99998418 Civpro 1 28 Case Digests

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NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 141524

September 14, 2005469 SCRA 633

CORONA, J.:

Facts:Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance

and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents. Later, inan order, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners

allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or

on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another

order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five dayslater, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight

days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion forreconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for

certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal

before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice ofappeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998

since this was the day they received the final order of the trial court denying their motion for

reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsedand they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. On September 16, 1999, the CA

dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March

3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to

the appellate court, the order was the final order appealable under the Rules.

Issues:I. Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period to

appeal the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the

Motion for Reconsideration

II. Whether or not petitioners filed their notice of appeal on time.

Held:I. The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the motion for reconsideration should be deemed as the

final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner non-

suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed anomnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to

appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus

motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed outof time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal

of his complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. The SC reversed

the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of

dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there.This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al. where the SC

again considered the order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration as the final order which

finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC


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sustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsiderationwas the final order contemplated in the Rules.

II. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fairopportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within

which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for

a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule

40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does not apply to Rule 64(Review of Judgments and FinalOrders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit) because Rule 64

is derived from the Constitution. It is likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal cases. The

new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the orderdenying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order

or resolution.

This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that

the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The useof the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It

should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of or in the

above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice ofjudgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to

the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.

PINGA vs. HEIRS OF SANTIAGOGR No. 170354June 30, 2006494 SCRA 393

TINGA,J.:Facts:

The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been unlawfully

entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of thecoconut trees. As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the lands to which he was harvesting

the fruits. However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered the

dismissal of said case. Respondents thus filed a Motion for Reconsideration to ask for the entire actionto be dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte. Said motion was granted by

the RTC, hence the counterclaim was dismissed.

The lower court further ruled that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently ofplaintiffs cause of action vis a vis the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the

counterclaim. Petitioner therefore elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari

under Rule 45 on pure questions of law also averring that respondents motive for seeking the

dismissal of their entire case is to avoid putting their ownership in controversy in the counterclaim.

Issue:Whether or not the dismissal of the original complaint affects that of the compulsory

counterclaim.


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Held:No, the counterclaim herein can stand on its own. The dismissal of the complaint does not carry

with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the

complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute his counterclaim. Section 3

contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him andwhich, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also

covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant

or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim,permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative significance. The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is

evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence

the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits.

The complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matterof course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation

therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the

concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim.The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition

of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaimitself and not on the survival of the main complaint. Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably withoutmerit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not

precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing

the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the

amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason ofthe dismissal of the complaint.

Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of his presentation of his evidence x xx the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion,

without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a

separate action.

BARITUA vs. MERCADERG.R. No. 136048January 23, 2001

350 SCRA 86

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Facts:Mercader boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line bounded from Manila to N. Samar.

However, while said bus was traversing the Beily Bridge in N. Samar, the bus fell into the river and as

a result, Mercader died. The heirs of Mercader sued petitioner for breach of contract of carriage. Withthe heirs of Mercader attaining a favorable judgment at the lower court and CA level, petitioner assails

the said decisions rendered therein with the Supreme Court via Petition for Review under Rule 45 on

the ground of procedural flaws, specifically questioning: (1) the jurisdiction of the lower court over the

original and amended complaints or over the subject matter of the case as the trial court was not paidthe correct amount of docket and other lawful fees; (2) the arbitrary disregard for petitioners

constitutional right to procedural due process and fairness as the appellate court denied their right to


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present evidence, to expect that their evidence will be duly considered and appreciated and when thecourt passed sub silencio on the trail courts failure to rule frontally on petitioners plea for a bill of

particulars; and (3) that both the RTC and CA failed to adhere to the rule that their decision must state

clearly and distinctly the facts and the laws on which they are based.

Issues:I. Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the caseII. Whether or not petitioners procedural rights were disregarded as to the denial of their

Motion for a Bill of Particulars

III. Whether or not petitioner was denied of his procedural right to adduce evidence

Held:I. Yes. The Court, in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, held that the court

acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee An amendmentof the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the

payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

Generally, the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the commencementof the action, unless such statute provides for its retroactive application. Once the jurisdiction of a

court attaches, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The trial court cannot be oustedtherefrom by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character that would have preventedjurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

The Manchester ruling, which became final in 1987, has no retroactive application and cannot

be invoked in the subject Complaint filed in 1984.

II. No. It must be noted that petitioners counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a

motion for a bill of particulars. The RTC gave him ten days within which to do so. He, however, filed

the aforesaid motion only eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motionwas already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer

and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint. Section 1, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court,

provides:Section 1. When applied for; purpose. -- Before responding to a pleading, a party may move

for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with

sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading. If

the pleading is a reply, the motion must be filed within ten (10) days from service thereof. Suchmotion shall point out the defects complained of, the paragraphs wherein they are contained, and the

details desired.

III. No. First, judges cannot be expected to rely on the testimonies of every witness. In

ascertaining the facts, they determine who are credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all

the evidence before them. In other words, the mere fact that Judge Noynay based his decision on the

testimonies of respondents witnesses does not necessarily mean that he did not consider those ofpetitioners. Second, there is no sufficient showing that Judge Operario was overzealous in questioning

the witnesses. His questions merely sought to clarify their testimonies.

ATTY. ABRENICA vs. LAW FIRM OF ABRENICA, TUNGOL AND TIBAYANG.R. No. 169420



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YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

Facts:Respondents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against

petitioner regarding an alleged refusal of petitioner to return and transfer partnership funds. The SECinitially heard the cases but they were later transferred to the RTC of Quezon City pursuant to

Republic Act No. 8799, which transferred jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies from the SEC

to the courts. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents, causing petitioner to file with the

Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Attached Petition for Review under Rule 43 ofthe Revised Rules of Court. The CA, however, denied said motion as well as the subsequent Motion

for Reconsideration.

