9:08-cv-80736 JANE DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2 vs USA | ORDER DENYING INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR A...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.:08-CV-80736-KAM

JANE DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2,

Petitioners,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

______________________________/

ORDER DENYING INTERVENORS MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER

This cause is before the Court on Intervenor Jeffrey Epsteins Unopposed Motion for a

Supplemental Protective Order. (DE 261). The once-unopposed motion is now opposed by

Petitioners (DE 298) and prospective intervenors the Palm Beach Post and Palm Beach Daily

News (the Media) (DE 305). Considering the positions of the parties and intervenors, the Court1

concludes that the proposed supplemental protective order should not issue.

I. Background

This is a case against the United States for allegedly violating the Crime Victims Rights

Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3771, by failing to involve Petitioners (and other similarly situated

victims of Intervenor Epstein) in the process that ultimately led to a federal non-prosecution

agreement between the Government and Epstein. (DE 1). The parties and intervenors have

debated, and continue to debate, the discoverability and discloseability of correspondence

documents that evidence just exactly what transpired between the Government, Epstein, and their

The Court is granting the Medias motion to intervene and will consider its arguments1against the protective order accordingly.

Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 326 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/15/2015 Page 1 of 16

respective attorneys.

In March 2011, Petitioners moved to allow use of correspondence between the U.S.

Attorneys Office and counsel for Jeffrey Epstein to prove their CVRA case. (DE 51 at 1).

Petitioners argued that the correspondence was relevant as it shows that the U.S. Attorneys

Office was aware of its statutory obligation to inform the victims of the non-prosecution

agreement, and that they should be allowed to use it as it sheds important light on the events

surrounding the non-prosecution agreement, which are central to the victims arguments that the

U.S. Attorneys Office violated their rights. (Id. at 5, 6). Intervenor Epstein and his attorneys

opposed the motion and sought a protective order, arguing that case law as well as sound and

substantial policy considerations prohibit disclosure of the letters and emails prepared by Mr.

Espsteins lawyers during plea negotiations with the government, and require that the letters and

emails that Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 already have remain confidential. (DE 162 at 1; see also

DEs 160, 161).

On June 18, 2013, this Court rejected the intervenors concerns and granted Petitioners

motion:

Accordingly, the court rejects the privileges asserted by intervenorsas bases for maintaining the correspondence and related pleadingsincorporating the correspondence under seal in this proceeding. Finding the asserted privileges inapplicable, the court finds nolegitimate compelling interest which warrants the continuedsuppression of this evidentiary material under seal in thisproceeding, and shall therefore grant petitioners motion to unsealthe correspondence. While the court shall also grant thepetitioners motion to use the evidence as proof of alleged CVRAviolations to the extent it shall allow petitioners to proffer theevidence in support of their CVRA claims, this order is notintended to operate as a ruling on the relevance or admissibility ofany particular piece of correspondence, a matter expressly reserved

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for determination at the time of final disposition.

(DE 188 at 9-10) (internal citation omitted). The Court then ordered that discovery recommence

(DE 189 at 14) and ordered the Government to [p]roduce responsive documents . . .

encompassing any documentary material exchanged by or between the federal government and

persons or entities outside the federal government (including without limitation all

correspondence generated by or between the federal government and Epsteins attorneys) (DE

190 at 2).

Intervenor Epstein and his attorneys challenged these orders in an interlocutory appeal to

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. (DEs 194, 195, 196). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed this

Courts orders and lifted its stay on the order compelling the disclosure of the correspondence.

Jane Doe No. 1 v. United States of America, 749 F.3d 999, 1010 (11th Cir. 2014). The court

held that [n]o privilege prevents the disclosure of the plea negotiations. Id. at 1008.

