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    94. ELENA CONTRERAS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR J. MACARAIG, defendant-appellee(Garsh)No, L-29138. May 29, 1970 - Dizon, J.

    Nature of the Action: Civil Action (Appeal from a decision of the Juvenila and DomesticRelations Court of Manila)

    Note: Take note of the dates!Facts:1. March 16, 1952- Plaintiff Contreras and defendant Macaraig got married in Quiapo,

    Manila. They were blessed with three children.2. September 1962- The family driver told plaintiff-wife Contreras that defendant

    Macaraig was living with Lily Ann Alcala (he met Lily at work; he was a manager of aprinting establishment owned by plaintiff's father)

    3. April 1963- Plaintiff received some rumors that defendant was seen with a woman.4. May 1963- Defendant Macaraig returned to the family home. Plaintiff Contreras was

    happy and desisted from discussing the matter with him because he did not want toprecipitate a quarrel and drive him away. Defendant would only stay for 2-3 nights andwould be gone for a month.

    5. However she finally found out about her husbands mistress and the birth of the latterschild.6. December 1963 plaintif wife finally met with her respondent husband and pleaded

    him to give up his mistress and return to the conjugal home, assuring him that all wouldbe forgiven. He declined.

    7. In the same month, she filed suit for legal separation.8. Decision of Trial Court:The case was dismissedbecause of prescription.

    Article 102 provides that an action for legal separation cannot be instituted

    except within one yearafter plaintiff 'became cognizant of the cause.'

    Prescription has already taken place from September 1962 when she had found

    out about her husbands illicit relationship from the family driver.9. Decision of CA:The CA dismissed the complaint because of prescription.

    Issue: Whether or not the one-year prescription period provided in Art. 102 of the Civilshould be counted from Sept. 1962 or from December 1963? December 1963.

    Ruling:1. RULE: In the eyes of the law, the only time when the wife really became cognizant of the

    infidelity of her husband as to start the one-year period to file the action for legalseparation, is when the husband admitted the relationship and could no longerreturn to their conjugal abode.

    2. The period of one year should not be counted from the time when the wife receivedhearsay information about the infidelity of her husband which she apparentlythought it best to ignore for the sake of family solidarity and in her desire not to anger ordrive her husband awayand no reasonable person may' justifiably blame her for it,

    3. APPLICATION OF RULE IN THIS CASE: It was only on December 1963 when the

    plaintiff-wife became truly cognizant of her husbands infidelity. Hearsay informationwould not have been legally sufficient as a basis for legal separation.

    Disposition: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is herebyrendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation as prayed for in her complaint;and the case is hereby remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings inaccordance with law.

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    3. These rights are mere effects of a decree of separation, their source being the decreeitself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before thefinality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenesduring the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing amore radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claimswould necessarily remain unborn.

    4. Such action became moot and academic upon the death of one of the spouses, and therecould be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automaticallydissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a resultof Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined in aproper action for partition by either the surviving spouse or by the heirs of the deceasedspouse.

    Disposition: ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile andDomestic Relations is hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

    96. SOCORRO MATUBIS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. ZOILO PRAXEDES, defendant andappellee. (Garsh)

    No. L-11766. October 25, 1960, Paredes

    Nature: Civil Action (Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Surinvolving a complaint for Legal Separation and change of surname against her husband)

    Note: Take note of the dates!Facts:1. Jan 10, 1943- Plaintiff wife Socorro Matubis and Defendant Zoilo Praxedes were legally

    married but they failed to agree how they should live as husband and wife.2. April 3, 1948- The couple agreed to live separately from each other, which status

    remained unchanged until the present. They also entered into an agreement whichstates: (1) Both of them are free to get any mate and live with as husband and wifewithout prosecution for adultery or concubinage, (2) Neither of them are entitled to

    support or any benefits, and (3) Neither of them can claim anything from they time theyverbally separated until the time they put their verbal separation in writing3. Jan 1955- Defendant Praxedes began cohabiting with a certain Asuncion Rebulado and

    she later on gave birth to a child.4. April 24, 1956- Plaintiff wife filed a complaint for Legal Separation and change of name

    against her defendant husband Praxedes alleging abandonment and concubinage.5. Decision of Trial Court: The acts of defendant husband constituted concubinage as a

    ground for legal separation but it dismissed the complaint on two grounds:a) Prescription - Art. 102, CC provides that an action for legal separation cannot be

    filed EXCEPT within one year from and after the date on which the plaintiffbecome cognizant of the cause and within 5 years from and after the date whenthe cause occured.

    b) Legal separation can only be claimed by the innocent spouse. In this case, the

    spouse the agreement of the spouses show that the plaintiff wife CONSENTED tothe commission of the concubinage.

    Issue:(Relevant issue) Whether the period to bring the action for legal separation already expired?

    YES.Whether there was consent on the part of the plaintiff to the concubinage? YES.

    Ruling:

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    Ruling #1: The period for the plaintiff wife to bring an action for legal separationalready expired1. RULE: While defendant's act of cohabiting with a woman other than his wife constituted

    concubinage, a ground for legal separation, nevertheless, the complaint should bedismissed, because it was not filed within one year from and after the date on which theplaintiff became cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date

    when such cause occurred (Art. 102, new Civil Code).2. APPLICATION OF RULE IN THIS CASE: In this case, the wife discovered the affair lastJanuary 1955 and she only filed the complaint for legal separation on April 24, 1956which is more than year from and after the date on which the plaintiff become cognizantof the cause. Hence, it is filed out of time and barred by prescription.

    Ruling #2: There was consent on the part of the plaintiff wife to the concubinage1. The law specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent

    spouse, provided the latter has not condoned or consented to the adultery orconcubinage committed by the other spouse (Art. 100, new Civil Code; and plaintiff(innocent spouse) having condoned and/or consented in writing to the concubinagecommitted by the defendant husband, she is now underserving of the court's sympathy

    Disposition: Judgment affirmed.