they bam- stormed through Massachusetts, Martin worked behind the scenes to overcome the ”hard feelings” between Taftites and Ikeites remaining from the convention. At first he believed it would be difficult to surmount these an- imosities, but by campaign’s end he predicted an Eisenhower landslide.93 For one who for years had been trying to revitalize the GOP in the South, the results must have been most gratifying as Eisenhower’s triumph included victories in Virginia, Florida, Texas, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.

Despite the fact organized labor had tagged him for defeat a confident Martin did not campaign extensively until late October. He emphasized the liberal portions of his record, his service to his constituents, ties to the Portuguese community, and the likelihood he would be Speaker again in 1953. As in the past it was difficult to defeat a national figure in a local campaign. Martin won with ease, 108,184 to 63,522, carrying every city and town except Bellingham. He was the only Republican, including Eisenhower, to win in Fall River.94

Immediately after the election Martin called for cooperation between the two major parties. With a majority of only nine Republicans in the House, and the Senate evenly divided, such an appeal was necessary, for a Republican program could be enacted only with Democratic votes. Mar- tin claimed he was not overly concerned about the miniscule Republican majority, for the magnitude of Eisenhower’s victory would encourage

"The Communist Menace. . . More Alnrniing than . . . the Hitler Menace" 193

wavering Democrats to support administration policies. Optimistic as usual, he even asserted a narrow margin was good for the party and the country, as it would keep the Republicans alert. His goals were rather in- nocuous and appealed to several Democrats: retrenchment in spending and a reduction in taxes to stimulate business and employment as linch- pins of a program that would be both "sound and progre~sive."~~

Ten days later the Speaker-elect was even more circumspect about the domestic program, admitting that budget balancing depended on the foreign situation and that it was too early to comment on tax reduction. However, in the same interview, hoping to take advantage of Eisen- hower's victory in the South and make the GOP a national party, he recommended distributing patronage to Southern Democrats. Even more fanciful were his foreign policy objectives: bolstering aid to Europe in a "practical" fashion, showing the Russians that a stalemate in Korea was unacceptable by building up anti-Communist forces in Asia, encouraging rebellion in the Chinese mainland, and using Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea. Under present circumstances, for example, any truce reached in Korea would be meaningless, he ~ o n t e n d e d . ~ ~

Several times in the following months he continued to urge that Chi- nese national soldiers be employed and that Japan be rearmed, thereby giving that nation "more encouragement to enter the fight.'' He even suggested these steps to the president-elect and in February was so unpolitic as to recommend that Eisenhower regard MacArthur as his advisor- in-chief on Korean strategy-according to Martin the two of them working together could achieve peace.97 Despite his Asian first interests, most of Martin's December meeting with Eisenhower and Taft dealt with the domestic program. At the end of the conference the Speaker-to-be announced that legislation, not investigation, would be Congress's main concern and that cooperation with the president would result in a "good, strong, progressive and constructive program." Although extravagance would be eliminated, a tax cut was only a possibility-the priority was a balanced budget.98

For the buoyant Martin there was a hint of leadership problems to come when immediately after the election friends of Halleck thought about "booming" him for Speaker. They claimed that Eisenhower's intimates privately were sympathetic to Halleck, a preconvention champion of the president. The Bay Stater's response to accounts of the unrest was typical: "I have had no word of any opp~si t ion."~~ Halleck's biographer writes the Indianan believed the Republicans could not afford to fight among themselves and killed the maneuver. Nevertheless, with each passing year intraparty bloodshed became less a concern for the Hoosier, who finally unseated Martin in 1959, charging he was too complacent about the Dem- ocratic opposition.

194 Chapter 5

NOTES

1. Joseph W. Martin as told to Robert J. Donovan, M y First Fifty Years in Politics (New York McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 1975), 193.

2. NYT, 5 November 1948; AP release 5 December 1948, scrapbook 50, MP. 3. Henry Z. Scheele, Charlie Halleck: A Political Biography (New York Exposition,

1966), 126; Tris Coffin, ”Washington Day Book,” in Taunton Gazette, 5 January 1949. 4. NYT, 28 January 1949; ”Effect of New Policy Committee,” n.d. and ”Reso-

lution Offered by Mr. Martin,” n.d., MP. 5. Elsie Gridley to Snell, February 4, 1949, Bertram Snell Papers, Crumb Li-

brary, State University of New York, Potsdam; Charles 0.Jones, Party and Policy Making: The House of Representatives Policy Committee (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rut- gers University Press), 28-29,31.

6. Martin to Carl Smith, January 21, 1952, MP. 7. Radio Address, March 15,1947, MP. 8. Fall River Herald News, 3 4 January 1949; NYT, 16,21 January 1950. 9. Materials on HR 2100, MP; scrapbook 52, MP.

10. “Joint Statement,” January 6,1952, MP. 11. Correspondence excise tax, 1949, MP. 12. NYT, 26-27 January 1950; Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 2d sess., 1950, 96:

993-95. 13. NYT, 2330 June 1950; Press release, June 23, 27, 1950, MI’; Congressional

Record, 81 Cong. 2d sess., 1950,96: 9385-86. 14. NYT, 27,30 July 1950; Statement on Controls, July 19, 1950, MI? 15. NYT, 9-10 March; 23 May 1949. 16. Richard 0.Davies, Housing Reform During the Truman Administration (Co-

lumbia, Mo: University of Missouri Press, 1966), 108-17; David B. Truman, The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: Wiley, 1959), 22; NYT, 18 March; 23 June 1949; ”Letter to Speaker on Housing Bill, June 7, 1949, Harry S. Truman, Public Papers, 1949 (Washington: GPO, 1964), 299-307.

17. Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 1st sess., 1949,95: 8130-31. 18. Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 2d sess., 1950, 96: 3825-26; Boston Globe,

21 March 1950. 19. Speech to Boston Medical Society, in Chronicle, 10 October 1950. 20. R. Alton Lee, Truman and Taft-Hartley: A Question of Mandate (Lexington, Ky.:

University of Kentucky Press, 1966; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980), 172-74; Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 1st sess., 1949,95: 5504-5505.

21. Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 1st sess., 1949, 95: 104647. 22. William F. Hartford, Where Is Our Responsibility: Unions and Economic Change

in the New England Textile Industry 1870-2960 (Amherst, Mass.: University of Mass- achusetts Press, 1966), 96.

23. David R. Mayhew, Party Loyalty Among Congressmen: The Diflerence Between Democrats and Republicans 2947-1952 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), 3942.

24. Donald Kingsley to Chair Committee of Education and Labor, June 15,1949, MP.

"The Communist Menace. . . More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace" 195

25. Speeches February 2 and 20,1950, MP. 26. NYT, 14 December 1948. 27. NYT, 14 August 1950. 28. H. Conn. Res. 189, March 24,1950 and prepared press comments, MP. 29. Floyd M. Reddick, "The Eighty-first Congress: First and Second Sessions,"

Western Political Quarterly 4 (March 1951): 60. 30. NYT, 18 August 1949. 31. NYT, 28 September 1949; 28 March 1950; Fall River Herald Nezus, 25 May

1950. 32. Press release, August 7,1949, MP. 33. Speech to Advertising Club of Boston, February 1,1950 and to Republican

dinner in Brockton, May 1,1950, MP. 34. Washington Star, 17 October 1949. 35. Acheson wrote that the nature of the Republican debate during the first bill

was a major factor in encouraging the North Koreans, with Soviet approval, to at-tack South Korea. See Dean Acheson, A Citizen Looks at Congress (New York: Harpers, 1957), 83-84; Congressionnl Record, 81 Cong. 2d sess., 1950, 96: 655-56, 1731-49; Harry S. Truman, Years of Trinl and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), 329; Greg Mitchell, Tricky Dick and the Pink Lady: Richard Nixon us. Helen GR-hagan Douglas-Sexual Politics and the Red Scare, 1950 (New York: Random House, 1998), 80.

36. Attleboro Sun, 26 June 1950; NYT, 27 June 1950. 37. NYT, 8 July 1950; Joint Statement July 18, MP; Chronicle, 6 July 1950. 38. Speeches August 19,24, and September 5,1950, MP. 39. Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 2d sess., 1950, 96: 13657; Statement, August

28,1950, MP; NYT and NYHT, 29 August 1950. 40. "White House Statement on Meeting," Truman, Public Papers, 1950, 303;

Truman, Trial and Hope, 423-26; UP release 14 December 1950, scrapbook 54, MP; Pearson column, WP,12 December 1950.

41. Policy Resolution, December 15,1950, MP; Charles J. Graham, "Republican Foreign Policy, 1939-1952" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1955), 265-66.

42. Tris Coffin, "Washington Daybook" in Fall River Herald News, 3 March 1949. 43. Truman, Congressional Party, 205-8; Duncan Mac Rae Jr., Dimensions of Corr-

gressional Voting: A Statistical Study ofthe House of Representatives in the Eighty-Jrst Congress (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), 230,235.

44. Washington Times Herald, 12 June 1950. 45. Washington Times Herald, 4 September 1950. 46. For Martin and 81st see his assessment of Congress, October n.d., 1949, and

for Fair Deal see "State of the Union-State of Socialism," January 6,1950, both in MI'; Truman, Public Papers 1950, 167-68.

47. See especially Alabama Today and Tomorrow (November 1948), MP; Speeches in Mobile, Miami, and Charlotte, January 1949, scrapbook 45, MP; Texas Speeches, December 1,1949, scrapbook 53, MP; address in Virginia, Washington Times Herald, 16 March 1950.

48. Fall River Herald News, 12 December 1950. 49. Wilfred Sheed, Clare Boothe Luce (New York: Dutton, 1982), 10.

196 Chapter 5

50. Chronicle, 25 January 1950. 51. Scrapbook 55, MP, is devoted to this election. 52. Attleboro Sun, 29 November; 8 December 1950; Katherine Howard, Lun-

cheon Notes, December 6, 1950, Katherine Howard Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

53. Press release, January 14,1951 and Joint Statement, January 15,1951, MP. 54. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951, 97: 1614, 1621-28; Floyd M.

Riddick, “The Eighty-second Congress First Session,” Western Political Quarterly 5 (November 4,1952): 104.

55. “Classified Memo,” Republican Democratic Coalition, April 30,1951, Office Files, Correspondence File, Truman Papers, University Publications.

56. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951,97: 6982-83; Press release, June 18, 1951, MP.

57. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951, 97: 13278-79; NYT, 19 June; 16-17,20 October 1951; Press release, October 13,1951, MP.

58. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951,97: 7823-27. 59. Truman to Martin, May 10,1951, Harry S. Truman Papers, Official File, Tru-

man Library, Independence, Missouri. 60. NYT, 12 March 1951; Address to Eastern Young Republican Conference,

March 16, 1951, MP. 61. Co&resszonal Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951, 97: 1156; NYT, 11 November

1951. 62. NYT, 10 January 1952. A typical speech was that to the Republican Club of

Frederick, Maryland, February 23,1952, MP. 63. Press release, May 23, 1952, MP; Remarks on Senate Version, July 2, 1952,

MP. 64. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 2d sess., 1952, 98: A 3221; Martin to Editor,

Fall River Herald News, 25 June 1952; Speech on Social Security, September 1952, MP.

65. GOP Statement, April 29, 1952, Martin press release, April 27,1952, Speech to Sons of Revolution, May 19,1952, all in MP; NYT, 1May 1952.

66. “Look at the Record: With Voting Chart,” New Republic, September 22,1952, 14-21.

67. Styles Bridges and Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican Accomplishments in the Eighty-second Congress, 82 Cong., 2d sess., Senate Document 166, Washington, 1952.

68. NYT, 26 February 1952. 69. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951,97 3380 and 2d sess., 1952,98:

1864,1894; Resolution House Policy Committee, March 9,1951, MP; NYT, 5 March 1952.

70. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951, 97: 457-64; Chicago Tribune, 22 January 1951.

71. Washington Times Herald, 26 February 1951. 72. Statement on Nationalist China, October 20, 1950; House Resolution

December 15, 1950; Statements for NBC and Mutual Networks, December 15, 1950, all in MP.

73. Lincoln Day Address, February 12,1951, MP.

”The Communist Menace . . .More Alarming than . . . the Hitler Menace” 197

74. For Humphrey’s role see James N. Milne to Edward Martin, December 22, 1978, MP.

75. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 386, 389.

76. Robert E. Wilson, ”Just One More Term,” Worcester Sunday Telegram, 17 July 1966, 13.

77. Martin to MacArthur, March 8,1951, MacArthur to Martin, March 20,1951, M P.

78. For Martin threat see Edward Martin as told to James J. Kenneally, Down Memory Lane (North Easton, Mass.: privately printed, 1980), 100-101; for Truman ”burned up” see Notes on MacArthur Dismissal, April 28,1951, Office Files, Tru-man Papers, University Publications.

79. Policy Committee Resolution, April 12, 1951, MP. 80. Address, April 13, 1951, MP. 81. Congressional Record, 82 Cong. 1st sess., 1951,97 4129. 82. MacArthur to Martin, July 30, 1951, MI? 83. Edward Martin, Notes on MacArthur, MP; Moreland-McCormack memo

April 19, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States 1952, vol. 7, Korea and China (Washington: GPO, 1983), 1630-31.

84. Martin, First Fifty Years, 202; for his speeches and Acheson diatribes see addresses to Republican Club, April 13,1951, at Bridgeport, Conn., May 5,1951 and at Honolulu Dinner, November 10,1951, MP; also WP, 5-6 May 1951.

85. The casualty quotation from Lincoln Day Speech, 12 February 1952 in Uticn Obseruer; among others see speeches of January 24,1952, February 11,1952, April 10, 1952, MP. Oficinl Report of the Proceedings of the Twenty-first Republican Conven- tion (Washington: Judd & Getweiler, 1952), 156-61.

86. Speeches, press releases, clips, and diaries in Round the World files, MP; scrapbook 56, MP.

87. NYT, 8 November 1951; for the plan see Truman Address to the Nation, November 7, 1951, Truman, Public Papers, 1951,623-28.

88. W P and Attleboro Sun, 30 November 1951; NYT, 4 December 1951; Edward Martin, M e m o y h n e , 107-9.

89. Interestingly Tris Coffin in a nationally syndicated column (22 March 1949 in the Fall River Herald News) reported speculations in Republican circles of an Eisenhower-Martin ticket, and that Martin refused comment on such an event.

90. JamesJ. Kenneally, “A Delegation Divided: Massachusetts Republicans and the Nomination of Dwight D. Eisenhower” in Massachusetts Politics: Selected His- torical Essays, eds. Jack Tager, Martin Kaufman, and Michael Konig (West field, Mass.: Westfield State College, 1998), 174-90; Leonard Lurie, The King Makers (New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegen, 1971); Joe Martin, f irst Fifty Yenrs, 168-71; Edward Martin, Memory Lane, 108-18.

91. Chronicle, 23 September 1952; clips 23 September 1952, scrapbook 55, MP; Undated California Speech, September 1952, MP.

92. Speech for Halleck, October 29, 1952, MP. 93. Martin to Clare Luce, September 16, 1952 and n.d. fall 1952, LP. 94. Fall River Herald News, 24,27 October; 5 November 1952; scrapbooks 54, 58

and campaign notebook, MP.

198 Chapter 5

95. Chronicle, 4 November 1952; Radio Broadcast, November 13,1952, MP. 96. “Joe Martin Sizes Up the 83rd,” Newsweek, November 24,1952,24-25. 97. NYT, 4 November; 11 December 1952; INS release 6 February 1953 in Fall

River Herald News. 98. NYT, 20 November; 16,20 December 1952; Christian Science Monitor, 17 De-

cember 1952. 99. WP,11 November 1952.

6

”[Republicans] Shedding the Psychology of Oppositionf f 1.

1953-1956

ENACTING THE EISENHOWER PROGRAM THE FIRST SESSION

MJartin eagerly awaited the convening of the Eighty-third Congress, anuary 3,1953.For the first time since 1930the presidency and both

branches of the legislature would be in Republican hands-and he would be Speaker. During the campaign Eisenhower promised an era of cooperation by ending the “running warfare” between the White House and the Capitol.2 Indicative of this new spirit was a December meeting between the president-elect with Martin and his leadership team, to develop a leg-islative program and foster c~operation.~ Although the president led the more liberal wing of the party and Martin was more of a centrist, observers expected the Speaker to have little trouble adjusting to the president’s program: he was renowned for his loyalty and known as a compromiser rather than an ideologue. But Martin knew there would be difficulties ahead: Republican congressmen who had supported Taft for president would find Eisenhower’s program too similar to the New Deal for them. Consequently, he cautioned congressional conservatives that if they prevented Eisenhower from succeeding, the next administration would be a radical

Outgoing Speaker Rayburn presented his ”close personal friend,” Mar- tin, “a great legislator . . . great American,” to the newly assembled chamber. After expressing his love for the House, “the true citadel of the Re- public,” the incoming Speaker announced that the president had agreed to support him in restoring Congress to its full participation in govern- rne~it .~This statement was interpreted by some of his colleagues in a far

199

200 Chapter 6

different fashion than Martin intended. Republican conservatives, several occupying key committee posts, believed it meant delaying, modifying, or defeating administration programs. Although dedicated to legislative supremacy, Martin was so desirous of creating a record of Republican achievement, that he sometimes defied his old colleagues and on occasion even flouted House tradition on behalf of the administration.

The first such occasion pitted Martin against a wily, experienced legislator, the dean of congressional Republicans with thirty-four years’ con- tinuous service, Daniel A. Reed (New York). A Ways and Means chairman, Reed was a “dear friend” who twice had nominated Martin for Speaker, backed his 1948 presidential bid, and on January 3 swore him in as Speaket6 But even on that occasion there was an indication of growing political differences between the two. At the caucus selecting a Speaker, Martin reflected the president-elect’s priorities. He announced his main objective was to reduce ”drastically” federal spending in order to pave the way for a tax cut and so stimulate business activity that revenue loss, if any, would be slight. But on that very day, Reed reversed the policy by declaring that when Congress convened he would submit a measure to lower income taxes and thereby force spending reductions. Almost immediately he introduced a measure (H. R. 1)to advance by six months the date abolishing the 11 percent surtax financing the Korean War. Brushing aside the incoming Eisenhower team and Republican congressional leadership, he announced his goal: passage by the end of February.’

For the time being inaugural festivities obscured Republican divisions. Clare Luce was Martin’s guest at a Capitol luncheon following the presidential swearing in and then rode with him to the reviewing stand, where they watched the parade. Even though she was Martin’s partner throughout the galas, he adhered to his regular early-to-bed schedule. The inaugural committee insisted the Speaker attend two ceremonial balls. After leaving the first, a convoy of cars, escorted by motorcycle policemen, headed for the second hi Georgetown. As Eisenhower and Nixon bore right, Martin had his driver bear left and return to the Hay-Adams, where he was in bed by 11:30.8

The president’s State of the Union Address was pleasing to conservatives: he called for progress toward free enterprise, a “natural economic law,” a balanced budget, and a new foreign policy in which the Seventh Fleet would no longer protect the People’s Republic of China from attacks by Chiang on Taiwan. Martin thought it an ”outstanding exposition of clear thinking and sane policies.” However, there was one section which troubled Martin and infuriated Reed, who was miffed that Eisenhower had not consulted him on its preparation. There would be no tax cut until the budget was balanced, a position the president stated even more forcibly at a press conference a few days later.9

201 “lRepublicans1 Shedding the Psychology of Opposition ”

Despite pleas from majority leader I-Ialleck and from Martin that he delay action until May, Reed announced that Ways and Means would soon consider his bill, as the 1952 elections mandated an immediate tax cut. In a further challenge to administration policy he revealed his opposition to extending excess profits taxes due to expire June 30. That same day, Mar- tin, completely loyal to Eisenhower, told the press in relationship to H.R.l, “We’ve got to do some saving first-we’ve got to do some cutting.”I0 Years later the Speaker wrote that under other circumstances he most likely would have supported Reed, but despite the popularity of the proposal, he had no alternative other than to back the president.”

After meeting with Eisenhower, Republican leaders announced that the earliest vote on Reed‘s measure would be in May; by then the budget would be completed and balanced and most likely the excess profits tax extended. Notwithstanding this latest signal, Reed convened his committee and on February 16 reported out his bill. At the request of Martin, Rules, under his friend Allen, immediately buried H.R. 1. Defying three appeals from an angry Reed to release the measure (February 28, March 5, March lo), Allen retorted, “My committee will be guided by the leadership of the House Speaker, Joe Martin.”12 Reed, who could get only forty-six signatures on a discharge petition, defended his tax reduction measure from the floor, where he assailed the leadership and questioned what he had done to deserve “such treatment.”13

Martin, however, was not entirely inflexible. He praised the integrity, zeal, and courage of his good friend Dan Reed, and retreated ever so slightly, “As long as I am Speaker of the House I shall never encourage the passage of a tax reduction bill until we have opened the door f o a balanced budget [italics author’s].’’ He asked for a ”little tolerance as to time” in getting the budget not in “absolute balance” but in sight of a balance, to be followed probably by a tax cut next year.14 Martin then praised the president for staying within the framework of the constitution and criticized those trying to drive a wedge between the president and Congress.15

Martin’s leadership and his loyalty to Eisenhower were further tested. It had been relatively easy for the Speaker to kill H.R.l in Rules, leaders had resorted to that tactic in the past, but to enact a measure against the wishes of a committee and its chair required Martin to defy House traditions. On several occasions Eisenhower and/or his staffers indicated it might be necessary to extend the excess profits tax beyond its expiration date of June 30. Unable to reduce the Truman deficit to less than $5.5 bil-lion, Eisenhower explained to the nation in May that it was essential that Congress extend excess profits, a step Reed had publicly labeled unnecessary and unwise. Determined not to lose a second time, the New Yorker began a campaign “to preserve the integrity of the chairman, the prestige of the committee, and the dignity of the House” by defying the president

202 Chapter 6

and thereby ensuring Congressional ”independence . . . from executive dictates.”16 Martin, however, once again rallied to the president’s side. In a press release timed for distribution with Eisenhower‘s national address, he pointed out further budget reductions were impossible, and because the nation was approaching its statutory debt limit there was no choice but to enact the e~tensi0n.l~

Reed continued to ignore the president’s request. Consequently Martin conferred with party leaders and Ways and Means Committee members (on one occasion for two and one-half hours) and, in what one scholar has described as a ”brazen move,” announced hearings on the administration bill and invited Reed, the committee chair, to attend.18 In an equally unusual step, Martin disclosed that he expected the bill to be reported out, but if not, he would bypass Ways and Means and have the measure go directly to Rules, a rarely used procedure never employed on a revenue bill. Under Reed’s leadership Ways and Means dragged out hearings for eleven days, with 105 of the 111witnesses hostile to extension. Reed, who described extension as “immoral and vicious,” asserted the administration failed to make its case and therefore refused to call for a vote. Martin, seeking to avoid antagonizing committee chairs any more than necessary, delayed the drastic step of turning to Rules. At his request Eisenhower met twice with a stubborn Reed-to no avail. Asked by the press if there was any chance Reed would change his mind, Martin replied, ”while the light holds out to burn, the vilest sinner may re t~rn .” ’~ When a discouraged Eisenhower wondered if Republicans could ever get their programs across, Martin attributed their difficulties to “twenty years in the wilderness.”20

With all options closed, Martin instructed Halleck to ask Rules to cir- cumvent Ways and Means and send the bill directly to the floor. Three hours of dramatic debate ensued in which Reed, “red-faced with rage,“ asserted this unconstitutional step would destroy American representative government and violate Republican campaign promises. By a voice vote, with several noes, Rules voted the bill to the floor. Still anxious to compromise and avoid needlessly undercutting a committee chair, Martin delayed calling the bill, giving Reed the opportunity for a face-saving withdrawal. The New Yorker finally convened his committee, ostensibly to deal with “long-range tax reform.” Over his objections Ways and Means then voted the bill out, sixteen (nine Republicans, seven Democrats) to nine (six Republicans including Reed, three Democrats). When an embittered Reed argued from the floor against passage, he was given a standing ovation for what many saw as a fight to preserve the committee system. However, the House overwhelmingly approved the measure, 32!5-77.*l

Although Martin as legislative leader often received help from the op-position, in this struggle he received none. McCormack rallied his parti-

203 "1RepublicansJ Shedding the Psychology of Opposition"

sans against the Speaker's tactics, announcing he would fight these "drastic procedures," because revenue bills should originate in Ways and Means. One Democratic representative even wrote to Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, that the Democratic Party "certainly did stick him [Martin] on this Martin, a little miffed at his Democratic colleagues, claimed he could get their support whenever he did not need it and couldn't get it when he did.23 Consequently, he must have been pleased with the many accolades he received from political observes for his leadership and mastery of parliamentary techniques.24

Shortly after the tax extension, Martin, under the guise of celebrating the first anniversary of Eisenhower's nomination, hosted a luncheon to promote party harmony. He persuaded Reed to attend, replaced the head table place card of Len Hall, the RNC chair, with that of Reed, and then arranged for a widely publicized photo of the president and the New Yorker shaking handsz5 But budget and tax issues had only been deferred for a year; tensions remained between the executive and legislative leaders.

In his address on tax legislation in May, Eisenhower asked Congress to postpone an increase in Social Security levies from 1.5 to 2 percent, slated to go into effect January 1, 1954, and to rescind the 52 to 47 percent corporate income tax reduction scheduled on April 1,1954. Republican leaders, still embroiled on the excess profits tax, were surprised when his message also included a plea to retain the unpopular excise tax due to expire in April. Temporarily they refrained from public comment.26 The July and August hearings on the extension indicated congressional aversion when the Ways and Means Committee witnesses consisted primarily of those favoring expiration. Even Martin was averse to the president's proposal; in an interview in September he predicted that both a balanced budget and excise tax reduction could be achieved, and if necessary a national sales tax could be enacted to offset lost revenues2' More outspoken was Reed. After a White House meeting, he dismissed the president's tax program as "purely political-financial trickery." Moreover, with John R. Taber (New York), chair of the Appropriations Committee, he boycotted that portion of a December leadership conference dealing with taxes.28

Martin apparently supported Eisenhower at that conference, for the president hailed the Speaker's courage, judgment, cooperation, and praised him, unlike some Republicans, for rendering unwavering assistance. Ignoring the discord, Martin described the meeting as "fine and dandy."29 If, as appears likely, the conferees disagreed on the preparation of the State of the Union Address, that too was publicly papered over. At the press conference's conclusion Reed merely wished everyone a Happy New Year and almost in passing disclosed that Ways and Means would undertake a revision of the general tax structure. Martin, on the other hand, asserted the meeting revealed a "dynamic and progressive"

204 Chapter 6

legislative program, one not likely to “arouse bitter controversy” but, nevertheless, subject to improvements from congressional committees.30

That disagreements remained between legislative leaders and the president was indicated in their response to the State of the Union and to the president’s budget message, wherein Eisenhower again called upon Con- gress to repeal the scheduled reduction of corporation taxes and retain excise levies. Martin enthusiastically hailed both messages. He described the budget address as a “masterpiece of statesmanship” leading the way to a balanced budget while increasing national security. He endorsed the corporate tax extension but equivocated on excise taxes, stating he hoped for a reduction, as no industry should be taxed more than 10 percent?I Reed was more outspokenly critical, announcing his opposition to retain- ing the corporation tax and revealing that his committee was beginning work on a bill to reduce excise taxes?*

A few days later Martin surprised a news conference by eagerly championing a proposal by Richard M. Simpson (Pennsylvania), an administration ally on the Ways and Means Committee. The bill, which quickly became identified with Martin, had been coordinated privately with both the leadership and the administration. It rescinded the corporate tax reduction, retained the excise rate on liquor, gasoline, automobiles, and cig- arettes, but reduced it from 20 to 10percent on all other items.33 There was something for nearly everyone in this proposition. Reed, who announced the committee would shortly begin work on the measure, could take credit for a substantial tax reduction. Martin could claim there would be no loss in revenues, as increased sales would offset any shortfall. Eisen- hower could save face by receiving credit for fiscal responsibility with the retention of the corporation tax and a substantial portion of the excise levy.

As it became apparent that under Martin’s prodding the House would enact the Martin/Simpson measure calling for a 50 percent reduction on most items, Eisenhower made no effort to influence that chamber. He told Martin the “boys had gone a little too far and hoped the Senate would restore some of the reductions.”M The House passed the bill 411 to 3, and with very little change it was enacted into law. Eisenhower signed the measure “wholeheartedly,” hoping that by stimulating business, revenues would not be reduced.35

One of the reasons Eisenhower yielded gracefully was because a reduction in excise taxes would undercut Democratic demands for an income tax reduction. While excise reductions were being discussed, the Ways and Means Committee was preparing a general revision of the tax code, which Democrats demanded should be amended to increase personal income tax exemptions from $600 to $700. Both Martin and Eisen- hower labeled this change irresponsible. Martin declared if Democrats succeeded in making this part of the omnibus tax bill, Eisenhower would

205 “[Republicans]Shedding the Psychology of Opposition”

veto the entire measure, killing tax relief. (Among other changes the bill provided for deductions for medical expenses and reduced rates for heads of family, retirees, and on dividend income.) In a lengthy caucus where he threatened to resign if the increased exemptions were added to the bill, Martin pressured Republicans to stand by Eisenhower. The amendment was defeated 210 (201 Republicans) to 204, and the omnibus tax bill passed 339 to 80. A relieved Treasury Secretary congratulated Mar- tin on his

The only friction between the president and the speaker during that year was over patronage. This issue plagued their relationship for the rest of Eisenhower’s term and resulted in the president viewing his legislative leader condescendingly as a typical politician and in Martin believing the president had little, if any, regard for the party.37 In the first few months of his administration appointments were relegated to his chief of staff, Governor Sherman Adams, but as a result of the Speaker’s complaints, were transferred to the office of Len Hall, the RNC However, the change did not improve the situation for legislators because the federal bureaucracy was cut, reducing the number of appointments available, and the presidential attitude that patronage was an “annoyance” remained unchanged. Not only did congressmen have fewer jobs to fill, but they were not even given the courtesy of being informed of appointments in their district-a consideration the Democrats had always extended. A bemused Martin complained he had to read the newspapers to discover who was appointed in his bailiwick.39 On one occasion at a Legislative Leaders Conference the Senate Whip, Leverett Saltonstall, asked Martin if he were able to get any new jobs for his constituents. “New jobs,” snapped Martin. “I lost two that I got when Truman was in office.” He registered the same complaint to his friend Leo Allen on Rules.4o Martin was not alone. In GOP caucuses representatives criticized administration patronage policies, and Martin in turn dutifully raised the issue at legislative leaders meetings?’ As late as 1960 he was still annoyed, noting in his memoirs that when he needed a new road in his district he spoke to F.D.R. “and I got it, which is more than I have got out of the present Re- publican admini~tration.”~~

Tensions between Eisenhower and Martin were not serious enough to affect their professional relationship. The president came to appreciate Martin’s leadership and loyalty in defeating the “forces of reaction,” which, according to Martin, were rooted in the attitude of Republican leg-islators. Having chafed under Democrats for twenty years, they had an almost instinctive opposition to the executive branch.43 Eisenhower praised him to others and wrote to the Speaker, “never once have you failed to come forth with your entire array of ‘horse, foot and gun’ to implement our program.” You have ”my lasting gratitude.”44

206 Chapter 6 A portent of things to come was the greater effusiveness in the presi-

dent's thanks to majority leader Halleck. Eisenhower not only expressed his admiration to Halleck but also informed him that he had been on his short list for vice president.@ To his friend "Swede" Hazlett, the president promoted Halleck as an acceptable presidential candidate in 1956.More-over, in his diary he listed Halleck among the most important men in his administration (a list that did not include Martin)-intelligent, charming, a team player, and also wrote of two splendid men in the House-Martin, but "especially" H a l l e ~ k . ~ ~

Eisenhower had every reason to congratulate Martin for his achievements in the face of such a small majority. Early in his administration the president and his congressional leaders agreed on an eleven-point legislative program, of which eight points, despite some intense opposition, passed the House during the first session. Social security extension was enacted in the second session, a proposal for two additional commission- ers for the District of Colombia died in committee, and although hearings were held on Taft-Hartley revisions a bill was never reported."

Other portions of the legislative agenda that were enacted were ten separate reorganization bills including a new cabinet position secretary of health, education, and welfare, the Tidelands Bill giving states title to offshore oil rights, and two measures which tested Martin's loyalty: the Mu- tual Security (foreign aid) Bill and the Trade Agreements Act (reciprocal tariff). Martin took to the floor to fight against isolationist cuts in foreign aid. In a very moving speech, described by one reporter as Martin at his best, the Speaker asserted that security was more precious than money, that leadership had been thrust upon the United States by "God [who] had placed [it] on our hands," and that Eisenhower deserved a chance. When the House reduced the president's $5.4 billion request by only half a billion, Eisenhower applauded Martin for getting the legislation passed and praised the House for having "performed a great service for the American

More difficult for Martin, because it meant a dramatic reversal of his and the party's commitment to a high tariff, was Eisenhower's request to extend for one year the Trade Agreement Act due to expire in June 1953 and thereby allow a study of long-range trade policy. Except for the immediate postwar years Martin had fought reciprocal programs and pushed repeatedly for higher tariffs. Furthermore, according to Martin, about two-thirds of the House Republicans were against reduction^.^^ Nevertheless, despite the views of his district he pressed hard for its passage, called in obligations accumulated over the years, and was able to kill the addition of quotas which would weaken presidential authority. In the closing days of the session his compromise resulted in the extension: the president would name seven representatives to a Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, including its chairman (his appointee was Clarence Ran-

207 "[Republicans] Shedding the Psychology of Opposition" dall, a free-trader), and the Speaker and president of the Senate would each appoint five legislators. The Commission's recommendations would be submitted to Congress, not the president.%

In all Eisenhower sent forty-four proposals to Congress during its first session: thirty-two were acted on favorably, three partially, there was no action on six, and only three were rejected. On House roll calls the administration was victorious thirty-one times and defeated but three times5' "Must requests" in addition to those in the eleven point program were a postal increase on which no action was taken and passage of a measure providing wheat for Pakistan. In championing the latter Martin contended the "United States never failed to heed the appeal of the distressed." Much more divisive and emotional was the president's request to admit in a two-year period 240,000 refugees over and above regular immigration quotas. As the bill made its way through the House, two thou-sand Portuguese were included because, as Representative Francis Walter (Democrat, Pennsylvania) stated, "Speaker Joseph W. Martin Jr. would like i t . . , and Joe Martin is a nice fellow."

To make the measure more palpable to the Senate the House extended the two-year period to three. Again Martin took the floor, praising immigrant contributions to the nation, calling for support of the president, and describing the bill as "a generous humane act that will remove one of the causes of war." The House-enacted quota of 240,000 was reduced by the Senate and Conference Committee to 214,000. Nevertheless, the final version was praised by Eisenhower and singled out by Martin as one of the achievements of the Eighty-third Congress.52

Martin's success was attributed in part to his friendship with Demo- crats. On assuming the speakership, he had told Raybum he was well aware that only a few months earlier Republicans were in the minority, "Yet you treated us with respect and dignity, and we shall do the same."53 But their relationship went far beyond formal courtesies. Martin disclosed to Washington journalist Drew Pearson how much he liked his private office near Raybum. "I can slip in to see Sam . . . Sam and I have a lot of things we like to work out from time to time. Sam is a good friend and a square shooter. . . Sam's word is as good as his bond . . . and on questions of foreign policy and so on, I know I can count on Sam to help pass the president's program."% Martin had an equally warm relationship with New England Democrats. Quite typically he informed the newly elected Tip ONeill (Massachusetts) that if there was anything he or his staff could do to help him, "feel free to ask." The future Speaker said that the offer "was like having a friendly hand placed on your shoulder" and proceeded to compliment Martin in the highest terms he knew. Martin "looks like a Democrat, acts like a Democrat, but votes like a Rep~blican."~~

Likable "Joe" Martin had changed little over the years. The columnist Allen Drury described him best when he wrote a Martin press conference

208 Chapter 6

was "somewhat disjointed, somewhat rambling, awfully good natured; as tousled in a way, as the gentleman himself, who always looks as though he had just climbed out of bed and flung on his clothes as an after- thought," with his suit rumpled and his hair askew. But to Willkieites, Deweyites, Taftites, and Ikeites "he has been equally faithful, and for each equally diligent."56

Though Martin was affable and good-natured, his velvet glove hid an iron fist. Several western representatives dissatisfied with the number of seats their section held in the House GOP Policy Committee proposed a twenty-member strategy committee similar to the one in the Senate. Al- though careful to insist such a body would not interfere with the Speaker's authority or privileges, nor seek to frame overall policy, or perform as a standing committee, Martin nevertheless was cool to the idea. Consequently, it quickly faded into obscurity.57 On the other hand, he intervened when Clare Hoffman (Republican, Michigan) subpoenaed the columnist Drew Pearson to appear before his committee, which was investigating undue influence on small business. Pearson had criticized Hoffman in a column when the Air Force awarded a huge contract to a small Michigan firm. Not only did Martin get Hoffman to drop the Pear- son hearing, but prevailed upon him to abandon his plans to investigate CIO influence in the Michigan Democratic Convention of 1950.By threat-ening to withhold committee funds, the Speaker obtained Hoffman's promise not to step out of line again5* These incidents may explain Mar- tin's publicly endorsing plans of a subcommittee of the Rules Committee to study ways of assuring "maximum fairness, dignity, and efficiency" for witnesses before congressional c0mmittees.5~ Martin also used his authority to protect the prestige of the House. The tradition that a joint congressional committee be chaired by a Senator was broken by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, which with every new Con- gress alternated the chair between a member of the House and a member of the Senate. However, in 1953 Senate members of the committee refused to yield the office to the senior House Republican, Sterling Cole (New York). Cole was so embarrassed over the affair that he planned to withdraw as a candidate. But Martin, ably seconded by Rayburn, with the honor of the House at stake, pressured Cole into continuing the fight. The Senate finally retreated and House dignity was preserved.60

ENACTING THE EISENHOWER PROGRAM: THE SECOND SESSION

Early in August the Congress adjourned, ending one of the shortest sessions in years, as the White House claimed it needed additional time to

209 “IRepublicansl Shedding the Psychology of Opposition”

prepare its agenda.61 When the second session convened on January 6, 1954, relations were different. Eisenhower had begun to assume a more prominent role visd-vis Congress. Beginning in December 1953, rather than seek the approval of legislative leaders he informed them of his program. His changed attitude was reflected in his State of the Union Ad- dress, where his recommendations were more specific than previously and were followed by detailed propositions reflecting presidential initiative. The president‘s more forceful leadership was needed, for his own party increasingly opposed his programs. Indicative of hardening lines was congressional reaction when he delivered his State of the Union: wild yells of approval as he called for a harsher policy toward Communists, but little response at all to his legislative agenda. Nevertheless, Martin was optimistic as usual, describing the message as “inspiring and stimulating” and predicting a substantial part of the program would pass.62

The Speaker was not enthusiastic about all of the president’s proposals, but he fought vigorously for each, except for the St. Lawrence Seaway, a project to enable large vessels to sail from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes. Under pressure from Boston’s port interests, not a single member of the Massachusetts delegation had supported a seaway in six congressional votes over twenty years.63 At a legislative leaders meeting Martin told the president he could not be ”converted” on this issue. Consequently, he assumed a low profile, leaving Halleck to speak for the administration.@ Nevertheless, at legislative leaders meetings he did report to Eisenhower on the measure’s status, and according to the president, “Week by week, Speaker Martin and Majority Leader Halleck shepherded the progress of the legislation,” which passed 240-158.65

Martin was instrumental in the passage of other measures to which he was committed primarily or solely due to presidential loyalty. Eisenhower requested that the 1949 Housing Act be broadened to provide for slum clearance and long-term loans to low-income families to buy government housing, 140,000 units of which would be constructed over a four-year period. Although he had opposed Truman’s housing agenda, Martin labored on behalf of the administration, defied the Republican majority (155 Re- publicans voted against 140,000 units), and was able to pass a measure authorizing 35,000 houses for one year under restrictive conditions. As other parts of the legislation, slum clearance, lower down payments, and lengthier loan provisions, were included, Eisenhower and Martin (probably tongue in cheek) hailed the act as a step forward. The president, grateful for any bill, gave Martin one of the pens he used in the signing.h6

To salvage an unpopular reciprocal trade bill Martin again compromised. He strove to enact the administration’s proposals. When other Re-publican leaders (Halleck a noteworthy exception) made their opposition known, Eisenhower, on Martin’s advice, surrendered to the inevitable.

