7. ADDITIONAL STUDIES - environmentclearance.nic.inDesign Throughput MMTPA 1.25 ... Project...

Dahej Nagothane Ethane Pipeline (DNEPL) Project Chapter-7 Additional Studies

Reliance Gas Pipelines Ltd. 255 Bhagavathi Ana Labs Pvt. Limited

IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7. ADDITIONAL STUDIES

7.1. Quantitative Risk Assessment

Risk analysis study was conducted for DNEPL originating from RIL DMD in Gujarat to RIL NMD in Maharashtra with a spur pipeline to RIL HMD.

Conducting a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is important in the management of risk, as cross country pipelines transport hazardous material traversing several hundreds of kilometres through villages, forests, rivers, roads, rail crossings, etc. Risk Assessment study was undertaken to address the hazards and risks associated with pipeline transportation of hydrocarbons as per requirement of MoEFCC.

The goal of risk assessment is to estimate the risk to personal, property and public along the pipeline route from the unlikely event of leaks and/or rupture during pipeline operation. In addition, results of such studies provide help in improvement of safety by recommending measures to risk to the extent possible.

This section outlines the Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) Report prepared by M/s Bureau

Veritas.

7.1.1. Project Details

The proposed pipeline will transfer liquid Ethane made available from RIL DMD to RIL NMD and HMD through 12” dia mainline and 8” dia spur pipeline respectively. One pump station is proposed to be located within RIL DMD. The pipeline will be constructed as per OISD 214 and ASME B 31.4 standards.

Table 100: Salient details of the proposed pipeline

Dahej Nagothane Ethane Pipeline Project–Salient Details

Description UoM Details

Design Throughput MMTPA 1.25

Pipeline Design Life (for Economic

Evaluation) Years 30

Design pressure Bar(g) 112

Pressure at the Pipeline Inlet Battery Limit at DMD bar(g) 30(Min)

Temperature at the Pipeline Inlet Battery Limit atDMD

oC 0

DeliveryPressure bar(g) 56 (Min)

DeliveryTemperature oC 30(max)

Type of External Anti‐corrosion Coating ‐ High integrity Three‐layer

polyethylene (3‐LPE)

Pipeline Design Code ‐ OISD‐214, ASMEB31.4,

Entry Point Location

‐

Mainline Pump Station at

DMD,Gujarat

Source: Provided by RGPL

Cathodic protection system, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system,

dedicated optical fibre cable based telecommunication system, mobile/permanent flaring



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

systems at MLVs/IPSs, leak detection system / pipeline application software, emergency

shutdown system, flow measurement and control instrumentation, fire and gas detection

system, fire protection system, control and auxiliary buildings and associated facilities.

7.1.2. Need for Risk Assessment

While underground pipelines have proven to be one of the easiest and safest ways to transport

hydrocarbons, probability of loss of integrity/ damage exists due to interference from third

parties, corrosion, accidents, human error etc. during normal operation cannot be overlooked. It

is therefore necessary to evaluate the risk of pipeline operation to ensure safety to personnel,

public, property and environment.

7.1.3. Objective of QRA Study

The objective of the QRA study is to identify and assess the hazards associated with Dahej - Nagothane Ethane Pipeline Project in accordance with the following steps:

• Identify accident events.

• Determine the consequence of events;

• Determine the frequency of hazardous releases from process piping, equipment etc.

• Determine the risk to facility personnel and surrounding population from such releases;

• Determine the risk to environment;

• Determine the Residual Individual and Societal Risk.

• Verify whether the assessed risks are acceptable on the basis of international risk criteria and, when needed, suggest risk reduction measures.

• Final Report.

The analysis is based on output from the DNV software modelling tool called PHAST Risk Micro v6.7.

The outputs from PHAST Risk Micro in combination with Person in facility data is further analysed to determine Individual Risk (IR), and Societal Risk (SR).

The inputs assumed for the modelling and the approach taken are detailed in the Assumption

Register, attached as an Appendix A.

7.1.4. Scope of Work

Quantitative Risk Analysis is undertaken to identify and assess the hazards associated with the project and to demonstrate that the residual risk levels are acceptable or As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

Scope includes also the following:

• Identify key hazard initiating events associated with DNEPL Pipeline based on the Project document review;

• Model and appraise the consequence & risk associated with all flammable hazards resulting from potential loss of containment accident scenarios;

• Perform a risk assessment to confirm that risk can be reduced consistent with the ALARP principle and

• Recommend risk reducing measures to ensure that all risks are As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

Risk Assessment studies have been done for 1.4 MMTPA for higher factor of safety.

7.1.5. Software

QRA study has been performed using DNV PHAST Risk Micro v 6.7 software.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Source and Battery Limit

Liquid Ethane Source

Liquid Ethane will be made available from RIL DMD.

Composition and Properties

Composition (mole %) of Ethane envisaged to be imported is as under:

Liquid Ethane Composition Details

Components Volume in Mole(%)

Ethane 99.5

Methane 0.5

Source: Provided by RGPL

Other vital properties of Ethane are listed below: Critical Pressure : 48.8bar Critical Temperature : 32.2ºC Design Throughput

The pipeline shall be designed to transport 1.25 MMTPA of liquid Ethane considering the current and potential near future requirements. However, Risk Assessment studies have been done for 1.4 MMTPA for higher factor of safety.

Battery Limit Conditions

Following battery limit conditions have been considered:

• Source Location – Storage Tank at DMD (at Pipeline Battery Limit)

Pressure (Min) : 30 bar (g) Temperature (Max) : 0oC

• Delivery Locations – At Pipe line Battery Limit)

Pressure (Min) : 56 bar (g) Temperature (Max) : 30°C

Climatic Conditions

Preliminary temperature data along the route as collected from secondary sources are as follows:

Maximum ambient air temperature : 50°C

Ground temperature at pipeline depth : 20°C- 30°C

Project Facilities Planning

Project facilities forming part of the overall pipeline system comprising of trunk pipeline, originating pump station, mainline valve stations, intermediate pigging stations, and receipt terminal are described below:



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Preliminary locations of the project facilities proposed to be installed have been identified and

shown in Overall Pipeline Schematic Arrangement Diagram attached at Exhibit‐3 of

Feasibility Report. These will be finalized during design and engineering phase.

Facilities at Dispatch Pumping Station (PS at DMD)

Mainline Pump Station shall be installed and set up at DMD, Gujarat which will broadly house following:

• Inlet filtration system

• Mainline Pumps with drives

• Pig Launcher

• Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

• Fire and Gas (F&G) detection system and Fire Suppression System

• Flaring facilities, Fire water, service water, plant air and instrument air distribution system

• SCADA and Telecommunication system

• Electrical facilities including Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS), Battery Bank etc.

• Buildings and HVAC system

Maintenance bases will be set up at the Pumping Station at DMD and appropriate other location(s) along the route.

Facilities at Intermediate Pigging Station (IPS)

The broad list is given below:

• Pigging facilities

• Fire and Gas Detection System and Fire Suppression System

• SCADA and Telecommunication equipment

• Electrical facilities, UPS, Buildings and HVAC System

• Mobile/Permanent Flaring System, Potable water facility, electric pump, water storage tank etc.

Facilities at Delivery (M&R) Terminals

The broad list for each station is given below:

• Pigging facility

• Filtration System

• Custody Transfer Metering skid

• Pressure / flow regulation and control skid

• SCADA and telecommunication equipment

• Fire and Gas Detection System, Fire Suppression System, Flaring facilities

• BuildingsandHVACsystem

Facilities at Mainline Valve Stations

Broad list of facilities at MLV station is given below:

• Mainline valve with by‐pass and mobile/permanent blow‐down piping and flaring system

Depending upon the type of MLV Station, following additional facilities will be provided:

MLV Local Operation co-located with CP Facility

• Solar powered supply with battery backup for CP equipment, area lighting, and guard room

• Fire Extinguishers

• BuildingtohouseCPequipment,batteriesandpowercontrollers



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

MLV Remote Operation

• Field instrumentation, SCADA and Telecom equipment

• CP Equipment

• Fire and Gas Detection System and Fire Suppression System

• Control Building to house all equipment, battery etc.

• Electrical facilities and emergency diesel engine generator back up.

7.1.6. Methodology

The QRA methodology would include following steps.

Source: Provided by BALPL

Figure 79 : QRA Methodology

7.1.7. Consequence Analysis

Consequence analysis computes the consequence impacts in terms of damage distances due to heat radiation, vapour cloud explosion etc. A list of probable or potential accidents in the facility arising due to use and handling of the hazardous materials is examined to establish their credibility. Depending upon the effective hazardous attributes and their impact on the event, the maximum effect on the surrounding environment and the respective damage caused can be assessed.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.1.8. Hazard Identification

Scenarios for ethane release have been examined considering release at aboveground and underground locations. The major hazards events are identified. The Table 101 defines the various identified scenarios and process conditions.

Dahej Nagothane Ethane Pipeline (DNEPL) Project Chapter-7 Additonal Studies

Reliance Gas Pipelines Ltd. 261 Bhagavathi Ana Labs Pvt. Limited IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 01

Table 101: Identified Scenarios and Process Conditions

Scenario. No

Scenario Description

Section Boundaries PFD Reference/ Docs

Reference Release Phase

Capacity Operating

Pressure, barg

Operating Temperature,

degree C

Stream Composition (Mole percent)

Start Main

Equipment End

S1 Loss of containment

(Ethane release) from pump station at DMD

Liquid Ethane from DMD

Pump (MP-J45-P001)

MLV-01 DNES001-G31-J45-001 Rev. And DNEPL Feasibility Report

DNEPL route scheme Gas 175 TPH 112 30

Ethane = 99.5 Methane = 0.5 Reference: Doc Title: DNEPL Feasibility Report DNEP000-Z10-J00-502

S2 Loss of containment

(Ethane release) from DNEPL

Main line pumping station

DNEPL pipeline TAP-OFF STATION

DNES001-G31-J45-001 Rev. And DNEPL Feasibility Report

DNEPL route scheme Gas 1.4 MMTPA 112 30


S3

Loss of containment (etahne release) from intermediate pigging

station (IPS)

MLV at DMD

Pig launcher/ receiver (PY-J45-K002/PY-

J45-K001)

MLV AT NMD DNES001-G31-J45-001 Rev. And DNEPL Feasibility Report



S4

Loss of containment (Ethane release) from

metering and regulating station (M&R) at NMD

Tap-off station Nagothane

pipeline

M&R AT NAGOTHANE

PIPELINE




S5

Loss of containment (gas release) from Hazira

SPUR pipeline at M&R (46 KM) (8 Inch)

Hazira spur takeoff Hazira spur

pipeline M&R AT HMD


DNEPL route scheme Gas 77 TPH 89 30


S6 Loss of containment (gas

release) from existing HDPL pipeline 26 inch

RIL DMD Dahej HDPL pipeline

26 inch COMMON RoU


DNEPL route scheme

Gas 6 MMSCMD 60.78 60

Methane = 83.72 Ethane = 6.56 Propane = 0.19 I-Butane = 0.527 N-Butane = 0.454 I- Pentane =0.105 N-Pentane= 0.111 Hexane = 0.07 H2O = 0 CO2 =5.214 N2=0.08 Reference: Company Input


release) from existing HDPL pipeline 24 inch

RIL DMD dahej HDPL PIPELINE

24 INCH COMMON RoU


DNEPL route scheme

Gas 2.5 MMSCMD 71.18 50

Methane = 99.25 Ethane = 0.595 Propane = 0.22 I-Butane = 0.001 N-Butane = 0.004 I- Pentane =0 N-Pentane= 0.01 Hexane = 0.01 H2O = 0 CO2 = 0 N2=0.13 Reference: Company Input


release) from existing EWPL pipeline

Bharuch CS-10 EWPL PIPELINE MLV-38

DNES001-G31-J45-001 Rev. and DNEPL Feasibility Report

DNEPL route scheme

Gas 80 MMSCMD 98 60

Methane = 98.25 Ethane = 0.44 Propane = 0.19 I-Butane = 0.05 N-Butane = 0.04 I- Pentane =0.02 N-Pentane= 0 Hexane = 0 H2O = 0.01 CO2 = 0.19 N2=0.64 Reference: Company Input

Dahej Nagothane Ethane Pipeline (DNEPL) Project Chapter-7 Additonal Studies

Reliance Gas Pipelines Ltd. 262 Bhagavathi Ana Labs Pvt. Limited IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 01

Scenario. No


Section Boundaries PFD Reference/ Docs

Reference Release Phase

Capacity Operating

Pressure, barg

Operating Temperature,

degree C

Stream Composition (Mole percent)

Start Main

Equipment End


release) from existing HAZIRA spur line 28 inch

- HAZIRA spurline -


DNEPL route scheme

Gas 16 MMSCMD 97 30

Methane = 98.25 Ethane = 0.44 Propane = 0.19 I-Butane = 0.05 N-Butane = 0.04 I- Pentane =0.02 N-Pentane= 0 Hexane = 0 H2O = 0.01 CO2 = 0.19 N2=0.64 Reference: Company Input


release) from existing Propane pipeline

- Propane pipeline - DNES001-G31-J45-001 Rev. and DNEPL Feasibility Report

DNEPL route scheme Gas - 89 65

Propane = 100 Reference: Company Input

S11

Loss of containment (gas release) from existing

HDPL extension line 16 inch

- HDPL pipeline -


DNEPL route scheme

Gas - 60.78 71.2

MEthane = 90.48 Ethane = 6.36 Propane = 2.15 I-Butane = 0.36 N-Butane = 0.49 I- Pentane =0.01 N-Pentane= 0 Hexane = 0 H2O = 0 CO2 = 0 N2=0.15 Reference: Company Input

S12

Loss of containment (gas release) from existing

HDPL extension line 12 inch

- HDPL pipeline -


DNEPL route scheme

Gas - 71.2 50

MEthane = 90.48 Ethane = 6.36 Propane = 2.15 I-Butane = 0.36 N-Butane = 0.49 I- Pentane =0.01 N-Pentane= 0 Hexane = 0 H2O = 0 CO2 = 0 N2=0.15 Reference: Company Input



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.1.9. Consequence Modelling in PHAST

The consequence modeling has been done using Vessel / Pipe source model considering process parameters, material composition. The release direction is considered vertical for underground pipeline section and horizontal for above ground pipeline section/equipment.

Overview

All the scenarios are modeled using the initial (peak) flow rate of the release which is appropriate for immediate fatalities. All the scenarios are modeled as outdoors releases.

Modeling of the following is detailed in this section.

• Flash fires;

• Jet fires;

• Vapour Cloud Explosions;

Release Hole Size

Component failures are the initiating events for hazards and accidents. Failures could be in the form of small gasket leak in a flange joint or failure of a pipeline or even rupture / catastrophic failure of equipment.

Major failure modes associated with different operational areas in a facility are for example; pipeline small/large leaks and ruptures, failure of weld joints / tie-in connections etc, valve gland leakages, leaks from flanges, compressors and other process equipment (due to rupture etc).

The scenarios are defined based on four different release sizes for process leaks;

• 5 mm;

• 25 mm;

• 100 mm;

• 150 mm (FBR);

Wind Characteristics

Wind characteristics, both direction and speed, impact the gas dispersion calculations influencing impact contours for flash fires and the gas volumes used in the explosion analysis. The wind does not influence jet fire impact contour apart from for vertical jet fires. Horizontal jet fires are not impacted by wind speed however their impact directions are equally distributed in the wind directions assumed in the analysis.

For consequence modelling purpose, 1.5F and 5D weather conditions are modelled, the details of these conditions are as below;

• 1.5F: 1.5 m/s wind speed, Stable-night with moderate cloud and light/moderate wind;

• 5D : 5 m/s wind speed, Neutral – Little sun and high wind or overcast/windy night;



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 102: Pasquill – Gifford Atmospheric Stability

Sr. No. Stability Class Weather Conditions

1. A Very unstable – sunny, light wind

2. A/B Unstable - as with A only less sunny or more windy

3. B Unstable - as with A/B only less sunny or more windy

4. B/C Moderately unstable – moderate sunny and moderate wind

5. C Moderately unstable – very windy / sunny or overcast / light wind

6. C/D Moderate unstable – moderate sun and high wind

7. D Neutral – little sun and high wind or overcast / windy night

8. E Moderately stable – less overcast and less windy night

9. F Stable – night with moderate clouds and light / moderate wind

10. G Very stable – possibly fog

Source: Purple Book

Ambient Conditions

As defined under QRA assumption register (Appendix A), the following ambient conditions are considered for consequence modelling:

• Wind direction: Wind rose data was used for defining wind direction;

• Set of weather: 1.5/F and 5/D

• Natural solar radiation 1 W/m2;

• Surface roughness coefficient 0.1 fraction;

• Atmospheric pressure 1.013 bar;

• Relative humidity 70 %(min);

• Ambient (average) temperature 41 °C.

Directional Probabilities

In the event of a loss of containment, the process fluid can be released in any of six directions namely upward, downward, or horizontally, north, south, east or west from the release location. The approach adopted assumes all these directions are equally likely so each attract a 17% probability of occurring. PHAST Risk Micro also includes options for impacted releases where the initial plume momentum is reduced to reflect impact. The plume characteristics for impacted releases are different from free field releases usually being slightly fatter with the effect length being significantly reduced.

The generic possible consequences effects of release / loss of containment is as follows:

Flash Fire

The extent of a flash fire is defined by the UDM Dispersion modelling. Flash Fire envelopes are defined by the dispersion down to lower flammable limit, LFL, and 50% LFL. 100% fatalities are assumed within the 50% LFL contour. The flash fires are assumed to occur with delayed ignition, when the overpressure is not significant.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

LFL: Lower flammability limit (LFL), usually expressed in volume percent is the lower end of the concentration range of a flammable solvent at a given temperature and pressure for which air/vapor mixtures can ignite.

