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Housing Stock Transfer in Glasgowthe First Five Years A Study of PolicyImplementationAde Kearnsa; Louise LawsonaaDepartment of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

To cite this ArticleKearns, Ade and Lawson, Louise(2008) 'Housing Stock Transfer in Glasgowthe First Five Years: AStudy of Policy Implementation', Housing Studies, 23: 6, 857 878

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Housing Stock Transfer in GlasgowtheFirst Five Years: A Study of PolicyImplementation

ADE KEARNS & LOUISE LAWSON

Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, UK

(Received March 2008; revised August 2008)

ABSTRACT In 2003 the City of Glasgow saw the largest housing stock transfer in the UK, involvingaround 80 000 dwellings. Since then, the implementation of the stock transfer policy has been heavily

criticised. This paper uses a framework developed from implementation studies to analyse why thispolicy has been susceptible to difficulties and to reflect upon the important elements of a revised

analytical framework. The paper finds that the study of policy implementation must contain anappreciation of the effects of having multiple policy objectives, multiple layers of governance andmultiple actors involved in policy delivery. Additional elements of a policy implementation framework

are: the specification of the stages of implementation; consideration of interactions between policyobjectives; the need for government to oversee and ensure the effective management of policynetworks; and finally, consideration of the effects of competing political interests and perspectives.

KEY WORDS: Housing policy, housing stock transfer, policy implementation, Glasgow

Introduction

It is five years since public sector tenants in Glasgow saw their housing transferred from

Glasgow City Council (GCC) to the Glasgow Housing Association (GHA) in March 2003,

following a majority vote in favour of the move in a ballot of tenants in April 2002. The

policy of stock transfer for Glasgow was meant to be the flagship of the Scottish Executives

new housing programme of community ownership (see Kintrea, 2005; Scottish Executive,

2000), but ownership of Glasgows ex-council housing at a community level has taken

longer to achieve than many wanted. This has led many observers and commentators to

declare the policy a failure, such as the following:

An inheritance of four years of political bitterness resulting from the failure to split

the organisation into more than 60 local associations. (Gerry Braiden, journalist,The

Herald, 11 June 2007)

ISSN 0267-3037 Print/1466-1810 Online/08/06085722 q 2008 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/02673030802416635

Correspondence Address: Ade Kearns, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, 25 Bute Gardens,

Glasgow, G12 8RS, UK. Email: [email protected]

Housing Studies,

Vol. 23, No. 6, 857878, November 2008

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It is with some concern that I see the situation with Glasgows stock transfer drifting

all over the place. (Alastair McGregor, former GHA Board member, The Herald,21 September 2007)

Given that council housing stock transfer has been taking place in the UK for around 20

years, commencing under the Conservative Governments of the 1980s and 1990s and

continuing under New Labour, it could be asked why Glasgows transfer has been so

problematic.1

Malpass & Mullins (2002) have shown how stock transfer policy in the UK

has gone through different phases, from locally led initiatives (early 1980s), to a centrally-

controlled programme of local initiatives (late 1980s to early 1990s), to centrally

promoted policy to overcome local resistance to stock transfers and to resolve financial

barriers (late 1990s onwards). Interest in the Glasgow housing stock transfer stems partly

from the fact that it is the product of a centrally-directed, and locally unpopular (with local

authority councillors and some tenants) solution to the problem of investing sufficiently in

poor quality housing stock (see Scottish Office, 1999); but also that the implementation of

the policy has been left in the hands of a fragmented system of local housing governance

which has been further complicated by the policy prescription itself, as we shall see. Thus,

the case shows how the fragmentation of local governance is not only an objective of

policy, as argued by Malpass & Mullins (2002), but also a problem for policy. A further

reason to look at this policy in practice is that most of the literature on housing stock

transfers has looked at the overall, housing-system-level effects of the various

programmes over time (e.g. Kleinman, 1993; Mullinset al., 1995; Taylor, 1998), rather

than at the implementation of stock transfer on the ground.

In what follows, the paper first discusses how the Glasgow transfer is unique compared

to its predecessors. It goes on to use a framework developed from implementation studies

in public policy to review various elements of the policy and its implementation to identify

weaknesses and complications that have predisposed the policy to implementationdifficulties. The paper concludes by considering what the Glasgow case has added to

our understanding of the important elements of policy implementation to be studied in

future.

Glasgows Unique Stock Transfer

Whilst the transfer of council housing to other landlords is no longer a new phenomenon,

having taken place across the UK continuously since 1988 (see Malpass & Mullins, 2002;

Mullinset al., 1993; Taylor, 2000), Glasgows transfer has been unique in at least four

respects. First, the size of transfer: GCC owned over 80 000 dwellings at the time of

transfer, compared with a typical transfer among other local authorities of between 5000

10 000 units each (see Wilcox, 2001), with notable exceptions being Coventry (21 000

units), Wakefield (31 000) and Sunderland (36 000).Second, allied to both the size of the transfer and the poor condition of the housing stock

involved, Glasgows transfer involves much larger sums of money than previous events:

housing debt of circa 900 million, plus 4 billion of public-and-private housing

investment over 30 years. As Gibb (2003) outlines, this involves a great deal of risk

surrounding the following: future moves in interest rates; policy reforms to the Housing

Benefit system which underpins rental payments; and the need to improve rental income in

the context of falling social housing demand (Gibb, 2000).

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Third, the Glasgow stock transfer is to be a two-stage affair, in comparison to other

single-event transfers. Scottish politicians presented the policy as consistent withGlasgows heritage of successful community-based housing association (CBHA). The

belief in the CBHA model is expressed by two of the individuals involved in the original

policy formulation:

[it was] about giving tenants real choice of localised, neighbourhood-based

community ownership because we believed it was real. (Scottish Executive Official)

So for us it was always about, this is a totally different model of management and

ownership . . . This was about what works, small is beautiful. (Labour MSP)

Local ownership was not to be achieved through a series of sales to individual housing

associations over a period of time, but rather through a single transfer to the GHA, and

thereafter second stage transfers (SST) to local communities. A network of local housing

organisations (LHOs) was to be created and supported by GHA to manage the housing

stock in the interim before taking ownership.