210 Chapter 6

Instead of adhering to his original request for a three-year extension, he announced he would be satisfied with one year, but hoped a new congress in 1955 would extend his authority for three years. The log jam broke: a one-year bill was introduced on June 8, approved unanimously by the Ways and Means Committee on June 10, cleared by Rules the same day, and passed 281 to 53 on June 11.Martin was pleased with the result- time had been gained, and the administration had not been repudiated by the addition of protectionist curbs.67

As he had in the first session, Martin took the floor on mutual security (foreign aid). In what for him was a lengthy address, he contended that the president’s request for $3.5billion was, like all aid, a calculated risk but deserved to be approved. He even defended its economic provisions, emphasizing the need to feed hungry people. Despite the opposition of Republi- can isolationists, the House, with Democratic support (141 Democrats for, 47 against), approved $3.368 billion in what was hailed as an administration victory. The final legislation after Senate action called for $2.8 billion.‘j8

Although Eisenhower’s proposal to substitute sliding flexible supports of 75 to 90 percent on major commodities (wheat, cotton, rice, tobacco, and peanuts) was in keeping with Martin’s convictions, it was opposed by farm state representatives of both parties. The Speaker’s efforts were to no avail as the House by a voice vote defeated the Eisenhower program. Martin then took the floor and advocated a fair compromise: parity of 82.5 to 90 percent, an amount, he claimed, that would help empty the storage bins, get rid of the surplus, “put food in the stomachs of the poor,” and begin getting the government out of the agricultural business. Moreover, he indicated Eisenhower would veto any legislation continuing the present program of 90 percent parity. Martin was given most of the credit when the House stunned anti-administration forces by passing the compromise 228 (182 Republicans) to 170 (23 republican^).^^

The most exciting episode in the second session occurred when Puerto Rican nationalists fired into the House chamber on March 1,1954. At 2:30 P.M., as Martin was presiding over an uneventful session, he heard what appeared to be firecrackers in the gallery. Three assailants shouting, “Puerto Rico is not free” and “Viva Puerto Rico,” began shooting indis- criminately. In the ensuing pandemonium, during which twenty to twenty-five shots were fired, representatives dove to the floor and scram- bled under chairs and desks. The Speaker, as he fled behind a pillar, shouted at 2:32 P.M., ”The House stands recessed!” Representative James S. Van Zandt (Republican, Pennsylvania) raced to the gallery and helped capture one of the gunmen while the two physician members of the House administered first aid to five who had been wounded. As some semblance of order was restored, Martin convened the House at 2:42, only to adjourn in accordance with a motion offered at his request.70

211 “IRepublicansIShedding the Psychology of Opposition”

In the days that followed Martin received thousands of letters pertaining to the affair, most of which, including those from numerous Puerto Ricans, expressed sorrow. He appointed a committee to investigate security and increased the number and training of Capitol police officers, but refused to install bulletproof glass around the front of the galleries as some recommended, for he believed Americans did not want their Con-gress walled off from the p~pulace.~’

Martin was as effective in the second session as in the first. Congressional Quarterly claimed Congress approved 150of Eisenhower’s 232 legislative requests, a 65 percent total (they rejected only 49, or 21 percent; the White House, using a different formula, declared a passing rate of 83 percent).72 Among other requests approved were two reorganization plans, tax revision, extended social security benefits, and a highway bill. At the end of the session, Time magazine praised the Speaker’s effective leadership, attributing his success, in part, to his political philosophy, which the journal illustrated by quoting a recent speech: “We [Republicans] are not reform- ers, not theorists, not the advocates of any alien philosophies or political dipsy-do. We are just practical Americans, trying to do a practical job to reach practical goals. We do not belong to that school of political thought which has for so many years pursued the fallacious proposition that if a little bit is good for us-ten times as much is just ~onderful.”’~

Martin was proud of the House‘s achievements, and the president was ”lost in admiration” for the Speaker’s accomplishments and grateful for his guidance and leader~hip.~~ Nevertheless it was becoming increasingly apparent that Halleck was replacing the Speaker in presidential esteem. The president’s confidant and press secretary, James C. Hagerty, recorded an appraisal of legislative leaders with which Eisenhower agreed. Hal- leck, he wrote, stands out in the Republican leadership and is the only one with ”guts to come in out of the rain.” Furthermore, Hagerty noted, the president turned to the majority leader rather than the Speaker at legislative leaders conferen~es.7~ Eisenhower’s admiration for Halleck resulted in the Hoosier spreading tales of his closeness to the president, how he had been asked to remain at the close of leaders conferences and had been on Eisenhower’s short list for vice Martin became annoyed at this braggadocio, which made his respect and admiration for his Demo- cratic counterpart Rayburn all the more striking. This esteem was mutual, as manifested in the Texan’s resolution hailing Martin, “one of the finest men who has ever served as Speaker,” for the “able, impartial, and dignified manner” in which he presided over the Eighty-third Congress-a res-olution which passed unanimo~sly.~~

One of the overriding concerns of the first Eisenhower administration was the domestic Communist threat, especially Communist penetration into the government during the Roosevelt and Truman years. A major

212 Chapter 6

portion of the 1952 campaign had addressed this subversion, with Eisen- hower himself promising to drive Reds out of the government. In April 1953 the president issued an Executive Order shifting the grounds for dismissal of federal employees from security risks, as under Truman, to loyalty risks, and easing discharge procedures. By November 1954 close to seven thousand employees had been removed from federal service, and in December, to Martin’s great satisfaction, Eisenhower pledged to complete the task before the 1954 congressional elections, thereby removing Communists in government as an election

The Republican victory and the new security program had eliminated much of the justification for congressional investigations of Communist penetration, but once fear of subversion had been promoted, it was difficult to contain. Even Martin, although less zealous than most anti- communist legislators, continued to warn of the Red menace at home and abroad and of the folly of dismissing exposes of Communists as “witch hunts’‘ or “red herrings.”79 This charge was often levied against the new HUAC chair, Harold A. Velde (Illinois), a former FBI agent who had been first elected to Congress in 1948 with the slogan, ”Get the Reds out of Washington and Washington out of the red.” With the approbation of Martin, the committee adopted more formalized rules, including a witness’s right to counsel and to make statements; nevertheless HUAC set a record with 178 days of testimony and 650 witnesses.80 Increasingly Velde became reckless. When he announced he was going to investigate Communism in the churches, Martin snapped, ”The hell he is.” Velde backed down, even deleting in longhand the portion of his press release pertaining to that inquiry.81

Martin may have succeeded in curbing some of Velde’s excesses, but he failed to temper the approach of Senator McCarthy. The Speaker had little to do with the senator, as the Wisconsonite never served in the House and their personalities and social habits were diametrically opposed. In 1951 McCarthy urged a boycott of Adam Hats, the broadcast sponsor of his earliest and most outspoken critic, Drew Pearson, whom he dubbed “the sugar-coated voice of Russia.” He appealed to newspaper publishers to stop aiding the cause of international Communism by publishing Pear- son’s column. However, Martin‘s Chronicle continued to feature Pearson on its editorial page.82 McCarthy was probably unaware of the Chronicle; at any rate he showed no bitterness toward Martin. Shortly after the 1952 election the senator wrote the Speaker, urging him to appoint to the For-eign Affairs Committee newly elected Alvin Bentley (Michigan), a former State Department employee, who according to McCarthy had provided his committee with a “great deal of information.” Bentley received the appointment, but Martin never took the senator up on his offer to come to Massachusetts whenever the Speaker wished.83 When McCarthy “to the

213“/Republicans]Shedding the Psychology of Opposition“

consternation of many of us” continued to investigate Communists in government, Martin urged Senator William Jenner (Indiana), McCarthy’s friend, to appeal to the controversial senator “to talk less.”84 Although he hoped the Wisconsinite would continue his investigations, he publicly cautioned him that they should be conducted ”with proper re~traint .”~~ A few months later he rendered similar advice to Jenner, who had associated the Democratic Party with treason. Criticism must be “honest” and based on “facts,” he intoned, and a “reasonable course” followed.86 De- spite his concern with McCarthy ’s overzealousness, Martin admired him, commenting in 1957, “I regret exceedingly the death of Joe McCarthy. He did great service at a time when it required a lot of courage to do it.”87 Nevertheless, Martin’s silence during the administration‘s struggles with McCarthy and his dismissal of the senator as the possible leader of a third party was interpreted as administration support.sa

Martin was more concerned about the worldwide Communist threat than he was about the domestic subversion, singling out the stalemate in Korea as the top congressional priority. Early in the administration he claimed he would wait and hear what the president had to say before offering his advice. Nevertheless he continued to advocate increased aid to Nationalist China and to urge the United Nations and South Korea to provide additional fighting support in Korea.89 In a private conversation with Henry Cabot Lodge, U.N. ambassador designate, he emphasized “peace . . . for the first time,” but Martin must have meant a victorious conclusion based on a military victory.g0 He hailed Eisenhower’s ”tough mindedness” in abandoning the Truman policy begun in June 1950 of having the Seventh Fleet neutralize the Formosa Straits by preventing Taiwan and Communist China from attacking one another. To the president, as well as the Speaker, there was neither “logic or sense” in protecting “a nation fighting [us] in Korea.”g1 Making it possible for the Nationalists to attack Mao’s China was not enough for Martin. In a widely publicized major address on CBS he called for the United States to support Chiang’s “battle- tested army’’ in opening up a second front in China. Echoing his hero MacArthur, Martin claimed that Communists had chosen Asia for a showdown; as a result the conflict in Korea was “not a pink tea [or] police action. It is war.” In that speech he also lambasted American concessions at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences, as well as Truman’s policy of a stalemate along the thirty-eighth parallel in Koreaeg2 Still frustrated by insufficient action, he hailed the appointment a month later of Admiral Arthur W. Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, a selection he believed would mean an end to “the appeasement of the Reds in Korea.” At the same time Martin warned against accepting a British proposal to seat Communist China in the U.N. and urged stepped up fighting in Korea if negotiations ~ollapsed.9~

214 Chapter 6

The Speaker was dissatisfied with the way the Korean War ended, but as an Eisenhower leader he had little choice but to describe the settlement as “welcome news.” However, he emphasized the fact that it was a truce-a cease-fire-not a peace. The United States, he asserted, must continue to maintain its military might while strengthening the “free countries of Asia,” for “we owe it to them [the thousands of American dead] to end the war with a peace that will not make vain their sacri- f i ~ e . ” ~ ~This “breathing space” will be shattered once more by godless “vicious Communist aggressors” who “will strike again as their purpose of world domination remains un~hanged.”~~ Martin believed the turning point in the Korean War was the president’s order to the Seventh Fleet unleashing the Nationalists in Taiwan. This step had led to “an amazing chain of events,” as the “Communists fear backbone.”96 Consequently, in a highly publicized speech, he urged an aggressive American policy directed against “devious” Communists-especially those in Asia. He called for increased aid to Japan, expanded support to South Korea, assistance to the Nationalists for recapturing the mainland, and for Amer- ican “world supremacy on the ground, in the air, and on the sea.” Un- fortunately, he added, “we are obliged to tax our people for these objectives at the expense of new roads and bridges, clearing of slums, and aid to the aged, sick, and ~nfortunate.”~’

It was not necessary, he thought, to use American troops to stop the spread of Communism in Asia. Even after Ho Chi Minh’s Communist Vi- etminh army defeated the French at Dien Bien Phu, he insisted an Amer- ican army would never be needed to fight in French Indo-China. There were ”enough Asiatics to fight for themselves.” American aid to an alliance of free Asian countries, Japan, South Korea, Nationalist China, Pak- istan, Ceylon, Philippines, Australia, and the states of Indo-China, was all that was required. He expressed essentially the same thought privately to Clare Luce, adding that France and Britain were too timid to make “the stand necessary for peace.”98

However, Martin became more bellicose in response to Churchill’s and Eisenhower’s plans for “a real good try” at coe~istence.9~ In a declamation reported in newspapers and magazines throughout the world (U.S. News and World Report and Vital Speeches printed the entire address) he asked, “What possible chance is there for ‘co-existence’ of this outlaw conspiracy alongside a civilization based on truth, trust, and faith when Commu- nists are characterized by “untruths, suspicion, and heresy?” This nation needs ”firmness and toughness” to make the Communist conspirators live up to their agreements.’OO

A European trip did little to change his mind. To better acquaint himself with European issues Martin, accompanied by his secretary George Kelley-his sister Jeanette’s son-and with former Under-Secretary of

215 "[Republicans1 Shedding the Psychology of Opposition"

State Henry I? Fletcher, undertook a six-week tour of that continent. When his long-time admirer Hugh Roy Cullen discovered that in order to maintain his independence the Speaker had paid his own way, Cullen sent Martin a check to defray the expenses. Martin promptly returned it.Io1 At the request of the State Department Martin revised his itinerary to visit Germany and France. According to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Martin's appearance in these two nations contributed substantially to the understanding between them.'"* In a widely circulated anecdotal account of his trip, he called for a united Germany as the key to European prosperity and observed that American troops were there as allies, not occu- piers. Italy still feared the Communist challenge, he claimed, and implied Rome would be better off with a colonial empire; he hailed the Spanish dictator Francisco Franco as a good anti-Communist, a church-going family man, and declared France a question mark. There the Communist Party was still strong, he averred, and France would quit the war in Indo- China if American aid were withdrawn.lo3 Martin's assessment of the Cold War had changed not at all. He told a press conference that Com- munists, bent on world conquest, did not want peace. Nevertheless, they could be stopped by military strength. If the United States wants peace it must continue to provide military aid to its allies, even if such expenditures lead to a deficit. However, he concluded, the prospects for peace were better than they were two years

Despite these forays into foreign affairs Martin's primary concern remained domestic issues and politics. The Speaker was on his way to a testimonial for his old friend Len Hall, chair of the National Republican Congressional Committee since 1947, when he heard Wesley Roberts, head of the RNC, had resigned. At the dinner and at the press conference following it, as well as on several other occasions, Martin promoted Hall as the most qualified person for the RNC chair, the key to 1954 congressional election victory. He promised to do all that he could to see that Hall was chosen and appealed to his wife not to object to her husband assuming the chairmanship. The Speaker had his congressional colleagues wire national committeemen on Hall's behalf and arranged for forty-seven of Hall's congressional supporters to meet with Wilton (Jerry) Persons, the president's congressional liaison. Governor Dewey, miffed at Hall's criticism of his 1948 campaign, was reluctant to see Hall as chairman but had little choice except to yield to White House interests and Martin's tactics. Like the Taftites, who had candidates of their own, the governor had been outmaneuvered by Martin and by Eisenhower, who a week before the RNC meeting, finally made it public that Hall was his choice. Hall was unanimously selected by the RNC, in what the Nezu York Times saw as a victory for Martin and the party's congressional wing.'05

216 Chapter 6

IN THE MINORITY AGAIN: THE 1954 ELECTIONS

As usual Martin was optimistic about the 1954 congressional elections, predicting in October 1953 a gain of twenty to twenty-five seats. However, as time passed the size of his projected victory decreased: January twenty seats, September fifteen, and by October ten. Privately he expected only three or four (even that would be virtually unprecedented, as the president's party usually lost seats in an off-year election).lW Decreasing expectations were certainly no fault of his. In 1953 he delivered over a dozen major speeches hailing the achievements of his party and urging the electorate to support Eisenhower by returning a Republican Congress in 1954.'07The next year he intensified his efforts, stumping much of the East when Congress was in session and touring the nation after adjournment. He undertook two extensive campaigns: one in September in which he delivered nineteen major speeches in thirteen states, the other in October with fifty-three addresses in eighteen states.lo8 At these rallies the Speaker extolled the "progressive and conservative record of the administration" resulting in peace and prosperity and the expulsion of Communists from government. He praised Republican success in cutting taxes, creating the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, increasing the Social Se- curity rolls, and in extending the reciprocal tariff agreement. At times, Martin sounded like a New Dealer, declaring before the Iowa Bankers As-sociation, "We will continue to refine the administration policies of expanding and improving Social Security. We will continue to provide better health facilities and funds for basic research into those disorders which strike so many of our able-bodied citizens. . . . We will continue to improve the lot of those who have retired because of years or health, just as we improved the prospects of a better life for all Americans during the recent session of Congress."1o9 On every occasion he capitalized upon Eisen- hower's popularity by praising the president and his agenda and then un- derscoring the need of a Republican Congress to complete his program.

In addition to barnstorming, Martin assisted the party by raising funds, recording reelection appeals, and campaigning with candidates."O To Re-publican incumbents Martin sent a letter that could be used for election purposes. In it he praised their achievements in the Eighty-third Congress and expressed the hope they would be reelected. An indication of the bitterness of those adhering to Old Guard values was the response of Ralph W. Gwinn (New York), who censured his fellow Republicans for continu-ing the "disintegration of the Constitution" by programs such as housing, Social Security, and unemployment. He promised to campaign "to restore constitutional government.""'

One of the non-House races in which Martin was vitally interested was that of his old colleague Senator Margaret Chase Smith. In remarks clearly

217 “[Republicans]Shedding the Psychology of Opposition”

directed against Senator McCarthy, she delivered a “Declaration of Con- science” on the Senate floor June 1, 1953. In it, she attacked totalitarian techniques endangering the American way of life and stated she did not want to see her party ride to victory on the “Four Horsemen of Fear, Ignorance, Bigotry, and Smear.” Her election opponent Robert L. Jones ran with the public approval of McCarthy. Despite his virulent accusa- tions impugning her Americanism, Smith defeated him by a five-to-one margin and thanked Martin for his ”part in my victory-for you stood by me as you did in 1948.””*

Henry Cabot Lodge, one of the president’s closest political advisors, fearing the administration would lose both Houses unless its nominees were “modem Republicans,” counseled the president in the fall of 1953 not to risk his popularity on a lot of ”shopworn” congressmen, many of whom were more ready “to knife” him than were democrat^."^ Until Oc- tober 1954 Eisenhower followed Lodge’s advice and avoided involvement in partisan e1ecti0ns.l~~ At that time he yielded to party leaders, including Martin, and undertook an active role in the campaign, traveling over ten thousand miles and delivering nearly forty speeches. Disap- pointed by Republican failures to support his program, he did not denounce Democrats, many of whom voted his agenda, but emphasized instead the accomplishments of Congress and the need for additional Republicans to back his reforms. Moreover, he followed Martin’s advice and occasionally posed for photographs with candidates and mentioned them by name in his remarks.115 Despite the Speaker’s and president’s campaigning the GOP lost two seats in the Senate and seventeen in the House, forfeiting control of both branches. Eisenhower and Martin appreciated one another’s efforts, believing they did everything possible to avoid the disaster. Martin was convinced the defeat would have been even worse if it were not for the president’s participation.116

As usual Martin had little difficulty with his own reelection bid. In the general election he faced once again the union leader Edward Doolan, who concentrated his fire more on the Republican Party than on the popular incumbent. Confident of victory, Martin left the district to stump for House colleagues, but for the first time in ten years he lost Fall River, Doolan’s home, and his majority was cut by ten thousand votes.”’

Martin was somewhat disheartened by the national results, especially as he believed the defeat could have been averted if the party had emphasized foreign affairs or if the campaign had lasted another week. He even toyed with the idea of relinquishing his leadership position, privately fearing the Eighty-fourth Congress would attempt “to block or sidetrack constructive moves.”118 As early as April it had been reported that he might resign as leader if the GOP lost.119 His heir apparent, Hal- leck, awaited Martin’s resignation, claiming the Bay Stater had told him

218 Chapter 6

he would never again serve as minority leader.lZ0 Hearing nothing from Martin, Halleck claimed he was not treated with proper respect. He then asked the president to approve his challenging Martin for the post. Afraid such a contest would split the party, Eisenhower refused.lZ1

On November 9 Martin publicly announced he would probably take the leadership, but a few days later indicated to Luce he was still unde- cided. Despite his protestations, Martin’s letters of congratulations to elected Republican congressmen read as if he had every intention of continuing in office, and most replies indicated the recipients anticipated he would do so.122When the House convened he was easily reelected leader but was able to retain the Speaker‘s suite. Rayburn, tired of playing musical chairs with his friend as they alternated the speakership and the rooms that went with it, suggested they retain their current offices and merely swap signs. Consequently, Martin remained in the Speaker’s quarters until his defeat as minority leader in 1959.lZ3

Halleck was disappointed and embittered, not only because of Martin’s indecisiveness and failure to resign, but because a post as assistant minority leader was not created for him. Nor was he appointed whip, which was usually considered the number two position in the party. This neglect came despite the fact Eisenhower had asked Martin to find a place for Halleck on the leadership team. The president, however, made up for this slight. He invited Halleck to continue to attend legislative leaders meetings and met with him just to lift his morale. The president’s secretary thought all these “pats on the back” unnecessary, for Halleck was the only congressman who played golf regularly with the president. Their relationship gave sustenance to Martin’s suspicion that behind the scenes White House aides had been encouraging reports of his re~ignati0n.l~~

Martin had reason to feel uncomfortable. Both Eisenhower and Hagerty agreed that the party needed to put forward good-looking, well-trained men, who by representing liberal views would attract young progressives into GOP ranks. Surprisingly, they included the fifty-four-year-old Halleck in this category-but not Martin.125 Further indication that Halleck was moving into the inner circle at the expense of Martin was his inclusion-the only legislator-in Eisenhower’s private list of ”fine” Republicans.’26 Meanwhile, because of his high tariff views Martin so alienated the president’s economic advisor Clarence Randall that he concluded the Speaker was an ignorant and stubborn ward politician.’*’

THE EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS: FIRST SESSION

After the election Eisenhower laid out his domestic agenda before Repub- lican legislative leaders. Martin described the session as ”harmonious”

219 "[Republicans] Shedding the Psychology of Opposition"

and immediately called upon Congress to enact the president's program, emphasizing the need to extend corporate and excise taxes scheduled for reduction in The following day, at a meeting with Democratic leaders and his Republican team, Eisenhower mapped out his foreign policy and military objectives. Consequently by the time he delivered his State of the Union Address, most of its provisions were known to Congress. The president's ambitious goals included the extension of selective service and taxes, the renewal of the Defense Production Act and reciprocal trade, flexible price supports, an improved highway system, a pay increase for federal employees, and housing and health 1egi~lation.l~~ Martin was readily recognized as an Eisenhower man who would push the agenda even if "it may quite often not represent his own private view." He hailed the program as "splendid" and predicted most of it would pass.lm Among those with whom the minority leader would have to contend were liberal Dem- ocrats who believed it was too cautious, and the center and right of his own party, who, while not actually hostile, feared it was too liberal.'31

As leader of the president's party, Martin took the floor more often than in the past. One of the measures which he espoused, albeit reluctantly, was the Reciprocal Trade Bill, enthusiastically supported by Democrats, who designated it H.R.l. The proposal encountered strong opposition from the textile industry, claiming it would inundate the country with cheap foreign goods and lower American wages. Martin reassured them their interests would be safeguarded.l3* After successfully urging the president to include protective language in the measure, he informed Eisenhower that he would support it, even though he probably would be the only New England Republican to do so. "If there is a protectionist in this country, it's supposed to be me. That's the way I've been elected year after year in my district, but I'll go along and vote for the measure."133

Martin did much more than cast a reluctant vote. From the floor he contended that the bill protected the national interest, would stimulate trade, and by means of an "escape clause" protect domestic manufacturers. Af- ter conferring with the president, he announced he was sure Eisenhower would not permit American manufacturers to suffer: "having faith in his loyalty to American interests, I favor this legislation." As a part of his advocacy of H.R.1,Martin read a presidential letter urging passage and concluded his congressional remarks by stating, "No American industry will be placed in jeopardy by the administration of this Martin and Rayburn then called in their credits to defeat a recommitment and pass the bill 295-110 (109 Republican for, 75 against) authorizing the president to cut most tariffs 5 percent in each of the next three years and in some cases as much as 50 percent.

To prevent the Senate from defeating the measure, the administration retreated and accepted amendments, including one on quotas, which

220 Chapter 6

weakened the bill. Because of the administration’s backsliding House members of the Conference Committee had little choice except to report the modified Senate version. An embarrassed Martin sought approval of the Conference Committee version, telling the House, “In requesting legislation one is obliged at times to yield on some points to secure the legislation.” The weakened version passed the House 347-56.135

One of Eisenhower‘s major goals was a ten-year $101 billion interstate highway system to which the federal government would commit $31 bil-lion financed by thirty-year bonds. Democrats wanted to pay for the roads with increased taxes, primarily on gasoline, diesel fuel, and tires. Martin appealed for a compromise-some bonds, some taxes.136 In a speech unusually critical of Democrats, he contended it was not necessary to increase taxes to finance the highway network. A growing economy would swell revenues and a decrease in international tensions would cut expenses, enabling the highways to be paid for so fast “you would not know we had done it.” When challenged by the majority leader to indicate how he would vote if his only choice were the Democratic plan, the minority leader stated he would retreat to his office and ”prayerfully give consideration to any such unexpected alternati~e.”’~~

God must have advised him to vote no. Martin joined with the House to reject the Democratic measure by such overwhelming numbers (123-292) that Speaker Rayburn concluded a highway measure was killed for the next session as well.138 Martin, however, continued to press for a compromise, assailing the Democrats for their obstinacy in frustrating the “real backbone” of Eisenhower’s “program for peace and pr~sperity.”’~~ Early the next session, Martin surrendered and met with Democratic leaders to plan legislation based on their proposal. He then convinced Eisen- hower it was the best he could do-either that or nothing. With little choice the administration supported the “pay as you go” measure, which was enacted 388 to 19, and committed the federal government to $33.4 billion to initiate the modern highway system, which changed the American lifestyle more than any other measure in the Eisenhower years.140

If compromise with House Democrats failed, Martin sometimes turned to the Senate to achieve legislation reflecting administration goals. The House eliminated public housing from the president’s housing program, but the Senate approved between 50,000 and 135,000 units over four years. Martin appealed to the Conference Committee to follow the Sen- ate’s lead and include 35,000 units for two years as the president requested.141 To Martin’s dismay the Committee recommended only 45,000 units for one year. He attacked that watered-down provision and stated that a displeased president might call a special session on housing and highways. But when the House approved the committee recommenda-

221 "[Republicans] Shedding the Psychology of Opposition"

tion 187 to 168 (34 Republicans for, 131 Republicans against), he announced he expected Eisenhower to sign the measure, for it also included some praiseworthy features: slum clearance, a college building loan program, and the easing of FHA mortgages.142

Martin also turned to the Senate when House Democrats amended an administration bill extending corporate and excise taxes. Speaker Ray- burn's rider allowing a $20 per person tax reduction was condemned by Martin as a political ploy, a blow to Eisenhower's program of "prosperity based on peace." Nevertheless, many Republicans defected and joined in passing it 242 to 175.1a Eisenhower denounced the vote as the height of physical irresponsibility, while Martin publicly expressed his hope that the Senate and subsequently the Conference Committee would act more re- sponsibly. To the satisfaction of Eisenhower and Martin the Upper House approved the corporate and excise tax extension, but rejected all efforts to reduce the income tax. Martin pressured the Conference Committee to report the Senate version, which it did; the measure was then passed by the House overwhelmingly.144 He continued to contend that any income tax reduction must be preceded by a balanced budget, and was so successful that even in the election year 1956 there was no tax

The administration and Martin also relied upon the Senate for reserve forces legislation. In an effort to increase the quantity and quality of reserves Eisenhower requested that pre-draft-age males be draft exempt by enlisting in the reserve or National Guard, followed by active duty training and a stint in the ready reserve. The minority leader appealed to the House to enact the measure as part of the president's program for peace. According to Martin the nation would be prepared militarily without straining the economy or relying on universal military training.'46 The House, on a non-roll call vote of 126 to 87, adopted an antisegregation amendment offered by Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat, New York) which would have required states to integrate their National Guard. Be- cause passage was now in doubt due to Southern opposition to this provision, the bill was laid on the Speaker's table rather than voted on. To Martin the choice was either a huge standing army based on doubling the draft call or allowing young men to pursue a career while defending their country as part of a well-trained reserve-some units of which would continue to be segregated. Martin agreed with Eisenhower, who described the amendment as "extraneous" and expressed the hope the Senate would pass legislation without it, for the minority leader believed that the House would then accept the Senate version, which essentially was what happened. The National Guard of Southern states continued to be segregated, but like all reserve units was better trained than in the past.'" For one of the few times in his career Martin was upbraided by

222 Chapter 6

the NAACP, which accused him of leading “the parade of Jim Crowism in the National Guard.“148

To make Social Security changes more acceptable to his party Martin again relied on the Senate. Most representatives were sympathetic with Eisenhower’s request to extend benefits to the military, but Democrats also advocated reducing women‘s retirement age from sixty-five to sixty- two, liberalizing benefits for the disabled, extending coverage to self- employed professionals, and increasing the Social Security tax. White House spokesmen, reluctant to find fault with these popular proposals, countered by urging an intensive study of the whole program. Martin was not so reticent. He claimed the Democratic bill as reported by the Labor Committee was politically based and would jeopardize the entire Social Security system by draining its reserves. Yet like most Republicans he voted for it, describing the measure as a ”step in the right direction” and expressing the hope that the Senate version would be more acceptable. However, he never indicated what changes would improve it.149 If he really expected modifications from the Senate, he must have been disappointed. The Senate version was the same as that of the House, and Eisen- hower signed the bill.

Often when Martin was unable to make a measure acceptable to the Democratic majority the proposal was defeated or put over to the next session. Among these were bills pertaining to farm parity, school construction, and the promotion of Douglas MacArthur. Despite his plea from the floor to give the flexible price support program enacted by the Eighty-third Congress a chance to work, the House voted 206 to 201 to return to fixed parity (there was no action from the Senate during the first session).150 His enthusiastic advocacy for the administration’s effort to launch a $7 billion federal state school construction program meant little. Nothing was accomplished in the first session because of the issue of aux- iliary services for Catholic schools, claims by many Democrats that $7 bil-lion was not enough, and attempts to prohibit funding to segregated systems. The latter was so divisive that it led literally to blows when the sixty-nine-year-old Cleveland Bailey (Democrat, West Virginia) accused Powell, the author of the amendment, of trying to wreck the public school system and proceeded to knock him down.151 Martin’s efforts to get MacArthur promoted to General of the Armies, a rank previously held only by John Pershing, Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, must have irked the president. Eisenhower mentioned to confidants he had served MacArthur “in an intimate but subor- dinate position” and had never been forgiven by him for winning the presidency in 1952, when they both sought the office.15* Nevertheless, Martin pushed unsuccessfully for such recognition of his friend in 1955, 1956, 1961, and 1963.lS3

223 “[RepublicnnslShedding the Psychology of Opposition“

FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

Although Eisenhower must have been irked at the minority leader’s ac-tions on MacArthur’s behalf and realized that Martin championed some of his programs only reluctantly, they agreed on major foreign policy issues. The Nationalists on Formosa held the Pescadore Islands in the center of the China Sea halfway to the mainland, as well as Quemoy and Matsu, islands off the Asian coast. To the accompaniment of bellicose rhetoric on both sides, the mainland Chinese in September 1954 began shelling these latter two islands, which had been used as bases for raids on their nation. Tension mounted: the Seventh Fleet patrolled the China Sea protecting Formosa, and the United States in December negotiated a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalists. While awaiting its ratification by the Senate, Eisenhower sent a special message to Congress seeking approval of a resolution committing the country to the defense of the Pescadores and ”closely related localities” if an attack was a prelude to an invasion of Formosa.’54 Martin assured the president that as commander-in-chief he did not need the resolution, but the House would easily approve it; the Senate would provide some oppositioi~.’~~ In the House Martin defended the request, contending, as did Eisenhower, it would eliminate the danger of Chinese miscalculation; furthermore it would preserve the peace and demonstrate American firmness.156 The House approved it 410 to 63, as did the Senate, after defeating limiting amendments, 83 to 3.

The historian cousin of the actual author of the resolution, Secretary of State Dulles, asserted that the precedent for American involvement in Vietnam was established by this action, for “Congress was in some measure abdicating its responsibility in the conduct of foreign affairs by giving the president a free hand that could lead to war.”157 Martin, although a proponent of congressional power, would nevertheless disagree. He asserted the resolution was deliberately vague in order to give the president discretionary authority to use any measure necessary to defend Formosa. Instead of relinquishing congressional responsibility, it displayed Ameri- can unity and was a means of calling Red China’s “bluff and bluster”- threats that meant nothing as it could be defeated easily by American atomic supremacy. “We also have scraped off the crust of fear encasing our atomic weapons and have notified the world that in our defense we would use them in the full fury of their awesome power.”158 Martin’s mil- itancy resulted in the mainland Chinese press labeling him a ”stupid American war monger,” an ”atomania~.”’~~

A year later, as a result of an article written for Life magazine, Secretary Dulles was the object of a storm of protest including calls for his resignation. He had advocated resolute, positive action, as a means of avoiding

224 Chapter 6

war, for if one is afraid to go to “the brink,” he claimed, one is lost. Mar- tin advised the beleaguered Secretary to ignore the hammering and not let the criticism, which was really political, get him down.’@’

Martin’s distrust of Communist nations and his adherence to a hard line were further reflected in his cynical attitude toward the Geneva Sum- mit of 1955. In response to pressure from American allies, particularly the United Kingdom, Eisenhower reluctantly agreed to a conference with the Soviet Union, France, and England dealing with European security, Ger- man reunification, and disarmament. Martin, who predicted nothing substantive would result from this summit, was proved right when all significant issues were deferred to a follow-up foreign ministers meeting of which Martin again was skeptical and which also achieved nothing.161 From this perspective he was able to pronounce the summit a success, for Soviet intransigence had proved once again that the United States must remain vigilant. To Martin the Soviets had not changed since Stalin’s day, as they tried to extend their rule by stirring up trouble and taking advantage of appeasement.16* Nevertheless, when Eisenhower had proposed his ”open skies plan” at Geneva, calling for an exchange of military establishment blueprints with unlimited air inspection, Martin, unlike many Republicans, showed his loyalty by immediately endorsing it.163

As did most of the administration, Martin viewed foreign aid as a major weapon in the Cold War, especially as each year a larger percentage of it was devoted to military needs. He argued vigorously and successfully to defeat an attempt to cut $70 million from India, claiming that to lift its standard of living would make that nation “less fertile soil” for Commu- nism. He also thwarted an attempt to bar aid to Yugoslavia, which, he claimed, would thrust it into the arms of Russia.lU He was less successful in his pleas for the House to approve the president’s entire package. Along with the Democratic leadership he made no effort to restore House cuts, as he feared it might result in further reductions. Instead he relied on Senate and Conference Committee approval of the entire amount. How- ever, the tactic failed-the final authorization was $830 million less than the $2.7 billion the president asked for.

Eisenhower’s foreign aid program was even more seriously questioned in the second session, and a wary Martin was even more cautious in con-fronting the program’s critics. As part of his effort to show his moderation he warned early in the session the Soviets may be trying to lead the United States into bankruptcy by “excessive foreign aid . . . [a] trap of economic disaster.’‘ Instead, he suggested the two countries join together in a “world rehabilitation plan” administered by the United Nations.’65 Nev- ertheless, he and Speaker Rayburn urged the House to restore $600 mil-lion of the over $1billion the Foreign Affairs Committee cut from the administration’s request of $4.9 billion in aid. In his impassioned plea the

225 "1Republicansl Shedding the Psycliology of Opposition"

minority leader read a letter from the president asserting the reduction jeopardized American security. But in what the New York Times described as the first clear-cut defeat for Eisenhower's foreign policy, the House not only ignored the appeal but failed to challenge the remarks of James T. Richards (Democrat, South Carolina) chastising Martin and Raybum. Richards, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, criticized the two for un-dermining the authority of the House. "Here they are, the former Speaker of the House [Martin] and the present Speaker of the House, who have said time after time how they loved this House and how they would fight to preserve the integrity of the House, leading the fight to repudiate what a committee, an arm of the House has done . . . these distinguished gen- tlemen .. .are themselves helping to destroy one of the checks essential to the preservation of democratic government, and they are doing it in their own House.''166 Afraid additional efforts on his part would antagonize aid's opponents and result in further cuts, Martin, in conjunction with the Democratic leadership, agreed to make no effort to recommit the bill. Once again he told the House he would rely on the Senate's "better judgment" to correct "errors" which jeopardize the safety of the nation. This tactic was approved by Eisenhower, who allegedly said in reference to it and to Martin, "I'll leave it to my general."16' Although the Senate approved $700 million more than the House, the amount was reduced in the Conference Committee and further diluted by appropriations: the final $3.76billion was over a billion less than the administration requested. This victory for conservatives, most of whom were Republican, disappointed the administration, but both Eisenhower and Dulles praised Martin for his efforts, which had helped prevent an even more devastating loss.'68

Martin and his leadership team were more successful tacticians on the minimum wage bill. Democrats and unions wanted the wage raised to $1.25, but Eisenhower believed $1.00 was enough. Martin advised him to ask for 904, which Congress would increase to $l.OO-if he asked for $1.00 it would be considerably higher when it left the legislature. Eisenhower followed his advice and in time approved legislation increasing the minimum to $1.00.'69

THE EIGHTY-FOURTH CONGRESS: SECOND SESSION

Since the second session of the Eighty-fourth Congress took place in a presidential election year it was relatively short, ending July 27, and was characterized by more political posturing than usual. Indicative of the latter was the inclusion as ex ofico members of the Policy Committee representatives from the freshmen classes of the Eight-second, third, and fourth Congresses and Martin's enthusiastic approval of a Republican response

226 Chapter 6

team to answer Democrats on the floor.170 The most contentious issues were administration requests carried over from the first session. Early in December, a month before Congress was to convene, Martin and William F. Knowland (California), the Senate leader, met with the president at his Gettysburg farm, where he was recovering from a heart attack. There they discussed his legislative program and State of the Union Address. Indica- tive of his view of the Speaker’s authority, Martin refused an administration recommendation that he consult with committee chairs and obtain their recommendations in preparation for this c~nference.”~ At the meeting’s conclusion Martin predicted that the president’s program would be dynamic and progressive and that Congress would be unable to continue neglecting highway construction, agricultural problems, and adequate funding for our “friends abroad.” Furthermore, he warned that a balanced budget must precede a tax cut, and even then a reduction was not a sure thing because of the necessity of ”liberal” defense spending.’”

Eisenhower’s address emphasized issues remaining from the first session: school construction, a federal highway program, and agricultural changes. Other requests included foreign aid, expansion of social security coverage, equal pay for equal work for women, and membership in the Organization for Trade C~operation.’~~ Martin, of course, praised the document, especially as it called for a balanced budget. A few days later he was even more enthusiastic when the balanced budget measure included $500,000 for continuance of a Fall River Harbor pr0 je~t . l~~ Despite his satisfaction, Martin was pessimistic about chances for school construction legislation or a tax cut and described Congress as not ”too warm” on foreign aid.175

One of the earliest specific requests from the president dealt with the farm surplus, which he wanted reduced by flexible discretionary payments to those who voluntarily took acreage out of production (soil bank). Passage of such legislation was sure to be difficult, for not only were many farmers opposed, but the measure passed by the House the previous session called for rigid price supports (parity). Martin met with House Re- publicans and after a two-hour conference reported that the message was well received, but as the effects of agricultural legislation would not be felt for a year or two, there should be immediate action only in three areas: liberalized farm credit, expanded purchase of pork and beef by the government, and an exemption from the federal tax on gasoline used on farms.176 The gas exemption was enacted by the spring, and beef and pork pur- chases were included in the final agricultural legislation.

