9. quieting of title.docx

7/29/2019 9. quieting of title.docx

1/6

GALLAR vs. HUSAIN, et al., G.R. No. L-20954 May 24, 1967

FACTS:

On January 9, 1919, Teodoro Husain, the owner, sold this

land to Serapio Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to

repurchase it within six years.

Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although shortly

after the execution of the deed of sale, that is, on January 28, 1919,the vendee a retro, Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana

Husain, sister of the vendor aretro, in what purports to be a resale of

the land. Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her rights to the

land to appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow.

Possession of the land, together with the owner's

duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered

on the same occasion to appellee who since then has been in

possession of the land. In an affidavit dated March 6, 1928,

Chichirita confirmed the "redemption" of the land by Graciana

Husain. In another affidavit of the same date, Graciana Husain for

her part confirmed having subsequently sold the land to the

appellee.

In 1960, appellee asked the Cadastral Court for the

issuance to him of a transfer certificate of title but the court

dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction. (The court, however,

granted appellee's request for the amendment of the certificate of

title by changing the surname of "Osaen" to "Husain.") He,

therefore, filed this suit in the CFI to compel Hermenegilda and

Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of

conveyance in his favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of

title.

The heirs denied the sale and contended that the

agreement between their father and Chichirita was that of a

mortgage to secure a loan of P30. They claimed that the mortgagehad been discharged on January 28, 1919 when Graciana Husain

paid Teodoro Husain's debt to Chichirita.

The trial court found that after acquiring the land from

Teodoro Husain, Serapio Chichirita sold it to Graciana Husain who in

turn sold it to the appellee. It ordered the appellants to execute a

deed of conveyance of the land in favor of the appellee. From this

judgment, Bonifacio Husain brought this appeal to this Court

contending that no action can be brought on the basis of the deed of

sale with a right of repurchase because the land in question was

redeemed a few days after it had been sold.

ISSUE: Whether or not plaintiffs action for reconveyance will

prosper.

HELD:

While it is indeed true that the first note written on the

reverse side of the deed of sale speaks of the "redemption" of the

land, there is no evidence to show that the vendee, Graciana Husain,

was acting in behalf of her brother Teodoro Husain, in the exercise

the latter's right of redemption. Now, unlike a debt which a third

party may satisfy even against the debtor's will the right of

repurchase may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right

is recognized by contract3

or by any person to whom the right may

have been transferred.Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed

to have acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro

Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect

right to dispose of the land as she in fact did when she exchanged it

for a cattle with the appellee.

Now, when Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land

within the stipulated period, i.e., January 9, 1925, its ownership

became consolidated in the appellee. True the successive sales are

in a private instrument, but they are valid just the same. By the

delivery of possession of the land on April 2, 1919 the sale wasconsummated and title was transferred to the appellee. Indeed, this

action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title,to

remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of

appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor

And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is

imprescriptible. Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed

would be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet

title would then be an action for recovery of real property which

must be brought within the statutory period of limitation governing

such actions.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

__________________________________________________

CORONEL vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ELIAS

MERLAN, et al. G.R. No. 70191 October 29, 1987

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery

of possession of a parcel of land registered under his name. The

complaint was filed against the private respondents Elias Merlan

Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico Nostrates, Severo Jecie

Santiago Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before the then CFI of

Cavite.

Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he

purchased the subject parcel of land, the defendants (private

respondents herein) were already occupying a portion thereof as

"tenants at will" and that despite demands to vacate the premises

the defendants failed and refused to move out from the land.

The defendants denied that Coronel was the owner of the

whole parcel of land and alleged that the lots occupied by them

form part of a 1/3 undivided share of brothers Brigido Merlan and

Jose Merlan which they inherited from their deceased father Gabrie

Merlan, one of the three heirs of Bernabela Lontoc, the origina

owner of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that the Merlan

brothers together with their two brothers and a sister never sold

their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody; that it was actually

their other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions and that the

plaintiff's claim of ownership of the whole parcel of land, if ever i

has basis, is fraudulent, void, and without effect; that the Merlans

have always been in open and peaceful possession of their

undivided share of the lot throughout the years from the first sale by

their co-heirs of Lot No. 1950-A in 1950; and that the other

defendants were legitimate tenants. In their Third-Party Complaint

the defendants charged that the third-party defendants, owners o

the remaining portion of Lot No. 1950-A, defrauded them when they

sold the entire parcel.


