A Calculated Crusade: Venice, Commerce, and the Fourth Crusade

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University UndergraduateJournal of History, Series II

Volume 10 Article 10

2005

A Calculated Crusade: Venice, Commerce, and theFourth CrusadeJames B. Hooper

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A Calculated Crusade 87

1Fulcher of Chartres, “Urban II’s Call for a Crusade,” in S.J.Allen and Emilie Amt, eds., The Crusades: a Reader (Broadview,2003), 40.

A Calculated Crusade:Venice, Commerce, and the Fourth Cru-sade

James B. HooperWhen Urban II preached the First Crusade to the

Council of Clermont at the end of the 11th century, heurged a pre-emptive strike against the Muslims whosemilitary advances continually threatened the easternboundaries of the Byzantine Empire. Exhorting hisspiritual subjects to “destroy that vile race from thelands of our friends,” Urban inspired an emotionalresponse from western Christians based on the factthat their Muslim opponents differed so greatly fromthem in culture, religion, and ethnicity.1 The popularpolarization of light versus dark, Christ versus Mo-hammed, west versus east, and good versus evil filledmany Europeans with hatred and ignited the flames ofcrusade that would not be extinguished for hundredsof years. However, closer examination of the Crusadesand the relationships developed therein reveal that adiametric reduction of the conflict is grossly inaccu-rate. In fact, the intimate trade relationships that theVenetians developed as a result of the early Crusadesgave them specific knowledge which proved paramountin the redirection of the Fourth Crusade throughConstantinople.

As the First Crusade took form and the Holy Landerupted in religious conflict, the Christians occupied

88 Historical Perspectives March 2005

2Jonathan Phillips, “The Latin East,” in Jonathan Riley-Smith, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades(Oxford, 1999), 115. 3Ibid.

a number of territories—including Jerusalem—knownas the Crusader States. After stabilizing the region asmuch as possible, a practical problem emerged. Sinceall the Muslims had not been expelled from the Levant,the two sides would be forced to live in peace together.While the war had been founded on cultural incompat-ibility and religious opposition, neither side couldjustify genocide. When Christians had gained firmcontrol of the Holy Land and had established theCrusader States, they allowed Muslims and Jews tolive under their jurisdiction with relative freedom,adopting “an attitude of relative tolerance towardsother creeds.”2 According to Jonathan Phillips, theChristians lived side-by-side with Muslims not neces-sarily out of any religious concession, but simplybecause “it was impractical for the Franks to drive outor persecute all those who did not observe the Latinrite.”3

The interfaith communities that developed as aresult of the First Crusade led to a dramatic rise incross-cultural contact. Although there was no lovelost between Christians and Muslims, out of necessityand comparative advantage, they began trading withone another. The Muslims could obtain goods fromthe East that were not available in great quantities inEurope, while in exchange, the westerners could offerraw materials from the countryside as well as finishedgoods from the more specialized urban centers of themedieval west. In addition, the Crusaders who settled

1

Hooper: A Calculated Crusade

Published by Scholar Commons, 2005


1Fulcher of Chartres, “Urban II’s Call for a Crusade,” in S.J.Allen and Emilie Amt, eds., The Crusades: a Reader (Broadview,2003), 40.

A Calculated Crusade:Venice, Commerce, and the Fourth Cru-sade

James B. HooperWhen Urban II preached the First Crusade to the

Council of Clermont at the end of the 11th century, heurged a pre-emptive strike against the Muslims whosemilitary advances continually threatened the easternboundaries of the Byzantine Empire. Exhorting hisspiritual subjects to “destroy that vile race from thelands of our friends,” Urban inspired an emotionalresponse from western Christians based on the factthat their Muslim opponents differed so greatly fromthem in culture, religion, and ethnicity.1 The popularpolarization of light versus dark, Christ versus Mo-hammed, west versus east, and good versus evil filledmany Europeans with hatred and ignited the flames ofcrusade that would not be extinguished for hundredsof years. However, closer examination of the Crusadesand the relationships developed therein reveal that adiametric reduction of the conflict is grossly inaccu-rate. In fact, the intimate trade relationships that theVenetians developed as a result of the early Crusadesgave them specific knowledge which proved paramountin the redirection of the Fourth Crusade throughConstantinople.

As the First Crusade took form and the Holy Landerupted in religious conflict, the Christians occupied


2Jonathan Phillips, “The Latin East,” in Jonathan Riley-Smith, ed., The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades(Oxford, 1999), 115. 3Ibid.

a number of territories—including Jerusalem—knownas the Crusader States. After stabilizing the region asmuch as possible, a practical problem emerged. Sinceall the Muslims had not been expelled from the Levant,the two sides would be forced to live in peace together.While the war had been founded on cultural incompat-ibility and religious opposition, neither side couldjustify genocide. When Christians had gained firmcontrol of the Holy Land and had established theCrusader States, they allowed Muslims and Jews tolive under their jurisdiction with relative freedom,adopting “an attitude of relative tolerance towardsother creeds.”2 According to Jonathan Phillips, theChristians lived side-by-side with Muslims not neces-sarily out of any religious concession, but simplybecause “it was impractical for the Franks to drive outor persecute all those who did not observe the Latinrite.”3

The interfaith communities that developed as aresult of the First Crusade led to a dramatic rise incross-cultural contact. Although there was no lovelost between Christians and Muslims, out of necessityand comparative advantage, they began trading withone another. The Muslims could obtain goods fromthe East that were not available in great quantities inEurope, while in exchange, the westerners could offerraw materials from the countryside as well as finishedgoods from the more specialized urban centers of themedieval west. In addition, the Crusaders who settled

2

Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 10

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4Ibid., 116. 5Ibid., 117. 6David Abulafia, “Trade and Crusade,” in Michael Goodich,Sophia Menache and Sylvia Schein, eds., Cross CulturalConvergences in the Crusader Period, (Peter Lang, 1995), 3.

in the Levant harvested such cash crops as sugar andcotton, as well as millet, maize, grapes and olives forexport, making the East a thriving commercial center.4

Most of this economic activity took shape in the formof the Islamic kharaj, a tax system where the indige-nous subjects of the Crusader States paid their Chris-tian rulers from their crops.5

Before the Crusades, the Mediterranean wasalready the scene of a robust inter-cultural economy.The merchant city-states of Southern Italy, especiallyAmalfi, dominated trade in the Southeast Mediterra-nean in places such as Jerusalem and Alexandria.The Amalfitans were mostly involved in the import ofluxury items from the East for the wealthy courts andmonasteries throughout Southern Europe and theByzantine Empire. These southern Italian merchantsmaintained a level of maritime dominance throughoutthe tenth and eleventh centuries, and it was only laterthat the Venetians, the Pisans and the Genoesesurpassed their southern rivals in the control of theLevant microeconomy.6

Nevertheless, Northern Italians did have an easternMediterranean presence in the pre-Crusading years.A huge collection of correspondence and contractsfound in Old Cairo contains hundreds of letterspertaining to Egyptian and Mediterranean trade duringthe period from 900-1300. One letter written inapproximately 1060 by an Egyptian merchant namedNahray ben Nissim mentions the Italians present in


7A.L. Udovitch, “A Tale of Two Cities: Commercial Relationsbetween Cairo and Alexandria during the Second Half of theEleventh Century,” in Harry A. Miskimin, David Herlihy, andA.L. Udovitch, eds., The Medieval City, (Yale University Press,1977), 150-7. 8Abulafia, “Trade,” 7.

Alexandria at the time. Indiscriminately referred to asRumi, the Italians are mentioned in a number of otherdocuments buying indigo and brazilwood, a materialgrown in India and used as a red dye for textiles. Inanother letter, the Italians are involved in the purchaseof large quantities of flax. The author of the letters isunder the impression that the Rumi will pay excessiveprices for these commodities, and will pay the same forpoor quality flax as high quality flax. This assessmentseems to indicate either the value and scarcity of theseproducts in the west, or the incompetence of theItalians. One letter specifically identifies Genoesemerchants in Alexandria, so we know that theAmalfitans did not operate a maritime monopoly.7

But, prior to the crusades, the involvement of northernItalian merchants in Egyptian commerce was neitherregular nor widespread.8

Interestingly enough, the advent of the crusadingera undermined the Amalfitans’ commercial superior-ity. Tied up in the politics of the turbulent region ofsouthern Italy, the Amalfitans could not coordinate afleet for the First Crusade, and their northern counter-parts managed to obtain the privilege of the crusadersfor their naval assistance and religious devotion. Inexchange for their commitment to the crusading causeby 1104, the Genoese received the first honors, receiv-ing total exemption from commercial duties at a

3




4Ibid., 116. 5Ibid., 117. 6David Abulafia, “Trade and Crusade,” in Michael Goodich,Sophia Menache and Sylvia Schein, eds., Cross CulturalConvergences in the Crusader Period, (Peter Lang, 1995), 3.

in the Levant harvested such cash crops as sugar andcotton, as well as millet, maize, grapes and olives forexport, making the East a thriving commercial center.4

Most of this economic activity took shape in the formof the Islamic kharaj, a tax system where the indige-nous subjects of the Crusader States paid their Chris-tian rulers from their crops.5

Before the Crusades, the Mediterranean wasalready the scene of a robust inter-cultural economy.The merchant city-states of Southern Italy, especiallyAmalfi, dominated trade in the Southeast Mediterra-nean in places such as Jerusalem and Alexandria.The Amalfitans were mostly involved in the import ofluxury items from the East for the wealthy courts andmonasteries throughout Southern Europe and theByzantine Empire. These southern Italian merchantsmaintained a level of maritime dominance throughoutthe tenth and eleventh centuries, and it was only laterthat the Venetians, the Pisans and the Genoesesurpassed their southern rivals in the control of theLevant microeconomy.6

Nevertheless, Northern Italians did have an easternMediterranean presence in the pre-Crusading years.A huge collection of correspondence and contractsfound in Old Cairo contains hundreds of letterspertaining to Egyptian and Mediterranean trade duringthe period from 900-1300. One letter written inapproximately 1060 by an Egyptian merchant namedNahray ben Nissim mentions the Italians present in


7A.L. Udovitch, “A Tale of Two Cities: Commercial Relationsbetween Cairo and Alexandria during the Second Half of theEleventh Century,” in Harry A. Miskimin, David Herlihy, andA.L. Udovitch, eds., The Medieval City, (Yale University Press,1977), 150-7. 8Abulafia, “Trade,” 7.