Petitioner invokes liberal construction of the rules in seeking reversal of the above resolutions.He alleges that his appeal was not filed late but that he only resorted to the wrong mode of appeal; that

realizing his error, he immediately filed the Motion For Leave to Admit Petition for Review; that his

notice of appeal had the effect of tolling the period of perfecting his appeal under Rule 43 of the Rulesof Court; that although unaware of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, he appealed four days after receiving the

consolidated decision through a notice of appeal, thus showing his "sincerity" in appealing the

decision.

Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in the non-application of a liberal construction of

the rules resulting in the refusal to admit petitioners petition for review

Held:No. Under Rule 1, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the

rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as

possible, be decided on their merits and not on technicalities. This does not mean, however, that

procedural rules are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the convenience of a party. Procedurallaw has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective

enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that

substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to each other, or as often suggested, thatenforcement of procedural rules should never be permitted if it would result in prejudice to the

substantive rights of the litigants.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities, but every case must be prosecuted in accordance withthe prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved. Hence, rules of

procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to

relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribedprocedure. Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part

of the party invoking liberality to explain his failure to abide by the rules.

"Oversight" and "excusable negligence" have become an all too familiar and ready excuse onthe part of lawyers remiss in their bounden duty to comply with established rules. Rules of procedureare tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate attainment of justice,

such that strict adherence thereto is required. The application of the Rules may be relaxed only when

rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice.

PALOMA vs. MORAG.R. No. 157783


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CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:

Facts:Petitioner was terminated from his appointment as General Manager of the Palompon, Leyte

Water District. By reason thereof, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with prayer to be restored to

his former position and for preliminary injunction with damages before the RTC. Unable to obtain a

favorable ruling with the RTC, petitioner filed a complaint with the Civil Service Commission foralleged Violation of Civil Service Law and Rules and for Illegal Dismissal. The CSC, however,

dismissed the petition for lack of merit, which was likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issues:I. Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the Board of Directors of Palompon, Leyte

Water District to reinstate the General Manager thereof

II. Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has primary jurisdiction over the case forillegal dismissal of petitioner

Held:I. No. Mandamus does not lie to compel the Board of Directors of the Palompon, Leyte Water

District to reinstate petitioner because the Board has the discretionary power to remove him under

Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, as amended by P.D. No. 768.Moreover, Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Petition for mandamus. ' When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person

unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting

from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a rightor office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in

the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper

court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding therespondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be

done to protect the rights of the petitioner and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by

reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.Mandamus lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to

compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control or review the

exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon said public officer the right and

duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is hisjudgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

II. Yes. As a general rule, no officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or

suspended except for cause provided by law as provided in Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987Constitution. As exception to this, P.D. No. 198, a special enabling charter of Local Water Districts,

categorically provides that the General Manager shall serve 'at the pleasure of the board.Water districts are government instrumentalities and their employees belong to the civil

service. Thus, the hiring and firing of employees of government-owned or controlled corporations are

governed by the Civil Service Law and Civil Service Rules and Regulations.

In cases where the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is clearly applicable, the court cannotarrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged

with an administrative body of special competence. Quasi-judicial bodies like the CSC are better-


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equipped in handling cases involving the employment status of employees as those in the Civil Servicesince it is within the field of their expertise. This is consistent with the powers and functions of the

CSC, being the central personnel agency of the Government, to carry into effect the provisions of the

Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws, including, in this case, P.D. No. 198.

QUESADA vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICEG.R. No. 150325August 31, 2006500 SCRA 454

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:

Facts:Respondent Teruel filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City an

affidavit-complaint against petitioner, Camacho, Jr., and Corgado with the crime of estafa under

Article 315 (2) and (3) of the Revised Penal Code, which in turn was opposed by petitioner who filed acounter-affidavit thereto. Thereafter, an Information for estafa was filed with the RTC upon the

recommendation of Assistant City Prosecutor Esteban A. Tacla, Jr. after the latters issuance of a

Resolution finding probable cause. In the meantime, petitioner filed with the Department of Justice aPetition for Review challenging the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, but was however,

dismissed.

Pending the criminal case at the RTC, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Petition forCertiorari alleging that the Secretary of Justice, in dismissing his Petition for Review, acted with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Issue:Whether or not the filing of the present petition directly with the Supreme Court constitutes an

utter violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts

Held:Yes. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily

perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannotand should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original

jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely

necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should

generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or beforeconstitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not

controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the

competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the

specific action for the writs procurement must be presented.The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a

general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. It is a policy thatis necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better

devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the

Courts docket.

NGO BUN TIONG vs. HON. MARCELINO M. SAYOG.R. No. L-45825


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June 30, 1988163 SCRA 237

PARAS,J.:

Facts:The case originated from a decision of the Court a First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII in a

case entitled Caltex (Phil.) Inc. vs. Pilares Construction Co. ordering among others, the payment by

the defendant to the plaintiff of the sum of P67,052.32 plus interests, attorney's fees and costs. Said

decision became final and execution thereof commenced with an execution sale for the purpose.Meanwhile, the case was appealed up to the Supreme Court. Pending proceedings in the latter court,

private respondent filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII,

Caloocan City, against herein petitioner and Emilio Z. Reyes for "Declaration of Nullity of the Auction

Sale and Damages" and a Motion to Annul Certificate of Sale and to declare alleged auction sale withthe Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII as null and void. The said court rendered judgment

issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction restraining defendants from pulling

out or removing any such property of the plaintiff from its compound, and ordering defendants toreturn immediately such equipments and properties now in their possession which were removed or

hauled by them by virtue of the sale allegedly had between them. This order of the CFI, Branch

XXXIII is now being assailed.