2/6

Third-Party Defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Daniel

Anuat and Rosario Cailao the defendants' co-owners of Lot No.

1950-A denied that they had something to do with the fraudulent

acts or illegal machinations which deprived the defendants of their

share in the subject parcel of land, and that what they sold was only

their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel.

The lower court ruled in favor of the defendants and on

appeal, the lower court's decision was affirmed.

In dispute in the instant case is the 2/8 share of Bernabela

Lontoc of the Naic Estate designated as Lot 1950-A. When Lontoc

died in 1945, she was survived by three sets of heirs: 1) Bernardino

Merlan, a grandson by her son Enrique Merlan who died in 1918; 2)

Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan, defendants in the case below and

private respondents herein, Graciano Merlan, Agapito Merlan and

Corazon Merlan, children of her son Gabriel who died in 1937; and

3) Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat children of her daughter Francisca

Merlan.

In 1950, Bernardino Merlan, Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat

sold their 2/3 undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio

Manalo and Marcela Nobelo. In 1960, TCT No. T-3116 RT-5010 was

cancelled by TCT No. T-1444 but carried the same afore-specifiedregistered co-owners with an annotation carried from the former

Transfer Certificate of Title.

Sometime in 1970, Ignacio Manalo sold his interest in Lot

1950-A to Mariano Manalo. The deed of sale was and thereafter,

TCT No. T-1444 was cancelled and TCT No. T-41175 was issued for

Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate in the name of Mariano Manalo.

The certificate of title issued in the name of spouses Manalo

covered the whole Lot No. 1950-A without any mention of the 1/3

share of the private respondents in the parcel of land which was

not sold to them.

Relying on the transfer certificate of title of the spouses

Mariano Manalo and Jorga Lagos, petitioner Rodolfo Coronel then

bought Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate from the former. The deed

of sale was registered on December 19, 1974 causing the

cancellation of TCT No. T-41175 and the issuance of TCT No. T-75543

in the name of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.

In the instant petition, petitioner contends that the claim

of the private respondents over their 1/3 undivided portion of Lot

No. 1950-A 25 years after the registration of the deed of sale in

favor of Ignacio Manalo in 1950 and more than five (5) years after

the registration of the deed of sale in favor of Mariano Manalo is

barred by prescription or laches. According to him, there was undue

delay on the part of the private respondents to claim their 1/3

portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate and that the action forannulment should have been brought within four (4) years (Art.

1391, New Civil Code) counted from the date of the registration of

the instrument.

The petitioner likewise insists that he is a purchaser in

good faith. Thus, he argues that TCT No. T-41175 in the name of his

successor-in-interest Mariano Manalo was very clear to the effect

that there is no lien or encumbrance stated therein which could

have been seen by his parents who represented him in the sale as he

was then in the United States and by the lawyer contracted by him

to execute or prepare the corresponding deed of sale.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the claim of private respondents to theland has been barred by the Statutes of Limitation or by

estoppels by laches.

2. Whether or not the petitioner as purchaser in good faithand for value is entitled to the whole lot subject matter of

the present petition.

HELD:

1. It is evident that the private respondents never sold their 1/3

share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that what their co

owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot

and that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party

defendant Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest o

petitioner Rodolfo Coronel. Consequently, there was a mistake

when Transfer Certificate of Title No. 41175 was issued to Mariano

Manalo covering the whole area of Lot No. 1950-A. Moreover

private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in open,

peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even

after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The first time

they knew about Coronel's claim over the whole lot was when they

were served a copy of his complaint in 1975.

The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in

effect a reconveyance to them of their 1/3 undivided share over lot

No. 1950-A has not prescribed. As lawful possessors and owners o

the lot in question their cause of action falls within the settled

jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property-in one's

possession is imprescriptible, Their undisturbed possession over a

period of more than 25 years gave them a continuing right to seek

the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse

claim of a third party and the effect of his own title. If at all, the

private respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and

to annul TCT No. T-75543 accrued only in 1975 when they were

made aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at that time

that, the statutory period of prescription may be said to havecommenced to run against them.

