8/8/2019 642701

1/17

!"#$%&%'&!%($)*

+,$-%)./01&2%)3#'&4,""(*5%,)6(1&4)((6(&7&8%3(9&5(6%':&5();(/9&?PAAP>QQB&QB1EA

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Cambridge University Press and The Classical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve

and extend access to Greece & Rome.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/642701?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cuphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/642701?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

8/8/2019 642701

2/17

PLATO ON POETRYlBy NORMAN GULLEY

The 'poetry' of my title has at least the virtue of brevity as a des-cription of the sort of literature Plato discussesin Books 2, 3, and10 of the Republic. But in its Platonic sense 'poetry' is too narrowa description. Two characteristicsrecognized by Plato as invariablybelonging to poetry (poiesis) are (i) that what it composes arefictional stories (muthoi) (Phd. 61 b), and (ii) that it composesthem in verse (Grg. 502 c; Smp. 205 c; R. 393 d, 601 d, 607 d;Phdr. 258 d). And the sort of literaturediscussed in the Republic,while it invariablyhas characteristic(i), does not invariablyhave(ii).

Admittedly the discussion concentrates on verse literature,naturally enough in view of its predominance in Greekimaginativeliterature.Yet it embracesprose as well as verse literature. WhenPlato talks of fabricated or fictional stories (muthoi plasthentes:R. 377 b; all furtherunspecified references are to the Republic)and discusses whether there is any room for them in the educationof the middle and top classes of his ideal state, he means to includestories in prose as well as in verse. This is made quite clear (380 c,390 a, 392 a-b). So that if 'poetry' is to designate accurately therangeof literature Plato is dealingwith we need to take it, asAristotle takes poiesis in the Poetics, in a sense broad enough toinclude imaginative prose literature. I shall use it in this broad sensein examining Plato's views in the Republic of its aim and value.Webster'sdictionary definition of it as 'inventiveor imaginativewriting', in distinction from history and philosophy, gets the sensewell enough.Plato's assessment of poetry has two readily distinguishableparts.First, in Book 10, there is an analysis of its aims;this provides botha positive theory of its aims and a rebuttal of the high claims oftenmade in respect of the didacticism of its aims and the moral author-ity of the literary artist. Second, in Books 2 and 3, there is an evalu-ation of its educational uses; this assumesas its basis the truth ofthe positive theory in Book 10. I will start with Book 10, the funda-mental part of the assessment.Here is Plato's own statement of the claims made on behalf ofHomer and the tragedians(598 d-e). Some people, he says, tell

1 Substantially a paper read at the A.G.M. of the ClassicalAssociation at theUniversity College of Wales, Aberystwyth in April 1976.

8/8/2019 642701

3/17

us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertain-ing to virtue and vice and all things divine. They also tell us, hesays, that this knowledge is the essential basis of poetic ability, ofbeing a good poet. This second claim is treated as tantamount tothe claim that the essential mark of a poetic work is its ability toconvey to others the author's insight into the truth of things; thepoet is the expert educator. Plato deals first with the claim thatpoets actually possess this wide-rangingknowledge. Wemay forgetthe part of it which claims for the poet expert technical knowledgeand finds in his work a guide to housekeeping, military strategy,and so on. This sort of thing is no essential part of the poet'ssubject-matter.Plato describes the poet's subject-matter,asAristotle does, as human behaviourin its moral aspects (603 c).And he treats as the crucial part of the cognitive claim made onbehalf of the poets the claim that they know what moral excellenceis (599 d, 600 e, 603 b). This is the main target of his criticism.His first and most important criticism is specially important forthe notion of artistic imitation which it contains. In outlining it Iwill leave out of account the part which Forms or Ideas play in it.When I refer to what is 'real' or 'the real thing' I refer to the thingsof this world, not the Forms. Poets, Plato argues,are like painters(597 e-598 d). 'Ut pictura, poesis.' And painters portray onlyphantoms of what is real. If a painter portrays a bed he portrays amere phantom bed, the appearanceof a bed from a particularper-spective. His painted bed is not real at all. You cannot sleep in it.Nor can you make inferences from your perception of any numberof phantom beds to a real bed, the kind made by a carpenter.Forthe painter'sbeds arewholly delusive as metaphysical pointers.Now poets, Plato goes on, are in the same metaphysical boat(598 e ff.). All they portray or 'imitate' are phantoms or appear-ances of the real thing. Instead of phantom beds and tables theyportray a sort of phantom moral behaviour,just as radicallycut offas the painter'sportraits from the real world, from what goodbehaviouris in real life. And you can no more infer what moralexcellence is from listening to a recital of the Iliad or watching theAgamemnon than you can make inferences to a real table fromlooking at paintings of a table. Notice how Plato fills out hisanalogy (599 b-600 e). To the carpenter'sbeds and tables corres-pond good deeds in real life. To the painter'sphantom bed ortable correspondsthe Iliad or the Agamemnon, phantoms of real-life good behaviour.And to carpenterscorrespondphilosophers.The metaphysical downgradingof the Iliad and the Agamemnoncarries with it a cognitive downgradingof the poet's vision. The