Alexandria at the time. Indiscriminately referred to asRumi, the Italians are mentioned in a number of otherdocuments buying indigo and brazilwood, a materialgrown in India and used as a red dye for textiles. Inanother letter, the Italians are involved in the purchaseof large quantities of flax. The author of the letters isunder the impression that the Rumi will pay excessiveprices for these commodities, and will pay the same forpoor quality flax as high quality flax. This assessmentseems to indicate either the value and scarcity of theseproducts in the west, or the incompetence of theItalians. One letter specifically identifies Genoesemerchants in Alexandria, so we know that theAmalfitans did not operate a maritime monopoly.7

But, prior to the crusades, the involvement of northernItalian merchants in Egyptian commerce was neitherregular nor widespread.8

Interestingly enough, the advent of the crusadingera undermined the Amalfitans’ commercial superior-ity. Tied up in the politics of the turbulent region ofsouthern Italy, the Amalfitans could not coordinate afleet for the First Crusade, and their northern counter-parts managed to obtain the privilege of the crusadersfor their naval assistance and religious devotion. Inexchange for their commitment to the crusading causeby 1104, the Genoese received the first honors, receiv-ing total exemption from commercial duties at a

4




9Christopher Marshall, “The Crusading Motivation of theItalian City Republics in the Latin East, 1096-1104,” in PeterEdbury and Jonathan Phillips, eds., The Experience ofCrusading, (Cambridge, 2003), 60. 10John Julius Norwich, Venice (Allen Lane, 1981), 113. 11Jonathan Riley-Smith, “King Fulk of Jerusalem and theSultan of Babylon,” in Benjamin Z. Kedar, Jonathan Riley-Smithand Rudolph Hiestand, eds., Montjoie: Studies in CrusadeHistory in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayor, (Variorum, 1997),58.

number of Holy Land ports.9 The Venetians profitedconsiderably from their crusade to assist King Baldwinin the defense of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1122-1124. They were given various rights in all the majorcities of the Kingdom, and were promised one third ofTyre and Ascalon if they helped the Christians capturethem.10 In the process, the Venetians encountered anddestroyed Egypt’s most effective naval fleet as theMuslims attempted to regain a foothold in the Levant.11

Beyond that, the Venetians managed to ravage enoughByzantine holdings to scare emperor John IIComnenus into issuing a new chrysobull to Venice,renewing their inordinately advantageous commercialprivileges in Eastern Europe. So, for the NorthernItalian merchant states, the Crusades proved to bebeneficial in more than just a spiritual dimension.

The early Crusades gave rise to Acre as a majorport of the eastern Mediterranean, and the subsequentcontrol of the coastline of the Levant achieved by theconquest of Tyre (with the exception of Ascalon)ensured the presence of western merchants in the eastfor years to come. The popular trade route thatemerged in the mid-1100s took merchants fromnorthern Italy with finished goods to deliver to Acre,


12Abulafia, “Trade,” 2-3. 13Ibid., 14. 14David Abulafia, “The Role of Trade in Muslim/ChristianContact,” in D. Agius and R. Hitchcock, eds., Arab Influence inMedieval Europe,” (Ithaca Press, 1994), 6-7.

and then on to Alexandria, the more profitable market,with luxury goods and more attractive investments. Inthis system, Acre is merely a link point between theFrankish settlers and the Egyptians, an excuse toconnect the worlds of Islam and Christianity.12 AdolfSchaube contends that by 1150, a sophisticatedmonetary system had developed that transferred silverfrom the west into gold that was coined in Jerusalemand used to purchase goods in Alexandria. By thistime, Alexandria had established itself as a major hubof economic prosperity, and both Italians and Crusad-ers had taken a significant interest in it.13

Alexandria gained such a distinct advantage overthe Christian port of Acre by the 1150s, primarilybecause of its geographic advantage. As the maintrading locus of the Egyptian region, merchants inAlexandria were able to gain access to the world of thewest through the Mediterranean, and had access tothe vast resources of India and the east by virtue of itsproximity to the Red Sea. According to David Abulafia,“Alexandria was the interchange point between [two]otherwise largely self-contained trading systems.”14

Although operating on favorable terms with easterners,the Christians of Acre could never hope to enjoy thatkind of connection because of their location on thecomparatively static Levant coast, and the Egyptianshad control of the Red Sea.

At this point, the Muslims were regaining a signifi-cant level of military power and political control over

5




9Christopher Marshall, “The Crusading Motivation of theItalian City Republics in the Latin East, 1096-1104,” in PeterEdbury and Jonathan Phillips, eds., The Experience ofCrusading, (Cambridge, 2003), 60. 10John Julius Norwich, Venice (Allen Lane, 1981), 113. 11Jonathan Riley-Smith, “King Fulk of Jerusalem and theSultan of Babylon,” in Benjamin Z. Kedar, Jonathan Riley-Smithand Rudolph Hiestand, eds., Montjoie: Studies in CrusadeHistory in Honour of Hans Eberhard Mayor, (Variorum, 1997),58.

number of Holy Land ports.9 The Venetians profitedconsiderably from their crusade to assist King Baldwinin the defense of the Kingdom of Jerusalem from 1122-1124. They were given various rights in all the majorcities of the Kingdom, and were promised one third ofTyre and Ascalon if they helped the Christians capturethem.10 In the process, the Venetians encountered anddestroyed Egypt’s most effective naval fleet as theMuslims attempted to regain a foothold in the Levant.11

Beyond that, the Venetians managed to ravage enoughByzantine holdings to scare emperor John IIComnenus into issuing a new chrysobull to Venice,renewing their inordinately advantageous commercialprivileges in Eastern Europe. So, for the NorthernItalian merchant states, the Crusades proved to bebeneficial in more than just a spiritual dimension.

The early Crusades gave rise to Acre as a majorport of the eastern Mediterranean, and the subsequentcontrol of the coastline of the Levant achieved by theconquest of Tyre (with the exception of Ascalon)ensured the presence of western merchants in the eastfor years to come. The popular trade route thatemerged in the mid-1100s took merchants fromnorthern Italy with finished goods to deliver to Acre,


12Abulafia, “Trade,” 2-3. 13Ibid., 14. 14David Abulafia, “The Role of Trade in Muslim/ChristianContact,” in D. Agius and R. Hitchcock, eds., Arab Influence inMedieval Europe,” (Ithaca Press, 1994), 6-7.

and then on to Alexandria, the more profitable market,with luxury goods and more attractive investments. Inthis system, Acre is merely a link point between theFrankish settlers and the Egyptians, an excuse toconnect the worlds of Islam and Christianity.12 AdolfSchaube contends that by 1150, a sophisticatedmonetary system had developed that transferred silverfrom the west into gold that was coined in Jerusalemand used to purchase goods in Alexandria. By thistime, Alexandria had established itself as a major hubof economic prosperity, and both Italians and Crusad-ers had taken a significant interest in it.13

Alexandria gained such a distinct advantage overthe Christian port of Acre by the 1150s, primarilybecause of its geographic advantage. As the maintrading locus of the Egyptian region, merchants inAlexandria were able to gain access to the world of thewest through the Mediterranean, and had access tothe vast resources of India and the east by virtue of itsproximity to the Red Sea. According to David Abulafia,“Alexandria was the interchange point between [two]otherwise largely self-contained trading systems.”14

Although operating on favorable terms with easterners,the Christians of Acre could never hope to enjoy thatkind of connection because of their location on thecomparatively static Levant coast, and the Egyptianshad control of the Red Sea.