Specifically, the court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 410 does not protect against the

discoverability of plea negotiations, and, even if it did, Petitioners intend to admit the

correspondence to prove violations of the Act allegedly committed by the United States, not

against Epstein, whom Rule 410 protects. Id. at 1008. The court also rejected arguments that

the correspondence was protected under the work-product privilege or a common-law privilege

for plea negotiations. Id. at 1008-10. Although plea negotiations are vital to the functioning of

the criminal justice system, a prosecutor and target of a criminal investigation do not enjoy a

relationship of confidence and trust when they negotiate. Their adversarial relationship, unlike

the confidential relationship of a doctor and patient or attorney and client, warrants no privilege

beyond the terms of Rule 410. Id. at 1009.

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Thereafter, Intervenor Epstein moved for a Protective Confidentiality Order, arguing that,

although the Court (and Eleventh Circuit) ruled that Petitioners could discover the

correspondence at issue, the Court should bar the Plaintiffs from disseminating and/or publically

disclosing the substance of the [correspondence] absent further order of the Court. (DE 247 at

4). Epstein sought a protective order which (1) limits the dissemination of [the correspondence

at issue in the Courts June 18, 2013 Order (DE 188)] to a designated list of the Plaintiffs

counsel and support staff, and (2) prohibits any party from filing pleadings, briefs, memorandums

or exhibits purporting to reproduce, quote, paraphrase or summarize any [of this correspondence]

or portions thereof, absent leave of the Court to file the document or portion thereof under seal.

(Id. at 1; see also DE 247-1).

On September 22, 2014, this Court granted Epsteins request for a protective order in part

and denied it in part. (DE 255). The Court held as follows:

Epstein argues that good cause exists for protecting thecorrespondence because this is a high profile case, andpetitioners counsel has made numerous comments to the pressabout this case in the past. The Court finds that Epstein has showngood cause to prevent potential dissemination of thecorrespondence between the government and the intervenors to thepress for the purposes of generating publicity. Accordingly, theprovisions [of the proposed protective order] that would limitdisclosure of the correspondence in question to the proposed list ofpeople are acceptable. However, the Court finds the proposedrequirement to seek leave of Court to seal the filing every time aparty files a motion is overly restrictive and that it will inhibit theadministration of this case. Any party may file any documentsubject to the limited protective order in connection with anymotion when such document is relevant to the prosecution ordefense of any motion.

(DE 255 at 4-5). The Court declined to enter the proposed protective order; however, it invited

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the parties or Epstein [to] propose another protective order consistent with this opinion. (Id. at

5).

Neither the parties nor Epstein submitted a proposed protective order consistent with the

Courts September 22, 2014 opinion (DE 255). Rather, on October 8, 2014, Epstein filed the

instant motion for a supplemental protective order. (DE 261). The motion proposed the entry

of a protective order that would expand the limited Protective Order allowed in [the Courts]

decision Granting in Part and Denying in Part the Intervenors Motion for a Protective

Confidentiality Order. [D.E. 255 at 4]. (Id. at 1). In particular, this expanded protective order

would require that any party would be required to file under seal any portion of the plea

negotiation correspondence between the Government and Epsteins counsel, whether offered as

an exhibit or quoted from in the content of a pleading or motion. (Id.). As this proviso seemed

to conflict with the Courts earlier ruling that [a]ny party may file any document . . . in

connection with any motion without first seeking leave to seal (DE 255 at 4-5), and the general

policy that judicial filings be open to the public, the Court requested justification as to why a

preemptive seal on filed documents was necessary in this case. (DE 286).

Intervenor Epstein responded with his justifications for a temporary seal on filings that

utilize the correspondence. (DE 295). Petitioners, who once did not oppose such a seal,

responded with their position that the correspondence should be filed in the public record. (DE

298). The Media also responded with their reasons for why a temporary seal on public filings

should not issue. (DE 305).

II. Discussion

A district court has broad discretion . . . to decide when a protective order is appropriate

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and what degree of protection is required. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 35

(1984) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also F.T.C. v. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 58

(11th Cir. 2013) (noting that district court has considerable discretion to modify its own

protective order). Although broad, the courts discretion is not unbounded: the court must take

care to apply the correct legal standard and follow the proper procedures in determining whether

a protective order should issue. See Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263

F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2001).