1/2 LFL: Conservative estimate for LFL distance is considered as 1/2 LFL, for detectors mapping the detectors are set for 50%LFL, 20% LFL detection in that particular zone.

A flammable gas cloud will tend to form downwind from the release. Most small releases will rapidly disperse and will not ignite. There is unlikely to be an ignition source within range of such a release, because it would normally be in a Zone 1 or Zone 2 rated hazardous area. However, large releases in relatively calm conditions could result in the formation of a large flammable gas cloud that could eventually reach an ignition source located in a non-hazardous rated area. The ensuing fire would then tend to flash back to the source of the leak, resulting in a flash fire followed by a jet fire or pool fire. Flash fire scenarios are more likely in open areas with little or no potential for confinement.

The size of the flash fire depends on the size of the flammable gas cloud that has accumulated prior to ignition, which is influenced by the properties of the gas and the prevailing environmental conditions. The size of this cloud is predicted using gas dispersion computer modelling techniques for the Lower Flammable Limit (LFL) concentration of the flammable gas cloud, and for conservative reasons, half the LFL concentration. If the vapor cloud is unconfined and is less dense than air then it will disperse upwards.

Jet Fire

A jet flame occurs following the immediate ignition and combustion of a flammable fluid issuing continuously from a pipe or orifice. The cone model has been adopted which is a semi-empirical model, relatively simple and designed to predict quantities such as flame shape and heat flux to external objects. The API RP521 model is one of two methods available for calculating the effects of jet fires. The model treats the flame as a banana-shaped plume that is tapered at the ends, and bent by the wind or by the effects of gravity.

Vapour Cloud Explosion

The ignition of a flammable vapour cloud in a confined area gives rise to a VCE (Vapour Cloud Explosion). The overpressure produced in a VCE is determined by the reactivity of the gas, the degree of confinement of the vapour cloud, the number of obstacles in and around the cloud and the location of the point of ignition with respect to the escape path of the expanding gases.

In most VCEs the expanding flame front travels more slowly than the pressure wave. This type of explosion is called a deflagration and the maximum overpressure is determined by the expansion ratio of the burning gases. If the flame front travels fast enough to coincide with the pressure wave then the explosion is called a detonation and very severe overpressures can be produced.The main aim in modelling VCEs is to estimate the overpressures produced at various locations at various distances from the explosion.

It should be noted that the velocity of a flame front in a flash fire could increase drastically when it travels through obstacles or spaces between equipment, buildings or structures, resulting in an explosion scenario.

7.1.10. Ignition Sources

Electrical equipment and cables can act as sources of ignition if sparks are generated at contact points or where wires overheat. Most electrical equipment on the facility will be certified for use in hazardous areas. However, typical non-certified items could include:

• Portable electrical and welding equipment connected to small power sockets and welding outlets (the outlets themselves are certified);

• Non-certified equipment located in non-hazardous areas (e.g. the cranes, emergency generator, air compressors, chillers, etc); and



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

• Non-certified equipment located within the control or equipment rooms (e.g. emergency generator, firewater pumps).

In general, all electrical equipment will be automatically isolated upon detection of gas in the vicinity or in the ventilation intakes in the case of enclosed areas. However, there is always a delay due to the response time of the gas detectors. Battery powered emergency lighting will remain operational.

Static Electricity – static electricity can build up on any unearthed equipment and generate sparks. Static is commonly found on vehicles, vessels handling particulate solids and manned areas with unearthed floors.

Hot Surfaces – un-lagged surfaces (e.g. exhausts) on hot equipment can act as sources of ignition to oil releases.

Naked Flames – all naked flames (including cigarettes) are potential sources of ignition; this category also includes welding, flame-cutting equipment and other hot work, existing fires and flares.

Friction – equipment with moving parts in contact can generate heat through friction if not properly lubricated. This includes all rotating equipment and cold cutting devices such as drills, lathes and saws.

Impact – impact between hard surfaces, particularly metal on metal contact, can generate sparks. Potential impacts include dropped objects, hand tools, ladders and boat impact.

Auto-ignition – some chemicals can spontaneously ignite if exposed to air while oxidising agents, such as oxygen gas and peroxides, can cause flammable materials to ignite at ambient temperatures. Auto-ignition can occur upon the release of highly volatile gases such as hydrogen and acetylene, whose composition is such that a reverse Joule-Thompson effect occurs on their release that provides sufficient energy to ignite the escaping gas. However, auto-ignition is not applicable to process hydrocarbons.

Delayed Ignition

The consequences of ignition depend partly on the ignition delay from the time of the release. Flash fire and vapour cloud explosion scenario will take place in case of delayed ignition.

Immediate Ignition

Immediate ignition is usually caused by the incident causing the release. Examples include hot work, overheated bearings causing seal failure, impacts that generate sparks and rupture releases where friction or rupture energy can result in ignition.

Immediate ignition prevents personnel escaping before the fire occurs. It also occurs prior to the build-up of a large flammable gas cloud and jet fire shall take place in case of immediate ignition.

7.1.11. Impact Criteria

Thermal Radiation

Following thermal radiation levels, are proposed to be set as thresholds

Table 103: Impact Criteria for Radiation

Radiation KW/m2 Damage to People

4.0 Will cause pain in 15 to 20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure

12.5 30% Fatality in 30 sec. First degree burns in ten sec.

37.5 100 % Fatality.

Source: Purple Book



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Flash Fire

A 100% fatality level has been assumed for persons within the 0.5LFL radius of the flash fire, and none outside this radius. This is conservative compared with guidance provided in OGP report 14.1, Ref [18 &11] which suggest the LFL level for 100% fatality.

Explosion Overpressure

Following explosion overpressure levels, are proposed to be set as thresholds,

Table 104: Impact Criteria for Overpressure

Peak Over Pressure (bars) Type of Damage

0.03 Glass Shattering with body penetrating velocities

0.1 Repairable (10% damage)

0.35 30 % lethality for people outdoors

0.5 90 % lethality for people outdoors

Source: Purple Book



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Consequence Modelling Results

Table 105: Consequence Result for Flash Fire and Jet Fire

Scenario No. Description Pressure

(Barg) Temp.

(Deg. C) Leak Size

(mm)

Release Rate Kg/S

Flash Fire Impact Distance

Flame Length (M)

Jet Fire Impact Distance

LFL Concentration Downwind Distance (M)

Radiation Level Effect Distance (M)

1.5F 5D (Kw/M2) 1.5F 5d

S1 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from pump station

at DMD 112 30

5 1.22 LFL 9 7

14.9

4 23 20

12.5 19 16

0.5 LFL 19 15 37.5 17 13

25 62.07 LFL 65 63

30

4 103 88

12.5 85 70

0.5 LFL 148 158 37.5 74 58

100 207 LFL 316 331

489

4 359 310

12.5 293 242

0.5 LFL 594 711 37.5 253 202

FBR 293 LFL 474 504

1101

4 514 445

12.5 420 347

0.5 LFL 860 1050 37.5 362 289

S2 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL 112 30

5 9.6 LFL 0.5 0.9

1.22

4 12 14

12.5 2 8

0.5 LFL 1.6 2.3 37.5 NR 1.7

25 30.5 LFL 4 5

40.1

4 58 56

12.5 18 29

0.5 LFL 12 13 37.5 NR 2.9

100 48.9 LFL 193 49

133.9

4 190 168

12.5 60 82

0.5 LFL 393 120 37.5 NR 6.3

FBR 1101 LFL 498 226

189

4 258 230

12.5 76 108

0.5 LFL 878 403 37.5 NR 8.3

S3 Loss of containment (etahne release) from intermediate

pigging station (IPS) 112 30

5 1.22 LFL 9 7

14.9

4 23 20

12.5 19 16

0.5 LFL 19 15 37.5 17 13

25 62.07 LFL 65 63

30

4 103 88

12.5 85 70

0.5 LFL 148 158 37.5 74 58

100 207 LFL 316 331

489

4 359 310

12.5 293 242

0.5 LFL 594 711 37.5 253 202

FBR 1101 LFL 474 504

293

4 514 445

12.5 420 347

0.5 LFL 860 1050 37.5 362 289

S4 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from metering and

regulating station (M&R) at NMD 73 30

5 0.75 LFL 7 6

12.06

4 19 16

12.5 15 12

0.5 LFL 14 10 37.5 13 10

25 18.7

LFL 48 46

50.2

4 83 71

12.5 68 56

0.5 LFL 113 116 37.5 59 47

100 300 LFL 245 253

167

4 289 249

12.5 237 195

0.5 LFL 476 568 37.5 204 163

FBR 675 LFL 374 396

238

4 415 359

12.5 339 280

0.5 LFL 692 841 37.5 293 233



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03


(Barg) Temp.

(Deg. C) Leak Size

(mm)

Release Rate Kg/S


Flame Length (M)




1.5F 5D (Kw/M2) 1.5F 5d

S5 Loss of containment (gas release) from Hazira SPUR

pipeline at M&R (46 KM) (8 Inch) 89 30

5 0.8 LFL 0.3 0.7

8.10

4 10 12

12.5 1.3 7

0.5 LFL 1.2 1.8 37.5 NR 1.2

25 20.7 LFL 3 4

33.7

4 48 47

12.5 14 25

0.5 LFL 9 10 37.5 NR 2.5

100 331 LFL 324 34

112

4 163 144

12.5 53 71

0.5 LFL 600 88 37.5 NR 5.3

FBR 745 LFL 362 155

160

4 222 197

12.5 67 94

0.5 LFL 653 285 37.5 NR 7

S6 Loss of containment (gas release) from existing HDPL

pipeline 26 inch 60.78 60

5 0.19 LFL 0.06 0.17

5.07

4 1.7 4.9

12.5 NR NR

0.5 LFL 0.24 0.48 37.5 NR NR

25 4.87 LFL 0.54 1.02

23.8

4 13 22

12.5 NR 5.7

0.5 LFL 1.90 2.7 37.5 NR NR

100 78.06 LFL 3.3 4.7

80.32

4 57 81

12.5 NR 28

0.5 LFL 10 12 37.5 NR NR

FBR 175 LFL 5.6 7.3

114

4 86 118

12.5 NR 44

0.5 LFL 17 19 37.5 NR NR


pipeline 24 inch 71.18 50

5 0.2 LFL 0.08 0.22

6

4 2.5 5.6

12.5 NR 0.9

0.5 LFL 0.34 0.62 37.5 NR NR

25 5.35 LFL 0.7 1.3

25

4 16 25

12.5 NR 8

0.5 LFL 2.6 3.6 37.5 NR NR

100 85.6 LFL 4.5 6.1

84.7

4 68 91

12.5 NR 36

0.5 LFL 14 16 37.5 NR NR

FBR 192 LFL 7.5 9.6

120

4 102 133

12.5 NR 55

0.5 LFL 22 25 37.5 NR NR

S8 Loss of containment (gas release) from existing EWPL

pipeline 98 60

5 0.29 LFL 0.1 0.2

6.91

4 3.09 6.4

12.5 NR 1.1

0.5 LFL 0.4 0.7 37.5 NR NR

25 7.31 LFL 0.92 1.5

28

4 18 29

12.5 NR 9.4

0.5 LFL 3.1 4.2 37.5 NR NR

100 117 LFL 5.4 7

96

4 79 105

12.5 NR 42.5

0.5 LFL 16 18 37.5 NR NR

FBR 263 LFL 9 10

137

4 118 153

12.5 NR 64

0.5 LFL 170 29 37.5 NR NR

S9 Loss of containment (gas release) from existing HAZIRA

spur line 28 inch 97 30

5 0.3 LFL 1.1 0.2

7.1

4 3.2 6.6

12.5 NR 1.1

0.5 LFL 0.4 0.7 37.5 NR NR

25 7.8 LFL 0.9 1.6

29.09

4 19 30

12.5 NR 9.8

0.5 LFL 3.3 4.4 37.5 NR NR



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03


(Barg) Temp.

(Deg. C) Leak Size

(mm)

Release Rate Kg/S


Flame Length (M)




1.5F 5D (Kw/M2) 1.5F 5d

100 125 LFL 5.7 7.5

99

4 82 109

12.5 NR 44

0.5 LFL 17 20 37.5 NR NR

FBR 282 LFL 9.3 11

141

4 122 158

12.5 NR 66

0.5 LFL 220 31 37.5 NR NR

S10 Loss of containment (gas release) from existing Propane

pipeline 89 65

5 1.1 LFL 0.6 1.1

8.9

4 15 14

12.5 5.6 8.4

0.5 LFL 1.9 2.6 37.5 NR 3

25 27.6 LFL 100 34

36.9

4 60 53

12.5 24 29

0.5 LFL 140 67 37.5 NR 4.2

100 442 LFL 27 28

122

4 179 160

12.5 61 82

0.5 LFL 351 77 37.5 NR NR

FBR 994 LFL 220 121

173

4 243 220

12.5 77 109

0.5 LFL 443 188 37.5 NR 11


extension line 16 inch 60.78 60

5 0.18 LFL 0.07 0.2

4.57

4 2.4 5.2

12.5 NR NR

0.5 LFL 0.3 0.5 37.5 NR NR

25 4.74 LFL 0.6 1.1

23.64

4 15 23

12.5 NR 7

0.5 LFL 2.3 3.2 37.5 NR NR

100 75.71 LFL 4 5.5

79.57

4 64 86

12.5 NR 34

0.5 LFL 12 14 37.5 NR NR

FBR 170 LFL 6.7 8.4

113

4 96 125

12.5 NR 52

0.5 LFL 20 22 37.5 NR NR


extension line 12 inch 71.2 50

5 0.2 LFL 0.08 0.2

6.13

4 2.7 5.7

12.5 NR 1

0.5 LFL 0.34 0.6 37.5 NR NR

25 5.73 LFL 0.7 1.3

25.7

4 16 25

12.5 NR 8.5

0.5 LFL 2.6 3.5 37.5 NR NR

100 91.7 LFL 4.6 6.18

86.47

4 70 94

12.5 NR 38

0.5 LFL 14 16 37.5 NR NR

FBR 206 LFL 7.6 9.6

122

4 105 137

12.5 NR 57

0.5 LFL 35 25 37.5 NR NR

Based on the above results of Flash Fire and Jet Fire for different sections of pipeline at different leak sizes following observations are made

1. The damage distances in terms of Flash fire and Jet fire are considerably high for above ground section of pipeline than underground pipeline. 2. The flash fire at 0.5 LFL distance is reaching to maximum distance of 498 m at 100 % LFL for DNEPL pipeline 3. The maximum damage distance of 514 m is observed for 4kw/m2 heat radiation for Pump station (Above ground) 4. The maximum damage distance of 258 m is observed for 4kw/m2 heat radiation for DNEPL pipeline (Underground)



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 106: Vapour Cloud Explosion Results (VCE)

Sr.No Description Scenario Ref.

Explosion

Impulse (bar)

Weather

1.5F 5D

(m) (m)

S1 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from pump station at DMD

5 mm

0.03 16.05 15.41

0.1 11.49 11.33

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 178.21 184.79

0.1 149.44 158.59

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 755.23 863.63

0.1 630.83 747.96

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S2 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL pipeline route

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 40.57 35.26

0.1 17.55 16.24

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 507.28 172.44

0.1 418.98 125.43

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S3 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from Intermediate Pigging Station (IPS)

5 mm

0.03 16.05 15.41

0.1 11.49 11.337

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 178.21 184.79

0.1 149.44 158.59

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 755.23 863.63

0.1 630.83 747.96

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S4 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from metering and regulating station (M&R) at

NMD

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR 31.24

0.1 NR 15.24

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 234.88 115.54

0.1 163.44 58.66

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Sr.No Description Scenario Ref.

Explosion

Impulse (bar)

Weather

1.5F 5D

(m) (m)

S5 Loss of containment (gas release) from Hazira SPUR pipeline at M&R (46 KM) (8 Inch)

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 32.13 NR

0.1 15.46 NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 726.23 125.68

0.1 631.19 91.29

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S6 Loss of containment (gas release) from existing HDPL pipeline 26 inch

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 48.43 43.18

0.1 19.49 18.2

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S7 Loss of containment (gas release) from existing HDPL pipeline 24 inch

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 51.24 45.59

0.1 20.19 18.79

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S8 Loss of containment (gas release) from EWPL pipeline

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 62.07 54.81

0.1 22.85 21.07

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

S9 Loss of containment (gas release) from HAZIRA spur line 28 inch

5 mm

0.03 16.05 15.41

0.1 11.49 11.33

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 64.05 56.88

0.1 23.35 21.58

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S10 Loss of containment (gas release) from Propane pipeline

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 40.64 35.03

0.1 17.57 16.18

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 769.78 353.49

0.1 679.60 290.63

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S11 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL extension line 16 inch

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 51 45

0.1 20 18

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

S12 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL extension line 12 inch

5 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

25 mm

0.03 NR NR

0.1 NR NR

0.35 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

100 mm

0.03 55 49

0.1 21 19

0.3 NR NR

0.5 NR NR

Based on the above results of Vapour Cloud explosion for different sections of pipeline at different leak sizes following observations are made

1. The maximum damage distance of 863 m is observed for 0.03 bar peak overpressure for Pump station at DMD (Above ground)



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Thermal Radiation Contours

The effect zone contours and graphs for various radiation levels for jet fire @ 5D condition and flash fire concentration zone (LFL and 0.5LFL) are shown below:

Figure 80 : Effect Zone Contours – 1: Gas Jet Fire (Scenario – S1, 25 mm Leak)




IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 82 : Effect Zone Contours –5: Gas Jet Fire (Scenario – S3, 25 mm Leak)




IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03


Figure 85 : Effect Zone Contours – 11:Jet Fire (Scenario – S6, 25 mm Leak)



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 86 : Effect Zone Contours – 13: Jet Fire (Scenario – S7, 25 mm Leak)




IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03





IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.1.12. Likelihood Assessment

Failure Frequency

Failure frequencies are estimated using generic failure databases published by organizations such as International Oil & Gas Producers Association (OGP).