At this point, the Muslims were regaining a signifi-cant level of military power and political control over

6




15Ibn al-Athir, “Ibn al-Athir on the Fall of Edessa,” in Allenand Amt, eds., The Crusades, 133. 16P.M. Holt, The Age of Crusades: The Near East from the 11th

Century to 1517, (Longman, 1986), 38. 17Ibn al-Athir, 134.

the regions they had lost to the Christians during thefirst quarter-century of the crusading era. After theirdevastation at the hands of westerners during the FirstCrusade, the Muslims lacked the ability to organize acohesive political union strong enough to combat theirChristian occupiers until around 1139. Around thistime, the emir of Aleppo, a Muslim town just to theeast of the major crusader city of Antioch (the seat ofa Christian principality) began to gain control andcommand some military authority. His name wasZengi, and he set the stage for a dramatic re-unifica-tion of the Muslim empire when he recaptured thenortheastern crusader city of Edessa in1144.15 UnderZengi and his son Nur al-Din, the unifying message ofjihad enabled the Muslims to take advantage ofFrankish politicians who were primarily involved ininternal squabbles. In addition to Christian rulers,even Muslim leaders of the northeastern portion of theHoly Land were indiscriminately swept under thecontrol of Zengi and Nur al-Din. The rise of theZangids was less a divinely inspired reclamation thanan attempt at expanding political sway.16 This risingthreat sparked a new crusade from the west, preachedprimarily by Bernard of Clairvaux, which met littlesuccess.17

After the conquest of Damascus by Nur al-Din in1154 and the acquisition of Ascalon by the FrankishKing Baldwin III, a period of stability followed. But,the focus of the political conflicts moved to the south-


18Holt, 46. 19Mahmoud Omran, “King Amalric and the Siege ofAlexandria,” in Peter W. Edbury, ed., Crusade and Settlement,(Cardiff, 1985), 191. 20Holt, 46. 21Ibid. 22Ibid., 48.

ern region of the Levant, and Egypt came to theforeground. By mid-century, the authority of theFatimids who controlled the Muslims in North Africawas beginning to wane.18 Around 1163 Baldwin wasable to “place Egypt under tribute,”19 at least to someextent. Soon after his death, Baldwin’s successor,Amalric, mismanaged his holdings in Egypt andjeopardized his truce with Nur al-Din in Damascus byleading a number of sorties into Egypt and Alexandriaover the next 4 years.20 The Christian king intervenedin the intra-territorial dispute between the Fatimidviziers fighting for political control, but could not makeany advances because he was thwarted by the inter-vention of Nur al-Din’s head commander, Shirkuh,who hoped to secure the valuable Egyptian cities forhis own interests.21 In 1167 and 1168, Amalric againattempted to take over Egypt. This time, he wascompletely expelled and his army was obliterated.

Amalric’s attempts at strengthening his ownholdings proved to be disastrous and fatal for hisfuture as a Levant monarch. In the process, Shirkuhtook the leading role in the Egyptian government.Within weeks he would die, and his nephew Saladin,who had assisted him throughout the past years ofmilitary upheaval, would be appointed leader.22

Saladin subsequently initiated the most widespreadunification of the Holy Land in history. He continued

7




15Ibn al-Athir, “Ibn al-Athir on the Fall of Edessa,” in Allenand Amt, eds., The Crusades, 133. 16P.M. Holt, The Age of Crusades: The Near East from the 11th

Century to 1517, (Longman, 1986), 38. 17Ibn al-Athir, 134.

the regions they had lost to the Christians during thefirst quarter-century of the crusading era. After theirdevastation at the hands of westerners during the FirstCrusade, the Muslims lacked the ability to organize acohesive political union strong enough to combat theirChristian occupiers until around 1139. Around thistime, the emir of Aleppo, a Muslim town just to theeast of the major crusader city of Antioch (the seat ofa Christian principality) began to gain control andcommand some military authority. His name wasZengi, and he set the stage for a dramatic re-unifica-tion of the Muslim empire when he recaptured thenortheastern crusader city of Edessa in1144.15 UnderZengi and his son Nur al-Din, the unifying message ofjihad enabled the Muslims to take advantage ofFrankish politicians who were primarily involved ininternal squabbles. In addition to Christian rulers,even Muslim leaders of the northeastern portion of theHoly Land were indiscriminately swept under thecontrol of Zengi and Nur al-Din. The rise of theZangids was less a divinely inspired reclamation thanan attempt at expanding political sway.16 This risingthreat sparked a new crusade from the west, preachedprimarily by Bernard of Clairvaux, which met littlesuccess.17

After the conquest of Damascus by Nur al-Din in1154 and the acquisition of Ascalon by the FrankishKing Baldwin III, a period of stability followed. But,the focus of the political conflicts moved to the south-


18Holt, 46. 19Mahmoud Omran, “King Amalric and the Siege ofAlexandria,” in Peter W. Edbury, ed., Crusade and Settlement,(Cardiff, 1985), 191. 20Holt, 46. 21Ibid. 22Ibid., 48.

ern region of the Levant, and Egypt came to theforeground. By mid-century, the authority of theFatimids who controlled the Muslims in North Africawas beginning to wane.18 Around 1163 Baldwin wasable to “place Egypt under tribute,”19 at least to someextent. Soon after his death, Baldwin’s successor,Amalric, mismanaged his holdings in Egypt andjeopardized his truce with Nur al-Din in Damascus byleading a number of sorties into Egypt and Alexandriaover the next 4 years.20 The Christian king intervenedin the intra-territorial dispute between the Fatimidviziers fighting for political control, but could not makeany advances because he was thwarted by the inter-vention of Nur al-Din’s head commander, Shirkuh,who hoped to secure the valuable Egyptian cities forhis own interests.21 In 1167 and 1168, Amalric againattempted to take over Egypt. This time, he wascompletely expelled and his army was obliterated.

Amalric’s attempts at strengthening his ownholdings proved to be disastrous and fatal for hisfuture as a Levant monarch. In the process, Shirkuhtook the leading role in the Egyptian government.Within weeks he would die, and his nephew Saladin,who had assisted him throughout the past years ofmilitary upheaval, would be appointed leader.22

Saladin subsequently initiated the most widespreadunification of the Holy Land in history. He continued

8




23Ibid., 60-1.

to preach the message of jihad and aggressively soughtto reclaim the Near East for Islam and his politicalregime. This platform reached its height with theconquest of Jerusalem in 1187, and the subsequentdefense of the Holy Land against the Third Crusade ledby Richard of England, Philip of France, and FrederickBarbarossa. The Levant was almost completelyretaken by Muslims in this period, and the only majorcity in Christian hands after 1193 was the port of Acre.Upon Saladin’s death in 1195, however, the empire heunited quickly disintegrated. As so often happensafter the unexpected death of a strong authoritarianleader, the Muslim empire suffered from a lack oforganization, and factional leaders sought to use theirmilitary power to wrest control of government func-tions. Clan struggles followed Saladin’s death, mainlyinitiated by his family members. Under this disorga-nized Ayyubid confederacy, major regions were parti-tioned off and given to Saladin’s relatives. Eventually,in 1200, As-Adil Sayf Al-Din took some semblance ofcontrol, but the Ayyubid leaders were “frequently atodds” with one another.23

In Rome at this time, a new, young and headstrongPope had come into power advocating a new crusadeto reclaim Jerusalem, attempting to resurrect the samereligious fervor that Urban had elicited from theknights and commoners of Europe more than acentury before. Innocent III called his followers to winback Christ’s city, and by 1201, a treaty had beensigned in Venice, officially organizing what wouldbecome the Fourth Crusade. By the turn of thecentury, knights and nobility interested in the military


24Omran, 191. 25Norwich, Venice, 151.

strength of the Levant generally agreed that Jerusalemcould only fall to the Christians if an army traveledfirst through Egypt. Once they took Egypt, the restshould fall into place. In the century since Jerusa-lem’s first capitulation, Egypt’s political strengthconstantly threatened the safety of the crusaderssettled in the Levant. Although its leaders were notconsistently hostile, Egypt remained Muslim-con-trolled for the duration of the 12th century, a fact thatdid not sit well with Europeans in the Levant. Accord-ing to Mahmoud Omran, the Egyptians (especiallyunder the Fatimid caliphate) posed “persistent opposi-tion” that threatened the continued existence of theCrusader States.24

In addition, the crusaders of 1201 had learned fromthe catastrophic Third Crusade of Richard Coeur deLion in the previous decade. That King gave hisopinion that Egypt was the weakest part of the Muslimempire, and that any subsequent assaults on Jerusa-lem must go through Alexandria in order to succeed.25

Furthermore, the previous position held by Alexandriabefore Muslim conquest still had to be fresh in theminds of those with an interest in the strength of theRoman Church. Alexandria, along with Rome, Jerusa-lem, Antioch and Constantinople, had been one of theoriginal five patriarchates of the Church. When theFirst Crusade was called, the prospect of reuniting theChurch Empire only increased the fervor with whichEuropeans set out for the Levant. At that time, onlytwo of the original five patriarchates were in “Chris-tian” hands. The establishment of the Crusader States

9




23Ibid., 60-1.

to preach the message of jihad and aggressively soughtto reclaim the Near East for Islam and his politicalregime. This platform reached its height with theconquest of Jerusalem in 1187, and the subsequentdefense of the Holy Land against the Third Crusade ledby Richard of England, Philip of France, and FrederickBarbarossa. The Levant was almost completelyretaken by Muslims in this period, and the only majorcity in Christian hands after 1193 was the port of Acre.Upon Saladin’s death in 1195, however, the empire heunited quickly disintegrated. As so often happensafter the unexpected death of a strong authoritarianleader, the Muslim empire suffered from a lack oforganization, and factional leaders sought to use theirmilitary power to wrest control of government func-tions. Clan struggles followed Saladin’s death, mainlyinitiated by his family members. Under this disorga-nized Ayyubid confederacy, major regions were parti-tioned off and given to Saladin’s relatives. Eventually,in 1200, As-Adil Sayf Al-Din took some semblance ofcontrol, but the Ayyubid leaders were “frequently atodds” with one another.23