In a Democratic route of the administration, the Senate added forty-one amendments to the House agricultural bill. A soil bank was approved, but with price supports of 90 percent on major crops, an increase in dairy support, and a dual system of establishing parity. An angry Eisenhower indi-

227 "fRepublicans1 Shedding the Psychology of Opposition"

cated he might veto the measure if the Conference Committee reported the Senate version, which it did, setting aside the 1954 flexible support act. Martin proclaimed the bill unacceptable, asserted it should be returned to committee and rapidly corrected, but announced that the administration would accept a compromise: flexible supports with none less than 82.5 percent and an increase in dairy supports. Even with this concession Mar- tin's motion to recommit lost 181 to 235 and the bill was passed 237 to 181. As expected Eisenhower vetoed the measure and in his veto message called again for a soil bank, while announcing administrative action to raise to an average of 82 percent parity on basic crops and increasing price supports on milk and butter. Although Martin had to intervene to get time for override opponents to address the House, he was successful in getting the veto sustained.'" As the need for farm legislation remained pressing, a compromise was finally enacted, the Agricultural Act of 1956, inter-preted by many as an Eisenhower victory. The president himself was rather pleased, although he commented that he signed the law only as "its advantages outweigh its disadvantages." The legislation provided for a $1.2 billion soil bank program and flexible parity of 75 to 90 percent, but the administration yielded as feed grain parity was raised from 70 to 76 percent (which irked northeast farmers).*78

Among the unfinished business from the first session was Eisen- hower's request to authorize American membership in the Organization for Trade Cooperation (OTC), whose purpose was to administer GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), which the United States had joined with thirty-three other nations in March 1955. The OTC was designed to supervise reciprocal trade agreements and to deal with trade disputes and complaints against GATT members. Congress, reflecting protectionist fears, received Eisenhower's request for membership in 1955 with such coolness that the administration postponed the matter until the second se~s i0n . l~~

In manufacturing areas the OTC was very unpopular, for it was feared membership would lead to lower tariffs. Martin described his attitude on membership as only "lukewarm," and told the president that as the Sen- ate would not act on it, there was not much sense getting into a "hassle" over membership in the House. A month later Martin, concerned over existing competition from cheap imports, especially from Japan, canvassed the House, concluded there was no possibility of passage, and told the president the matter would not be taken up.lSo Eisenhower informed Re-publican leaders, if returned to office, he would be right back with the same request in 1957. He didn't even wait that long, for in December 1956 he again requested that the United States join.18'

Also remaining from the first session was school construction legislation, which had become embroiled with civil rights issues. An amendment

228 Chapter 6

offered by Powell prohibiting federal funds to a segregated system was instrumental in preventing passage of such a measure in the first session. The administration introduced a new bill calling for $250 billion over five years in loans and grants to states for school construction. Powell revealed he would again introduce his amendment. Martin informed the press that although opposed in principle to riders, he would vote for this amendment, as he did not want to appear in opposition to the Supreme Court and that he expected the bill as amended to pass the House. (In 1954 the Court in Brown v. Board of Educufion had ruled school segregation by law unconstitutional and ordered desegregation with ”all deliberate speed.”) There was no inconsistency, he claimed, in backing Powell on school construction and opposing him on the reserve bill of 1955. The latter might very well have impeded national defense.lE2 Once again, the minority leader and the president were on different pages. Eisenhower announced his opposition to any step that might jeopardize or delay needed school construction.*83

Many in Congress feared that a combination of segregationists and opponents of federal aid would defeat an amended bill. Consequently, the Democratic leadership, favoring school aid, kept the bill in Rules, awaiting assurances Powell’s amendment would not be added when the proposal was reported to the floor. Martin, who had become increasingly outspoken, was asked to abandon his support of an amended bill. Eight Democratic congressmen wrote the president, ”your minority leader” is endangering passage of this measure by his stance, and then suggested there would be no justification for an amendment if the president would agree to withhold funds from school systems not in compliance with the Court. Powell, too, indicated that such a commitment would remove the justification for his amendment. However, the administration contended there was no need for such a remedy; it was up to the judiciary to ensure comp1iance.l8*

As Eisenhower’s opposition to the Powell proposal became better known, Martin was encouraged by the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties Union to continue his support for it. He informed the press that the Republican caucus favored it and then publicly urged all Republicans to vote for it.185 The amendment was adopted 225 to 192, but the amended bill was defeated 192 to 224. Ninety-five congressmen, all Republican, voted for the amendment but against the bill, giving credence to the charge Martin and Powell had killed federal aid to school construction. As the historian J. W. Anderson wrote, “Republican votes for the amendment had ensured Southern votes against the

Equally as divisive was the Civil Rights Bill. The Montgomery Alabama bus boycott, which catapulted Martin Luther King to national prominence, had begun in December 1955. Attorney General Herbert Brownell, worried about a ”dangerous racial conflagration,” proposed a four-point

229“1RepublicansI Shedding the Psychology of Opposition“

civil rights bill. He recommended a civil rights commission, elevating the Civil Rights Section of the Justice Department to a division, and empow- ering the attorney general to initiate civil proceedings to enforce school desegregation and voting rights. Even though the House had approved eight civil rights bills since 1937, prospects for Brownell’s proposal were bleak, as indicated by the struggle over school construction and as an obstructionist and segregationist Howard Smith (Democrat, Virginia) chaired the Rules Committee. To get the bill to the floor Martin and his friend Rayburn cooperated, the Speaker pressured two Committee Dem- ocrats into supporting it, and Martin intervened with four Rep~b1icans.l~~

To the surprise of nearly everyone, during debate William E. Miller (Re- publican, New York) moved to strike the enabling clause, thereby killing the measure. To the cheers of Southerners he asserted the bill was a danger to civil liberties and the kind of legislation that brought Hitler to power. An infuriated Martin rushed to the well and, as described by Al- bert S. Herlong (Democrat, Florida), lashed out at members of his own party, virtually threatening them, and pointed his finger at Southerners in anger and scorn. One ”would have thought from the look of contempt on his face that all of us from the South had leprosy.”’88 Proclaiming equality and social justice the cornerstones of the Republican Party, the minority leader warned fellow Republicans that if they followed Southern Demo- crats in defeating the bill they would seriously regret it in the next elec- ti011.I~~Miller’s motion was overwhelmingly rejected 140-91 and the bill approved 279-126, only to die in the Senate Judiciary Committee. The NAACP praised Martin as courageous and asserted his “strong and effective” plea was significant in obtaining House approval. The praise was not unusual. During the Eighty-third Congress, he had been feted at Howard University as a friend of the organization of black Elks and in 1956 was rated by the NAACP as voting “right” on five of seven significant roll calls, a record few could surpass, as his only negatives were state- hood for Hawaii and Alaska.Igo

With changing times and a Republican president some of Martin’s previous positions had shifted. He pushed for and succeeded in authorizing a joint American-Canadian commission to survey the Passamaquoddy Tidal Project to bring cheap public power to the New England States. This, he claimed, would give them a chance to work out their own destiny. This stance could be explained in terms of New England’s interests, but his appeal for $756 million for reclamation projects on the upper Col- orado River must have shocked those who remembered his opposition to TVA. Not only did he champion this as a “program close to his [Eisen- hower’s] heart’’ but as one which gave the Mountain States a chance to live.’91 Less surprising was his joining with Majority Leader McCormack to obtain compensation for the Vatican for the damage American bombs

230 Chapter 6

caused at Castle Gondolfo in 1944. As late as 1953 the State Department had denied the basis for the claim. However, with the Church as an ally against Communism, attitudes changed. Supported by the State Depart- ment, Ambassador to Italy Clare Luce, Senator John F. Kennedy, and others, the two House leaders, with no congressional opposition, obtained over $900,000 as a "matter of grace"-an action pleasing to both Cardinal Spellman and the Vatican.192

Considering that the Eighty-fourth Congress was Democratic, the Eisen- hower program fared well, in part due to Martin's ability to work with the opposition. According to Martin, Congress's major failures were the school construction program and the delay in authorizing a soil bank. Its achievements, however, were such that he assigned it a "passing grade"- even though he thought it less successful than the Eighty-third Republican Congress. Despite some congressional setbacks the president "deeply" appreciated Martin's leadership, skill, and advice. He wrote his minority leader that he took even greater pride in the results achieved by "our people" than in the Eighty-third because of the increased difficulties they faced as a minority.1y3 Martin, too, had come to respect Eisenhower. Before a meeting of "old fashioned type" Republicans, who had entered the House in 1939 or 1941, Martin declared that although he was a Taftite in 1952, he had come to know Eisenhower as a great man, an outstanding patriot, one who had learned a lot about politics and was entitled to their support. At the suggestion of Henry Cabot Lodge, the president wrote Martin, thanking him for these remarks and stating that he valued his judgment.*94

But Eisenhower's relationship with Halleck had become even closer. By August 1956, when the president selected Halleck to nominate him for the presidency at the Republican Convention, the United Press described the Indianan as "Ike's fair-haired boy" and reported his aspiration for Mar- tin's seat was making the minority leader uneasy. A year earlier Eisen- hower had written to Halleck an effusive letter about his leadership, offering to meet with him and discuss future plans.195


As usual, especially with a presidential election at hand, Martin addressed Republicans throughout the country in 1955 and 1956. He praised his party for bringing peace and prosperity, lauded Eisenhower's leadership, warned of Soviet intentions, hailed the achievements of the Eighty- third Congress, and called for a Republican Eighty-fifth Congress. As in 1952and 1954 he chaired the Massachusetts Republican State Convention, where he commended the GOP for bringing peace and stopping the "sick- ening trend toward Socialism."'y6

231 ”[Republicans]Shedding the Psychology of Opposition”

Publicly Eisenhower was noncommittal about a second term and on occasion even told a few intimates he intended to retire at the conclusion of his first term.’97 Martin, however, beginning in February 1955 promoted and publicized an Eisenhower candidacy and by May was predicting he would run.198

These hopes were dashed in September 1955 when the president suffered a heart attack while vacationing in Colorado, and the nation speculated whether he would be well enough to run, even if he wanted to do so. While most Republicans awaited word from the president and refrained from public statements, Martin pushed for an Eisenhower candidacy. Even before the president had taken a few steps, Martin was predicting that with full recovery expected, he would respond to the country’s need and run for reelection. Publicly he advised the president to take his time announcing his intentions; there was no rush, a counsel that rankled Knowland and other Republican aspirants.’% Martin’s assurances about Eisenhower‘s candidacy were repeated with even more confidence after he visited the president December 3. He insisted Eisen- hower would be unable to resist the country’s call and, although he knew some Republicans were awaiting the president’s statement of intentions, he again affirmed there was no rush.200

Finally on February 29 Eisenhower announced he was a candidate for the Republican nomination. The immediate question, especially in view of his heart attack, was whether Nixon would again be his choice for vice president. For the next two months Eisenhower hoped to encourage Nixon to leave the ticket by suggesting he advance his career by joining the cabinet. As part of his strategy the president did not endorse the Cal- ifornian, but on the other hand took no action to force him out. There was no doubt where Martin stood. Publicly he attached no special significance to Eisenhower’s failure to approve Nixon and asserted if the convention were held “today” the vice president would be renominated with ease. He was the strongest candidate, even superior to Massachu- setts Governor Herter, whom some Bay Staters were promoting for that office.*O1 The president continued noncommittal, until Nixon met with him in the Oval Office and declared he wanted the nomination. Having little choice, the president had his press secretary call a news conference and announce that Eisenhower was delighted that Nixon would be on the ticket.202

Eastern establishment Republicans, who were uneasy about Nixon on a slate headed by a heart patient, were further concerned when the president had an ileitis attack and subsequent operation in June. It was probably this group that encouraged Harold Stassen, Eisenhower’s disarmament advisor, to challenge Nixon’s candidacy. On July 20 he met with the president and told him the Californian’s presence would cost the party

232 Chapter 6

votes and most likely lead to a Democratic Congress. He then informed Eisenhower he would lead a drive to nominate Governor Herter. Not ordered to stop by the president, Stassen called a press conference announced that Eisenhower approved of an open convention and would be pleased to run with Herter if he were the nominee. The president then granted Stassen’s request for a four-week leave of absence to pursue “certain political activities”-a step interpreted by anti-Nixonites as sympathy for Stassen’s quest and by Nixon‘s followers as a rebuff of the disarmament advisor’s reckless endeavor.

Martin’s reaction left no room for speculation. He forthrightly hailed an Eisenhower-Nixon ticket, declaring they both would be nominated by ac- ~ l a m a t i o n . ~ ~ ~The president remained equivocal, stating only that although Nixon was acceptable the choice was up to the delegates. Eisen- hower’s staff, fearing all Stassen could do was further divide the party, offered Herter a position in the State Department if he would nominate Nixon. Herter accepted. Republican congressmen also frustrated anti- Nixon efforts when 180 of them signed a petition attesting to Nixon’s qualifications for the office.zo4 Because it would not be ”ethically right” in his position as convention chairman, Martin did not sign, but such an overwhelming congressional endorsement would have been impossible without his approbation. Even though Stassen’s gambit was becoming increasingly futile, Eisenhower continued to assert the convention would be an open one. Not until the very day he was nominated did he meet with Stassen, who then renounced his ineffective crusade and agreed to second the vice president‘s nomination.

Nixon’s problems may have come to an end; Martin’s were just beginning. Convention rules allowed only four delegates to second. Stassen was not a delegate and eight seconders had already been selected. It was necessary to amend the convention rules by unanimous consent, but Martin feared he could not obtain it because of anti-Nixon and anti-Stassen sentiment. Seven delegates, including Senator William Jenner (Indiana), had already informed him as convention chair and presiding officer that they would oppose unanimous consent and thereby prevent Stassen from addressing the conventi0n.2~~ Consequently, immediately after an impassioned speech by Governor Dewey as delegates were milling around and paying little attention, Martin introduced from the podium a resolution allowing nine seconders, one of whom could be a nondelegate, and then quickly gaveled it through. His brother, who assisted him on the dais, wrote, ”I‘m not even sure how many knew what was being passed at the time,” and joked about his brother’s and his going to jail over the maneuver.zo6

Martin’s troubles were not over yet. He received a note from Fred Seaton, Secretary of the Interior, warning him not to recognize any Ne- braska delegate during the nominations for vice president, as someone

233 "[Republicans]Shedding the I~sychologyof Opposition"

was planning to name a candidate other than Nixon, probably Seaton himself. Senator Carl T. Curtis (Nebraska) also advised him to call on no one but the delegation's chair. At the same time, Len Hall, the National Committee Chairman, advised him that delegate Terry Carpenter was go-ing to make an issue of Eisenhower's health in a nomination speech.207 During the call of states the Nebraska chair announced that without the consent of the others, one delegate desired to place a name in nomination for vice president. Three times Martin asked whom the delegate wished to nominate, explaining his reason for the inquiry was that a "distinguished son of Nebraska [Seaton] does not want his name placed in nomination." The rebellious delegate, Terry Carpenter, a Democratic congressman from 1933 to 1935 and a Republican only since 1952, seized the microphone and announced his candidate was Joe Smith. In order to ensure that when the actual nominating speeches were made, Carpenter would be bound to Smith and no other, Martin announced, "Nebraska reserves the right to nominate Joe Smith-whoever he is." A listless convention was disrupted as newsmen surrounded Carpenter, and confusion and noise drowned out the chairman's call to clear the aisles. An exasperated Martin finally hollered, "Take your Joe Smith and get out of here." Sergeants-at-arms pushed Carpenter and newsmen from the hall, but let "Terrible Terry" return in time to cast his vote for Nixon, who was the unanimous nominee. In the following weeks Martin received hundreds of letters from Joe Smiths throughout the country, most of them good-natured references to the incident.*O*

Immediately after the convention Eisenhower congratulated Martin on his "grand job," stating it was all the more noteworthy as it was no easy task. He also praised Martin's address as convention chair.*09 Earlier the president had made it known that speeches were to be moderate, emphasizing achievements rather than castigating the opposition. Martin had followed this directive, with but passing reference to the "forces" bent on creating an alien, socialist America. Most of his address focused on the Re- publican accomplishments of peace and prosperity and the need for a GOP president as well as a Republican Congress to continue along that path. He concluded by warning against

Martin followed his own advice by campaigning hard for a Republican victory. Using an airplane chartered by the Republican National Commit- tee, he barnstormed throughout the nation on behalf of individual congressional candidates, a Republican Congress, and, of course, the top of the ticket. The schedule would have exhausted a man half his age. Again his emphasis was on peace and prosperity, especially as exemplified by the achievements of the Eighty-third Congress. Occasionally he would abandon the positive and criticize the Democrats for trying to make an issue of the Joe Smith incident, claiming it showed the paucity of significant

234 Chapter 6

issues. Martin repeated many of these points in a lengthy article in the Sat-urday Evening Post and, as he did during the campaign, ignored the matter of Communist subversion.2I1

In September he optimistically predicted a gain of twenty-five Republi- can seats. However, by the end of October, although he expected an Eisen- hower landslide, he pleaded for a Republican Congress in what he believed would be a close fight.212 Eisenhower, too, had misgivings, expecting the Democrats to retain both the House and Senate. But he could live with such a result. As he told Gabe Paul (his personal economic advisor), he was not too interested in trying to elect a Republican Con- gress, for in many issues he was just as satisfied to have the Democrats in control. Jack Z. Anderson, the special assistant to the secretary of agriculture, was even more disenchanted with his own party, believing Republi- cans did not deserve a House and Senate majority, as they did not know how to handle it.213

In many ways, Martin’s reelection bid was a replay of his earlier campaigns. Once again he was renominated without opposition, and once again, as in 1952 and 1954, his opponent was Doolan. As usual the minority leader had considerable Democratic support. A confident Martin directed most of his efforts toward the national campaign, spending only two weeks on his own contest. As in the past, except in 1946 when running against a liberal, he stressed his own “liberalism”: his record of for- warding “Humane, Progressive Laws,” beginning with his support of the original Social Security legislation and every extension thereto. He also underscored his promotion of minimum wage legislation and advocacy of labor’s agenda. Although he accused Doolin of being part of the typical left-wing Americans for Democratic Action effort to defeat those who refused to abandon protectionist policies, there was less emphasis on the threats from socialism and domestic and international Communism than in any campaign since 1944.214

As usual Martin won with ease, topping Doolin by over 40,000 votes, 111,263 to 66,798, and carrying every city and town except Fall River. Na- tionally, even though Eisenhower increased his 1952 majority, the House and Senate remained Democratic by a small margin-the first time in over a century that a president’s party had failed to carry one congressional house. Martin attributed the defeat to insufficient funding of congres-sional races. Eisenhower, who claimed to be pleased with Martin’s leadership and “spirited” campaigning, stated he intended to rely upon him for advice. Nevertheless, he believed the congressional loss had to be re- dressed; otherwise Democrats would win in 1958 and capture the presidency in 1960.It was essential, he thought, to create a legislative record, a political climate, party spirit and organization in order to achieve vic- t o r ~ . ~ ~ ~Although Martin shared these goals they were not to be realized.

235 “[Republicans1 Shedding the Psychology of Opposition”

NOTES

1. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. as told to Robert J. Donovan, M y First Fi f ty Years in Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 1975), 30,229.

2. ”Martin and Taft Aid Ike in Fight Over Who’s Boss,” Newsweek, March 30, 1953, 24.

3. Memo, December 18, 1952, ”The Diaries of Dwight Eisenhower, 1953-61” (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, microfilm, 1986), henceforth Eisenhower Diaries.

4. Martin, First Fifty Years, 229, 231-32. 5. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953, 99: 13-14. 6. Martin, First F i fy Years, 230. 7. NYT, 3-4,12 January 1953. 8. Chronicle, 19 January 1953; Fall River Herald News, 10 February 1953; Edward

Martin’s inaugural comments, diary, MP. 9. Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusade (New York: Macmil-

Ian, 1972), 214-19; David W. Reinhard, The Republican Right Since 2945 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 102; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953 (Washington: GPO, 1960), 21,4748.

10. W P and NYT, 28 January 1953. 11. Martin, First F i fy Years, 230. 12. Henry F. and Katherine Pringle, ”TheTerrible Twelve of Capitol Hill,” Sat-

urday Ezrening Post, June 19,1954,22-23. 13. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953,99: 1904-1908. 14. Speech to Tax Payer Association, March 21, 1953, MP; N Y T , 22 March;

15 April 1953. 15. Speech to Republican Women, Chronicle, April 24, 1953. 16. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953,99: 8491; Reinhard, Republican

Right, 104. 17. For Eisenhower’s early statements on this tax see Press Conference, Febru-

ary 17, March 19, Radio Address to American People, May 15 and Address to Con- gress, May 20 in Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953,49,115,314,318; Martin Press release, May 20,1953, M.P.

18. Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The American Speakership: The Office in Historical Per- spective (Baltimore: JohnsHopkins University Press, 1990), 129.

19. ”President Eisenhower‘s Meetings with Legislative Leaders” (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, Microfilm, 1986), meeting of March 9, 1953; Washington Star, 24 June 1953.

20. Legislative Leaders, May 25,1953. 21. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953,99: 8492-93. For surveys of this

struggle see Parmet, Eisenhower, 218-20; Reinhard, Republican Right, 1024. For an account sympathetic to Reed see Peter B. Bulkley, ”Daniel A. Reed: A Study in Conservatism” (Ph.D. diss., Clark University, 1972), 331-72.

22. Washington Times Herald, 27 June 1953; NYHT, 28 June 1953; Frank W. Boykin (Dem. Ala.) to Adams, July 13,1953, Sherman Adams Papers, DDEL.

23. “Legislative Leaders,” June 24, 1953.

236 Chapter 6

24. "Battle for a Tax," Time, July 6,1953,9-10; Boston Post, 26 June 1953; NYHT, 30 June 1953; Lynn (Mass.) Telegram News, 22 March 1953.

25. Chronicle, 13July 1953. 26. "Address to Congress, May 20," Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, 318, 323;

NYT, 21 May 1953. 27. NYT, 10,12 September 1953. 28. Boston Post, 26 November 1953; Iwan W. Morgan, Eisenhower versus "The

Spenders:" The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats and the Budget, 1953-1 960 (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 60.

29. Eisenhower to Martin, December 21,1953, MP; NYT, 19 December 1953. 30. NYT, 5 January 1954. 31. NYHT, 8 January 1954; NYT, 22 January 1954; Gannett News Interview,

January 13, 1954, M.P. 32. NYT, 25 January 1954. 33. NYT, and Chicago Tribune, 28 January 1954; Pearson column, WP, 2 Febru-

ary 1954; Morgan, Eisenhozuer versus the Spenders, 60. 34. NYT, 9,12 March 1954. 35. Press Conference, March 31, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1954,364. 36. NYT, 14,19 March 1954; "Lord of the Citadel," Time, August 9, 1954, 17. 37. Martin, First Fifty Years, 222-27. 38. Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story ofthe Eisenhower Administration

(New York: Harpers, 1961), 53-61,78-99. 39. Legislative Leaders, January 11, 1954. 40. Adams, Firsthand Report, 61; Martin, First Fify Years, 225. 41. Pearson column, WP, 2 February 1953; Washington Times Herald, 21 April

1953; Legislative Leaders, March 16, 1953, January 11,1954. 42. Martin, First Fify Years, 71. 43. Martin, First Fify Years, 195. 44. Eisenhower Diaries, February 7, 1953; Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower,

October 9, 1953 in Eisenhower Diaries; Eisenhower to Martin, August 3, 1953, November 12, 1953, January 20, 1954, M.P; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change 1943-2963 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), 195.

45. Eisenhower to Halleck, August 3, 1953, December 21, 1953, Eisenhower Diaries.

46. Eisenhower to Hazlett, December 12,1953, Eisenhower Diaries; Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries (New York: Norton, 1981) entries for May 14, 1953,238 and January 18,1954,270.

47. After the collapse of cooperation between the administration and the AFL and CIO, unions feared attempts to modify would lead to further restrictions and opposed any effort at revision. The administration lost its enthusiasm. Gerald Pomper, "Labor Legislation: The Revision of Taft-Hartley in 1953-1954," Labor History 6 (spring 1965): 143-44.

48. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953, 99: 6898-99; Eisenhower to Martin, June 20, 1953, M.P.

49. Martin, First Fifty Years, 229. 50. NYT, 3 April; 26 May; 3 June 1953; UP release 3 April 1953 and Doris Flee-

son, column 27 May 1953 in scrapbook 59, MP.

237 "IRepublicansl Shedding the Psychology of Opposition I'

51. Floyd M. Riddick, "The Eighty-third Congress First Session," Western Polit- ical Quarterly 6 (no. 1,1953): 793.

52. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953, 99: 1162-63; WP, 29 July 1953; NYT, 11April; 14 August 1953.

53. D.B. Hardeman and Donald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography (Austin, Tex.: Texas Monthly Press, 1987,375.

54. Interview Pearson column, WP, n.d., 1953, scrapbook 101, MP. 55. Chronicle, 2 June 1953. 56. Minneapolis Star, 27 November 1953. 57. Felix Morley, "G.O.P. Policy Committee," Burron's, January 3,1953,3; Wash-

ington Star, 29 January 1953. 58. Pearson column, WP, 2 April 1953. 59. WP, 11 June 1953. 60. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York:

McKay, 1963), 385. 61. N Y T , 27 May; 10June; 3 August 1953. 62. NYT, 8 January 1954. 63. N Y T , 5 January 1954. 64. Martin, First Fifty Years, 234; NYT, 22 January 1954. Even Saltonstall the

party whip and number three Republican in the Senate voted against the measure. One of the few New Englanders voting for it was John F. Kennedy.

65. Eisenhower, Mandate, 301-2. 66. New York Post, 12 August 1954; N Y T , 3, 24-25 April; 1June 1954. 67. Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis A. Dexter, American Business

and Public Policy: The Politics of Trade (New York Atherton Press, 1968), 50-58; Eisenhower, Mandate, 293; NYT, 8 August 1954.

68. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 2d sess., 1954, 100:9180-81; NYT, 28-29 June 1954.

69. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 2nd sess., 1954, 100: 9535-36; W P and Balti-more Sun, 2 July 1954; Ezra Taft Benson, Cross Fire: The Eight Years With Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), 201-5.

70. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 2d sess., 1954, 100:2434; NYT, 2 March 1954; Martin, "Ten Minutes of Terror," Fall River Herald News, 2 March 1954; Martin, First Fifty Years, 216-20.

71. Puerto Rican shooting file, MP. 72. Floyd M. Riddick, "The Eighty-third Congress, Second Session," Western

Political Quarterly 7 (no. 4, 1954): 632-33. 73. "The Congress" Time, August 9, 1954, 17. 74. N Y T , 18April 1954; Eisenhower to Hazlett, March 18,1954, Eisenhower Di-

aries; Eisenhower to Martin, August 23,1954, MP. 75. Robert H. Ferrell, ed., The Diary of James C. Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid

Course, 2954-2955 (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1983), entries for March 24, 1954,33, April 20, 1954,46, and August 14, 1954,87.

76. Pearson column, WP, 15 May 1954. 77. Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 2d sess., 1954,100: 14554-555. 78. Martin statement, December 2, 1953, MP.

238 Chapter 6

79. Martin's article for the Texas War Veterans Quarterly enclosed in Martin to Paul A. Brown, March 13,1953, MP. Also see his speech in Newark assailing "evil disbelievers who crept into power in our land," NYT, 14 February 1954.

80. Carl Beck, Contempt of Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions Initiated by the Committee on Un-American Activities 1945-1957 (New Orleans: Hauser Printing, 1959), 99-101; M. J. Heale, American Anti-Communism: Combating the Enemy Within 1830-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 176.

81. Pearson column, WP, 14 March 1953; Boston Herald, 15 March 1953. 82. Congressional Record, 81 Cong. 2d sess., 1950,96: 16640; Edwin R. Bayley,

loe McCarthy and the Press (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 165-67.

83. McCarthy to Martin, December 4, 1952, MP. This may be the only correspondence between the two.

84. Martin, First Fifty Years, 235-37. 85. Boston Herald, 3 December 1953. 86. NYT, 14 February 1954. 87. Boston Globe, 3 May 1957. 88. Boston Globe, 11 December 1954; Boston Post, 6 December 1953; SpringFeld

Union, 20 March 1954. 89. Chronicle, 14 January 1953. 90. Eisenhower diaries, January 7,1953. 91. Eisenhower, "State of the Union Address, January 7, 1954," Eisenhower,

Public Papers, 1954,17. 92. CBS Broadcast, March 4, 1953, MP. 93. INS release, Fall River Herald Nezus, 19 May 1953. 94. Press release, July 26, 1953, MP. 95. Speeches in West Virginia, September 6,1953 and to Republican Dinner in

Boston, September 22,1953, MI! 96. INS release, Chronicle, 11August 1953. 97. Speech National Jewelers Association, July 20,1953, MP. 98. Martin to Luce, spring 1954, LP. Also see NYT, 25 April; 9 May; 6 June 1954;

New York Daily Nezus, 4 May 1954; Atfleboro Sun, 7 June 1954; Taunton Gazette, 4 June 1954. William B. Ewald, Jr., Eisenhower the President: Crucial Days: 1951-1960 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1981), 109-10, states that on April 3 Dulles and Radford met secretly with congressional leaders to consider a course of action in French Indo-China and reported Congress would go along with vigorous steps if joined by others, including Asians.

99. The words are Churchill's after a White House conference with Eisen- hower. See NYT, 29 June 1954. 100.NYT, 10July 1954; speech file July-August 1954, MI? 101. Cullen to Martin, January 17,1954, MP. 102. Memo, Mr. Morton to Dulles, November 23, 1953 and Dulles to Martin,

November 27,1953, Dulles Papers, Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. 103. Spenker Martin Looks at Europe (Fall River: Fall River Herald News, 1954),

booklet. 104. End of Tour Press Conference, NYT, 24 November 1953.

239 “fRepublicans1 Shedding the Psychology of Opposition “

105. NYT, 30-31 March; 3,5,10-11 April 1953; St. Louis Globe Democrat, 14 April 1953; Chronicle, 23 August 1956; Parmet, Eisenhower Crusade, 211-12; Raymond Moley’s Newsweek column, “Leader and Party Builder” as read by Karl Mundt (Rep. S.D.) into the Congressional Record, 83 Cong. 1st sess., 1953,99: A1947.

106. Martin to Luce, n.d. fall 1954, LP; NYT, 9 October 1953; 25 January; 6 Sep-tember 1954; Chronicle, 8 October 1954.

107. 1953 Speech, file, MP. 108. Speech schedule in Chronicle, 8 September; 2 October 2,1954. 109. Worcester (Mass.) Telegram, 10 November 1954. 110. Martin to Deems Taylor, October 20, 1954, and Taylor to Martin, October

21,1954, Deems I? Taylor Papers, Rensselaer County Historical Society, Troy, N.Y. 111. Martin to Congressmen, August 1954; Gwinn to Martin, September 17,

1954, MP. Martin ignored this reply and Gwinn ignored Martin’s form letter congratulating him on his reelection.

112. Smith to Martin, July 23,1954, MP. There is no indication in either the Mar- tin or Smith manuscripts or in her biography indicating what Martin did, nor is he mentioned in Janann Sherman’s account of the campaign in No Place for a Wotnan: A Life of Senator Margaret Chase Smith (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Uni- versity Press, 2000), 133-36. Thomas C. Reeves, The Life aid Times ofJoe McCarthy: A Biography (New York Stein and Day, 1982), 547; Charles L. Potter, Days of Shairze (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965), 152-59.

113. Memo to the President, October 15,1953, Eisenhower Diaries. 114. Press conferences, October 21 and 27,1953, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953,

701,714-27. 115. NYT, 9 October 1954; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President (New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), 217-19; Eisenhower, Mandate, 428-40. In the speeches published in his Public Papers only two candidates for the House were mentioned by name.

116. Eisenhower to Martin, November 1, 1954 and Martin to Eisenhower, November 5, 1954, Office Files, Eisenhower Papers, DDEL.

117. For the election see Chronicle, September-November, 1954, and scrapbook 64, MP.

118. Martin to Luce, November 1954, LP 119. NYT, 5 April 1954. 120. Halleck, Oral History, 18, DDEL. 121. NYT, 10 November 1958; WP, 23 November 1958; UP1 release, 6, 9 No-

vember in Fall River News; INS release 7,lO November in Chronicle. 122. Martin to Congressmen, November 8 through November 16, MP. Halleck

was one of several who did not answer the form letter; in their replies Auchincloss (N.J.), Corbett (Pa.), and Reece (Tenn.) specifically urged him to continue as leader.

123. Martin, First Fifty Years, 278. 124. Robert S. Allen column, November 10 and John ODonnell column, No-

vember 18, 1954, scrapbook 64, MP; Halleck Oral History, 18-19; Eisenhower, Mandate, 442; Robert J. Donovan, Confidential Secretary: Ann Whitinan‘s 20 Years with Eisenhozuer and Rockefeller (New York: Dutton, 1988), 77.

125. James C. Hagerty, Diary, December 20,1954, DDEL.

240 Chapter 6

126. Eisenhower to E. E. Hazlett, December 8,1954, Eisenhower Diaries. 127. Clarence B. Randall Journal, December 13,1954, DDEL. 128. Attleboro Sun, December 13,1954; 14 December 1954. 129. State of the Union Address, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955,7-30. 130. William S. White, "Ten Who Will Rule Congress," NYT Magazine, 2 Janu-

ary 1955,67. 131. NYT, 6-7 January 1955. 132. Press release, January 10,1955, MP. 133. Legislative Leaders, February 8, 1955. Also see Hagerty Diary, January 8,

February 16,1955 and Randall Journal, February 8 and March 8,1955. 134. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955, 101: 1781-82. 135. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955, 101: 8169. 136. Press release, July 28, 1955, MP. 137. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955,101: 1157678,11697. 138. NYT, 28 July 1955. 139. Martin on "Meet the Press," Boston Globe, 1August 1955; press release, Au-

gust 4,1955 and speech August 8,1955, MP. 140. NYT, 28 January; 1February 1956; WP, 1February 1956; Legislative Lead-

ers, January 31,1956. 141. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955, 101: 12133; NYT, 9 June; 30

July 1955. 142. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955,101: 12982; WP, 30 July 1955;

NYT, 2-3 August 1955. 143. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955, 101: 12170; NYT, 20, 25 Feb-

ruary; 18 March 1955. 144. NYT, 16,18 March 1955. 145. NYT, 27 March; 28 August; 15 December 1955. 146. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955,101: 654445. 147. NYT, 1,22 May 1955; Memorial Day Address, May 30,1955, MI? 148. AP release, Attleboro Sun, 2 July 1955. 149. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955, 101: 10781-82; NYT, 19 July;

3 August 1955. 150. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955,101: 5449. 151. NYT, 9 February; 9 December 1956. 152. Press Conference Notes, July 31,1957, Eisenhower Diaries. 153. Press releases January 20,1955, January 26,1956, January 3, 1961, April 3,

1963, MP. 154. Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955,207-211. 155. Eisenhower Diaries, January 20,22,1955. 156. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955,101: 662. 157. Foster R. Dulles, American Policy Toward Communist China, 2949-2969 (New

York:Crowell, 1972), 155. 158. The quotation is from a speech to the Industrial Editors Association as

reported in the Philadelphia lnquirer, 25 February 1955. Also see Washington Star, 11 February 1955, and Providence journal, 21 March 1955.

159. Washington Star, 10 February 1955.

241 "[Republicans] Shedding the Psychology of Oppositioiz"

160. Phone Log, January 20,1956, Minutes of Telephone Conversations of John Foster Dulles and of Christian Herter, 1953-61 (Washington, D.C.: University Pub- lications of America, Microfilm, 1980).

161. NYT, 6 June; 21 October 1955. 162. NYT, 20-21 October 1955; Speech to Massachusetts Republican Women's

Club as in Chronicle, 17 November 1955; Longhand notes on Geneva Conference, M P.

163. NYT, 22 July 1955. 164. Coiigressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1955, 101: 9659-60. 165. Speech to Westport County Republicans as in NYT, 27 January 1956. 166. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 2d sess., 1956, 102: 9830-31; NYT, 8 June

1956. 167. Legislative Leaders, July 10, 1956; Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 2nd sess.,

1956,102: 12201-12203,12364; Eisenhower quote in "Better Billions," Time,July 23, 1956, 10.

168. Eisenhower to Martin, June 19,1956, MI'; Dulles Phone Log, July 11,1956; Dulles to Martin, August 7, 1956, MP.

169. Legislative Leaders, May 24, 1955; Eisenhower to Martin, June 22, 1955, MP.

170. Laurence Curtis to Richard Simpson, February 8, 1956, MP; Charles 0. Jones, The Minority Party in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 29.

171. Bryce Harlow memo to Governor Adams, December 13, 1955, Harlow Papers, DDEL.

172. Press release, December 2,1956, MP. 173. State of the Union, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1956,l-7. 174. Press release, January 5,16,1956, MP; Annual Budget Message, January 16,

Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1956,75-92. 175. Martin interview with Rep. Ken Keating, January 8,1956, MP. 176. NYT, 12 January 1956. 177. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 2d sess., 1956, 102: 6129-30,6537. 178. Eisenhower, Mandate, 557-63; Benson, Cross Fire, 313-24. 179. NYT, 16 July 1955. 180. Legislative Leaders, April 17, 1956; Eisenhower Diaries, May 18, 1956. 181. Eisenhower Diaries, May 8, 1956; Eisenhower to Thomas J. Watson,

December 11, 1956, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1956,318. 182. Boston Globe, 9 January 19.56; Pearson column, WP, 12 January 1956; NYT,

12,25 January 1956. 183. Press Conference, January 25,1956, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1956,20-21. 184. Thomas L. Ashley et al. to Eisenhower, February 10 and March 3, 1956,

Eisenhower Papers. 185. NYT, 15 May; 3 July 1956; Washington Star, 26 June 1956; INS release in

Chronicle, 25 June 1956. 186. Anderson, Eisenhower, Brownell, and the Congress, 8. 187. Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn Books,

1975), 313; Bruce J. Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W. Smith (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1987), 17; press release, June 14,1956,

242 Chapter 6

MP. For Martin Rayburn cooperation on breaking loose bills from Rules see Richard W. Bolling, House Out oforder (New York: Dutton, 1965); 204,207.

188. Mount Dora (Fla.) Topics,26 July 1956. 189. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 2d sess., 1956, 102 13563-64. According to

the Washington Times Herald Martin deleted the words ”in the next election” from the Congressional Record’s account.

190. Monthly Report Washington Bureau NAACP, September 6,1956, NAACP Papers, Sup. I (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1982); Denton L. Watson, Lion in the Lobby: Clarence Mitchell, 1r.s Struggle for the Passage of Civil Rights Laws (New York: Morrow, 1990), 97; Washington Eagle, March 1954; ”The NAACP Legislative Scoreboard,” Crisis, October 1956,477,481.

191. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 2d sess., 1956,102 928-29,3752-53. 192. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 2d sess., 1956,102: 9570-71. File 38.84.8MP

is dedicated to this subject and includes Spellman to Martin, June 6,1956; Gerald P. Fogarty, The Vatican and the American Hierarchyfrom 1870 to 1965 (Stuttgart: An- ton Hiersemann, 1982), 345.

193. Eisenhower to Martin, August 11,1955,June 19,1956,August 19,1956, MP. 194. Lodge to Eisenhower, June 19,1955, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Of-

fice Files, 1953-61, Part 1 (Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America, 1990), henceforth office files, microfilm. Eisenhower to Martin, June 21, 1955, of-fice file 94, Eisenhower Papers.

195. Halleck to Eisenhower, August 31,1955, office files, microfilm; Eisenhower to Halleck, August 3,1955, Eisenhower Diaries.

196. See speech files May 1954 and 1956, MP. 197. Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises (New York Pyramid Books, 1968), 165. 198. NYT, 5 February; 12 May 1955. 199. Interview, Boston Globe, 20 October 1955, reprinted in several other papers.

For Knowland’s ambition and attempt to pressure Eisenhower to commit himself before the New Hampshire primary see Gayle B. Montgomery and James W. John- son, One Stepfrom the White House: The Rise and Fall of Senator William F. Knowland (Berkeley: University of California, 1994), 192-94.

200. NYT, 4,9,12,20 December 1955; Washington Star, 3 4 December 1955. 201. Boston Globe interview, 6 March 1956. 202. NYT, 22 April 1956. 203. NYT, 24 June 1956. 204. NYT, 29 July 1956. 205. Telegram from seven delegates to Martin, August 21-22,1956, MP. 206. Edward Martin, Memoy Lane, 127-28; Proceedings of Twenty-sixth Republi-

can National Convention, San Francisco, August 20-23, 1956 (Washington: Judd & Detweiller, 1956), 259. In that portion of his memoirs dealing with the convention Martin ignores the need for a rules change. First FFy Years, 171-74.

207. Seaton to Martin and Curtis to Martin, both n.d., MP. 208. NYT, 23 August 1956; Edward Martin, Memory Lane, 128; Joseph Martin,

First Fifty Years, 171-74; the official proceedings make no mention of Carpenter’s ejection, 293.

209. Eisenhower to Martin, August 29, 1956, MP. 210. Convention speech, August 21,1956, MI?

243 “[RepublicansJ Shedding the Psychology of Opposition”

211. Joe Martin, “The Case for the Republicans,” Sutirrduy Evening Post, October 13,1956,34-35,132-34.

212. The plea is in NYT, 26 October 1956. Also see Chronicle, 13,20, September; 13, 21, 27 October 1956; Boston Globe, 21 October 1956; NYT, 28 August; 18 Sep-tember; 26 October 1956; and 1956 speech files, MP.

213. Eisenhower Diaries, February 13,1956;Anderson Diary, April 11,1956,68, Jack Z. Anderson Papers, DDEL.

214. 1956 election literature file, ME’; 1956 campaign speeches file, MP; Chmni-cle, 27 October; 1 November 1956.

215. Eisenhower to Martin, November 11,1956,40, MP.

7

"Minority Leader Meanest Job in the World'? 1956-1958

THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET

In order to spend Christmas in North Attleborough, Martin postponed for nearly two weeks a presidential conference whose purpose was to

prepare for the legislative leaders meeting. Finally he met with Eisen- hower on December 28 and, optimistic as usual, predicted the president would have the "best batting average'' with Congress of any chief executive in years. Democratic representatives, influenced by the heavy Eisen- hower vote in their districts, would, he claimed, "see the light." Briefing reporters after the session, Martin labeled the liberalization of immigration laws "a must" and anticipated passage of legislation to aid education and to increase military spending? Three days later, Eisenhower met with the entire leadership to discuss domestic issues. At that gathering minority leader Martin endorsed as "moderate" an administration proposal extending the minimum wage and after informing Secretary of Commerce Weeks that the leadership was committed to OTC, advised him to save his prepared speech favoring that measure until votes were needed on the hill.3 At a press conference following the meeting Martin forecast passage of civil rights legislation early in the session, but warned there would be no significant tax cuts3

In his State of the Union Address Eisenhower reiterated his conviction that a balanced budget must precede tax reduction, but his message call-ing for expenditures of $71.8 billion, the highest of all peacetime budgets, shocked many fellow Republicans and began a struggle with Congress that dominated the entire first session. Republicans John Taber and Dan

245

246 Chapter 7

Reed immediately called for cuts, especially in foreign aid. Surprisingly the Secretary of Treasury George Humphrey criticized Eisenhower’s request and proclaimed that both the budget and taxes must be reduced and announced he opposed ”several [presidential] programs.” In time Eisen- hower’s brother Edgar added his voice to what one reporter described as an ”open r e~o l t . ”~ Although Martin continued to defend Eisenhower’s policy of balancing the budget before cutting taxes, he announced that Congress could trim enough “fat“ from the budget so that excise rates could be pared in 1957,followed by a substantial reduction in 1958. These steps which “our people deserve” would, he thought, lead to a Republi- can Congress6 His party’s right rejected this moderate approach. The New Yurk Daily News warned that Martin would seriously damage the GOP unless he responded to the national uproar over the Eisenhower budget, and the Chicago Daily News severely censured him, tagging the minority leader a ”tired political hack,” who pulled his punches against the New Deal and did nothing to resist Eisenhower’s drift into ~ocialism.~

Attacks upon the budget had become so common that at a press conference the president invited his critics to find where he might “save a dollar’’ and “if Congress can . . . it is their duty to do it.”8 Both parties pounced upon the invitation. In an effort to thwart House conservatives, who would use the challenge as a means of emasculating the entire Eisen- hower program, Martin announced that $3 billion could be saved if every department would cut a little. This would enable a tax decrease, which in turn would increase prosperity and empl~yment .~ However, the Republi- can Policy Committee called for a more substantial reduction, and with the support of every member of the Rules Committee the House circulated a petition calling for a cut from $3 to $7 billion, with half the savings applied to the public debt and the remainder for tax relief.

Moreover, sixty-six Republicans deserted their party and, as congressman jeered, whistled, and cheered, joined with Democrats (220 to 178) in an unprecedented resolution asking the president to cooperate with the House by recommending specific “substantial” cuts.’O Eisenhower observed that constitutional responsibility for the budget rested with Con- gress, but complied to the extent of submitting revised forecasts. By postponing some requests and shaving others, he reduced his budget by $1.342 billion. Further retrenchment, he warned, would jeopardize national defense or essential programs.” Caught between his loyalty to the president and the House budget-cutters, with whom he was ideologically allied, Martin continued to denounce tax reduction prior to a surplus as “legislative irresponsibility” but, on the other hand, criticized the revised budget as still too high. It could be further pruned by postponing additional programs, but he warned defense cuts, although possible, must be minor, for Communists were bent on “total rule by terror.’’12

247 “Minority Leader Meanest lob in the World”

Neither the president nor his congressional team could prevent substantial reductions in programs they considered essential. Although in terms of the entire budget the administration’s request for $144 million for the United States Jhformation Agency was relatively minor, Eisenhower suffered a serious congressional rebuke when despite his and Martin’s appeal for full funding, the House slashed appropriations for this agency by $37.9 million. Ignoring Eisenhower’s assertion that the House had exercised the wrong kind of economy and his frequent descriptions of the agency’s work as ”vital,” Senate Republicans further reduced the amount to $90.2 million. The Conference Committee split the difference, settling on a final figure of $96.2 million. This, the sharpest reduction of a single administration estimate, was a blow to presidential prestige. Fearing additional cuts in essential programs, Eisenhower appealed to the American people. On May 14 in a lengthy TV and radio address he reviewed his entire budget, emphasizing the necessity of approving his defense estimates, and a week later he dedicated his entire report to the nation to funding national security. He charged that Congress gambled recklessly with peace and freedom and concluded the one rational way to lower taxes was “to succeed in waging peace“ and then reduce military spending.13

Martin was no more successful in funding the president’s military program. The Defense Department originally sought $48 billion; Eisenhower lopped off over $10 billion before submitting the request to Congress. De- spite Martin‘s efforts the Democratic Appropriations Committee reduced it a further $2.856 billion. The president urged the House to restore $1.2 billion, but Martin, after meeting with the Policy Committee, concluded such an increase was impossible; instead he sought to reinstate $323 mil-lion. From the floor, he pleaded with Congress not to tempt the Soviets “to march by an appropriation so low it would reduce training in all three military branches and limit aircraft and naval pro~urement.’~ Martin’s efforts to restore defense authorizations were fruitless: restoration was defeated. The final defense appropriation was $33.5 billion, $2.5 billion less than the president originally requested, and $1billion less than what he described as the absolute minimum.