A. Legal Standard

Intervenor Epstein argues that the proper legal standard is the good cause standard

found in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). (DE 295 at 4-5). He argues that the Court aimed

too high when it requested that he demonstrate extraordinary circumstances or particularized

needs in its order requesting justification for a protective order. (Id. at 4). The Court agrees

that, under the principles espoused in Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263

F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001), the good cause standard governs the request for a protective order

under these circumstances.

In Chicago Tribune, the Eleventh Circuit held that, once discovery materials have become

subject to a protective order under Rule 26, the fact that [the] sealed material is subsequently

submitted in connection with a substantive motion does not mean that the confidentiality

imposed by Rule 26 is automatically foregone. Id. at 1313. The issue of whether previously

sealed discovery materials should be disclosed when attached to public filings requires the court

to balance the respective interests of the parties . . . [which] may be resolved by the Rule 26 good

cause balancing test. Id. This standard requires the district court to balance the partys interest

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in obtaining access against the other partys interest in keeping the information confidential. Id.

Whether good cause exists for a protective order is a factual matter to be decided by the nature

and character of the information in question, and due regard may be given to media entities

contention that disclosure serves a legitimate public interest. Id. at 1315.

These standards guide the Courts determination whether a protective order should issue

concerning disclosure of the correspondence in the court file. The parties and intervenors operate

under the assumption that a Protective Confidentiality Order [is] presently in place regarding

the disclosure of the correspondence at issue. (DE 295 at 3 (citing DE 255 at 4); see DE 298 at

3). Therefore, whether materials subject to that order should now become part of the public

record is governed by the good cause standard of Rule 26. Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1313.

For the following reasons, the Court concludes that the balance of interests does not favor

imposing the proposed supplemental protective order.

B. Interest in Obtaining Access

Intervenor Epsteins supplemental protective order seeks to provide . . . protection when

[correspondence] documents are converted into exhibits and filed as a public record with the

Court. (DE 295 at 3). That is, he seeks a preemptive seal on exhibits that are attached to a

motion for the ostensible purpose of aiding the Court in resolution of that motion. When

discovery material [is] filed in connection with pretrial motions that require judicial resolution

of the merits, the common-law right of access attaches. Chicago Tribune, 263 F.3d at 1312.

Such materialsplaced in the record to materially advance the judicial resolution of the

meritsplay a key role in informing the public of the grounds upon which the district court bases

its adjudicative decision. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Excalibur Reinsurance Corp., No. 11-cv-

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1209, 2013 WL 4012772, at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2013) (Discovery documents are not judicial

documents subject to a presumptive right of access because, prior to admission into the record

in support of a motion or as evidence at trial, [they] play no role in the performance of Article III

functions of a federal judge.) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Importantly,

the common-law right of access imposes a general presumption that, once materials are

presented to the court for judicial resolution of the merits of a case, the public should be

afforded the right to inspect and copy those documents. AbbVie Prods. LLC, 713 F.3d at 62-63.

These principles weigh against the Intervenors request for a temporary blanket seal on

public filings. The Media argues that the correspondence in question touches a question of

profound public concern, i.e., whether the justice system failed to afford Epsteins victims the

rights to which they were entitled. (DE 305 at 2). The Court agrees that questions concerning

the federal justice system are of significant public concern. See, e.g., Hyland v. Wonder, 972

F.2d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 1992) ([A]buses, inefficiency, threats to public safety, potential civil

rights violations, and incompetence of public law enforcement officials . . . . are of vital interest

to citizens in evaluating the performance of their government.); Floyd v. City of New York, 283

F.R.D. 153, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (case involving the unfair treatment of participants in the

criminal justice system presents an issue of great public concern); Comm. On The Judiciary

U.S. House of Representatives v. Miers, 575 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209 (D.D.C. 2008) (stay pending

appeal denied because stay may leave important public concerns regarding the nations federal

criminal justice system unaddressed.). The Medias interest in disclosure regarding the

appropriate resolution of this question is therefore entitled to significant weight.