In the same manner, there is no bar based on laches to

assert their right over 1/3 of the disputed property. The facts of the

case show that the private respondents have always been in

peaceful possession of the 1/3 portion of the subject lot, exercising

ownership thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only in 1975

when the petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of his torrens

title covering the entire Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate. It was only at

this point that private respondents knew about the supposed sale o

their 1/3 portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they

immediately resisted.

2. Notwithstanding the good faith of petitioner when he purchased

the land from Mariano Manalo, we cannot close our eyes to the fact

that neither the private respondents nor their co-owners of the

subject parcel of land sold the former's share of the lot

Furthermore, even Ignacio Manalo to whom the third-party

defendants sold their share resold only the 2/3 shares to Mariano

Manalo, the successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Whether or not

there was fraud or just a mistake or oversight of an employee of the

Register of Deeds of Cavite is not clear from the records. The point is

that the 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents over Lot

No. 1950-A was mistakenly included in the transfer certificate of title

of Mariano Manalo.


3/6

We apply equitable considerations. The acceptance

accorded the Torrens system of registration would certainly be

impaired if it could be utilized to perpetrate fraud and chicanery.

Deceit is not to be countenanced; duplicity is not to be rewarded.

Witness the favor with which jurisprudence has looked on the

action for reconveyance as well as the recognition of the

constructive trust.

Moreover, the simple possession of a certificate of title,

under the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the

possessor a true owner ofallthe property described therein. If aperson obtains a title, under the Torrens system, which includes by

mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the

Torrens systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,

become the owner of the lands illegally included.

We find no reversible error on the part of the lower courts

in recognizing the ownership of the private respondents over 1/3 of

Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate. The petitioner is bound to

recognize the lien in favor of the private respondents which was

mistakenly excluded and therefore not inscribed in the torrens title

of the land of his predecessors-in-interest.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

_____________________________________________________

CARAGAY-LAYNO vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

SALVADOR ESTRADA G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984

FACTS:

The Disputed Portion is a 3,732 square-meter-area of a bigger parcel

of land denominated as Lot No. 1 with a total area of 8,752 square

meters. The entire parcel is covered by OCT No. 63, issued on 11

September 1947 in the name of Mariano M. DE VERA, who died in

1951 without issue. His intestate estate was administered first by hiswidow and later by her nephew, respondent Salvador Estrada.

Petitioner, JULIANA Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano DE VERA,

were first cousins.

As Administratrix, DE VERA's widow filed in a special proceeding, an

Inventory of all properties of the deceased which included the

disputed portion.

Because of the discrepancy in area mentioned in the Inventory as

5,147 square meters (as filed by the widow), and that in the title as

8,752 square meters, ESTRADA repaired to the Disputed Property

and found that the northwestern portion, subsequently surveyed tobe 3,732 square meters, was occupied by petitioner-spouses Juliana

Caragay Layno and Benito Layno. ESTRADA demanded that they

vacate the Disputed Portion since it was titled in the name of the

deceased DE VERA, but petitioners refused claiming that the land

belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA's father Juan

Caragay.

ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery of the

Disputed Portion which she resisted, mainly on the ground that the

Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly included in

OCT No. 63, so that an implied or constructive trust existed in her

favor. She then counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the

sense that title be issued in her favor.

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered judgment ordering JULIANA

to vacate the Disputed Portion.

On appeal respondent Appellate Court affirmed the Decision in toto.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioner can seek reconveyance of the disputed

portion on the ground that it was fraudulently included in OCT No

63.

2. Whether or not petitioners action for reconveyance is barred by

prescription.

HELD:

1. Tacking the previous possession of her father to he

own, they had been in actual open, continuous and uninterrupted

possession in the concept of owner for about forty five (45) years

declaring the land for taxation purposes and paying realty taxesthereon from 1938 to 1972 until said possession was disturbed in

1966 when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed Portion

was registered in Mariano DE VERA's name.