How this two-stage process would work in practice appears to have been difficult to

specify in detail. The Glasgow Housing Partnership Steering Group, set up by the Scottish

Executive and Glasgow City Council in 1999 (also with local housing association

representation) published a Framework Agreement in 2000 (GHPSG, 2000) which

contained some key statements about SST:

From the outset, tenants will be offered advice and assistance about taking

ownership at a more local level in future. There will be different solutions for

different parts of the city . . .

Transfer to local ownership will be by means of a local ballot which can take place

as soon as it is legally and financially possible after a city-wide transfer has been

effected

At the end of a 10-year period after city wide transfer, those tenants who have not

chosen local ownership will be invited to participate in a survey confirming whether

they wish to remain within the GHA of consider transferring to more local

ownership arrangements.

Thus, although not specific about the timetable for SST, the Framework Agreement

implies that local transfers of ownership would happen during the early years after whole

stock transfer and certainly much of it would happen within the first 10 years, with

remaining GHA tenants being offered the chance to express their wishes at the end of thisten year period. However, the legal notice about city-wide stock transfer that went to

tenants in 2001 was less committal about the timing but more specific about the conditions

for SST:

Such SSTs will only happen if the financial and other arrangements for such a

transfer continue to ensure that all the commitments given in this document are

guaranteed to be delivered to those tenants transferring and to those who remain with

Housing Stock Transfer in Glasgow 859

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the GHA. In addition, SST will only happen if it has a financially neutral effect on

the GHA and its operations. (GCC, 2001)

Here it can be seen that SST could be proscribed by the requirement for financial

neutrality, the concern being that the best stock could be transferred to local

organisations, whilst the remainder becomes unviable as a collective stock holding under

GHA. The uniqueness of the Glasgow case is therefore also the fact of its complexity, as

noted by Gibb (2003).

Finally, the Glasgow stock transfer is unique in its political importance. Locally, the

transfer has been politically controversial with a vocal opposition in the form of a Vote

No campaign at the time and an ongoing Defend Council Housing campaign (see Defend

Council Housing, 2003). In Glasgow, the dominant housing culture was municipal

(Dalyet al., 2005, p. 329), and it is difficult to underestimate the role that council housing

plays in the fabric of Glasgow life, in its recent social history and . . . in its politics

(Mooney & Poole, 2005, p. 30). The performance of GHA continues to be controversial

with the city councils credibility on the line if things go wrong, since the transfer was seen

as something of a watershed (Mooney & Poole, 2005, p.30).

Nationally, the Glasgow stock transfer is also politically crucial. Kintreas (2005)

analysis of housing policy development in the early years of the Scottish Parliament (see in

particular Scottish Office, 1999 and Scottish Executive, 2000) led him to the conclusion

that there

is one dominant method designed to simultaneously achieve all of these [high level]

goals [of social justice, social cohesion, economic competitiveness and

empowerment]stock transfer or community ownership. (p. 191)

He describes the Glasgow case as absolutely pertinent and of political importance,more so since the adoption of the Scottish Housing Quality Standard (to be achieved by all

social housing by 2015) has renenergised the stock transfer debate, with more councils

now accepting that this is the route they will follow (p. 195). As a result, progress in

Glasgow has become a totemic political issue:

Succeeding to transfer Glasgows council housing was massively important both in

terms of securing a sustainable future for Scotlands largest council stock, and for

constructing a symbol of success for community ownership.

In the light of this level of importance, it is a very significant development that many

commentators are now calling the transfer process in Glasgow a failure.

The Research

The investigation here of the formulation and implementation of the Glasgow housing

stock transfer consisted of three elements. First, an analysis was made of policy documents

and academic articles on the issue, over the period 1999 to 2007. Second, media

commentaries about Glasgows housing over the same period were reviewed. Many of the

protagonists involved in the delivery or receipt of the policy voiced their opinions in the

national press. Third, 20 policy makers and practitioners at national and city levels were


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interviewed. These were people who had been closely involved in the development and

implementation of the stock transfer policy at various times over the period of study,2 andincluded staff, or former staff, from the Scottish Executive, Communities Scotland,

Glasgow City Council, Glasgow Housing Association and other Registered Social

Landlords (notably Community Based Housing Associations) in the city, as well as

opponents involved in campaigning against the transfer. Interviewees were either

identified and selected by ourselves from the documents studied, or were named to us by

other key participants. The interviews were recorded and transcribed in full for analysis.

Anonymity was preserved here by only giving individuals organisational affiliations rather

than their job titles. The majority of the interviews were conducted in the period August to

October 2006, with one interview in 2007.

A Framework for Studying Implementation Difficulties

It is clear that things have not run smoothly in the process of Glasgows two-stage housing

stock transfer, whether or not one concludes that it has been a failure. The rest of this

paper identifies the causes of difficultieswithin the area of policy formation and in

practiceusing a framework developed from implementation studies, a field which has

recently been revived (see Schofield & Sausman, 2004).

Overviews of implementation studies (see for example Barrett, 2004) identify three

types of approach. The top-down approach seeks to suggest ways of enhancing the

likelihood of obtaining compliance (Barrett, 2004, p. 254) with policy objectives made at

the top. This is taken to be a rational and normative view of policy, seeing the goals of the

top as legitimate and divergence as undemocratic (Ham & Hill, 1993). Jordan (1995)

points out that more sophisticated top down models (e.g. Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980)

take a less mechanical view, but while they see implementation as being more political,

they nonetheless retain a top down focus (p. 8). Bottom-up approaches focus more onthe behaviours of implementing agencies who have their own motivations, structural

constraints and who exercise discretion given that they face contradictory demands and

partially formulated initiatives (Elmore, 1979 80; cited in Jordan, 1995). Third, the

bargaining and negotiation models approach (Barrett & Fudge, 1981) examines how

implementation is a product of both the top and the bottom in reciprocal power relations.

The top may structure the implementation process and constrain the power of those below,

but lower level actors also take decisions which effectively limit hierarchical influence,

pre-empt top decision-making, or alter policies (p. 25).