• OGP Report No. 434-1 “Process Release Frequencies” for equipment & piping

• OGP Report No. 434-4 “Riser and Pipeline failure Frequency”

For underground pipeline OGP Report No. 434-4 “Riser and Pipeline failure Frequency” guideline is referred and for different section of pipeline such Pump station, Pigging station, and Metering and Regulating station OGP Report No. 434-1 “Process Release Frequencies” for equipment & piping is referred. As such no data is available for different leak size for an underground pipeline the failure frequency have been taken depending upon the wall thickness of the pipeline.

The failure frequency considered for various scenarios is listed below.

Table 107: Release Frequency for various Scenarios

Sr. No


Scenario No. 5mm 25mm 100mm 150 mm (FBR)

Release frequency

1

Loss of containment (Ethane release) from pump station at DMD

S1 1.9E-03 1.2E-3 8.0E-9

8.0E-9

2

Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL pipeline route

S2 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4

3

Loss of containment (etahne release) from intermediate pigging station (IPS)

S3 1.9E-03 1.2E-3 3.7E-4 4.6E-4

4

Loss of containment (Ethane release) from metering and regulating station (M&R) at NMD

S4 1.6E-5 6.7E-6 1.4E-6 5.9E-6

5

Loss of containment (gas release) from Hazira SPUR pipeline at M&R (46 KM) (8 Inch)

S5 1.7E-5 7.4E-6 7.6E-6 7.6E-6

6

Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL pipeline 26 inch

S6 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4

7


S7 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Sr. No


Scenario No. 5mm 25mm 100mm 150 mm (FBR)

Release frequency

8 Loss of containment (gas release) from EWPL pipeline

S8 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5

9

Loss of containment (gas release) from HAZIRA spur line 28 inch

S9 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5

10 Loss of containment (gas release) from Propane pipeline

S10 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4

11

Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL extension line 16 inch

S11 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5

12


S12 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5

7.1.13. Ignition Probability

Release probability

The ignition probabilities are based on ignition probability data published by OGP Report, March 2010. The reference provides a curve that provides a relationship between the total ignition probability and the release rate in kg/s. As a conservative estimate average ignition probability has been considered for calculation. The breakdown between immediate and delayed ignitions has been assumed which suggests that 30% of ignitions will be immediate and 70% delayed. The same had been defined in Assumption Register.

• Delayed Ignition Probability = Ignition Probability × 0.70

• Immediate Ignition Probability = Ignition Probability × (1- 0.70)

The defaults within PHAST Risk Micro were assumed for the break down between flash fires and explosions.

Event Tree

Each release can produce a variety of possible outcomes. If ignited, a vapor release can produce a jet fire, a flash fire, or even a vapor cloud explosion. If the vapor release contains toxics and it is not ignited, it could deliver toxic effects to receptors downwind. The PHAST Risk program calculates the frequency and the associated consequences of every possible outcome using four basic event trees. The event tree shown in Figure is for hazardous event outcome for Ethane pipeline.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 92 : Event tree for hazardous incident outcomes for DNEPL



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 108: Event Frequency for various Scenarios

Sr. No


Scenario No.

Leak Size/

Rupture

Initiating event

Probability of Jet Fire

Probability of Flash

Fire

Probability of VCE

1

Loss of containment (Ethane release) from pump station at DMD

S1

5 mm 1.90E-03 5.70E-04 9.58E-04 1.06E-04

25 mm 1.20E-03 3.60E-04 6.05E-04 6.72E-05

100 mm 8.00E-09 1.92E-10 4.03E-09 4.48E-10

150 mm (FBR)

8.00E-09 1.92E-10 4.03E-09 4.48E-10

2 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL

S2

5 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

25 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

100 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

150 mm (FBR)

1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

3

Loss of containment (etahne release) from intermediate pigging station (IPS)

S3

5 mm 1.90E-03 5.70E-04 9.58E-04 1.06E-04

25 mm 1.20E-03 3.60E-04 6.05E-04 6.72E-05

100 mm 3.70E-04 1.11E-04 1.86E-04 2.07E-05

150 mm (FBR)

4.60E-04 1.38E-04 2.32E-04 2.58E-05

4

Loss of containment (Ethane release) from metering and regulating station (M&R) at NMD

S4

5 mm 1.60E-05 4.80E-06 8.06E-06 8.96E-07

25 mm 6.70E-06 2.01E-06 3.38E-06 3.75E-07

100 mm 1.40E-06 4.20E-07 7.06E-07 7.84E-08

150 mm (FBR)

5.90E-06 1.77E-06 2.97E-06 3.30E-07

5

Loss of containment (gas release) from Hazira SPUR pipeline at M&R (46 KM) (8 Inch)

S5

5 mm 1.70E-05 5.10E-06 8.57E-06 9.52E-07

25 mm 7.40E-06 2.22E-06 3.73E-06 4.14E-07

100 mm 7.60E-06 2.28E-06 3.83E-06 4.26E-07

150 mm (FBR)

7.60E-06 2.28E-06 3.83E-06 4.26E-07

6


S6

5 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

25 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

100 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

150 mm (FBR)

1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Sr. No


Scenario No.

Leak Size/

Rupture

Initiating event


Probability of Flash

Fire

Probability of VCE

7


S7

5 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

25 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

100 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

150 mm (FBR)

1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06


S8

5 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

25 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

100 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

150 mm (FBR)

8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

9

Loss of containment (gas release) from HAZIRA spur line 28 inch

S9

5 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

25 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

100 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

150 mm (FBR)

8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06


S10

5 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

25 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

100 mm 1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

150 mm (FBR)

1.70E-04 5.10E-05 8.57E-05 9.52E-06

11


S11

5 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

25 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

100 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

150 mm (FBR)

8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

12


S12

5 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

25 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

100 mm 8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06

150 mm (FBR)

8.10E-05 2.43E-05 4.08E-05 4.54E-06



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Leak Detection and Isolation time

The closing (isolation) time of the systems is based on the following considerations:

The closing time for an automatic blocking system is based on a fully automated gas detection system. The closing time of 2 min consists of:

• 30 s for the gas to reach the detector;

• 30 s for the closing signal from the detector to reach the closing valve;

• 1 min to close the valves.

The closing time for a remote controlled blocking system is based on an automated gas detection system. The closing time of 10 min consists of:

• 30 s for the gas to reach the detector;

• 30 s for the alert signal from the detector to reach the control room;

• 7 min to validate the signal

• 2 min to close the valves.

The closing time for a hand-operated blocking system is based on automated gas detection system. The closing time of 30 min consists of:

• 30 sec for the gas to reach the detector;

• 30 sec for the alert signal from the detector to reach the control room;

• 7 min to validate the signal;

• 15 min for the operator to go to the blocking valve and to make use of personal protective equipment;

• 7 min to remove the security locks and to close the valves.

This is the conservative approach considered for assessment rather than the actuals to study worst case effects (Purple book).

The isolation time depends upon the availability of ESDV in the identified scenario loop. If ESDV present in the hazardous scenario, assumption of 2 minute isolation time and if ESDV not present then 10 minute isolation time is considered.

7.1.14. Risk Evaluation

Risk Criteria

Risk criteria are standards used to translate numerical risk estimates (e.g. 10-6 per year) as produced by a risk analysis into value judgements (e.g. ‘negligible risk’) that can be set against other value judgements (e.g. ‘high economic benefits’) in a decision-making process. Risk criteria comprise the technical aspect of the decision making process.

There have been several interpretations of the terminology of risk criteria, in which the terms ‘acceptable’ and ‘tolerable’ are often used. Sometimes these are used interchangeably. Sometimes ‘acceptable’ risks are considered to be lower than ‘tolerable’ ones (HSE 1992b).

Individual Risk Criteria

Individual risk is the risk that an individual remaining at a particular spot would face from the facility. The calculation of individual risk at a geographical location in and around a facilityassumes that the contributions of all incident outcome cases are additive. Thus, the total individual risk at each point is equal to the sum of the individual risks, at that point, of all incident outcome cases associated with the plant.

The individual risk value is a frequency of fatality, usually chances per million per year, and it is displayed as a two-dimensional plot over a locality plan as contours of equal risk in the form of iso-risk contours.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

For the purpose of effective risk assessment, it is necessary to have established criteria for tolerable risk. The risk tolerability criteria defined by RIL standards is used for risk assessment. The individual risk criteria as per RIL standard are as follows.

Intolerable Risk Region: If the summed individual risk of fatality is greater than 1 in 10,000 per year (IRPA 1.0e-04/year for onsite) and 1 in 1,00,000 per year (1.0e-05/year offsite) then the risk is deemed intolerable and fundamental improvements are needed. Under exceptional circumstances operations may be considered or continued for a limited duration only, provided that no practicable alternative solutions exist and the workforce is fully informed.

ALARP Region: if the summed individual risk of fatality lies between (1 in 10,000 per year (onsite), 1 in 1,00,000 per year (offsite) and above 1 in 1,000,000 per year (IRPA 1.0e-03/yr / 1.0e-04/yr > 1.0e-06/yr), then remedial measures need to be implemented to reduce the risk to a level that is ALARP. The expenditure considered reasonably practicable to achieve the necessary risk reduction will depend on the level of initial risk, the risk reduction that would be achieved and the cost of achieving the reduction (This process is known as Cost Benefit Analysis).

Negligible Risk Region: A summed individual risk of fatality below 1 in 1,000,000 per year (e.g. IRPA 9.9e-07/yr) is negligible and deemed acceptable. No additional measures other than applying best practice and maintaining normal precautions are considered necessary, bearing in mind the requirement to reduce all risks to ALARP and to continually investigate areas for improvement

The ALARP triangle as per HSE UK Standard is presented below in Figure 93. A region of 1E-04 and 1E-06 represents the ALARP region. This should be subject to a risk reduction exercise to demonstrate that the ALARP position has been achieved for the project.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 93 : Individual Risk Criteria

Societal Risk (or Group Risk) Criteria

Societal Risk parameter considers the number of people who might be affected by hazardous incidents. Societal risk is represented as an F-N (frequency-number) curve, which is a logarithmic plot of cumulative frequency (F) at which events with N or more fatalities may occur, against N.

Societal risk criteria indicate reduced tolerance to events involving multiple fatalities. For example a hazard may have an acceptable level of risk for one fatality, but may be at an unacceptable level for 10 fatalities. The tolerability criteria for societal risk as defined by UK-HSE are shown in the following Figure 94.

Intolerable

Risk

Risk

Tolerable if

Broadly

Acceptable

10-4 per year

10-6 per year

10-5 per year

10-6 per year

Risk to

Personnel

Risk to

Public



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 94 : Societal Risk Criteria

Risk Results

The results of a QRA are the Individual Risk Contours and the Societal Risk graphs.

The Individual Risk represents the frequency of an individual dying due to loss of containment events (LOCs). The individual is assumed to be unprotected and to be present during the total exposure time. The Individual Risk is presented as contour lines on a topographic map.

The Societal Risk represents the frequency of having an accident with N or more people being killed simultaneously. The people involved are assumed to have some means of protection. The Societal Risk is presented as an F-N curve, where N is the number of deaths and F the cumulative frequency of accidents with N or more deaths.

Pipelines and Equipment Risk contours

The risk estimated due to the different pipeline sections are shown in risk contours given in

Figures 95 to 99.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 95 : Risk Transect for Pump station at DMD

From the figure, the following observation can be taken further:

• The maximum individual risk at the Pump station at DMD is found to be 1x10-5.

• The risk at the Pump station at DMD is at ALARP region as per HSE UK Risk criteria.

Figure 96 : Iso Risk Contour for DNEPL Pipeline



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03


• The maximum individual risk at the DNEPL Pipeline is found to be 1 x 10-5.

• The risk due to DNEPL Pipeline is at ALARP region as per HSE UK Risk criteria.

Figure 97 : Iso Risk Contour for Intermediate Pigging station


• The maximum individual risk at the Intermediate Pigging Station is found to be 1 x 10-6

• The risk at the Intermediate Pigging Station is at ALARP region as per HSE UK Risk criteria.

Figure 98 : Risk transect for M&R station at NMD



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Fromthe figure,the following observation canbetakenfurther:

• The maximum individual risk at the M&R station at NMD is found to be 1 x 10-6.

• The risk at the M&R station at NMD is at ALARP region as per HSE UK Risk criteria.

Figure 99 : Iso Risk Contour for M&R station at Hazira Spur pipeline


• The maximum individual risk at the M&R station at Hazira Spur pipeline is found to be 1x10-6.

• The risk at the M&R station at Hazira Spur pipeline is at ALARP region as per HSE UK Risk criteria.

7.1.15. Societal Risk Results

The Societal Risk represents the frequency of having an accident with N or more fatality simultaneously. The people involved are assumed to have some means of protection. The Societal Risk is presented as an FN curve, where N is the number of fatalities and F the cumulative frequency of accidents with N or more fatalities.

Based on the risk analysis as the consequences affects are not reaching the surrounding population it is concluded that societal risk is in the acceptable region. The societal risk is presented in below Figure 100.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 100: Societal Risk

From the above Overall Societal risk graph it is observed that the curve for Frequency Vs Number of fatalities is below 10-4 and fall under acceptable region.

7.1.16. Evaluation of Individual Risk

The entire pipeline route was surveyed to locate the areas of habitation/settlements within the proximity of the pipeline upto 200 m. For simplification of risk evaluation, the locations were classified into three zones, viz. (1) 0-20 m, (2) 20-125 m and (3) beyond 125 m. The total population distribution was assumed to be the worst case. Risk was estimated by summing up the potential effects of all events along the pipeline.

The maximum IR within the three zones is given in the table below:



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 109: Event Frequency for various Scenarios

Cumulative Chainage (m)

Dwellings Population Dwelling Type Village Name

Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

1.09 1 78

Reliance Industries

Limited, Dahej Manufacturing

Division

Lakhigam/Dahej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

2.39 1 26 Sterling Industries Ambheta/Da

hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

2.29 1 15 Hutments Ambheta/Da

hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

2.44 1 2 Hut Ambheta/Da

hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

2.71 1 2 Nocil Industries Ambheta/Da

hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

3.07 1 3 Chamber Dahej/Dahej

GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

3.13 1 38 Getco Ambheta/Da

hej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

3.19 1 7 Temple Dahej/Dahej

GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

3.81 1 95 Gujarat Alkalies And Chamicals

Ltd.(Gacl)

Ambheta/Dahej GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

4.96 1 2 Room Dahej/Dahej

GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

5.75 1 44 (Dgen

Power)Torrent Energy Ltd.

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- I 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

5.40 1 10 Back Bone

Enterprises Ltd.

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- I 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

5.33 1 0 Gspc Chamber Dahej/Dahej

GIDC 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

Phase- I

5.87 1 12 Luna Chemical

Bus Stop

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- I 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

6.63 1 2 Hut Dahej/Dahej

GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

6.67 1 2 Hut Dahej/Dahej

GIDC Phase- I

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

6.68 1 2 Uday Weigh

Bridge

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- I 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

6.69 1 8 Temporary Hut

Area

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- I 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

6.70 1 11 Temporary

Hutment Area

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

6.82 1 2 House Dahej/Dahej

GIDC Phase- II

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.58 1 35 Swaminarayan Infrastructure

Camp

Dahej/Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.94 1 60 Saraswati Town

Ship

Suwa/Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.90 1 6 Bus Stop Suwa/Dahej

GIDC Phase- II

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.92 1 7 Saraswati Town Ship Bus Stop

Suwa/Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.02 1 12 Vadadala Bus

Stop

Suwa/Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.34 1 5 House Suwa/Dahej

GIDC Phase- II

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.41 1 10 Hotel Malwa Suwa/Dahej

GIDC Phase- II

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.47 1 6 Weigh Bridge Suwa/Dahej

GIDC Phase- Ii

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

11.08 1 2 Room Suwa/Dahej

GIDC Phase- II

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

12.02 1 50

Under Construction M/S. ADANI Thermal

Power Plant.

SUWA/DAHEJ GIDC

PHASE- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

12.94 1 6 Temple Suwa/Dahej

GIDC Phase- II

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

13.42 1 12 Action Company

Open Plot

Rahiyad / Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

14.01 1 110

Gujarat Narmada Valley Fertilizers & Chemical Ltd.

(GNFC)

Rahiyad / Dahej GIDC

Phase- II 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

17.60 15 45 Dahej GGS Koliyad/Dah

ej GIDC Phase IV

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

26.43 1 4 Building Eksal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





26.51 3 95 School Eksal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

31.24 1 5 SV-1 Hazira

Dahej (HDPL RIL) Bhadbhut 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

31.23 1 4 G.S.P.L Terminal

Bhadbhut Bhadbhut 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

31.14 1 12

RGTIL EWPL Compressor

Station, Bhadbhut(Cs-10)

Bhadbhut 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

38.36 1 4 Room Matied 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

40.88 62 248 Village Site Nava

Dhanturiya Matied 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

41.09 1 10 Temple Matied 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

42.74 1 10 GAIL DUPL MLV Mothia 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

46.61 1 4 Room Digas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

46.76 1 2 ONGC Drillsite Digas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

46.93 1 5 ONGC Drillsite Digas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

47.72 1 5 IOCL SV Station (Amod To Hazra

Pipe Line) Kalam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

48.28 1 10 ONGC Drillsite Kalam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

50.31 25 65 Residential Area Rohid 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

52.09 1 12 ONGC Drillsite Kudadara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

55.58 50 120 Parvat Village Site Parvat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

63.33 25 70 Anita

Village Site Anita 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

67.59 1 4 Temple Syadla 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

69.93 1 4 House Kareli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

73.19 1 4 House Sekhpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

73.47 1 5 Shed Sekhpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

74.33 1 4 Room Sekhpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

74.63 32 76 Hari Darshan

Society Sekhpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

74.87 1 3 Room Sekhpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

75.23 1 4 House Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

75.24 1 3 Room Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

76.41 88 224 Ram Vatika

Society Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

76.49 6 50 Building Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


76.69 10 40 Building Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

76.71 1 5 Fram House Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

76.78 1 12 Textiles City Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

76.80 1 4 Shed Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


76.90 1 4 Hut Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

76.92 1 4 Hut Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

77.09 1 3 Open Na Plot Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

77.41 1 22 Millenium Resident

Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

77.63 1 18 Madhav Resident Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

77.99 1 8 EWPL MLV-37 Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

78.41 1 12 Panchbhumi N.A.