Further, De Vera, borrowed from petitioner the Tax

Declaration of her land to be used as collateral for his loan and suga

quota application and that relying on his assurances, she acceded to

his request and was made to sign documents the contents she did

not know because of her ignorance. She discovered the fraudulent

inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63 only in 1966 when

ESTRADA so informed her and sought to eject them. For twenty (20

years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when

this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the

deceased DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his

successors-in-interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse

claim to the Disputed Portion. They may, therefore be said to be

guilty of laches as would effectively derail their cause of action

Administrator ESTRADA took interest in recovering the said portion

only when he noticed the discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of

Property and in the title.

Inasmuch as DE VERA had failed to assert any rights over

the Disputed Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his

successors-in-interest possess it for a single moment: but that

JULIANA had been in actual, continuous and open possession

thereof to the exclusion of all and sundry, the inescapable inference

is, fraud having been unsubstantiated, that it had been erroneouslyincluded in OCT No. 63. The mistake is confirmed by the fact of the

substantial difference in the area declared in the Inventory and the

area declared in the certificate of title. In fact, the widow by limiting

the area in said Inventory in effect, recognized and admitted tha

the Disputed Portion did not form part of the decedent's estate.

Mere possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens

System is not conclusive as to the holder's true ownership of all the

property described therein for he does not by virtue of said

certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally

included. A Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a

lot to persons who have never asserted any right of ownership


4/6

over it. JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered

in the name of another, but which had not yet passed into the

hands of third parties, can properly seek its reconveyance.

2. Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the

reason that as lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion,

her cause of action for reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet

title to the property, falls within settled jurisprudence that an action

to quiet title to property in one's possession is imprescriptible. Her

undisturbed possession over a period of fifty two (52) years gave her

a continuing right to seek the aid of a Court of equity to determinethe nature of the adverse claim of a third party and the effect on her

own title.

Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA's right to quiet

title, to seek reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in

1966 when she was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It

was only then that the statutory period of prescription may be said

to have commenced to run against her.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

______________________________________________________

ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET ALCOU vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

CAMILO AVILES

G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996

FACTS:

PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of a

parcel of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen, Pangasinan. This

property is the share of their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of

the defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents, Ireneo Aviles

and Anastacia Salazar.

SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession of the

afore-described property. In fact, the latter mortgaged the same

with the Rural Bank and Philippine National Bank branch in

Lingayen. When the property was inspected by a bank

representative, Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary

owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio Aviles and

Juana and Apolonio Joaquin(,) pointed to the inspector the existing

earthen dikes as the boundary limits of the property and nobody

objected. When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the

property was sold at public auction but this was redeemed by

plaintiffs' mother and the land was subsequently transferred and

declared in her name.

ON March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a

color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area

of approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo

fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting

and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said

portion.

UPON the other hand, defendant Camilo Aviles admitted

the Agreement of Partition executed by him and his brothers,

Anastacio and Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the total area of

the property of their parents which they divided is 46,795 square

meters and the area alloted to Eduardo is 16,111 square meters, to

Anastacio is 16,214 square meters while the area alloted to

defendant Camilo is 14,470 square meters more or less. The

respective area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured before

the execution of the agreement but he was not present when the

measurement was made. Defendant agreed to have a smaller area

because his brother Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigge

share because he has several children to support. The portion in

litigation however is part of the share given to him in the agreement

of partition. At present, he is only occupying an area of 12,686

square meters which is smaller than his actual share of 14,470square meters. Tax Declarations covering his property from 1958

show that the area of his property is 14,470 square meters.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of basis

and merits. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the

trial court, reasoning that a special civil action for quieting of title is

not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that

petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a complaint for quieting of is the properemedy for settling of a boundary dispute.

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct inrendering a decision without fully determining the

respective rights of the herein parties.

HELD:

1. The facts presented unmistakably constitute a clear case of

boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a special civil action to

quiet title.

Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the remova

of any cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to

real property. Pursuant to Article 476 of the Civil Code, to avail ofthe remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that there is

an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which

constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the

owner's title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have

wholly misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming

that respondent Court erred in holding that there was "no . .

evidence of any muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, .