In the analysis in this paper of developments in Glasgow, elements of all three

approaches are combined. Figure 1 identifies the key factors sought to consider in

analysing the implementation of stock transfer, or the governments community

ownership policy, in Glasgow. This draws heavily upon the frameworks proposed by

Van Meter & Van Horn (1975), Hogwood & Gunn (1984) and Mazmanian & Sabatier(1983) (and Sabatier, 1986). Van Meter & Van Horn (1975) focused mostly on policy

standards and the characteristics and disposition of the implementers, which Marsh &

Walker (2006) in another study of housing policy implementation divided into the

implementers understanding of the policy and, second, their response to it. Hogwood &

Gunn had more to say about policy theory and on the degree of dependency and consensus

among agencies (see Hill & Hupe, 2002 for a review). Mazmanian & Sabatier (1983)

identified all the elements mentioned in Figure 1 concerning the Implementation Agency,


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but in particular the need to keep discretion within bounds and to look at efforts by the

state to structure implementation (Sabatier & Mazmanian, 1980, p. 544). Nearly all the

available frameworks mention either the effects upon policy implementation of social and

political upheaval, or simply the effects of the operating environment. This factor has been

included in part IV of Figure 1, but a second element has also been added here, namely the

way in which policy design and delivery is affected both by national political factors and

by local political influences.

Three things have also been added to the consideration of the policy domain: whether ornot the parameters for preferred outcomes are set out in policy (or are all outcomes which

are compatible with the broad political aim of policy acceptable?); how well considered

are the practicalities and logic of implementation (although Hogwood & Gunn

recommended that policy makers specify the sequencing of tasks); and how do the

different objectives of policy interact over time? These things are particularly important

where there are several major policy objectives, and amongst these is an objective of

institutional reorganisation which is often the most difficult to achieve.

The remaining domain of the framework is that of inter-organisational relations, also

part of Van Meter & Van Horns model, but there it mostly relates to relations between

levels of government involved in implementation, rather than something broader. The first

element of this domain refers to support for the policy from non-governmental members of

the policy network, and is included in Sabatiers (1986) conditions for effective

implementation. Mullins & Rhodes (2007) remind us that the shape and structure ofnetworks increasingly affect policy making and implementation, especially as a result of

institutional changes in housing systems. Thus, two other elements have been added here

to reflect the fact that stock transfer policy as enacted in Glasgow relies for its

implementation upon a complicated, local network of housing agencies, where trust,

oversight and management may all play a part. A network of inter-dependent actors

rendered more complicated by the creation of new agencies as part of the stock transfer

policy (e.g. the Glasgow Housing Association and its constituent Local Housing

Figure 1. Framework for analysis of policy implementation


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Organisations)who have different perceptions of the policy problem, different values

and different desired solutions (cf. Termeer & Koppenjan, 1997) are nonetheless requiredto work together in a local context. What is more, some of the actors have developed

stronger expectations as a result of being involved in the policy design stages (see

Palumbo & Calista, 1990). In this situation, central government has a choice with regard to

the role it plays in the network, namely to try to manage in a traditional sense through

central oversight, or to become a network member and manage through a form of

governance which induces actors to co-operate (Stoker, 1991), and which steers the

network towards joint problem solving and further policy development (Kickert &

Koppenjan, 1997), influencing inter-organisational decision making (Klijn & Teisman,

1997). In neither case would central government be merely a passive observer of policy

implementation.

In what follows, the paper considers each of the four main areas in turn in relation to

the Glasgow housing stock transfer, to see how each might have contributed to

implementation difficulties.

Policy Itself

First, the paper considers the nature of the policy objectives and the degree of consensus

over those, as well as the key assumptions underlying the policy. Then, there is a look at

how well specified the policy was in term of the end state to be attained, the logic and

logistics of implementation, and the attention given to issues of interactions between

policy objectives.

Policy Objectives

It is important to recognise that housing stock transfer in Glasgow had multiple objectives,

complicating any judgement about success. For Glasgow City Council, the two key

objectives were debt removal and stock improvement, as these two officials testify:

I mean, community ownership from the council perspective, community ownership

was always incidental. The main, I mean, the main driver of the Council was getting

rid of the debt. (GCC Official)

The councils driver was investment in the housing stock, the Executives was

undoubtedly community ownership which is why we ended up . . . with a two-stage

stock transfer . . . it was the only way of putting two objectives together and getting a

win-win. (GCC Official)

Likewise, it is possible to identify two key objectives for the Scottish Executive:

community ownership or community empowerment; and the creation of an efficient and

effective social housing system:

The original policy for stock transfer in Glasgow [was] very much driven by

community ownership as such, very much driven by the view that in order to make

communities sustainable, local people should be involved in decision-making,


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shaping the thing, owning the regeneration, as opposed to just owning the houses.

(Scottish Executive Official)

We were strongly committed to using the stock transfer to create a better housing

system for the non-market sector of the city as a whole. (Scottish Executive Official)

In fact, the pre-transfer Framework document listed six objectives for transferthe four

mentioned above plus two others: to provide opportunities for house purchase; and to

achieve excellent standards of design, construction, management and maintenance

(GHPSG, 2000, p. 2). Research (Pawson et al., 2008, forthcoming) has since indicated that

the City Councils approach, and in particular its advocacy of a single-transfer model,

were also informed by the desire to secure continued work and employment for its Direct

Labour Organisation (DLO), which was granted a five-year contract to undertake GHA

housing repairs.

It could be argued that in its early years the GHA has put more effort and resources into

investment in the housing stock and improving its housing services, than into community

ownership. This partly reflects the political reality wherein there was pressure on politicians

to be seen to be improving the circumstances of Glasgow residents, and pressure on GHA

to perform better than GCC as a landlord; but it also reflects the more detailed timescales

put alongside the investment objectives in the original tenants promises at transfer. But

how the agencies deal with these simultaneous goals also raises issues about the

assumptions of causality and progress within the policy itself.

Policy Assumptions

The link between ownership and empowerment. In the words of the original Green Paper,

Community ownership is a way of empowering tenants. . .

(Scottish Office, 1999), andthereby a contribution to the sustainable communities goal (Kintrea, 2005). But there is no

consensus among the protagonists as to whether or not community ownership is necessary

for community empowerment. The view that community ownership is not essential can be

found in several places:

Its easy to get bogged down with focusing on the negative, you know second stage

transfer is not being delivered, but thats not, you know thats not what its all about

. . . (GHA Official)

You dont have to own a damn thing in order to have some say about the things about

it that are important to you . . . the trick is to find a way to give people some influence

over what happens locally without necessarily having to own (GCC Official)

Those holding the first view above would no doubt emphasise the priority that tenant

participation has within GHA. Independent researchers have remarked on how much more

GHA is tenant-driven than its predecessor, particularly in relation to policy making

(Pawsonet al., 2008, forthcoming), whilst government inspectors have said that GHA has

made tenant participation one of its strengths (Communities Scotland, 2007, p. 37).