Issue:Whether or not a Court of First Instance or a branch thereof, has jurisdiction to annul or set

aside, for alleged irregularities an execution sale, held by virtue of a decision rendered by another

Court of First Instance or a branch thereof, and subsequently to order the return of the properties sold

at public auction to the judgment debtor

Held:Pursuant to the policy of judicial stability, the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction

may not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction. No court has the power to interfereby injunction, with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having

equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. For the simple reason that the power to open,

modify or vacate a judgment is not only possessed by, but is restricted to the court in which thejudgment was rendered.

For obvious reasons, the matter should have been laid to rest, but private respondent instead

again filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXIII, raising the very same

issues which were already decided by the Court of First Instance, Branch XIII with finality. It is animportant fundamental principle in Our judicial system that every litigation must come to an end.

Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be a limit thereto. Once a litigant's rights have been

adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled

license to come back for another try. The prevailing party should not be harassed by subsequent suits.For, if endless litigations were to be encouraged, unscrupulous litigants will multiply in number to the

detriment of the administration of justice.

ELLA vs. HON. JUDGE SALANGAG.R. No. L-23826



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MAKALINTAL,J.:

Facts:A verified complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur by petitioners against

respondents for specific performance, to compel the payment of the price of the land allegedlypurchased by the government under a perfected sales contract with petitioners, as well as attorneys

fees, expenses of litigation, and moral and exemplary damages. The case was raffled and assigned to

Branch II whereby the latter, through Judge Dumaual, issued a writ of preliminary injunction against

respondents and subsequently proceeded with the trial thereon. Later, Executive Judge AngelinoSalanga, formerly presiding Judge of Branch III filed a "Motion Ex Parte to Return the Case to Vigan

and To Set Same for Trial." Thereafter, Judge Salanga issued an order directing the "Clerk of Court of

Narvacan, Branch 2, to transfer all the records of the above entitled case to this Court for the furtherprosecution of this proceeding."

The plaintiffs filed an ex-parte motion seeking to reverse and/or recall the order of Judge

Salanga on the grounds that they had not been served with notice thereof and that after the hearing hadbeen commenced in Branch II, jurisdiction to hear and decide the case had been firmly lodged in said

branch to the exclusion of other branches. A motion was subsequently filed seeking to dissolve the

writ of preliminary injunction issued by Judge Dumaual.

Issue:I. Whether or not Branch II had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case

II. Whether or not the transfer of the case from Branch II to Branch III constituted undueinterference with the processes of the former

III. Whether or not the writ of injunction, issued by Branch II, may be validly dissolved by

respondent Judge of Branch III

Held:I. No. The different branches of a Court of First Instance of one province do not possess

jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other. The Judiciary Act vests jurisdiction

upon the court, not upon any particular branch or Judge thereof. When a case is filed in one branchjurisdiction over the case does not attach to the branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the other

branches. Trial may be held or proceedings continued by and before another branch or judge. It is forthis reason that Section 57 of the Judiciary Act expressly grants to the Secretary of Justice, the

administrative right or power to apportion the cases among the different branches, both for the

convenience of the parties and for the coordination of the work by the different branches of the samecourt. The apportionment and distribution of cases do not involve a grant or limitation of jurisdiction;

the jurisdiction attaches and continues to be vested in the Court of First Instance of the province, and

the trials may be held by any branch or judge of the court.

II. No. Generally, the branches being coordinate and co-equal, one branch or the judge thereof

cannot unduly interfere with the processes and proceedings of another branch or Judge constituting anundue interest. The transfer of the case to Vigan was not an unusual one under the circumstances, anddid not constitute a grave abuse of discretion, or an excess of jurisdiction such as to call for the

issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. had authority from the Department of Justice to

continue holding court at Vigan, where he was Presiding Judge of Branch III prior to his appointmentto Branch IV. This authority granted to Judge Salanga is allowed under Section 56 of the Judiciary

Act, which provides as follows:


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SEC. 56. Special terms of court. When so directed by Department Head, District Judgesshall hold special terms of court at any time or in any municipality in their respective districts for the

transactions of any judicial business.

The order for him to remain in Vigan came about because the Candon branch still had neitherpersonnel nor available courthouse, by reason of which Judge Salanga could not immediately assume

his duties there.

III. Yes. The dissolution of the writ of injunction after the filing of a bond is allowed under

section 6 of Rule 58. It rests upon the sound discretion of the court, which, unfortunately, has been

abused in this case. The damage that it could cause to the petitioner is not irreparable, being subject tocompensation in money. And a further consideration that cannot be ignored at this stage is that two of

the original plaintiffs, co-owners of the land which was the subject of the earlier negotiations with the

government, have sold their shares to a third party, as a result of which there is a distinct possibility

that the said land may no longer be suited for the purpose for which it was intended.

VILLAMORvs. SALAS

G.R. No. 101041

November 13, 1991203 SCRA 450

GRIO-AQUINO,J.:

Facts:Carlos filed an administrative case against Judge Villamor, charging him with having issued

illegal orders and an unjust decision in a case he was a party of regarding a dispute on ownership and

possession of a certain parcel of land against Naval. The same was summarily dismissed by theSupreme Court. Dissatisfied, Carlos filed a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor for

knowingly rendering an unjust judgment when he dismissed five criminal cases against Naval and the

same was raffled to the RTC presided by Judge Salas. Meanwhile, Attorney Guerrero's complaint fordamages was raffled to Branch 21, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City wherein Judge Aleonar took

cognizance of the same.