Plot Velanja 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

80.30 1 4 House Kathor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

81.04 1 2 Hut Bhada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

81.23 25 100 Bhada Gaon Village Site

Bhada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

81.24 1 3 Room Bhada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

81.33 1 2 House Bhada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

81.35 1 4 House Bhada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

82.46 35 140 Bhada Gaon Basti

Site Bhada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.49 12 55 Bajrang Society Walak 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.54 68 175 Bajrang Society Walak 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.79 1 22 Mahakali Temple Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.75 34 75 Lalan Krupa

Society Walak 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.87 1 55 Building Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.90 1 12 Sai Nath Graned Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.96 10 30 Bhola Nagar Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

83.94 1 4 Shop Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

84.08 1 100 Building Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

84.30 21 45 Bhola Nagar Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

84.51 1 12 Garage Laskana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

84.98 1 3 Room Pasodara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

85.67 1 4 House Pasodara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

87.22 1 3 House Kosmada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

87.74 1 4 House Kosmada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

88.32 1 7 Open Plot Kosmada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

88.71 1 1 Room Kosmada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

88.80 1 4 Temple Kosmada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

88.96 3 7 Village Site Kosmada

Kosmada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

89.55 1 1 Room Chedsa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

89.85 1 2 Room Chedsa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

89.96 1 1 Room Chedsa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

90.08 1 2 Room Chedsa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

90.56 1 2 Room Chedsa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

90.93 1 2 Room Antroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

91.29 1 25 Bhathvari Hotel Sabar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

91.34 1 1 Pump House Antroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

91.42 4 26 Haridhwar Farm Antroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

91.45 1 2 Room Sabar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

92.10 1 3 House Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

92.10 1 5 Tabelo Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

92.10 1 4 Mp Farm Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

92.75 1 5 U/C Work Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

92.89 2 7 C.M Farm Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

93.33 4 14 Residential Plot Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

93.43 1 4 House Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

93.45 2 6 Tiku Farm Niyol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

100.70 1 5 House Vaktana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

100.73 1 3 Room Vaktana 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

101.30 35 145 Residential Buildings

Pardi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

101.85 1 3 House Bhatia 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

102.23 1 4 House Bhatia 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Bhatia 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

102.69 1 2 Room Bhatia 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

102.81 1 2 Room Bhatia 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

103.34 20 70 Hajipur Village

Site Kachholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

105.25 1 2 House Kachholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

105.25 1 3 House Kachholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

107.47 1 2 Room Dabhel 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

107.71 37 77 Mehmud Nagar

Residential Society

Dabhel 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Dabhel 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

108.16 5 26 Residential Buildingds

Dabhel 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

108.43 1 3 Poultry farm Dabhel 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

108.93 1 9 RGTIL EWPL

MLV-36 Dabhel 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

109.53 1 2 Room Dhaman 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

110.46 1 4 House Parthan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

111.91 1 7 Temple Vejalpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

111.93 1 4 House Vejalpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

112.00 1 11 Residential Buildingds

Vejalpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

112.21 1 2 Room Vejalpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

114.30 1 3 Room Amadpor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

114.57 1 2 Room Amadpor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

116.16 1 8 Temple Moldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

117.85 1 22 Shree Datt

Navnath Ashram Moldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

117.83 1 6 House Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

117.84 1 5 Shed Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

117.85 1 7 Shed Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

118.22 1 3 House Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

118.26 1 33 Baps Shree

Swaminarayan Temple

Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

118.43 1 3 House Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

118.45 1 7 House Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

118.73 1 2 Room Onchi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

121.28 1 3 House Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

121.49 1 5 House Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

121.52 1 2 Room Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

121.99 1 9 House Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

122.01 1 4 House Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

122.02 1 3 House Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

122.07 1 6 Temple Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

122.07 1 5 Shed Munsad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

124.55 1 55 Somnath Agro

Industries Ashtgam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

124.75 1 4 House Ashtgam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

124.83 3 22 Koli Samaj

Sanskrutik Sankul Ashtgam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

124.93 1 6 House Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

124.97 1 2 Shop Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

125.04 1 3 Shop Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

125.17 1 13 Shree Sai Kutir Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

125.55 1 2 Room Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

125.57 1 4 House Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

127.47 1 2 Room Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

128.08 1 7 Temple Khadsupa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

130.69 1 3 Room Pipaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

132.00 1 2 Room Pipaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

133.31 1 7 Shed Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

133.50 1 8 Temple Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

133.95 1 7 Temple Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

134.21 1 2 Pump House Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

135.43 1 3 House Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

135.99 1 4 House Duwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

136.14 1 7 Temple Duwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

136.64 1 3 House Khergam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



137.68 1 4 House Deshad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

138.99 17 54 House Area Ambheta 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

139.21 1 14

Mlv-35 Reliance Gas

Transportation Infrastructure Ltd

Ambheta 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

139.22 1 4 House Ambheta 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

139.25 1 2 Room Ambheta 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

139.26 9 5 Poultry Farm Ambheta 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

139.59 1 5 Shed Ambheta 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

141.90 1 1 Toilet Nandarkha 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

142.11 1 3 House Nandarkha 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


142.68 1 2 Room Nandarkha 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


142.73 2 5 Houses Nandarkha 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

142.74 12 56 Houses Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

142.76 1 3 House Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


142.84 1 3 Shed Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

143.04 1 1 Toilet Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

143.19 1 4 Shed Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


143.23 1 7 Yojna Samiti (Vakal) Pani

Purvatha Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


143.24 1 3 House Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

143.25 1 4 House Vankal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

145.98 1 2 Poultryfarm Undach Vaniya Faliya

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

146.93 3 7 Houses Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


147.06 1 3 House Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

147.08 1 1 Toilet Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07






147.19 1 1 Toilet Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



147.41 9 29 Village Site

Leshiya Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


148.74 1 13 Sarvoday Hotel Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

149.26 1 2 Room Vaghaldhara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

150.13 1 1 House Gorgam 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

153.36 6 17 Houses Tighara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


156.09 7 16 Houses Area Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

156.21 9 21 Houses Dhanori 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


157.42 7 23 Houses Fanaswada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

157.45 1 3 House Fanaswada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

157.50 11 33 House Area Fanaswada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

157.65 9 26 House Area Fanaswada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




157.84 1 1 Toilet Fanaswada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

158.02 1 16 Ashram Fanaswada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m


158.83 1 4 House Kochwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

158.89 1 3 House Kochwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

159.30 8 17 Village Site Kochwada

Kochwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

159.42 1 7 Temple Kochwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

159.44 14 31 House Area Kochwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

159.47 2 13 Building Kochwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

161.36 1 5 Shed Thakkarwad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

162.01 10 23 Houses Area Thakkarwad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

162.07 1 2 Room Thakkarwad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

162.09 6 19 Houses Area Thakkarwad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

94.17 1 20 Rgtil Ewpl

Compressor Station - 09

Kanjan Hari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

164.34 13 34 Houses Area Kanjan Hari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

165.66 1 4 House Gadariya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

165.68 1 2 Room Gadariya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

165.72 7 34 Building Gadariya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

165.99 8 43 Building Gadariya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

166.18 3 8 House Area Gadariya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


166.25 2 7 Houses Gadariya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07








166.96 3 7 Houses Area Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.00 4 9 Houses Area Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.05 2 4 Houses Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.06 1 2 House Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.12 3 8 Houses Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.24 4 13 Houses Area Devi

Choki Faliya (Anjlav)

Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

167.37 1 3 House Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.48 1 4 House Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.50 1 2 Room Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

167.57 1 3 House Anjlav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.28 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.32 1 4 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.39 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.45 1 2 Room Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.49 1 5 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.54 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.62 2 4 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.73 3 8 Houses Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.73 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.75 1 2 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

168.90 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

169.00 1 7 Temple Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

169.01 1 4 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

169.02 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

169.05 2 5 Houses Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

169.07 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

170.19 1 4 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

170.28 1 2 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

170.34 1 5 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

170.70 1 3 House Navera 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

172.23 1 4 House Parvasa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




172.35 2 5 Houses Parvasa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


173.17 1 2 Room Sundhalwad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

173.78 4 9 Houses Sukhesh 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


174.01 1 3 House Sukhesh 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07










IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m



175.40 5 17 Building Sukhesh 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


175.59 11 37 Houses Area Sukhesh 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

176.15 1 97 School Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

176.20 1 6 School Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

176.39 3 7 Houses Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

176.50 1 3 House Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





177.23 17 45 House Area Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

177.61 48 94 House Area Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




178.53 1 3 Room Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

178.54 1 2 Room Sonwada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

178.73 1 1 Room Tarmaliya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

178.75 5 22 House Area Tarmaliya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

178.75 6 25 House Area Tarmaliya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

179.27 8 31 Houses Tarmaliya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



179.70 1 5 Shed Tarmaliya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



180.29 1 4 House Tarmaliya 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





180.80 5 13 Houses Rohina 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

180.81 1 4 House Rohina 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

181.31 1 3 House Rohina 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

181.37 1 2 Shop Rohina 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

181.42 1 4 House Rohina 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

182.39 1 2 House Dumalav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

182.48 1 12 Temple Dumalav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



182.93 2 6 Houses Dumalav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


183.53 1 2 Pump House Dumalav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07







184.91 1 4 House Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

185.31 4 15 Houses Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



185.63 1 4 House Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

185.67 1 3 House Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

186.13 1 2 House Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

186.18 1 3 House Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


186.44 1 2 Room Ambach 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


187.44 1 4 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

187.55 1 5 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

187.56 1 4 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

187.61 1 4 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

187.71 1 5 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

187.97 1 2 Hut Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

188.08 2 7 Houses Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

188.14 1 4 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

188.69 1 5 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

188.81 1 4 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

189.03 1 3 House Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Pandor Pandor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

190.31 1 3 House Kocharva 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07








IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m



191.66 1 8 Mlv-34 Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

191.62 1 85 Industries Area Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

191.79 1 105 Industries Area Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.09 1 4 House Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.10 1 3 House Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.25 31 63 Bhatkarwad Village Site

Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.37 1 5 House Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.78 1 2 Room Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.78 1 5 Shed Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.83 1 2 Room Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.84 1 11 Shopping Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.88 5 17 Shopping House Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

192.92 13 37 House Area Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

193.06 2 21 Prince Park

Co.Op. Hsg Soc Ltd.

Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


193.09 1 12 Meet Apartment Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

193.10 1 16 Sai Astha Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

193.29 1 4 House Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


193.50 1 4 House Karvad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

193.70 2 9 Building Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

193.82 1 15 Damanganga Industrial Park

Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

194.33 10 42 Houses Area Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

194.58 13 48 Houses Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

194.63 1 2 Room Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

194.90 1 29 Aman Park Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

194.99 1 23 Prathmesh

Parkiing Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

195.01 1 7 Shopping Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

195.05 1 17 Nawab's Dhaba Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

195.06 1 7 Shed Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

195.07 1 9 Shed Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

195.09 3 11 Houses Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


195.23 4 15 U/C Work Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

196.19 11 35 House Area Kanbi

Wad (Dungara) Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

196.23 1 8 Temple Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

196.28 1 2 Room Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

196.29 1 5 House Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

196.32 1 2 Room Dungara 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





197.60 7 27 Houses Achchhari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

197.66 8 33 Houses Achchhari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

197.67 1 6 House Achchhari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



198.14 1 7 Temple Achchhari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




198.32 1 6 Shed Achchhari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

198.96 1 6 House Boralai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07










200.41 12 45 Houses Boralai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




201.65 1 1 Pump House Boralai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07






202.45 1 52 Castrol Oil Company

Bhilad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

202.55 6 21 Houses Bhilad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

202.61 1 5 House Bhilad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

202.67 1 9 House Bhilad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


202.75 1 2 Room Bhilad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

202.80 1 1 Toilet Bhilad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




204.40 1 4 Shed Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

204.87 1 6 Rgtil Ewpl Top-10

Station Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

205.51 1 5 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

205.82 1 4 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

206.45 1 16 Brick Kiln Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

206.57 1 9 Temple Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

206.62 1 5 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

206.73 1 6 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

207.15 12 47 Houses Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

207.30 3 11 Houses Nagwas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



207.42 1 5 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


207.55 1 4 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

207.59 1 5 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

207.60 1 1 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

207.86 1 2 Room Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




209.41 1 4 House Zaroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

209.58 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

209.60 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

209.84 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

209.86 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

209.90 1 4 Room Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

209.94 1 9 Rgtil Ewpl Mlv-33 Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

210.26 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

210.33 1 6 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

210.68 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

210.69 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

210.91 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

211.10 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

211.62 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

212.44 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

212.54 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

212.70 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

213.18 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

213.59 1 4 House Upalat 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

213.97 1 4 House Varwade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





















215.94 1 50 School Varwade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

216.01 1 3 Shed Varwade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





216.95 1 4 House Talasari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07








IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m











219.61 1 4 House Ibhadpada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



















221.21 1 4 House Thakarapad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

222.05 1 25 Adivashi Utkarsh Samajik Shastra

Sanchalit

Thakarapada

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

222.24 1 45 Adivashi Mulk Kshatriya Basti

Thakarapada

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

222.49 1 6 U/C School Thakarapad

a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


a 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

222.69 1 4 House Vadavali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

























228.95 1 4 House Bramhanwa

di 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


di 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

229.15 1 7 House Bramhanwa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

di


di 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

229.34 1 50 Houses Pardi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

229.40 1 3 House Pardi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

229.47 1 47 Nareshwadi

Learning Centre Pardi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

232.08 1 4 House Chinchale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


























235.42 1 3 House Dhanivari 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07











IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m


132.80 1 8 MLV-32

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

238.07 1 4 House Dahigaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


238.09 2 7 Houses Dahigaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


239.93 1 4 House Vivalvedhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07













244.66 1 4 House Charoti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

244.84 1 4 House Charoti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

245.77 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

245.89 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

246.01 1 3 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

246.03 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

246.31 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

246.54 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

246.95 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

246.96 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

247.46 1 4 House Bharad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

248.60 1 3 House Ghol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

248.64 2 7 House Ghol 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.28 2 9 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.38 1 4 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.52 1 4 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.71 1 3 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.78 1 4 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.87 1 0 Shed Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.88 1 4 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

249.92 1 4 House Kolhan 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

250.24 1 3 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

250.82 1 4 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

250.95 1 4 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

251.15 1 4 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

251.24 1 5 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

251.49 1 4 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

251.52 1 4 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

251.77 1 4 House Tawa 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

252.15 1 5 House Barhanpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

252.48 1 3 Room Barhanpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

252.65 1 7 Temple Barhanpur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



253.78 2 7 House Somate 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

253.94 1 4 House Somate 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

254.87 1 3 House Somate 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

254.95 1 5 House Somate 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

255.96 2 7 House Vilshet 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07







257.67 32 95 Village Site Of

Kandgaon Kondgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

258.46 8 25 Houses Area Kondgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

258.54 5 17 Houses Area Kondgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

258.74 1 4 House Kondgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





259.22 1 3 Hut Kondgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

261.12 1 3 Hut Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

261.33 1 3 Hut Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

261.53 1 22 Talavli School Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

262.03 1 3 House Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

262.10 1 15 Houses Area Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

262.18 1 3 Room Talavali Tarf 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

Satkor

262.19 1 25 School

(Avachitpada) Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

262.20 1 1 Toilet Talavali Tarf

Satkor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

263.80 1 3 Hut Bhopoli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

264.03 1 3 Hut Shil 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

264.16 1 4 House Shil 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

264.49 1 4 House Shil 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

264.52 1 5 House Shil 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

265.67 1 4 House Mhasroli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

268.53 1 9 Mlv Station - 31 Kurze 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

268.87 1 4 House Kurze 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

269.89 3 11 Houses Area Bramhangao

n 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

269.89 1 0 Shed Bramhangao

n 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

270.37 1 4 House Bramhangao

n 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

270.57 1 4 House Bramhangao

n 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

270.66 1 3 Room Bramhangao

n 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

271.45 1 3 House Suponde

(Suponda) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

271.59 1 3 Room Suponde

(Suponda) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Suponda) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Suponda) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Suponda) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

271.88 1 0 Shed Suponde

(Suponda) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.46 1 7 Sanjivani Masala Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.46 1 15 Shri Samrth

Krupa Computer Sels & Service

Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.54 1 5 Service Center Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.54 1 5 Weigh Bridge Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.56 1 4 Building Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.61 1 23 Swasam

Chemicals P.V.T Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

274.69 1 8 Pipe Factory Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

274.94 1 1 Toilet Kalam Khand

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

276.24 4 15 Houses Mande 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

276.27 1 4 House Mande 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

276.52 7 22 Farm House Mande 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

277.15 1 6 Temple Bhopivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

277.62 1 3 Room Bhopivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

277.74 1 5 House Kharivali

Tarf Kohoj 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

278.68 1 7 Rice Mill Kharivali

Tarf Kohoj 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

278.76 8 22 Kharivli Village

Site Kharivali

Tarf Kohoj 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

279.20 1 5 Gail Terminal Kharivali

Tarf Kohoj 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

279.82 1 7 Farm House Kharivali

Tarf Kohoj 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

280.11 1 5 Poultry Farm Kharivali

Tarf Kohoj 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

281.56 1 6 Poultry Farm Ambiste Kh. 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

283.64 1 6 Factory Ambiste Bk. 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



283.77 1 4 House Ambiste Bk. 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