Some participants question what empowerment, beyond participation, is supposed to

deliver for communities:


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Nobody could say, what is this thing right? Community ownership it kind of sounds

good so, em, is it about empowering, is it about empowerment, is it about control, isit a substitute for people who cant own personal assets; they can own community

assets? Are there behaviours that change because that level of control is, that level of

actual ownership is in place? (GHA Official)

Other participants believe that community ownership is necessary for empowerment, but

not always sufficient.

I dont think tenants can be empowered without ownership. They can be consulted.

They can participate. Unless you control the money, control how that moneys spent

then you dont really, you dont real, youre not empowered as such. (Communities

Scotland Official)

I think that a case can be made that community ownership can often be a major

stimulus of empowerment. But it is neither necessary nor sufficient. (Scottish

Executive Official)

This variety of opinion on the necessity of community ownership, alongside policy

vagueness about the links between ownership and empowerment and the expected benefits

from them, feeds in to a lack of consistent commitment to this policy goal.

The demand for SST. As well as presuming the link between community ownership and

empowermentrather than demonstrating itthe original policy also assumed that the

vast majority of communities or LHOs will want to achieve SST. Based on her work with

LHOs, McKee (2007) appears to concur: The aspirations of LHO actors are however

clear: SST is regarded as the only means by which they can realise their ambitions for localautonomy (p.329).

However, with over 60 LHOs created, of different sizes and in different community

contexts, with housing stock of different quality and value, there was always going to be

scope for the aspiration of community ownership to vary, both among LHO committees

and among the wider population of tenants. Surveys of various types during 2007 (reported

in Communities Scotland, 2007) found that most tenants had not heard of SST and over

half (57 per cent) of tenants were not interested in SST for their areas. Whilst all the LHOs

linked to existing community based housing associations said SST was important to them,

just over half (56 per cent) of the standalone, forum-based LHOs said SST was no more

important to them than managing the stock and influencing services in other ways. Only

half (52 per cent) of registered tenant representative groups saw SST as important for their

group. It is clear that there is scope for reality and experience to belie the presumption of

uniform or widespread demand for SST.

Policy Specification

Outcome parameters. Given the desire to devise a better overall set of arrangements or

housing system for the city, it is surprising that policy makers did not give any indication

as to what the end-state should look like. This is important since the existence of 60 LHOs

is now a problem for SST in organisational and financial terms. Further, despite the early


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Framework Document noting that the local outcome could vary, critics have been

unwilling to accept that independent ownership should not be achieved by all LHOs.Policy makers appear to have been caught between competing objectives of housing

system efficiency and community empowerment. A variety of local residents groups

across the city were invited to say whether they had an interest in becoming an LHO, either

standalone or linked to an existing housing association. This process produced a total of 78

LHOs, now reduced by mergers to around 60, and is seen by some to have had great virtues

in being a bottom-up organic process which boosted tenant involvement:

I mean obviously, the transfer, em, in terms of how it delivers at a local level has set

up this LHO network which is really significant. I mean, none of the other transfers

have, have done that. You know, theres over five hundred, em, individual tenants

involved in this, engaging with this. (Communities Scotland Official)

Others identify the network itself as a problem:

The original model never, never imagined that there would be 60 new LHOs formed

as community owners. We assumed, on the advice of consultants, that there would

be some 15 to 25 new organisations created on the traditional lines. (Scottish

Executive Official)

The responsibility for this situation is laid at the door of the implementing agencies:

The existence of the 60 represents a failure within GHA the first year after the ballot

and of Communities Scotland in registering all these bodies. Ministers never wanted

all of this and encouraged a managing down of the numbers. (Scottish Executive

Official)

However, it could also be argued that the failure lay with the politicians who did not give

a clear indication of how far they wished to go with their favoured small is beautiful

scenario. Further, there was a lack of oversight and assessment of this key stage in policy

development.

The logistics of implementation. The key partners in the transferGCC, the Scottish

Executive, and GHA did not have a route map to follow . . . (Communities Scotland,

2007, p. 41). A further deficiency was the absence of sufficient consideration of the legal,

technical, financial, logistical and organisational issues involved in the disaggregation of

the GHA stock. To be fair, a great deal of policy effort was put into getting the difficult first

stage transfer right, but the subsequent challenge was not adequately addressed at the time

of policy formulation, even though there was awareness of the impending difficulties:

What the feasibility study showed was that if you wanted to split the stock up for

reasons because of the high cost of improvements, the high management costs of

some of the stock, the high propensity of high rise blocks for example . . . weve got

these pooled rents that are sharing the cost of this. If you break the stock up you lose

the integrity of that and some of the stock becomes unviable because it wont meet

funders requirements. (GCC Official)


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You cant take the GHA business plan and infrastructure and just (dis)aggregate that

into 63 and still have everything the same and the same things happening andproportionately, you know, the same number, it doesnt work. (GHA Official)

Thus, four to five years after transfer Communities Scotland (2007) had to recognise the

problems stemming from the creation of a network of 60 LHOs, and from GHAs 30-year

business plan, which appears to lack sufficient flexibility to fund the multiple transaction

costs of further transfers or to vary the expected price to be received from LHOs for the

stock:

. . . neither the financial terms nor the operational detail of how to achieve SST had

been worked out at the time of transfer. (p. 42)

. . . transfers to 63 LHOs are not possible within the existing financial envelope; . . .

the principles of financial neutrality limit GHAs ability to consider transfers with

proposals that vary significantly from GHAs model. (p. 46)

Capacity building versus SST sooner or later? There are a number of other ways in which

the stock transfer policy lacked sufficient consideration of the logic of the implementation

process. Policy makers did not reconcile the dilemma between moving to SST in the short-

term and the need for capacity building among LHO committee members for them to be

able to take on the more strategic role and responsibilities of community ownership. Thus,

a political supporter of SST can say:

All the evidence is that it takes time to acquire the confidence . . . that process would

allow more sophisticated ways of making decisions to be made because peoplewouldnt be saying I do want to hold onto my multi, they would be, what are the

other options for me. (Labour MSP)

Paradoxically, the same person was also highly critical of the lack of SST to-date and

called it a monumental disaster, and yet McKee & Cooper (2007) indicate that LHO

committees are not prepared yet for the responsibilities to come and find the prospect

somewhat stressful. There does not seem to have been a clear process set out by which to

develop and gauge the capacity of LHO committees beyond the initial training they

received when the LHOs were first set up.