Issue:Whether or not Judges Aleonar and Salas may take cognizance of the actions for damages

against Judge Villamor for allegedly having rendered an unjust order against Carlos and Attorney

Guerrero which the Supreme Court subsequently annulled

Held:No. No Regional Trial Court can pass upon and scrutinize, and much less declare as unjust a

judgment of another Regional Trial Court and sentence the judge thereof liable for damages withoutrunning afoul with the principle that only the higher appellate courts, namely, the Court of Appeals and

the Supreme Court, are vested with authority to review and correct errors of the trial courts.To allow respondent Judges Aleonar and Salas to proceed with the trial of the actions for

damages against the petitioner, a co-equal judge of a co-equal court, would in effect permit a court to

review and interfere with the judgment of a co-equal court over which it has no appellate jurisdiction

or power of review. The various branches of a Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court)being co-equal, may not interfere with each other's cases, judgments and orders. Only after the


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Appellate Court, in a final judgment, has found that a trial judge's errors were committed deliberatelyand in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled against the latter.

DELA ROSA vs. ROLDANG.R. No. 133882


CALLEJO, SR.,J.:

Facts:The case originated from a claim of ownership over a parcel of land which was decided in

favor of defendant. However, plaintiff therein, despite the order of the court, continues to refuse tovacate the land thereby prompting defendant to file with the MTC a complaint for recovery of

ownership, reconveyance, cancellation of title, and damages. The MTC rendered judgment therein in

favor of defendant on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the issue between theparties was one of ownership and not merely possession de facto. Thus, the possession of the property

by defendants was not by mere tolerance, but by virtue of a claim of ownership; in fact, defendants

never recognized the plaintiffs' claim of ownership over the property.

Issue:Whether or not the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents

Held:Yes. The action of respondents against petitioners was one for unlawful detainer, and as such,

the MTC had jurisdiction over the same. It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature ofan action as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint

and the character of the relief sought, whether or not plaintiff is entitled to any and all of the reliefs

prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of the action cannot be made todepend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question

of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. Once jurisdiction is vested, the same is

retained up to the end of the litigation.Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be

acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it conferred by

the acquiescence of the court. It is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule,

this matter being legislative in character. Thus, the jurisdiction over the nature of an action and thesubject matter thereof is not affected by the theories set up by defendant in an answer or motion to

dismiss.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691, amending Section 33(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,

which was the law in effect when respondents filed their complaint against petitioners, provides that"Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer; provided that, when,in such cases, defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of

possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be

resolved only to determine the issues of possession."

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOYG.R. No. L-21450


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April 15, 196823 SCRA 29

DIZON,J.:

Facts:Tijam filed for the recovery of P1,908 and legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants in

turn, filed a counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Judgement was rendered in favour of

the plaintiffs and a writ of execution was issued against the defendant. Defendants then moved for writ

of execution against the Surety which was granted. The Surety, after the denial of its motion to quashthe writ appealed to the Court of Appeals, without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction; however the

appellate court affirmed the appealed decision. Hence, the Surety then filed a Motion to Dismiss on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a

month before the filing of the petition for recovery. The Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction ofinferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. Due to such, the

CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to the Supreme Court since it has exclusive

jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

Issue:Whether or not the Surety is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the

first time upon appeal

Held:Yes. The Surety is barred by laches from invoking a plea after almost fifteen years before the

Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time. A party

may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus

what is referred to is estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to

do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it

has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision onthe merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable

practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,

and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.The contention of the Surety that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the

writ of execution because the same was issued without the summary hearing is untenable. A summary

hearing is not intended to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted.

It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved with dispatch, with the least possible delay,and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings. What is essential is that "the

defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged upon

him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties. In the

case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date when thesame would be submitted for consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the

motion was called, and it was upon his request that the court a quo gave him a period of four dayswithin which to file an answer. Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or

objection. The surety cannot now, therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court.

CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZG.R. No. L-34362

November 19, 1982


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118 SCRA 399

VASQUEZ,J.:

Facts:Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel

Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelledand a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the title

not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court directing him

to surrender the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-partepetition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition

was granted by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the

name of the corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the

parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastralcourt, praying for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition.

Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568

but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to the filing of a complaint in for thecancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property, covered by

TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have bought the property from Independent

Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over theproperty in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim annotated on the title thereof at the

instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the

same is barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, therespondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment.

Issue:Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment

Held:No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC

Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing

of the subsequent civil case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among

others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the properjurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If

there is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order

cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of bar by

prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case.The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of

the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land registration court. Reliance was apparently

placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance,

acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, itsproceedings are not adequate for the litigation of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as,

questions involving ownership or title to real property.

DELA CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 139442

December 6, 2006510 SCRA 103


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VELASCO, JR.,J.:

Facts:The case stemmed from a dispute when petitioner refused to adhere to several verbal and

written demands by the Reyeses to vacate a certain lot which it leased from the latter. Respondent TanTe, having bought the lot from the Reyeses, demanded from petitioner to vacate the lot to be used as

the formers residence. However, petitioner continues to reject such demands, prompting respondent

Tan Te to file an ejectment suit against him at the Manila MeTC, which rendered judgment in

respondents favor. Aggrieved with the decisions rendered upon appeal, petitioner now files a petitionfor review seeking to nullify the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals which reversed the

decision of the Manila RTC and reinstated the decision of the Manila MeTC, which ordered petitioner

Dela Cruz to vacate the subject lot in favor of respondent Tan Te.