283.90 1 8 Factory Khanivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

284.69 1 5 House Khanivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

285.87 1 5 Labor Shed Biloshi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

285.95 13 42 Houses Biloshi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

287.13 6 21 Houses Biloshi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

288.61 1 4 Room Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

289.31 7 29 Houses Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

289.66 1 4 House Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

289.69 1 10 Temple Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


289.82 22 85 Houses Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


289.93 1 40 Vaishnav Poloys

Pvt Ltd Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

291.03 1 70 Industry Chinchghar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

292.93 1 4 House Dongaste 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

294.68 1 4 House Musarane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

294.72 1 1 Toilet Musarane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

295.25 73 287 Musarne Village

Site Musarane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


85.47 1 8 Mlv-30

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

295.56 1 9 Poultry Farm Musarane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

295.66 16 67 Musarne Village

Site Musarane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



295.85 12 46 Houses Musarane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

296.11 1 4 House Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

296.17 1 10 Poultry Farm Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

296.29 22 47 Khonsaipada Village Site

Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



296.92 4 15 Houses Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



297.16 1 22 Factory Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

297.18 1 60 Indian Oil Steel

Ltd. Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

297.22 1 40 Industry Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

297.23 1 30 Pharmaceticals

Factory Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


297.57 1 50 Dutaiatrans For

Industries Ghonsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



298.47 1 4 House Dighashi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




302.12 52 209 Khanivli Village

Site Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

302.50 1 4 Room Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

302.54 1 160

Shadhna Collage Of Education B.Ed Khanivli

(Ambadi)

Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

302.57 1 175

Vivekand Public School & Collage Of Arts & Science Khanivli (Ambadi)

Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

302.58 1 1 Toilet Kharivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

303.06 14 52 Vanbroli Village

Site Gondravali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

303.30 1 4 House Gondravali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

303.36 1 4 House Gondravali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

304.02 3 13 Houses Jambhivali Tarf Kunde

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

304.02 1 1 Toilet Jambhivali Tarf Kunde

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

304.02 1 4 House Jambhivali Tarf Kunde

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

304.43 63 225 Jambevli Village

Site Jambhivali Tarf Kunde

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

305.01 1 4 House Dabhad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

305.20 1 4 House Dabhad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

305.26 1 4 House Kiravali Duravali

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

310.28 1 10 Crematorium Lap Bk. 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

312.41 1 4 House

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

312.51 1 4 House

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

312.53 1 4 House

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

313.71 1 4 House Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

313.75 1 7 Poultry Farm Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

313.97 1 3 Shop Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

313.97 3 13 Houses Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.00 1 1 Toilet Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.02 3 12 Houses Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.26 1 4 House Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.30 1 4 House Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.31 1 4 House Kurund 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.59 1 4 Room Arjunali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.63 1 8 Tol Naka Arjunali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.65 1 8 Tol Naka Padgha (Ct) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.77 1 4 House Padgha (Ct) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

314.80 1 9 Stud Farm Padgha (Ct) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


314.97 1 4 Room Padgha (Ct) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




317.37 1 55 Kalpit Parides Fun Land (Water Park)

Bhadane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

318.10 1 15 Buffalotabelo Bhadane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

318.95 1 12 Temple Ozarli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

322.47 18 71 Shiv Nagari Utane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

322.54 15 65 Shiv Nagari Utane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

322.70 1 4 House Utane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

322.73 1 4 House Utane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

323.85 1 12 Buffalotabelo Titawala 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

323.93 1 4 Room Titawala 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

324.28 1 1 Toilet Titawala 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

324.30 1 4 House Titawala 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

324.31 1 1 Toilet Titawala 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


325.13 4 60 Home City Co-

Op- Society Titawala 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



325.71 1 4 House Ghotsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

325.71 1 6 Top Station-13 Relinace Office

Ghotsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

325.94 1 4 House Ghotsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

326.01 1 11 Farm House Ghotsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

326.10 1 12 Farm House Ghotsai 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

327.15 1 35 School Ankhar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

327.16 1 10 Temple Ankhar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07






327.24 1 4 House Ankhar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

328.77 76 302 Revati Village Site Revati 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

331.12 1 8 Rgtil Ewpl

Compressor Station-08

Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

331.66 1 4 House Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

331.67 1 4 House Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

331.70 1 11 Poultry Farm Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



332.12 1 9 Shed Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

332.17 1 6 Shed Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

332.25 1 4 House Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

332.25 1 4 House Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

332.28 1 4 House Vaholi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

332.53 15 63 Kumbhar Pada Houses Area

Manjali Tarf Barhe

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

332.57 1 4 House Manjali Tarf

Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

332.92 81 322 Kumbhar Pada

Village Site Manjali Tarf

Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

333.41 1 4 Room Manjali Tarf

Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

333.42 1 4 House Dahagaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

333.69 1 4 Room Dahagaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

335.04 1 0 Abounded Company

Apati Tarf Barhe

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

335.07 1 9 Shed Apati Tarf

Barhe 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

336.79 1 15 Farm House Ambeshiv

Bk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

337.08 1 12 Farm House Ambeshiv

Bk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

337.29 1 4 House Ambeshiv

Bk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Bk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Bk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

339.67 1 95 School Sonivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

339.86 1 70 Kgn Food Product Badlapur

(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

339.92 1 12 Shed Badlapur

(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

340.07 1 10 Farm House Badlapur

(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

341.06 44 178 Houses Area

Badlapur Badlapur

(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

341.10 1 4 House Badlapur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

(Mcl)

341.11 1 4 House Badlapur

(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


(Mcl) 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.31 1 4 House Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.58 1 4 House Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.78 1 86

Leelavati Awhad Institute Of

Technology M S & R

Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.81 1 60

Leelavati Awhad Institute Of

Technology M S & R

Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.85 1 105 Balasaheb Mhatre

Polytechnic Badlapur West

Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.86 1 40 Building Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

342.87 1 50 Building Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

343.85 1 13 Poultry Farm Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

343.86 1 10 Poultry Farm Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

344.71 1 4 Room Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

344.73 1 4 Room Kanhor 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

345.33 1 8 Farm House Indgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


345.67 1 5 Pump House Indgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

345.77 1 3 Pump House Indgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

346.37 1 4 House Indgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07







347.84 1 12 Farm House Kudsaware 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

348.42 1 8 Nursery Kudsaware 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

349.55 1 10 Farm House Kudsaware 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

349.60 1 4 House Kudsaware 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

350.97 1 5 Shed Done 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

352.34 1 4 House Nikhop 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

352.37 1 4 House Nikhop 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

353.44 1 4 House Mohili

T.Waredi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

353.46 1 4 House Mohili

T.Waredi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

354.85 34 135 Birdale Village

Site Birdole 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

356.71 1 0 Cardboard

Abounded Factory Dahiwali T.Waredi

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

356.71 1 8 Transformer Shed Dahiwali T.Waredi

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

356.98 1 4 Hut Dahiwali T.Waredi

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

357.05 1 4 Hut Dahiwali T.Waredi

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

357.32 1 4 House Dahiwali T.Waredi

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

358.29 1 4 House Talwade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

358.36 1 4 House Talwade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

359.12 1 4 House Pimploli Bk. 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

359.27 18 55 Pimploli Village

Site Pimploli Bk. 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07






360.64 1 0 Shed Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

361.07 1 9 Wakas Sanker

Temple Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

361.82 1 6 Pooja Farm

House Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

361.86 1 3 Irfhans Farm House Neral

Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

362.02 1 2 House Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

362.17 1 3 Room Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

362.18 1 3 House Vakas 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

363.19 1 0 Shed Nasarapur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

363.29 1 7 Farm House Nasarapur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

363.33 1 3 House Nasarapur 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

363.62 1 2 Room Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

363.73 1 3 Room Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

363.75 1 2 Room Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

364.15 1 2 Room Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

364.27 1 3 House Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

364.43 1 3 House Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

364.47 1 2 Room Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

364.70 1 5 House Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

364.79 1 3 House Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

365.37 1 6 Temple Salwad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

365.58 1 7 Farm House Chinchayali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

366.45 1 3 Room Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

366.55 1 4 House Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

366.82 1 0 Open Plot Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

366.86 1 6 Rgtil Ewpl Mlv 28 Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

366.93 1 0 Shed Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

366.98 1 5 House Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

367.10 1 5 House Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

367.12 1 3 Room Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

367.14 1 3 Room Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

367.19 1 5 House Kadav 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

367.94 2 8 House (Village

Site) Markechiwa

di 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

368.09 1 5 House Markechiwa

di 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

368.25 1 500 School Wadawali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

369.10 1 5 House Bhatgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





369.73 1 4 House Vavloli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07












370.54 1 5 House Bendase 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

370.66 1 4 House Bendase 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

370.96 1 2 Room Koshane 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

372.02 12 48 House Wanjale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

372.08 1 2 Room Wanjale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

372.09 1 4 Room Wanjale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Kirawali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

374.53 41 200 House Kirawali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




374.74 1 4 House Haliwali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07






375.35 1 5 House Bhisegaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07







Site) Bhisegaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

375.96 1 5 House Palibudruk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

376.10 1 4 House Nangurle 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



377.16 17 85 House Tighar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

377.17 2 6 Room Tighar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

377.39 1 3 Room Tighar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

378.01 1 4 House Tighar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Tighar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

378.31 1 3 House Tighar 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

378.38 1 3 House Pali Budruk 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

378.90 1 3 Room Bhilvale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

378.95 1 5 House Bhilvale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



Site) Bhilvale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

379.23 1 3 Room Bhilvale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m


Site) Bhilvale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



379.97 1 10 Temple Bhilvale 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


380.22 1 5 House Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

381.02 1 6 Farm House Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



Site) Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

381.80 1 7 Poultry Farm Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

381.88 6 32 Shop Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

381.90 1 4 Shop Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


381.97 1 2 Room Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

382.04 1 10 Building Vavandhal 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07








382.09 1 3 Farm House Kandhroli

Tarfe Vankhal

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

382.12 1 4 House Kandhroli

Tarfe Vankhal

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Tarfe Vankhal

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Tarfe Vankhal

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Tarfe Vankhal

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

382.73 1 4 Room Asare 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Asare 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

383.46 1 5 House Asare 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Asare 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

384.56 25 128 House Asare 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

386.42 1 98 Factory Majgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

387.21 13 78 Building Majgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

387.33 1 5 House Majgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Majgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

387.74 7 30 House Majgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Poud 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

387.98 3 20 House Poud 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

388.90 4 20 House Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.00 1 35 Factory Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.07 23 100 House Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.15 1 6 Stone Quarry Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.20 1 5 House Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.28 1 5 House Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.30 1 5 House Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.32 1 5 House Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

389.72 1 12 Industry Mandap 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.70 18 55 Village Site Varwada

(Gundanpada) Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.76 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.76 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.77 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.77 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.77 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.77 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.78 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

395.79 1 4 House Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

396.28 1 15 Industry Apti 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

397.88 1 5 House Nandanpada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07







Nandanpada Nandanpada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07





IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m













399.15 1 4 House Jambhivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

400.03 7 31 Village Site Jambhivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

400.12 14 50 Village Site Jambhivali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

400.29 1 5 House Shedashi 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07









Gagodi Budruk Gagode Budruk

2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

405.55 1 8

U/C Asha Kiran English Midium

School Girl's Boarding Social

Work Center

Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

405.76 1 7 Poultry Farm Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

405.80 1 6 Building Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

405.91 6 24 Houses Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.17 1 5 House Kamarli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.47 103 418 Village Site Paned Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.26 1 6 House Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.29 1 3 House Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.40 1 6 House Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.46 1 3 House Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

406.47 1 3 House Paned 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07






IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m


407.21 2 4 House Kurmurli 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07




408.27 1 5 House Adharne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

408.35 1 5 House Talavali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07










410.11 1 10 Building Talavali 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

410.68 1 5 House Shene 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

410.83 1 5 House Shene 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

410.88 1 3 Farm House Shene 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

410.92 1 8 Building Shene 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

411.11 7 34 House Shene 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

411.27 1 5 House Shene 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

412.12 1 5 House Borgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



412.81 1 7 Poultry Farm Borgaon 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

















IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m






415.37 1 5 House Pen 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

415.58 8 45 House Pen 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

416.07 1 5 House Pen 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

416.90 1 5 House Pen 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

417.09 11 55 House Pen 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

420.47 19 89 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

420.84 1 5 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

420.84 1 3 Hut Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

421.01 7 32 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

421.10 1 2 Shed Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

421.16 1 5 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

421.31 1 3 Plinth Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

421.89 1 5 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

421.92 1 5 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

422.42 1 5 House Jirne 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

422.73 11 50 House Kalad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

423.13 1 5 House Kalad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Kalad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

423.86 1 5 House Kalad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.83 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.84 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.85 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.86 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.87 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.87 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.89 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.89 10 50 House Kalad 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.92 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

424.93 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

425.07 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

425.71 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

425.75 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

425.78 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

425.82 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

425.95 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

426.06 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

426.08 1 5 House Nigade 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


Site) Khar

Mundhani 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

429.75 3 12 House Khar

Mundhani 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

430.45 1 3 Plinth Jotirpada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

430.48 1 3 Plinth Jotirpada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

430.50 1 5 House Jotirpada 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07







432.53 1 5 House Benase 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

432.03 1 68

Reliance Industries Limited,

Nagothane

Benase 2.06E-07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

Spur Pipeline

3.31 1 5 GAIL SV Station Parvat 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.13 1 5 GSPL SV

Station Asarma

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.67 1 4 Room Umrachhi 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

7.67 1 4 Room Umrachhi 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.64 1 6 Building Vadoli 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.69 1 7 Building Vadoli 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.82 1 4 SV2 Vadoli RIL

HDPL Vadoli

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

8.96 48 192 Buildings Vadoli 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

9.63 51 204 Buildings Vadoli 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

9.64 1 5 66kV Power

House Vadoli

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

10.82 1 4 House Malgama 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

12.39 4 15 Room Bhadol 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

12.72 1 5 GSPL SV

Station Bhadol

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

15.90 1 9 House Erthan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

15.98 136 680 Houses/Huts Erthan 2.06E- 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m

07

17.04 1 4 Room Erthan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

17.05 1 4 Room Morthan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

18.97 1 5 GAIL DUPL SV

Station-4 Morthan

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

19.17 1 3 Room Morthan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

19.78 1 8 Building Achharan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

20.09 77 231 Hut Achharan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

20.19 1 3 Room Achharan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

20.28 4 15 Hut Achharan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

22.06 1 3 NA Residential

Plots Atodara

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

22.38 1 2 OPEN

PLOT/COMPOUND WALL

Atodara 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

22.56 4 12 Houses/Huts Atodara 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

22.69 1 2 ROOM Karamala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

22.80 5 12 Residential

Buildings Under construction

Karamala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

22.97 1 6 Factory Karamala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

23.41 1 10 Residential

Buildings Under construction

Karamala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

27.24 1 3 NA Plots Masma 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

27.41 1 2 Room Talad 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

28.23 63 320 Village

SiteTalad Talad

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

28.83 1 4 Room Jothan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

29.08 1 4 Room Jothan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.10 1 4 Room Vanakala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.80 1 7 BUILDING Vanakala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.81 1 1 OPEN

PLOT/COMPOUND WALL

Vanakala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03



Zone 1 0 - 20 m

Zone 2 20 - 125m

Zone 3 > 125m


07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07


07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.89 1 4 House Vanakala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.90 3 11 HDPL SV-3 Vanakala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.93 1 25 School Vanakala 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.95 1 4 Room SACHIN 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

32.98 1 4 Room SACHIN 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

33.05 1 4 Room SACHIN 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

33.15 73 292 Village

settelment Okha

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

35.34 1 5 House Bhesan 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

37.17 68 250 MALGAMA

VILLAGE SITE Malgama

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

37.46 1 5 local Crickate

statdium Malgama

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

40.72 95 285 HAEP

TOWNSHIP Ichchhapu

r 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

41.79 257 771 KRIBHCO

TOWNSHIP Damka

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.00 1 7 DAMKA M&R

STATION Damka

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.04 1 5 Shed Damka 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.07 1 15 GSPL MORA TERMINAL

Damka 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.09 1 12 SHELL GAS TERMINAL

Mora 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.37 65 260 NTPC

TOWNSHIP Mora

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.59 1 8 Temple Mora 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

43.60 3 10 3 HUT Mora 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

44.58 1 75 ABG CEMENT

PLANT Mora

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

45.19 1 350 NTPC power

plant Mora

2.06E-07

2.04E-07 1.01E-07

45.69 1 75

RELIANCE INDUSTRIES

LIMITED Hazira Plant

Mora 2.06E-

07 2.04E-07 1.01E-07

Notes:

TH-Temporary Hutments

PD-Permanent Dwelling having more than 3 storeys



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

PDM-Permanent Dwelling having more than 3 storeys

PP-Public place like school, Hospital, Playground, Market, Temple, places of public

gathering/annual fare etc.

7.1.17. Domino Effect Analysis

The proposed DNEPL will be laid in the RoU of existing pipeline (EWPL, HDPL and Propane Pipelines). There is a minimum edge to edge separation distance of 5 meters between the pipelines.

The domino effect analysis from DNEPL to existing pipeline is carried out by modelling for different section of pipelines considering vertical release for underground pipeline and radiation intensity of 37.5kW/m2.

It is observed from domino effect analysis is that the likelihood of any damage to the adjoining

existing pipelines due to failure of DNEPL is remote.

Escalation Potential

Loss of containment of Ethane pipeline would result in following outcomes:

• Jet fire

• Flash fire

Jet fire event from one pipeline has potential to damage the neighboring pipeline in the same RoU when the escalating jet flame impinges. Flash fire is a transient phenomenon as there is no sustained, high temperature flame or fire to cause damage to asset. Hence flash fire escalating to damage the neighboring pipeline is considered unlikely. Jet fire upon loss of containment may impair the nearby pipeline leading to escalation of hazard.

Jet fire due to a leak/rupture which is occurring first is known as the primary event. The jet fire caused due to leak/rupture may affect the neighboring pipeline which leads to its failure. This incident is known as secondary event.