Policy Interactions Over Time

The policy has also lacked a consideration of various interactions between its differentelements, and this is especially important over a 10-year period during which the move to

SST was expected to happen. First, LHOs would experience service provision by the GHA

and this may shift them from a position of disaffection felt previously with GCC. The

latest GHA survey shows that approximately three-quarters of tenants are satisfied with

GHA and its services; think GHA cares about them; and that GHA listens to them, with all

these indicators rising dramatically since transfer (GHA, 2006). Moreover, GHA used a

wide range of methods to consult and involve tenants and residents both individually, and


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through representative groups and intermediary organisations (GHA, 2005). The net effect

of these developments upon community empowerment and the desire for SST amongresidents (as opposed to LHO committees) does not appear to have been considered by

policy makers and yet their effects may be considerable given that SST depends upon a

ballot of all tenants within each LHO area.

Then there are the effects of the housing investment and regeneration programmes

implemented by GHA. Whilst relying upon the model of the CBHA movement as a

template for community empowerment, policy makers have departed from what many see

as a key element of the success of the CBHA modelcontrol over their own investment

programme was crucial to community involvement and empowerment:

. . . theyre losing the prospect of the capital investment works providing the focus

and the catalyst for local action. I mean, thats not, cause thats how housing

associations were formed . . . determination in improving the environment and need

to have control of the resources at your disposal to give to the committees round the

tables . . . (CBHA Director)

The GHA approach to-date has been closer to GCCs original conception:

So, the Councils proposal was, keep it as an entity for ten years, complete the

investment programme, complete the demolitions and then, and run it through local

management groups and then, at the end of that period, transfer the ownership. (GCC

Official)

The fact that the GHA is making the big decisions about the scale, timing and nature of

housing investments and on the demolition of high-rise blocks means that a potential

source of community empowerment is foregone.

3

McKee identifies the major weakness as:

While individual tenants choice is permitted in terms of colours and designs . . . in

terms of the bigger picture local preferences with regards to the style and cost of the

modernisation works are being sacrificed for bulk procurement and standardisation.

(McKee, 2007, p. 328)

Although McKee may understate the degree of local influence upon investment decisions,

once again suggestions can be seen of a conflict between objectives of economy and

efficiency on the one hand and empowerment on the other. A further risk in this approach

is that with much of the investment programme preceding the SST stage, many tenants

may no longer see SST as a key objective as time moves on.

The investment and regeneration programmes will further complicate SST by raising

the price to be paid by the receiving landlords for the stock, which will then be in bettercondition. This could take prices beyond the reach of LHOs without CBHA asset backing,

and/or result in disagreements over whether the asking price reflects the sustainability of

the stock after refurbishment (where LHOs did not make the investment decisions).

Finally, as Kintrea (2005) points out, preparations for the stock transfer policy involved

strengthening regulatory policy over the social rented sector, and curtailing some of the

freedoms housing associations enjoyed over housing allocations. The implications of such


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strong regulation of the RSL sector have not been spelled out, so that many LHO

committee members still expect more freedom than they will have in practice after SST.

Implementation Agency

According to theory, effective policy depends upon having an implementation agency that

is sufficiently skilled and committed for the task, has adequate resources, and whose room

for discretion and autonomy can be curtailed. Each of these presumptions is problematic in

the GHA case. Much of the difficulty and the source of much suspicion comes from the

fact that the GHA has been multi-tasked, having to dramatically improve housing services

to tenants, undertake a large investment programme, and arrange for the onward transfer of

the stock to the LHOs. GHA in its early years prioritised the first two objectives over the

third and this has led to scepticism and criticism from all sides:

Many within the LHOs, however, believe GHA is not a willing seller and is content

to hold what it has. (Gerry Braiden, The Herald, 11 June 2007)

I worry that [the break up of GHA] wont happen now because this beast is in our

midst and the bigger it becomes and the more solid it becomes, the more difficult it,

when it comes to deal with it because if you split it up. (GCC Official)

The fact that the inspectors (Communities Scotland, 2007, p. 42) gave a positive report on

GHAs efforts with regard to SST, as well as concluding that SST was not possible as

originally conceived, has led some participants and observers to criticise Communities

Scotland as a weak regulator:

Four years later not one house has been transferred . . .

But instead of taking GHA totask and admitting its own role in its failure, the regulatory body is now asking GHA

to come up with its own template for the future and, on GHAs say so, implying that

second-stage transfer is unworkable. (Anne Johnstone, The Herald, 20 September

2007)

Two fundamental problems with the organisational arrangements have been identified by the

critics. First, that of regulatory capture, i.e. that Communities Scotland is too close to GHA:

. . . the regulator Communities Scotland has been compromised in coming to its

judgement about GHAs performance . . . there is a close relationship between these

two organisations that is unhealthy . . . now would be a good time to transfer the

regulatory function of social housing providers to Audit Scotland, which is at truly

arms length from government and its policy-making ambitions. (Douglas Robertson,The Herald, 22 September 2007)

Second, that the relationship between GHA the LHO network, which was not set out

clearly in the original policy, is inverse to that desired:

Ive a sense of the centre of GHA being completely unaccountable now to the local

arms, just because of the structural thing about them and, and the way in which the


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whole thing delivers and, of course, that wasnt what was intended but the centre of

GHA has got bigger and bigger and bigger. (GCC Official)

With regard to the third element of agency, sufficient resources is a key difficulty, whereby

The major stumbling block is the funding gap between the prices GHA needs to transfer at

and what the LHOs can afford to pay (Communities Scotland, 2007, p. 44). This gap has

been estimated at anywhere between 85 million and 507 million, with the higher figures

pertaining to larger numbers of transfers, so the issue of whether there are 30 or 60 local

SSTs matters. Again, Audit Scotland has been called upon to give an independent view.