Issues:I. Which court, the Manila RTC or the Manila MeTC, has jurisdiction over the Tan Te

ejectment suit

II. Whether or not the present petition filed before the Supreme Court for review under Rule 45

is proper.

Held:I. Jurisdiction is the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear

and determine certain controversies. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law.Section 33 of Chapter III -- on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts of B. P. No. 129 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts andMunicipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases.Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial

Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

x x x x

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer:

Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in hispleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of

ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.Thus exclusive, original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged

with the first level courts. This is clarified in Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure

that embraces an action for forcible entry (detentacion), where one is deprived of physical possessionof any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In actions for

forcible entry, three (3) requisites have to be met for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction.

First, the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property. Second, they must alsoassert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

Third, the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors learned

of their deprivation of physical possession of the land or building.The other kind of ejectment proceeding is unlawful detainer (desahucio), where one unlawfully

withholds possession of the subject property after the expiration or termination of the right to possess.

Here, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive; for in such action, the defendant is the party

in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the termination of the defendants right tocontinue in possession. The essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: (1) the fact of lease by virtue

of a contract express or implied; (2) the expiration or termination of the possessors right to hold

possession; (3) withholding by the lessee of the possession of the land or building after expiration ortermination of the right to possession; (4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply


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with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and (5) the action must be filed within one (1) yearfrom date of last demand received by the defendant.

A person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an ejectment

suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure which allows immediate execution ofthe judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the defendant perfects an appeal in the RTC and

complies with the requirements to stay execution; all of which are nevertheless beneficial to the

interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of possession.On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts

provides:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive

original jurisdiction:x x x x

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any

interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands orbuildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts,

Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the jurisdictionof the RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession (accion

publiciana) when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when the action was filedmore than one (1) year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or defendant; and (2) anaction for the recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of

possession. These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and adjudication takes a

longer period than the summary ejectment suit.

To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of theMeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level court), allegations of the complaint must be referred

to. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction

over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be made to depend upon the defensesset up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. This general rule however admits exceptions.

While the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by

way of defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdictionas the case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations.

The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what

the allegations in the body of the complaint define and describe. The designation or caption is not

controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even anindispensable part of the complaint.

II. Firm is the rule that findings of fact of the CA are final and conclusive and cannot bereviewed on appeal to this Court provided they are supported by evidence on record or substantial

evidence. Fortunately for petitioner, the case has been relaxed therefrom as the Court gave a liberal

with the petition considering that the CAs factual findings contradict those of the RTC, and there was

an asseveration that the court a quo went beyond the issues of the case. Indeed, these grounds wereconsidered exceptions to the factual issue bar rule. Secondly, the petition unnecessarily impleaded the

CA in violation of Section 4, Rule 45. This breach, however, was allowed to pass by the Court in thiscase only because there is a need to entertain the petition due to the conflicting rulings between the

lower courts; however, a repetition may result to sanctions.

STA. CLARA HOMEOWNERS vs. GASTONG.R. No. 141961


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January 23, 2002397 SCRA 396

PANGANIBAN,J.:

Facts:Private respondents filed a complaint for damages with preliminary injunction/preliminary

mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial Court in Negros

Occidental at Bacolod City against petitioners alleging the following: (1) upon private respondents

purchased lots in the subdivision; (2) at the time of purchase, there was no mention or requirement ofmembership in any homeowners association and since then, they have remained non-members of

SCHA; (3) an arrangement was made wherein non-members of the association were issued non-

member gatepass stickers for their vehicles for identification by the security guards and such

arrangement remained undisturbed until mid March, 1998, when SCHA disseminated a boardresolution which decreed that only its members in good standing were to be issued stickers for use in

their vehicles; (4) on three separate incidents, Victor M. Gaston, the son of the private respondents

herein who lives with them, was required by the guards on duty employed by SCHA to show hisdrivers license as a prerequisite to his entrance to the subdivision and to his residence therein despite

their knowing him personally and the exact location of his residence; (5) private respondent herein

Victor Ma. Gaston was himself prevented from entering the subdivision and proceeding to hisresidential abode; and (6) these acts of the petitioners were done in the presence of other subdivision

owners had caused private respondents to suffer moral damage.

Petitioners argued that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case as it involves an intra-corporate dispute between SCHA and its members pursuant to Republic Act No. 580, as amended by

Executive Order Nos. 535, much less, to declare as null and void the subject resolution of the board of

directors of SCHA, the proper forum being the Home Insurance (and Guaranty) Corporation (HIGC).

Issues:I. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint

II. Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action

Held:I. Yes. In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to

resolve preliminarily -- on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint -- whether private respondents

are members of the SCHA.It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined bythe allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the

defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependentalmost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. The Complaint does not allege that private

respondents are members of the SCHA. In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC

has no jurisdiction over the dispute.

The HIGC exercises limited jurisdiction over homeowners disputes. The law confines itsauthority to controversies that arise from any of the following intra-corporate relations: (1) between

and among members of the association; (2) between any and/or all of them and the association ofwhich they are members; and (3) between the association and the state insofar as the controversy

concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity.

II. Yes. A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action isregarded as having hypothetically admitted all the factual averments in the complaint. The test of the

sufficiency of the allegations constituting the cause of action is whether, admitting the facts alleged,


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the court can render a valid judgment on the prayers. This test implies that the issue must be passedupon on the basis of the bare allegations in the complaint. The court does not inquire into the truth of

such allegations and declare them to be false. To do so would constitute a procedural error and a denial

of the plaintiffs right to due process.A complaint states a cause of action when it contains these three essential elements: (1) the

legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of

the defendant in violation of the said legal right.In the instant case, the records sufficiently establish a cause of action. First, the Complaint

alleged that, under the Constitution, respondents had a right of free access to and from their residential

abode. Second, under the law, petitioners have the obligation to respect this right. Third, such rightwas impaired by petitioners when private respondents were refused access through the Sta. Clara

Subdivision, unless they showed their drivers license for identification.