In Rome at this time, a new, young and headstrongPope had come into power advocating a new crusadeto reclaim Jerusalem, attempting to resurrect the samereligious fervor that Urban had elicited from theknights and commoners of Europe more than acentury before. Innocent III called his followers to winback Christ’s city, and by 1201, a treaty had beensigned in Venice, officially organizing what wouldbecome the Fourth Crusade. By the turn of thecentury, knights and nobility interested in the military


24Omran, 191. 25Norwich, Venice, 151.

strength of the Levant generally agreed that Jerusalemcould only fall to the Christians if an army traveledfirst through Egypt. Once they took Egypt, the restshould fall into place. In the century since Jerusa-lem’s first capitulation, Egypt’s political strengthconstantly threatened the safety of the crusaderssettled in the Levant. Although its leaders were notconsistently hostile, Egypt remained Muslim-con-trolled for the duration of the 12th century, a fact thatdid not sit well with Europeans in the Levant. Accord-ing to Mahmoud Omran, the Egyptians (especiallyunder the Fatimid caliphate) posed “persistent opposi-tion” that threatened the continued existence of theCrusader States.24

In addition, the crusaders of 1201 had learned fromthe catastrophic Third Crusade of Richard Coeur deLion in the previous decade. That King gave hisopinion that Egypt was the weakest part of the Muslimempire, and that any subsequent assaults on Jerusa-lem must go through Alexandria in order to succeed.25

Furthermore, the previous position held by Alexandriabefore Muslim conquest still had to be fresh in theminds of those with an interest in the strength of theRoman Church. Alexandria, along with Rome, Jerusa-lem, Antioch and Constantinople, had been one of theoriginal five patriarchates of the Church. When theFirst Crusade was called, the prospect of reuniting theChurch Empire only increased the fervor with whichEuropeans set out for the Levant. At that time, onlytwo of the original five patriarchates were in “Chris-tian” hands. The establishment of the Crusader States

10




26Gunther of Paris, The Capture of Constantinople, Alfred J.Anrea ed. and trans., (University of Pennsylvania, 1997), 77,152.

temporarily reunited most of the original Mediterra-nean Church. If the crusaders could regain Alexandriain 1204 and move north, all the patriarchates could atlast be restored, along with the domination of theChristian church throughout the Mediterranean.

The chronicler Gunther of Paris, who participatedin the Fourth Crusade, offered a number of explana-tions for the selection of Egypt as the initial target ofthe Jerusalem expedition. “At this time a truce be-tween our people and the Barbarians was in effect inthe regions beyond the sea. Our people could notviolate what they had pledged in good faith.” Thecontract he mentions with the Muslims in Syria wouldstand from 1198 to 1203, and had been negotiated inthe interest of protecting the Latins who lived there.Those Europeans still living in the Levant had negoti-ated peace with their Islamic neighbors and hoped tokeep conflict to a minimum.26 Gunther also cited theunanimous agreement of the Crusade leaders Baldwinof Flanders and Boniface of Montferrat on Alexandriaas the target. They firmly agreed with Coeur de Lion’smilitary assessment of the Muslim East. Richard’sstatement proved to be even more pertinent due to thecurrent economic situation in Egypt, at least as it wasperceived by Gunther. The Nile had been dry for aperiod longer than normal, and word had spread to thewest that the formerly lush harvests of the Egyptianswere nonexistent because the land had become infer-tile. In an exaggerated estimation of the state ofEgypt’s citizens, Gunther remarked that “almost the


27Ibid. 28Queller, The Fourth Crusade, (University of Pennsylvania,1977), 13. 29al-Maqrizi, A History of the Ayyubid Sultans, R.J.C.Broadhurst, ed. and trans., (Twayne, 1980), 70. 30Holt, 56-7. 31Queller, 13.

entire population had either perished, the victim offamine, or was barely eking out a poor living.”27

Although the situation was not likely this dire, theEgyptians certainly appeared to be in a vulnerableposition. Donald Queller seems to agree with Gun-ther’s analysis, at least to some extent. The Nile couldthen—and still does today—weigh heavily on thephysical well-being of the Egyptian people, and subse-quently on their political stability. Queller also citeshints from earlier crusaders like Amalric in the 1160sand Reynaud of Châtillon, who led an expeditionagainst the Egyptians in 1183.28 For a short timeReynaud’s presence threatened the most importanttrade and pilgrimage routes of the Muslims. In hisAyyubid history, al-Maqrizi recognized Reynaud’sintent to take the holy city of Medina.29 The 14th

century Muslim scholar al-Safadi referred to Reynaudas “the most malicious, evil, and treacherous of theFranks.”30 While ultimately unsuccessful, Reynaudand Amalric managed to sufficiently threaten theEgyptian Muslims and highlight the military realitythat if Egypt fell, Christians would be able to livecomfortably and freely in the Holy Land. Moreover,control of Egypt would split the Muslim world in twosections, divorcing the Middle East and North Africa,most likely rendering it powerless.31

11




26Gunther of Paris, The Capture of Constantinople, Alfred J.Anrea ed. and trans., (University of Pennsylvania, 1997), 77,152.

temporarily reunited most of the original Mediterra-nean Church. If the crusaders could regain Alexandriain 1204 and move north, all the patriarchates could atlast be restored, along with the domination of theChristian church throughout the Mediterranean.

The chronicler Gunther of Paris, who participatedin the Fourth Crusade, offered a number of explana-tions for the selection of Egypt as the initial target ofthe Jerusalem expedition. “At this time a truce be-tween our people and the Barbarians was in effect inthe regions beyond the sea. Our people could notviolate what they had pledged in good faith.” Thecontract he mentions with the Muslims in Syria wouldstand from 1198 to 1203, and had been negotiated inthe interest of protecting the Latins who lived there.Those Europeans still living in the Levant had negoti-ated peace with their Islamic neighbors and hoped tokeep conflict to a minimum.26 Gunther also cited theunanimous agreement of the Crusade leaders Baldwinof Flanders and Boniface of Montferrat on Alexandriaas the target. They firmly agreed with Coeur de Lion’smilitary assessment of the Muslim East. Richard’sstatement proved to be even more pertinent due to thecurrent economic situation in Egypt, at least as it wasperceived by Gunther. The Nile had been dry for aperiod longer than normal, and word had spread to thewest that the formerly lush harvests of the Egyptianswere nonexistent because the land had become infer-tile. In an exaggerated estimation of the state ofEgypt’s citizens, Gunther remarked that “almost the


27Ibid. 28Queller, The Fourth Crusade, (University of Pennsylvania,1977), 13. 29al-Maqrizi, A History of the Ayyubid Sultans, R.J.C.Broadhurst, ed. and trans., (Twayne, 1980), 70. 30Holt, 56-7. 31Queller, 13.

entire population had either perished, the victim offamine, or was barely eking out a poor living.”27

Although the situation was not likely this dire, theEgyptians certainly appeared to be in a vulnerableposition. Donald Queller seems to agree with Gun-ther’s analysis, at least to some extent. The Nile couldthen—and still does today—weigh heavily on thephysical well-being of the Egyptian people, and subse-quently on their political stability. Queller also citeshints from earlier crusaders like Amalric in the 1160sand Reynaud of Châtillon, who led an expeditionagainst the Egyptians in 1183.28 For a short timeReynaud’s presence threatened the most importanttrade and pilgrimage routes of the Muslims. In hisAyyubid history, al-Maqrizi recognized Reynaud’sintent to take the holy city of Medina.29 The 14th

century Muslim scholar al-Safadi referred to Reynaudas “the most malicious, evil, and treacherous of theFranks.”30 While ultimately unsuccessful, Reynaudand Amalric managed to sufficiently threaten theEgyptian Muslims and highlight the military realitythat if Egypt fell, Christians would be able to livecomfortably and freely in the Holy Land. Moreover,control of Egypt would split the Muslim world in twosections, divorcing the Middle East and North Africa,most likely rendering it powerless.31

12




32Norwich, Venice, 101.

The assessment of the crusade leaders about Egyptseems to have been pretty accurate. One majorimplication of their decision to go to Alexandria wasthe necessity for sea travel. The plan involved acoastal assault on the great port city, and the crusad-ers needed to commission an enormous fleet to carrythe proposed 33,500 crusaders necessary to sack thecity. Therefore, the crusaders negotiated the Treaty of1201 with the Venetians, who halted a majority of theircommercial activities over the subsequent year inorder to construct the requisite armada. The decisionto involve the commercially proficient Venetians—thehistorically debated fatal flaw of the doomed FourthCrusade—had many (mostly negative) implications.