It seems a partial judgement for Communities Scotland (2007, p. 43) to blame GHA for

not having done detailed financial analysis early enough to identify the funding gap.

Whilst it might be argued that policy makers could not have known the exact size of the

gap, it begs credibility to argue that they should not have anticipated that there might be a

funding gap at all, that they would be surprised by its occurrence, and that there would be

insufficient flexibility within the GHA business plan and funding arrangements to make

any response to it. Indeed, as will be discussed later, it has become evident that some of the

parties were aware of the funding gap, but not all.

A similar point can be made about the key requirement of financial neutrality for SST,

where Communities Scotland (2007) says:

GHA has been criticised for an over-rigid interpretation of the financial neutrality

element of its commitment for SST. This term was not defined at the time of the

original transfer, and it was not until mid-2005 that it was clarified further. (p. 45)

Again, this seems a crucial shortcoming of policy making since SST hinges on the use of

this criterion. The paper will return later to the question of the origins of these missing

steps of the route map to SST.

Inter-organisational Relations

Inter-organisational relations at a local level have been hostile, with a great deal of

mistrust. Glasgow City Council are accused alongside GHA of not being committed

themselves to the whole process:

Why have we got into such difficulties? Its because its not clear, it is not owned,

what you have now is the most appalling standoffs between the parties who are all

shouting at each other. You cant make it happen that way . . . there is no ownership

of the philosophy [of community ownership] . . . its a monumental failure because,

in my view, because the City Council stance didnt own the vision. (Labour MSP)

As a result, there are suspicions among the various parties that GCC were aware of many

of the difficulties of splitting the stock up at SST, but were not forthcoming with the other

parties. Ministers rejected the councils proposal for a Glasgow Housing Trust early on as

not providing enough empowerment for tenants, so councillors and officers have not been

favourably disposed to a large and independent GHA.

Relationships between the council and the CBHAs were also affected by the stock

transfer process. Ministers turned to the CBHA movement for advice and assistance, and


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CBHA directors were involved in the creation of the original Framework Agreement, the

establishment of GHA and the creation of the LHOs:

The other big part, we were involved in setting up local housing organisations which

was an unbelievably difficult process . . . the Council were, officers in particular,

annoyed that CBHAs were being brought in. (CBHA Director)

From championing the citys housing association movement in earlier years, GCC officials

now saw CBHAs as rapacious housing developers involved in the bottom-up process that

created the LHO network:

Everybody and anybody was invited to bid for any stock in the city . . . you got

empowered, well funded, well resources organisations with professional staff,

competing with tenants associations with no staff, dependent on grant from

Communities Scotland. . .

I just thought it was appalling. . .

against everything we

were trying to do . . . Its nothing but self-interest in their approach to this . . . a lot of

the existing housing association directors . . . are not, their interest is not in the

tenants its about their own organisation or the capacity of their own organisation.

Its about the ability to continue to develop in new ways. (GCC Official)

Council officials were now prepared to question the cost-effectiveness of the CBHA model

and its contribution to community empowerment, although also to acknowledge that

CBHAs are politically influential and seen as being a success For some, GCCs

negative views on CBHAs are not attributed so much to the behaviour of CBHAs as to the

original stance of the council as a reluctant seller.

However, like the city council, CBHAs did not want GHA to appear in their midst: a

registered social landlord like themselves but much larger, with significantly more funding(but also debt). They were bitterly disappointed that the housing stock did not come

directly to them rather than through a two-stage process. Having put a lot of effort into

helping ministers to establish GHA and the LHOs, CBHAs are increasingly frustrated that

SST has not happened yet to give them a return for their efforts. Relations between the

CBHA movement and GHA are very bitter, with GHA being described as dysfunctional

and guilty of maladministration.

A large element of the CBHA animosity towards GHA stems from the bureaucratic

process put in place by GHA to assess the suitability of LHOs and CBHAs as receiving

landlords under SST. CBHAs see this process as cumbersome, as well as inappropriate in

that a fellow housing association, with less experience than themselves, is assessing their

own competence and performance:

Now the information they ask for is nonsense. They are judge and jury over yourperformance . . . Four Gateways and we only know what one of them is. Now if you

think this is The Prisoner, youre right okay. Three more Gateways, four more

Gateways, I dont know what they are. Im just telling you that they are really heavy

duty in SST. I have to say that theyre running a parallel universe, right. Its just not

happening, right. In the meantime, theyve cut up this decision into somewhere

between five and seven. (CBHA Director)


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However, in its inspection report, Communities Scotland (2007) concluded that it is

legitimate for GHA as prospective seller of stock to assess the suitability of purchasingorganisations (p. 44). This is unlikely to placate the CBHAs, who would ask why

Communities Scotland cannot perform this task. So there is an issue about what the

appropriate roles should be for the different parties, especially the regulator.

Underlying all this bitterness though, is the fundamental mistrust of GHA as a

transitional body. This affects the parties interpretations of most of GHAs actions. A very

important case in point is GHAs introduction of Local Shared Services (LSS) over the

period 20052007: this has involved dividing up some of GHAs central services (e.g.

financial management, organisational development, investment) into more local service

units around the city (GHA, 2006b). Whilst this has been seen as a positive step in the

disaggregation of GHAs central services (Communities Scotland, 2007, p. 69), others

see it as a means of locking-in LHOs to having their future services provided by GHA.

The LSS development has also suffered from a bottom-up approach: LHOs were asked

to form their own LSS groupings and this resulted in seven groupings, with two dozen

LHOs choosing not to participate (presumably aiming to get their central services from

CBHAs or GHA centrally). The resulting configuration is not ideal:

We found the geography of the groupings is not necessarily the best for delivering

services efficiently; this is a missed opportunity for GHA to achieve a strategic fit for

delivering its service. (Communities Scotland, 2007, p. 69)

This is potentially an important issue for the future of the social housing system in the

cityone of the original key goals of the stock transfer policyif a large proportion of the

social housing providers are configured in a way that is sub-optimal and not consistent

with other emerging spatial governance arrangements such as Community Planning. One

is left wondering where the oversight of the policy was during this crucial stage? Someindependent assessment of the suitability of LSS to serve the ultimate policy goals should

have taken place.