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE vs. HON. ASUNCIONG.R. No. 79937-38February 13, 1989

170 SCRA 274

GANCAYCO,J.:

Facts:Sun insurance filed a case for the consignation of premiums on a fire insurance policy with a

prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private

respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary

period. Meanwhile, the Respondent Manuel Tiong also filed a case against Sun Insurance for the

refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, seeking the payment ofactual, compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of

litigation, and costs of suit, but the damages sought were not specifically stated in the prayer, although

it may be inferred from the body of the complaint that it would amount to about P50M. The amount ofonly P210.00 was paid for the docket fee. Private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in

the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than P10M as actual and exemplary damages but in

the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately P44,601,623.70. Saidamended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee

of P39,786.00, which he paid.

Later, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20M

in damages so that his total claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. Four months after, privaterespondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the promulgation of the decision of the

respondent court wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional docket fee,

and during the pendency of this petition, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of

P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for thedocket fee considering the total amount of his claim in the amended and supplemental complaint

amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that private respondent must pay a docket fee ofP257,810.49.

Issue:Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction when the correct and proper docket fee has not

been paid?


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Held:Yes. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the

payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or

nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of thedocket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the

applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third party claims and similar pleadings,which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court

may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable

prescriptive or reglementary period.Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading

and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified

in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional

filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk ofCourt or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

BALLATAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 125683March 2, 1999304 SCRA 34

PUNO,J.:

Facts:Ballatan discovered encroachments made on her land when she constructed her house which

was surveyed by Engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of the Araneta Institute ofAgriculture (AIA), the owner- developer of the subdivision project. Ballatan made a written demand

on respondent to remove and dismantle their improvements on the said lot. Failing to agree amicably,

petitioner Ballatan instituted against respondents Go a civil case for recovery of possession before theRTC. The Go s filed their Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading as third-party defendants

respondents Li Ching Yao, the AIA and Engineer Quedding. Judgment was rendered in favor of the

plaintiffs but the third-party complaint filed by third-party plaintiffs Go against third-party defendantswas dismissed. Upon appeal by Go, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the third-party

complaint against the AIA but reinstated the complaint against Li Ching Yao and Jose Quedding.

Petitioners question the admission by the CA of the third-party complaint by respondents Go

against the AIA, Jose Quedding and Li Ching Yao. Petitioners claim that the third-party complaintshould not have been considered by the Court of Appeals for lack of jurisdiction due to third-party

plaintiffs failure to pay the docket and filing fees before the trial court.

Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on question of law and gravely abused its discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it did not dismiss the third party complaint due to non-payment of any filing of docket fee.

Held:No. The Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the third-party complaint against AIA. The

claim that the discrepancy in the lot areas was due to AIAs fault was not proved. The appellate court,

however, found that it was the erroneous survey by Engineer Quedding that triggered these


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discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Go relied upon in constructing hishouse on his fathers land. He built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of

his fathers land. In short, respondents Go had no knowledge that they encroached petitioners lot.

They are deemed builders in good faith until the time petitioner Ballatan informed them of theirencroachment on her property.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that when an action is filed in court, the complaint must be

accompanied the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees. In real actions, the docket and filingfees are based on the value of the property and the amount of damages claimed, if any If the complaint

is filed but the fees are not paid at the time of filing, the court acquires jurisdiction upon full payment

of the fees within a reasonable time as the court may grant, barring prescription.

YUCHENGCO vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 131127

June 8, 2000333 SCRA 368

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:

Facts:The Republic of the Philippines filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for Rescission,

Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos

and Prime Holdings, Inc. Alleging ownership of the properties of the Marcoses sought to be forfeitedby the Republic, petitioner Yuchengco filed a motion for intervention and complaint-in-intervention

on, impleading the Republic, the PCGG, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda Marcos and PHI as defendants-

in-intervention. After petitioners payment of the docket fee of P400.00, the Sandiganbayan issued a

Resolution granting the motion for intervention and admitting the complaint-in-intervention, thereafterdenying the Republics motion for reconsideration thereto. Petitioner moved for leave to admit

amended complaint-in-intervention to implead the said claimants. This was admitted by the

Sandiganbayan in open court and as a consequence, amended answers-in-intervention were filed by theRepublic and the PHI.

On the other hand, the Estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Imelda O. Cojuangco filed a motion to

dismiss the amended complaint-in-intervention on the ground of failure to state a cause of action andlack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the case, inasmuch as petitioner did not pay the correct

docket fees. They argued that the amended-complaint-in-intervention failed to state the amount of the

claim or the value of the property subject of the complaint, in violation of the doctrine laid down in

Manchester Development Corporation, et al. v. Court of Appeals and Section 7 (a) of Rule 141 of theRules of Court. Further, they contend that as the action seeks to litigate the ownership and disposition

of properties consisting of subject shares, the amount of docket fees must be based on the total value of

the same. Petitioners opposed, maintaining that no docket fees are payable to the Sandiganbayan,

pursuant to Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.

Issue:Whether or not petitioner is barred from asserting his alleged causes of action against

respondents by reason of non-payment of the proper docket fees

Held:The ruling that the timely filing of correct docket fees is jurisdictional is all too familiar. It

should be noted, however, that the pronouncements of the Court on the matter have always been


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influenced by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances surrounding each case. In the presentcase, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private

respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as

required. In the said case, the payment of the correct fee within "a reasonable time" but in no casebeyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period was allowed.

Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim

purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In thisevent the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged

from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed or the claims as to which

the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion,permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the

meantime become time-barred. The other is where the pleading does specify the amount of every

claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a

reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment,the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime

prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.

VDA. DE MURGA vs. CHANG.R. No. L-24680October 7, 196825 SCRA 441

ANGELES,J.:

Facts:Petitioner as lessor, entered into a contract of lease with respondent as lessee. Before the

expiration of the ten-year period of the lease, there had been intercourse of communications between

the lessor and the lessee for the renewal of the lease, but the parties failed to arrive at an agreement;

hence, this action by the lessor against the lessee. A letter of demand to vacate the leased premises wassent to lessee as follows: Please be advised further that we reiterate our demand made to you in our

registered letter dated February 4, 1959 (to vacate the leased premises) which was received by you on

the 10th instant, unless you pay the amount of Six Hundred pesos (P600.00) or Seven Hundred pesos(P700.00) as new rental per our letter of January 19, 1959, before the expiration of the 15-day period

granted you for vacating the same.

Without any further definite demand on the lessee to vacate the premises, petitioner filed a

complaint of unlawful detainer in the municipal court of Zamboanga City against the lessee, JuanitoChan, to eject the latter from the leased premises. The facts alleged in the complaint as cause of action,

consisted in reproducing and reiterating the substance of the correspondence exchanged between lessor

and lessee, as narrated above, and claiming that the possession of the lessee of the premises had

become illegal by his failure and refusal to pay the increased new rental. For relief, the plaintiff prayedthat the defendant be ordered to vacate the premises, and "TO PAY THE NEW RENTS DEMANDED

OF P600.00 or P700.00 FROM FEBRUARY 1, 1959 MONTHLY AS THE CASE MAY BE."Attached to the complaint, as annexes thereto, were copies of the letters exchanged between the lessor

and the lessee.

Issue:


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Whether or not the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for unlawfuldetainer, and confer jurisdiction over the case to the municipal court (now city court) of Zamboanga

City, under the provisions of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and decisions interpreting the same

Held:The notice giving lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise to vacate

the land is not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When aftersuch notice, the lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected

until he defaults in said obligation and necessary demand is first made.

In the case at bar, it clearly appears from the demand letter that the obligation to vacate theleased premises would be dependent on the failure of the lessee to agree to the new rent demanded by

the lessor. As the lessee, however, was in the physical possession of the land by virtue of a prior

contract of lease, and the demand was in the alternative imposing a new rental, even without taking

into account the efficacy of the stipulation for an automatic renewal of the lease. Without anysubsequent definite demand to vacate the premises, subject to no condition, the lessee did not incur in

default which would give rise to a right on the part of the lessor to bring an action of unlawful detainer.

Clause "7" of the contract of lease, meant an express grant to the lessee to renew the lease athis option, contrary to the claim of the lessor-appellee that there must be a prior mutual agreement of

the parties. Clause "7" provides the happening of two eventualities at the expiration of the leaseeither the lessor may purchase the improvements constructed by the lessee on the land, or in case thelessor fails, for any cause or reason, to exercise the option to buy, the lease shall be deemed

automatically renewed. The evidence has established that the lessor had refused to buy the buildings

on the land. The statement in said clause "7" that in case of renewal the duration of the lease and the

new rental to be paid shall be adjusted by the parties, is of no moment in the solution of the issue,whether or not the facts alleged in the complaint constitute a cause of action of unlawful detainer. The

pleadings of the parties, and the annexes thereto, clearly show that the jugular vein of the controversy

hinges on the correct interpretation of clause "7" of the contract of lease, a matter outside thejurisdiction of the municipal court. Inasmuch as the controversy hinges on the interpretation of clause

"7" of the contract, that is, whether or not said clause contemplated an automatic renewal of the lease,

the action was not for unlawful detainer but one not capable of pecuniary estimation and, therefore,beyond the competence of the municipal court.

HEIRS OF VALERIANO CONCHA vs. SPOUSES GREGORIO LUMOCSOG.R. No. 158121

December 12, 2007450 SCRA 1

PUNO,J.:

Facts:This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals, annulling the resolutions and order of the Regional Trial Court ofDipolog City, Branch 9, in a civil case wherein petitioners filed for a complaint for Reconveyance

and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against respondents, seeking to annul Free Patent No. (IX-

8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of"Gregorio Lumocso" covering a certain parcel of land.

Respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds

of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state


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causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the

complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No.

7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less than P20,000.00. Petitionersopposed, contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of

pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the

exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes ofaction: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the

totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive

original jurisdiction of the RTC.

Issue:Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of

Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values ofthe subject lots are less than P20,000.00

Held:Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general

class to which the proceedings in question belong. It is conferred by law and an objection based on thisground cannot be waived by the parties. To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subjectmatter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.

The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance. An action for

reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property,

which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legalowners, or to those who claim to have a better right. There is no special ground for an action for

reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of

the registered owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser forvalue.

Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the

applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended byR.A. No. 7691, viz:

Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise

exclusive original jurisdiction:

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or anyinterest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand

pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty

thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer oflands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and

their assessed values are less than P20,000.00. Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction. Petitioners'contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original

jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.