The Venetians’ relationship with Alexandria and theEgyptian government has fallen under great scrutinyby historians hoping to find evidence that the Vene-tians deliberately steered the Fourth Crusade not toEgypt, but to Constantinople, which the Christiansended up conquering by the end of their journey. Inorder to analyze this relationship, we must first lookdeeper into the commercial history of Alexandria andits involvement with the Italians. Earlier, we discussedthe geographic advantage of Alexandria as the centrallink of the commercial chain connecting east and west.Under this advantage, Alexandria became a “majorclearing-house for spices from India and the southernseas, providing in return a ready market for Europeantimber and metal.”32 In this environment merchantscould exchange goods to the great economic gain of theEgyptian government. For example, cotton, pepper,and ginger were not even produced in Egypt, yet they


33Abulafia, Arab Influence, 7. 34Ibn Jubayr, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, William Wright, ed.,(AJ Brill, 1907), 31-2.

would pass through the commercial registry of theSultan and be heavily taxed.33

The Sultan had a significant control over the tradethat occurred in Egypt. In 1183, Ibn Jubayr traveledfrom his hometown in North Africa through the Mus-lim Empire, keeping a detailed itinerary the whole way.Upon arriving in Alexandria, he made note of theimmediacy with which the Sultan’s agents boarded hisvessel in order to record all the luggage items and foodstores that came with the ship. In addition, theytemporarily confiscated all of the travelers’ personalbelongings for inspection. Jubayr was particularlyupset when some of his companions’ possessions were“lost” in this process, most likely stolen by the cus-toms agents.34

Some variation of this procedure occurred withevery vessel that entered an Alexandrian harbor.According to Aziz Atiya, an expert on medieval com-merce, the Alexandrian agents would remove the sailsand rudders of any ship coming into port. They alsoused the common restraint of a giant chain across thebreakwater, in order to keep merchants from leaving inthe night without paying the fee of one gold piece todock at Alexandria. In addition to these constraints,more restrictions were imposed on foreigners. Mer-chants from abroad could not travel deep into thechannels of the Nile delta or far inland at all, in orderto protect the Red Sea from potential danger. Thesultans “zealously guarded [the Red Sea] against alieninfiltration,” because it was such a crucial point in the

13




32Norwich, Venice, 101.

The assessment of the crusade leaders about Egyptseems to have been pretty accurate. One majorimplication of their decision to go to Alexandria wasthe necessity for sea travel. The plan involved acoastal assault on the great port city, and the crusad-ers needed to commission an enormous fleet to carrythe proposed 33,500 crusaders necessary to sack thecity. Therefore, the crusaders negotiated the Treaty of1201 with the Venetians, who halted a majority of theircommercial activities over the subsequent year inorder to construct the requisite armada. The decisionto involve the commercially proficient Venetians—thehistorically debated fatal flaw of the doomed FourthCrusade—had many (mostly negative) implications.

The Venetians’ relationship with Alexandria and theEgyptian government has fallen under great scrutinyby historians hoping to find evidence that the Vene-tians deliberately steered the Fourth Crusade not toEgypt, but to Constantinople, which the Christiansended up conquering by the end of their journey. Inorder to analyze this relationship, we must first lookdeeper into the commercial history of Alexandria andits involvement with the Italians. Earlier, we discussedthe geographic advantage of Alexandria as the centrallink of the commercial chain connecting east and west.Under this advantage, Alexandria became a “majorclearing-house for spices from India and the southernseas, providing in return a ready market for Europeantimber and metal.”32 In this environment merchantscould exchange goods to the great economic gain of theEgyptian government. For example, cotton, pepper,and ginger were not even produced in Egypt, yet they


33Abulafia, Arab Influence, 7. 34Ibn Jubayr, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, William Wright, ed.,(AJ Brill, 1907), 31-2.

would pass through the commercial registry of theSultan and be heavily taxed.33

The Sultan had a significant control over the tradethat occurred in Egypt. In 1183, Ibn Jubayr traveledfrom his hometown in North Africa through the Mus-lim Empire, keeping a detailed itinerary the whole way.Upon arriving in Alexandria, he made note of theimmediacy with which the Sultan’s agents boarded hisvessel in order to record all the luggage items and foodstores that came with the ship. In addition, theytemporarily confiscated all of the travelers’ personalbelongings for inspection. Jubayr was particularlyupset when some of his companions’ possessions were“lost” in this process, most likely stolen by the cus-toms agents.34

Some variation of this procedure occurred withevery vessel that entered an Alexandrian harbor.According to Aziz Atiya, an expert on medieval com-merce, the Alexandrian agents would remove the sailsand rudders of any ship coming into port. They alsoused the common restraint of a giant chain across thebreakwater, in order to keep merchants from leaving inthe night without paying the fee of one gold piece todock at Alexandria. In addition to these constraints,more restrictions were imposed on foreigners. Mer-chants from abroad could not travel deep into thechannels of the Nile delta or far inland at all, in orderto protect the Red Sea from potential danger. Thesultans “zealously guarded [the Red Sea] against alieninfiltration,” because it was such a crucial point in the

14




35Aziz Atiya, Crusade, Commerce and Culture, (IndianaUniversity, 1962), 194. 36Ibid., 181. 37David Jacoby, “The Supply of War Materials to Egypt in theCrusader Period,” in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 25(2001): 103. 38Ibid., 104.

protection of Mecca and Medina, and was the site of anactive eastern trade hub.35 In addition to travelrestrictions, foreigners were kept in a funduq (Italianfondaco), a small neighborhood or simple inn. Thefunduq had to keep its doors closed from nightfall untildawn, and during Friday prayers. Highly suspiciousof infidels from the west, the Egyptians enacted thesemeasures in order to protect their domestic securityagainst sabotage.36

In addition to taxation, the state monopolized thesale and purchase of commodities that came throughAlexandria, and had done so since 1052. For thoseraw materials imported and not marked for re-export,the Matjar (trade office) would purchase the wholeshipment, and determine the price at which theywould enter the market.37 The Matjar was able toobtain this monopoly by charging lower duties ongoods sold to the state than those purchased byprivate individuals. They would often resell thesegoods, even war materials, on the open market for afair profit, after fulfilling state requirements. Accord-ing to David Jacoby, an expert on Near Eastern com-merce, the Matjar would offer to buy commodities suchas timber, iron and pitch at prices that would attractforeign merchants. In a letter addressed to the Pisans,Saladin encourages Pisan investment trade by high-lighting the potentially high profit levels.38


39Abulafia, “Trade,” 17. 40Jacoby, 105. 41Ibid., 105-6.

During the late Fatimid era, and especially after thefirst wave of crusaders took control of the Holy Land,Egypt became particularly dependent upon the westfor the supply of the war materials. Before the fall ofSyria to crusaders, Egyptians could simply sail uptheir coast to cut timber in the abundant Cilicianforests.39 This advantage was lost in the 12th century,but they were able to draw western interest throughthe Matjar’s monopoly, the eastern luxury items, andtheir own production of the minerals. Alum in particu-lar was used abundantly in the textile and leatherindustries of the Europeans, and therefore in highdemand. The Egyptians also secured the supply oftimber, pitch and iron through contingent tradeprivileges granted on the condition that the merchantswould supply timber and other wartime commodities.40

Under these agreements, many records exist docu-menting the supply of timber to the Muslims in Alex-andria from the Pisans and the Genoese during theheight of crusading conflicts. The Italians rarelymissed an opportunity to capitalize on a profitableopportunity.41

The Pisans seemed to have gained the upper handin the Egyptian market in the first half of the 12th

century, receiving trade privileges and a funduq inAlexandria before 1153, and numerous advantages insubsequent agreements. According to comments madeby the geographer Zuhri around 1150, it seems thatthe Pisans even supplied swords to Alexandria duringthe crusades. Conflicts emerged when the Crusader

15




35Aziz Atiya, Crusade, Commerce and Culture, (IndianaUniversity, 1962), 194. 36Ibid., 181. 37David Jacoby, “The Supply of War Materials to Egypt in theCrusader Period,” in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 25(2001): 103. 38Ibid., 104.

protection of Mecca and Medina, and was the site of anactive eastern trade hub.35 In addition to travelrestrictions, foreigners were kept in a funduq (Italianfondaco), a small neighborhood or simple inn. Thefunduq had to keep its doors closed from nightfall untildawn, and during Friday prayers. Highly suspiciousof infidels from the west, the Egyptians enacted thesemeasures in order to protect their domestic securityagainst sabotage.36

In addition to taxation, the state monopolized thesale and purchase of commodities that came throughAlexandria, and had done so since 1052. For thoseraw materials imported and not marked for re-export,the Matjar (trade office) would purchase the wholeshipment, and determine the price at which theywould enter the market.37 The Matjar was able toobtain this monopoly by charging lower duties ongoods sold to the state than those purchased byprivate individuals. They would often resell thesegoods, even war materials, on the open market for afair profit, after fulfilling state requirements. Accord-ing to David Jacoby, an expert on Near Eastern com-merce, the Matjar would offer to buy commodities suchas timber, iron and pitch at prices that would attractforeign merchants. In a letter addressed to the Pisans,Saladin encourages Pisan investment trade by high-lighting the potentially high profit levels.38


39Abulafia, “Trade,” 17. 40Jacoby, 105. 41Ibid., 105-6.

During the late Fatimid era, and especially after thefirst wave of crusaders took control of the Holy Land,Egypt became particularly dependent upon the westfor the supply of the war materials. Before the fall ofSyria to crusaders, Egyptians could simply sail uptheir coast to cut timber in the abundant Cilicianforests.39 This advantage was lost in the 12th century,but they were able to draw western interest throughthe Matjar’s monopoly, the eastern luxury items, andtheir own production of the minerals. Alum in particu-lar was used abundantly in the textile and leatherindustries of the Europeans, and therefore in highdemand. The Egyptians also secured the supply oftimber, pitch and iron through contingent tradeprivileges granted on the condition that the merchantswould supply timber and other wartime commodities.40

Under these agreements, many records exist docu-menting the supply of timber to the Muslims in Alex-andria from the Pisans and the Genoese during theheight of crusading conflicts. The Italians rarelymissed an opportunity to capitalize on a profitableopportunity.41

The Pisans seemed to have gained the upper handin the Egyptian market in the first half of the 12th

century, receiving trade privileges and a funduq inAlexandria before 1153, and numerous advantages insubsequent agreements. According to comments madeby the geographer Zuhri around 1150, it seems thatthe Pisans even supplied swords to Alexandria duringthe crusades. Conflicts emerged when the Crusader

16




42Ibid., 106.