Social and Political Factors

Finally, the paper considers the role of social and political factors in the delivery of

housing stock transfer. First, there is a look at political changes that have mostly occurred

at the national level. Second, there is an examination of how key decisions and the

attitudes of key players have been influenced by political considerations, both at the

national and local levels.

Social and Political Change

There have been no dramatic social or economic changes in the city of Glasgow since the

initial stock transfer in 2003, but there have been political changes at the national level of

three types.

First, there have been several different ministers responsible for housing. Some argue

that if the energy and drive of the early political champions for the policy had been

retained, progress to SST would have been quicker. Subsequent ministers have had


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different priorities and perhaps less local knowledge, confidence and appetite to intervene

in Glasgows politics to try to sort things out.Second, the national housing agency Scottish Homes was changed early under the

Scottish Parliament from being a quasi-independent body to become part of the Scottish

Executive itself. At this time, it lost some of its most experienced staff (often with RSL

experience) and some would also say, lost some of its bite. Certainly their role in the

stock transfer process has been heavily criticised:

Well second stage transfer, why its no happened. Whats the role of the regulator

there, of Communities Scotland there? . . . you also get the impression that, em, if the

regulator does occasionally raise its head above the parapet then they just get so

scared of the GHA or the GHA immediately goes running to a QC . . . the regulator

then backs off and says, Im terribly sorry. (CBHA Director)

The third national change has been the advent of an SNP minority government within the

Scottish Parliament since May 2007. They committed themselves early on to a review of

the GHA situation, but this has yet to produce a notable outcome. In their first major

housing policy statement, the new Scottish Government avoided use of the terms

community ownership and community empowerment, placing more emphasis on

giving tenants a greater say, and accepting that there would be a variety of outcomes for

communities in Glasgow:

We want to see tenants being given a greater say in the management of the houses

and their neighbourhoods, including through second stage transfer where that is

what tenants want and where it is sensible and financially achievable. (Scottish

Government, 2007, p. 56)

This is not quite what the policys supporters want. The CBHA movement has sought to

use knowledge of the SNPs preferences (particularly for community land ownership in

rural areas) to argue for stronger community rights to SST, attempting to reverse the power

relation from seller to buyer:

The Scottish Parliament should approve legislation that will give communities the

right to purchase the stock which is currently the subject of a management

agreement approved by ministers under statutory order. (Lyn Ewing, Glasgow and

West of Scotland Forum of Housing Associations, The Herald, 22 September 2007)

Surprisingly, for many observers, the SNP-led government has been fairly cautious and

silent on the matter, and in its inspection report, Communities Scotland noted: GHA has

been reluctant to commit itself to an alternative direction on SST in future until the policyobjectives of other key stakeholdersmainly Scottish Ministersare clear (CS, 2007,

p. 47). But perhaps reflecting uncertainty among SNP Ministers, the report went on:

However, GHA clearly has a central and legitimate role to provide leadership on the

future strategy for the ownership and management of its houses (CS, 2007, p. 47). This

somehow has to be married with giving tenants a greater say.

However, the SNP Government has been clearer on other issues and has announced the

abolition of Communities Scotland, with its regulatory function (defined as setting


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standards, and measuring the performance and value for money of landlords) being

reassigned to have greater independence. This still leaves open the question of whomonitors the implementation of a policy such as stock transferif it is now left to the core

civil servants in the Scottish Executive, this is more likely to be done in a softly, softly

manner rather than pro-actively since experience suggests that civil servants do not like to

get involved in local political issues.

The Politicisation of Policy

Lowe (2004) has reminded us recently that in respect of welfare provisions, politics

matters and that housing, more so than some other areas, is a policy sector very much in

the public domain and subject to conflict (p. 28). Yet, the housing policy network is, as

Lowe describes it, becoming less vertically integrated with a more extensive network that

the centre is less able to steer. Given Glasgows municipal culture and the fact that in the

UK, in housing affairs local politicians have been both more confident and disposed to

intervene than in other areas of service delivery (Cole & Furbey, 1994, p. 122), the

politicisation of housing stock transfer should come as no surprise.

Whilst some key difficulties with Glasgows stock transfer stem from the technical and

financial challenges involved in trying to improve and disaggregate a large housing service

suffering problems, a key lesson for policy makers is that of the need to give more explicit

attention to the political issues surrounding policy, and especially to how the politics of the

situation influences the stance, behaviours and decisions of key actors.

At a national level the political thrust towards community ownership has had a number

of repercussions. The link between ownership and empowerment has been poorly

specified, with confusion then ensuing as to whether community ownership is a means or

an end in itself. In people forming judgements about the policy, community ownership has

been at the forefront (as an end) much more so than the other policy goals.The political emphasis upon community ownership has had two other important

consequences. First, the bottom-up and small is beautiful ideology led to the instigation

of a process that produced potentially 60 SST recipients, well beyond the original policy

makers intentions, and now seen as a major difficulty. The same approach helped produce

a set of arrangements for shared services, which is seen now as sub-optimal in strategic

terms. Second, GHA has felt under pressure to be getting on with SST as a result of

which it raised false expectations that it could substantially deliver SST over four years to

2008, now the cause of severe criticism (see Communities Scotland, 2007, p. 43).

National political changes, of minister and in the treatment of the regulating agency,

have contributed to a lack of overall control of the policy. At times, it has seemed as if no

one wanted to take charge or responsibility for the implementation of national policy in

Glasgow until forced to do so by political pressure from beneath. Key decisions were made

by the parties locally without any independent assessment of their potential effects.Spanning the national and the local levels is the unresolved issue of the funding gap

within GHAs business plan. At the national level, the Scottish Executive opted to use an

unusually low discount rate in the initial pricing of GHA stock, but they should have

recognised that this could cause a problem of high stock valuations for LHOs and CBHAs

later on.

At the local level, it is reported (Pawsonet al., 2008, forthcoming) that GCC, through its

consultants, knew before the first ballot that there would be a funding gap for SST as a


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result of this approach, but this information does not appear to have been transmitted or to

have been recognised by all the other parties, until it emerged in analysis for GHA andCommunities Scotland in 2005. Silence on this issue served the interests of the two main

protagonists: it reduced the Scottish Executives financial commitment to the GHA

Business Plan; and for GCC, it protected the amount of funding within the GHA Business

Plan available for housing stock investment. Thus, different political interests at both

levels influenced the fact that an extremely important problem was created for the future

but then not addressed until it could be ignored no longer.