.", and that there were, as a matter of fact, two such contracts, viz.

(i) the Agreement of Partition executed by private respondent and

his brothers (including the petitioners' father and predecessor-in

interest), in which their respective shares in the inherited property

were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing the

redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject

property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no wayconstitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners

Rather, the uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and

fix the boundary between their respective properties.

As correctly held by the respondent Court, "(i)n fact, both

plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of

partition dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed

area was allotted (sic) to them and that the only controversy is

whether these lands were properly measured. There is no adverse

claim by the defendant "which is apparently valid, but is, in truth

and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable" and

which constitutes a cloud thereon.


5/6

Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the

bamboo fence enclosing the disputed property and the moving of

earthen dikes are not the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be

removed in an action for quieting of title. An action to quiet title or

to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a

boundary dispute.

2. Petitioners also chide the respondent Court (and the trial court)

for not declaring the respective rights of the parties with respect to

the land in question, arguing that "when one is disturbed in any

form in his rights of property over an immovable by the unfoundedclaims of others, he has the right to ask from the competent courts: .

. . that their respective rights be determined . . .

Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, dealing with actions for

declaratory relief, specifies in Section 1 thereof the grounds,

conditions precedent or requisites for bringing such petitions. Under

this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will,

contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected

by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any

question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or

statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This

means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or

other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant

declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is

deemed excluded.

Even assuming arguendo that the action to quiet title had

been brought under Rule 64, the same would still not have

prospered, the subject matter thereof not referring to "a deed,

will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or

ordinance," but to a boundary dispute, and therefore not

warranting the grant of declaratory relief.

From another perspective, we hold that the trial court

(and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for

quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the

claimed property, as that would be tantamount to awarding to oneor some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the

sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record, claim,

encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the

petitioners' interest or title in and to said property. Such

determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial

proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be

considered and where evidence aliunde, other than the

"instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding" itself,

may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever

warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of

possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be

availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary

dispute may be fully threshed out.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the

instant petition is hereby DENIED and the Decision appealed from is

AFFIRMED.

AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 128102. March 7, 2000]

FACTS:

Lot No. 4399 was acquired by AZNAR from the heirs o

Crisanta Maloloy-on by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Rea

Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated 3 March 1964 which was

registered with the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City on 6 March

1964.

After the sale, petitioner AZNAR declared this property

under its name for taxation purposes and regularly paid the taxes

thereon. Herein private respondents were allegedly allowed to

occupy portions of Lot No. 4399 by mere tolerance provided that

they leave the land in the event that the company would use the

property for its purposes. Later, AZNAR entered into a joint venture

with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the

development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing

subdivision and beach resort. When its demands for the private

respondents to vacate the land failed, AZNAR filed with the

Municipal Trial Court (MTCC) of Lapu-Lapu City a case for unlawfu

detainer and damages.

On the other hand, the private respondents alleged that

they are the successors and descendants of the eight children of the

late Crisanta Maloloy-on, whose names appear as the registered

owners in the Original Certificate of Title No. RC-2856. They had

been residing and occupying the subject portion of the land in the

concept of owner since the time of their parents and grandparents

Private respondents claimed that the Extrajudicial Partition of Rea

Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale is void ab initio for being

simulated and fraudulent, and they came to know of the fraud only

when AZNAR entered into the land in the last quarter of 1991 and

destroyed its vegetation. They then filed with the Regional Tria

Court (RTC) of Lapu-Lapu City a complaint seeking to declare the

subject document null and void.

The MTCC rendered a decision ordering the private

respondents to vacate the land in question upon the finality of the

judgment. The MTCC delved into the issue of ownership in order to

resolve the issue of possession. Aggrieved by the decision of the

MTCC, private respondents appealed to the RTC.

During the pendency of the appeal, a writ of execution was

issued by the RTC upon motion of petitioner. AZNAR filed an

omnibus motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which was

likewise issued. Per Sheriffs Report, private respondents houses

were demolished on 3 August 1994, except for two houses.