Epstein argues that much of the correspondence is irrelevant to answering this question.

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(DE 295 at 14). According to him, [w]hether the plaintiffs CVRA rights were violated is an

issue that is extrinsic from the detailed exchanges of emails and letters that constitute the plea

and non-prosecution negotiations between Mr. Epsteins counsel and the government. (Id. at 9).

The Court disagrees: it is likely that much of the evidence concerning whether the Government

violated the Petitioners CVRA rights by allegedly concealing from them the plea negotiations

will come from the plea negotiations themselves. As Petitioners point out, the victims have2

previously alleged that (for example) the defense attorneys pushed prosecutors to agree to a

confidentiality provision that illegally kept the non-prosecution agreement secret from the

victimsand the public. Allowing the issue to be litigated in public pleadings . . . promotes

public confidence that these important issues are being handled appropriately by the Court. (DE

298 at 6). The Media agrees that the plea negotiation correspondence will be relevant to the

central issue in this casewhether the Plaintiffs were afforded their rights under the Crime

Victims Rights Act. (DE 305 at 2). The correspondence at issue cannot be said to be

altogether extrinsic to Petitioners claim; it is likely that some of what was said touches matters

of central importance in this case.

Moreover, the Court finds that the procedure that Epstein proposestemporarily sealing

all correspondence filed until a party or the public moves to unseal it (DE 295 at 15)is overly

restrictive and threatens to inhibit the administration of this case, especially in light of the

Petitioners indication that they now oppose sealing the correspondence in public filings. The

procedurefiling under seal, with the inevitable accompaniment of a motion to

The Court does not decide the relevance or admissibility of any particular piece of2evidence that this time, and no statement from this Order should be construed a ruling orindication in that regard.

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unsealresembles the procedure that the Court rejected in Epsteins initial proposed protective

orderseeking leave to seal each time a party wishes to file a piece of the correspondence.

In sum, the Court finds that the public has a legitimate interest in the issues presented in

this case and in having access to the materials presented before the Court for resolution of those

issues. This interest is entitled to significant weight.

B. Interest in Keeping Correspondence Confidential

Intervenor Epstein argues that the correspondence, which has been held non-privileged,

should nonetheless be afforded protection against public dissemination in [this] high-profile

case [because] there are valid heightened concerns that voluminous settlement negotiations will

be dumped in the court record simply to make them available to the gossip media. (DE 295 at

10). He offers two primary reasons for a seal: (1) the longstanding tradition that plea and

settlement negotiations are confidential, and his expectation that they would remain so (id. at 10,

12); and (2) the harm that would befall him and his counsel if Petitioners are allowed to engage

in a wholesale dump of sensitive documents into the public record (id. at 13-15). The first set

of reasons has been rejected as they relate to Epsteins argument that the correspondence was

privileged, and they remain unavailing as far as confidentiality is concerned. The Court finds

that the threat of abusive filings is better addressed by means other than a preemptive seal on

public filings.

1. Plea Negotiation Confidentiality

Intervenor Epstein argues that [p]lea negotiations and settlement communications have

no tradition of being publically accessible, and that serious Sixth Amendment implications,

the spirit of Federal Rule of Evidence 410, and the environment of confidentiality fostered by

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Rule 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 indicate that the plea negotiation

correspondence should be protected from future use by an adversary. (DE 295 at 10-12).

These alleged justificationstogether or separatelydo not support a prevailing interest

in keeping the plea negotiation correspondence confidential. As the Eleventh Circuit has already

held, Rule 410 does not bar disclosure of the correspondence (at trial or otherwise) because

Epstein cannot invoke Rule 410 because he pleaded guilty to state charges . . . and has not

withdrawn those pleas. Doe No. 1, 749 F.3d at 1008. Rule 11 says nothing about whether plea

negotiation materials that lead to a guilty plea should be kept confidential. And, although

Epstein argues that the correspondence should be protected from future use by an adversary

(DE 295), this Court has already held that Petitioners may make such use of that

correspondence as necessary (DE 188 at 10) against their adversary in this case, the Government.