At a local level, the stock transfer policy has faced the strong municipal culture of the

city. This was always going to lead to vocal opposition to what was seen by some as the

privatisation of council housing in the city. This fed into the decision to have a two-stage

transfer process so as to avoid multiple, local ballots having to be fought by ministers

across the city at the same time, and with potentially variable outcomes. However, this

two-stage process may turn out to have been more trouble than it was worth. But the

alternative of the municipal culture was fierce criticism of the council as a monolithic,

poorly performing housing provider. This fed into early rejection of the option of dividing

the citys housing up into a smaller number of units as this was seen as too similar to

GCCs own operational structure. Into the midst of this situation, politicians created GHA

as a large housing provider without the public sector and dependent on private lendersa

sure-fire recipe for criticism that has not ceased since.

Local inter-organisational politics, as exemplified by the Glasgow scenario, has also

been under-appreciated by policy makers. The long-standing consensus that community-

based housing associations are highly performing and empowering organisations is now

breaking down as the basic assumptions of policy are being questioned. There is

underlying animosity between the key partners who have to work together to implement

the policy: the city council, GHA and the community based housing associations all

question each others motives. The city council now sees itself, and to some extent itstenants, as the victims of the housing associations predatory behaviour.

The city council and the housing associations are suspicious that the GHA is seeking to

be a permanent feature of the local institutional landscape. There is potentially a

fundamental and perhaps nave flaw in a policy design which creates a large, new

organisation in the midst of all the pre-existing social landlords, hands most of the power

to it, and expects it to both develop organisationally in order to improve housing service

performance but also to design and implement its own demise through stock sales.

Another key lesson is that for a programme like this to work over a period of ten years or

so, there needs to be strong and independent oversight of the process: to assess decision

making, to arbitrate in disputes, and to step in where delaying tactics are alleged. The stock

transfer process in Glasgow has lacked such a presence.

Conclusion

In relation to the case study presented here, it can be seen that the implementation of

housing stock transfer in Glasgow has been hindered by three key deficiencies. First, there

have been weaknesses in policy formulation, most particularly a lack of attention to the

balance and interactions between competing policy objectives over time, as well as

insufficient consideration of important financial and organisational elements of the

implementation process. Second, the policy has lacked consistent and strong oversight by


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and on behalf of ministers, which has allowed the policy to drift and key decisions to be

made without proper assessment of their impacts upon the ultimate policy goals. Third,there has been a lack of appreciation of how the politicisation of the policy at national and

local levels has influenced the course of its implementation, and at the same time a lack of

awareness of how the local politics of housing within the city affects working relations

with the key implementation agency, GHA.

The study of policy implementation must therefore contain an appreciation of the

effects of having multiple policy objectives, multiple layers to the governance of policy,

and multiple actors involved in policy delivery. This echoes the suggestion by Hill & Hupe

(2000, p. 43) that the study of implementation might have to be varied according to the

type of policy issue concerned and the institutional context within which it occurs. The

crucial elements of the framework here for studying policy implementation therefore

turned out to be as follows: the extent to which policy formulation had considered issues of

implementation; inter-organisational relations in the local arena and the degree of

oversight of this policy network; and the effects of political considerations and competing

political interests and perspectives upon key decision-making and on inter-organisational

relations.

The Glasgow stock transfer policy issue is a good illustration of what Exworth &

Powell (2004, building on Evans & Davies, 1999) call the need to address the spatial

domains of implementation (p. 278). Looking at two of the policy windows they

discuss (the other being the horizontal dimension at the centre), it can be seen, first in

the vertical dimension, weaknesses in policy design and a reluctance and naivety on the

part of central government as regards policy oversight. In the local, horizontal dimension,

the issue is not simply (as they discuss it) that of whether local partners can agree a

common purpose or have it imposed on them, but also whether central government,

either directly or through its agent (in this case Communities Scotland) is itself willing to

become a player in the local policy network and engage in network management (Klijn &Teisman, 1997) in order to shape outcomes. This may be important for two reasons: first,

the spatial arena of Glasgow is nationally significant in scale and political terms (see

Kintrea, 2005), so the outcome is especially important for social housing in Scotland;

and, second, the local housing network, which is a highly politicised domain, is both the

subject of policy and the means for achieving policy, a rather unusual context (in Hull &

Hupes terms).

But as has already been stated, the Glasgow housing stock transfer policy as a whole has

endemic policy conflicts: between housing improvements as an urgent priority and

community empowerment as a goal; and between community empowerment and housing

system efficiency and effectiveness. Policy design and delivery has to get cleverer at

taking into account such trade-offs and tensions, rather than continuing to operate as if

policy targets can be measured and achieved as if they were mutually exclusive

phenomena (Mulgan & Lee, 2001). The Glasgow case provides further evidence ofcompeting institutional logics in social housing, which Mullins (2006) described as

between local accountability on the one hand, and scale and efficiency on the other. Here,

similar tensions have existed between community empowerment (incorporating but going

beyond accountability) through LHOs, and economy and effectiveness of delivery through

the GHA. But a third institutional logic could be added that will also come into play and

which has a distinctly spatial focus, namely the production of an effective housing system

and housing governance structure for the city as a whole.


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Acknowledgements

This research was conducted as part of the GoWell Research and Learning Programme. GoWell is a collaborative

partnership between the Glasgow Centre for Population Health, the University of Glasgow and the MRC Social

and Public Health Sciences Unit and is sponsored by Glasgow Housing Association, the Scottish Government,

NHS Health Scotland and NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde. Thanks also to Professor Hal Pawson for discussions

with him about Glasgows stock transfer.

Notes

1This is not necessarily to accept the label of failure applied to the stock transfer policy in Glasgow.

2The period of study is 1999 to mid-2007. There have been some recent policy developments aimed at

furthering community empowerment, but at the timeof writing,there had still not been any second stage

transfers.3

However, there is a community consultation process underway in relation to eight large regeneration

sites.

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