State leaders began to realize that a fair amount ofdouble-dealing had occurred. In 1156 King Baldwin IIIof Jerusalem offered commercial exemptions to Pisans,but only to those who did not get involved in the armsand war commodity trading in Egypt. Some respondedby cutting off the Egyptians, some continued a secrettrading relationship, and some decided to stay with theEgyptians after the sultan offered more incentives tokeep their business.42

Although the Pisans had the strongest presence inAlexandria through the opening years of crusading,the Genoese and the Venetians were certainly notexcluded. A Byzantine edict shows that the Venetiansmay have supplied war materials to the Muslims inAlexandria as far back as 971. With abundant timberand iron resources in the region surrounding thelagoon, the Venetians were well equipped to supplyEgypt with the tools of war. However, their trade focusand political allegiance lay, for the most part, with theByzantines in Constantinople, where they had receivedvery generous customs considerations since thechrysobull of 992. But, this relationship changeddramatically after Emperor Manuel expelled theVenetians from Constantinople in 1171, imprisoningthe thousands of merchants who conducted businessin his empire, and confiscating their property. As aresult, trade between Venice and Egypt immediatelyincreased. In fact, Saladin granted the Venetians afunduq in Alexandria in 1172 at the request of theDoge himself. In addition, large shipments of timberwere regularly scheduled for Alexandrian delivery.Finally, the Venetian diplomatic embassy sent in 1174


43Ibid., 107-110.

to patch up the misunderstanding with Byzantiummade a winter-long stop with Saladin in Alexandria.Coincidentally, the main ambassador on that missionwas the same man who would lead the Venetians inthe expedition against Constantinople 30 years later,the future doge Enrico Dandolo.43

Regarding the events of 1201-1204, it is the con-tention of this paper that the Venetians had ultimatelydecided that they should try to steer the crusadersaway from Egypt, and towards Constantinople or anyother region where they might find economic gains.Many scholars have supported the claim that theSultan of Egypt sent gifts and bribes to the Venetiansin 1202. These scholars contend that a formal treatyassured the cooperation of the two powers in divertingthe crusaders, but I see no reason to believe that thistreaty was ever concluded. It did not need to be. TheVenetians were smart enough to recognize that theirinterests would be better served if they could gain thefavor of the Egyptians and secure Constantinople forthe future. Even if the Crusade were successful, theVenetians could not have hoped to take the economyof Alexandria under their control, and this was madeevident by their actions. Their actions also proved thattheir motives were driven primarily by profits and notpiety. Venetian ascent to commercial dominance afterthe conclusion of the Crusade indicates the nature oftheir privileged status within the Muslim kingdom asa result of their hand in the Crusade’s diversion.

In order to more fully understand the motivationsof Venice with regards to Egypt, we must first addressthe council at Montpellier in 1162 and Third Lateran

17




42Ibid., 106.

State leaders began to realize that a fair amount ofdouble-dealing had occurred. In 1156 King Baldwin IIIof Jerusalem offered commercial exemptions to Pisans,but only to those who did not get involved in the armsand war commodity trading in Egypt. Some respondedby cutting off the Egyptians, some continued a secrettrading relationship, and some decided to stay with theEgyptians after the sultan offered more incentives tokeep their business.42

Although the Pisans had the strongest presence inAlexandria through the opening years of crusading,the Genoese and the Venetians were certainly notexcluded. A Byzantine edict shows that the Venetiansmay have supplied war materials to the Muslims inAlexandria as far back as 971. With abundant timberand iron resources in the region surrounding thelagoon, the Venetians were well equipped to supplyEgypt with the tools of war. However, their trade focusand political allegiance lay, for the most part, with theByzantines in Constantinople, where they had receivedvery generous customs considerations since thechrysobull of 992. But, this relationship changeddramatically after Emperor Manuel expelled theVenetians from Constantinople in 1171, imprisoningthe thousands of merchants who conducted businessin his empire, and confiscating their property. As aresult, trade between Venice and Egypt immediatelyincreased. In fact, Saladin granted the Venetians afunduq in Alexandria in 1172 at the request of theDoge himself. In addition, large shipments of timberwere regularly scheduled for Alexandrian delivery.Finally, the Venetian diplomatic embassy sent in 1174


43Ibid., 107-110.

to patch up the misunderstanding with Byzantiummade a winter-long stop with Saladin in Alexandria.Coincidentally, the main ambassador on that missionwas the same man who would lead the Venetians inthe expedition against Constantinople 30 years later,the future doge Enrico Dandolo.43

Regarding the events of 1201-1204, it is the con-tention of this paper that the Venetians had ultimatelydecided that they should try to steer the crusadersaway from Egypt, and towards Constantinople or anyother region where they might find economic gains.Many scholars have supported the claim that theSultan of Egypt sent gifts and bribes to the Venetiansin 1202. These scholars contend that a formal treatyassured the cooperation of the two powers in divertingthe crusaders, but I see no reason to believe that thistreaty was ever concluded. It did not need to be. TheVenetians were smart enough to recognize that theirinterests would be better served if they could gain thefavor of the Egyptians and secure Constantinople forthe future. Even if the Crusade were successful, theVenetians could not have hoped to take the economyof Alexandria under their control, and this was madeevident by their actions. Their actions also proved thattheir motives were driven primarily by profits and notpiety. Venetian ascent to commercial dominance afterthe conclusion of the Crusade indicates the nature oftheir privileged status within the Muslim kingdom asa result of their hand in the Crusade’s diversion.

In order to more fully understand the motivationsof Venice with regards to Egypt, we must first addressthe council at Montpellier in 1162 and Third Lateran

18




44Ibid., 109. 45Innocent III, “To Venice,” in Allen and Amt, eds., TheCrusades.

Council of 1179, both called by Pope Alexander III.These councils outlawed the sale of arms, iron orlumber to Muslims, and even banned the ferrying ofMuslims on Christian vessels. The punishment forbreaking either of these laws was excommunication.Based on the persistence of trading activity, theItalians seemed to pay no heed to these papalthreats.44 When Innocent came to power at the end ofthe century, he chose to implement these policies withmore authority than had his predecessors. Clearly,the Venetians in particular would have been economi-cally devastated by these restrictions, as evidenced bytheir dependence on the Egyptians. When he wasinformed by two envoys from Venice that the Venetianscould not observe the decree, Innocent wrote a letteraddressed to the city itself. His letter acknowledged itsdependence on trade since they did not “engage inagriculture,” and he allowed them to participate intrade with Egypt as long as only non-war materialswere exchanged. He still forbade the sale of “iron, flax,pitch, sharp instruments, rope, weapons, galleys,ships, and timbers, whether hewn or in the rough.”According to this letter, Innocent simply reasserts theprovisions of the Third Lateran Council, and expectsthe Venetians to offer their naval assistance to Jerusa-lem in return for his “favor.”45

This letter is a testimony to the prevalence of theexchange in war commodities between Venice andEgypt, very late into the 12th century. Interestinglyenough, the Cairo Genizah documents contained a


46SD Goiten, A Mediterranean Society: The Jews of the ArabWorld as Portrayed by the Documents of the Cairo Geniza 1, (UCBerkeley, 1967): 301. 47Innocent III in Allen and Amt. 48quoted. in Abulafia, “Trade,” 17. 49Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Villehardouin and De Joinville:Memoirs of the Crusades, Frank Marzials, trans., (JM Dent &Sons, 1955), 2.

letter from 1200 reporting the unconfirmed arrival inAlexandria of two Venetian ships loaded with timber.This anticipated shipment shows that the Venetianshad no intention of honoring the prohibition of Inno-cent III.46 Under risk of “divine condemnation,”47 theVenetians continued to pursue profits. Claude Cahenputs it directly in his assessment of Venetian inten-tions: “In order to strengthen their right to trade inEgypt, the Italians succumbed to the requests of theFatimids and the Ayyubids for armaments.”48 It is alsoapropos to note that, by 1200, the impending Crusadewas well known throughout the west. Many prominentnobles began to take up the cross as early as 1199.49

That the Venetians (as they had done many timesbefore) would supply the enemy in direct defiance oftheir spiritual ruler shows that they acted primarily forthe advancement of their commercial benefit.

After the Treaty of 1201 was signed, the Venetiansbegan to prepare for the supposed attack on Jerusa-lem. Scholars such as John H. Pryor and John JuliusNorwich contend that the Sultan sent envoys andbribes to Venice at this time in order to sway theentourage away from the shores of Alexandria.Norwich bases his argument on a treaty signed by theSultan As-Adil Sayf Al-Din granting numerous privi-leges to the Venetians, including tax considerations,

19




44Ibid., 109. 45Innocent III, “To Venice,” in Allen and Amt, eds., TheCrusades.