On appeal by the private respondents, the Court ofAppeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC; declared the

private respondents as the rightful possessors de facto of the land in

question; and permanently enjoined Sheriff from effectuating the

demolition of the houses of the private respondents. AZNAR then

elevated the case to this Court, via this petition for review

on certiorari.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not prior physical possession over the land bythe petitioner is required to effect an action of unlawfu

detainer.


6/6

2. Whether or not the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed ofAbsolute Sale was null and void.

HELD:

1. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, prior physical

possession by the plaintiff of the subject property is not an

indispensable requirement in unlawful detainer cases, although it

is indispensable in an action for forcible entry . The lack of prior

physical possession on the part of AZNAR is therefore of no

moment, as its cause of action in the unlawful detainer case is

precisely to terminate private respondents possession of the

property in question.

2. In an action for ejectment, the only issue involved is

possession de facto. However, when the issue of possession cannot

be decided without resolving the issue of ownership, the court may

receive evidence upon the question of title to the property but

solely for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.[

In the instant case, private respondents have set up the

defense of ownership and questioned the title of AZNAR to the

subject lot, alleging that the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of

Absolute Sale upon which petitioner bases its title is null and voidfor being simulated and fraudulently made.

First, private respondents claim that not all the known

heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on participated in the extrajudicial

partition, and that two persons who participated and were made

parties thereto were not heirs of Crisanta. This claim, even if true,

would not warrant rescission of the deed. Under Article 1104 of the

Civil Code, "[a] partition made with preterition of any of the

compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless it be proved that

there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested;

but the latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person

omitted the share which belongs to him." In the present case, no

evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the

two parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is

in point; it provides: "A partition which includes a person believed to

be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such

person." In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not

render the partition void in its entirety but only to the extent

corresponding to them.

Private respondents also allege that some of the persons

who were made parties to the deed were already dead, while others

were still minors. Moreover, the names of some parties thereto

were misspelled, and others who knew how to read and write their

names were made to appear to have affixed only their thumbmark

in the questioned document. Likewise, the signatures of those who

were made parties were forged.

The foregoing are bare allegations with no leg to stand on.

No birth or death certificates were presented before the MTCC to

support the allegations that some of the parties to the deed were

minors and others were already dead at the time of the execution of

the deed. It is worthy to note that the Extrajudicial Partition with

Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its

favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary

weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution He who

denies its due execution has the burden of proving the contrary. It

must also be stressed that whoever alleges forgery has the burden

of proving the same. Forgery cannot be presumed but should be

proved by clear and convincing evidence. Private respondents failed

to discharge this burden of proof; hence, the presumption in favor

of the questioned deed stands.

Anent the non- annotation of the Extrajudicial Partition

with Deed of Absolute Sale in the reconstituted Original Certificate

of Title No. RO-2856, the same does not render the deed legally

defective. It must be borne in mind that the act of registering a

document is never necessary to give the conveyance legal effect as

between the parties and the vendors heirs. As between the

parties to a sale, registration is not indispensable to make it validand effective. The purpose of registration is merely to notify and

protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be

ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing

said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their

obligations thereunder. Here, no right of innocent third persons o

subsequent transferees of the subject lot is involved; thus, the

conveyance executed in favor of AZNAR by private respondents and

their predecessors is valid and binding upon them, and is equally

binding and effective against their heirs.

The principle that registration is the operative act that

gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land "refers

to cases involving conflicting rights over registered property and

those of innocent transferees who relied on the clean title of the

properties." This principle has no bearing on the present case, as

no subsequent transfer of the subject lot to other persons has

been made either by private respondents or their predecessors-in

interest.

It bears repeating that petitioners claim of possession

over the subject lot is anchored on its claim of ownership on the

basis of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale. Ou

ruling on the issue of the validity of the questioned deed is solely

for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession and is to be

regarded merely as provisional, without prejudice, however, to the

final determination of the issue in the other case for the

annulment or cancellation of the Extrajudicial Partition with Deedof Absolute Sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

9. quieting of title.docx

Documents

Transcript of 9. quieting of title.docx