PLATO ON POETRY 155

8/8/2019 642701

4/17

PLATO ON POETRYpoet cannot possibly know what moral excellence is. If he did, hewould not waste his time and prostitute his knowledge by producingphantoms. He would set a real-lifeexample to others by his gooddeeds and help them to see the light for themselves. He would bea philosopher, not a poet.The main interest of this argumentlies in its notion of artisticimitation. It is as imitators that Plato condemns paintersand poets.He does not say simply that they arerestricted in their vision toappearancesor phantoms. He also says, explicitly, that all they aredoing in producing their paintings or poems is imitating appear-ances or phantoms (598 b, 600 e). It is not the case that they areimitating the real thing, makinga hash of it, and producingas aresult a deceptive appearanceof the real thing. They are directlyimitating or portrayingmere appearances.'Imitation' is restrictedin sense to 'direct portrayal of appearances'.It could well be arguedthat the painting or the poem is a merephantom of the real thing in either case, i.e. whether it is an appear-ance or the real thing that the poet or painter is imitating. So whyall the fuss about Plato's notion of imitation? Does it matter whetherwe say that the painter aims to representa real bed or to present aphantom one? It does. The fuss is about aims, in particularaboutPlato's notion of the aims of the literaryartist. He is deliberatelyrulingout any idea that the literaryartist is aiming,however unsuc-cessful he might be in the result, to imitate something beyondappearanceby means of an appearanceor phantom-show, torepresentsomething beyond what he directly portrays. So thatPlato is not just rulingout the idea that the artist can botch hisportrait. He is also rulingout the idea that he can upgradeit bymaking it more than a mere copy of a phantom. It follows that apoetic work has no referentialvalue, and so no cognitive value,beyond the images it imitates or portrays. In the story which thepoet presents to us there is no pointer to any truth behind thescenes. To use Proclus'phrase in his commentary on the Republic(in Remp. ed. Kroll. i. 74.19-20), there are no 'concealed thoughts'behind the veil of fictions. The painted veil is all there is. And thereis no truth in it.Let me illustrate in simple, concrete terms the level of signifi-cance to which Plato is restrictingthe poet's portraitsand the levelsof significance he is rulingout. Some of us immediately react toPlato's argumentby saying something like this: 'Surely one of thegreat things about Homer's work or Shakespeare'swork is the truthabout human nature and human behaviourwe find in them.' It ismisguided,we say, to rule out even the possibility that literary

156

8/8/2019 642701

5/17

PLATO ON POETRYworks can representsuch truth. More specifically, we would argueagainstPlato that implicit in a literary artist's work-whether anIliad or an OliverTwist-is some generalconception of humanexcellence or some generaltruth about human fortunes. This canbe inferred from the story and reflects the artist'smoral insights.You pick up the clues from the way the story is made to evolve,from the author's apparentsympathy or lack of sympathy withparticularcharacters,from moral predicates applied to particularactions and apparently reflecting the author's convictions, and soon. You note that what Achilles does to Hector after killing him isdescribed as outrageous, that his killing of the Trojancaptives forPatroclus' funeral pyre is described as wicked. You sympathizewith Oliverand Nancy but not with Fagin and Bill Sikes. And whenDickens says in the preface to his story that the conduct and char-acter of Nancy are true, he is not saying that it is true that therewas a Nancy who actually behaved as Nancy is portrayed as behav-ing, that it is true, e.g., that this Nancy went to meet someonenamed Brownlow at the side of the Thames. He is saying that hisportrayal of Nancy representscertain generaltruths about moralbehaviour which his readers,by inference from his story, canrecognize and which he wants them to accept, e.g., that sincerityof affection, devotion to the best moral interests of the object ofone's affection, indeed moral goodness generally, are not childrenof particularmaterial circumstances or of a particularsocial class.To quote what Dickens himself liked to quote:

True hearts are more than coronetsAnd simple faith than Norman blood.So what the literary artist is doing, on this view, is embodyinghis moral and psychological insights in his story, not by statingany general truths but by making his story a particularimaginativeillustration or instance of them; he representsthem. And it is thiswhich, on Plato's analysis, the literaryartist is incapableof doing.He does not have the insights. And the level of significance of thephantoms he produces is the level belonging to what he directlyportrays. There is no truth to be inferredfrom this level. And notruth belongs to this level. The literary artist has made up what heportrays.But Plato does not merely argue,as he has done so far, that infact the literary artist lacks insight into moral truth and produceswhat are only phantoms of reality. He goes on to arguethat theproper aim of the literaryartist has no concern with truth or reality.It is not his job to try to be an expert moral educator. So what

157

8/8/2019 642701

6/17

PLATO ON POETRYprecisely is his job? To answerthis Plato puts forwardwhat weshould nowadays call an emotionalist thesis about the literaryartist's aims. Whatis it in us, he asks, that the poet aims to gratify?(603 b-c). Not reason, he says, but feeling (pathos) (604 a-b).Whenwe praisesomeone as an excellent poet we are not assuming,as some misguidedpeople do, that knowledge of virtue and vice isthe basis of his excellence. We are praisinghim, Plato says, as theone whose stories have the greatest emotional effect on us (605 d).Aristotle follows Plato here in recognizingthat the importantquestion to ask in evaluatinga poet's work is the question: what isits actual or potential effect on those who read it or listen to it? Healso follows Plato in recognizingthat it is the emotional effect wehave to consider. Plato emphasizes especially the insidious natureof these effects in moulding our emotional dispositions (605 c-607a). The audience is carriedalong emotionally with the charactersand events portrayed. It weeps with Priam as he moans and rolls inthe dung at the sight of Hector being draggedbehind Achilles'chariot. It rejoices with Electraand the Chorusat the reunion withOrestes.The audience abandons itself, as Plato puts it, in followingthe portrayal (605 d). And what is insidious about this, he goes on,is that we do not realize what effect this sort of thing has on ouremotional attitudes. Wedo not reflect that entering into the feelingof others inevitably reacts on the tenor of our own feelings andhence on our moral attitudes (606 b-c). For it is our approvalsanddisapprovals,our sympathies and antipathies, which are evoked bywhat the poet portrays. And they are not evoked accordingto anyconsistent pattern, let alone a pattern which would result in theright moral attitudes. Why should the literaryartist be concernedwith that? He is an entertainer,not an expert moral teacher.This is an acute analysis of the literary artist as entertainer,givinghis audience or readerwhat he thinks will be maximum emotionalsatisfaction. And note that, in keeping with the metaphysical gradingof his portraits, the literaryartist's aim is presented as one whichrelies for its effects on what is directly portrayed or imitated. WhatI mean, and what I think Plato means, is this. The poet's tale is atale of particularevents which in itself, in the mannerof an adven-ture story, is calculated to engage the audience's feelings. A con-dition is that the audience must 'believe in it', as we say. But notin the sense that the poet must prompt his audience to recognizeand accept any general truths suggestedby his tale. The aim is toget the audience to accept as 'real',as actually happening,some-thing which is unreal,which is not happening,which is made up.The rhapsodeand the actors are the poet's allies in this. In Plato's

158

8/8/2019 642701

7/17

PLATO ON POETRYIon the rhapsode confesses that when he sings of Odysseus leapingon to the threshold and revealinghimself to the wooers, or ofAchilles rushingon Hector, or of some pitiful incident aboutAndromache or Hecuba or Priam,he is beside himself. He feelshimself present in the action he describes-in Ithaca or Troy orwherever (535 b--c). This is how he gets the most telling effect onhis audience (535 b, e)-presenting what is directly portrayed asthe real thing, as if what he portraysreally happened, as if hisfictions are true. Moreoverit is made clear (535 e-536 b) that indoing this he is carryingout the aims of the literaryartist. He isthe link-man between poet and audience.