One of the most popular targets of the budget cutters was foreign aid. To head off critics Eisenhower declared at press conferences that his request of $4.4 billion was so low further reduction would jeopardize American security.I5 Nevertheless opposition mounted. Consequently, the president appealed to the nation, sent a special message to Congress reducing the amount to its absolute minimum of $3.865billion, and sought support from congressional leaders of both parties. Both Martin and Rayburn promised their best to get Mutual Security passed without substantial reduction. An emotional appeal from Martin that Congress was flirting with another war because its reckless irresponsibility would encourage the Soviets was

248 Chapter 7

ignored as the House slashed the request by $200 million, twice the Sen- ate’s reduction.lb Eisenhower and his congressional leaders urged the Con- ference Committee to raise the House authorization, with Martin warning that the president might call Congress into special session if the House figure stood. Nevertheless the Conference Committee compromise was un-satisfactory. An angry Eisenhower, threatening a special session if the funds proved inadequate, signed a bill authorizing an amount closer to the House figure than that of the Senate, $2.768 bi1li0n.l~ Despite his disappointment, Dulles praised Martin for the ”vigor” with which he supported foreign policy legislation and for his invaluable leadership in the House. Eisenhower, too, singled him out for praise, especially for his fight for foreign aid, defense appropriations, and civil rights.Is

Tensions between the president and House Republicans had been exacerbated to such an extent that the minority leader invited Eisenhower to a box luncheon with Republican representatives to smooth differences stemming from the budget imbroglio and to discuss school construction and civil rights legislation. Eisenhower claimed he enjoyed the affair. He ignored the budget struggle and rather than address specifically civil rights and school construction issues, appealed to the attendees to help enact the 1956 platform. One critic claimed the president was so charming that if he had used his charisma earlier he might have won the budget battle.19

THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE

A federally aided school construction program, one of Eisenhower’s major goals, fell victim to a combination of budget mania and, as in the Eighty-fourth Congress, to civil rights issues. The president’s State of the Union Address asking Congress for a school construction bill ”without delay” was followed by a special message urging the legislature to “act quickly upon this pressing problem” by appropriating $2 billion. Eisen- hower publicly stated that he hoped the proposal would be decided on its merits without reference to school integration and asked his minority leader to fend off any Powell-type amendments, which he believed were responsible for the defeat of similar legislation in 1956. Martin responded that he was unable to make “any rash promises.”20

When the House Education and Labor Committee finally approved a measure which made concessions to the economizers on formulas for dollar matching and reduced substantially the amount requested (only $1.5 billion over five years), Eisenhower’s support wavered. He told Martin he was “not entirely satisfied” and was not sure he would sign the bill, if passed. However, he never got the opportunity. Stuyvesant Wainwright I1 (Republican, New York) introduced an antisegregation amendment

249 ”Minority Leader Meanest job in the World“

similar to that of Powell’s in the preceding Congress. While his proposal was being voted, many Southerners abandoned the chamber, for they wanted the amendment approved in order to weaken the measure’s chance of final passage, but did not want to cast a vote for integration. With the backing of Republican leaders Martin, Halleck, and Arends, the amendment carried 136 to 105. But once again the inclusion of integration killed school construction, for the amended bill was rejected 208 to 203- only 27 Republicans including Martin supported it; 111including Halleck and Arends voted against the amended bill. Many Democrats, some Re- publicans, and several political observers thought that Eisenhower, with a few phone calls, as had been publicly suggested by his secretary of health, education, and welfare, could have rallied enough legislators to pass the measure. Martin, however, attributed the defeat neither to integration provisions nor to the president, but rather to bad timing and the “economy crowd.” The House had recently passed a mutual security act authorizing $3.242 billion for foreign aid, thus creating what the minority leader called an “economy mood” killing school construction?*

In keeping with his 1956 campaign commitment, Eisenhower in his State of the Union Address in January 1957 asked for a civil rights commission, a civil rights division in the Department of Justice, laws to aid in the enforcement of voting rights, and legislation permitting the federal government to seek preventative relief from the courts in civil rights cases.22 A measure incorporating these provisions made its way to Rules, where it was held up by the chairman, a segregationist, Howard Smith (Democrat, Virginia). Only as a result of Speaker Rayburn’s intervention was a bill finally reported out on May ZZ3Southerners meanwhile searched for a Republican to introduce an amendment requiring jury trial in contempt cases arising from Justice Department civil rights suits. Mar- tin publicly assailed this endeavor and after a party caucus, proudly announced a majority of Republicans would oppose such an amendment and would support the bill as reported. Moreover, at a meeting with officers of the Washington Bureau of the NAACP, he pledged to work for prompt passage without crippling amendmentsz4

A jury trial amendment was introduced by a conservative Republican, Russell Keeney (Illinois), whom Martin berated in the presence of other congressmen. “This was the most stupid, most ignorant thing I have ever seen,” he charged. “You have interfered with and hurt the Republican Party. I shall never forget what you have done.”= The amendment was defeated 167 to 199, and after three other attempts to include such a provision were also defeated, the measure, essentially as submitted by the administration, passed the House 286 (168 Republicans) to 126 (19 Republicans).

Senate opposition was at first concentrated on Title 111, which would enable the attorney general to enforce public accommodations. Eisenhower,

250 Chapter 7

who believed voting provisions to be the heart of the bill, publicly equivocated on Title 111 and when it was dropped by the Senate indicated he would not insist on its restoration. However, encouraged by Martin, who warned him too many concessions would lead to a “hollow victory,” he remained resolute against a jury trial amendment in contempt cases protecting voting rights.26

When the Senate on August 7 passed the measure with an enfeebling jury trial amendment, a disappointed and angry Eisenhower announced he would prefer no bill to one with this provision. Martin too swore he would fight this version, stating pro-civil rights Democrats and Republi- cans believed the Senate version was a ”joke.” If by some chance it should be enacted, he claimed, Eisenhower would veto it and call Congress into special session to deal once again with civil rights2’

However, it appeared as if the Senate version would never get out of House Rules. Many pro-civil rights Democrats, and Speaker Rayburn, believing it the best bill possible, wanted it reported to the floor with a rule prohibiting amendments. Such a procedure, they were sure, would result in the first civil rights legislation in nearly a century, a significant step forward, even if its voting provisions were nearly meaningless. Rules consisted of twelve members, eight Democrats, four of whom including chairman Smith were Southerners and opposed to any bill. It was necessary then for three of the four Republican members to agree to send the bill to the floor. On the other hand, it was necessary for three of the non-Southern Democrats to join with the Republicans if the proposal were to go to Con- ference, where it could be modified. Neither swing group moved. To solicit Republican support Rayburn was willing to report a measure with an amendment limiting jury trial to voting rights only, rather than all criminal contempt charges. Fearing southern jurors would acquit, Martin, who assumed leadership in the struggle for the Eisenhower bill (Knowland, the Republican Senate leader, advocated compromise), dismissed the proposal. He told the legislative leaders conference the Senate version would stay in Rules until the opposition, which was weakening, came to him with acceptable changes. Eisenhower endorsed Martin’s strategy and admired his courageous fight, even though he confided it was almost impossible to get his minority leader to understand any subtle suggestionF8 In response to a presidential question, Martin indicated he would meet with House Re- publicans and discuss an acceptable compromise. However, his idea of an acceptable compromise was one that would not substantially alter the bilLZ9 Publicly he was even more intransigent. He again stated that he would refuse to yield to amendments that would defeat a citizen’s right to vote, even if such a policy killed the measure. However, he didn’t believe that would happen; all that was necessary was for Republicans to stand fast and not foolishly abandon the fight on the eve of victory.30

"Minority Lender Meanest Job in the World" 251

Some black leaders and civil rights partisans, believing half a loaf better than none, urged Martin to compromise. In this group were several NAACP leaders, including Roy Wilkins, as well as Senator George Aiken (Republican, Vermont) and Martin's old friend, Majority Leader John Mc- Cormack. Senator Eugene McCarthy (Democrat, Minnesota) demanded to know where Martin's civil rights commitment was when he was Speaker in the Eightieth and Eighty-third Congresses, and the Senate Leader Lyn- don Johnson (Democrat, Texas) accused the minority leader of playing politics.31 More critical was Senator Hubert Humphrey (Democrat, Min- nesota), whose national reputation as a civil rights champion dated from the 1948 Democratic convention. He charged Republican leadership and Martin in particular of trying to scuttle the measure for political purposes and sarcastically asked, "When did he [Martin] become a champion of civil rights?" Martin countered by stating the NAACP did not speak for all "Negroes," that he represented far more of them than any other congressman, and back in 1925 when Humphrey was jerking sodas, pound- ing pills, and learning to be a druggist, he was voting for civil rights. He then challenged his critics to examine his record.32 In further response to these charges Martin released correspondence from prominent blacks extolling his efforts for an effective bill. This included the NAACP's lobbyist Clarence Mitchell, whom Martin was advising on ways to influence the vote of wayward republican^.^^ Moreover, the minority leader read into the Congressional Record extracts of communications backing his stance from thirty-two notable African-Americans and claimed this was but a small portion of hundreds of such letters.34

Despite Martin's apparent intransigence the press speculated on the possibility of compromise: the GOP, it reported, was moving away from its all-or-nothing position. To kill such rumors Martin told newsmen that he was not backing down but relying on the Conference Committee to improve the Senate versi0n.3~ Although reporters concluded he was among the most adamant Republicans on this issue, Martin never entirely closed the door to compromise; his opposition to a "hollow bill" was often clouded with ambiguity. The minority leader's position became somewhat mysterious when he informed the press that with the nearly unanimous backing of House Republicans, he had a "secret" civil rights proposal. The way to get a bill passed was for Democrats to approach him with concessions, and he would then discuss a "tangible cornpr~mise."~~

Eisenhower was unwilling to wait for Democrats to approach the leadership. On August 21, he announced that Republican congressional leaders would shortly reveal a proposal that he hoped would break the dead-

A few hours later Martin and the rest of the leadership released a compromise drafted by the presidential staff. It provided for jury trials in civil rights cases where the penalty would exceed a $300 fine or 89 days

252 Chapter 7

in jail. If the Democrats agreed to accept the provisions, Republican committeemen would vote the bill to the floor, recommending those amendments. In a press conference Martin loyally defended the new proposal in what the New York Times described as a reluctant and gloomy retreat.38 With the logjam broken, Johnson, Knowland, Martin, and Rayburn, who claimed the first he knew of the Republican concession was when he read it in the paper, engaged in a lengthy five-hour conference on details. Af- ter returning to the Senate, Johnson phoned Eisenhower, asking if the president would agree to the only settlement the Texan thought that chamber would approve: a jury trial when the sentence exceeded a forty- five-day jail term or $300 fine. Eisenhower called Knowland and Martin, soliciting and obtaining their approval. As the House leader was a little hesitant, the president assured him this would be “a great The Civil Rights bill with this provision was reported out of Rules by a ten to two vote, with Representatives Smith and William Colmer (Mississippi) opposed. It passed the House 279 to 97 and, after a 24-hour and 15-minute filibuster (the longest speech ever heard in the Senate) by Strom Thur- mond (Democrat, South Carolina), was approved by the Senate.40

Washington Post editorials were typical of much of the nation’s press, hailing the compromise and the statesmanship of those involved. Eisen- hower, too, was pleased, thanking Martin for his leadership in getting the bill passed and sending him one of the pens with which he signed it.41 In 1964 the NAACP’s Clarence Mitchell toured New England, informing voters of the role legislators played in the struggle for African- American equality and praised Martin as “a tremendous asset in the civil rights effort . . . a great man.”42 The bill in which Martin played such a prominent part was overshadowed by the civil rights legislation of 1964 and 1965; however, its precedent-shattering significance made subsequent laws possible, for the first time in nearly a century civil rights legislation had been enacted.

FOREIGN POLICY AND ADJOURNMENT

With Democratic backing Martin was more successful on foreign policy issues than with domestic legislation. In 1957 Eisenhower requested Con- gress authorize the president to use military force and spend $200 million in fiscal 1958 and 1959 for economic cooperation with Middle Eastern nations in order to check Communist aggression. When asked by reporters if Congress would alter the president’s Mideast resolution, Martin quipped, ”Even the Lord’s Prayer would be changed if it were presented to Congress.”43 Martin did his best to prevent such an occurrence. From the floor he insisted that a vote on what became known as T h e Eisen-

253 “Minority Leader Meanest job in the World”

hower Doctrine” might be the most important one cast in 1957, for it would block the Soviets‘ attempt at world conquest and thereby contribute to world peace. A similar grant of authority, he claimed, had succeeded in keeping Taiwan free. The measure easily passed the House and after considerable debate and minor amendments was approved by the Senate.44In supporting the president on issues that related to foreign policy, such as economic aid and defense appropriations, Martin often argued in terms of their effect on Soviet expansion; this was true even in the case of a British loan. He championed the White House request deferring interest payments on their 1945 loan, contending that if the United States were to enjoy prosperity the whole world must be prosperous. More typical was his assertion the loan would assist a valuable Cold War ally. Al- though the measure passed 218 to 167, neither Martin nor Eisenhower was successful in convincing Republicans of its necessity, for they voted 85 to 99 against it.

During October and November 1957 the launching of a Soviet satellite into orbit (Sputnik) dominated the news. Eisenhower asked for and received additional defense funding in December 1957 and in April and June 1958. Other than supporting the president’s requests, Martin’s response to the Soviet achievement was contradictory and inconsistent. At first he blamed the administration for inadequate satellite research, but later claimed the Soviets stole the technology from the United States. He frequently downplayed the launch’s significance, asserting it was merely a propaganda victory, a “stunt” which the United States could have brought about two years earlier if it had been warranted. More important, he asserted, was American missile supremacy; thus this nation had nothing to fear. On the other hand he called for increased satellite research without the overspending that would lead to deficits and inflation and cripple the country.45 Consequently, he introduced a bill for university scholarships for selected high school students recommended by congressmen in a procedure similar to military academy nominations. Like many science education bills submitted in the early days of the second session it died in committee, and the National Defense Education Act, which appropriated $882 million in federal aid to science education, made no provision for scholarships.

With the adjournment of Congress, Martin, as usual, fulfilled many speaking engagements and visited area post offices for his thirty-fourth annual tour. His speaking program, in which he berated the Democratic Congress for defense cuts that had ”diminished the security of the country,” was interrupted by the death of his mother in He had returned with her from his summer house to their North Attleboro home, where a few days later she died peacefully in her sleep. Although her death was not unexpected, because of failing health and her ninety-five

254 Chapter 7

years, it was still a grievous loss to Martin because they had been so cl0se.4~After her burial following a solemn high Mass in the local church, Martin resumed his politicking.

As Martin awaited the convening of the second session he worried about the budget more than usual. Despite Eisenhower’s prediction of a balanced one, he feared increased military spending necessitated by So-viet space achievements, and a reduction in revenue because of the recession would lead to a deficit. It was all the more imperative then for Con- gress to cut expenses and, after doing so, if still faced with a deficit, to increase the national debt limit rather than raise taxes. (With Martin’s encouragement from the floor and his plea not to “straitjacket” the president, the debt limit was easily raised early in the session.)48 Even though the need to keep American allies strong was more important than ever, he feared Congress would “wrangle“ over Mutual Security Legislation and that a “hot fight” over reciprocal trade would either defeat the administration’s proposals or change them substantially. Cautiously he warned the president to harbor his prestige and not to press for legislation that had no chance of passing.49

SECOND SESSION OF THE EIGHTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

In his budget message on January 13,Eisenhower proposed expenditures of $73.9 billion. Although this was more than the record-setting 1957 request, reaction was less impassioned. It was but an increase of $2.1 billion, with 62 percent of the amount earmarked for defense. Moreover, the president hoped to reduce domestic spending, especially in the areas of health, welfare,and education, the last of which he claimed was a state responsibility. Nevertheless, Martin was concerned, for despite the recession, revenue estimates assumed an economic recovery without federal intervention.

To budget cutters the most vulnerable portion of the budget was once again Mutual Security or foreign aid, and once again, chief among the president’s defenders was his minority leader. Martin immediately jus-tified Eisenhower’s request of $3.9 billion (an increase of $55 million from the year before) as a necessary part of a successful war against Communism. His impassioned plea in support of the Foreign Affairs Committee recommendation of $3.603 billion, of the $3.9 billion requested by Eisenhower which Martin claimed was a “rock bottom’’ estimate, must have been persuasive. By a vote of 259 to 134 the House approved the Committee’s allocation in what the New York Times described as an act of statesmanship.50

But there was little public support for the program, and consequently many congressmen had second thoughts. The House Appropriations

255 "Minority Leader Meanest lob in the World"

Committee, after rejecting an effort to kill the entire program, reduced the allotment even further. The chamber by a voice vote approved its recommendation of $3.078 billion. Eisenhower hoped funding would be restored, but Martin warned him that without Democratic help such a step would be unlikely; nevertheless he would try. Martin failed to get the needed Democratic support; however a disappointed Secretary of State Dulles thanked him for his valiant efforts.51 The Senate was more receptive to administration appeals, and a compromise earmarking $3.298 bil-lion for foreign aid was finally passed. Eisenhower was disappointed with the result, but drew solace from the fact mutual security survived, for foreign aid was one of his three "imperatives" requiring action.

The president's second imperative was renewal of reciprocal trade authority due to expire June 30. Eisenhower requested an unprecedented five-year extension with the right to lower tariffs 25 to 30 percent. Despite justifying his request as a Cold War weapon and appealing frequently to the Congress and business community, the opposition remained powerful and vocal, including Republicans on the Ways and Means Committee. Martin was again tom between loyalty to a Republican president and his commitment to manufacturers in his district as well as his ideological opposition to tariff reduction. Once more his responsibility as minority leader prevailed, even as he pressed for a textile tariff increase at a legislative leaders meeting while the legislation was before the House.52 He was one of the advisors who convinced Eisenhower to call a conference of national leaders including Truman and Adlai Stevenson, the Democratic presidential nominee of 1952 and 1956, to come to Washington and pressure for mutual security and tariff legi~lation.~~ Furthermore, he called upon the administration to undercut protectionist efforts to scuttle any bill by making some concessions to attract moderates and Democrats and ensure passage of an acceptable measure.54 Concessions were made and Ways and Means reported a five-year extension but limited reductions to 25 percent. Furthermore it empowered the House by a two-thirds vote to overrule the president if he rejected Tariff Commission recommendations to implement the "escape clause." For three days Martin worked behind the scenes capitalizing upon his friendship with Dan Reed to ensure the bill would not be sent back to committee for further disabling amend- m e n t ~ . ~ ~He also defended it from the floor by emphasizing its protectionist features, contending it would preserve jobs, could result for the first time in tariff increases, and would strengthen the free world in its conflict with Communism. Efforts to weaken the bill by amendments were rejected on an unrecorded vote and the Ways and Means version was passed. The Senate version called for a three-year extension, and the Conference Com- mittee recommendation of four years was accepted by both branches and defended by Martin as in keeping with the administration program for

256 Chapter 7

“trade, good-will, and peace.” Eisenhower, while recognizing that the minority leader was not entirely convinced of the measure’s merits, was “pleased” with the result, thanked Martin for his hard work, and congratulated him on the bill’s

The third of Eisenhower’s imperatives was defense reorganization. In April in a lengthy seven thousand word message, he urged Congress to grant the secretary of defense authority to transfer appropriations from one service to another, to redefine the secretaries of army, navy, and air force as the defense secretary’s administrative agents and the Joint Chiefs as his assistant^.^^ Eisenhower emphasized these changes would save money while improving the nation’s safety.

Despite Eisenhower’s military expertise many opposed his proposals. Each service had its champions who resented any diminution of their branch’s role; moreover some critics feared this was a step toward a Prussian-type general staff. The measure approved by the House Armed Services Committee contained provisions unacceptable to the president: each service would be separately organized; the defense secretary before abolishing, merging, or transferring command functions was required to provide Congress with thirty days’ notice and obtain the Joint Chiefs’ approval. Once again Eisenhower called upon the nation to support him. Martin, of course, sided with the president and expressed the hope that with the votes of thirty to forty Democrats and solid Republican backing he could get a measure acceptable to him.58To pressure Congress, Martin announced Eisenhower would ”go to the country” if the final version were unacceptable; moreover he called a caucus where he allegedly threatened that Republicans who opposed the measure would be left “out in the cold.” On the eve of a vote to recommit the bill with instructions to amend it as requested by the president, he predicted 95 percent party support. Although his prediction was accurate, the motion was defeated 192 (172 Republicans, 20 Democrats) to 211 (15 Republicans, 196 Democrats) and the bill was passed 402 to 1. The almost united Democratic opposition, it was claimed, resulted from the Republican solidarity, which irritated the majority party and destroyed bipartisanship. Martin, who was well known for seeking Democratic collaboration, feebly claimed that in the Republican caucus all he had done was give members ”information they needed to vote intelligently.”59 However, the Senate version and Conference Committee report were so close to the original administration request that the president congratulated the Armed Service Committee of both Houses for legislation that ”adequately meets every recommendation I submitted.”60

In a message close to his heart Eisenhower petitioned Congress to lower price supports for major crops from 75 to 60 percent of parity and rescind provisions for automatic increases. Many farm belt Republicans as well as

257 “Minority Leader Meanest Job in the World”

Democrats objected. When the Senate approved freezing price supports at the 1957 level Martin and William S. Hill (Colorado, senior Republican in the Agricultural Committee), at the request of the Policy Committee, met with the president, Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson, and White House staff. They asked the administration to modify its program, especially pertaining to parity for dairy products. Softening, they asserted, could be used as a bargaining chip to get additional representatives to join in killing the freeze. The president and Benson refused to yield. The session convinced Benson that House leaders were not providing the support to which the administration was entitled and were inclined to let Republicans vote as they pleased rather than encourage them to “stand up” for Eisen- hower programs. In what Benson referred to as “a mild spanking” the president cautioned him about inflexibility with congressional leaders, wam- ing him one must listen to their recommendations, as it will be difficult for them to keep their colleagues together in critical moments “unless we are willing to make what they consider are some necessary concessions from time to time.”61 Martin was proved right; with no bargaining power the House approved the freeze, leaving Eisenhower little choice but to veto.

A more cooperative Senate, fearing the repercussions of no bill whatso- ever, approved a measure satisfactory to the administration. Meanwhile the House Agriculture Committee reported out a “Democratic bill” which Raybum wanted to send directly to the floor, bypassing Rules and thereby precluding amendments. At a legislators White House conference it was agreed the Republican House leadership would decide upon tactics. However, the leaders were divided: Martin and Benson would urge Re- publicans to defeat the House proposal and then support the Senate bill, while Halleck, Arends, and Allen advocated passage of the House bill and hoped for improvement in Conference. Once again Benson came on too strong. Eisenhower wrote Martin that neither he nor the secretary intended to embarrass him; the loyalty and vigor he used to advance the cause of the administration was appreciated.62

Martin’s strategy was correct. The hoped-for quick passage of the House bill was soundly defeated due to Martin’s efforts by a vote of 214 to 171. With practically unanimous Republican support it fell far short of the two-thirds needed to bypass Rules and come to the floor. A week later it was then brought up in routine fashion, amended in keeping with much of administration policy, and passed easily, as the Farm Bloc could not get even enough support for a roll call. The Senate approved the House version, and, although far short of its original request, the administration claimed another victory which would point the farm program and its ever-mounting surpluses in the proper direction.

Meanwhile because Martin was convinced that a balanced budget was secondary to “humane policies,” his financial conservatism fell victim to

258 Chapter 7

the worsening recession, for unemployment reached a postwar high. If necessary he was willing to countenance a vast public works program but believed that a tax cut for individuals and business was more likely to check the economic decline. However, no action should be taken, he averred, until the results of Eisenhower’s antirecession program could be evaluated. The president’s effort to speed up housing construction, public works and military procurement and to extend unemployment insurance and encourage consumer spending would give an “immeasurable boost” to a lagging ec0nomy.6~

One of the administration’s responses to unemployment policies was a bill lending money to the states to enable them to extend jobless benefits for up to fifteen weeks at 50 percent of what state-insured workers had been receiving before their benefits ran out. Impatient Democrats found the measure inadequate. They proposed a $1.6 billion emergency unemployment fund to extend by sixteen weeks payments for those already covered and provide sixteen weeks for the unemployed who had not been protected by state law. This measure, reported out by the Ways and Means Committee, was criticized by Eisenhower as a ”dole,” a view shared by many conservative Democrats whom Martin expected to join Republicans in reshaping the bill in conformity with administration When the House debated amendments to do just that, Martin, referring to Eisen- hower’s hint he would veto an unsatisfactory measure, contended that because of the need for prompt action, the House could not afford to “wrangle” over features that displeased the executive. If the situation worsened, he pointed out the federal government could take further action. A coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats succeeded in amending the bill to the president’s liking and then passed the measure with ease. Martin and Eisenhower had been victorious again.

Among the nonadministration measures in which Martin played a prominent part was a presidential pension bill. One had passed the Senate in 1957 but had languished in the House, where there was considerable opposition, especially from Republicans, whose animosity toward Truman influenced their stance (the only other living ex-president to whom the benefits would apply was Hoover, who announced his pension would go to charity). Both Martin and Raybum testified favorably before the House Civil Service Committee, and from the floor the minority leader, after mentioning his disagreements with Truman, asserted that the Missourian had made notable contributions by serving his country and deserved it. Ex-presidents were awarded $25,000 annually, office space and staff, and franking privileges. A grateful Truman thanked Martin for his efforts, stating his appreciation, for it’s a ”wonderful thing for you to do.”&

As the session drew to a close many hailed the minority leader. The New York Times praised the cooperation between Martin and Raybum, describ-

259 “Minority Leader Meanesf Job in the World”

ing the Eighty-fifth as a “yes Congress” to a Republican president.66 Ray- bum agreed with the Times’s evaluation and at the conclusion of the session paid tribute to both parties in the ”hardest working session of Con- gress I have ever served in with the possible exception of the first hundred days . . . of the first Roosevelt administration.” The Democratic Speaker especially commended his old friend Martin, with whom he had a special relationship which he would “cherish as long as life is in my body.“67

MARTIN’S PROBLEMS

However, Martin was not well. Shortly before adjournment he was admitted to Bethesda Naval Hospital for a leg ailment soon diagnosed as a blood clot. Progress was slow. When he was discharged he still had ”trouble moving around,” even with a cane. He was forced to curtail his campaigning and miss his testimonial in Westport, Massachusetts. After a physical in December his physician advised him to follow a less strenu- ous schedule, rest in the middle of the day, lose weight, and continue using the cane.68 To many Republicans, especially younger congressmen, their leader, instead of being an experienced veteran, at age seventy-four was becoming little more than an old man.

Equally important to Martin’s future was the gradual deterioration of his relationship with the administration. The “bad blood” between Mar- tin and Halleck over the leadership continued to mount, resulting in the administration’s catering to the Indianan because it feared his ambition would divide the party. Furthermore, with the passage of time Eisen- hower aides increasingly came to believe him more effective than Martin and became uneasy over the minority leader’s friendship with Rayburn. Early in the session the president’s staff even hoped to get Arends to resign as Whip, creating a leadership vacancy for H a l l e ~ k . ~ ~

Word of strained relationships and the growing tendency to tum to Hal- leck rather than Martin leaked to the press.7O One columnist reported that as part of the “personal feud” Halleck was attempting to control the Policy Committee in order to oust Martin from the leadership in 1959 and that Martin had commented, ”The way the White House is running things [with Halleck], I won‘t have a minority to lead after the next ele~tion.”’~ Personal relationships between the two must have been exacerbated by Martin’s tee- totaling and Hallecks well-known penchant for a drink. Martin referred to Halleck‘s hideaway where he would gossip with cronies and plan operations as “Charlie’s drinking room.“ Halleck called it “the clinic.””

Newsweek reported that Republican Young Turks were anxious to “light a fire” under their leadership, while the Wall Street journal asserted their goal was to oust Martin. The paper alleged that Nixon, in order to further

260 Chapter 7

his forthcoming presidential bid, sympathized with the rebels. The vice president did not object when his aides leaked this story but warned them about identifying him with an ouster. “You must not leave any implication,” he wrote, ”that I am trying to get Joe Martin thrown out, because I never give any encouragement to that thinking. You must never put me in the middle of that kind of fight.”73 Although it was later reported the revolt fizzled out because of Martin’s success with the administration’s proposals on foreign aid, reciprocal tariff, and unemployment compensation, there was little doubt his influence with the White House was waning.74

An indication of the minority leader’s loss of influence was when Wilton Persons, deputy assistant to Eisenhower, refused to wake the napping president when Martin phoned, going so far as to pretend to be the president him~elf.7~ Eisenhower even began to express doubts about Mar- tin’s loyalty, at least as it pertained to OTC 1egislationP Part of the president’s attitude could have stemmed from his growing disappointment with his own party. In 1958he saw fewer legislators at the White House than usual, leading to complaints from Republican congressmen. More- over as the president indicated in his memoirs the first session of the Eighty-fifth Congress adjourned ”unmourned” by him.” Martin was aware that he was not getting adequate support from the White House and even complained about being “deserted by presidential progressives” as well as Republican ”rea~tionaries.”~~ But equally as bothersome was Eisenhower’s failure to stand by Martin during the Natural Gas affair, an abandonment which tended to make the president’s letter of praise at the end of the session appear little more than a routine, mechanical obligation.

The furor following Martin’s appearance at a Republican fundraiser in Houston, Texas exacerbated uneasy White House relations. One February 11, the morning after Martin spoke, Edward T. Folliard, Pulitzer Prize- winning reporter of the Washington Post, revealed the circumstances sur- rounding the $100 plate appreciation dinner whose proceeds were earmarked for the Republican National Committee. In addition to routine notices publicizing the affair, H. J. “Jack” Porter, Texas finance Republican chair and Republican National Committeeman, wrote to prominent gas and oil moguls on RNC stationery. In the letter he stated Martin “has always been a friend of Texas, especially of the oil and gas producing in-dustries. He mustered two-thirds of the Republican vote in the House each time the gas bill [came up]. . . . It will be up to Joe Martin to muster at least 65percent of the Republican votes in order to pass the gas bill this year. . . . He has to put Republican members from northern and eastern consuming areas on the spot politically because the bill is not popular due to the distortion of facts by newspaper columnists and others. The dinner must raise substantial amounts of money for the Republican Party as part of these will go toward the election of Republican Congressmen and Sen-

261 “Minority Leader Meanest Job in the World”

a t o r ~ . ” ~ ~The legislation to which Porter referred was the result of pro- tracted efforts by oilmen, who controlled the gas fields, to have the natural gas industry removed from the regulatory supervision of the Federal Power Commission. A similar measure had been vetoed by Truman in 1952 and another by Eisenhower in 1956 because of “the stench” sur- rounding the legislation, when Senator Francis P. Case (Republican, South Dakota) revealed his campaign fund received a cash contribution from “an out of state party. . . interested in the passage of the

The media, although sometimes excusing Martin as an innocent dupe, assailed the audacity of oil tycoons and their lobbyists. The Washington Post demanded a congressional investigation. The Democratic National Chairman, Paul M. Butler, condemned this “cynical and unethical conduct” and regretted the “sorry spectacle” of the Republican leader’s name giving prestige to a “shoddy exercise in mass bribery.”81 Meade Alcom, RNC chairman, discussed the incident with Eisenhower aid Persons and with James D. Hagerty, presidential press secretary. The latter two met with Eisenhower, who ordered the National Committee to refuse the dinner proceeds. Alcorn then issued a statement with the president’s approval that the RNC was rejecting the funds. An incensed and embarrassed Eisenhower in reply to a question at his press conference did not mention Martin when he stated he would not withdraw his support of the gas bill because the episode was ”an isolated incident that will never be repeated.”82 Martin was “infuriated” by the White House reaction, for to refuse the banquet’s proceeds was to imply the affair was scandalous and the charges of a conflict of interest were well grounded.

Democratic Senators Estes Kefauver (Tennessee), Wayne Morse, and Richard Neuberger (Oregon) and Representative Torbet MacDonald (Massachusetts), while either ignoring Martin‘s role in the sordid affair or expressing their respect for his personal integrity, assailed the crass- ness of the Republican Party and the ruthlessness of the oil interests. Newberger used the retention of the money by Texas Republicans as further justification for federal financing and reform of election laws.83 Their assaults and the negative publicity over the episode resulted in the bill dying in committee.

Martin received hundreds of letters objecting to the affair. Many in-cluded donations of $1to the ”Texas Millionaire Relief Fund,” asking if it were possible to deduct this contribution for tax purposes like an oil de- pletion allowance.84 Correspondents were informed that only after the dinner did Martin learn of the letter, the product of an overzealous ticket seller. According to the Balfimore Sun Martin’s office at first denied receiving these contributions but, when the House postmaster initiated an inquiry into them, began returning the money.85 The hapless Martin took solace in his belief that a ’,liberal” employed by one of the recipients had mailed

262 Chapter 7

Porter’s solicitation to the Washington Post, resulting in the Folliard ex- pose. He also found consolation in several Texan newspapers (Houston Post, Dallas News, Houston Chronicle, Ausf in American) which lambasted the exploitation of Porter’s political blunder as a means of defeating worthwhile legislation. Martin’s long-time supporter Hugh Cullen typified many conservatives when he wired Martin that the measure was a safeguard against eventual government ownership and no matter what, “I will continue to support sincere Democrats and Republicans who are fighting Socialist, Communistic tendencies.”86 Nevertheless, the one from whom he hoped to obtain succor remained silent. It must have been particularly painful at the legislative leaders meeting following the affair, when the president mentioned his support for his beleaguered secretary of agriculture, whom he described as a man of integrity and honest dedication, but failed to mention M a r k E 7

NOTES

1. Martin, “Address to Press Club,” January 13,1959, MP. 2. Entry of December 14, 1956, The Diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower 1953-

1961 (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1986); INS Release in Chronicle, 28 December 1957.

3. Legislative Leaders, December 31,1957. Martin was correct. Despite several pleas from the president and Weeks‘s speech, once again due to protectionists and those who believed membership would delegate too much of Congress’s tariff- making authority to the president, the bill died in committee. One scholar, however, believes Eisenhower may have been able to secure its passage if he had tried harder. Burton I. Kaufman, Trade and Aid: Eisenhozuer‘s Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1982), 76.

4. NYT, 2 January 1957. 5. N Y T , 17 January 1957; News Conference, May 22, Dwight D. Eisenhower,

Public Papers, 1957 (Washington: GPO 1958), 408. 6. Chicago Tribune, 1 February 1957; NYT, 17 February 1957. 7. Chicago Tribune and New York Daily News, 4 February 1957. 8. News Conference, January 23, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957,73-74. 9. Press release, March 5, 1957, MP.

10. N Y T , 13 March 1957. 11. Chronicle, 7, 14 March 1957; NYT, 4 March 1957; Eisenhower to Rayburn,

April 18, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957, 304-8. 12. NYT, 27 March; 11,23 April 1957. 13. NYT, 13,17-18 April 1957; Radio and TV Report to American People, May

14,1957 and Radio and TV Address to American People on Mutual Security, May 21, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957, 341-52,385-86.

14. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 1st sess., 1957, 103: 7893-94, 8062; NYT, 26, 29 May 1957.

263 "Minority Leader Meanest lob in the World"

15. News Conferences, March 7, April 3, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957, 176-77,248.

16. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 1st sess., 1957,103: 12032-33. 17. N Y T , 13,15 August 1957; News Conference, August 14,604-7; Statement on

Senate Restoration, August 27, 634-35; News Conference, September 7, 641-42, Statement on Signing Appropriation, September 3,655, all in Eisenhower, Public Popers, 1957.

18. Dulles to Martin, August 30,1957,John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton Uni- versity Library, Princeton, N.J.;Eisenhower to Martin, September 6,1957, MP.

19. Pearson column, WP,4 June 1957; Eisenhower to Martin, June 6,1957, MP. Martin's legislative assistant obtained a price of $2 per luncheon. Martin objected, claiming it was too much and ordered him to shop around; he finally obtained a price of $1.19.Ed Martin notes June 11,1967, MP.

20. State of the Union, January 10 and Special Message on Aid to Education, January 28, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957, 23, 93-94; President Eisenhower's Meetings with Legislative Leaders, 1953-86 (Frederick, Md.: University Publica- tions of America, microfilm, 1986), January 8,1957.

21. Robert Bendinger, Obstacle Course on CapitoZ Hill (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964), 138-39; N Y T , 26-27 July 1957. In 1960 I-Ialleck also voted for a Powell Amendment to the administration's school construction bill and then joined with Southerners to vote against the measure. This time the bill passed but died when four Republicans in Rules refused to vote it out to the Conference Committee to be reconciled with the Senate version. WP, 12 June 1960.

22. State of the Union, January 10, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957,23. 23. Alfred Steinburg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn Books,

1975), 313. The KKK had burned a cross at Rayburn's farmhouse after he helped get the 1956 bill reported to the floor, and according to Steinberg 314 threatened to do the same when the House finally passed this measure.

24. INS report, Chronicle, 6 June 1957;NAACP Board of Directors Meeting, May 13,1957, NAACP Papers, Supplement 1 to Part 1,1956-1960 (Bethesda, Md.: Uni- versity Publications of America, 1991).

25. Pearson column, WP, 20 June 1957. 26. Eisenhower Diaries, July 16, 1957; News Conferences, March 27, May 15,

July 31, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957,215,357,593. For Lyndon Johnson's role in eliminating Title 111 and obtaining the jury trail amendment in order to get Southern support for the bill see Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson:Mas-ter ofthe Senate (New York: Knopf, 2002), 892-998.

27. N Y T , 4,7, 9 August 1957. 28. Daily Diary, August 13, 1957, Jack Z . Anderson Papers, DDEL; Ann Whit-

man Diary, August 17,1957, Whitman Diary Series, Eisenhower Papers, DDEL. 29. Legislative Leaders, August 8, 16, 1957. 30. NYT, l0,13 August 1957; INS release, 10 August 1957. 31. N Y T , 11 August 1957. 32. WP, 12, 15 August 1957; Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 1st sess., 1957. 103:

14726,14736.There was no civil rights bill in 1925;however, in 1926 Martin voted for funds to erect a monument in France commemorating the service of "colored" troops in World War I. The measure, bitterly attacked by Southerners, passed

264 Chapter 7

227-116 primarily as a result of overwhelming Republican support. CongressionalRecord, 69 Cong. 2d sess., 1926, 66: 8395. Hugh Scott stated in an interview with Anthony Champagne (June 23,1980, p. 11, Sam Rayburn Library, Bonham, Tex.) that Martin came reluctantly to civil rights because it was politically helpful for the GOP.

33. Pearson column, WP, 24 August 1957; Gilbert T. Ware, "The National Asso- ciation for the Advancement of Colored People and the Civil Rights Act of 1957" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1962), 162.

34. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 1st sess., 1957, 103: A6800-A6802, A6927; press releases August 14,17, 1957, MI?

35. INS release, 16-17 August 1957; NYT, 17 August 1957. 36. WP, 20-21 August; Washington Star, 20 August; NYT, 21 August 1957. 37. News Conference, August 21, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957,618-19. 38. NYT and WP, 22 August 1957. 39. Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger, Jr., "The Eisenhower Ad-

ministration and the 1957 Civil Rights Act," in Shirley A. Warshaw, Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1973), 95.

40. Michael S. Mayer, "The Eisenhower Administration-The Civil Rights Act of 1957,"Congress and the Presidency 16 (autumn, 1989): 137-54 and his 1984 Prince-ton dissertation, "Eisenhower's Conditional Crusade: The Eisenhower Adminis- tration and Civil Rights, 1953-1957"; Richard W. Bolling, House Out of Order (New York: Dutton, 1965), 179-85; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-1961 (Gar-den City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 171.

41. Eisenhower to Martin, September 6, 1957, MP; Gerald Morgan to Martin, September 16, 1957 Eisenhower Papers. Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon: The Educa- tion ofa Politician (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), I: 435, is rather critical of Martin, writing that Republican congressmen were not happy with the bill and went along only because Eisenhower demanded it. He states that at a legislative leaders meeting after Nixon stated the law would result in increased black votes for Republicans Martin growled, "Yeh, I might even get two or three in my district." The source Ambrose cites does not include the "Yeh," gives no indication Martin growled, and mentions earlier at the same meeting Martin agreed with Senator Saltonstall that many more African-Americans would get the right to vote after the measure passed. One could conclude Martin was being realistic about his own district. See Minnick File, Legislative Leaders Meeting, August 13, 1957 Eisenhower Papers.

42. Fall River Herald Nezus, 1 October 1954; also see Denton L. Watson, Lion in the Lobby: Clarence Mitchell, ]r.'s Strugglefor the Passage of Civil Rights Legislation (New York: Morrow, 1990), 398,674,398,674.

43. UP release, Washington Daily Nezus, 3 January 1957. 44. President's Message to Congress, January 5, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1957,

6-16; Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 1st sess., 1957,103: 1155; Martin Notes on Res- olution, n.d., MI'; NYT, 6 January 1957.

45. Attleboro Sun, 24 October 1957; Providence Journal, 12 November 1957; Fall River Herald News, 22 November 1957; Chronicle, 13 December 1957; WP, 13 Janu-ary 1958; TV Program with Congressman Clarence J. Brown (Ohio), January 13, 1958, MP.

265 "Minority Leader Meanest Job in the World I'

46. Speech at Otis AFB, Chronicle, 24 September 1957; at Pawtucket Business Chamber, Chronicle, 5 November 1957; at Bristol County Agricultural Dinner, NYT, 24 October 1957; Statement for telenews, December 31,1957, MP.

47. Martin to Luce, September n.d., 1957, LP. 48. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess., 1958, 104: 708. 49. Chronicle, 13December 1957; NYHT, 13January 1958; NYT, 14January 1957;

Legislative Leaders, December 9,1957. 50. Statement, February 19, 1958, MP; Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess.,

1958,104: 8601-8602; NYT, 10 May 1958. Foreign aid was such an unpopular pro-gram throughout the country that Martin issued a special press release to district papers outlining its advantages to Massachusetts's economy. Press release, May 13, 1958, MP

51. Dulles to Martin, August 3,1958, Dulles Papers. 52. Legislative Leaders, March 11,1958. 53. NYT, 12 January 1958. 54. WP, 14 May 1958; NYT, 20 May 1958; Fall River Herald News, 7 June 1958. 55. Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York:

McKay, 1963), 368-69. 56. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess., 1958,104: 10745, 16505; Eisenhower

to Martin, June 12,1958, MP. 57. Special Message to Congress on Reorganization of the Defense Establish-

ment, April 3, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1958, 274-90. 58. NYT, 8 June 1958. 59. NYT, 11-13 June 1958. 60. NYT, 24 July 1958. 61. Ezra Taft Benson, Cross Fire: The Eight Years With Eisenhozuer (Garden City,

N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962); reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976), 393-96; Eisenhower to Benson, March 20,1958, Eisenhower Diaries.