Council of 1179, both called by Pope Alexander III.These councils outlawed the sale of arms, iron orlumber to Muslims, and even banned the ferrying ofMuslims on Christian vessels. The punishment forbreaking either of these laws was excommunication.Based on the persistence of trading activity, theItalians seemed to pay no heed to these papalthreats.44 When Innocent came to power at the end ofthe century, he chose to implement these policies withmore authority than had his predecessors. Clearly,the Venetians in particular would have been economi-cally devastated by these restrictions, as evidenced bytheir dependence on the Egyptians. When he wasinformed by two envoys from Venice that the Venetianscould not observe the decree, Innocent wrote a letteraddressed to the city itself. His letter acknowledged itsdependence on trade since they did not “engage inagriculture,” and he allowed them to participate intrade with Egypt as long as only non-war materialswere exchanged. He still forbade the sale of “iron, flax,pitch, sharp instruments, rope, weapons, galleys,ships, and timbers, whether hewn or in the rough.”According to this letter, Innocent simply reasserts theprovisions of the Third Lateran Council, and expectsthe Venetians to offer their naval assistance to Jerusa-lem in return for his “favor.”45

This letter is a testimony to the prevalence of theexchange in war commodities between Venice andEgypt, very late into the 12th century. Interestinglyenough, the Cairo Genizah documents contained a


46SD Goiten, A Mediterranean Society: The Jews of the ArabWorld as Portrayed by the Documents of the Cairo Geniza 1, (UCBerkeley, 1967): 301. 47Innocent III in Allen and Amt. 48quoted. in Abulafia, “Trade,” 17. 49Geoffrey of Villehardouin, Villehardouin and De Joinville:Memoirs of the Crusades, Frank Marzials, trans., (JM Dent &Sons, 1955), 2.

letter from 1200 reporting the unconfirmed arrival inAlexandria of two Venetian ships loaded with timber.This anticipated shipment shows that the Venetianshad no intention of honoring the prohibition of Inno-cent III.46 Under risk of “divine condemnation,”47 theVenetians continued to pursue profits. Claude Cahenputs it directly in his assessment of Venetian inten-tions: “In order to strengthen their right to trade inEgypt, the Italians succumbed to the requests of theFatimids and the Ayyubids for armaments.”48 It is alsoapropos to note that, by 1200, the impending Crusadewas well known throughout the west. Many prominentnobles began to take up the cross as early as 1199.49

That the Venetians (as they had done many timesbefore) would supply the enemy in direct defiance oftheir spiritual ruler shows that they acted primarily forthe advancement of their commercial benefit.

After the Treaty of 1201 was signed, the Venetiansbegan to prepare for the supposed attack on Jerusa-lem. Scholars such as John H. Pryor and John JuliusNorwich contend that the Sultan sent envoys andbribes to Venice at this time in order to sway theentourage away from the shores of Alexandria.Norwich bases his argument on a treaty signed by theSultan As-Adil Sayf Al-Din granting numerous privi-leges to the Venetians, including tax considerations,

20




50Norwich, 152. See also FC Hodgson, The Early History ofVenice, (Ballantine, Hanson & Co., 1901), 428-34.

their own quarter, and the safe passage of any pilgrimsaboard Venetian ships bound for the Holy Sepulchre.The agreement also involved an envoy exchange, witheach side sending an ambassador to their respectivecapitals. Norwich’s argument is based on Karl Hopf’sanalysis which dates the treaty to 13 May 1202. Sixwestern sources exist that address the treaty betweenthe Venetians and the Sultan of Egypt. One is clearlyfrom after 1204; another date is unintelligible, and theremaining four give the date as the 19th day of theIslamic month of Saben, but not the year. The criticalelement of these sources is that in them the Sultanrefers to himself as “king of kings and Commander ofthe Faithful,” a title which was not bestowed upon himuntil 1207-1208. In addition, the Sultan’s pledge toprotect Christian pilgrims would not likely have beenmade at a time when the westerners were organizing acrusade. The Sultan would be unlikely to make anyconcessions outside of the commercial sphere toChristians in such a potentially hostile climate. M.Hanotaux and Ludwig Streit convincingly discreditedHopf’s analysis in a series of works published aroundthe turn of the 20th century. Their apparently correctdate of 9 March 1208 places this treaty far enoughpast the Fourth Crusade to render its direct implica-tions for the Fourth Crusade meaningless.50

Pryor’s argument, based on the Chronicle of Flan-ders, presents a slightly different angle. The Chroniclestates that the Sultan sent 1,000 gold marks toDandolo upon hearing that Egypt was under threat ofinvasion. Although Pryor ultimately admits that “there


51John H. Pryor, “The Venetian Fleet for the Fourth Crusadeand the Diversion of the Crusade to Constantinople,” in Kedar,Riley-Smiith and Hiestand, Montjoie, 113-4. 52Holt, 163.

is no reason whatsoever to give any credence to [thesereports],” the fact of the matter remains that theserumors did exist in the crusader camps.51 There maynot be a smoking gun, but the lack of conclusiveevidence does not mean that it did not exist at onepoint. In fact, based on the string of chance encoun-ters that led the crusaders to Constantinople, it seemsthat such a rumor is suspiciously creative. Ultimately,however, it seems that the rumor was more than likelyinserted into the Chronicle after the conclusion of theCrusade as a way of placing more blame on the Vene-tians, to lighten the guilt of the crusading host.

Nevertheless, the treaty cannot be so easily dis-missed in this discussion. Following the FourthCrusade, the Venetians did enjoy significant growth inthe rights they enjoyed in Alexandria. The existingtreaty mentioned earlier was indeed signed in 1208,and it is probable that this treaty was a reward for theactions undertaken from 1201-1204 to deflect theFourth Crusade. Furthermore, by 1238 a royal decreefrom the Sultan Abu Bakr guaranteed the generalsecurity of all Venetians in Egyptian lands, exemptionfrom any new duties, complete freedom of trade, twofactories, a bathhouse and a chapel all under theirown jurisdiction, the freedom to import wine, andvarious legal privileges including trial by their peers.In addition, the Venetians were safeguarded againstany Muslim corsairs or pirates raiding Egyptianwaters.52 Compared to the restrictions that weighed

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50Norwich, 152. See also FC Hodgson, The Early History ofVenice, (Ballantine, Hanson & Co., 1901), 428-34.

their own quarter, and the safe passage of any pilgrimsaboard Venetian ships bound for the Holy Sepulchre.The agreement also involved an envoy exchange, witheach side sending an ambassador to their respectivecapitals. Norwich’s argument is based on Karl Hopf’sanalysis which dates the treaty to 13 May 1202. Sixwestern sources exist that address the treaty betweenthe Venetians and the Sultan of Egypt. One is clearlyfrom after 1204; another date is unintelligible, and theremaining four give the date as the 19th day of theIslamic month of Saben, but not the year. The criticalelement of these sources is that in them the Sultanrefers to himself as “king of kings and Commander ofthe Faithful,” a title which was not bestowed upon himuntil 1207-1208. In addition, the Sultan’s pledge toprotect Christian pilgrims would not likely have beenmade at a time when the westerners were organizing acrusade. The Sultan would be unlikely to make anyconcessions outside of the commercial sphere toChristians in such a potentially hostile climate. M.Hanotaux and Ludwig Streit convincingly discreditedHopf’s analysis in a series of works published aroundthe turn of the 20th century. Their apparently correctdate of 9 March 1208 places this treaty far enoughpast the Fourth Crusade to render its direct implica-tions for the Fourth Crusade meaningless.50

Pryor’s argument, based on the Chronicle of Flan-ders, presents a slightly different angle. The Chroniclestates that the Sultan sent 1,000 gold marks toDandolo upon hearing that Egypt was under threat ofinvasion. Although Pryor ultimately admits that “there


51John H. Pryor, “The Venetian Fleet for the Fourth Crusadeand the Diversion of the Crusade to Constantinople,” in Kedar,Riley-Smiith and Hiestand, Montjoie, 113-4. 52Holt, 163.

is no reason whatsoever to give any credence to [thesereports],” the fact of the matter remains that theserumors did exist in the crusader camps.51 There maynot be a smoking gun, but the lack of conclusiveevidence does not mean that it did not exist at onepoint. In fact, based on the string of chance encoun-ters that led the crusaders to Constantinople, it seemsthat such a rumor is suspiciously creative. Ultimately,however, it seems that the rumor was more than likelyinserted into the Chronicle after the conclusion of theCrusade as a way of placing more blame on the Vene-tians, to lighten the guilt of the crusading host.

Nevertheless, the treaty cannot be so easily dis-missed in this discussion. Following the FourthCrusade, the Venetians did enjoy significant growth inthe rights they enjoyed in Alexandria. The existingtreaty mentioned earlier was indeed signed in 1208,and it is probable that this treaty was a reward for theactions undertaken from 1201-1204 to deflect theFourth Crusade. Furthermore, by 1238 a royal decreefrom the Sultan Abu Bakr guaranteed the generalsecurity of all Venetians in Egyptian lands, exemptionfrom any new duties, complete freedom of trade, twofactories, a bathhouse and a chapel all under theirown jurisdiction, the freedom to import wine, andvarious legal privileges including trial by their peers.In addition, the Venetians were safeguarded againstany Muslim corsairs or pirates raiding Egyptianwaters.52 Compared to the restrictions that weighed

22




heavily on the freedom of the Venetians through the12th century (they were held captive in Alexandria in1195), they were now practically part of the family.Although an explicit treaty does not exist, it seems thata policy of back-scratching was certainly initiated afterthe Treaty of 1201. The Venetians were given morefavorable treatment after the Crusade than were rivalItalians from Pisa and Genoa. (It is also imperative tocomment on the lack of a physical treaty. Since anyagreement between Venice and Egypt would have beenkept very secret, the discovery of a physical documentoutlining their commercial collusion is highly unlikely.Consider the Treaty of 1201—it makes no mention ofEgypt either!)

