8. Target & Vital Areas

International Atomic Energy Agency

8. Target & Vital Areas

8. Target & Vital Areas

Information presented, developed and compiled in this workshop is intended for persons

working professionally in the management and regulation of research reactor facilities

National Training Workshop on Nuclear Security of Research Reactors

Place and Date

International Atomic Energy Agency2

Session Objectives

At the completion of this session participants

should be able to:

1. Understand the unacceptable consequences

2. Understand the target identification process

steps for unauthorized removal and sabotage

3. Recognize the Categorization tables in NSS #13

and NSS #14 are used to identify targets of

unauthorized removal

Information presented, developed and compiled in this workshop is intended for persons

working professionally in the management and regulation of research reactor facilities


The consequences may have:

• Political and organizational impacts

• Economic Impact

• More than just financial cost of clean up

• Health effects

• Long-term damage to environment

3


Unauthorized Removal as Defined by International

Community

Severity of potential unauthorized removal

consequences is based on quantity, the form

and isotope of the NM

Categorization tables in CPPNM and Code of

Conduct

4


Sabotage is defined by State

Severity of potential sabotage consequences

is based on the thermal power and

effectiveness of mitigating safety systems

• Dose rate at site boundary

• Facility condition (core melt)

State should identify multiple unacceptable

radiological consequence limits to establish

graded security against sabotage

• PPS should protect against any sabotage

scenarios exceeding unacceptable

radiological consequences criteria

5


Target Identification Process

Two target identification processes:

• Unauthorized removal

• Sabotage

Target identification provides the basis for PPS

design, by focusing on what to protect to

prevent unacceptable consequences

Target identification addresses:

• Areas

• Materials

• Critical systems, operations, equipment (target

sets)

6


Steps in Unauthorized Removal

Target identification

7

• Identify nuclear and radioactive material inventory

• Compare to tables in NSS # 11 and NSS #13

• Determine category of target materials


Unauthorized Removal--Identify Target

Nuclear Material (NSS#13)

• Protect nuclear material from unauthorized

removal that could lead to:

• use in nuclear explosive device or

• subsequent dispersal

Radioactive Material (NSS#14)

• Protect radioactive material from unauthorized

removal that could lead to use in a:

• radiological dispersal device or

• radiological exposure device


IAEA Categorization of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC 225/Rev 5)

Table 1. Categorization of Nuclear Material

Material Form Category I Category II Category IIIc

1. Plutoniuma Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg

but more than 500 g

500 g or less

but more than 15 g

2. Uranium-235 (235U) Unirradiatedb

– uranium enriched to

20% 235U or more

5 kg or more Less than 5 kg

but more than 1 kg

1 kg or less

but more than 15 g

– uranium enriched

to 10% 235U but less than

20% 235U

10 kg or more Less than 10 kg

but more than 1 kg

– uranium enriched

above natural, but less

than 10% 235U

10Kg or more

3. Uranium-233 (233U) Unirradiatedb 2 kg or more Less than 2 kg

but more than 500 g

500 g or less

but more than 15 g

4. Irradiated Fuel

(The categorization of irradiated fuel in the

table is based on international transport

considerations. The State may assign a

different category for domestic use, storage,

and transport taking all relevant factors into

account.)

Depleted or natural

uranium, thorium or

low-enriched fuel

(less than 10% fissile

content)d/e

a. All plutonium except that with isotopic concentration exceeding 80% in plutonium-238.

b. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level equal to or less than 1Gy/hr

c. Quantities not falling in Category III and natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium should be protected at least in

accordance with prudent management practice.

d. Although this level of protection is recommended, it would be open to States, upon evaluation of the specific

circumstances, to assign a different category of physical protection.

e. Other fuel which by virtue of its original material content is classified as Category I or II before irradiation may be

reduced one category level while the radiation level from the fuel exceeds 1 Gy/hr (100rad/hr) at one meter

unshielded.


Summary Table - Categorization of

Radioactive Sources Safety Guide RS-G-1.9

Category Relative Danger Activity Ratio (A/D)

1Extremely

DangerousA/D ≥ 1000

2 Very Dangerous 1000 >A/D ≥ 10

3 Dangerous 10 > A/D ≥ 1

4Unlikely to be

Dangerous1 > A/D ≥ 0.01

5Most Unlikely to

be Dangerous0.01 > A/D

10


Examples of Categorization of

Radioactive Sources

11

Category Sources and Practice

1 Radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), Irradiators,

Teletherapy sources, Fixed multi-beam teletherapy (gamma

knife) sources

2 Industrial gamma radiography sources, High/medium dose rate

brachytherapy sources

3 Fixed industrial gauges that incorporate high activity sources,

Well logging gauges

4 Low dose rate (LDR) brachytherapy sources, Industrial gauges

that do not incorporate high activity sources, Bone densitometers,

Static eliminators

5 LDR brachytherapy eye plaques and permanent implant sources,

X-ray fluorescence devices, Electron capture devices, Mossbauer

spectrometry, Positron emission tomography (PET) check

sources


IAEA Categorization of Radioactive Sources

RS-G-1.9 Table 2


Sabotage

Adversary applies energy directly to nuclear/radioactive material to cause dispersal

• Explosive or incendiary device used

to disperse material

Adversary uses energy present in material or system to

cause dispersal

• Requires initiating process upset and disabling

mitigation systems

e.g. disabling primary cooling system (initiating

event) and backup cooling capability (mitigating

systems), and resulting in core overheating


Steps in Sabotage Target identification

14

Review safety analysis report and power history to

develop sabotage scenarios relative to DBT

Define target sets which would result in unacceptable

consequences as determined by the State

Identify vital areas to be protected


Vital Areas

If required, vital areas should be established

• Vital Area: an area inside a protected area containing equipment, systems or devices, or nuclear material, the sabotage of which could directly or indirectly lead to high radiological consequences (NSS #13, NSS #16)

Vitals areas should provide additional layer to the protected area for detection, access control, and delay


Summary

State needs to define unacceptable radiological consequence thresholds

Target Identification Process/Steps differ between unauthorized removal and sabotage

Categorization tables in NSS #13 and NSS #14 are

used to identify targets of unauthorized removal

Vital areas contain targets that could yield high

radiological consequences (as determined by the

State)

8. Target & Vital Areas

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Transcript of 8. Target & Vital Areas