Cf. Doe No. 1, 749 F.3d at 1008 (The victims intend to admit the correspondence to prove

violations of the Act allegedly committed by the United States, not against Epstein. And even

if rescission of the non-prosecution agreement abuts Epsteins interests, the purpose of the

admission does not change. Rule 410 does not bar disclosure of the correspondence written by

the attorney-intervenors.). The Court rejects these grounds for imposing a confidentiality

protective order in this case. (DE 295 at 10-12).

Epstein argues that the Court should shield the correspondence from public disclosure

because he and his counsel had and continue to have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality

in their settlement negotiations with the government. (DE 295 at 12). The Eleventh Circuit

rejected similar reasoning as it related to Epsteins claim that the correspondence was privileged:

Although plea negotiations are vital to the functioning of the criminal justice system, a

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prosecutor and target of a criminal investigation do not enjoy a relationship of confidence and

trust when they negotiate. Their adversarial relationship, unlike the confidential relationship of a

doctor and patient or attorney and client, warrants no privilege beyond the terms of Rule 410.

Doe No. 1, 749 F.3d at 1009. The Court finds no support (and Epstein cites none) for the

proposition that a court must respect a suspects unilateral expectation that he shared a

relationship of confidence and trust with the prosecutor, where no such relationship existed by

operation of law. In fact, Rule 410 serves to inform suspects (and their attorneys) that plea

discussions are subject to admissibility in court (and thus open to the light of day) if they

ultimately lead to a guilty plea that is not later withdrawn. Because this potential is present in

every plea negotiation, the Court finds no support in Epsteins purported reasons for keeping

such discussions confidential after a guilty plea is reached. (DE 295 at 13).

The Court finds no principled reasonin longstanding tradition or otherwisefor

holding that plea negotiations that lead to a guilty plea, not withdrawn, are confidential,

especially where things said in those negotiations are potentially relevant to whether the federally

protected rights of others were violated. Intervenor Epsteins interest in keeping the

correspondence confidential is thus entitled to little weight.

2. Protection Against Abusive Filings

Intervenor Epstein argues that a preemptive seal is necessary to prevent a wholesale

dump of irrelevant documents into the file, which are offered for no purpose but to further

sensationalize this case. (DE 295 at 1-4; 14-15). The Court is cognizant of this concern. Even3

The document that Epstein argues exemplifies this concern was previously stricken3from the record. (DE 324 at 10 (striking DE 293)).

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so, the Court does not find that it is necessary to place a preemptive seal on the filing of every

piece of correspondence that may be pertinent to a matter fairly presented for judicial resolution

by this Court.

The Court finds that the parties are in the best position to police their conductas

officers of the Court with sworn professional responsibilitieswhen it comes to placing material

in the public record. Every written submission and filing must be submitted for a proper

purpose, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), such as materially advancing judicial resolution of an issue

that is pertinent to this litigation. Relevancy is a broad term; however, it is not without its clearly

acceptable limitations. Relevant evidence must, for instance, advance the determination of a

fact of consequence in the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401(b). As the Court views itand

Petitioners and the Media seem to agreethe facts of consequence that most clearly relate to4 5

this actionand which therefore have the most support for being made a part of the public

recordare those statements in the plea negotiations that relate to the rights of the victims, i.e.,

the Governments knowledge, and alleged disregard, of the rights which it owed the victims

under the CVRA. Parts of the correspondence that relate to the victims rights in this regard, or

that raise inferences that the Government had known obligations and disregarded them, are most

appropriate for public filing as they lead to judicial resolution of this central issue.

Petitioners contend that the correspondence may show that (for example) the defense4attorneys pushed prosecutors to agree to a confidentiality provision that illegally kept the non-prosecution agreement secret from the victims . . . . (DE 298 at 6) (emphasis added).

The Media contends that the correspondence will be relevant to the central issue in the5casewhether the Plaintiffs were afforded their rights under the Crime Victims Rights Act . . . . (DE 305 at 2) (emphasis added).