Attempting to approach the decision to go to Egyptfrom the Venetian perspective, at first glance it wouldseem that conquering Egypt would serve them betterthan Constantinople. For example, the Venetians hadjust renegotiated their chrysobull of commercialprivileges with Byzantium in 1198. They had a signifi-cant advantage over the Pisans and Genoese in Con-stantinople, and trailed behind their two main rivals inAlexandria. Taking over the Alexandrian market wouldhave given the Venetians a monopoly on the easternconnection. However, a closer inspection into thestructure of the Egyptian and Muslim society will shedsome new light on the realities of a Christian assaulton Alexandria.

The Venetians would have been familiar with thebureaucratic organization of the Egyptian government,primarily through their dealings in the harbors ofAlexandria with the Matjar. With the rise to ascen-dancy of Islam in the Near East, Arabic metropoliseswould develop in stark contrast to the major cities of


53Udovitch, 144. 54Ibid., 145.

the west. The primary difference between the Islamiccities and those of Western Europe lies in geography.The rise of the Islamic urban center occurred inland,primarily because the main contingent of Mus-lims—Arabs and North Africans—were desert dwellers.So when major cities began popping up, they werenaturally distant from the coastline of the Mediterra-nean and Red Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf.According to A.L. Udovitch, “the sea was a menacingfrontier to Muslim rulers.”53 The sea was not feared forthe inherent dangers it presented to all men—storms,waves, etc.—but it was a threat because it threatenedthe strategic unity of Islamic domination. The sea wasthe “one vulnerable frontier” where Muslims couldpotentially be conquered from the West. A perfectexample is the ease with which Reynaud ravaged thecoasts of the Red Sea once he was able to launch afleet there. The Muslims’ fear grew so potent that theCaliph Umar went so far as to outlaw sea travel for hissubjects, punishing anyone who traveled or conqueredby water.54

Saladin maintained Umar’s attitude of negativitytoward the sea. By the time the Mamluks took controlof Egypt in 1250, they set out to destroy coastalfortifications so that enterprising crusade outfits couldnot occupy them and threaten Islamic stability. Thecoastal centers in Islamic nations took the role of“frontier outposts,” and were not the focus of militaryor political strength. In Egypt, Alexandria was themain port, but it was still referred to as a frontiertown. Cairo was the main hub of naval and military

23




heavily on the freedom of the Venetians through the12th century (they were held captive in Alexandria in1195), they were now practically part of the family.Although an explicit treaty does not exist, it seems thata policy of back-scratching was certainly initiated afterthe Treaty of 1201. The Venetians were given morefavorable treatment after the Crusade than were rivalItalians from Pisa and Genoa. (It is also imperative tocomment on the lack of a physical treaty. Since anyagreement between Venice and Egypt would have beenkept very secret, the discovery of a physical documentoutlining their commercial collusion is highly unlikely.Consider the Treaty of 1201—it makes no mention ofEgypt either!)

Attempting to approach the decision to go to Egyptfrom the Venetian perspective, at first glance it wouldseem that conquering Egypt would serve them betterthan Constantinople. For example, the Venetians hadjust renegotiated their chrysobull of commercialprivileges with Byzantium in 1198. They had a signifi-cant advantage over the Pisans and Genoese in Con-stantinople, and trailed behind their two main rivals inAlexandria. Taking over the Alexandrian market wouldhave given the Venetians a monopoly on the easternconnection. However, a closer inspection into thestructure of the Egyptian and Muslim society will shedsome new light on the realities of a Christian assaulton Alexandria.

The Venetians would have been familiar with thebureaucratic organization of the Egyptian government,primarily through their dealings in the harbors ofAlexandria with the Matjar. With the rise to ascen-dancy of Islam in the Near East, Arabic metropoliseswould develop in stark contrast to the major cities of


53Udovitch, 144. 54Ibid., 145.

the west. The primary difference between the Islamiccities and those of Western Europe lies in geography.The rise of the Islamic urban center occurred inland,primarily because the main contingent of Mus-lims—Arabs and North Africans—were desert dwellers.So when major cities began popping up, they werenaturally distant from the coastline of the Mediterra-nean and Red Seas, as well as the Persian Gulf.According to A.L. Udovitch, “the sea was a menacingfrontier to Muslim rulers.”53 The sea was not feared forthe inherent dangers it presented to all men—storms,waves, etc.—but it was a threat because it threatenedthe strategic unity of Islamic domination. The sea wasthe “one vulnerable frontier” where Muslims couldpotentially be conquered from the West. A perfectexample is the ease with which Reynaud ravaged thecoasts of the Red Sea once he was able to launch afleet there. The Muslims’ fear grew so potent that theCaliph Umar went so far as to outlaw sea travel for hissubjects, punishing anyone who traveled or conqueredby water.54

Saladin maintained Umar’s attitude of negativitytoward the sea. By the time the Mamluks took controlof Egypt in 1250, they set out to destroy coastalfortifications so that enterprising crusade outfits couldnot occupy them and threaten Islamic stability. Thecoastal centers in Islamic nations took the role of“frontier outposts,” and were not the focus of militaryor political strength. In Egypt, Alexandria was themain port, but it was still referred to as a frontiertown. Cairo was the main hub of naval and military

24




55Ibid., 146-8, 158.

activity. It also served as the financial, commercial,and economic center of the Egyptian caliphate, whileAlexandria was its very distant “suburb.”55 Based onprevious encounters with the Egyptian navy (1123),the Venetians would have been confident in theirability to dominate them on the coast, but they wouldhave also known that the heart of Egyptian power layin waiting many miles to the south in Cairo.

The Muslims’ history of negativity toward sea-travelalso meant that the Venetians knew that the Egyptiansneeded allies for trade in the Mediterranean. If anAlexandrian assault proved unsuccessful, as theVenetians must have believed it would, they riskedlosing their diplomatic ties to Egypt. Although theCrusaders could have taken Alexandria with ease, therest of Egypt would be much more unmanageable.And, without the support of the Muslims who con-trolled the trade routes connecting the Red Sea andthe Persian Gulf with Alexandria, those vital connec-tions to the east would most certainly be lost as well.As a privileged client-state of the Caliphate, the Vene-tians could surpass their North Italian rivals and reapthe benefits of an inside connection with the Matjar.Ultimately, this is precisely what happened.

In line with their plan to keep the coast of Egyptfree from invasion, it is my contention that the Vene-tians did not expect to conquer Constantinople. Thealliance with Alexius IV did not necessarily mean thatConstantinople had to be sacked, but it would meanthat the Crusaders could pass through the ByzantineEmpire on their way to Jerusalem, and avoid going toEgypt at all. As it turned out, the events of the Fourth


Crusade played to the Venetians’ immense advantage,no matter what their initial intentions. But it seemsclear that the Venetians had no intention of going toEgypt, with or without an extant treaty of collusion.As a city founded on the principles of mercantilism,the Venetians dealt with all contemporary politicalgroups as clientele, from the Pope in Rome to theSultan in Cairo. This attitude sparked their rise to thetop of the Mediterranean world, and the events of theFourth Crusade proved paramount in this unprece-dented ascension.

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55Ibid., 146-8, 158.

activity. It also served as the financial, commercial,and economic center of the Egyptian caliphate, whileAlexandria was its very distant “suburb.”55 Based onprevious encounters with the Egyptian navy (1123),the Venetians would have been confident in theirability to dominate them on the coast, but they wouldhave also known that the heart of Egyptian power layin waiting many miles to the south in Cairo.

The Muslims’ history of negativity toward sea-travelalso meant that the Venetians knew that the Egyptiansneeded allies for trade in the Mediterranean. If anAlexandrian assault proved unsuccessful, as theVenetians must have believed it would, they riskedlosing their diplomatic ties to Egypt. Although theCrusaders could have taken Alexandria with ease, therest of Egypt would be much more unmanageable.And, without the support of the Muslims who con-trolled the trade routes connecting the Red Sea andthe Persian Gulf with Alexandria, those vital connec-tions to the east would most certainly be lost as well.As a privileged client-state of the Caliphate, the Vene-tians could surpass their North Italian rivals and reapthe benefits of an inside connection with the Matjar.Ultimately, this is precisely what happened.

In line with their plan to keep the coast of Egyptfree from invasion, it is my contention that the Vene-tians did not expect to conquer Constantinople. Thealliance with Alexius IV did not necessarily mean thatConstantinople had to be sacked, but it would meanthat the Crusaders could pass through the ByzantineEmpire on their way to Jerusalem, and avoid going toEgypt at all. As it turned out, the events of the Fourth


Crusade played to the Venetians’ immense advantage,no matter what their initial intentions. But it seemsclear that the Venetians had no intention of going toEgypt, with or without an extant treaty of collusion.As a city founded on the principles of mercantilism,the Venetians dealt with all contemporary politicalgroups as clientele, from the Pope in Rome to theSultan in Cairo. This attitude sparked their rise to thetop of the Mediterranean world, and the events of theFourth Crusade proved paramount in this unprece-dented ascension.

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A Calculated Crusade: Venice, Commerce, and the Fourth Crusade

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