AGUSTIN vs. BACALANG.R. No. L-46000March 18, 1985135 SCRA 340


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GUTIERREZ, JR. ,J.:

Facts:The precursor of this case was a complaint for ejectment with damages filed by plaintiff-

appellant Agustin, as adininistrator of the Intestate Estate of Susana Agustin, against defendant-appellee Bacalan, before the City Court of Cebu. Bacalan is a lessee of a one-door ground floor space

in a building owned by the late Susana Agustin. Due to nonpayment of rentals despite repeated

demands an action to eject him was filed wherein the City Court of Cebu rendered judgment

dismissing the counterclaim and ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question and to paythe plaintiff unpaid back rentals. From this decision, the defendant filed an appeal with Branch Ill of

the Court of First Instance of Cebu which rendered judgment reversing that of the City Court. No

appeal was taken by the plaintiff-appellant hence the decision lapsed into finality and becameexecutory. A writ of execution was issued by virtue of which a notice to sell at public auction real

properties belonging to the estate of Susana Agustin was issued by the Deputy Sheriff to satisfy

judgment in the case. Plaintiff's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, confessing his fault andgiving the reason why he failed to perfect the appeal on time. The motion was denied.

Thereafter, with the aid of new counsel, the plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint with Branch

V, Court of First Instance of Cebu, against the defendant and the Deputy Sheriff of Cebu for the

declaration of the nullity of the above-cited decision of Branch III, Court of First Instance of Cebu inthe ejectment case on the ground that the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction was null and void. The

court sustained the defendant.

Issues:I. Whether or not the present action for the annulment of the judgment in the ejectment case is

the proper remedy after it has become final and executoryII. Whether or not the Court of First Instance may, in an appeal, award the defendant-appellee's

counterclaim in an amount exceeding or beyond the jurisdiction of the court of origin

Held:I. To this procedural dilemma, the solution lies in the determination of the validity of the

judgment sought to be annulled, for against a void judgment, plaintiff-appellant's recourse would be

proper. There is no question as to the validity of the court's decision with respect to the issue ofphysical possession of property, the defendant-appellee's right to the same having been upheld.

However, the plaintiff-appellant assails the money judgment handed down by the court which granted

damages to the defendant-appellee. By reason thereof, he seeks the declaration of the nullity of theentire judgment. Plaintiff-appellant loses sight of the fact that the money judgment was awarded the

defendant-appellee in the concept of a counterclaim. A defending party may set up a claim for money

or any other relief which he may have against the opposing party in a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule 6,Revised Rules of Court). And the court may, if warranted, grant actual, moral, or exemplary damages

as prayed for. The grant of moral damages, in the case at bar, as a counterclaim, and not as damages

for the unlawful detention of property must be upheld. However, the amount thereof is another matter.

II. It is well-settled that a court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine a set-off or

counterclaim in excess of its jurisdiction (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court; Ago v. Buslon,

10 SCRA 202). A counterclaim beyond the court's jurisdiction may only be pleaded by way ofdefense, the purpose of which, however, is only to defeat or weaken plaintiff's claim, but not to obtain

affirmative relief (Section 5, Rule 5, Revised Rules of Court). Nevertheless, the defendant-appellee, in

the case at bar, set up his claim in excess of the jurisdiction of the city court as a compulsorycounterclaim. As a consequence, the doctrine enunciated under the case of One HeartClub, Inc. vs.


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Court of Appeals, an appellant who files his brief and submits his case to the Court of Appeals fordecision, without questioning the latter's jurisdiction until decision is rendered therein, should be

considered as having voluntarily waives so much of his claim as would exceed the jurisdiction of said

Appellate Court; for the reason that a contrary rule would encourage the undesirable practice ofappellants submitting their cases for decision to the Court of Appeals in expectation of favorable

judgment, but with intent of attacking its jurisdiction should the decision be unfavorable.

The rule is that a counterclaim not presented in the inferior court cannot be entertained in theCourt of First Instance on appeal. The amount of judgment, therefore, obtained by the defendant-

appellee on appeal, cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the court in which the action began. Since the

trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim in excess of the jurisdictionalamount, the appellate court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by its decisions or

otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being not only a continuation of the exercise of the same judicial

power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original

and appellate courts are capable of participating in the exercise of the same judicial power.

MANGALIAG vs. CATUBIGG.R. No. 143951October 25, 2005

474 SCRA 153

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:

Facts:Private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a complaint for damages

against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano for failure to exercise extraordinary diligence

in the selection of her employee (truck driver) resulting to serious injuries and permanent deformities

of private respondent and his co-passengers therein. Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the groundof lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial Court has

jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls

within its jurisdiction.

Issue:In an action for recovery of damages, does the amount of actual damages prayed for in the

complaint provide the sole test for determining the courts jurisdiction, or is the total amount of all the

damages claimed, regardless of kind and nature, such as moral, exemplary, nominal damages, and

attorneys fees, etc., to be computed collectively with the actual damages to determine what court

whether the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction over the action?

Held:The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving

warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the firstinstance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of

the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately beforeappellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of

courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but

legal questions.

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of theaction is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law, irrespective of whether

or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. In the


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present case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover notonly his medical expenses, lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due

to permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action

for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), which providesfor the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict causing physical injuries. Private

respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered as merely incidental to or

a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or anindependent actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her

body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable Hence, the demand for moral

damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damagesand must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance with paragraph 2

of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.

ONG YU vs. PACLEBG.R. No. 172172

February 24, 2009580 SCRA 197

PUNO, C.J.:

Facts:The present action is an action for specific performance and damages filed by petitioner

spouses against Javier to compel performance of the latters undertakings under their Contract to Sell.

A decision was rendered therein at the RTC acknowledging Langcaan, not a party in the case, as the

rightful owner of the property in dispute. Petitioner spouses argue that the decision of the Regional

Trial Court as to the rightful owner of the Langcaan Property is conclusive and binding uponrespondent even if the latter was not a party

99998418 Civpro 1 28 Case Digests

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