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The Nuclear Terrorist Threat to Russia

and the World -- What is to be Done?

Matthew Bunn, Harvard University

2nd Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference

September 19-20, 2003

http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/atom

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Terrorists and nuclear explosives

With HEU, gun-typebomb -- as obliteratedHiroshima -- very

plausibly within

capabilities ofsophisticated terroristgroup

Implosion bomb(required for Pu) more

difficult, stillconceivable (especially ifthey got help)

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Insider threats

The desperate insider

Danger in Russia reduced with Russian economic stabilization (butstill frequent incidents of minor theft by soldiers and sailors)

The greedy/corrupt insider

e.g., recent arrest of Atomflot deputy director Tyulyakov(corruption? radioactive theft?) -- countless other cases worldwide

The ideologically sympathetic insider

e.g., case of Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood in Pakistan

The blackmailed insider

Chechens, others have used tactic of kidnapping a child of anofficial -- many other possibilities

Outsiders and insiders may work together

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Summary: the nuclear terrorist threat

Do terrorists want nuclear weapons?

Clear Bin Laden statements, some Chechen interest

Is it conceivable terrorists could make a crudebomb if they got the material?

Is there material that might be vulnerable to

theft and transfer to terrorists?

Is it likely that terrorists, if they had a crudedevice, could smuggle it to Moscow,

Washington, or New York?

Yes No

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Much has been accomplished

to reduce this threat

Russian unilateral steps to tighten security for nuclearfacilities -- especially since Chechen terrorist attacks, 9/11

U.S.-Russian cooperation has improved security forhundreds of tons of potential bomb material, thousands of

nuclear warheads, at dozens of sites

Enough bomb material for thousands of nuclear weaponshas been permanently destroyed

Project Vinca (removal of HEU from Yugoslavia) showedpotential for U.S.-Russian cooperation to address insecurestockpiles around the world

Hundreds of dedicated Russian and U.S. experts have mademajor contribution to world security

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But much remains to be done

138 MT

108 MT

354 MT

Comprehensive Upgrades

Rapid Upgrades

Cooperative Upgrades Not

Completed

MT=Metric Tons

Weapons-Usable Material MPC&A Upgradesin Russia Expected by Oct. 1, 2003

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Strong Presidential statements highlight

the danger of terrorists with WMD

Bush:

The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalismand technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they areseeking weapons of mass destruction.History will judge harshly those

who saw this coming danger but failed to act.-- National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 9/02

Putin:

We do not think that the major threats nowadays are presented by

ICBMsWe all know exactly how New York and Washington werehitWas it ICBMs? What threat are we talking about? We are talkingabout the use of mass destruction weapons terrorists may obtainchemical weapons, biological weapons, and so on. Russia is convincedthat this is what should be given the most serious thought to.

-- Press conference, 1/01

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Matching statements to actions

If they really see nuclear terrorism as a high-priority threat:

Why have disputes over access to sensitive sites, liability and taxissues, slow contracting procedures, visa problems, and otherimpediments been allowed to slow progress in securing nuclear

weapons and materials for years? Why were security and accounting for nuclear stockpiles around the

world not identified as a priority of the Global Partnership?

Why has the Russian government consistently underfunded its ownnuclear security upgrade programs (e.g., $200M cost to meet

Russian physical protection regulations -- GAN 2002 report)? Why has the Russian government only given the 12th GUMO the

resources to install a handful of the already-purchased site securityupgrade kits each year, leaving equipment in warehouses for years?

Why has the U.S. government decided not to help upgrade security

for Russian operational tactical warhead sites?

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Key priorities if the Presidents agreed on

a high-priority cooperative program

Global cleanout -- fast-paced effort to remove nuclearmaterial from most vulnerable sites around the world

Accelerated, strengthened MPC&A cooperation

Fast-paced agreed deadline -- e.g., FSU upgrades done in 4 years

Focus also on sustainability -- security that will last, including afterinternational assistance ends

Security strong enough to meet post-9/11 threats

Requires Presidential decision to finally resolve access issue, sweepaside other impediments to acceleration

Joint U.S.-Russian efforts to cooperate with other countries-- e.g., Pakistan, India, China -- to improve nuclear security

Accelerated blend-down of HEU; securing and monitoringmost dangerous warheads; strengthened global standards;

expanded support for the IAEA

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The challenge

If Presidents Bush and Putin really believed that nuclearterrorism was an urgent threat, and that actions they couldtake could substantially reduce it, many problems would besolved -- how do we convince them?

If the two Presidents announced that they had agreed toreduce this threat as much as possible as quickly as

possible, what specific actions would we recommend?

On the day after a nuclear terrorist attack, what would wewish we had done to prevent it?

Why arent we doing it now?

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2010: the danger

Multiple unrecovered thefts of weapons-usable nuclearmaterial have occurred

Weapons-usable nuclear materials in some countries aroundthe world remain dangerously insecure -- as do nuclear

power plants and spent fuel facilities in some countries

Substantial numbers of large radioactive sources remainunaccounted for

Intelligence indicates that a thriving black market in nuclearmaterial exists, and that several terrorist groups, as well asstates such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, have gainedaccess to enough weapons-usable material for a bomb

Nuclear terrorist attacks may have already occurred -- or

could occur at any time

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For further reading

Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials

http://www.nti.org/cnwm

Letter Report from the Co-Chairs of the Joint Committee onU.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Non-Proliferation,John P. Holdren and Nikolai P. Laverov

http://www4.nationalacademies.org/news.nsf/isbn/s02052003?OpenDocument