62. Benson, Cross Fire, 402; Legislative Leaders, August 5, 1958; Eisenhower to Martin, August 5, 1958, MP.

63. Fall River Herald Nezus, 3 March 1958; Chronicle, 11, 24 March 1958; WP, 30 March 1958. For administration antirecession measures see Eisenhower to Martin, March 8,1958, MP.

64. WP, 30 August 1958. 65. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess., 1958, 104: 18942; Truman to Martin,

April 2, 1958, Post Presidential File, Truman Papers, Truman Library, Indepen- dence, Missouri; Joseph W. Martin, Jr. as told to Robert J. Donovan, M y First Fijty Years in Politics (New York McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Green- wood, 1975), 249.

66. NYT, 24 August 1958. 67. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess., 1958, 104: 19711. 68. Martin to Rayburn, September 11,1958, Rayburn Papers; Dr. Paul Dudley

White to Martin, December 4, 1958, and to Dr. George Calver, December 2, 1958, M P.

69. Entries of December 12,15,1957, January 5,7,1958, March 19,1957, Ander- son Diaries.

70. WP, 24 Februaryl957; Doris Fleeson column, Washington Star, 17 May 1957.

266 Chapter 7

71. Jack Anderson, “Washington Merry-Go-Round,“ WP, 10 April 1957. 72. Mac Neil, Forge of Democracy, 83. 73. “Republican Young Turks,” Newsweek, April 7, 1958, 19; Wall Street Journal,

April 4,1958; Nixon to W.C.K. and C.K. McW., April 8,1958, Richard M. Nixon Pa- pers, Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Niguel, Calif.

74. Roy Tucker’s widely syndicated column, ”National Whirligig,” Chronicle, 19 June 1958.

75. Phone calls 1:30 P.M., January 3,1957, Eisenhower Diaries. 76. Eisenhower to Henry Ford 11, April 25,1957, Office File 299, Eisenhower

Papers; Eisenhower phone call to Martin April 4, 1957, Eisenhower Diaries. 77. NYT, 25 May 1958;Geoffrey Perett, Eisenhower (New York: Random House,

1999), 587; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 148. 78. Entries February 5 and April 5, 1957, Anderson Diaries; “National

Whirligig,” Chronicle, 19 June 1958. 79. Also see Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess., 1958,104: 2214. For Martin‘s

account see First Fify Years, 23740. 80. Congressional Record, 84 Cong. 1st sess., 1956,103,196346,1994-2002,2014-

2016,2046. Legislative Leaders, February 14,1956.Two loyalists charged with conspiracy to influence a vote pleaded guilty to failure to register as lobbyists and were fined and given suspended sentences. For lobbyists and national gas see Edith T. Carper, Lobbying and the Natural Gas Bill-Znter University Case Program #72 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1962).

81. NYT, 12 February 1958. 82. Press Conference, February 26, Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1958,191. 83. Congressional Record, 85 Cong. 2d sess., 1958, 104: 2043, 2073-74, 2279-80,

2217,2221. 84. For example see J. A. Powers to Martin, February 14,1958, MP. 85. Baltimore Sun, 24 March 1958.There are no copies of letters returning funds

in the Martin papers; one letter, which included a check for $1, had a pencil notation on it ”return” but no date.

86. Cullen to Martin, February 12,1958, MP. 87. Legislative Leaders, February 25,1958.

”The Sting of Ingratitude 4.. 1958-1968

REPLACING A LEGEND 1958-1959

Martin began campaigning for the 1958 congressional elections early in 1957 and soon predicted a GOP victory because Democrats re-

fused to enact many Eisenhower initiatives and Republicans had brought both prosperity and peace.2 As a result of a Republican in the White House he pointed out the danger of renewed conflict with the Soviet Union had lessened. Early in 1958 during his western tour promoting a COP Con-gress Martin declared, “If the Soviets choose Communism we have no quarrel with that. . . . But the American people prefer what is called the American Way of Life and we are determined to defend that precious heritage. There is no reason for conflict between Russia and the United States once there is full appreciation of our position.” He continued by describing a nuclear balance of terror which would “stay the most warlike hand.”3 At the Lions International Convention, the same body where in 1954 he questioned the policy of coexistence, he was even more optimistic. Although he asserted, ’Tommunism is a massive empire for evil,” he noted the United States had blocked its progress for six years, and could continue to do so “short of war”-if the nation remained steadfast?

Domestically in 1957 he anointed Richard Nixon as the party’s 1960 presidential nominee. At a November press conference in Chicago, he announced to the surprise of many that the popular vice president should be the Republican candidate. Martin wrote Nixon that his declaration was an attempt to head off any of his challengers, for the press was endeavor- ing to stir up intraparty conflict.5 The Bay Stater was even more forthright

267

268 Chapter 8

in his western speaking tour a few months later. In what was described as starting the Nixon bandwagon, he proclaimed the vice president could and should be the next president, there was not another Republican in sight, and no Democrat could beat him.6 He further boosted Nixon’s candidacy when the House unanimously approved a Martin resolution hailing the vice president for his ”courageous and dignified conduct” when his life was endangered by Peruvian mobs during his Latin American “good will” tour?

However, in the fall of 1958 the minority leader was unable to stump the nation in behalf of congressional Republicans due to his afflicted leg. But he was able to travel to Washington to confer with Eisenhower and other party leaders at a strategy meeting called by the president when polls predicted a Democratic victory. Eisenhower was apprehensive about the party’s “apathy and complacency.” Martin agreed that the Republi- cans would lose unless supporters contributed time, brains, and money to the cause. He readily endorsed a joint statement released at the end of the two and one half-hour meeting, that if Democrats were victorious the United States was “certain to go down the left lane which leads increasingly to Socialism.” However, the minority leader, optimistic as usual, predicted an upset on the magnitude of Truman’s 1948 victory, for although the party was low in funds, he claimed the economy was improving and business was in an upturn.*

Predictably he was also involved in Massachusetts politics. Martin tried unsuccessfully to get his friend and legislative compatriot, seventy-seven- year-old Edith Nourse Rogers, to challenge Senator Kennedy’s bid for reelection. Abandoning his neutrality in the three-way Republican contest for governor, he supported Attorney General George Fingold, who was chosen by the convention, but died before the primary? Martin’s perennial opponent, Edward E Doolan, made his fourth successive run. Doolan allied himself with John Kennedy and blamed the Republicans for the recession and subsequent increase in unemployment.’0

Because of Martin’s poor health, his assistant James Milne substituted for him at various functions until September 9. On that date the minority leader attended a “nonpartisan” testimonial sponsored by the North At- tleborough Chamber of Commerce to honor his thirty-four years in Con- gress. He hobbled to the podium and claimed his personal inclination was to lay down this ”heavy burden,” but he could not ask others to make sac- rifices if he failed in his duty to contribute leadership, experience, and knowledge to his district. Two weeks later at a Taunton clambake he announced that physicians had cleared him to run, his health was fine, and he would be “all the way back in ten days.”” Although Martin undertook fewer speaking engagements than normal, his campaign was nearly as extensive as in the past: he even completed his round of post office visits,

269 “The Sting of Ingrutitirde”

stopping sometimes at as many as ten a day. In what pundits predicted would be a Democratic year, Martin emphasized his support of progressive measures, his nonpartisan constituent services, and his ability to obtain federal monies for the area. He did, however, attack the Democratic Eighty-fifth Congress as the biggest spending nonwartime Congress in history.12 Once again he won with ease: Martin 90,596, Doolan 57,934.

Nationally it was another story. Republicans suffered their worst defeat since 1936; for the third consecutive time both branches would be in Dem- ocratic hands: the Senate 64-34, the House 283-133. Nevertheless, Martin received many letters of congratulations on his impressive victory, including one from Secretary Dulles and messages from Eisenhower and Nixon. In view of the fact that soon he would be ousted as minority leader it was ironic that both the president and vice president stated they were looking forward to working with him, and in Nixon’s case that included rebuilding the Republican Party.I3

The letters provided little solace. Martin described his birthday as “mis- erable” because of the national results. Privately he blamed the loss on a lack of party leadership, writing to Clare Luce, “you can’t let a party run itself as in the last six years.”14 Publicly he attributed the defeat to six fac- tors: the recession, intraparty fights in several states, insufficient funds, lack of attractive candidates, failure to communicate the Republican message, and labor opposition.15 He was a little more candid with Eisen- hower, describing the election as puzzling and contending that “a lot of house cleaning throughout the county” was necessary if Republicans were going “to get anywhere.”16

As was his custom, shortly after the election Martin sent to the newly elected representatives congratulatory letters soliciting recommendations for the new session.” Their replies, including that of one of his most severe critics, Thomas 8. Curtis (Missouri), were occasionally censorious but gave no indication his leadership was in jeopardy.18 Neither was there an indication of trouble from the White House, although Martin‘s meeting with the president was strained. The minority leader conferred with Eisen- hower from 745 to 8:50A.M. on November 19; most of their conversation dealt with political issues. They agreed the election was not a serious setback, but that there was need to reorganize and energize the party with “good” candidates. According to the minutes, Martin ignored the president’s observation that new chairmen were needed for the House and Sen- ate Campaign Committees, ”fended off” the suggestion that younger Re- publicans be invited to the weekly leadership meetings (in his memoirs Eisenhower used the word “resisted” in reference to this proposal), and “sparred over” the recommendation that the House and Senate Campaign Committees be merged. None of these concerns were mentioned at Mar- tin’s press conference following the meeting. Instead he briefed the media

270 Chapter 8

that he would work closely with the opposition, that the president believed the party would be back stronger than ever in 1960 and would do everything possible to avoid increasing the debt ceiling (on June 30 it was scheduled to revert from $288billion to $283billion). Martin concluded by stating he expected to continue as minority leader, brushing aside reports Halleck would challenge him for this office, claiming such rumors cropped up every year.19 After a bipartisan legislative leaders meeting De- cember 15, Martin left Washington to spend Christmas in North Attle- borough. Eisenhower, however, continued to assess the election results with others, including Nixon, two Republicans defeated for reelection (Senator Charles E. Potter [Michigan] and Representative Charles B. Brownson [Indiana]), and his friend Cliff Roberts, with whom he emphasized the party’s need for youth and vigor.zo

By December 26, when Martin returned to the Capitol, reports of congressional dissatisfaction and plans to depose him were so rampant that he could no longer ignore them. Instead, he dismissed them as unrealistic, asserting that he had more than enough votes to retain the leadership. However, the challenge was more serious than he realized or cared to admit. In the middle of December in the office of Robert C. Wilson (Califor- nia), a known ally of the vice president, about fifteen representatives had met to analyze the election. They concluded it was necessary to strengthen House leadership and discussed the possibility of replacing Martin as one way of doing so. The insurgents, soon thirty-five in number, resolved to oust their leader. Many of them leaned toward Gerry Ford (Michigan), at forty-seven much younger and seemingly more liberal than Martin. When Ford showed little enthusiasm for a struggle, the planners turned to Halleck, who committed himself to the contest and whose candidacy would attract some support from older and more conservative members, Martin’s natural Compromises were rejected. Shortly before New Year’s Day Martin refused to accede to the suggestions of a group headed by Gerry Ford that he step down and become leader emeritusz2 “What are they trying to do,” asked Representative Clarence Brown (Ohio), “kick old Joe in the teeth after all the years of faith-ful service he has given our party?” After mentioning Martin would probably serve only two more years, he added, “Can’t Charlie Halleck wait that Perle Mesta, known to be a friend of Martin, lunched with one of the insurgent leaders, William Ayres (Ohio), at his request. He told her if she were a good friend of Martin, “you should go and tell him he had better resign,” that if he does not we have the votes to put him As the election approached Robert Humphreys, Martin’s friend on the RNC, allegedly tried to get him to strengthen his candidacy by announcing Ford would be his assistant.25 Three days before the caucus the insurgents were a little less sure of victory and proposed that Martin appoint an

271 "The Sting of Ingratitude"

assistant leader and resign as Policy Committee Chairman; confident of his election, Martin again refused. But on the very morning of the vote, when it appeared the tally would be close, Martin was willing to accept this compromise, but now Halleck rejected it.26

Halleck, reelected with his smallest margin (6,141 votes) since 1936, had long lusted for the offices of minority leader or when possible Speaker. He regretted that he had not challenged Martin for the latter position in 1952. When the Democrats retook the House in 1954 and 1956 Martin stepped down to minority leader rather than turn that position over to Halleck as the Indianan claimed had been promised. With "blood in my eye" Halleck believed Martin had taken "my job." (Martin denied ever having made such a commitment.) Despite the fact Martin had hailed him in a 1952 Indiana campaign speech as "my strong right arm," Halleck claimed the minority leader never treated him with respect and found the four years 1954-1958 particularly frustrating. Eisenhower, afraid the rivalry would fracture the party, talked Halleck out of running against Martin in 1955 and 1957, but in 1959 Halleck was determined to be elected leader or resign."

A self-described "restless, ambitious guy," he met with White House aides Jack Z. Anderson, Gerald D. Morgan, and Edward A. McCabe and informed them of his plans. It is disputed whether they offered to help him, but there is no question they did not attempt to dissuade him.28 A few days later he called at the White House and was told the president would remain neutral. Still not satisfied, he met with Eisenhower, his golf- ing partner at Burning Tree (the president had requested their lockers be located back to back), where he obtained a hands-off commitment. Ap-parently Halleck would have run with or without it, for according to Eisenhower's memoirs the Indianan stated, "The time has come when I can no longer work under Martin's nominal leadership. Twice before I have held off, but now I am determined to unseat him. And I have the votes to do it." Halleck must have found the president's reply encouraging: "With the poor showing the Republicans have made throughout the country, I simply say to you that, while I shall make no attempt to influence any congressman's vote, I shall no longer stand in your way."29 Eisenhower's response was in keeping with press aide Hagerty's advice that he not prevent a "change of face," for the election provided an opportunity for new blood; young congressmen could not be any worse than their predecessor^.^^

On January 5, the day before the caucus, Halleck for the first time publicly announced his candidacy and met with about forty insurgents led by Wilson. There he claimed the only way they could win was to rally behind him. He was persuasive. It was agreed all factions would unite behind the Hoosier and would press for a secret ballot at the election. On the same

272 Chapter 8

day Martin appeared in the Capitol for the first time without his cane, but still limping. He met with supporters in his office, solicited votes by phone from other representatives, and publicly proclaimed he would win?]

Martin entered the caucus carrying in case it were needed, a letter from Dr. Paul Dudley White certifying his good health. He predicted his opponents would fall short by at least nine votes and was nominated by Richard M. Simpson (Pennsylvania), substituting for the hospitalized Dan Reed, who usually performed that honor. Halleck was then nominated by Noah M. Mason (Illinois), one of the most conservative men in the House. Martin claimed Mason’s nominating speech ”would have done credit to the Bourbons.” In keeping with the insurgent’s plan and in violation of tradition, by a vote of 96 to 50 a motion carried that the election be by secret ballot-a sure sign that Martin was in trouble. Les Arends chided his “rubber legged” “no guts” colleagues for not standing up and being

The tally 73 for Halleck, 72 for Martin with one ballot illegible, necessitated a second ballot, which Halleck won 74 to 70. For the first time an incumbent leader was defeated for reelection. In the excitement the traditional motion to make the vote unanimous was forgotten. An emotional Martin received an ovation as he addressed his colleagues, appealing for unity and pledging his loyalty and cooperation to the victor, but rejecting the post of honorary floor leader that was offered to him.33 One of the more moving accounts of Martin’s defeat was found in the New Republic, a frequent critic of his:

The white movie spotlights were on in the marble corridor and the elderly bachelor came out like somebody who has stepped out of an auto wreck, dazed and crumpled. He had been knifed by regretful friends; they considered him too old, and since they couldn’t afford the luxury of disregarding the election mandate as the victorious Democratic hierarchy has, they chopped him. His political career was over. . . . It was grimly fascinating to see how fifty years of political experience led him to make his automatic re-sponse; he was doing it without thinking, making the game jokes that were expected of him-like the man in the wrecked car giving his name automat- ically to the policeman. In sheer pity the reporters blunted their questions to the tortured old man, but not the photographers. ”Hold Mr. Halleck‘s arm,“ they said, “come closer-closer. Now smile.” [To the request for a smile Mar- tin replied, “That’s asking a helluva lot from me.”] It was one of those ob- scene sights you can never quite rub

That evening Martin made his way to the National Democratic Club, where his friend Rayburn was celebrating his seventy-seventh birthday. The Democratic Speaker, whose earlier comment on the affair was “The events of the day bring discredit on every member of Congress, and the nation will live to regret it,” put his arm around his saddened colleague. With


tears running down his cheek Martin asked, "Do you have a cubbyhole for me anyplace?" Raybum replied he could have anything he ~ a n t e d . 3 ~

Shortly after the caucus Eisenhower phoned, expressing his gratitude for all Martin had done and inviting him to attend leadership meetings, which he refused to do. When Meade Alcom mentioned that Eisenhower and Nixon would like to host a White House dinner to honor him, Mar- tin replied as he did to other kind-hearted gestures, "Mr. Chairman you believe in sending flowers to the dead." However, he did welcome a consolation offered by his colleagues of both parties. The House appropriated funds for a chauffeur-driven limousine, an administrative assistant, and a secretary for former speakers (Martin was the only one). But bitterness remained. Several newspapers criticized the perk, as did Representative Ayers and Senator Frank Lausche (Democrat, Ohio). The latter inserted negative comments in the Congressional Record but then requested their deletion, for the Senate to rap the House in print was a violation of pro- ~ o c o ~ . ~ ~After attending the first few meetings of Congress and taking an unaccustomed nonleadership seat, Martin left for a two-week rest at the Nassau home of his Attleboro friends the Balfours, returning in time for a testimonial party hosted by Perle Mesta.

Martin was crushed by the desertion of congressional colleagues: "The test of true friendship is loyalty. A few of my friends let me down today. I am the fall guy all right."37 Equally hurtful was the "strange neutrality" of Eisenhower, who had let the defeat occur by not reining in his subor- dinates, and the participation of Richard Nixon, without whose approval, Martin was convinced, Representative Wilson would never have begun the revolt. Although both the president and vice president owed him allegiance, White House aides, he believed, were active participants in his defeat, probably because they found him too independent. He was also sure his health was a contributing factor to his loss; because of his ail- ments he was tired and unprepared. "If I'd been in good health, they couldn't have beaten me, no matter who attempted it." To friends he confided that it was the old anti-Taft forces and Deweyites who managed the "blitz" in preparation for the 1960 convention. He consoled himself by telling well-wishers the defeat was a blessing in disguise, relieving him of the burden of office, enabling him to live longer, and freeing him from the necessity of supporting legislation with which he did not agree.38

To many, including Martin, it was apparent his friendship with Ray-bum contributed to his loss. Less than a year after his ouster Martin, leaning heavily on his cane, his words "slow and full" with "deep affection showing through their formality," paid tribute to Sam Raybum on his birthday. Before a silent House chamber he mentioned how their friendship lasted over thirty-five years without a jarring note, lauded Raybum's Americanism, his struggle to maintain the honor and dignity of the House

274 Chapter 8

and concluded by stating, "Thank God we have Sam Raybum as Speaker."39 According to Raybum, as a result of their personal and professional relationships there was never "an unpleasant moment between us" and a smoother running Congress. Many scholars have praised this pragmatic approach that enabled proposals to be discussed, modified, and enacted into law rather than be rebuffed out of hand. Trusting one another, they exchanged information and rendered mutual assistance, thereby reducing interparty conflict. Rayburn's secretary and confidant, Alla Clary, stated the Texan never brought a bill up without first consulting with the Bay Stater. The most noteworthy example of their cooperation was the Rules Committee. There by means of a timely absence or a shift of votes, Republican moderates joined liberal Democrats to offset the conservative leadership of Judge Smith and William Colmer and sent bills to the floor.40 Raybum told a friend, "I could always manage to get a bill out of the Rules Committee while Joe Martin was Republican leader. I could work along with Joe.He was always ready to lend a hand if I requested help."41 Con- servative Republicans viewed this relationship as at best a lack of leadership and a weakness on Martin's part, while surprisingly one liberal Dem- ocrat criticized these two for "waltzing with one another"; instead of pushing their programs, "cronyism had become bipartisan."" Conse-quently Martin's ouster was a "blow" to Raybum, who knew things would be far different with Halleck. According to Clary the Indianan had been "tricky" when he was majority leader (1947-1949,1953-1955) trying to put something over on "Mr. Sam" and sneak in bills. Raybum was correct. Halleck and Smith, by changing the Republican approach on Rules, hoped to lead a coalition by which they could control the House.43

A week after his loss Martin attempted to make a little light of the affair. In an address to the National Press Club on January 13 he deviated from his prepared remarks to claim that being minority leader was the "meanest job in the world"-he hesitated-and then tumed to Rayburn, who was sitting at the head table, "especially under your president, Sam." To the amusement of the newshawks and in reference to his party's loss, he raised his right hand and swore, "I had nothing to do with the results in California," and then added, "Nothing in the House affected the result in Indiana" or Connecticut. In his first lengthy prepared remarks since his defeat, he described how hard he had worked in the last session despite his poor health, how he was caught napping, and how representatives opposed to his candidacy sat in on his conferences solely to reassure him he was in no danger. Martin defended himself against charges he was too familiar with Democrats and not aggressive enough by stating that sniping at the majority would not have changed the election results. He then explained his political philosophy: "I tried to lead and persuade rather than coerce and demand," and problems are solved by reasonable men willing

275 “TheSting of Ingratitude“

to conciliate and compromise. He concluded by stating he would continue to do what was best for the nation.44

Although many Martin supporters shared his conviction that pressures from the White House and the vice president were responsible for his defeat, none were applied directly. According to Persons, Eisenhower’s assistant who was also Halleck‘s friend and advisor, the president not only kept “his hands off” but also warned his staff to do so. Congressmen, both publicly and privately, denied White House involvement. The president himself stated that the selection of a leader was strictly up to Congress, that it was unfortunate that in a contest between one’s friends the good fortune of one has to be at the expense of the other. He thanked Martin for his long and effective service and stated he would continue to value his experience and counsel. Nevertheless, the president and his staff were pleased at the result. Sherman Adams noted that as a result of changes in the House and Senate leadership (Knowland left that chamber to run for governor) the president found pleasure in legislative leaders meetings and actually looked forward to them.“5 The only Eisenhower staffer who seemed to revel in Martin’s ouster was Clarence Randall, special assistant on foreign economic policy. He wrote in his journal that the defeat was forty-eight years too late; Martin lacked intelligence except for animal cm- ning, was close to disloyal, only moved on controversial issues when “the whip was laid on him hard. Charlie Halleck will behave differentl~.”~~ But Halleck’s different behavior did not result in increased congressional support for the administration’s program. Both sessions of the Eighty-sixth Congress lowered the percentage of presidential proposals passed, reaching an Eisenhower low of 30.6 percent in the second se~sion.~’

Nixon, too, denied that either he or the White House staff intervened in what was a “congressional decision” and proclaimed his regard and respect for his ”close friend” Martin4* Wilson, the acknowledged leader of the coup, stated that it was merely coincidence that the vice president’s friends preferred H a l l e ~ k . ~ ~ In a letter to Nixon, Wilson reported that a Fulton Lewis, Jr. column he enclosed was fairly accurate except for the role of Joseph F. Holt (California). In the article Lewis asserted that the leaders of the move were friends and supporters of Nixon, but that the vice president took his cue from the White House and remained neutral. At the last minute, so Lewis claimed, Martin went to Nixon for help and the vice president contacted several congressmen, but they were unable at that late date to renege on their commitment to Halleck.50 Nonetheless, many remained unconvinced of executive branch neutrality. Simpson, who nominated Martin, told the Pennsylvania delegation that the minority leader was the victim of White House “conniving,” a “double-cross” by White House aides.51 The journalist Tom Wicker denounced Nixon, for he “stage-managed the overthrow of Joe Martin,” his

276 Chapter 8

“one time benefactor.” Thirty years after the event Ernest Ladiera, who was appointed to Martin’s staff in January 1957, could not refer to Nixon without dubbing him “the ingrate.”52 After citing Nixon’s role in the ouster, Martin told a story about a New Englander out for a buggy ride with a girl whom he had courted for years. “’Mary, will you marry me?’ the fellow asked. The girl said she would. The fellow said nothing for several miles. Then the girl asked him why he hadn’t responded. ’I guess I’ve said too much already,’ replied the fellow.”53

But it was not necessary for Eisenhower or Nixon to intervene in order to influence the outcome. Representative Wainwright (New York) has pointed out the mere fact that Halleck was known to be a friend of Nixon “carried weight.” The vice president had expressed his displeasure at Martin’s failure to resign the chairmanship of the Policy Committee, first privately to Bob Wilson and then publicly. Maybe this expression of dis- approval led to Nixon’s comment to a Republican, who voted for Halleck, “I suggested you light a fire under Joe, not a revol~t ion.”~~

The occasion was the election debacle; the opportunity, the “neutrality” of Nixon and Eisenhower; the catalyst, discontent with Martin’s chairmanship of the Policy Committee. Younger Republicans objected to its in- frequent meetings, inadequate staff, and failure to listen to their views. Older Republicans were frustrated as Martin used the Committee to transmit the president’s wishes rather than convey the legislative mood to the executive. Thomas B. Curtis (Missouri) complained to Martin that not only was more staff needed, but there was open discontent because the White House treated representatives as “hacks.” (As Martin would not commit himself to any changes until after his reelection as leader, Curtis voted against him.) Until it was too late to make a difference, Martin refused to resign as Policy Chair. Halleck, however, in his bid to oust Mar- tin, agreed to separate that office from the leadership and support as chair John W. Byrnes (Wisconsin), the most senior Republican available in the group clamoring for Martin’s ouster. Bymes promised that with him as new chair the Committee would no longer be docile and rather than implement White House directives would formulate policies. Moreover it would present a Republican congressional position more articulately, more aggressively, and more forcibly than in the past.55

Younger insurgents resented the administration’s failure to treat them as equal partners, while many older ones objected to Eisenhower‘s ”New Republicanism” being enacted under the leadership of Martin. In a 1961 television interview Martin stated that often he disagreed with White House legislative proposals that he pushed and mentioned his achievement in obtaining reciprocal tariff legislation was “much to my discom- fort at home, and little appreciation with the administration.” He went on to state that being minority leader is a “happy job except when your party

“The Sting of Ingratitude“ 277

is in the White House, [then] you’re . . . under hobbles all the time.rr56 Moreover while the executive branch did not appreciate his efforts, he claimed senior Republicans to whom he would ordinarily turn for support were alienated by them.57 Ben F. Jensen (Iowa), justifying his Halleck vote to Joseph Pew, Martin’s old friend, explained that in times past Mar- tin would urge Republicans to vote their district but for the last four years had pressured us ”to follow blindly Ike’s every wish; in so doing he was responsible for the defeat of a number of farm state congressmen as he “deserted his former conservative course by constantly fighting for Ike’s program of Modem Republicani~m.”~~ John Taber, the most senior Re- publican, publicly announced he hoped Halleck would provide more conservative leadership, and Edward J. Derwinski (Illinois) voted for Hal- leck, for as a “typical conservative Republican” he was more at home with a fellow Midwestern conservative than with an Eastern liberal.59 Some observers, too, saw the result as a conservative victory. The syndicated columnist Ray Tucker described Halleck as an “utter reactionary“ whose election strengthened the Republican right, while President Truman characterized him as “just” a little to the right of King George IK60 Voting analysis gave some sustenance to these views: in the previous Congress on 110 key issues Martin was with the administration 74 percent of the time, Halleck, 67 percent; AFL-CIO COPE rated Martin as voting properly on seven of thirteen roll calls on social welfare, civil rights, and labor, but Halleck only on four.6’ Americans for Democratic Action ratings on leading Republican insurgents demonstrated that Martin’s ouster was not an attempt to provide more liberal leadership: on twelve key votes Ford voted liberal five times, Donald Jackson (California) three times, and all of the others two or less.62 A Brookings Institute study concluded that Martin sometimes sided with the Republican urban progressive wing, but Halleck “stood squarely with the ~ ~ n ~ e r ~ a t i ~ e ~ . ~ ’ ~ ~

In order to get the Eisenhower program enacted Martin had compromised with Speaker Rayburn by accepting Democratic amendments. This led to the charge he was too friendly with the majority, an accusation especially from conservatives.@ Halleck asserted that Martin’s friendship with Rayburn didn‘t mean “a damn thing”; nevertheless the new leader reached out for Democrats, claiming it was one of his responsibilities. But these were Southern Democrats with whom he sought to form a conservative coalition, not northern liberals who would support the administration’s legislative agenda. It was even charged that he tried to prevent a Republican from introducing Eisenhower’s 1959 civil rights bill, as it would cost him southern support on budget measures.@

In some ways Halleck’s personality cut across ideological lines. To some he was a “gut fighter” who would provide more aggressive leadership after a disastrous November. To others he provided youth and

278 Chapter 8

symbolized change, whereas Martin was old and consequently inefficient. Two of Martin’s critics believed he was senile and another that he was approaching senility. Ford found him pleasant, but ineffective, handicapped by age, necessitating someone more vigorous and articulate. Even Hugh Scott (Pennsylvania), his advocate, believed Martin “was slipping” and attributed his defeat to the better intelligence service of the “young wolf” in his contest with “the old

There is little doubt about the sharp contrast between the two.Halleck was forceful, overpowering, theatrical, and a cajoler of his fellow Repub- licans, often to extremes. Some voted for Martin only because Halleck’s “fierce partisanship and temper” rubbed them the wrong way6’ More concerned with marshaling GOP opposition than working a compromise, he judged his colleagues by only one standard-were they voting with him or against him?68

These tactics frequently failed. Martin arranged with the Democratic leadership not to fight a measure Eisenhower wanted passed. In a fiery speech Halleck attacked the majority, and the bill was defeated. The Democratic floor leader, McCormack, informed Martin, “Joe, we were go-ing to give you that bill until Halleck damned us all.” Halleck, himself, on occasion, admitted he pushed too hard.69 New York TimesWhite House reporter William H. Lawrence described him as noisier, but less reliable than Martin, a change that worked to Eisenhower’s detriment.7O Younger Republicans increasingly became discontented with Halleck’s leadership as he “froze out Modern Republicans.” Even in the Policy Committee, which had triggered the Martin ouster, newer representatives felt shunted aside as older partisans were given additional weight in structured voting (the most recent five classes of electees had no vote), and the Committee rarely met. In 1964 young activists, aided by a joyful Martin, succeeded in ousting Halleck and replacing him with Ford. Eisenhower, however, never lost his respect or affection for Halleck. In 1960 he personally appeared at a tribute to him as ”Indiana’s Man of the Year,” in which he proclaimed it was a great privilege to say ”Thank you, Mr. Halleck,” to a “topflight, fighting, tough little Hoosier,” who performed valuable service for the entire nation.71 He was all the more effusive in 1966, when contrary to his policy against writing prefatory remarks for publishers, he authored a foreword to a biography of Halleck. He described the former leader as one of the finest men he had even known, a foremost patriot of political courage whose counsel and friendship were “indispensable throughout my service in the Presidency.””

Meanwhile Martin received tributes from many: hundreds of letters from admirers throughout the nation, including one from Foster Dulles hailing his assistance and counsel and praising his integrity and fair- mindedness.” Edith Rogers (Massachusetts) read two kudos into the Con-

279 “The Sting of Ingratitude“

gressiorral Record, and Clare Hoffman (Michigan) on the floor of the House, after stating that “ambition is a jealous mistress and kindly virtues are sometimes forgotten or disregarded when she is on the way to a desired goal,’‘ praised Martin’s devotion to party, Congress, and nation.’* Many newspaper articles and editorials as well as magazines acclaimed his service and integrity. Yet Martin remained downcast, for although he improved physically, the ouster “hurt dreadful.”75 According to his friend Representative James C. Auchincloss (New Jersey), he had lost interest in practically everything and was “pretty sour,” a reaction interpreted by those less sympathetic as Martin ”sulking in his tent.” Accompanied by Jack Anderson, Auchincloss in March asked the president to give Martin “a lift” by ensuring that he preside at the 1960 Republican National Con- vention. Eisenhower’s tart response was that twice he had prevented Hal- leck from running against Martin but Martin refused to appoint Halleck assistant leader when he asked the Bay Stater to do so. Despite these comments Eisenhower reported the conversation to Alcom and Persons. The latter, with the president’s permission, under Eisenhower’s name, sent a warm note and flowers to the bedridden Martin, who was in Bethesda Naval Hospital due to arthritis of the knee. Eisenhower was much more magnanimous a month later when he saw Martin seated and clutching his cane outside the dining room at the annual Republican women‘s dinner. The president went over and escorted the ailing former leader to the cocktail party which preceded the banquet.76 Martin may have been dejected, but according to Persons, he was ”not really difficult in the obvious sense of the word,” upset for a time, but he got straightened out. “Joe Martin was, I’d say, all right, pretty damned nice to us, all things considered.””’

Martin’s views on national politics were less optimistic than in the past. This change in perspective may have been attributable to the fact that Nixon, whom Martin had not forgiven for his role in Halleck‘s victory, ap-peared headed for the presidential nomination. In April the congressman stated that Republican prospects “don’t look too bright” and in a veiled slap at Nixon announced that the party must recruit ”attractive candidates who will bring strength to the ticket, not just men who are hoping to ride on someone else’s coat tails.” Martin, who had enthusiastically endorsed Nixon less than six months before, now refused to commit himself to the vice president. Nelson Rockefeller by his election as governor of New York in November 1958 became a possible alternate to a Nixon nomination. Speculation on his candidacy was fostered by his staff and promoted by Martin’s assessment that the nomination is “more up in the air than anyone realize^."^^ A month later the deposed leader took another public step toward the governor’s camp. After meeting with Eisenhower he briefed the press on how he told the president that although Nixon was ahead, the race was wide open, and Rockefeller’s strength would increase as more

280 Chapter 8 and more of the country turned to him. (Martin’s first call on the president had been a few weeks earlier when he paid a “social visit” on May 5.)79

Interpreting Martin’s moves as a reaction to the vice president’s alleged participation in his defeat, the Nixon circle sought to regain the Bay Stater’s allegiance. However, it is possible Martin was attracted to the governor for reasons other than bitterness toward Nixon. Apparently he was friendly with Rockefeller as early as 1952 and Edward, Joseph Mar- tin’s brother, who was acquainted with the governor through their Dart- mouth College ties, noted that he did not know whether he or his brother, who were Rockefeller “boosters for years,” first sold the other on the New Yorker. He did, however, admit his brother’s enthusiasm was remarkable, especially in the light of his more conservative friends.@’

Nixon sought a rapprochement with Martin early in 1959. After Repre- sentative Simpson reported to Martin that Nixon would like to see him, the former leader hosted a luncheon in his office for Simpson, Len Hall, former RNC chairman, and the vice president. Nixon shook hands cor- dially with Martin and the four sat around and discussed politics. But to Martin‘s surprise Nixon never mentioned a word on Halleck’s election, the subject on everyone’s mind, especially as the conversation dealt with the forthcoming 1960 congressional elections. If Nixon were not going to raise the subject, Martin determined neither would he.81 Relations continued to be strained because, according to one of Nixon‘s aides, the Bay Stater’s assistant, Jim Milne, was keeping Martin “upset.” It is not known if anyone followed the aide’s advice “to soften up Milne” in order to get the former leader ”back in line.”8z However, a few days after this suggestion, Nixon sent an ingratiating letter congratulating Martin for organizing and speaking at a fund-raising dinner. In his message the vice president mentioned that Catherine Martin, who would have just turned ninety-seven, if living, would be proud of her

Nixon’s overtures were ignored. It soon became common knowledge that Martin was assisting Rockefeller’s candidacy. It was even reported the governor’s staff approached the new RNC chairman Thruston Morton to get Martin appointed chairman of the Republican National Convention.@ In September, Nixon suggested to Herb Klein, his advisor, friend, and press aide, that he see if Jim Copley, a friend of Martin‘s, would intervene and persuade the congressman not to isolate himself from the party by supporting Rockefeller, a sure 10ser.8~ If James S. Copley, leader in the Re- publican Congressional Booster’s Club, saw Martin, it was to no avail. In October the representative all but publicly endorsed Rockefeller when he asserted that although Nixon may be more popular in the party, Republi- cans needed a candidate such as the New Yorker, who would “top“ Nixon in an election by attracting independentsF6 Nevertheless, the vice president continued to reach out to the congressman, sending him greetings on his seventy-fifth birthday and other congratulatory messages, even after

”TheSting of Ingratitude“ 281

Rockefeller withdrew from the contest. When Representative Auchincloss, chair of the Republican Capitol Hill Club, announced that a planned office building housing the Republican National Committee, the Young Repub- licans, and the Congressional and Senatorial Campaign Committees would also be the repository for Martin’s papers and named for him, Nixon publicly hailed the choice. He praised it as recognition of Martin’s fine work on behalf of the party and the country, and an appropriate honor which would please the congressman’s host of friend^.^'

In mid-December after concluding that the vice president’s strength among party regulars was so strong it precluded his nomination, Rocke- feller announced he was not a candidate. With Nixon‘s selection then all but certain, Martin turned his attention to the vice presidential nomination, which his nemesis Halleck openly coveted. In what has been interpreted as retaliation against the new leader, Martin proclaimed that with Nixon heading the ticket it was essential to have an Easterner in second place. After mentioning as possibilities several New Englanders, including Margaret Chase Smith, he focused his attention on United Nations ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and began to gather support for himess As Halleck‘s vice presidential hopes waned, the minority leader accepted the permanent chairmanship of the Republican National Convention (Martin’s old post) and as presiding officer-to-be abandoned his quest for office. Martin continued to campaign for Lodge while clinging to dreams of a Rockefeller nomination. In June the governor belatedly authorized a Draft Rockefeller Movement. After forcing platform changes on civil rights, defense, and economic stimulation and rejecting Nixon’s offer of the vice presidency, on the Saturday preceding the convention he withdrew once again. Nevertheless still hoping to cast a vote for the New Yorker, Martin prevented the Massachusetts delegation from endorsing Nixon; on the other hand he pushed through a pro-Lodge reso l~ t ion .~~ The convention easily nominated Nixon (Rockefeller’s name was not even placed in nomination) and his vice presidential choice Lodge. Early in the proceeding, delegates presented Martin with a silver gavel and named him honorary permanent convention chairman. “Kindly Joe Mar- tin” was deeply hurt by this “crumb from Nixon” according to columnist Drew Pearson.go But he was appreciative of a letter from Lodge. The ambassador stated he was honored by the congressman’s support and looked forward to working with him in the campaign.91

BACK-BENCH CONGRESSMAN

During 1959 and 1960 Martin maintained his hard line against world Communism, urging the West to stand firm in Berlin and not yield to So-viet pressure to change the city’s status. He castigated the visit of Soviet

282 Chapter 8

Premier Nikita Khrushchev to the United States as killing "the hopes of captive nations behind the iron curtain . . .by wining and dining and giving the red carpet treatment to the very people who hold them in bondage." His warnings of the dangers of international Communism seemed to reach a climax in the spring of 1960 when an American U-2 observation plane was shot down deep over Soviet territory. He denounced the USSR for this outrage and vilified it for spying on the West-yet he concluded with hope: "Peace is so essential no effort should be left un-turned to keep the world at peace. ...There is room enough in the world for all of us.'192 However, he saw no room in the United Nations for the People's Republic of China and he petitioned both Democratic and Re-publican Parties to include a platform plank against its admission to the world body and against American recognition of that nati0n.9~

Martin's domestic addresses also emphasized long-held themes: a balanced budget, economy in government (although to him slashing foreign aid was a false economy, the United States must aid the emerging African and Asian nations), the threat of inflation, and the dangers imported manufactured goods presented to American workers.94 He appealed to Eisen- hower and to the Tariff Commission to increase duties on some items and impose quotas on others and urged congressional study of the effects of imported goods on American industry and j0bs.9~ Moreover, Martin criticized administrative extravagance, depicting Congress as the innocent victim of inordinate budget requests by an executive branch whose duty it was to scrutinize estimates and participate in a joint effort to foster rigid economy. Unless change was forthcoming, the nation was on "a joyride to a disastrous

In April 1959 he announced he would run again if his health permitted; as his leg prevented him from standing very long, he stated the decision might be delayed until the last minute.97 That his health was improving and there would be no need to wait so long was indicated by a Washington newspaper's gossip column. It reported that Martin and Polly Guggenheim, a popular hostess, were a capital twosome. She stated it was nothing serious; they were just longtime good friends. Nevertheless the columnist claimed Martin had not looked so well since he lost to H a l l e ~ k . ~ ~ Therefore it was no surprise that in August as guest of honor at a county clambake he disclosed he would run again. Although still walking with a cane, he declared he was ready for a tough fight, as he was in his best shape in ten years.99 Accordingly, he made his usual post office visits in the fall and resumed a full schedule of speech making.

Once again Martin was challenged by his perennial Democratic opponent Doolan, who emphasized the same issues as in the past: increases in the minimum wage and social security benefits, the need for new lead-


ership, and economic dangers from low tariffs. Martin stressed his experience and liberal record, deemphasized his party affiliations, and portrayed himself as an "outstanding champion" of social security, unemployment compensation, and the minimum wage. This characterization was not too much of an exaggeration. Of nine key votes selected by Americans for Democratic Action, Martin was absent for one, but voted on the "liberal side" for five others, including civil rights. As in the past he joined the majority of his party in adding a Powell-type amendment to the school aid bill, and as in the past, unlike the majority of his party, he voted to pass the amended measure. Despite Republican opposition (49-92) the bill was enacted (208-189). Moreover he joined with fourteen other Republicans to try to override Eisenhower's veto of a water pollution measure, the first time he voted to override the president.lo0 His commitment to the cause was reflected in Martin's vice presidency of the National Rivers and Harbors Congress, a nonpartisan organization committed to the comprehensive development of water resources. Declaring flood control and water pollution a federal problem, as rivers did not recognize state boundaries, Martin advocated federal aid for the construction of water treatment and sewage disposal plants.101

The publication of Martin's memoirs greatly benefited his campaign. Their purpose according to him was to reveal an "American story . . . how a boy who sold newspapers in North Attleboro could one day become Speaker of the House without any special group pushing him."lo2 Robert J. Donovan, Washington Bureau Chief of the Los Angeles Times,helped Martin with the book, interviewing him every day in his office from 8:OO to 10:OO A.M. The reporter would then take the tapes home, work on them, and with the help of a researcher edit the 1000 pages of typescript, reducing them to a 250-page b00k. l~~ Donovan, who had not known Mar- tin, came to like, respect, and admire the doughty New Englander as a re-sult of the sessions and as late as 2002 described him as a politician of in-tegrity "whose like we shall not encounter again."'"