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Undoubtedly, the amount of correspondence now made available to Petitioners contains6

reams of documents thatwhile interesting on some levelbear no arguable pertinence to any

issue necessary for judicial resolution of this case. No judicial purpose will be served by placing

such documents into the court record; therefore, doing so should be avoided. Also, documents

that may be pertinent by the line, paragraph, or page, may not be pertinent by the entire multi-

page document, file-folder, or box-full. The pertinent portionsand portions that are in good

faith necessary for contextshould be submitted, and the rest omitted from public filings.

Wholesale dumps of multi-page documents for the purpose of supporting brief quotations should

be avoided.

Counselas officers of the Court with sworn professional responsibilitiesare

circumscribed by several principles (including those espoused by the Court above) regarding

what documents should appropriately be made part of the public record. Counsel must not

present any document, or fail to remove unnecessary portions of a document, for any improper

purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1). Prior to filing certain motions, counsel is required to confer with all

parties or non-parties who may be affected by the relief sought in the motion in a good faith

effort to resolve by agreement the issues to be raised in the motion. S.D. Fla. Local R. 7.1(a)(3)

(emphasis added). At this required conferral, counsel should discuss what documentsor what

The victims report that they have now obtained the full text of correspondence6between the defense attorneys and prosecutors. (DE 298 at 6). Nothing within this Ordershould be construed as a ruling regarding the disclosure of documents that are subject to a claimof privilege that has yet to be decided by this Court.

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portions or documentsare necessary to support the proposed motion. Dispositive motions are7

not subject to this required conferral; however, counsel should be aware that filings either in

support or defense of motions for summary judgment should relate to the material facts of the

case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

The Court stands ready to police the filings in this case as well. The parties and

intervenor may move to sanction or to strike, should they have a good faith basis for believing

that another party has engaged in abusive filing. And, as the parties are aware, the Court may

strike on its own any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter from the record.

(DE 324 at 4) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f)). The Court finds that these remedies are sufficient to

address the potential for abuse that Intervenor Epstein envisions. See F.T.C. v. AbbVie Prods.

LLC, 713 F.3d 54, 64 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that Rules 11 and 12(f) may be sufficient

protections from abusive filings in appropriate cases). The parties should conduct themselves

accordingly.

III. Conclusion

In sum, the Court finds that Intervenor Epstein has not demonstrated that good cause

exists for imposing a supplemental, expanded protective order preemptively sealing the public

filing of any and all correspondence in this case. The interest in public disclosure outweighs

Epsteins interest in shielding the non-privileged correspondence from public view. Other

remedies may prove effective in preventing abusive filings in this case. The Court denies

Epsteins request for a stay of this order pending appeal. (DE 295 at 16). However, the Court

This should not be read as a requirement that counsel must certify whether there is7agreement regarding what documents may be submitted, or as a grounds for a party or intervenorto object to the submission before the motion is filed.

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will temporarily stay its ruling giving Epstein time to seek a stay from the Court of Appeals,

should an interlocutory appeal issue.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

1. Intervenor Epsteins Unopposed Motion for a Supplement Protective Order (DE

261) is DENIED; his request for a stay pending appeal (DE 295 at 16) is also

DENIED.

2. The effect of this Order is temporarily STAYED up to and including Monday,

April 27, 2015, in order to permit Intervenor Epstein an opportunity to renew his

request for a stay before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. If Epstein applies

for a stay in the Court of Appeals on or before April 27, 2015, the temporary stay

imposed by this Order shall remain in effect pending the Eleventh Circuits

disposition of the application for a stay.

3. The Medias Motion to Intervene to Oppose Intervenor Epsteins Motion for

Entry of a Supplemental Protective Order (DE 305) is GRANTED.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County,

Florida, this 15 day of April, 2015. th

____________________________________KENNETH A. MARRA United States District Judge

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9:08-cv-80736 JANE DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2 vs USA | ORDER DENYING INTERVENOR’S MOTION FOR A...

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