Domino Effect

A release from the DNEPL is considered as the primary event and release from 26” & 24” HDPL pipelines due to an escalation of jet fire from DNEPL is considered as the secondary events.

Probability of Occurrence

In the event of a loss of containment, the process fluid can be released in any of six directions namely upward, downward, or horizontally, north, south, east or west. The approach adopted assumes all these directions are equally likely so each attract a 17% probability of occurring. PHAST also includes options for impacted releases where the initial plume momentum is reduced to reflect impact. The plume characteristics for impacted releases are different from free field releases usually being slightly fatter with the effect length being significantly reduced. The effect of impacted releases is more pronounced in the far field than near field. Given the likelihood of impact occurring, 2/3rd of horizontal releases are assumed to be impacted. Downward releases have also been modeled as horizontally impacted releases as the results from such runs are very similar.Event tree due to Jet Fire due to large sized leak in 12” Ethane Pipeline as primary event.

The jet fire event frequency for the proposed Ethane Pipeline and HDPL pipelines along with

the domino effect frequency are calculated and tabulated below:



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 101 : Event tree due to Jet Fire due to large sized leak

Jet Fire Yes

0.1667

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Frequency (12"

Ethane pipeline

large size leak)

1.70E-04

2.40E-02

Immediate Ignition

Impinging 26" HDPL P/L (100%)

Impinging 24" HDPL P/L (100%)

Primary Event Secondary Event

No Jet Fire Escalation

Domino Effect

Domino Hazard by Jet Fire

Escalation (6.80E-07)


Domino Hazard by Jet Fire

Escalation (6.80E-07)





IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 110: Jet Fire Frequency impinged to Adjacent Pipeline

Sr. No

Scenario Description Scenario

No. Leak Size/ Rupture

Initiating event


1 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL pipeline route

S2

5 mm 1.70E-04 1.19E-08

25 mm 1.70E-04 2.98E-08

100 mm 1.70E-04 6.80E-07

150 mm 1.70E-04 6.80E-07

2 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL pipeline 26 inch

S6

5 mm 1.70E-04 9.35E-09

25 mm 1.70E-04 1.53E-08

100 mm 1.70E-04 1.47E-07

150 mm 1.70E-04 1.47E-07


S7

5 mm 1.70E-04 9.35E-09

25 mm 1.70E-04 1.53E-08

100 mm 1.70E-04 1.87E-07

150 mm 1.70E-04 1.87E-07

4

Loss of containment (Ethane Release) From Intermediate Pigging Station (IPS)

S3

5 mm 1.90E-03 1.33E-07

25 mm 1.20E-03 3.60E-07

100 mm 3.70E-04 8.49E-07

150 mm 4.60E-04 1.84E-06

5 Loss of containment (Gas Release) From EWPL

S8

5 mm 4.10E-05 2.26E-09

25 mm 4.10E-05 3.69E-09

100 mm 4.10E-05 2.05E-08

150 mm 4.10E-05 2.26E-08

Since the escalation potential is contributed by jet fire event, once the jet fire event frequencies of all scenarios are determined, the jet fire escalation or domino effect frequencies for various scenarios are calculated by summing up the jet fire event frequencies of each pipeline in the RoU.

Considering small, medium and large releases, the jet fire frequency of 12” Ethane Pipeline is 1.4E-06. The jet fire event frequencies of the 26” and 24” HDPL pipelines are 3.19 E-07 and 3.99 E-07 respectively. Thus the frequency of domino effect is sum of the jet fire event frequencies of 12” Ethane, 26 and 24” HDPL Pipelines i.e. 2.12E-06. The Domino Effect frequency for all credible scenarios is presented in the tables below.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 111: Domino Effect Frequency

Sr. No Scenario Description Jet Fire frequency

1 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL 1.4E-06

2 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL pipeline 26 inch 3.19E-07

3 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL pipeline 24 inch 3.99E-07

4 Loss of Containment (Ethane Release) From Intermediate Pigging Station (IPS)

3.18E-06

5 Loss of Containment (Gas Release) From EWPL Pipeline 4.90E-08

Table 112: Domino effect frequency for various segments of Ethane Pipeline

Sr. No Scenario Description Jet Fire frequency

1 Loss of Containment (Ethane Release) From DNEPL Impacted on 24” & 26” HDPL Pipeline

2.12E-06

2 Loss of Containment (Ethane Release) from Intermediate Pigging Station (IPS), DNEPL and 24” & 26” HDPL Pipeline

5.35E-06

From the above table it is observed that the domino effect frequency is lower than the frequency of the initiating event and hence an escalation effect or domino effect.

Risk due to Domino Effect

From the Table 104, it is observed that the domino effect frequency is very less than the frequency of the initiating event and hence an escalation effect or a domino effect of the existing pipelines on the proposed Ethane pipeline is considered to be negligible compared to pipeline failure frequency. Similarly, an escalation effect or a domino effect of the proposed Ethane pipelines on the existing pipelines can be considered negligible.

7.1.18. Suggestions & Recommendations

The risk levels are well within the acceptance criteria/limit, as per QRA Study. The below suggestions / recommendations are made to reduce the risk levels further. It can be concluded that DNEPL can be operated normally by following best practices & applicable guidance and regulations.

• In order to minimize third party interference, pipeline markers should be installed at appropriate locations. Use of warning tape and marker posts throughout the pipeline route.

• Periodic monitoring / integrity check. An appropriate corrosion monitoring system should be implemented in order to identify excessive internal corrosion. Cathodic protection system must be continuously monitored and tested for effectiveness and records must be maintained.

• Consideration should be given for providing leak detection system.

• Periodic Patrolling along the pipeline route shall be conducted to identify acts of sabotage, leakage or any other activity that may affect the safety of the pipeline.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.1.19. Conclusion

Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) is performed for the DNEPL Pipeline Project, using PHAST RISK 6.7.

• The maximum overall risk to the DNEPL pipeline facility is found to be 1.0 × 10-5 / year which is in Acceptable region as per HSE UK risk acceptance criteria

• The Societal risk for the overall DNEPL pipeline facility is observed to be in acceptable region as per the HSE UK Risk acceptance criteria.

• The pipeline traverses through 16 villages of Dahanu Taluka. The number of dwellings in the vicinity of the pipeline is very less and the overall risk is within the acceptable region.

• The impact of thermal radiation on adjacent buried pipelines will not have potential impact due to adequate soil cover and separation distance.

• The flash fire at 0.5 LFL distance is reaching to maximum distance of 498 m.

• The maximum damage distance of 514 m is observed for 4kw/m2 heat radiation for Pump station (above ground) and of 258 m is observed for 4kw/m2 heat radiation for DNEPL pipeline (Underground)

• The maximum damage distance of 863 m is observed for 0.03 bar peak overpressure from Vapour Cloud Explosion for Pump Station at DMD. The type of damage is considered less from a peak overpressure of 0.03 bar.

• Emergency Shut Down (ESD) System shall be incorporated in design of Pump Station for isolation of leaked section immediately within 1 minute (for pipeline it may be 2 minutes) and evacuation so that the duration of radiation effect is considerably reduced thereby ensuring safety and integrity.

• As a safety measure RGPL proposes to implement Pipeline Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) which will alert the Pipeline Operator about any third party activity within the RoU viz. excavation etc. for ensuring integrity of the pipeline. The system can supplement PAS for confirming leak in the cross country pipeline.Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, dedicated optical fibre cable based telecommunication system, leak detection system / pipeline application software will be provided.

7.1.20. References

• A Guide to Quantitative Risk Assessment for Offshore Installations, CMPT, Publication 99/2001999

• Consequence Modelling, OGP, Risk Assessment Data Directory, Report No.434-7, March 2010

• Guidance on ALARP decisions in control of major accident hazards (COMAH) (UK HSE)

• Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, Purple Book, CPR 18E, 1999

• Ignition Probabilities, OGP, Risk Assessment Data Directory, Report No.434-6.1, March 2010

• Lees’ Loss Prevention in The Process Industries, Third Edition, Elsevier Inc, 2005

• TNO “Method for determination of possible damage” (The Green Book), CPR16E, First Edition 1992.

• Occupational Risk, OGP, Risk Assessment Data Directory, Report No.434-12, 434-4 March 2010

• PHAST release notes for version 6.7 for all product modes, 2010, DNV Software

• TNO, “Methods for the calculation of physical effects, (The Yellow Book), CPR14E, Parts 1-2, 3rd Edition, Sdu Uitgevers, The Hague, 1997

• OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory 434 – 1, March 2010


• OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory 434 – 14.1, March 2010




IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03


• Phast Risk v6.7 Technical Notes

• CPR 18E, Guideline for quantitative risk assessment, Purple book

• Vulnerability of Humans, OGP, Risk Assessment Data Directory, Report No.434-14.1, March 2010



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.1.21. Assumption Register

Study Assumptions

The below Table present the summary of assumptions intended to use in QRA for DNEPP Project.

ASSUMPTION SHEET DESCRIPTION

Occupancy and Metrological Data

Assumption No: A1 Manning Level

Assumption No: A2 Meteorological Data

Frequency Analysis

Assumption No: A3 Representative Hole Size

Assumption No: A4 Scenario Identification

Assumption No: A5 Generic Failure Frequencies

Assumption No: A6 Ignition Probabilities

Consequence Modelling

Assumption No: A7 Release Direction

Assumption No: A8 Representative Process Parameters

Assumption No: A9 Consequence Modelling

Assumption No: A10 Impact Criteria

Risk Analysis & Assessment

Assumption No: A11 Event Trees

Assumption No: A12 Risk Acceptance Criteria

Software

Assumption No: A13 Software Used



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Occupancy and Meteorological data

Manning Level

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A1 Manning Level

Assumptions:

The following table shows the in pipeline manning details

Distribution of Manpower based on COMPANY response is provided below:

Facility Manpower

Day Time Night Time

Pump Station (01 no. at DMD)

Contract: 50

RGPL: 15

Contract: 04

RGPL: 01

MLVs 01 01

IPSs 01 01

M&Rs 01 01

1. COMPANY Input



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Meteorological Data

The assumption sheet below presents the meteorological data for QRA Study.

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A2 Metrological Data

Assumptions:

Weather Data:

Following weather conditions will be considered for assessment:

Parameters

Summer maximum dry bulb temperature 41 °C

Summer minimum wet bulb temperature 24°C

Relative humidity 6 -100 %

Atmospheric Pressure 1.013 25 bar

Incident solar radiation 1 W/m2

Surface roughness parameter 0.1 fraction or 183.2 mm length

Atmospheric Stability Classes:

For the study purpose, based on the review of meteorological data following wind speed and stability class will be used for modelling purposes:

• 1.5 F (F stability class and wind speed of 1.5 m/sec)

• 5 D (D stability class and wind speed of 5 m/sec)

Predominant Wind direction: North- West

Note:

1. Company input

2. DNV PHAST 6.7 literature;

3. The Meteorological Data has direct impact in the gas dispersion simulation for explosion as well as toxic and consequently in the calculation of the flammable volumes which will be used in the explosion.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Frequency Analysis

Representative Hole Size

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A3 Representative Hole Size

Assumptions:

Based on the OGP guidelines, the following hole sizes shall be considered for the QRA study purpose.

Equipment / pipework:

HOLE SIZE RANGE REPRESENTED

5 mm 1-10 mm

25 mm 10-50 mm

100 mm 50-150mm

>150 mm Full bore rupture

Note:

• Peak initial flow rate following a leak limited to maximum process flow rate (i.e., capacity) as per data provided by client and P&IDs

• As a worst case initial release rate will be considered for assessment.

• Initial release rate with isolation will be considered for modeling in Phast 6.7 for determining the consequence effects

Note:

1. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Process Release Frequencies, Report no. 434-1, 434-4 March 2010.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Scenario Identification

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A4 Scenario Identification

Assumptions:

Scenario Identification:

The release scenario is identified and defined based on the inputs / data provided by Company.

This identification step is based on a worst possible case or based on the maximum amount of material within a section, or a worst possible (credible) case from a hazards review.

Note:

CONSULTANT has identified the scenario based inputs provided and worst possible (credible) scenario will be selected based on vulnerable equipment and associated piping system.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Generic Failure Frequencies

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A5 Generic Failure Frequencies

Assumptions:

Generic failure frequencies have been adopted from the OGP database. OGP database is most recent and widely accepted database in the industry and hence used.

As per OGP 434-4, The datasheet presents frequencies of riser and pipelines releases.

Other equipment:

OGP presents the following failure frequencies for the other equipment.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A5 Generic Failure Frequencies

Justification/ Comments:

1. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Process Release Frequencies, Report no. 434-1, 434-4 March 2010

2. Expert and Engineering judgement;



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Ignition Probabilities

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A6 Ignition Probabilities

Assumptions:

Ignition sources in the facility and around the facility are considered as per data given by the client. The ignition probabilities have been taken from the OGP Database. The OGP estimates the ignition probabilities based on 28 mathematical functions drawn from the UKOOPA look-up correlation which relates ignition probabilities in air to release rate for typical scenarios both onshore and offshore.

The values presented in OGP relate to “total” ignition probability, which can be considered as the sum of the probability of immediate ignition and delayed ignition.

Immediate ignition probabilities and delayed ignition probabilities will be estimated based on the methodology presented in OGP database.

The TNO purple Book reference ignition probabilities will be used for event tree branches based on the characteristics of material reactivity.

The typical mathematical function (graphic representation) and associated ignition probabilities available from OGP are presented in figure below.


1. PHAST Risk v6.7 Technical Notes

2. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Ignition Probabilities, Report no. 434-6.1, March 2010



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Consequence Analysis

Release Direction

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A7 Release Direction

Assumptions:

Release Direction:

• For buried pipeline releases will be modelled as oriented vertically.

• For process facilities releases will be modelled as oriented horizontally for estimating risk to personnel as conservative approach (Purple Book)

Release Height

• The height of the outflow in relation to the surrounding area is determined by the location of the vessel or the pipeline. The height is equal to the location of the pipeline or the bottom of the vessel, given a minimum height of one meter. A height of 0 meters is only assumed for underground pipelines and vessels. (Reference Manual Bevi Risk Assessment/ Purple book)

Release Inventory

• Release inventory will be estimated based on the inventory of equipment consider as an input for the study.


1. Reference Manual Risk Assessment

2. The leakage point and duration has impact in the flammable or toxic volumes calculation.

Representative Process Parameters

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A8 Representative Process Parameters

Assumptions:

• The material characterization such as pressure, temperature, composition etc., for each scenario shall be taken from data provided by client.

• To have more conservative approach, the condition such as maximum pressure and minimum temperature stream in the section shall be taken into consideration.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Consequence Modeling

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A9 Consequence Modelling

Assumptions:

Depending on the type of release, the expected outcomes of consequence analysis are:

For gas & two-phase release under pressure:

• Jet Fire

This outcome occurs following the immediate ignition of a flammable material, usually from a pressurized source.

• Flash Fire

Flash fires arise from delayed ignition of a well-mixed flammable gas/ vapor cloud in the absence of significant confinement or obstruction. There are minimal overpressure effects and primarily local impacts.

• Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE)

When a flammable vapor or gas mixes with air and its concentration lies between the lower flammable limit (LFL) and upper flammable limit (UFL). An ignition source will ignite the mixture. If this event takes place in a confined space then the enclosure usually suffers a significant internal overpressure for a short duration.

For liquid release:

• Pool Fire

Pool fire will occur from an ignited liquid pool resulting from a liquid release. PHAST 6.7 will be used for consequence modelling

Jet fires:

Jet fires will be modelled using DNV recommended method in the software. Based on impact criteria downwind distance to various thermal radiation levels will be reported.

Flash fires:

Flash fires are represented by LFL contour. Based on the UDM dispersion method adopted by PHAST 6.7, LFL and ½ LFL contours will be reported.

Explosions:

Explosion results shall be extracted on the basis of the Vapour Cloud Explosion calculations modelled using PHAST 6.7.


1. PHAST Risk v6.7 Release Notes



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Impact Criteria

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A10 Impact Criteria

Assumptions:

As OGP database has been used for frequencies, an impact criterion is taken from the OGP database.

Fires:

The type of fires which are concerned as jet fire, flash fire and pool fires. Personnel either can get engulfed by fire or can get exposed to thermal radiation arising from fire. Following impact criteria has been taken forward from OGP.

Engulfment by fire

• 100% lethality for people outdoors engulfed by jet fires or pool fire

• 100% lethality for people outdoors engulfed by a flash fire

Thermal Radiation

• Immediate fatality (100% lethality) for people exposed to 37.5 kW/m2

Explosions:

OGP recommends following lethality levels for people onshore, and has been adopted for study purpose.

For people onshore, outdoors but adjacent to buildings or in unprotected structures (e.g. process units), the following lethality levels are recommended:

• 0.35 bar overpressure: 30% lethality for people outdoors

• 0.5 bar overpressure: 100% lethality for people outdoors

The following impact levels will be reported in the report:

• Thermal radiation: 4 kW/m2, 12.5 kW/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2 for fire;

• Flammable dispersion: LFL and 0.5 LFL;

• Overpressure levels:

o 0.03 bar

o 0.1 bar

o 0.35 bar

o 0.5 bar

Note:

1. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Vulnerability of Humans, Report no. 434-14.1, March 2010



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Risk Analysis& Assessment

Event Trees

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A11 Event Trees

Assumptions:

The event tree analysis is used to estimate event outcome frequency (i.e., jet fire, flash fire & explosion). The type of ignition and release orientations are accounted in event tree branches.

Event tree probabilities will include Immediate ignition, Delayed ignition and No ignition.

The generic event trees considered for gas, two-phase & liquid releases are presented in below figure.