The book reviews were all favorable, reflecting genuine affection for the old warhorse. In many ways Ernest K. Lindley, long-time political editor and Newszueek columnist, represented others when he wrote, "NOmember of Congress is better liked or more thoroughly trusted by his colleagues of both parties. . . . He is unassuming, direct, gently humorous, warm, kind."lo5 Apparently Henry Cabot Lodge was not as enamored of the book as the critics were. According to Martin and Donovan, Lodge's aides, fearful Martin's comments on Nixon would cost votes, pressured a large Boston department store to postpone the congressman's book signing until after the election.106

Shortly before Election Day Martin celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday, and at a huge testimonial marking his fifty years of public service

284 Chapter 8

was honored for ”his belief in the dignity and brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of God.” The affair, conceived and planned by his old friend Rabbi Baruch Korff, included Perle Mesta as a special guest and Nelson Rockefeller as the featured speaker, with messages from Herbert Hoover, Eisenhower, and Nixon. Although Martin in his address hailed Rockefeller as a future president, he failed to mention Nixon or call for a Republican victory in the fall.’“’

In November Doolan carried Fall River, but Martin ran far better than any other Republican in the Democratic city. He easily won the rest of the district, polling 115,164 to Doolan’s 75,876. After the election Drew Pear- son noted that Martin would have received more money by retiring than by serving another term. With taxes and contributions to the retirement fund, his salary was less than what his pension would have been. Martin quipped, ”I think I’ll go on losing money for a few more years.’1108

WITH DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS ONCE AGAIN

Martin had won with ease, but in one of the closest twentieth century elections Nixon was barely bested in the popular vote by John E Kennedy. De- spite his disappointing loss, the Californian graciously sent a congratulatory note on Martin’s reelection and later from his Washington quarters sent the nonsmoking congressman souvenir ashtrays with the vice presidential seal as well as a cast of the hand of Abraham Lincoln. Martin’s replies to those gifts were coolly formal; in words he frequently applied to his ouster by Halleck, he remarked that defeat is frequently a blessing in disguise and concluded with the words, ”I hope so in your case.”1w

Martin was even cooler to Halleck‘s attempt to dominate the Rules Committee. Although Republicans were outnumbered in the House three to two, Halleck announced he would lead conservatives of both parties in his campaign for sanity in government and to defeat “radical, wild-eyed, spendthrift proposals.” He would cooperate with Judge Smith, the Rules Committee Democratic chairman, in blocking Kennedy’s New Frontier program.”“

Martin had no intention of letting Halleck’s strident partisanship destroy the legislative process. Declaring he would not be part of a conservative coalition, he stated the new president must be given a fair chance, for most Americans shared Kennedy’s views: ”If he succeeds the country will succeed.” He even hinted he might lead a coalition of Eastern and New England Republicans to join liberal Democrats in passing measures such as aid to education and minimum wage.”’ These observations resulted in accolades from the president, Senator Hugh Scott, and several newspapers, which described them as statesman-like.*12


When Martin was minority leader Raybum had few problems getting bills reported out of the Rules Committee, but for two years under Halleck there was little cooperation, and in 1961 the minority leader threatened to be even more recalcitrant in using the Committee to block Democratic proposal^."^ To break the Rules Committee coalition of conservative Dem- ocrats and Republicans, Raybum sought to increase the Committee by three (two northem Democrats appointed by him, one Republican by Hal- leck). To get this reorganization approved by the House, Raybum needed some Republican votes, for a combination of southem Democrats and conservative Republicans would easily defeat it. Martin, who predicted many of his party would support the enlargement, met with Raybum and promised to round up Republican votes.114 Halleck fought the proposal, attacked it in the press and on the floor of the House, and coerced as many colleagues as he could to vote against it. In an unseemly display of anger the minority leader grabbed and shook Congressman Glen Cunningham (Nebraska) as he hollered at him to change his mind. Cunningham wrenched free, agreed to switch to a "no" vote, and muttered "that bas- tard" as he staggered away. Halleck also appealed to the Massachusetts business community to pressure the Bay State's Republican representatives; one switched back to the Halleck position, one never left it, but the remaining three resisted their leader and voted for re~rganization."~ By a narrow vote of 217 to 212 the House approved the expansion, and although an ill Martin, resting in Nassau, missed the roll call (he was paired in favor), his influence was the determining factor in its passage. Twenty- two Republicans, primarily from the Northeast, where Martin's authority was strongest, defied Halleck and voted for reorganization.116 Martin denied his efforts to increase the size of the Committee had anything to do with Halleck, but did state, "I would not, of course, care to see either Mr. Smith or Mr. Halleck with too much power." He asserted his vote was based on what was best for the country and the Republican Party and that the president should have "a fair chance." "This is my country as well as Mr. Kennedy's, and I want to see my country go ahead.""'

With his advice no longer sought in congressional councils Martin sought to help the GOP and country by instructing newly elected representatives in congressional procedures. He sat next to freshman Republi- cans during regular sessions, advising them when and where to speak, how to climb the ladder of assignments, sharing practical tips on committee work and effective ways of dealing with constituents' problems. His tutorship was gratefully received."*

h e to his declining health, Martin's absences increased threefold during the four congresses (8649) following his ouster. He introduced fewer bills and took the floor less often than usual. In the Eighty-seventh Congress (1961-1962) he had the second lowest recorded vote of any representative

286 Chapter 8

at 72 percent; by 1963 it had dropped to 51 per~ent.”~During one of Mar- tin’s hospitalizations, Robert Humphreys, his old colleague froin the Re- publican Congressional Committee, sent him flowers. In his acknowledgment Martin mentioned that until the flowers from Republican Chairman Miller arrived, “I didn’t know Republicans were still in existence,” for most of the messages and flowers came from Democrats.lZ0

By husbanding his energies Martin remained an important figure as he capitalized upon friendships developed over thirty-five years. Often he was of major importance in the introduction and passage of legislation directed toward social needs. Because he favored the “liberal” side of issues he frequently joined a small minority of Republicans who voted with the Democrats. In 1963, for example, the Republican average on select roll calls tabulated by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action was 16 percent; Martin’s was 56 percent. By 1964 it was noted that frequently he sat with Democrats as well as voted with them.lZ1

Although he desired a balanced budget he was one of nine Republi- cans in 1962 who defied leadership’s appeal not to increase the national debt limit and thereby force a curtailment of social programs, and in 1963 was the only Republican who dared do so. These votes, which startled most everyone, were justified by Martin as ”practical” and as proof he stood by his convictions. “The party can’t take me for granted,” he said. “Nobody can . . . I’m not the custodian of the party,”122 Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon was so impressed by Martin’s national-debt stand that he wrote expressing his appreciation for this example ”of the courage and high sense of responsibility that has always marked your public life.”lZ3

In that same year Martin warned Republicans about siding with southem Democrats to defeat the proposal making permanent the 1961 temporary Rules Committee expansion. It was not sound political strategy, he cautioned, to become too closely identified with conservative Demo- c r a t ~ . ~ ~ ~The twenty-seven Republicans who joined with him made possible the passage of the legislation-235 to 196. During those years Martin consistently backed foreign aid legislation and in 1963 was one of but sixteen Republicans opposing a $600 million aid cut. In that same year with a minority of his party he voted grants to medical schools and in the Eighty-eighth Congress was paired for antipoverty legislation.

One of his most important initiatives was a measure enacted in the Eighty-ninth Congress to continue paying social security benefits to children over eighteen, if they were full-time college students. Martin contended it was in the country’s best interests to enable students to remain in school, that a cutoff at eighteen was unfair and unrealistic, as the family may be at the point of its greatest need. Other provisions of the final bill which increased social security benefits 8 percent and added several

287 “TheSting of Ingratitude”

thousands to the rolls were hailed by Martin as a ”first step toward providing decent security for every

Martin also dedicated himself to protecting the interests of his district, his state, and New England. He sought to increase the number of representatives authorized in the House so Massachusetts would not lose two seats as a result of the 1960census and pushed for increased tariffs or quotas, especially on jewelry and textiles, and for the elimination of cotton price supports for the domestic market.

As the senior Republican on the Science and Astronautics Committee, he was of major importance in funding a proposed lunar launching and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which he saw as Cold War weapons. But there were more parochial reasons for his support of NASA; he hoped to locate its research facility in the Boston area as recommended during the Eisenhower administration. However, Republican leadership planned to make the deletion of a preliminary authorization of $3.8 million for a Boston area center a party issue. They asserted the location was politically inspired, the result of the election of Senator Ted Kennedy, the president’s brother, who had run under the slogan, “He can do more for Massachusetts.” When the measure came up Speaker McCormack phoned Martin, who was vacationing in Nassau, and asked him to return to help defeat the deletion. Martin was delighted; a Democratic president and Democratic Speaker from Massachusetts needed a Republican veteran to salvage their appropriation.126 A hush fell over the chamber when the seventy-nine-year-old Martin limped to the podium. Speaking with difficulty, he denounced the proposal as a “red herring,” for which he blamed the House leadership and expressed his disappointment with his many Republican friends, who by making “po-litical hay” of the issue, had forced him to come to Kennedy’s defense. Boston, he averred, with its universities and research facilities, was undoubtedly the best place to locate the center. Criticism of the Republican Party obviously pained Martin, and when he finished the House applauded; many shook his hand. Due to his efforts the amendment was easily defeated but the struggle was not yet finished. A year later Martin was proud of his role when the House, in keeping with the recommendation of its Space Committee, which had overturned its own subcommittee, voted to construct a NASA Electronic Research Laboratory in greater Boston. Opposition continued nevertheless, and the facility, which became operational in 1965,closed in 1969.127

Martinrs displacement as minority leader had no effect on his Cold War pronouncements, which were exacerbated by continuing crises: the pro- longed controversy over access routes to Berlin and the erection of the in- famous wall, the Cuban drift into the Soviet orbit followed by the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. To Martin there was no room for

288 Chapter 8

neutrals in this struggle between freedom lovers and Communists, whose ambition was unchanged: to rule the world and enslave mankind. Talk of coexistence, he now claimed, was a smoke screen to obscure the Reds’ real design. Consequently, he repeatedly urged the development of an impreg- nable defense with a capacity for massive retaliation. Spending programs including grants-in-aid to the states and new cabinet offices might have to be deferred.’28 Often he demanded a strong stand against Cuba, “a real and present danger,” the focal point for Communist penetration into the Americas. A well-armed United States should adapt a combative policy toward that Communist outpost and, in an implied criticism of the Bay of Pigs, added, “even at the risk of being branded an aggressor.” Yet there would be no war, he asserted; Communists sought the easy road to conquest, for there is no victory in war any longer; even the winner is a 10ser.I~~ This latter notion was not the only indication that there were limits to his bellicosity. He refused to use speech material provided for him which contained the words that although he did not believe an aggressive policy would mean a world war, “that is a risk we must take.”13o In keeping with his Cold War views and past positions, he tried once more, and failed yet again, to enact legislation promoting Douglas MacArthur to General of the Armies. But Kennedy was more receptive to MacArthur honors than was Eisenhower. After Congress passed a resolution awarding him a medal in appreciation for his service, Kennedy invited the World War I1 hero to a White House reception where Martin was among the guests.I3l

Martin remained concerned about Communist penetration at home and as a result still supported HUAC, although as in the past, he was not an outspoken champion of the Committee. If it exposes communism it is a good thing, he said, for the Committee serves as a deterrent to anti- American endeavor^.'^^ He was even more equivocal in expressing his views on the virulent anti-Communist John Birch Society, founded by the candy manufacturer Robert Welch in 1958. When asked in April 1961 to comment on the organization he replied he never heard of the group until a week ago, but that Welch is a “substantial citizen” and that its pur-pose of stopping Communism ”if done right” could be a help.133 He was less sanguine some months later when he equated the Birchers with the Communist Party U.S.A. as extremists whom “we can control.” It is not bad to have such groups in a free government, he observed, but they should be watched. He concluded his comments by jocosely suggesting that maybe the Birchers and the Communists could watch each other.lM He remained noncommittal about the society, stating still later that if it stuck to its ”ultra conservatism” it might do well, but if it is nothing but a hate group, which he implied it was, it had no future.135

During the Eighty-seventh through Eighty-ninth Congresses, Martin received many honors. In 1961as a guest at a Stonehill College fund-raising

289 “The Sting of Ingratitude”

dinner for a new library, Boston‘s Cardinal Richard J. Cushing convinced Martin to donate his papers to the college, which was located in his dis- t r i ~ t . ’ ~ ~The school’s library was named for Cushing and Martin, and busts and portraits of both were placed in wings dedicated to them.

The bust in the library, sculptured by Suzanne Silvercruys Stevenson, sister of the former ambassador from Belgium, was a duplicate of the one in the rotunda of the Old House Office Building. Funded by the National Federation of Republican Women to honor his service as Speaker, Martin’s was the only bust of a living person in the Capitol’s “Hall of Fame.” At its dedication where tributes from Eisenhower, Nixon, and Lyndon Johnson were read, Martin disclosed he would have retired from Congress in 1960, except his doctor told him he would be dead in two years; ”I guess he was right.” Martin also told his admirers he wished he could “convince myself the honor was deserved,” but privately he disliked the sculpture, muttering to his assistant, “What the hell can we do about it?”137

One of the honors of which Martin was particularly proud was the medal presented to him at the 1961 New England Israel Freedom Award Dinner (a tribute to Israel’s Bar Mitzvah) for advancing the cause of human dignity. Eleanor Roosevelt, who presented the award, privately commented that her husband would turn over in his grave if he knew she was bestowing a medal on Martin.138 As he had for years, the representative continued to be an advocate for Israel. In May 1962 as part of a salute to that nation on its fourteenth anniversary he entered remarks in the Con-gressional Record paying tribute to it and criticizing the United States- United Kingdom resolution to the United Nations Security Council censuring Israel for its raid into Syria. To him American participation in such a motion was unworthy of a ”solicitous“ parent and served to encourage Arab aggre~si0n.I~~ The Israeli ambassador thanked Martin for his friendship to the new nation and for his encouraging comments.140

All the honors could not offset the sadness at the death of his old friend and colleague Sam Raybum, for whom Martin delivered an emotional tribute at the opening of the Eighty-seventh Congress. At the Texan’s fu-neral, despite the trepidations of John McCormack, Martin was seated next to Halleck due to the machinations of the House doorkeeper, “Fish- bait” Miller. According to Miller they “ended up leaving as friends”- more likely they spoke to each other; they never were friends.I4I

The congressman remained as popular as ever in Massachusetts. The state lost two seats as a result of the 1960 census and had to be redis- tricted, but he had nothing to fear. Not only did Governor John Volpe confer with him on redistricting, but also as Martin himself knew, “My friends in the Massachusetts legislature will take care of Joe Martin.” In recogni-tion of his seniority and friendship even Democrats cooperated in pro-tecting his seat.Iq And he was taken care of the restoration to his district

290 Chapter 8

of the rest of the Democratic city of Fall River, which he welcomed back and stated he had always served, was more than offset by the addition of the Republican towns of Newton, Needham, and W e s t ~ o o d . ' ~ ~

In April 1961 Martin announced he would be a candidate for his nineteenth term in 1962. Doolan, after winning the Democratic primary, faced Martin for the sixth consecutive time with the issues unchanged. The congressman toured post offices as he had done every year since 1924 and emphasized his service to constituents, experience, leadership, and backing of liberal programs such as social security.'@ Expecting to win handily, Mar- tin devoted considerable effort to other state contests. Although the presidential election was two years away, he also commented on that, predicting Rockefeller would be the nominee and defeat Kennedy, something he could have done in 1960, when Nixon was just "the wrong man."145

Shortly after his seventy-eighth birthday, he was reelected and with the retirement of John Taber (New York) became the senior House Republi- can. Among those who congratulated him on achieving a record plurality and 64 percent of the vote was Richard Nixon. Martin advised the former vice president, who had lost a bid for the governorship of California in the same election, not to be discouraged, and predicted that with proper leadership Republicans would win in 1964, and concluded that he hoped to see him in Wa~hington.'~~

Long before the next election Martin committed himself to the presidential candidacy of Nelson Rockefeller. In April 1963 at a North Attle- borough Chamber of Commerce dinner he ignored the mounting support for Arizona's Senator Barry M. Goldwater and anointed Rockefeller as the best presidential candidate, the man who could beat John Kennedy.I4' In May, when the recently divorced Rockefeller married a mother of four less than a month after her divorce, the New Yorker's stock began to tumble. Martin was not deterred; asserting that voters were interested in issues and not personal lives, he dismissed the impact of the divorce and remarriage and declared the New Yorker the best qualified and the most popular candidate. With his brother Ed he worked for a Massachusetts delegation that would be sympathetic to R~ckefeller.'~~As the campaign became increasingly bitter, Martin appealed to Golden State voters on the eve of the all-important California primary to elect Rockefeller delegates as the best way to ensure a Re- publican victory in the fall.'49 The governor immediately wrote Martin, thanking him for his "courageous and forthright" statement and for his friendship over the years.'50 By a narrow margin Rockefeller lost the state. Martin put the best face on the defeat by stating that if Goldwater had won by a substantial amount the race would have been over, but this was not a particularly good showing; it only meant his candidacy could not be ignored.I5' But the governor was more realistic than the congress-

291 ”The Sting of Ingratitude”

man; he withdrew June 15 and asked Republican moderates to rally behind the candidacy of Governor William Scranton of

Everyone knew that Scranton‘s candidacy was nothing more than an opportunity to cast an anti-Goldwater protest vote. Martin had other plans. Despite Goldwater‘s dominance, which according to the Bay Stater made the convention “one of the dullest of all time,” he solicited votes for the presidential nomination of his friend Margaret Chase Smith. Smith hailed him for defying convention organizers and recognizing the achievements of all women. Martin and twenty-six other delegates voted for her on the first and only ballot as Goldwater rolled to an easy victory.lS3 Years later Martin claimed if Smith had received the nomination she would have run better against Johnson than did G01dwater.l~~

Martin’s declining health and arthritis forced him to move slowly, using a cane, and to miss House sessions as well as local civic functions. His administrative assistant Roger Putnam frequently substituted for him at district activities. (Putnam, a former assistant attorney general and veteran Massachusetts legislator, succeeded Milne, Martin’s top aide, who resigned in 1963.)Consequently, there was much speculation about Mar- tin’s successor; many thought it would be the minority leader of the state senate John Parker, who made no secret of his ambition as he patiently awaited the congressman’s retirement.155 However, in June Martin announced his candidacy, emphasizing his ranking membership on the House Science and Astronautics Committee and his role in bringing the NASA research laboratory to Massach~setts.’~~

For the seventh consecutive time in the general election he faced Doolan. Martin’s campaign was severely limited by his failing health and his hos- pitalization during much of September. For the first time since 1925 he failed to make his post-office visits. He did not give a single speech and even missed the Fall River Columbus Day celebration, where he had spoken for thirty-nine consecutive years (Ladiera substituted for him). For some time after his release from the hospital his politicking was from a wheelchair or an automobile. However, his organization ran an effective and aggressive campaign, capitalizing upon his thirty-eight years of patronage and personal favors. They emphasized his seniority, skill in obtaining federal benefits, especially the NASA laboratory, and his role in the district’s industrial growth. Clarence Mitchell, chief of the NAACP‘s Wash- ington Bureau, also spoke on his behalf.’” Doolan’s emphasis on Martin’s absences from Congress and appeal for new leadership had little effect. On Election Day, his eightieth birthday, Martin received greetings from Clare Luce, Goldwater, and even President Johnson. But more important to him was the electorate’s message: with 66 percent of the vote he carried every city and town except Fall River, which he lost by only 2,500 votes. His party did nowhere near as well; Johnson amassed a record-breaking 61.2 percent

292 Chapter 8

of the popular vote, and the new House had 295 Democrats and only 140 Republicans, the greatest disparity since 1936.

Despite his health and the party’s debacle, Martin remained optimistic. He pointed out that Republicans had recovered from the drubbing of 1936-all that was needed now was a conciliatory leader, someone more neutral than Goldwater who would recognize all factions. As for his health, he admitted he had not been too well and “couldn’t do any campaigning this year . . . but you can’t tell what the next year will bring.” Even though it was important that younger men take charge of the party, he would run again if his arthritis eased up.158 The ambiguity of these comments, coupled with his immediate retreat to Florida, fueled additional speculation that this might be his last term.159

The organization of the Eighty-ninth Congress, which resulted in a change of Republican leadership in the House, appeared to give additional sustenance to these rumors.16o Young Republicans had become discontented with Halleck’s leadership. As early as 1961 they complained they were underrepresented on the House Policy Committee, which was controlled by Halleck‘s small, handpicked group of opponents to social and economic programs.161 When the party, contrary to historical trends, gained only two seats in the 1962 off-year elections, many Representatives believed it was time to change the GOP’s stodgy image, personified by its elderly leaders and the tragicomedy “Ev and Charlie Show,” the weekly telecast of the House and Senate minority leaders. The Republican caucus by a secret 86-78 vote replaced sixty-seven-year-old Charles B. Hoeven (Iowa) as chair of the dormant House Republican Caucus with Gerry Ford. A bitter Hoeven warned Halleck to be careful: the next thing Ford and the others would be after, he claimed, was Halleck‘s job.16*

Halleck seemed to learn little from Hoeven’s defeat. Discontent continued to mount as younger Republicans were ignored in policy formation. Several who had voted to replace Martin with Halleck became convinced it was necessary to expel Halleck. Unlike many younger congressmen, he had been a strong supporter of Goldwater and became increasingly vulnerable after the crushing 1964 defeat, which saw thirty-eight incumbent Republicans lose their seats.la On December 18 Ford agreed to challenge Halleck in order to utilize fully our “talent, energy, and dedication.” The insurgents rallied behind him. He was popular and electable, eight years younger than the fifty-six-year-old Indianan and he provided an image of youth and energy. Halleck cut short his vacation and returned to Wash- ington to fight for his post. Martin, too, changed his plans, hurrying from Florida to assist Ford in this “admirable” effort to change the party’s image. When the caucus convened and the votes were cast, Martin gleefully printed FORD in huge letters on his ballot. He was considered instrumental in the Michigander‘s 73 to 69 victory, and as the defeated Halleck


walked down the aisle, shaking hands on his way from the caucus, he ignored Martin.’@ It is difficult to assess Martin’s significance in the Ford victory, but there is little doubt the new minority leader thought it important. Ford inscribed a copy of his book Portrait ofthe Assassin: “12/18/65 to Joe Martin in appreciation of your fine friendship and to express my deepest gratitude for your invaluable assistance and wonderful help in the rugged days of 1965. I am very indebted to you for your many kind- nesses and I look forward to working with you for the success of the Re- publican cause.”165 Until Martin’s death Ford continued to be attentive to the Bay Stater, coming to Massachusetts to speak at a testimonial, offering solace on his defeat in 1966, and remembering his birthdays.IM

Some thought that Martin’s support for Ford was motivated by revenge on Halleck and, with that accomplished, he would retire. If true, Martin gave no indication of it publicly or privately. He told the press the change was “a good move for the party,” which needed a new “progressive and aggressive face.” Privately he reported to his friend Luce, ”I think the Re- publicans have a very good man as leader.”167

Martin‘s attendance in the Eighty-ninth Congress was nearly as poor as that in the Eighty-eighth. In the 1963 session his 43 percent voting record was the lowest in the House; in 1964 his 46 percent was the lowest in the Massachusetts delegation and fourth worst in the chamber. In the first session of the Eighty-ninth he averaged 53 percent, the second lowest, while House Republicans averaged 87 percent, and in the second session (1965) at 30 percent he was again the lowest in the House, whose Repub- lican members averaged 82 percent.’@ However, on measures of major concern to his constituents or of personal interest to him he ensured his views were known, even if he was not present for the roll call.

Along with Massachusetts’s Congressman Silvio Conte he was credited with passage of the bill reducing silver in some coinage and eliminating it in others. Such legislation, he charged, would reduce the price of silver for commercial purposes and would contribute to increased employment in the new electronics industry.169 Martin bolted from party ranks to vote $1.3 billion for federal aid to schools and took credit for revisions on the immigration bill eliminating quotas on Portugal, Spain, and Greece (the entire national origins quota system was scrapped in the first major revision of immigration rules since the Truman era). He was also one of the minority of Republicans to vote for Medicare and supported both the Civil Rights Bills of 1965 (Voting Rights) and 1966 (Open Housing). He classified the struggle for voting rights as a national issue and predicted if it were not resolved in favor of equality the nation would be infected with hatred and bigotry.’70

Martin was ambivalent concerning the American commitment in Vietnam. He joined with the overwhelming majority of the House to

294 Chapter 8

appropriate supplemental funds for that conflict in 1955 (408-7) and 1956 (389-3). Yet he offered no comment in 1965 when the Boston Globe interviewed Massachusetts representatives on that war. A few months later a faculty group from greater Boston colleges was “heartened by his interest in an honorable termination of that troublesome conflict.” He told them he doubted the wisdom of military involvement in the first place, was apprehensive about where the conflict would lead, and supported the president’s call for negotiations without prior conditions. In 1966 he was a little more pessimistic, telling an interviewer he didn’t know how we got into the struggle or how we would get out of it.171

His equivocation was not because he feared to stand alone. In 1966 as in 1963 he was the only Republican to join with 198 Democrats and vote to increase the national debt. In so doing he ignored party colleagues who wanted to defeat the measure in order to force the president to cut domestic spending.’” He also stood with a handful of Republicans who voted 193 (4 Republicans) to 191 (121 Republicans) to preserve the $9.3 billion foreign aid bill.’”

THE LAST CAMPAIGN

In 1965 the Newton Graphic editorialized that it was time for Martin to bow out with his dignity intact, claiming his age, health, and absences made him incapable of representing the district.174 To kill rumors that he would not run again, Martin collared reporters in the House corridor and told them, “I’ll be a candidate unless I have a relapse. I plan to campaign around . . . maybe not so much as I used to. ..I am in good shape . . . one last time.” He went on to state that he would make a formal announcement in two or three months.175 At the same time Martin announced the resignation of his administrative assistant Roger Putnam and the promotion of his Fall River liaison Ernest Ladiera to that position. Ladiera’s tasks would be difficult, for it appeared the old veteran was increasingly vulnerable: if he survived a primary he would be challenged more seriously in the general election than he had been in years.

For the first time political observers began to think a Democrat could beat an ailing Martin: urban Democrats from Boston were moving into the district, the Democratic stronghold Fall River was growing, and Martin was aged and infirm.”6 John Parker, the minority leader of the state Sen- ate and Governor’s Councilor Peggy Heckler were among the Republi- cans indicating they would seek the nomination if Martin retired.In The latter, a thirty-five-year-old lawyer and mother of three, was completing her second two-year term. She had received excellent coverage in Martin’s paper and had been effusive in her thanks for his attendance at a Boston


theater party in her honor, writing that his presence was the greatest honor of her political career: “you are the greatest Republican of them all.”178

On February 19, 1966 at a tribute held at the Sheraton Boston Hotel, Martin announced he would be a candidate for one more term. “I’m like an old war horse ready for the next race,” he asserted. Claiming that he was in good health and that the doctor told him he would not know what to do if he retired, Martin stated that often he would stay in Washington all week, leaving Ladiera to “keep tabs” on the district. Almost immediately the Fall River City Committee began plans for a “Salute to Martin” to be held in April as the formal start of his ~ampaign.”~

Parker, assured of support by party regulars and by Martin when the latter vacated the seat, deferred to his old friend and agreed to wait two more years before running for Congress. Instead at Governor Volpe’s request he became chairman of the Republican State Committee.” But to Heckler, Martin’s announcement made little difference. On the assump- tion he would leave, she had begun an unannounced campaign in mid-1965, speaking before a wide variety of groups throughout the district.1s1 She must have been encouraged in this endeavor by two local newspapers urging Martin to retire due to his many absences from Congress.I8* Heck- ler has claimed, despite his announcement, she still expected Martin would not run. Even as late as the “Salute to Martin” festival, which was delayed to June, she thought he would step down. Consequently, she planned to announce her candidacy the end of that month. When Martin not only did not retire at the testimonial but received the blessing of Gov-ernor Volpe on his reelection, she believed it too late to change. According to Heckler she respected Martin and did not want to oppose him, but had little choice, fearing if he were the nominee, the party would lose the seat.lS3

At the June campaign kickoff, “District Ten Salute to Martin,” greetings were read from several notables, including Harry S. Truman, and the congressman’s old friend Margaret Chase Smith was the main speaker. Mar- tin’s remarks were brief, reflecting views he had expressed privately: the doctors had approved his candidacy; this would be his last term, as he wanted to rest and enjoy some leisure, but he desired to serve the district once again.IM More dramatic was the ringing endorsement of Martin’s candidacy by the governor, who proclaimed his delight at Martin’s reelection bid and announced his “wholehearted and enthusiastic support” for the North Attleborough congressman. At a press conference following the affair, Volpe, who wanted to save the seat for his friend Parker, stated he had no intention of supporting Heckler and a few days later spiritedly repeated his endorsement of his “dear friend” while making it plain if the seat were available it should be Parker’s.185

Heckler, who formally announced on June 28, has claimed Volpe’s continuing support of Martin aided her campaign, for the governor’s

296 Chapter 8

involvement in the only contested primary on the Republican ticket resulted in “fantastic press coverage.” During the contest she was careful to respect Martin’s achievements but indirectly made an issue of his age and incapacity, as she emphasized the need for vigorous leadership and full-time representation while quoting from material Martin had used forty-two years before in his run against the octogenarian William Greene. Moreover, she emphasized her nomination was the only guarantee of keeping the seat Republican.lS6

Martin spent most of his time in Washington and limited his campaigning primarily to weekends, thereby restricting the number of political events he attended. Usually his audience was by invitation only. “My people know me,” he claimed, and further explained his lack of a speaking schedule by commenting, “I never made a good speech.” Sometimes even though he was in attendance, he had someone speak for him at rallie~.’~’ The appearances that he did make exposed his frailty as he slowly shuffled along aided by a cane-a portrait of a weary, old man. The contrast with a young, vigorous, energetic, and perky Heckler was an embarrassment to his supporters.lss The compar- ison was particularly noticeable during parades in North Attleborough and Needham, where Martin rode and Heckler marched, receiving a great reception in the latter town.ls9

Martin’s major election effort was relegated to his organization, which expected to redeem hundreds of political debts accrued as a result of the forty thousand favors recorded in his office. His staff emphasized that his decision to run was an obligation to his constituents, stressed his seniority and experience, and publicized the support of the state’s party regulars and the respect in which he was held by prominent Americans. More- over, they maintained that as a result of his appeal to Democrats, Martin’s nomination would hold the district for Republicans despite demographic changes. However, they did not use current photographs in newspaper advertisements but rather ones apparently from the late 195Os.l9O

On Election Day Martin went to bed at 9 P.M. and was awakened at 7 the following morning by his brother Ed, who informed him that he had lost a relatively close race, 15,469 to 12,345. The northern part of the district, which had been added four years before-Wellesley (Heckler‘s hometown), Newton, Westwood-made the difference. Her 70 percent of the vote in that area resulted in Martin’s observation, ”I guess they just don’t know me there.”lgl As Martin was unavailable for comment immediately after the result, his brother Ed issued a statement on his behalf. The congressman, although disappointed, was relieved he could now devote time to his own affairs and was grateful to those friends who stood by him.192 When the shock wore off Martin spoke freely, asserting he was not bitter, for he had had a long career with no regrets; even the Boston


Celtics could not win them all. When asked if he would campaign for Heckler, he responded, “I’m retired.”193 Heckler has maintained Martin was bitter, sending her a note of one word. ”Congratulations,” but she, nevertheless, sent him a letter. Her account is not accurate; she sent him a rather lengthy telegram in response to one of his, which based on her reply, consisted of more than one

The Chronicle, edited by Martin‘s brother Al, was less forgiving than the vanquished congressman. In what its business manager, an admirer of publisher Joe Martin, described as a “petulant” response, it supported Heckler’s opponent, the Democratic nominee Pat Harrington. A county commissioner and lawyer from Fall River, Harrington had defeated Doolan in the Democratic primary. The paper predicted many Republi- cans would bolt and vote for Harrington along with those Democrats who usually backed Martin. When Harrington lost to Heckler by only four thousand votes, it labeled his narrow defeat a good showing, predicted he probably would run again, and delighted in pointing out he carried North Attleb~rough.’~~

Martin received many messages of consolation: Senators Robert and Ted Kennedy phoned, Clare Luce invited him to her home in Arizona, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek to visit her in China. In his response to Gerry Ford, the former minority leader praised the new minority leader as a fine chieftain and credit to the party whom he would be willing to help any time. Moreover Martin stated he would not have run if he had known it was going to cause such a In the House and Senate speaker after speaker from both parties and from all corners of the nation rose to honor him, frequently hailing his integrity and decency. Among those were Minority Leader Ford, Speaker McCormack, and future Speaker Tip O’Neal. Many of these encomiums were published on the front pages of the Chronicle. One of the most moving was that of Senator Jacob Javits (New York), who described the one-time Speaker as ”one of the dearest and most estimable human beings that it has ever been my privilege to meet.”19’ He also received hundreds of letters from lesser- known Americans throughout the country who had come to identify with him during his forty-year career in Washington.

Although his defeat provided him with additional opportunities for rest, Martin never regained his full health. He was not well enough to attend a parade and dinner in his honor sponsored by the Fall River Cham- ber of Commerce, and his doctors advised him that the earliest he would be able to travel to Washington would be April 1967.198Increasingly he re- laxed at his nephew‘s home in Fort Lauderdale, yet was unable to attend the dedication of North Attleborough’s Joseph W. Martin Elementary School in November 1967, a photo of which was part of his Christmas cards that year, the last of his life.lW

298 Chapter 8

Martin was not forgotten by his old friends; birthday cards and Christ- mas greetings continued to arrive. Ford maintained his warm relationship, paying tribute to him in the House on his eighty-third birthday and at Christmas writing Martin that he missed his advice and suggestions, for he valued his recommendations and comments.200

In March 1968Martin collapsed in his nephew’s Florida home and died of a ruptured appendix in the ambulance taking him to Holywood Memo- rial Hospital. There were no dramatic last words; he was as unassuming in death as in life. His brother Ed arranged with Fall River’s Bishop Con- nolly for a burial mass in St. Mary‘s, North Attleborough’s Catholic Church. Before the crowded congregation and the hundreds waiting outside the bishop praised Martin as “a good Christian and a gentleman to the core,” one whose life was characterized by loyalty and devotion.”’ Tributes poured in from all parts of the country and from abroad, paeans were sung to his praise in Congress, but Ernest K. Lindley, Newsweek columnist, writing in the Saturday Review a few years earlier, had best summed up the man and his career in a few words: “a thoroughly decent man, Joe Martin. We could use many more like him in our public life.”2o2

Lindley’s statement about the need for men like Martin is as applicable now as when he wrote it. During a lengthy career Martin demonstrated how one can serve his district without becoming parochial and how one’s allegiance to a political party is compatible with respect and affection for those on the other side of the aisle. Equally important, he showed one can compromise while remaining faithful to his political principles and that comity and courtesy are more than desirable social traits-they are as essential to a well-ordered legislative body as to life itself.

NOTES

1. JosephW. Martin, Jr. as told to Robert J. Donovan, M y First Fifty Years in Poli-tics (New York McGraw-Hill, 1960; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 1975), 19.

2. INS release, Chronicle, 4 June 1957. 3. The same paragraph was used in Houston, February 11 and Albuquerque,

February 12, and the same theme in his Phoenix speech, February 14,1958, MP. 4. Lions International Speech, June 11,1958, MI? 5. INS release, Chronicle, 2 November 1957; Martin to Nixon, November 5,1957,

1960 Support File, Richard M. Nixon Papers, Federal Archives and Records Cen- ter, Laguna, California.

6. AP release, Chronicle, 13 February 1958; Chronicle, 18 February 1958. 7. INS release, Chronicle, 15 May 1958. 8. Eisenhower to Ben F. Fairless, September 24, 1958 and Meade Alcorn to

Eisenhower, September 29,1958, Eisenhower Papers, DDEL; NYT, 3 October 1958; Boston Herald, 3,7 October 1958.


9. Boston Globe, 10 January 1958; Boston Herald, 30 May 1958. 10. Fall River Herald News, 3,6 October 1958. 11. Chronicle, 9,12 September 1958; Taunton Gazette, 22 September 1958. 12. Boston Globe, 26 September 1958; Chronicle, 4, 18, 22, 28, 30 October 1958;

Fall River Herald News, 11,18 October 1958; speech file June-September 1958, MP. 13. Dulles to Martin, November 5, 1958, John Foster Dulles Papers, Princeton

University Library, Princeton, N.J.; Eisenhower to Martin and Nixon to Martin, November 7,1958, MP.

14. Martin to Luce, November n.d. 1958, LP. 15. Chronicle, 4 November 1958. 16. Martin to Eisenhower, November 13,1958, MP. 17. For example see Martin to E.Y. Berry, November 12, 1958, Berry Papers,

Berry Library, Black Hills State University, Spearfish, S. Dak. 18. Curtis to Martin, December 6,1958, Thomas B. Curtis Papers, Joint Collec-

tion University of Missouri, Western Historical Manuscripts Collection, State His- torical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.

19. Bryce Harlow, "Memo for the Record," November 19, 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, microfilm, 1986); Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 7956-1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), 384; Fall River Herald Nezus, 20 November 1958.

20. Eisenhower Diaries, December 1,1958, and December 12,1958; Memo for Record, December 6,1958, Whitman File, DDEL.

21. For a brief survey see William A. Hasenfus, "Managing Partner: Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican Leader of the United States House of Representatives, 1939-1959" (Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1986), 401-15; Martin's account is in First Fifty Years, 1-20.

22. Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Aukobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 72. In his memoirs Martin writes that if Republican leaders had asked him to step down as he could no longer carry the burden of leader because of his age and health, he would have done so.First Fifty Years, 8. It is possible that Ford's request was not couched in sufficiently diplomatic tones and struck at Martin's pride.

23. Henry Z. Scheele, Charlie Halleck: A Political Biography (New York: Exposi- tion Press, 1966), 14, citing Warsaw lndiana Times Union,4 January 1959.

24. Perle Mesta with Robert Cahn, Perle: M y Story (New York McGraw-Hill, 1960), 220.

25. Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusade (New York: Macmil- Ian, 1972), 545.

26. Washington Star, 11 January 1959; Pearson column, WP, 9 January 1959. 27. Halleck, Oral History, DDEL, 12-14, 19; Diary Entry April 28, 1956, Jack Z.

Anderson Papers, DDEL. 28. Quote is from Scheele, Halleck, 18; also see John L. Steele, "COP Tactics that

Toppled a Veteran Leader," Life, January 10,1959,26; NYT, 8 January 1959; Pear-son column, WP, 9 January 1959. An indication of why it is difficult to ascertain if they promised any help, as some charge, is given in Anderson's 1957 diary, where he wrote of attempts to get Arends to resign to make room for Halleck as Whip: "Imperative that my tracks be completely covered," entry January 7,1957,6.

300 Chapter 8

29. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 384. 30. Memo, Hagerty to the President, December 9,1958, Whitman File, Political

Committee, 1959, Eisenhower Papers, DDEL. 31. Thomas B. Curtis (Congressman) and Donald L. Westerfield, Congressional

Intent (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), 50; Washington Star, 11 January 1959; NYT and Boston Globe, 6 January 1959.

32. Pearson column, WP, 10 January 1959. In a survey conducted in 1977 Re-publican representatives were asked if a standing vote would have made a difference. Those replying thought it would have helped Martin, not only because of favors he had done for them in the past but also because they feared his reaction if the attempt failed. Robert Michel (Illinois), himself minority leader 1981-1995, claimed Martin if he won would retaliate, and Robert Wilson asserted he was vin- dictive. Michel to Stephen Humphreys, April 22,1977 and Wilson to Humphreys, April n.d. 1977, MP.

33. Fulton Lewis, Jr. broadcast, January 6,1959,9, MI? 34. Richard Strout, “Johnson and Martin and Halleck” in TRB: Views and Per-

spectives on the Presidency (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 191; the smile quote is from NYT, 7 January 1959.

35. This story is repeated in several accounts and is based on two slightly different descriptions, one by Marie McNair the other by Betty Beale, both in the WP, 7 January 1959.

36. Congressional Record, 86 Cong. 1st sess., 1959,105: A1036, Washington Star, 20 February 1959.

37. Washington Star, 7 January 1959. 38. Martin to Lloyd Balfour, January 7,1959 and to Emery J. Malo, January 19,

1959, MP. 39. Congressional Record, 86 Cong. 2d sess., 1960,106: 9; for the emotional nature

of the speech see Clem Miller, Member of the House: Letters of a Congressman (New York: Scribners, 1962), 82.

40. James A. Robinson, The House Rules Committee (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 72, 77, 127; WP, 20 June 1960; Anthony Champagne Interview with Hugh Scott and Alla Clary’s Oral History, both in Sam Rayburn Library, Bonham, Texas. One-time Speaker himself, Carl Albert, in Little Giunt: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 226, praised this arrangement as did the following scholars: David C. Williams, “Mr. Sam’s House,” The Progressive, June 1959, 23, 25; Neil MacNeil, Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives (New York McKay, 1963), 106; D. B. Hardeman and Don- ald C. Bacon, Rayburn: A Biography (Austin, Tex.: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), 430; Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1964). 74; Richard 8.Cheney and Lynne V. Cheney, Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in the House of Representatives (New York: Continuum, 1983), 181; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., “The Internal Distribution of Influence in the House,” in David B. Truman, ed., The Congress and AmericaS Future, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1973), 88.

41. WP,12 June 1960. 42. Quoted in Charles L. Clapp, The Congressmen: His Work as He Sees It (Wash-

ington: Brookings Institute, 1963; reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980), 291.

301 “The Sting of Zngratitiide”

43. Ronald M. Peters, Jr., American Speakership: The Opce in Historical Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 131.

44. Address to Press Club, January 13,1959, MP; CBS News, January 13,1959. Martin’s memoir published the following year, about one-third of which dealt with the Eisenhower years and twenty pages with the dismissal, is quite similar to the address, with a little more emphasis on his claim that he lost support by pushing Eisenhower programs. In his papers there are three legal-sized pages written by him in longhand, numbered 1,2, and 9, dealing with his ouster. In them he writes with pride that according to the Congressional Quarterly 72 percent of Eisenhower’s proposals were passed in 1958. He asserts that White House staffers were “conniving” for years “to name Halleck” and that Sherman Adams even came to his home in North Attleborough to urge him to appoint Halleck his assistant. Halleck gave the impression he was the House Eisenhower leader, he wrote “and my only reply was ’It may be true but I’ ” and the account tantalizingly breaks off here. Martin notes, MI?