1. Event Tree for a continuous release without rain-out

2. Event tree for an Instantaneous release without rainout



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A11 Event Trees

3. Event Tree for a continuous release with rain-out

4. Event Tree for an instantaneous release with rain-out


1. Phast Risk v6.7 Technical Notes



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Risk Acceptance Criteria

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A12 Risk Acceptance Criteria

Assumptions:

The risk results will be presented as individual risk.

The UK Institution of Chemical Engineers (1992) defines risk as ‘the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards’. It is usually taken to be the risk of death and expressed as a risk per year. The most common example of individual risk is the iso-risk contour. This allows for major hazard areas to be easily identified and the effects on specific vulnerable locations to be more easily observed.

Individual Risk Acceptance Criteria

Societal Risk Acceptance Criteria

Justification/ Comments/ Reference:

1. Guidanceon ALARP decisions in control of major accident hazards (COMAH) (UK HSE)

• Guideline for developing Quantitative Safety Risk Criteria (CCPS)

• UK HSE Database



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Software

ASSUMPTION SHEET

A13 Software Used

Assumptions:

The PHAST Risk Software, v 6.7 will be used for consequences and risk modeling.

PHAST Risk v 6.7 (previously called SAFETI) is a comprehensive hazard analysis software tool which is applicable to all stages of design and operation across a wide range of process industries. The Unified Dispersion Model is respected as one of the world’s leading dispersion models for process safety applications.

Phast Risk v 6.7 models all stages of a release from outflow through a hole or from a pipe end, through atmospheric dispersion to thermal radiation from fires and explosion overpressures. Phast Risk combines recognized and validated models for the various physical phenomena, automatically selecting the appropriate model depending on the circumstances of the release. Phast Risk tool has been extensively validated and verified and has been used to comply with many regulations world-wide, including Seveso II, RMP, and COMAH.

The consequence outputs from the PHAST Risk 6.7 software are:

• The dimensions of the jet fire in terms of jet length and thermal radiation effect distance;

• The downwind distance to 100% Lower Flammable Limit (LFL); and

• Explosion Overpressure from TNO Multi Energy Model.

The risk outputs from the PHAST Risk 6.7 software are:

• Individual Risk

• Societal Risk


1. OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Vulnerability of Humans, Report no. 434-14.1, March 2010



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 113: Release Frequency

Sr. No

Scenario Description Scenario

No.

5mm 25mm 100mm 150 mm (FBR)

Release frequency

1 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from pump station at DMD

S1 1.9E-03 1.2E-3 8.0E-9 8.0E-9

2 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from DNEPL pipeline route

S2 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4

3 Loss of containment (etahne release) from intermediate pigging station (IPS)

S3 1.9E-03 1.2E-3 3.7E-4 4.6E-4

4 Loss of containment (Ethane release) from metering and regulating station (M&R) at NMD

S4 1.6E-5 6.7E-6 1.4E-6 5.9E-6

5

Loss of containment (gas release) from Hazira spur pipeline at M&R (46 km)

S5 1.7E-5 7.4E-6 7.6E-6 7.6E-6


S6 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4


S7 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4


S8 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5

9 Loss of containment (gas release) from HAZIRA spur line 28 inch

S9 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5


S10 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4 1.7E-4

11 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL extension pipeline 16inch

S11 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5

12 Loss of containment (gas release) from HDPL extension pipeline 12inch

S12 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5 8.1E-5



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 114: Ignition Source Probability

Source Probability of Ignition in one Minute

Point Source

• Motor Vehicle

• Flare

• Outdoor furnace

• Indoor furnace

• Outdoor boiler

• Indoor boiler

• Ship

• Ship transporting flammable material

• Fishing vessel

• Pleasure craft

• Diesel train

• Electric train

0.4 1

0.9 0.45 0.45 0.23 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.8

Line Source

• Transmission line

• Road

• railway

0.2per 100m

Note 1

Note 1

Area Source

• Chemical Plant

• Oil Refinery

• Heavy Industry

• Light Industrial Warehousing

0.9 per Site

0.9 per Site

0.9 per Site

As for population

Population Source

• residential

• employment force

0.01 per person

0.01 per person

Source Unit

Continuous Discrete (per s)

Gas Oil Gas Oil

Electrical Equipment Per m2 3.30x10-6 5.70x10-5 3.40x10-8 5.80x10-7

Pump Per item 6.40x10-5 4.40x10-3 1.20x10-7 3.40x10-6

Compressor Per item 1.50x10-3 1.50x10-2 2.70x10-6 2.70x10-5

Generator Per item 3.50x10-3 3.50x10-2 6.20x10-6 6.20x10-5

Other Per m2 1.40x10-5 4.10x10-4 8.40x10-9 1.50x10-7

Personnel Per m2 5.50x10-6 2.60x10-4 2.80x10-8 5.80x10-7

Note: Applicable ignition probabilities for from the above given tables were considered in the modelling.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.2. Disaster Management Plan

7.2.1. Introduction

A disaster is a sudden accident or a catastrophic situation that has the potential to cause damage to life and property.

While pipelines are the safest mode of transportation of hydrocarbons and management aims to prevent or minimize the risk of accidents through good design, operation, maintenance and inspection, absolute safety is not always achievable. Hence, an essential part of major hazard control must include mitigating the effects of a major emergency.

Disaster Management comprises two phases;

• The first phase refers to preventive measures envisaged in the project design, layout, construction, erection, commissioning, operations and maintenance.

• The second phase refers to a management plan to be pressed into action, should an emergency occur.

Accordingly, site specific plans are prepared for on-site emergencies.

Disaster Management Plan describes the emergency situations, the organization and line of command, the system and equipment to be used and role and responsibilities of the Key personnel. The plan should be updated on the basis of risk analysis, HAZOP studies, accidents, changes in regulatory and statutory requirements, learning from emergency mock drills and past experience.

7.2.2. Objectives of Disaster Management Plan (DMP)

The Objectives of the Disaster Management Plan (DMP) are as follows:

• To outline facilities provided and the organizational response to control & contain risks arising out of loss of containment of flammable material and resultant fire.

• To outline the roles and responsibilities of the key members of the emergency response team (ERT), to safeguard other employees and contractor workers, the people living in surrounding area, environment and assets.

• To provide a sequence of actions to regain control over the emergency situation and restore the system to normalcy with minimum disruption to the operations.

• To provide information to local authorities viz. local fire brigade, hospitals, factory inspectorate, state pollution control board and all the concerned government agencies regarding the hazards, equipment, facilities and procedures provided by the management in case of any emergency.

7.2.3. Scope and Purpose

The scope of the DMP is to establish the criteria for emergency planning and provide guidance for the effective emergency preparedness and response plan in the event of any potential emergency for all facilities of Dahej - Nagothane Ethan Pipeline including M&R stations located at Hazira and Nagothane.

The purpose of the DMP is to effectively manage and control the emergencies occurring during project operations. This DMP ensures,

• emergency response team is effective & adequate;

• clear roles and responsibilities of key personnel & support groups;

• availability and adequacy of emergency infrastructure & resources;

• efficient emergency communication and emergency response team is trained

• periodic training of the emergency response team,



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.2.4. Definitions

Emergency

A situation created by an accidental release or spill of a hazardous material, which poses a threat to the safety of workers, surrounding people, the environment or property.

On-Site Emergency

Typical on-site emergency is applicable to an industrial site or a factory. In case of cross-country pipeline the on-site emergency is restricted to incidents at Pump station.

Off-Site Emergency

For a cross country pipeline, the effect of an accident involves the community living in the vicinity of the pipeline, which is called an off-site emergency.

Emergency Response Team (ERT)

A team consisting of designated and trained members drawn from various departments who form the first-responders during an emergency.

7.2.5. Classification of Emergencies

Emergencies of DNEPL have been classified into three different levels based on seriousness and response required. These levels are

• Level 1: This is an emergency which can be effectively and safely managed and contained within the site/location with the help of available resources/ equipment and has no impact outside the station/ site.

• Level 2: This is an emergency which cannot be effectively and safely managed and contained within the site/location with the help of available resources/ equipment and additional support is required and is having effect beyond the pump station has no impact outside the pump station/ site and where external support of mutual aid member or local fire service is required to control the emergency.

• Level 3:

This is an emergency or an incident with

a) Off-site impact which could be catastrophic and is likely to affect the population property and environment inside and outside the installation

b) And management and control is done by district administration

Although the level III emergency falls under the purview of District Authority but till they step in, it should be responsibility of the organization to manage the emergency.

Level -1 and level -2 are grouped as on-site emergency and level-3 as off-site emergency.

7.2.6. Extent of Severity during Emergencies

Planning for an emergency is based on the rough estimates of the damages expected. Due consideration is given to the severity of potential emergency situation that may arise as a result of pipeline accident events as discussed in the Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). This will enable appropriate emergency response procedures to be effectively implemented.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Table 115: Estimates of expected damage and resources required

Level Nature of Damage expected Resources Required

1 & 2 • Rapid depressurization • Cooling/ frost formation • Noise • Blast effects & projectiles • Fire effects • Explosion overpressures

• Wind sock • LEL meters • Tools for shutting the valve • SCBA, • Additional vehicles for evacuation, etc. • Fire fighting equipment viz. fire tenders and extinguishers. • Pipeline Emergency Tool Kit

3 • Pipeline dented or shifted from its position • Leak and subsequent uncontrolled fire at MLV. • Full bore rupture of pipeline

• Communication with met department (details to be identified prior to commissioning) • Refer level-1 & 2 resources

The details in the table above must be supplied to the emergency services and rescue personnel and should be available to planning departments.

The emergency levels defined with respect to this EIA and DMP for the project based on their

severity have been discussed in the subsequent sections with 'decision tree' for emergency

classification being depicted in Figure 102.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 102: Emergency Classification for DNEPL

Any Person Noticing the Incident

Pipeline Operation Centre

(POC) in Command

POC to initiate Level-I Notification by informing Level-I team members

No

POC to intimate

to all concerned

Emergency Escalates to

Level - II

Emergency

Terminated

Yes

EMT Leader activates

ECC at RCP, Mumbai

Yes

No

Emergency Response Team

(ERT) to site

Incident leading to

emergency

Emergency Escalates

to Level - III

EMT Leader informs

CMT Leader Mumbai

and POC

CMT Activated

ERT Leader informs

POC/ EMT Leader

POC initiates Level-II

Emergency Notification

Emergency

Under

Control

Emergency

Under

Yes Yes

Yes

Incident handling and

assessment at site by ERT &

ERT Leader (AM)

Confirming back to POC

Initiating Event



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

The criteria for classification of various levels of emergencies and associated response have been presented in the Table 116 below.

Table 116: Emergency Types and Criteria for Selection

Level of Emergency

Situational guidance

Employees, people and community

impacts

Company asset or Business Continuity

impacts

Environmental impacts

Reputation impacts or public

concern

Notification and activation required

Level-I Emergency Minor health effect/ injury

Minor damage Minor effect Minor impact

� The site Emergency Response Team is activated, and the EMT Leader & Head-HSEF are notified by Pipeline Operations Centre (POC) shift engineer.

� External Emergency Services maybe requested.

� DNEPL control room is notified

Level-II

Major

emergency

with crisis potential

Major health effect/ injury or permanent total disability

Local or major damage

Local or major effect

Local or major national impact

� The EMT at RCP, Navi Mumbai, is activated.

� DNEPL Control Room is notified.

� The DNEPL Crisis Management Team is notified.

� HR to provide support for media communication.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Level of Emergency

Situational guidance

Employees, people and community

impacts

Company asset or Business Continuity

impacts

Environmental impacts

Reputation impacts or public

concern

Notification and activation required

Level-III DNEPL Crisis

One or more fatalities

Extensive damage Extensive effect Major international impact

� The DNEPL-CMT at RCP Navi Mumbai is activated.

� Ethane Terminal of Reliance Industries is notified.

� HR to provide support for media communication.

� Convey to District Magistrate, Chief Secretary

� HSE dept to inform Nodal Officer of MoPNG/OISD /PNGRB/ DISH/PESO after getting clearance from CMTL/EMTL



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.2.7. Management Measures for Prevention of Emergencies

All necessary measures for prevention of such incidents will be put in place. The preventive measures envisaged are listed below:

a. Pipeline Design & Material Selection: To ensure adequate public safety under all conditions likely to be encountered during operating conditions design of the proposed pipeline has been undertaken in accordance with the provisions of ASME B31.4 and OISD 214. Relevant studies for structural integrity and pipeline stability such as stress analysis, buoyancy control and stability analysis, soil & seismic analysis, etc. have been undertaken and the results incorporated in the design.

b. Line Pipe for use in the Pipeline System will conform to Line Pipe Specification API 5L. Isolation to limit the hazard and damage from accidental discharge from pipeline system and to facilitate maintenance of pipeline system will be effected through the provision of Main Line Valves (MLV) with remote and local controls.

Factors such as topography of the location, ease of operation and maintenance including requirements blow-down, security and proximity to occupied buildings will be taken into consideration in deciding the location of the Main Line Valves for isolation purpose.

c. Pipeline Safety Devices & Features include an Emergency Shut Down System to close down product delivery system and to de-energize the electrical facilities, over pressure shut off valves with alarm, etc. The pipeline will be monitored and controlled from SCADA system and Leak Detection Software to ensure effective and reliable control, management and supervision of the pipeline. All remote MLV stations, dispatch & receiving stations will have suitable field signals’ connectivity with SCADA.

d. The pipeline will be provided with both passive and active corrosion protection systems to prevent external corrosion of the pipeline. It will comprise of a high integrity three layer polyethylene coating system supplemented by an impressed current cathodic protection system. Insulating joints will be provided at underground and above ground transition of the pipeline for the electrical isolation. During construction of the pipeline temporary Cathodic protection will also be provided.

e. Pipeline Operation & Maintenance: A detailed operation and maintenance procedure for control system and safety interlocks will be developed for normal operations & shut down/ maintenance, temporary operations, emergency shutdown details and emergency operations.

A detailed periodic preventive maintenance procedure and schedule will be developed for entire pipeline system considering the recommendations given by the original equipment manufacturer and in accordance with PNGRB T4S & OISD standards.

Patrolling of the pipeline will be undertaken on a periodic basis as per OISD Standard 138 and PNGRB guidelines. All ground patrolling crew will be trained and periodically updated in handling hydrocarbon detection instruments.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

The ground patrolling crew shall be trained in the preliminary steps of Disaster Management and implementation of steps to cordon off the area of concern.

f. Fire Protection System & Emergency Response: The pipeline will have fire and gas detection system equipped with audio-visual alarm. Adequate fire fighting facilities along with vapour/gas detection and fire alarm system shall be provided at the Pump Station, IPS, Metering and Regulation Station and remotely operated MLV stations.

g. Appropriate communication system like telephone, walkie-talkie sets, Intrinsically Safe

Mobile Phone, optical fibre cable based communication system will be provided. A mutual aid

scheme for the fire fighting and emergency rescue operation will be developed involving local

industries, local govt. agencies. Periodic mock drills will be conducted in association and in

consultation with the local governing bodies.

7.2.8. Elements of the Plan

A number of elements are required to ensure effective decision- making during an emergency. These include

• Emergency organisation

• Roles and responsibilities of Emergency Response Team

• Emergency communication system.

• Emergency Control Center

• Emergency Procedures.

7.2.9. Emergency Organization

An emergency response structure will be developed for effective response to the emergency. The structure defines the main functions of the decision makers and the individual roles as well. The emergency shall be notified as per Table-116 to all the concerned for necessary action

A basic organogram is given in Figure 103.

RGPL will constitute emergency response teams (ERT) to respond to fires, accidents and

technical emergencies. These teams will be made up from operations personnel, who can be

called upon 24 hours a day, supported by senior management field personnel as and when

required. The emergency response teams will receive specific training for their roles and

exercised on a regular basis.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Figure 103 : Basis Organogram

7.2.10. Roles and Responsibilities

The various key members of the Emergency management team with respect to different levels

of emergencies and their prime responsibilities are mentioned below:



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Level-1 Emergency

Emergency Response Team Leader (Station In-Charge)

On noticing or receiving message of an emergency from control center, the Station in-Charge will-

• Rush to the emergency site along with all emergency tools.

• Communicate POC about emergency.

• Assume the overall responsibility and charge of the situation and mobilize resources at his command fully.

• Assess the situation and take necessary actions to control the emergency and give necessary instructions to auxiliary fire squad and field personnel for process control actions.

• Shut down the affected section in consultation with POC, if situation warrants, ensure the safe shut down to control the emergency.

• Ensure safety of the personnel and evacuate them if required to safe assembly points and arrange for head count.

• Instruct security to barricade the affected areas downwind.

• Arrange for first aid for injured and shifting of casualties if any to nearest hospital.

• Liaise with RM on escalation of an emergency.

• After the emergency is controlled/over instruct the Shift Security In-charge to activate “ALL CLEAR “ siren and also inform Control Center Panel Engineer to inform O&M Head, HSE&F After all clear, ensure conditions are safe for restart-up.

Shift Engineer

On receiving F&G alarm and or massage from field, the control center panel engineer shall inform the staff based on the level of emergency.

Level-1 Emergency:

• Inform Station In-Charge, Security shift In-charge, Head-O&M, Head-HSE&F and Head-Control Center in case of level-1 emergency.

• POC to activate ERSS and send SMS/Email to all the concerned about emergency.

Level-2 and 3 Emergencies:

• In case of level -2 emergency inform Station In-Charge, Security shift In-charge, Head-O&M, Head-HSE&F and Head-Control Center and EMT and emergency services viz. Police, Fire Brigade, Civil Hospitals etc.

• In case of level-3 emergency all staff of level-2 emergency and CMT members and local emergency services

• Activate ERSS and send SMS

• Inform or send SMS to customers about the emergency only after ascertaining the nature of emergency and only if supply interruption/ reduction are warranted. On all-clear communicate to customers and rework out the scheduling.