45. Press release, January 6, 1959, Alphabetical File 1960 Martin, Eisenhower Papers; Willard B. Persons, Oral History, DDEL, 30; Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhower Administration (New York Harpers, 1961), 26.

46. Clarence Randall, Journal, January 7, 1959, DDEL. 47. Floyd M. Riddick, ”The Eighty-sixth Congress: First Session,” Western Polit-

ical Quarterly 13 (March 1960): 128 and ”Second Session,” 14 (June 1961): 428. 48. Form letter to Albert H. Varnum, January 26,1959, Nixon Papers. 49. UP1 release, Chronicle, 8 January 1959. 50. Wilson to Nixon, September 3,1959 with enclosure. The author was unable

to find any evidence of this activity by Nixon. 51. Pearson column, 1959, scrapbook 103, MP. 52. Tom Wicker, One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream (New York

Random House, 1991), 178; author interview with Ladiera, October 13,1987. 53. Robert Healy in the Boston Globe, 7 January 1959. 54. Wainwright to Humphreys, April 14, 1977, Wilson to Humphreys, April

n.d., 1977, MP; ”Republican Revolt,” Nemszueek, January 19,1959,20. 55. Curtis to Martin, December 6 and 12, 1958; Curtis Papers; Curtis, Oral His-

tory, 17-18, OHCCU; Washingtoil Star, 8 January 1959; NYT, 11 January 1959; Charles 0.Jones, Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964), 2327, 35; and Jones, The Minority Party in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 153; Robert L. Peabody, ”The Survivors: The 1965 House Minority Leadership Contest,” in Bernard Cos-man and Robert J. Huckshorn, Republican Politics: The 1964 Campaign and Its After-math for the Party (New York: Praeger, 1968), 161.

56. Transcript, “Washington Conversation, October 1,1961,” 6, MP. In the same telecast he damned the administration with faint praise: “satisfactory,” “fairly good,” one that “will not stand out in history as one of the great administrations of our time,” 12.

57. WP, 8 January 1959. 58. Jensen to Joe Pew, February 9, 1959, Ben F. Jensen Papers, University of

Iowa Libraries, Iowa City. 59. Boston Herald, 7 January 1959; Denvinski to Humpreys, April 6, 1977, MP.

302 Chapter 8

60. Tucker in Chronicle, 17 January 1959; Truman quoted in Scheele, Halleck, 16. 61. Washington Star, 14 January 1959. 62. Fulton Lewis, Jr. column, January 15,1959, scrapbook 73, MP. 63. James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson

Years (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1968), 418. 64. Ray Tucker in Fall River Herald News, 15 January 1959. 65. ”Halleck Rules Again,” New Republic, December 14,1959,7; Scott Interview,

3-7; Halleck, Oral History, DDEL. The civil rights charge is in Joseph Alsop’s undated 1959 column in the Boston Globe, scrapbook 103, MP. The legislative leaders conference minutes for February 3,1959 state that the effect of civil rights legislation on Southern support for the budget was discussed, but says nothing else on the subject.

66. Ford, Time to Heal, 72; Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Gerald R. Ford’s Date with Destiny: A Political Biography (New York: Lang, 1989), 63. Those who mentioned senility were Samuel Devine (Ohio) April 5,1977; Jackson Betts (Ohio) April 8, and John J. Rhodes (Ariz.) to Humphreys, MP.Also see Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr. (N.J.) to constituents, January 22, 1959, Frelinghuysen Pa- pers, Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland; William Ayres, WP,6 Jan-uary 1959.

67. Perkins Bass to Lawrence Philbrook, January 28,1959, Perkins Bass Papers, New Hampshire Historical Society, Concord, N.H.

68. Alfred Steinberg, Sam Rayburn: A Biography (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975), 317; Jacob K. Javits, The Autobiography of a Public Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981), 141.

69. MacNeil, Forge, 93. 70. William H. Lawrence, Oral History, 3, OHCCU. 71. “Remarks at Indiana State Society Tribute,” March 10, Eisenhower, Public

Papers, 1960,287-88. 72. Scheele, Halleck, 1-2. 73. Dulles to Martin, January 9, 1959, Dulles Papers. 74. For Rogers see Congressional Record, 86 Cong. 1st sess., 1959,105: A264, A982

and for Hoffman, 367. 75. James Milne to Edward Martin, January 21,1959, MI? 76. Memo for Mrs. Whitman, March 9,1959, Anderson Papers; Telephone Calls,

March 9,1959, Eisenhower Diaries; Eisenhower to Martin, March 9,1959, MP; WP, 14 April 1959.

77. Persons, Oral History, 47. 78. Boston Globe, 20 April 1959; New Bedford Standard Times, 26 April 1959. 79. Attleboro Sun, 6 May 1959; Boston Globe, 31 May 1959. 80. Frank Gervasi, The Real Rockefeller: The Story of the Rise, Decline, and Resur-

gence of the Presidential Aspirations of Nelson Rockefeller (New York: Atheneum, 1968), 146; Edward Martin to Rockefeller, December 21,1974, MP.

81. Martin, First Ffty Years, 17; Edward Martin to James Kenneally, June 9,1987, M P.

82. Memo for file from Charlie McW[horter], June 3, 1959, Nixon Papers. 83. Nixon to Martin, June 10,1959, MP. 84. Robert S. Allen column, July 6,1959, scrapbook 75, MP.

303 ”The Sting of Ingratitude”

85. Nixon note to Klein on Wilson to Nixon, September 3, 1959, Nixon Papers.

86. Worcester (Mass.) Gazette, 25 October 1959. A clipping of the article was kept in the Nixon papers.

87. Nixon press release, January 15,1960 and Nixon to Auchincloss with cc to Martin, February 16, 1960, both in Nixon Papers; WP, 13 January 1960.

88. Fall River Herald News, 28 January 1960; New Bedford Standard Times, 29 Jan- uary; 6 June 1960.

89. Fall River Herald News, 25 July 1960; Edward Martin Convention Notes, August 4,1960, MP.

90. Column, WP, 1August 1960; for the award and Martin’s acceptance speech see Proceedings of the Tzuenty-seventh Republican Convention (Washington: Judd & Detweiler, 1960), 92-94.

91. Lodge to Martin, August 9,1960, MP. 92. Quote is from his speech on the Seventy-fifth Anniversary of the Town of

Millis, May 30,1960, MP. Also see speeches of June 26,1959, August 11,1959, April 20, 1960, MP.

93. Press release, n.d., 1961, MI? 94. For foreign aid comments see Fall River Herald News, 13 November 1959. 95. Martin to Eisenhower, November 4, 1959, Eisenhower Papers; Press re-

lease, August 17,1960, MP. On the other hand he objected to the Secretary of the Interior on the limitation on residual fuel imports. Martin to Fred Seaton, August 26, 1960, MP.

96. Address to Women’s Republican Club of Lancaster, Penn., October 15, 1959 and to the New England Society of N.Y., December 3,1959, MP.

97. Chronicle, 21 April 1959. 98. Washington Star, 5 June 1960. 99. Chronicle and Boston Globe, 13 August 1960.

100. Fall River Herald News, 2 September 1960; Boston Globe, 26 February 1960; Washington Star, 26 May 1960.

101. Speech at Harbors and Rivers Congress entered by Hale Boggs in Congres-sional Record, 86 Cong. 2d sess., 1960, 106: 12324-12325.

102. Pazutucket (R.1) Times, 15 September 1960. 103. Editor and Publisher as quoted in the Chronicle, 14 September 1960. 104. Donovan to Edward Martin, March 29, 1968, MP; Donovan, Boxing the

Kangaroo: A Reporter‘s Memoir (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 83.

105. Ernest K. Lindley, “Backstage from Washington,” Saturday Reviezu of Liter-ature, October 1, 1960, 16-17.

106. ”Campaign Close Ups,” Newsweek, October 3, 1960, 14. 107. Program MP; Martin to Korff, September 19,1960, MP. 108. Pearson column, WP,9 December 1960. 109. Martin to Nixon, November 14,1960, February 22,1961 and Nixon to Mar-

tin, July 16,1961, Nixon Papers. 110. Scheele, Hdleck, 203-4. 111. Press release, n.d., 1960, MP; Boston Globe and WP, 2 December 1960; Chron-

icle, 9 January 1961.

304 Chapter 8

112. NYT, 3 December 1960; WP, 2 December 1960. 113. Rayburn to John Smith, January 30,1961, quoted in H. C. Dulaney and Ed-

ward H. Phillips, Speak, Mister Speaker (Bonham, Tex.: Sam Rayburn Foundation, 1978), 428.

114. Steinberg, Rayburn, 337. 115. MacNeil, Forge of Democracy, 433-34. His account of the entire affair on

pages 412-46 is excellent. 116. Many scholars attribute the Republican defection to Martin's influence.

See Dwight Dorough, Mr. Sam (New York Random House, 1962), 15; Ronald M. Peters, Jr., The Speaker: Leadership in the US.House of Representatives (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 10 and his American Speakership, 138; Steinberg,Rayburn, 337; Bruce J. Dierenfield, Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1951), 182.

117. Mary Jo Bane, "New Rules for a New Frontier," Courier, February 24,1961, scrapbook 79, MP.

118. Chronicle, 10 May 1961; NYT, 9 May 1961; editorial Boston Globe, 10 May 1961; Nixon to Martin, May 29, 1961, Nixon Papers; Silvio Conte to Martin, June 21,1961 and F. Bradford Morse to Martin, June 25,1961, MP.

119. Pazotucket Times, 22 June 1964. 120. Martin to Humphreys, January 3,1964, Humphreys Papers, DDEL; Martin

to Lyndon B. Johnson, January 4,1964, MP. 121. Bruce Van Dausen, Providence Sunday lournal, 14 June 1964. Occasionally

Martin's "liberal" vote was after voting to recommit the measure. 122. R. Larrabee Interview, New Bedford Standard Times, 26 May 1963. 123. Dillon to Martin, May 16, 1963, MP. 124. AP release in Boston Record American, 3 January 1963. 125. Chronicle, 31 July 1964. 126. Edward Martin, memo, n.d., MP. 127. Congressional Record, 88 Cong. 1st sess., 1963,109: 13864-13909,3126-3127,

A4970; WP, 2 August 1963; Boston Globe 4 August 1963; Chronicle, 26 February; 14 March 1964; press release, March 2, 1964, MP; US House of Representatives, Toward the Endless Frontier: A History of the Committee on Science and Technology, 2959-2970 (Washington: GPO, 1980), 219,231.

128. Fall River Herald News, 22 July 1961; Chronicle, 3 November 1961; Memorial Day, Fall River, Mass., May 31,1961; Lincoln Day, Columbus Grove, Ohio, Febru- ary 14,1962;Serton Club, Washington, May 3,1962; Lions Banquet, Frederick, Md. June 7,1962, all in MP.

129. Speech N.H., April 8, 1961, MP; Chronicle, 8 September 1961; Lions Ban- quet, Frederick, Md., June 7, 1962, MP.

130. Draft material, June 9,1961, MP. 131. Press release, January 3,1961, MP; NYT, 17 August 1962. 132. Interview, Yale News, February 21,1961, scrapbook 79, MP. 133. Clip, 9 April 1961, scrapbook 79, MP. It is hard to believe given all the press

coverage that Martin had not heard of it earlier. If true, the first time he learned of the Birchers was as a guest at a dinner where Boston's Cardinal Cushing defended Welch as a capable and fearless individual, but dismissed as absurd Welch's charge that Eisenhower promoted the communist cause. Referring to the society

305 "The Sting of bigratitude"

the Cardinal deplored the excesses and exaggerations of even a good thing. Boston Pilot, 8 April 1961. 134. Fall River Herald Nezus, 14 December 1961. 135. Rabbi J. Freedman, "Congressman Joseph Martin on Israel," jewish Advo-

cate, July 19,1962. 136. Richard Potvin to Edward Martin, November 4, 1972, MP. According to

Potvin, Martin at first demurred, stating he had promised his papers to the Eisen- hower Library. Either Martin or Potvin was confused; Martin had earlier agreed to give them to the Capitol Hill Foundation. In 1966 Auchincloss wrote him, stating he had signed a document that the bulk of his papers, including the MacArthur letter and memorabilia, would go there with a small amount to the college. Martin signed a statement at the bottom of that letter confirming its contents, but he had already given the MacArthur letter and some correspondence to the college. Auchincloss to Martin, January 7,1966, MP.

137. The quotation is from James Milne to Edward Martin, May 7, 1976, MP. Also see press release, December 19, 1961, tribute and program MP; Congressionnl Record, 87 Cong. 1st sess., 1962,108: 6951,8452-8457.

138. Basil Brewer (one of the recipients) to Vernon Hutchins, May 29,1961, Basil Brewer Papers, Joint Collection, University of Missouri, Western Historical Man- uscript Collection, State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.

139. Congressional Record, 87 Cong. 2d sess., 1962, 108: 8000; press release, May 7, 1962, MP.

140. Abraham Harman to Martin, May 31,1962, MP. 141. William M. "Fishbait" Miller as told to Frances S. Leighton, Fishbait: The

Memoirs of the Congressional Doorkeeper (New York, Warner, 1977), 466-67. 142. The quote is from the Boston Herald, 8 September 1966. See Attleboro St in ,

10 February; 20 March 1961; Boston Globe, 18 July 1961. 143. Chronicle, 5 October; 7 April 1962. 144. "Dear Friend" letter and speeches, July-December 1967, MP. 145. N.H. Speech, April 12,1962, scrapbook 79, MI? 146. Martin to Nixon, December 4,1962, Nixon Papers. 147. Chronicle, 18 April 1963; David W. Reinhardt, The Republican Right Since

1945 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), 176, states Martin branded Goldwater an extremist, but he has the wrong Joseph Martin. See Barry M. Goldwater, With No Apologies: The Personal and Political Memoirs of United States Senator B u r y M. Goldwater (New York Morrow, 1979), 179-80.

148. Full River Herald Nezus, 23 December 1963; Ed Martin to Rockefeller, December 21, 1974, Edward Martin Papers, MP.

149. NYT, 29 May 1964. 150. Rockefeller to Martin, May 30, 1965, MP. Senator Thomas H. Kuchel also

thanked Martin, "a stand up guy," for the endorsement. Kuchel to Martin, June 17, 1964, MP.

151. Fall River Herald Nezus, 4 June 1964. 152. Rockefeller to Martin, June 15, 1964, MP. 153. Chronicle and Attleboro Sun, 13 July 1964; Margaret Chase Smith, Declara-

tion ofconscience (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1972), 389; Smith Tribute to Martin, June 22,1966, MI?

306 Chapter 8

154. WP, 16 July 1966. 155. Pawtucket Times, 22 June 1964; Providence Journal, 20 August; 8 September

1964. 156. Press release, June 11,1964, MP. 157. Attleboro Sun, 5 October 1964; Fall River Herald News, 1October; 2 Novem-

ber 1964; Boston Globe, 26 October 1964. 158. Boston Globe and Fall River Herald News, 5 November 1964. 159. Providence lournal, 19 December 1969. 160. Boston Globe, 8 February 1965. 161. Ray Tucker syndicated column, Fall River Herald News, 20 April 1961;

Roscoe Drummond column, WP, 31 May 1961. 162. Ford, Time to Heal, 73-74; Chronicle, 9 January 1963; Washington Star, 13Jan-

uary 1963; WP, 20 January 1963; "The Fighting Eighty-ninth," Newsweek, January 18, 1965,19; Scheele, Halleck, 217-20.

163. John Bibby and Roger Davidson, On Capitol Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1967), 118-19; The Reminiscences of Thomas B. Curtis, part III,1973,18, OHCCU; Boston Globe, 6 November 1964; WP, 19 December 1964.

164. Ford, Time to Heal, 77-78; "The Fighting Eighty-ninth," 18-19; WP, 6 Janu- ary 1965; Scheele, Halleck, 243-61; Robert L. Peabody, The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest 1965 (New York McGraw-Hill, 1966). In the Halleck Oral His- tory 98 owned by Professor Robert H. Ferrell, University of Indiana, Halleck claimed that in his 1959 overthrow of Martin he did not ask anyone to vote for him.

165. Gerald R. Ford and John R. Stiles, Portrait ofthe Assassin (New York Simon & Schuster, 1965), MP.

166. See Ford tribute in Congressional Record, 89 Cong. 1st sess., 1965, 111: 11604-11605.

167. Boston Herald, 5 January 1965; Martin to Luce, January 6, 1965, LP. 168. Those statistics, which exclude quorum calls, are from the appropriate vol-

ume of Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service).

169. Congressional Record, 89 Cong. 1st sess., 1965,111: 16805. 170. Congressional Record, 89 Cong. 1st sess., 1965,111: 68084809. 171. Boston Globe, 7 March 1965; press release, April 8,1965, MP; Robert E. Wil-

son, "Just One More Time," Worcester Sunday Telegram, 17 July 1966. 172. Congressional Record, 89 Cong. 2d sess., 1966, 112 12578-12579. 173. AP release, 15 July 1966, Boston Herald. 174. Newton Graphic, 30 December 1965. 175. Chronicle and Boston Globe, 11January 1966; Wilson, "One More Time." 176. Boston Herald, 10 January 1966; Newton Graphic, 28 April 1966. 177. Boston Globe, 8 February 1965; Providence Journal, 16 November 1965. 178. Heckler to Martin, May 10, 1964, MP. 179. Chronicle, 20-21,24 February 1966. 180. Peggy Lampson, Few Are Chosen: American Women in Political Life Today

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), 114; clips 15 September 1966, scrapbook 85, MI'. 181. Boston Herald, 21 February 1966; New Bedford Standard Times, 26 June 1966. 182. Newton Graphic, 30 December 1965; Quincy Patriot Ledger, 20 February 1966.


183. Lampson, Fez0 Are Chosen, 113; Lampson Interview with Margaret Heckler, Peggy Lampson Papers, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University.

184. Handwritten notes in the Salute program; Martin to Dick Byrd, July 12, 1966 both MP; Worcester Telegram, July 19, 1966.

185. Chronicle, 28 June 1966; Providence Journal, 27 June 1966; Boston Globe, 31 July 1966.

186. Heckler Lampson Interview, 16-17; Lampson, Few Are Chosen, 115-16. 187. Boston Herald, 17July; 18 September 1946; Chronicle, 1September 1966. 188. Richard L. Sherman, North Attleborough: A n Aflectionate History (North

Attleborough, Mass.: Bicentennial Commission of the Town of North Attle- borough, 1976), 119; Richard L. Sherman, Oral History, 1988,4, MP; Michael Kirby and Lawrence Kubilus, North Attleboro: "Then and Now" (Medway, Mass.: Jostens Printing, 1987), 27; George 8. Gibb to James Kenneally, January 13,1989, MP. Even the Chronicle was forced to admit that Martin had lost strength and walked with difficulty, 21 September 1966.

189. Boston Globe, 10 July 1966; Chronicle, 12 September 1966. Drew Pearson, whose columns had always been sympathetic to Martin, describes him at this time as having a short attention span with "muffled powers of sight and sound." Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson, The Case Against Congress: A Compelling Zndictment of Corruption on Capitol Hill (New York Simon & Schuster: 1968), 289.

190. Martin reelection pamphlet, MP; Chronicle, 28 July; 8 August; 7-12 Sep- tember 1966; Attleboro Sun, 12 September 1966.

191. Boston Herald, n.d. scrapbook 105, MP. 192. NYT, 15September 1966. 193. Clip, 15 September 1966, scrapbook 105, MP; Chronicle, 14 September 1966;

WP, 15September 1966. 194. A copy of the Martin telegram is not in the Martin papers and Heckler's

papers are closed. Lampson, Interview, 18; Heckler to Martin, September 14,1966, MP.

195. Sherman, North Attleborough, 199; Chronicle, 21 October; 1,4, 9, 12 Novem- ber 1966.

196. Kintner to Martin, September 16, 1966, White House Central Files, Name File, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin Tex.; Martin to Ford, September 30, 1966, folder S3-35, box 53, Ford scrapbook, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Mich.

197. Congressional Record, 89 Cong. 2d sess., 1966,112: 28315-28325,28412. 198. Chronicle, 17,21 November 1966; Note from Marvin to Lyndon B. Johnson,

January 7,1967, White House Central Files, Name File, Johnson Library. 199. Martin to Superintendent of Schools, November 8,1967, MP. 200. Congressional Record, 90 Cong. 1st sess., 1967, 113: 31121; Ford to Martin,

December 21,1967, Ford Congressional Papers, Ford Library. 201. Chronicle, 7-8 March 1968. 202. Lindley, "Backstage from Washington," 16-17. Also see 90 Cong. 2d sess.,

House Document #376, Memorial Addresses and Other Tributes in the Congress of the United States on the Life and Public Service of Joseph William Martin, J . (Washington, DC: GPO, 1968).

AP Chronicle DDEL FP

GPO INS LP

MP

NBC NYHT NYT OTC OHCCU RNC RNC

UP1 W P

Abbreviations Used in Endnotes

Associated Press The North Attleborough Evening Chronicle Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans. Henry P. Fletcher Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office International News Service Clare Boothe Luce Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Papers, Martin Institute, Stonehill Col- lege, Easton, Mass. National Broadcasting Company New York Herald Tribune New York Times Organization for Trade Cooperation Columbia University Oral History Collection Republican National Committee Papers of the Meetings of the Republican National Commit- tee. University Publications of America, 1986. United Press International Washington Post

309

Bibliography

Acheson, Dean. A Citizen Looks at Congress. New York: Harpers, 1957. -. Present at Creation: M y Years in the State Department. New York: Norton, 1969. Adams, Sherman. Firsthand Report: The Story of the Eisenhozuer Administration. New

York: Harpers, 1961. Albert, Carl with Danney Goble. Little Giant: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Al-

bert. Norman, Okla: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990. Allen, Robert A. and William V. Shannon. The Truman Merry-Go-Round. New York

Vanguard, 1950. Alsop, Joseph and Robert Kitner. American White Paper: The Story of American

Diplomacy and the Second World War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1940. Ambrose, Stephen E. Eisenhower: The President. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. -. Nixon: The Education of R Politician 1913-1962. New York: Simon & Schuster,

1987. Anderson, J. W. Eisenhozuer and Brownell and the Congress: The Tangled Origins of the

Civil Rights Bill of 1957. Kingsport, 'Tenn.: Kingsport Press, 1964. Anderson, Jack Z. Papers. Eisenhower Library. Abilene, Kans. Arnold, William A. Back Where It All Began: The Early Nixon Years. New York: Van-

tage, 1975. Attleboro Sun, 1911-1968. Atwater, Elton. American Regulation of Arms Exports. Washington: Carnegie En-

dowment for International Peace, 1941. Ayers, Eben. Trtirnaiz in the White House: The Dinry of Eben A. Ayers. Ed. Robert H.

Ferrell. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1991. Bailey, Stephen K. and Howard D. Samuel. Congress at Work. New York: Holt, 1952.

Reprint, Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1965. Bargeron, Carlisle. Confusion on the Potomac: The Alarming Chaos and Feuds of Wash-

ington. New York Funk, 1941.

311

312 Bibliography

. ]oe Martin: A n American Stoy.Washington, D.C.: Washington Features, 1948. Barnard, Ellsworth. Wendell Willkie: Fighter for Freedom. Marquette, Mich.: North-

ern Michigan University Press, 1966. Barnes, Joseph. Willkie: The Events He Was Part Of-The Ideas He Fought For. New

York: Simon & Schuster, 1951. Barone, Louis A. “Republican House Minority Leader Bertrand H. Snell and the

Coming of the New Deal 1931-1939.” Ph. D. diss., State University of New York at Buffalo, 1970.

Barton, Bruce, Papers. Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisc. Bauer, Raymond J., Ithiel de Sola Pool and Lewis A. Dexter. American Business and

Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press, 1968. Bayley, Edwin R. Joe McCarthy and the Press. Madison, Wisc.: University of Wis-

consin Press, 1981. Beck, Carl. Contempt of Congress: A Study of the Prosecutions lnitiated by the Commit-

tee on Un-American Activities, 2945-2957. New Orleans: Hauser, 1959. Bendinger, Robert. Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. -. “Pre-Elecction U.S.A.-Bay Sate Prospects.” Nation, October 12, 1946,

402-406. Benson, Ezra Taft. Cross Fire: The Eight Years with Eisenhower. Garden City, N.Y.:

Doubleday, 1962. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976. Berdahl, Clarence. ”Political Parties and Elections.” American Political Science Re-

view 37 (February 1943): 68-81. Berman, William C. The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration. Colum-

bus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1970. Bibby, John and Roger Davidson. On Capitol Hill: Studies in the Legislative Process.

New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1967. Biddle, Ellen A. “The American Catholic Irish Family.” Pp. 89-123 in Ethnic Fami-

lies in America: Patterns and Variations, ed. Charles H. Mindel and Robert W. Habenstern. New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1976.

Biddle, Francis. In Brief Authority. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1962. Binkley, Wilfred E. ”Wendell Willkie the Party’s Embarrassing Conscience.”

Pp. 53-70 in Public Men in and Out of Office, ed. J. T. Salter. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1946.

Blum, John. V Was for Victoy: Politics and American Culture During World War 11. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1976.

Bolling, Richard W. House Out of Order. New York: Dutton, 1965. Bolton, France P. Papers. Western Reserve Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio. Boskin, Joseph. “Politics of an Opposition Party: The Republican Party in the New

Deal Period, 1930-1940.” Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1959. Boston Globe, 1911-1968. Boston Herald, 1926-1967 Boston Post, 1926-1956. Boylan, James R. ”Reconversion in Politics: The New Deal Coalition and the Elec-

tion of the Eightieth Congress.” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1971. Brewer, Basil. Papers. Joint Collection of University of Missouri, Western Histori-

cal Manuscript Collection and State Historical Society of Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

Bibliography 313

Bridges, Ronald. ”The Republican Program Committee.” Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (April 1939): 299-305.

Bridges, Styles and Joseph W. Marin, Jr., Republican Accomplishments in the Eighty- Second Congress. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952.

Brinkley, David. Washington Goes to War. New York Knopf, 1988. Bulkley, Peter B. “Daniel A. Reed: A Study in Conservatism.” Ph.D. diss., Clark

University, 1972. Burns, James MacGregor. Four-Party Politics in America. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice Hall, 1963. ___ . Rooseuelt: The Soldier of Freedom. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich

1970. Butow, R. J. C. ”The FDR Tapes.” American Heritage 33 (February/March 1982):

20-21 Campbell, Thomas and George C. Herring, ed. The Diaries of Edward A. Stettinius,

I . 2943-2946. New York New Viewpoints, 1975. Cantril, Hadley and John Harding. “The 1942 Elections: A Case Study in Political

Psychology.” Public Opinion Quarterly 7 (summer 1943): 227-41. Caro, Robert A. Master of the Senate. New York Knopf, 2002. Carper, Edith T. Lobbying and the Natural Gas Bill-lnter University Case Program

#72. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1962. Carroll, Holbert N. The House of Representatives and Foreign Afairs. Rev. ed., Boston:

Little, Brown, 1966. Case, Francis. Papers. Mitchell, S. Dak.: Dakota Wesleyan University. Chamberlain, John. ”Herbert Brownell,” Life, April 9, 1945, 103-17. Chambrun, Clara Longworth. The Making of Nicholas Longworth. New York: Long

& Smith, 1933. Chapman, Richard N. Contours of American Public Policy 1939-1945. New York:

Garland, 1981. Cheney, Richard B. and Lynne V. Cheney. Kings of the Hill: Power and Personality in

the House of Representatives. New York: Continuum, 1983. Chenoweth, Richard R. “Francis Case: A Political Biography.” Ph.D. diss., Univer-

sity of Nebraska, 1977. Childs, Marquis. I Writefrom Washington. New York Harpers, 1942. Clapp, Charles L. The Congressman: His Work U S He Sees It. Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institute. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1980. Clara, Alla. Oral History. North Texas State University Oral History Collection,

Sam Rayburn Library, Bonham, Texas. Clifford,J. Garry and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr. The First Peace Time Draft. Lawrence,

Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 1986. “Coal Strike: JoeMartin‘s Way.” Newsweek, April 9,1948,2627. Coffin, Tris. “A Man of the Good Old Days,” New Republic, February 17, 1947,

28-30. Cole, Wayne S. Rooseuelt and the Isolationists 1932-2945. Lincoln, Neb.: University

of Nebraska Press, 1983. “The Congress.” Time, April 11,1938, 11-15. “The Congress.” Time, May 25,1942,13-15. “The Congress: Elephant Boy.” Time, April 11, 1938, 13-14.

314 Bibliography

“A Congress to End the War.“ New Republic, May 1942,682-711. Connally, Tom as told to Alfred Steinberg. My Name is Tom Connally. New York:

Crowell, 1954. Connolly, James L. The Diocese ofFall River. Fall River, Mass.: The Diocese, 1972. Cunningham, John T. Newark. Newark, N.J.: New Jersey Historical Society, 1966. Curtis, Thomas B. and John R. Vastine, Jr. The Kennedy Round and the Future of

American Trade. New York Praeger, 1971. Curtis, Thomas B. and Donald L. Westerfield. Congressional Intent. Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, 1992. Dahl, Robert A. Congress and Foreign Policy. New York: Harcourt Brace. Reprint,

Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1983. Dalleck, Robert. Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times 1928-1960. New

York: Oxford University Press. Darilek, Richard E. A Loyal Opposition in Time of War: The Republican Party and the Pol-

itics of Foreign Policyfrom Pearl Harbor to Yalta. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1976. David, Paul T., Malcolm Moos and Ralph M. Goldman, eds. Presidential Nominot-

ing Politics 2952. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954. Davies, Richard 0.Housing Reform During the Truman Administration. Columbia,

Mo.: Universitv of Missouri Press, 1966. Davis, Elmer. “Piesident Dewey’s Strange Bedfellows.” Harpers, September 1948,

25-33. Dewey, Thomas E. Papers. University of Rochester Library, Rochester, New York. Dierenfield, Bruce J. Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia.

Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1951. Dinnerstein, Leonard. “Anti-Semitism in the Eightieth Congress: The Displaced

Persons Act of 1948.“In Unemy at Home: Anti-Semitism and the American Experi- ence. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Divine, Robert A. Foreign Policy and US.Presidential Elections, 1940-2948. New York: New Viewpoints, 1974.

Doenecke, Justus D. “The Strange Career of American Isolationism, 1944-1954.” Peace and Change 3 (Summer/Fall, 1975): 79-83.

Donaldson, Gary A. Truman Defeats Dewey. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky, 1999.

Donovan, Robert J. Boxing the Kangaroo: A Reporter’s Memoir. Columbia, Mo.: Uni- versity of Missouri Press, 2002.

-. Conflict and Crisis: The IJresidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948. New York: Norton, 1977.

Dorough, C. Dwight. Mr. Sam. New York: Random House, 1962. Dubofsky, Melvyn and Warren Van Tine. john L. Lewis: A Biography. New York

New York Times Book, 1977. Dulaney, H. C. and Edward H. Phillips. Speak, Mister Speaker. Bonham, Tex.: Sam

Rayburn Foundation, 1978. Dulles, Foster R. American Policy Toward Communist China 1949-2969. New York:

Crowell, 1972. Dulles, John Foster. Minutes of Telephone conversations of John Foster Dulles and

of Christian Herter, 1953-1961. Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America. Microfilm.

Bibliography 31 5

-. Papers. Princeton University Library, Princeton, N.J. Eisenhower, Dwight D. Diaries. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of Amer-

ica, 1986. Microfilm. -. Mandate for Change. 1953-1956. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963. -. Papers. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans. -. Office Files, 1953-1961. Bethesda, Md.: University Publications of America,

Microfilm, 1990. -. Public Papers ofthe Presidents, 2953-2962. Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1954-1962. -. Waging Peace 2956-2962. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965. "Election Story." New Republic, November 11,1946,614. Evjen, Henry 0."The Republican Strategy in the Presidential Campaigns of 1936

and 1940." Ph.D. diss., Western Reserve University, 1950. -. "The Willkie Campaign: An Unfortunate Chapter in Republican Leader-

ship." journal of Politics 14 (May 1952): 241-56. Fall River Herald News, 1926-1968. Farago, Ladislas. The Game of the Fox. New York McKay, 1971. Farley, James A. Jim Farley's Sfory: The Rooseuelt Years. New York: McGraw-Hill,

1948. -. Papers. Library of Congress, 1986, Washington, D.C. Microfilm edition. Fausold, Martin A. lames W.Wadsworth, Jr.: The Gentlemanfrom New York. Syracuse,

N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1975. Ferrell, Robert H., ed. The Diuy of lames C. Hagerty: Eisenhower in Mid Course,

29541955. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1983. -, ed. The Eisenhozuer Diaries. New York: Norton, 1981. -, ed. Offthe Record: The Private Papers .f Harry S. Truman. New York Harper

& Row, 1980. Flanders, Ralph E. Senatorfrom Vermont. Boston: Little, Brown, 1961. Fleeson, Doris. "They Wear No Man's Collar." Nation's Business, September 1946,

50-52,70-73. Fletcher, Henry P. Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,

D.C. Flynn, Edward J. You're The Boss. New York Viking, 1947. Fogarty, Gerald P. The Vatican and the American Hierarchy from 1870 to 2965.

Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1982. Ford, Gerald R. A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald Ford. New York: Harper

& Row, 1979. -. Papers. Gerald R. Library, Ann Arbor, Mich. Forrestal, James V. Diaries. Ed. Walter Millis. New York: Viking, 1951. Friedman, Rabbi I. "Congressman Joseph Martin in Israel." Jewish Advocate, July

19, 1962. Frost, Michael. "Minority JoeCracks the Whip." Ken 4 (April 13,1939): 18-20. Galbraith, John Kenneth. A Life in Our Times: Memoirs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin,

1981. Gellman, Irwin F. The Contender: Richard Nixon the Congress Years, 2946-2952. New

York: Free Press, 1999. Gervasi, Frank. The Real Rockefeller: The Stoy of the Rise, Decline and Resurgence of

the Presidential Aspirations of Nelson Rockefeller. New York: Athenaeum, 1964.

316 Bibliography

Giles, Kevin. Flight of the Dove: The Story of Ieanette Rankin. Beaverton, Ore.: Touch- stone, 1980.

Goldman, Eric. The Crucial Decade-And After: America, 1945-2960. New York: enlarged Vintage ed., 1960.

Goldwater, Barry M. With No Apologies: The Personal and Political Memoirs of United States Senator B a y M . Goldwater. New York: Morrow, 1979.

Goodman, Walter. The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the Ifouse Committee on Un-Americian Activities. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1968.

"G.O.P. Tide Jars Democrats into Study of New Deal Rift." Newsweek, February 27, 1939,ll-13.

"G.O.P. Grooms Its Dark Horse." Newsweek, February 12,1940,15-16. Graham, Charles J. "Republican Foreign Policy, 1939-1952." Ph.D. diss., Univer-

sity of Illinois, 1955. Green, Constance McLaughlin. Washington: Capital City 2879-1950. Princeton, N.J.:

Princeton University Press, 1963. Groneman, Carol. "Working-Class Immigrant Women in Mid-Nineteenth Century

New York: The Irish Woman's Experience." Journal of Urban History 4 (May 1978): 255-73.

Gustafson, Milton 0. "Congress and Foreign Aid: The First Phase, UNRRA, 1943-1947. Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska, 1966.

Hamby, Alonzo L. Man of the People: A Life of Harry S . Truman. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Hamilton, John D. M. Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Wash- ington, D.C.

Hanks, Richard Ray. "Hamilton Fish and American Isolationism." Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1971.

Hardeman, D. B. and Donald C. Bacon. Rayburn: A Biography. Austin, Tex.: Texas Monthly Press, 1987.

Harding, John. "The 1942 Congressional Elections." American Political Science Re- view 38 (February 1944): 41-58.

Hartley, Fed A. Jr. Our New National Labor Party: The Taft-Hartley Act and the Next Steps. New York Funk & Wagnalls, 1948

Hartman, Susan B. Truman and the 80th Congress. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1971.

Hasenfus, William A. "Managing Partner: Joseph W. Martin, Jr., Republican Leader of the United States House of Representatives 1939-1959." Ph.D. diss., Boston College, 1986.

Hatch, Alden. Ambassador Extraordinary: Clare Boothe Luce. New York Holt, 1956.

-. The Wadsworths of the Genesee. New York: Coward-McCann, 1959. Heale, M. J. American AntiCommunism: Combating the Enemy Within 1830-2970. Bal-

timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. Henderson, Cary Smith. "Congressman John Taber of Auburn: Politics and Fed-

eral Appropriations, 1923-1962." Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1964. Herring, E. Pendelton. "First Session of Seventy-Third Congress, March 9-June 16,

1933."American Political Science Review 28 (February 1934):65-83.

Bibliography 317

I-ierzstein, Robert E. Henry A. Luce: A Political Portrait of the Man Who Created the American Century. New York: Macmillan, 1994.

Hewitt, Charles E., Jr. ”Martin-Small Town Big-Timer.” Scribner’s Commentator 8 (October 1940): 11-24.

High, Stanley. ”What Is Moral Rearmament?” Saturday Evening Post, August 12, 1939,23,34,36,38-39.

Hinchey, Mary H. ”The Frustration of the New Deal Revival.” Ph.D. diss., Uni- versity of Missouri, 1965.

Hoover, Herbert. “The Crisis and the Political Parties.” Atlantic Monthly, Septem-ber 1937,257-68.

-. Papers. Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa. Howard, Katherine. Papers. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Uni-

versity. Hurd, Charles. Washington Cavalcade. New York: Dutton, 1948. Hutt, Frank W. A History of Bristol County Massachusetts. New York: Lewis Histor-

ical Publishing, 1924. Jackson, Donald M. and James W. Riddlesperger, J . ”The Eisenhower Adminis-

tration and the 1957 Civil Rights Act.” In Reexamining the Eisenhower Presidency, ed. Shirley A. Warsaw. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993.

Javits, Jacob K. Jauits: The Autobiography ofa Public Man. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981.

Jensen, Benjamin F. Papers. University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City. “JoeMartin Says.“ The Republican, March 1941, 3. Johnson, Donald B. The Republican Party and Wendell Willkie. Urbana: University of

Illinois Press, 1960. Jonas, Manfred. “Pro-Axis Sentiment and American Isolationism.” The Historian

29 (February 1967): 221-37. Jones, Charles 0.The Minority Party in Congress. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970. -. Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee. New

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1964. Kay, Hubert. “JoeMartin and the People.” Life, January 1,1940,48-54. Kenneally, James J. ”Black Republicans During the New Deal: The Role of Joseph

W. Martin, Jr.” Reuiezu of Politics 54 (winter 1993): 117-140. -. “A Delegation Divided: Massachusetts Republicans and the Nomination of

Dwight D. Eisenhower.” In Massachusetts Politics: Selected Historical Essays, ed. Jack Tager, Martin Kaufman and Michael E Konig, 174-90. Westfield, Mass.: Westfield State College, 1998.

-. Edward E. and Beatrice H. Martin: A n Interpretation. Easton, Mass.: Privately Printed, 1987.

Kennedy, Robert E., Jr. The Irish: Emigration, Marriage, and Fertility. Berkeley: Uni- versity of California Press, 1973.

Keogh, James. This Is Nixon. New York: Putnams, 1956. Kilman, Ed and Theon Wright. Hugh Ray Cullen: A Story of American Opportunity.

New York, Prentice Hall, 1954. Kimball, Warren F. The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1942. Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1969.

318 Bib1 iography

-, ed. Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. 3v. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Kiplinger, W. M. Washington Is Like That. New York, Harpers, 1942. Kirby, Michael and Lawrence Kubilus. North Attleborough Then and Now. Medway,

Mass.: Jostens Printing, 1987. Lamb, Karl A. “Republican Strategy and the Congressional Election of 1938.”

Ph.D. diss., Oxford, 1957. Landon, Alfred M. Papers. Kansas Historical Society, Topeka, Kans. Langer, William L. and S. Everett Gleason. The Challenge to Isolation. New York

Harpers, 1953. Lapham, Lewis J. Party Leadership and the House Committee on Rules. New York

Garland, 1988. Lee, R. Alton. Truman and Taft-Hartley: A Question of Mandate. Lexington, Ky.: Uni-

versity of Kentucky Press, 1966. Reprint, Westport, Conn., Greenwood, 1980. Legislative Leaders, President Eisenhower’s Meetings with, 1953-1961. Frederick,

Md.: University Publications of America, 1986. Microfilm. Leuchtenburg, William E. ”Election of 1936.”In Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., ed., His-

t o y of American Presidential Elections 1789-1968. New York: Chelsea House, 1971.

-. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932-1940. New York Harper & Row, 1963

Lindley, Ernest K. “Appraising the 80th Congress.” Newsweek, June 28, 1948,23. -. “Backstage from Washington.” Saturday Review, October 1,1960. -. ”The Eighty-First Congress.” Yale Review 38 (December 1948): 193-203. Lindsay, John V. Journey into Politics: Some Informnl Observations. New York: Dodd,

Mead, 1967. Litschert, Frank P. “An Elephant Looks at Congress.” National Republic, September

1936,24,26-27. “Lord of the Citadel.” Time, August 9,1954, 16-20. Luce, Clare Boothe. Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washing-

ton, D.C. MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964. McCormack, John. Oral History. John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass. McCoy, Donald R. Landon of Kansas. Lincoln, Nebr.: University of Nebraska Press,

1966. -. “Republican Opposition During Wartime 1941-1945.” Mid America 49 (July

1967): 174-89. McGinnis, Patrick E. “Republican Party Resurgence in Congress 1936-1946.”

Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1967. McGriffin, Norton. “Gloomy Old Party.” North American Review 239 (March 1935):

250-56. MacKenzie, A. Lawrence. ”Joe Martin-Bay State’s Dark Horse. “ Boston Post Fea-

ture Section, April 7, 1940, 1-2. MacMahon, Arthur W. “First Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress, December 7, 1925-July 3,1926.” American Political Science Review 20 (August 1926): 604-22.

-. ”Second Session of the Sixty-Ninth Congress, December 6,1926-March 6, 1927.“American Political Science Review 21 (May 1927): 297-317.

Bibliography 31 9

McNaughton, Frank. Papers. Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo. McNaughton, Frank and Walter Hehmeyer. Harry Truman-President. New York:

Whittlesey House, 1948. MacNeil, Neil. Dirksen: Portrait of a Public Man. New York: World, 1970. -. Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives. New York David McKay,

1963. MacRae. Dimensions of Congressional Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Rep-

resentatives in the Eighty-First Congress. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958.

Mallon, Paul. ”Swordsman of the Senate.” Today, December 8,1934,5,21. Martin Edward as told to James J. Kenneally. Down Memory Lane. Easton, Mass.:

Privately Printed, 1980. Martin, Joe as told to Robert J. Donovan. M y First Fifty Years in Politics. New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1960. Martin, Joseph W., Jr. “Lock the Door Against Dictators.” The Republican, Septem-

ber 1945,3,20. -. Speaker Martin Looks at Europe. Fall River: Fall River Herald News, 1954. -. Papers. Martin Institute, Stonehill College, Easton, Mass. -. ”Worldwide Abolition of Conscription.” Journal of the National Educational

Association 34 (December 1945): 180-81. Maslow, Will. “FEPC-A Case History in Parliamentary Maneuver.” University of

Chicago Law Review 13 (June 1946): 40744. Massachusetts, Commonwealth of. Report of the Street Railway fnvestigating Com-

mission of the Problems Relating to the Street Railways, February 1 , 1918. Boston: Wright & Potter, 1918.

Massachusetts Works Progress Administration. Annunl Report, 1938. Boston, n.p., 1939.

Mayer, Michael S. “The Eisenhower Administration-The Civil Rights Act of 1957.”Congress and the Presidency 16 (autumn 1989): 137-54.

-. “Eisenhower’s Conditional Crusade: The Eisenhower Administration and Civil Rights 1953-1957.” Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1984.

Mayhew, David R. Party Loyalty Among Congressmen: The DifJerence between Democrats and Republicans 1947-1952. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.

Mesta, Perle with Robert Cahn. Perle: M y Story. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960. Milkis, Sidney M. The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American

Party System Since the New Deal. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Miller, Clem. Member ofthe House: Letters ofa Congressman. New York Scribners, 1962. Miller, William M. ”Fishbait” as told to Frances S. Leighton. Fishbait: The Memoirs

of the Congressional Doorkeeper. New York: Warner, 1977. Moley, Raymond. Papers. Hoover Institute for War and Peace, Stanford University. Montgomery, Gayle B. and Janies W. Johnson. One Stepfrom the White House: The

Rise and Fall of Senator William B. Knowland. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Morgan, Iwan W. Eisenhower Versus “The Spenders”: The Eisenhower Administration, the Democrats and the Budget 1953-1960. New York St. Martin’s, 1990.

Morgan, Ted. FDR: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985.

320 Bibliography

Morris, Harry Wesley. "The Republicans in a Minority Role, 1933-1938." Ph.D. diss., State University of Iowa, 1960.

Morris, Roger. Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician. New York Holt, 1990.

Moscow, Warren. Roosevelt and Willkie. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1968. "Mr. Speaker." Time, November 18, 1946,25. "MRA in Washington." Time, July 12,1939,54-55. Mundt, Karl E. Papers. Dakota State College, Madison, South Dakota. Murphy, Kevin. "Child of War: The Federal Income Withholding Tax." Mid-America

78 (Summer 1996), 203-29. NAACP Papers, Supplement to Part I, 1956-1960. Bethesda, Md.: University Pub-

lications of America. Microfilm. -. Part 9: Discrimination in the U. S.Armed Forces, 1918-1955. Frederick, Md.:

University Publications of America. Microfilm. Neal, Steve. Dark Horse: A Biography of Wendell Willkie. Lawrence, Kans.: Univer-

sity Press of Kansas, 1989. Neustadt, Richard E. "Congress and the Fair Deal: A Legislative Balance Sheet."

Public Policy 5 (1954): 351-81. New York Herald Tribune, 1925-1966. New York Times, 1925-1968. Nichols, H. G., ed. Washington Despatches 1941-1945: Weekly Political Reports from

fhe British Embassy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981. Nixon, Richard M. Papers. Federal Archives and Records Center, Laguna Niguel,

California. -. RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978. North Att leborough Chronicle, 1908-1968. Parmet, Herbert S. Eisenhower and the American Crusade. New York: Macmillan,

1972. -. Richard Nixon and His America. New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1990. Parmet, Herbert S. and Marie B. Hecht. Never Again: A President Runs for a Third

Term. New York: Macmillan, 1968. Parthenakis, Thomas. "Christian A. Herter and His Influence and Involvement in

U.N.R.R.A., the European Recovery Program and the Truman Point Four Pro- gram.'' M.A. Thesis, Kent State University, 1967.

Patterson, James T. "A Conservative Coalition Forms in Congress 1933-1935." Journal of American History 52 (March 1966): 757-72.

Peek, George N. Papers. Joint Collection of University of Missouri, Western His- torical Manuscript Collection and State Historical Society of Missouri, Colum- bia, Missouri.

"People of the Week." US.News and World Report, April 23,1948,34-35. "People of the Week." U.S. News and World Report, June 25,1948,37-39. Perett, Geoffrey. Eisenhower. New York Random House, 1999. Persons, Wilton B. Oral History. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans. Peters, Ronald M., Jr. The American Speakership: The Ofice in Historical Perspective.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. . The Speaker: Leadership in the U.S.House of Representatives. Washington, DC:

Congressional Quarterly, 1994.

Bibliography 321

Plesur, Milton. ”The Republican Congressional Comeback of 1938.”Review of Pol-itics 24 (October 1962): 525-62.

Polenberg, Richard L. Reorganizing Roosevelt’s Government: The Controversy over Ex- ecutive Reorganization 2936-2939. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.

-. War and Society: The United States 1941-2945. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1972.

Polsby, Nelson W. Congress and the Presidency. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice- Hall, 1964.

Pomper, Gerald. “Labor Legislation: The Revision of Taft-Hartley in 1953-1954.” Labor History 6 (spring 1975): 143-58.

Porter, David L. Congress and the Waning of the New Deal. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat, 1980.

-. The Seventy-Sixth Congress and World War [I, 1939-2940. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1979.

Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr. Adam by Adam: The Autobiography of Adam Clayton Pow- ell, Jr.New York: Dial, 1971.

President Eisenhower’s Meetings With Legislative Leaders 1953-1961. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1986. Microfilm.

Pringle, Henry F. and Katherine. “The ’Terrible Twelve’ of Capitol Hill.” SaturdayEvening Post, June 19,1954,22-23, 125-29.

Radosh, Ronald. Prophets of the Right: Profiles of Conservative Critics of American Globalism. New York Simon & Schuster, 1975.

Randall, Clarence. Journal. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kans. Rayburn, Sam. Papers. Sam Rayburn Library, Bonham, Tex. Redding, Jack. Inside the Democratic Party. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1958. Reichard, Gary W. Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower. Arlington

Heights, Ill.: Harlan Davidson, 1988. Reinhard, David W. The Republican Right Since 2945. Lexington, Ky.: University

Press of Kentucky, 1983. Republican Party Papers. Part 1, Meetings of the Republican National Committee

1911-1980, Series A: 1911-1960. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1986. Microfilm.

”Review of Seventy-Sixth Congress.” Newsweek, August 19,1939,ll-13. ”Revolt: Defeat on Reorganization.” Newsweek, April 18, 1938,13-14. Riddick, Floyd M. ”The Second Session of the Seventy-Seventh Congress, January

6-December 19, 1942. American Political Science Review 37 (April 1943): 290-305. -. “The Second Session of the Seventy-Ninth Congress, January 14-August 2,

1946.”American Political Science Review 41 (February 1947): 12-27. -. “The First Session of the Eightieth Congress, January 6-Decmber 31,1948.”

American Political Science Review 43 Uune 1949): 483-92. -. ”The Eighty-Second Congress: First Session.” Western Political Quarterly 5

(1952): 99-108. -. “The Eight-Third Congress: First and Second Sessions.” Western Politicd

Quarterly 6 (1953): 776-94, 7 (1954): 636-55. -. ”The Eighty-Sixth Congress: First Session.“ Western Political Quarferly 13

(March 1960); 113-30.

322 Bibliography

-. ”Leadership in the House.” South Atlantic Quarterly 36 (January 1937): 1-13. Robinson, James A. Congress and Foreign Policy Making: A Study in Legislative lnji’u-

ence and Initiative. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1962. Rogge, 0. John. The Oficial Report: Nazi Penetration 2924-2942; Pan-Arabism,

2939-Today. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961. Roosevelt, Elliott, ed.F.D.R. His Personal Letters 2928-2945. New York Duell, Sloan,

& Pearce, 1950. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Papers. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York. Rosenman, Samuel 1. Working with Roosevelt. New York Harpers, 1952. -, ed. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt. New York Russell &

Russell, 1969. Ross, Irwin. The Loneliest Campaign: The Truman Victory of 1948. Westport, Conn.:

Greenwood, 1968. Ruchames, Louis. Race, lobs, and Politics: The Story ofthe FEPC. New York: Colum-

bia University Press, 1953. Reprint, Westport, Conn.: Negro Universities Press, 1971.

Saltonstall, Leverett as told to Edward Weeks. Salty: Recollections of a Yankee in Pol-itics. Boston: Boston Globe, 1976.

Schapsmeier, Edward and Frederick H. Dirksen of Illinois: Senatorial Statesman. Ur-bana: University of Illinois, Press, 1985.

Scheele, Henry Z. Charlie Halleck: A Political Biography. New York: Exposition Press, 1966.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr. The Coining of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959.

-. The Politics of Upheaval. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960. -, ed. History of American Presidential Elections 2789-1968. New York Chelsea

House, 1971. Scott, Hugh, interview with Anthony Champagne, September 23,1980. Sam Ray-

bum Library, Bonham, Tex. Shadegg, Stephen. Clare Boothe Luce: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster,

1970. Shannon, William V. “Joe Martin: A Study in the Negative.” The Reporter, Novem-

ber 7,1950,14-16. Sheed, Wilfred. Clare Boothe Luce. New York: Dutton, 1982. Sherman, Jonann. No Place for a Lady: A Life of Senator Margaret Chase Smith. New

Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2000. Sherman, Richard L. North Attleborough: A n Aflectionate History. Bicentennial Com-

mission of the Town of North Attleborough, 1976. Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins: A n lntimate History. New York:

Hamers, 1948. 1 .

Smith, Margaret Chase. Declaration of Conscience. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday 1972.

-. Oral History. Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard University. Smith, Richard Norton. Thomas E. Dewey and His Times. New York: Simon &

Schuster, 1982. Snell, Bertrad. Papers. Crumb Library Archives, State University of New York,

Potsdam, N.Y.

Bibliography 323

“Speaker of the House.” Department of State Field Reporter 2 (January-February 1954):5.

Steinberg, Alfred. Sam Rayburn: A Biography. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1975. Steiner, Gilbert J. The Congressional Conference Committee: Seventieth to Eightieth

Congresses. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1951. Stripling, Robert E. The Red Plot Against America. Drexel Hill, Pa.: Bell Publishing,

1949. Swain, Martha H. Pat Harrison: The Nezu Deal Years. Jackson, Miss.: University Press

of Mississippi, 1978. T.R.B. “Washington Notes.” Nezo Republic 97 (November 9,1938): 16-17. Taft, Robert. Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Taylor, Dean P. Papers. Rensselaer County Historical Society, Troy, N.Y. Taylor, E. H. “The Man Who Believes We Can.” Country Gentleman, August 1939,

56-57. Tl~eoharis, Athan G. The Yalta Myths: A n Issue in US.Politics 2945-1955. Columbia,

Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1970. Toledano, Ralph De. One Man Alone: Richard Nixon. New York: Funk & Wagnalls,

1969. Townsend, Francis E. New Horizons. Chicago: Stewart Publishing, 1942 Troncone, Anthony C. “Hamilton Fish Sr. and the Politics of American National-

ism 1912-1945.” Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1993. Truman, David B., ed. The Congress and America’s Future. 2d ed., Englewood Cliffs,

N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973. Truman, Harry S. Office Files 1945-1953: Part I Political File. Frederick, Md.: Uni-

versity Publications of America, 1989. Microfilm. -. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Washington, D.C.: GPO,

1963-1 965. --. Papers: Official File, Post Presidential File. Truman Library. Independence,

Mo. -. Years of Trial and Hope. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956. “The Truth about Guam. . . A Search of the Record.” Newsweek, August 28,1944,

43. Twenty Second Republican National Convention, Proceedings, August 20-23, 1956.

Washington, D.C.: Judd & Detweiller, 1956. United States Congress, House of Representatives, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Re-

port #492. To Prohibit Exportation of Arms or Implements of War to Belligerent Na- tions. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1928.

-, 76th Congress, 1st session, Under House Resolution 130. Investigation and Study of Works Progress Administration. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1940.

-, Toward the Endless Frontier: History of the Committee on Science and Technology 2959-1970. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980.

-, Senate, 81st Congress, 2d Session, Subcommittee of the Committee on For- eign Relations. State Depurtrnent Employee Loyalty Investigation. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1950.

Vorys, John M. Papers. Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. Ward, Robert D. ”The Movement for Universal Military Training in the United

States, 1942-1952.” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina, 1957.

324 Bibliography

Ware, Gilbert. "The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the Civil Rights Act of 1957." Ph.D. diss., Princeton University.

"Washington Correspondents Name Ablest Congressmen in Life Poll." Lqe, March 20,1939,13-15.

Washington Post, 1925-1968. Wasington Star, 1925-1968. Washington Times Herald, 1939-1954. Watson, Denton L. Lion in the Lobby: Clarence Mitchell, Jr.'s Struggle for the Passage of

Civil Rights Laws. New York: Morrow, 1990. Watts, Jill. God, Harlem U.S.A.: The Father Divine Story. Berkeley: University of Cal-

ifornia Press, 1992. Weishot, Robert. Father Divine and the Struggle for Racial Equality. Urbana: Univer-

sity of Illinois Press, 1983. Westerfield, H. Bradford. Foreign Policy and Party Politics Pearl Harbor to Korea.

New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955. Reprint New York: Octagon Books, 1972.

Westphal, Albert C. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942.

White Arthur H. "Campaign, Martha Sharp for Congress 1946: A Case Study." Honors Thesis, Harvard University, 1947.

White, William Allen. Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Wash- ington, D.C.

-. Select Letters, 2899-2943. Ed., Walter Johnson. New York: Holt, 1947. White, William S. "Then Martin, Now Rayburn, and So On." New York Times Mag-

azine, 6 February 1955,17,36,38. "Who Is Your Personal Choice for National G.O.P. Chairman?" The Republican,

March 1941,ll. "Who's Who in the GOP?" Time, May 3,1948,20. Wicker, Tom. One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream. New York Random

House, 1991. Wilcox, Francis. "The Neutrality Fight in Congress." American Political Science Re-

view 33 (October 1939): 811-825. Willkie, Wendell. Papers. Lilly Library, Indiana University. Bloomington, Ind. Wilson, Joan Hoff. Herbert Hoover Forgotten Progressive. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975. Wolfskill, George and John A. Hudson. All But the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and

His Critics 1933-2939. New York: Macmillan, 1969. Wood, Lewis. "The Fighting Lumberjack-The Statesman's Corner-Presenting

Bertrand H. Snell." Today, February 24, 1934,9. Woolf, Samuel J. "Stage Managers of the Big Political Show." New York Magazine,

15 September 1940,15,22.

Index

absentee voting for military, 81, 104 Acheson, Dean G., 145,177,178;

Martin attempts to dismiss, 179, 186,188

Adams, Sherman, 203,205,275 AFL. See American Federation of

Labor African-Americans, 4, 10,15, 85,

263n32; election of 1936,23-25; election of 1940, 69; election of 1946,121; issues in Eightieth Congress, 141-42; Martin’s election as minority leader, 35-36; Un- American Activities Committee, 105-6. See also civil rights, Fair Employment Practices Commission, school construction

Agricultural Adjustment Act, 18-19,31 Aiken George D., 251 Albert, Carl B., 151 Alcom, Meade, 261,273,279 Allen, Leo E., 30, 53, 119, 153, 257; as

Rules Committee Chairman, 138, 148,201,205; election of 1948, 155

Allen Robert S., ix, x Alsop, Joseph, xii, 155 America First Committee, 84

American Christian Palestine Committee, 15,120, 142

American Civil Liberties Union, 228 American Federation of Labor (AFL),

26,31,69,88,155; AFL-CIO, 277 American Medical Association, 174,

183 American Palestine Committee. See

American Christian Palestine Committee

Americans for Democratic Action, 234, 277,283,286

Anderson, Jack Z. (John),234,271,279 Arends, Les (Leslie E.), 180,249,257,

259,272 atomic bomb, 107 Auchincloss, James C., 279,281 Austin, Warren R., 77 Ayres, William A., 270, 273

Bailey, Cleveland M., 222 Baker, Frederick, 102 Baltimore Sun, 261 Balfour Declaration, 120 Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 27 Barton, Bruce, 29,6748, 111 Benson, Ezra Taft, 257

325

326

Bentley, Alvin M., 212 Berlin, Isaiah, 82 Biddle, Ellen A., 1 Bolton, Frances, 16911147 Borah, William E., 24 Boston Globe, 5,8,294 Bowen, Rev. Ambrose, 122 Bradford, Robert F., 157,159,161 Bresnahan, Lawrence, 30-32,44n96,98 Brewer, Basil, 189,191 Brewster, Ralph Owen, 55,153, 159,

180-81 Bricker, John W., 6041,109-10 Bridges, H. Styles, 77,154,155,159,

184 British Loan (1946), 119,253 Brown, Clarence J., 148,270 Brownell, Herbert, Jr., 113,150, 228-29 Brownson, Charles B., 270 Buckwheat Republican Club, 34 Burdick, Usher L., 35 Burleson, Omar T., 48 Burns, James MacGregor, x, 62 Butler, Paul M., 261 Bymes, John W., 276

Cake, Ralph H., 190 Capehart, Homer E., 33 Capper, Arthur, 55 Carpenter, Terry M., 233 Case, Francis H., 55,153,155,261 Cassidy, Bishop James, 19 Catton, Bruce, 56 Chambers, Whittaker, 176 Chiang Kai-shek, 149,177-78,200 Chicago Daily News, 246 Chicago Tribune, 62,85, 185, 101-2, 109 Childs, Marquis, 62 Churchill, Winston S., 66,72,76,214 CIO. See Congress of Industrial

Organizations civil rights, 227-29, 263n23,293 Civil Rights Bill (1957), 249-52,

264n.41 Civil Rights Commission, 173 Civilian Conservation Corps, 27,81 Clapper, Raymond, 30,56

liidex

Clary, Alla, 274 Clifford, Clark M., 150 coal strike of 1948,154,168n119 coexistence, 214, 288 Coffin, Tris, x Cole, W. Sterling, 208 Colmer, William M., 252,274 Communists: American, 82, 113, 121;

in government, 138,144,211-13, 288; in Soviet Union, 182. See also Un-American Activities Committee

Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 26,30,65,104,122,208; Political Action Committee, 104, 111,112,122

Congressional Campaign Committee, 28-30

Connolly, Bishop James L. 298 “Constructive Conservatism,” 117-18 Conte, Silvio O., 293 Cooley, Harold D., 147 Coolidge, Calvin, x, 7,9,10,13 Cooper, John S., 171 Coplan, Judith, 175 Copley, James S., 280 Coughlin, Rev. Charles E., 231 Cox, Channing H., 9 Cox, Edward E. (Gene), 12,26,47,153,

174 Cullen, Hugh Roy, 82433,152,155-56,

16911136,215,262 Cunningham, Glen C., 285 Curtis, Carl T., 233 Curtis, Thomas B., 269,276 Cushing, Cardinal Richard J., 289

Davenport, Russell, 64 Davis, Elmer, 151 Davis, William Rhodes, 65 defense reorganization, 256 Democrats for Willkie, 64 Derwinski, Edward J., 277 Dewey, Thomas E., 74,83-84,136,179,

215; election of 1940,57-58,60,68; election of 1944,110-12; election of 1948, 150-61; election of 1952, 190-91; election of 1956,232

lndex 327

Dies Committee, 50,57, 105-6. See also Farley, Elizabeth J. (Mrs. James J.), 110 Un-American Activities Committee Farley, James J., 34,37n7,111

Dies, Martin Jr., 81,113 farm supports (parity), 175, 210, Dillon, Douglas, 286 226-27,256-57. See also soil bank Dirksen, Everett M.,14, 34,119, 155 Federal Silver Marketing Act, 15 displaced persons legislation, 142,150 Fine, John S., 190-91 Divine, Father, 69 Finegold, George, 268 Donovan, Robert J., ix, 283 Fish, Hamilton, 13,25,35,67,68, 75, Doolan, Edward F., 217,234,268-69, 107; neutrality legislation, 53;

282,290-91 selective service amendment, 65-66 Douglas, Helen Gahagan, 159 Fletcher, Henry P., 72,215 Drummond, Roscoe, 155 Flynn, Edward J., 66,70,79,84 Drury, Allen, 207 Folliard, Edward T., 260,262 Dulles, John Foster, 215,223,248,255, "force legislation," 15

269,278 Ford, Gerald R., 137,270,278,297,298; election as minority leader, 292-93

Eberharter, Herman P., 127n56 foreign aid, 177,210,224-25,24748, education grants to states, 142 254-55, 286; for China, 148-49; for Eisenhower, Dwight D., 143,279; Greece, 145; for Korea, 177; for

election of 1952, 189-93; election of Turkey, 145. See also Marshall Plan 1956, 231-33; first term, 199-234; Formosan Resolution, 223 health, 226, 231; Martin's defeat as Foss, Frank H., 9, 12 minority leader, 275-77; relations Franco, Francisco, 215 with Martin, 205,211,233,260,262, Frank, Glen, 29 269,279,284,289; second term, Frick, Helen Clay, 56 245-67 Fulbright Resolution, 108-9

Eisenhower Doctrine, 252-53 Fuller, Alvan, 58 Eisler, Gerhart, 175 Elections: of 1912, 7; of 1918, 8-9; of Gannett, Frank E., 78'85

1924,24-25; of 1932,17; of 1936, Geneva Summit (1955), 224 21-24; of 1938,30-32; of 1940, G.1. Bill, 107 55-71; of 1942,82-88; of 1944, Gibson, Ernest W, 171 109-12; of 1946,120-24; of 1948, Goldwater, Barry M., 290,291, 292 150-61; Of 1950,179-81; of 1952, Gore, Albert A., 116 188-93; Of 1954,216-18; of 1956, Graham, Louis E., 135 230-34; of 1958,261-69; Of 1960, Green, Dwight H., 117 279-84; of 1962,290; of 1964, Green, William, 30-31,69 290-92,299n22; of 1966,294-97 Greene, William S., 8-10, 296

Equal Rights Amendment, 68,85,110 Guggenheim, Polly, 134,282 European Recovery Program. See Gurney, John C., 77

Marshall Plan Gwinn, Ralph W., 216 executive branch reorganization, 27

Hagerty, James C., 211,218,261 Pair Deal, 117, 175, 181, 183 Hall, Len (Leonard), 189; as RNC Fair Employment Practices Chairman, 203,205,215,233,280

Commission, 115-16,141,173 Halleck, Charles A., 78,119, 249,257, Fair Labor Standards Act, xi, 26 2631121,281; conservative, 89n6,

328 Index

180; defeat as minority leader, 292-93; election as minority leader 27672,299n28; election of 1940,60, 9511108; election of 1948,150,157; as majority leader 80th Congress, 135-36,140,14748,274; as majority leader 83d Congress, 201-2,209,279; as minority leader, 275,277-78; relations with Eisenhower, 206,211,218,230,271, 278; rivalry with Martin, 171,193, 217-18,259

Hamilton, John D. M., 117; election of 1936,Zl-26; election of 1940,59, 61-62, 65, 70, 941186;opposition to Willkie, 72,86; as RNC Chairman, 25, 27,50,59,61-62

Harrington, Patrick H., 297 Hartley, Fred A. Jr., 140,154 Hasenfus, William A., ix, 20, 141 Hatch Act, 50-51,57,65,68 Hawley-Smoot Tariff, 15,28 Hays, William H., 74 Hazlett, "Swede," 206 Heckler, Margaret M. (Peggy), 294-97 Herlong, Albert S., 229 Herter, Christian A., 113,14748, 177,

180; election of 1956,231-32 Herzstein, Robert E., 134 highway program, 175,220 Hill, William S., 257 Hillman, Sidney, 111,122 Hiss, Alger, 176,192 Hoeven, Charles B., 292 Hoffman, Clare E., 140,185,208,279 "Hollywood Ten," 144-45 Holt, Joseph F., 275 Hoover, Herbert C., ix, x, 61, 75, 84,

284; election of 1936,21-22,24; Great Depression, 16-17; Marshall Plan, 149; mid-term convention plan, 28-30

Hopkins, Harry L., 30,83 housing legislation: under Truman,

143,174; under Eisenhower, 209, 220-21

Howard, Perry W., 23-24

Howard University, 229 Howe, Grace (Mrs. Louis McHenry

Howe), 31 Hughes, Charles Evans, 7 Humphrey, George M., 216 Humphrey, Hubert H., 251 Humphreys, Robert, 186,270,286 Hutcheson, William L., 155

Ickes, Harold A., 23,83 immigration quota increase, 207

Javits, Jacob, 135-36,180,297 Jenkins, Thomas, 106 Jenner, William E., 213,232 Jensen, Ben F., 277 Jewish homeland, 14-15,119-20,289 John Birch Society, 288 Johnson, Lyndon B., 81,251,252,289,

291 Jones, Robert L., 217

Kefauver, Estes, 261 Kelland, Clarence Buddington, 83-84 Kelley, George, 214 Kellog-Briand Pact, 52 Kennedy, Edward M., 268,287,297 Kennedy, John F., 137,153,230,268,

284; as President, 288,290 Kennedy, Robert F., 297 Kenney, Russell W., 249 Khrushchev, Nikita, 282 King, Martin Luther, 228 Klein, Herbert C., 280 Knowland, William F., 226,231,250,

252,275 Knox, Frank, 29, 33,35; election of

1936, 21-23; neutrality legislation, 31; Secretary of the Navy, 58-59,61

Knutsen, Harold, 74,136,138-39 Korean Conflict, 173,178-79,185-88,

213 Korff, Rabbi Baruch, 284 Krock, Arthur, 155

Ladiera, Ernest, 276,294-95 Lambertson, William P., 74, 105

index 329

Landon, Alfred M., x, 17,33, 35,59,72, 74,84; aid to Britain, 72,75, 78; election of 1936,21-24; election of 1940,55,58,60-62; election of 1948, 153,155; mid-term convention plan, 28-30; neutrality revision, 51,54

Lausche, Frank J., 273 Lawrence, William H., 278 Lemke, William, 23 "Lend-Lease,'' 72-76,80,107 "Lend to Spend Bill," 50 Lewis John L., 30,65,140,154,155 Liberty League, 35 Lindley, Ernest K., 151,283,298 Lippman, Walter, 78, 155 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 9 Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr., 92n56,157,

288; Eisenhower administration, 213,217,230; election of 1952, 189-91; election of 1960,281

Lombard, Helen, 87 Longworth, Nicholas I., 13, 14, 16 Louis, Joseph B. (Joe), 68-69 Lowden, Frank O., 29,75 Loy, Myrna, 134 Luce, Clare Boothe, 116, 155, 180,230;

election of 1940,68,87-88; Martin- Luce correspondence, 140,153,214, 218, 269,293; relationship with Martin, 103,113,134, 135,200,291, 297; Republican convention of 1944, 110-11

Lyons, Leonard, 110

MacArthur, Douglas, 111,193,222, 288; dismissal, 186-88; election of 1952,190-91; Korean policy, 178,213

MacDonald, Torbet H., 261 Mackinac Declaration, 108 McCabe, Edward A., 271 McCarthy, Eugene J., 251 McCarthy, Joseph R., 176,182-83,

212-13,217 McCarthyism, 161 McCormack, John W., 49,152,158,202,

251,289; Anti-Communism, 185; cooperation with Martin, 71,103,

229,278,287,297; as House majority leader, 81,220

McCormick, Robert R., 62,101-2 McNary, Charles L.; election of 1940,

57,61,63, 64, 66; as Senate majority leader, 29,6546,72,74, 108

McNary-Haugen Bill, 13 McNaughton, Frank, 151 Manning, Frank, 30 Mao Zedong, 177 Marcantonio, Vito A., 116, 159 Marshall, George C., 145,188 Marshall Plan, 14649 Martin, Albert L. (brother), 297 "Martin, Barton, and Fish," 6748,111,

188 Martin, Catherine (mother), 1,3,27,

36n2,159-60,253-54,280 Martin, Charles F. (brother), 5,32, 110 Martin, Edward (Senator), 156-57 Martin, Edward E. (brother), 3,7,78,

86,298; election of 1940, 59,61,65, 69; election of 1948, 157, 159; election of 1952, 189,191; election of 1956,232; election of 1964,290; election of 1966,296; and Nelson A. Rockefeller, 280

Martin, Frederick J. (brother), 27 Martin, George L. (brother), 2 Martin, Joseph W. (father), 1,3,37n3 Martin, Joseph W. Jr.:approach to

leadership, 47,49, 106,107,135-36, 140,151,171-72,206,207,211,274; assistant floor leader, 17-21,2628; boyhood, 1-5; China policy, 14849, 177-78,185-86,213-14,223; Civil Rights Act (1957), 249-52,264n41; Congressional Campaign Committee, 21,28-31; conservative coalition, 47; death, 297-98; defeat as minority leader, 259,269-77,301n44; Democrats, reaching out to, 47-48, 1034,110-12,120,124,180,193,258, 277; early years in Congress, 12-17; 84th Congress, 218-30; 85th Congress, 245-62; 86th to 89th Congresses, 285-88,293-94;

Index

European trip, 214-15; First Hundred Days, 18-20; Great Depression, 13,16-18; health, 259, 268,272-73,279,282,285-86,291, 295; Jewish homeland, 4,1415, 119-20,289; Kennedy Administration, 284-85; labor, 26,30, 31,118,192. See also AFL and CI liberalism, x, xi, 11,35,90n4; in Massachusetts legislature, 7-10; Massachusetts politics, 21,58,92n56, 181,230,268; MacArthur dismissal, 186-88; My First Fif ly Years in Politics, 283; natural gas affair, 260-62; New Deal, challenges to, 47-51,8041,104; Permanent Chairman Republican National Conventions, 1940,58-61; 1944, 110-11;1948,156-58; 1952,190-91; 1956,232-33; personal habits, 11-12, 14, 30,56-57,87,134; political philosophy, x-xii, 11,18,47,134-35, 175,179-80; post office visits, 11,134, 253,291; as presidential contender, 5560,109,152-57; religion, 4,37118, 154,298; as Republican National Committee Chairman: election of 1942,82-88; Willkie campaign, 70-71; Willkie controversy, 71-79; round the world trip, 189; 78th Congress, 102-9; Speaker: 80th Congress, domestic issues, 13745; 80th Congress, foreign policy, 145-80; 80th Congress, special session, 151; 80th Congress, evaluation, 151; 83d Congress, domestic issues, 199-213; 83d Congress, foreign policy, 213-15; 83d Congress, Speaker-elect, 193.199; tariffs, 15-16,28,73,141, 282. See also reciprocal trade. taxes, 16,13740, 172-73,182,201-5,221,246. See also processing tax. women, relations with, 12,68,87,282. See also Polly Guggenheim, Helen Lombard, Clare Boothe Luce, Perle Mesta women's rights, 8,38n18,38n19,38n20,85,

103,110,169n147. See also Charles A. Halleck, John W. McCormack, William Pickens, Sam Raybum

Martin, Mary A. (sister), 5 Martin, Jeanette (Nette) (sister), 2, 3,

11,30 Mason, Noah M., 272 Maxwell, Elsa, 110 May, Andrew Jackson, 115 Medicare, 290 Mesta, Perle, 110,126n41,284; election

of 1940,68-69; Martin's defeat as minority leader, 270,273

Mid-term Convention Plan, 28-30 Miller, William E., 229, 286 Miller, William M. (Fishbait), 11,289 Millikin, Eugene D., 141 Milne, James N., 14,268,280,291 minimum wage, 225. See also Fair

Labor Standards Act Mitchell, Clarence M. Jr., 251, 252, 291 "Modern Republicanism," 276-78 Moley, Raymond, 56 Mongan, Rev. Edward J., 4 Morgan, Gerald D., 271 Morse, Wayne L., 261 Morton, Thruston B., 280 Mundt, Karl, 75 Mundt-Nixon Bill, 176 Murray, Philip, 122

NAACP. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 69,85,222,228-29,251; Martin's election as minority leader, 35-36

national debt, 48,50,137-38,153,177, 266,270; Martin's votes to increase ceiling on, 202,254, 286,294

National Federation of Republican Women, 289

National Guard, 66, 221-22 National Industrial Recovery Act, 18,

20

lndex 331

National Moral Rearmament, 53 National Rivers and Harbors

Congress, 283 Neuberger, Richard I,., 261 neutrality legislation, 51-54

repeal of, 76-78 revision of, 54-55

New York Daily News, 246 New York Herald Tribune, 62, 75,83,86,

101 New York Times, 68,77, 158,225, 252,

258 Nezoton Graphic, 294 Nixon, Richard M, 137,269,281,284,

289,290; committee appointments, 137, 147; election of 1952,191-92; election of 1956, 231-32; election of 1960,267-68,279-81; Martin's defeat as minority leader, 259-60, 270-76

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 31 North Attleboroicgh Chronicle, 5, 160, 297 Norton, George, 76

OBrien, Rev. John F., 123 ODaniel, W. Lee ("Pappy"), 81 Office of Price Administration (OPA),

81,119 ONeill, Thomas P. (Tip), 207, 297 Open Skies Plan, 224 Organization for Trade Cooperation

(OTC), 227,245,260,262n3; Owens, Jessie, 24

Parker, John F., 103,291,294-95 Passamaquoddy Tidal Project, 229 patronage, 205 Paul, Gabe, 234 Pearson, Drew, 123,2074,212,281,

284 Perkins, Frances, 83 Persons, Wilton (Jerry), 215, 260,261,

275,279 Pettengill, Samuel B., 56, 84 Pew, Joseph N., 24,277 Pickens, William, 105-6 Plumley, Charles A., 75

Point Four, 176 Porter, H. J. (Jack), 152,156, 260,262 Potter, Charles E., 270 Powell, Adam Clayton, Jr., 116,221,

228,248,283 processing tax, 18,23, 67 Pryor, Samuel F. Jr., 58,60,62,64-65 Puerto Rican Nationalists, 210-11 Putnam, Roger, 291,294

Radford, Arthur W., 213 Randall, Clarence B., 206-7,218,275 Randolph, A. Philip, 115 Rankin, Jeanette, 79 Rankin. John E., 109, 112, 123, 127n56 Rayburn, Sam, 12,88,220-21,225,259;

civil rights, 229, 249, 250, 252, 263n23; death, 289; friendship with Martin, 4849, 104, 106,199,211, 218; Martin-Rayburn cooperation, 48, 79, 103, 136, 207, 219,224,229, 247,258,277; Martin's defeat as minority leader, 272-74; Rules Committee enlargement, 285-86

recession of 1958,258 reciprocal trade legislation, 23,206-7,

209,216,219,255-56,276 Redmond, Sidney, 69 Reed, Daniel A., 200-3,24546,255,

272 Reid, Helen, 62 "Republican Advance," 180 Republican National Committee, 21,

23, 117,152, 157,159, 186,270; Brownell as chairman, 113; electing a successor to Martin, 101-2; Hall as chairman, 203, 205,215, 280; Hamilton as chairman, 25,27,50, 59, 61-62; Martin as chairman, 64-65,67,69-73,75,82-86,88,180; natural gas dinner, 260-61

Republican Policy Committee, 136, 171, 174, 187, 208, 225, 246,247; Martin's defeat as minority leader, 271,276

Revenue Act of 1942,104-5 Richards, James T., 225

332 index

Ridgway, Matthew B., 187 Risk, Charles F., 21 Rivers, Francis E., 23-24,69 Roberts, Clifford, 270 Roberts, Wesley, 215 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 284; election of

1960,279-81; election of 1964,290 Rogers, Edith Nourse, l2,53,169n147,

278; election of 1958,268 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 289 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 17,33,48, 172;

death, 114; election of 1940,57-58, 67,80; election of 1944,111; and Martin, x, 79,65,107-8

Roosevelt, Theodore, 7, 25 Root, Oren Jr., 64 Rules Committee enlargement, 285-86 Ruml, Beardsley, 105

Sabath, Adolph J., 50 St. Lawrence Seaway, 209,237 Saltonstall, Leverett, 78,92n56,205;

election of 1948, 155, 157,161; election of 1952, 189

school construction, 175,222,227-28; civil rights, 24849,263n21,283

Schroeder, Warren W., 101-2 Science and Astronautics Committee,

287 Scott, Hugh D., xii, 89n6,157,278,284 Scranton, William W., 291 Seagrave, Arthur, 24 Seaton, Frederick A., 232-33 selective service legislation, 65-66, 76,

144 Shannon, William V., ix, x Sharp, Martha, 121-24 Sheed, Wilfred, 180 Sherwood, Robert E., 67 Short, Dewey, 75,78,188 Simmons, Roscoe Conkling, 24 Simpson, Kenneth F., 56 Simpson, Richard M., 204,272,275,280 Smith, Alfred E., 68, 84 Smith-Connally Act, 104 Smith, Howard W. (”Judge”), 140, 229,

249,252,274,284; Smith Act, 175

Smith, Margaret Chase, 103,155, 180, 281,291,295; election of 1948, 158-59, 169n47; election of 1954, 216-17,239n112

Snell, Bertrand, 47,172; as minority leader, 17,20-21,27,29,33-34

social security, 20,31,51,183,216, 222, 286

”socialized medicine,” 174, 183 soil bank, 226-27 Spain antiCommunism of, 189,215 Spangler, Harrison E., 102, 108 Speaks, Sara, 69 Spellman, Cardinal Francis J., 4,230 sputnik, 253 Stalin, Joseph, 154 Stassen Harold C., 64-65; election of

1956,231-32 Stevenson, Adlai E., 255 Stevenson, Suzanne Silvercruys, 289 Stimson, Henry L., 58/61 Stone, Elihu, 15 Stonehill College, 288 Strout, Richard L., 56 Sullivan, Mark, 56 Supreme Court reorganization, 27,33

Taber, John, 14849,157,203,245,277 Taft, Robert A., 74, 86,101-2, 112, 122,

148; de facto Republican floor leader, 176,178; election of 1940, 57-58,60-62,68; election of 1948, 150,152,156-57; election of 1952, 189, 193,199; housing legislation, 143

Taft, William Howard, 7 Taft-Hartley Act, 135, 140, 154, 173,

183-84 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), 18,

19, 31,51,229 Thomas, J. Parnell, 145 Thomas, Norman, 114 Thurmond, Strom, 252 Tilson, John Q., 17 Tinkham, George H., 15 Tobey, Charles W., 143 Townsend, John G. Jr., 33

Index 333

Trade Agreements Act. See reciprocal trade legislation

Treadway, Allen T., 36 Truman, Harry S., x, 113,255; election

of 1948,15041; Korean conflict, 179; relations with Martin, 114,135, 151,152,180, 182,258,295; steel plants seizure 184; vetoes, 119,139, 261

Truman Doctrine, 14546 Tucker, Ray, 277 Tugwell, Rexford G., x, 92 TVA. See Tennessee Valley Authority Twelve Point Program, 50 Twenty-one Day Rule, 172 Twenty-second Amendment, 114,141

Un-American Activities Committee, 105,137,144-45,158,175,212; Martin’s reelection in 1946,122-23; Martin‘s support of, 176,182, 288; as standing committee, 112-13,123. See also “Hollywood Ten”

United Nations, 105,120,213,282; Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1074,119,146

United States Information Agency, 247 Universal Military Training, 114-15,

14344,158 UNRRA. See United Nations Relief

and Rehabilitation Administration

Valentine, Allen, 64 Van Horn, Ezra, 154 Van Zandt, James S., 210 Vandenburg, Arthur H., 62, 108,141,

149; Republican Convention of 1936,21-22; Republican Convention of 1940,57-58; Republican Convention of 1944, 111;Republican Convention of 1948,157

Vatican, 229-30 Velde, Harold A., 212

Vietnam, 214,215,223,293-94 Volpe, John A., 289,295

Wadsworth, James W., 3536,107 Wainwright, Stuyvesant 11,248,276 Wallace, Henry A., 67,113, 192 Walter, Francis E., 207 Walter-Logan Act, 57 War Refugee Board, 120 Warren, Earl, 157 Washington Post, 133, 160,252,261,

262,263 Washington Times Herald, 135,154,185 Weeks, John W., 7,9 Weeks, Sinclair (Charles Sinclair), 7,

58-59,62,78,245 Welch, Richard, 140 Welch, Robert, 288 Wherry, Kenneth W., 84,157,187 White, Dr. Paul Dudley, 272 White, Walter, 35, 4511113, 69, 116 White, William Allen, 54,56, 66, 107 Wicker, Thomas, 275 Wilkins Roy, 251 Williams, Aubrey, 113 Willkie, Wendell, 80,84;election of

Martin’s successor as Republican National Committee Chairman, 101-2; election of 1942,82-83,85, 88; election of 1940,6247; election of 1944, 109-10; foreign policy issues, 71-79,86; Loyal Opposition Speech, 71; presidential nomination in 1940,5841

Wills, William H., 77 Wilson, Robert C., 270-71,273,276 Wilson, Woodrow, 135 Wolcott, Jessie P., 147 Wolverton, Charles A., 36 Works Progress Administration

(WPA), 31-32,49,50-51,80,104 Wright, Toody (Mrs. Hamilton), 56

Yalta Conference, 117, 178, 185,213

About the Author

James J. Kenneally, professor emeritus of history Stonehill College, Eas- ton, Massachusetts, is former chairman of the Department of History and former Director of the Martin Institute for Law and Society at that institution. Among other works he is the author of Women and American Trade Unions, A History of American Catholic Women (selected as an outstanding academic book by Choice in 1991) and co-editor of Gender Identities in American Catholicism (honorable mention Catholic Press Association 2001). He has been a frequent contributor to journals and of chapters in works on such subjects as the histories of American women, labor movement, and politics.

He is presently researching a history of daylight saving time in the United States and in addition to the usual professional organizations is an active contributor to a Catholic Jewish dialogue and the Boston Labor Guild. Professor Kenneally retired as colonel in the Air National Guard after active service in Korea during the Korean War and in Germany after the building of the Berlin Wall.

335

A Compassionate Conservative, A Political Biography of Joseph W. Martin Jr., Speaker of the House -...

Documents

Transcript of A Compassionate Conservative, A Political Biography of Joseph W. Martin Jr., Speaker of the House -...