Auxiliary Fire Squad

On hearing the alarm or getting notified by Station In-Charge, the fire squad will immediately:

• Proceed to emergency location. Auxiliary squad leader shall lead and guide the fire fighting crew.

• Ensure safety of the fire squad members and

• Decide line of control actions in consultation with Station in-Charge (Emergency Controller) for fire fighting and rescue operation.

• Impart first aid to injured and arrange for transportation to nearest hospital.

• Implement the evacuation plan as directed by Station in-Charge.

• Keep constant contact with Station In-Charge (Emergency Controller)



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Lead- Mechanical Maintenance

• On receiving the emergency communication, depute mechanical technician at fire water pump house to ensure water supply / running of fire water pumps and arrange to man the pump house till the emergency is over.

• Take necessary precautions like maintaining water level in fire water holding tanks by starting bore well pumps and availability of fire water pumps etc.

• Arrange to repairs of fire water pumps in case of failure.

Lead- Instruments and Electrical

• Proceed to the emergency site keeping upwind

• Identify critical electrical and instrument equipment in the affected area and provide electrical assistance for running the fire water pumps and bore well pumps.

• Isolate the electric supply if directed by EC.

Shift Security Officer

• Instruct and deploy security personnel at security gates and around the affected area.

• Cordon off the area and guide traffic/ emergency vehicles and control unnecessary gathering of persons around.

• Ensure vigilance at security gates and be in constant contact with Station In-Charge and other members connected with emergency management, fire fighting or rescue operation.

• Mobilize for evacuation of personnel from safe assembly points to safe locations as directed by Station In-charge.

• Arrange for transport for shifting the casualties, if any.

Lead IT

• Proceed to LCC and take charge as a communication coordinator and ensure that all the communication equipment are in order.

• Log all outgoing and incoming telephone calls during entire emergency operation.

• Resume and activate the satellite channel if all other communication channels fail.

• Ensure that the Internet, e-mail, web site facilities are in order.

• Establish a permanent liaison between CMTL and Control Center.

Level - 2 and 3 Emergencies

Head O&M

• Head-O&M shall take the charge of emergency and provide leadership and guidance to the emergency management team.

• Keep in regular touch with the ERTL and guide him accordingly.

• Inform and appraise at regular intervals regarding the situation to EMT

• Take strategic and technical decisions in line with the emergency scenario to terminate the cause of emergency.

• Ensure that all necessary support services are activated.

• Liaise with external support services.

• Liaise with the senior officials of Police, Fire Brigade, Medical and Factory Inspectorate and pass on information on possible effects to the surrounding areas outside the station premises and necessity of evacuating the area and moving the people to safe places.

• Requisition for mobilizations of Mutual Aid members.

• Ensure logging of all the emergency activities and incoming and out going messages.

• Initiate post-rehabilitation of the affected area.

• Brief the press and media about the emergency status.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

Emergency Controller (Station In-Charge)

• Declare on site emergency and take charge of the emergency at the incident site.

• Ensure local fire brigades are called at the incident site.

• Report to the Head-O&M and apprise him regularly of the developments.

• Take instructions only from EMTL or nominated representative.

• Coordinate with operations, control center, fire services, medical, security, maintenance, materials and head of safety district.

• Ensure barricading of affected area / roads by security.

• Assess various requirements of manpower, resources, devices, equipment etc. and seek additional support from CMTL if required.

• Ensure that the casualties are rescued and receive adequate and timely first aid and medical attention.

• Direct the fire auxiliary squad to secure the personnel on site and to secure adjacent facilities.

• Ensure that the operational containment actions / isolations are carried out.

• Coordinate with lead –Electrical and mechanical for power and utilities shedding if required.

• Closely monitor any effluents going into storm water channels. Alert the concerned personnel to take appropriate action to avoid any slippage outside the complex.

• Log all important events during the emergency.

• Declare “ALL CLEAR“ upon Completion of the emergency in consultation with RM.

• Liaise with the statutory authorities (Factory Inspector, Labour Dept.) as per the instruction of the CMTL.

7.2.11. HO Support

a. Emergency Management Team

• Advice ERTL and Head- O&Min managing the emergency situation based on the site inputs.

• Arrange for additional manpower, material and equipment to the emergency management team.

• Get the site situation from time to time and appraise / advice CMTL for appropriate action plan.

• Advice / Guide ERTL on critical matters.

• Send one member of team to the emergency site, if situation warrants.

b. HSE&F

• Advice ERTL/ EMTL on issues related to safety, health, environment and fire.

• Expedite the help of mutual aid partners and local fire services.

• Ensure that adequate safety and fire equipment are made available until the completion of emergency operations.

• Organize documentation of emergency scenarios using photography, video etc.

• Review and update MEMP based on the learning of emergency.

c. Technical Services Coordinator

• Provide all technical inputs to EMTL

• Arrange for retrieval of necessary drawings and related documents if required.

• Coordinate with outside technical consultants and experts and seek help if required.

d. HR Coordinator

• Carryout the strategic orders of EMTL.

• Coordinate to inform relatives of the affected persons.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

• Assign officials at various hospitals / clinics to look after the needs of victims admitted there.

• Arrange for rehabilitation, shelter, food etc. for affected people/

• Liaise with various media and release written statement to the press with concurrence of the corporate communication team.

e. IT Coordinator

• Take charge as a communication coordinator and ensure that all communication equipment is in order.

• Log all outgoing and incoming telephone calls during entire emergency operation.

• Resume and activate the satellite channel if all other communication channels fail.

• Ensure that the Internet, e-mail, web site facilities are in order.

• Establish a permanent liaison with ERTL

f. Commercial Coordinator

• Arrange for emergency financial /commercial support required during emergency management.

• Liaise with the insurance agencies/surveyors for any claim or settlement.

• Assist the purchase coordinator and concur emergency procurement.

• Assist HR Coordinator and concur for expenditure towards rehabilitation and other welfare expenses.

• Arrange for documents / photographs etc. of various losses. Preserve claim documents related to emergency.

h. Materials Coordinator

• Carryout the strategic orders from the EMTL for supplying all emergency materials, equipment, and other supplies as applicable.

• Arrange issue and transportation of material from Regional Warehouse to the affected site.

• Arrange emergency procurement from local dealers / vendors or from neighboring industries.

• Liaise with Commercial Coordinator for any approval or concurrence.

• Arrange emergency procurement from national / international vendors / suppliers if required. Liaise with Commercial Coordinator for any approval or concurrence.

• Organize air lifting of above emergency equipment if required with concurrence of EMTL.

• Ensure availability of materials. Liaise with all key vendors and arrange supplies like safety equipment, fire fighting equipment, foam compounds, medical equipment, medicines and other materials / consumable required for emergency control.

i. Security Coordinator

• Coordinate mobilization of security personnel, threat analysis, traffic control, evacuation of personnel etc.

• Arrange additional AFS members to emergency site.

• Ensure security staff for manning gates and Incident site.

• Give directions to prevent unauthorized entry into the station and control gathering of people at site who have no role in emergency management.

• Ensure easy access to all key members’ vehicles without hindrances /delays at the gate.

• Ensure that all non-emergency vehicles plying on the road are pulled to the side to make unobstructed way for emergency vehicles.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

• Transport casualties in security vehicles, (if ambulance is not available) maintain about 5 nos. slip-on mufflers (Spark arrestors) at security gate for emergency vehicles of mutual aid scheme members.

• Ensure security personnel escort mutual aid scheme vehicles to emergency site.

• Guide evacuation of persons as per guidance of the EC/CMTL.

• Liaise with local police under instruction from CMTL and mobilize additional security force if required.

• Communicate with the HCC and Top Management functionaries.

• Cordon-off roads around the incident site and establish alternate routes.

• Liaise with Reliance group companies to secure additional manpower.

J. RGPL Crisis Management Team

During a major emergency, there could be a situation when large-scale business interruption, loss of several lives etc. may result. On those occasions certain corporate strategic decisions need to be taken in line with business recovery, re-entry operations, product transfer, securing various inventories, shifting inventories to safe locations / group companies etc.

In this regard, the corporate crisis group will be formed at the Reliance Corporate Park (RCP)

office, Navi Mumbai who would guide the CMTL through Head-O&M.

7.2.12. Emergency Communication

Communication System

Responsibility for external and internal communication will be assigned at the station. Dedicated fiber optic cable based communication system will be provided for quick communication between the control stations, dispatch and delivery station(s) of the pipeline. The backup system will consist of appropriate combination of fixed telephone lines/data-bandwidth of the local service provider, mobile phones, VHF sets etc.

Emergency Control Center (ECC)

ECC will be located at safe place and will be reasonably, remote from major processing areas from where the widespread consequences during a major emergency can be better controlled. It will also be the central point for information gathering, processing and decision making more specifically to combat the emergency. Most of the tactical decisions will be taken in this centre with regard to the management of an emergency based on the information gathered and processed. The ERTL takes charge at the ECC and commands the emergency operations as per the emergency organization chart.

7.2.13. Emergency Procedures

DNEPL will evolve easy-to-follow procedures for responding to the identified situation, with

• Details of response equipment and location, procedures, training requirements, duties, etc.

• Descriptions and procedures for alarm and communications systems;

• Precautionary measures for securing the site;

• Evacuation procedures including for the person with special need.

Rehearsal of the Plan: The plan will be rehearsed once in three months to check for effectiveness. The following procedure will be adopted:

• An artificial emergency situation will be created at a predefined location

• Time log book will be maintained for

a) Time required for sounding siren

b) Time required by fire fighting crew to report at the site of the emergency and controls the emergency.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

c) Time required by rescue team to report at the site and start rescue operations

d) Time required by the site main controller to report to the ECR.

e) Time required by the second in-charge to report to the site of the emergency

f) Time required for emergency control to be maintained

g) Time wise sequence of events

h) Reporting of discrepancies observed from the actual plan

Ending of an emergency: After controlling an emergency, the ERT Leader will declare as ‘All Clear”. The siren will be sounded for 2 minutes to indicate that the Emergency is over.

7.2.14. Support from Mutual Aid Members

During major emergencies it may be necessary to seek the support of neighbouring industries, govt. agencies and other technical institutions in order to complement the supply of safety, fire fighting materials and equipment etc. in the shortest possible time. This will help in a greater way to control a major emergency that may escalate beyond the capability of the site. Station In-Charge shall communicate the mutual aid members to respond to an emergency at Pump Station.

In line with above and to share the reserves during major emergencies, the facility would become member of the existing mutual aid schemes available in that area. A protocol would be developed under the Chairmanship of District Collector in this regard. The procedure for seeking mutual aid, its area of operation and the conditions of the scheme are detailed in this protocol.

7.2.15. Summary

Emergency planning is just one aspect of safety and cannot be considered in isolation. In particular, it is not a substitute for maintaining good standards during operations. Management will ensure that the necessary standards and safety precautions are administered prior to preparing the plan. RGPL shall develop Detailed Emergency Response and Disaster Management Plan as per PNGRB Code of Practice for ERDMP 2010.

Emergency planning has included several measures aimed at preventing escalation of incidents as well as mitigating emergencies. The basic elements for an effective plan have been included in the development. Prior to the commissioning of the project, copies of the plan will be given to the authorities.

7.3. Occupational Health

Occupational health needs attention both during construction and erection and operation and maintenance phases. However, the problem varies both in magnitude and variety in the above phases.

7.3.1. Construction and Erection

The occupational health problems envisaged at this stage can mainly be due to constructional accident and noise.To overcome these hazards, in addition to arrangements to reduce it within TLV's, personal protective equipment (PPE) shall also be supplied to workers.

7.3.2. Operation and Maintenance

The problem of occupational health, in the operation and maintenance phase is due to noise hearing losses. Suitable personnel protective equipment shall be given to employees. The working personnel shall be given the following appropriate personnel protective equipment.

• Industrial Safety Helmet;

• Crash Helmets;



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

• Face shield with replacement acrylic vision;

• Zero power plain goggles with cut type filters on both ends;

• Zero power goggles with cut type filters on both sides and blue colour glasses;

• Welders equipment for eye and face protection;

• Cylindrical type earplug;

• Ear muffs;

• Leather apron;

• Aluminized fiber glass fix proximity suit with hood and gloves;

• Leather hand gloves;

• Asbestos hand gloves;

• Acid/Alkali proof rubberized hand gloves;

• Canvas cum leather hand gloves with leather palm;

• Electrically tested electrical resistance hand gloves; and

• Industrial safety shoes with steel toe.

Full-fledged hospital facilities shall be made available round the clock for attending emergency arising out of accidents, if any. All working personnel shall be medically examined at least once in every year and at the end of his term of employment. This is in addition to the pre-employment medical examination.

7.3.3. Safety Plan

Safety of both men and materials during construction and operation phases is of concern. The preparedness of an industry for the occurrence of possible disasters is known as emergency plan. The disaster in the pipeline project is possible due to leakage of hazardous chemicals and fire/explosion etc.

Keeping in view the safety requirement during construction, operation and maintenance phases, and the project authority shall formulate safety policy with the following regulations:

• To allocate sufficient resources to maintain safe and healthy conditions of work;

• To take steps to ensure that all known safety factors are taken into account in the design, construction, operation and maintenance machinery and equipment;

• To ensure that adequate safety instructions are given to all employees;

• To provide wherever necessary protective equipment, safety appliances and clothing and to ensure their proper use;

• To inform employees about materials, equipment or processes used in their work which are known to be potentially hazardous to health or safety;

• To keep all operations and methods of work under regular review for making necessary changes from the point of view of safety in the light of experience and upto date knowledge;

• To provide appropriate facilities for first aid and prompt treatment of injuries and illness at work;

• To provide appropriate instruction, training, retraining and supervision to employees in health and safety, first aid and to ensure that adequate publicity is given to these matters;

• To ensure proper implementation of fire prevention methods and an appropriate fire fighting service together with training facilities for personnel involved in this service;

• To organize collection, analysis and presentation of data on accident, sickness and incident involving people injury or injury to health with a view to taking corrective, remedial and preventive action;

• To promote through the established machinery, joint consultation in health and safety matters to ensure effective participation by all employees;

• To publish/notify regulations, instructions and notices in the common language of employees;



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

• To prepare separate safety rules for each types of occupation/processes involved in a project; and

• To ensure regular safety inspection by a competent person at suitable intervals of all buildings, equipment, work places and operations.

In operation, the safety guidelines shall be framed in consultation with OISD and were tested under their guidance. The same shall be implemented.

7.3.4. Safety Organization

Laying of Pipeline

A qualified and experienced safety officer shall be appointed. The responsibilities of the safety officers include identification of the hazardous conditions and unsafe acts of workers and advice on corrective actions, conduct safety audit, organize training programs and provide professional expert advice on various issues related to occupational safety and health. He is also responsible to ensure compliance of Safety Rules/ Statutory Provisions. In addition to employment of safety officer, every contractor, who employs more than 250 workers, shall also employ one safety officer to ensure safety of the worker, in accordance with the conditions of contract.

Operation and Maintenance Phase

When the construction is completed the posting of safety officers shall be in accordance with the requirement of Factories Act and their duties and responsibilities shall be as defined thereof.

7.3.5. Safety Circle

In order to fully develop the capabilities of the employees in identification of hazardous processes and improving safety and health, safety circles would be constituted in each area of work. The circle would consist of 5-6 employees from that area. The circle normally shall meet for about an hour every week.

7.3.6. Safety Training

A full-fledged training centre shall be set up. Safety training should be provided by the Safety Officers with the assistance of faculty members called from Corporate Center, Professional Safety Institutions and Universities. In addition to regular employees, limited contractor labours shall also be provided safety training. To create safety awareness safety films shall be shown to workers and leaflets etc. Some precautions and remedial measures proposed to be adopted to prevent fires are:

• Compartmentation of cable galleries, use of proper sealing techniques of cable passages and crevices in all directions would help in localizing and identifying the area of occurrence of fire as well as ensure effective automatic and manual fire fighting operations;

• Spread of fire in horizontal direction would be checked by providing fire stops for cable shafts;

• Reliable and dependable type of fire detection system with proper zoning and interlocks for alarms are effective protection methods for conveyor galleries;

• Housekeeping of high standard helps in eliminating the causes of fire and regular fire watching system strengthens fire prevention and fire fighting; and

• Proper fire watching by all concerned would be ensured.

7.3.7. Health and Safety Monitoring Plan

The health of all employees shall be monitored once in two years for early detection of any ailment due to exposure to petroleum (organic) products and Ethane.



IND.BH.41.14.0029/HSR Rev. 03

7.4. Socio-Economic Conditions

Following impacts are anticipated on the socio economic and cultural environment:

• Direct job creation for people during construction period

• Indirect economic development due to market multiplier effect

• Creation of infrastructure facilities

• Immigration of outside labour force

• Development of squatter slums

• Inducement of traffic congestion and road safety hazards

Following mitigating measures are proposed:

• Locals will be deployed during construction to the extent depending on their skills

• Effective public relations strategy will be maintained and the locals will be allowed to use the developed infrastructure facility.

• There will be regular interaction with the locals to solve their problems.

7.4.1. Measures to Improve Socio-Economic Conditions

Reliance is committed to undertaking CSR activities either directly or through Reliance Foundation. Reliance Foundation has undertaken such initiatives in many rural areas, some of which are listed below:

� Medical equipment such as oxygen flow meters, wheel-chairs etc. for hospitals.

� Installation of portable water tank in Schools. � Construction of bore wells for villages. � Benches, school bags and notebooks for students. � Local cultural upliftment.

The proposed project will generate direct and indirect employment in the region by deploying

semi-skilled workers and labourers during the construction phase of the project.

7. ADDITIONAL STUDIES - environmentclearance.nic.inDesign Throughput MMTPA 1.25 ... Project...

Documents

Transcript of 7. ADDITIONAL STUDIES - environmentclearance.nic.inDesign Throughput MMTPA 1.25 ... Project...