This, then, is Plato's conception of the literaryartist, as imitatorand entertainer.And these two aspects of the literaryartist and hiswork are complementary. The phantoms the literaryartist portraysas imitator are used by him as direct emotional stimuli. Proclus, inhis commentary on the Republic, is extremely unhappy about thisassessment. He is still partially under the spell of the idea of theliteraryartist as the man of wisdom. Whathe finds specially diffi-cult to accept is that Plato is serious in arguingthat the work ofHomer, of all people, is completely lacking in truth and aims onlyto give emotional kicks. Proclus cannot very well sweep Plato'sargumentsunder the carpet. Whathe does is to arguethat they donot apply to Homer (Kroll. i. 196.18 ff.). He grants that they applyto tragediansand comedians, that tragediansand comedians areimitators with an emotionalist aim (i. 197.30-198.11; 199.12-14).But Homer, he argues,is not an imitator (198.11 ff.). And sincePlato is condemning only imitators, Homer is exempt, and intendedby Plato to be exempt, from condemnation. But the plain fact isthat in the last book of the Republic Plato, havingintroduced atthe start a new generaldefinition of imitation (595 c-597 e),condemns all poets as imitators, Homer included (599 b-c; 600 c,e; 601 a; 603 b; 606 e-607 a). Proclus'argumentwill not fit Plato'stext. Yet his distinction between the imitative and the non-imitativepoet is important. It shows that he is well awareof the narrownessof Plato's concept of poetic imitation.Proclus' distinction is essentially a distinction between, on theone hand, what I shall call direct-levelportrayal,what Plato calls'imitation', and, on the other, allegoricalrepresentation. In hisfictional tales, Proclus says, the imitative literaryartist gives adirect-levelportrayalof particularevents in the life of particularpeople. Imitative literatureis a kind of picture-painting,as Plato'sanalogy between painter and poet tried to bringout. It does nottry to pack any recondite significance into its tales. It does not

159

8/8/2019 642701

8/17

PLATO ON POETRYpretend to have cognitive value. It presents a fiction (plasma) forour delight. Proclusrecognizes all this. But Homer, he argues,is notan imitator. As Proclus puts it, he uses the veil or curtain of his fic-tional tales symbolically, as an allegory of the truth of things.Behind the veil of appearances,he says, behind the veil of phan-toms, lie unseen or hidden thoughts which contain the essence(ousia) of things. So do not look for truth, he argues,in the make-believe of imitative poets. Look for it in a poet like Homer, whois not an imitator (Kroll. i.74.10 ff.; 86.15-23; 198.13-199. 14).This is a braveattempt to save Homer. Proclus'difficulty is thathe wants to defend Homer and Plato at the same time, not just toleave Homer unimpairedby Plato's literary theory but to leaveroom in Plato's theory for recognition of the greatnessof Homer'swork as a key to the mystery of things. And it cannot be done.Plato is classingall poetry, all imaginativeliterature,as imitative.It follows, as we have seen, that any truth-claims made for imagin-ative literature,Homer's work included, can be dismissed. Theliterary artist's statements, at the only level of significance theypossess, are simply untrue. It is not the case that Odysseus clung toa fig-tree above Charybdis,or that Oedipus knocked his father outof the carriagewith his stick, or that Louisa fell off the Cob atLyme Regis.Let me briefly sum up Plato's argumentso far. The truth-claimsmade on behalf of imaginativeliteraturecan be reducedvirtuallyto absurdity. Not only does it not representany truth. Whatitdirectly presents is obviously untrue. Truth in fact is not its concern.Its proper concern is to entertain by playing on the emotions. Now,with this theory alreadyfirmly fixed in his mind, Plato asks theimportant question: has imaginativeliteratureany part to play ineducation? Obviously it can be ruled out of highereducation. Ithas nothing to offer to grown-ups.It is intellectually void. Butwhat about children and adolescents? Plato's educational aim hereis to ensure that the moral dispositions requiredin the citizens arefirmly established by the age of seventeen or so. And he does notsee this stage of education as a matter of intellectual training;it isa matter of fostering the rightemotional dispositions (522 a). Canliteraturehelp here? After all, the literaryartist aims at emotionaleffect. But he is morally irresponsible.His aim does not include aregardfor any consistent morality in the emotional tendencies hefeeds. There is only one possible way that Plato can see of takingthis irresponsibilityout of literature and makingliterature servehis educational aim. It is by putting the control of literature into

160

8/8/2019 642701

9/17

PLATO ON POETRYthe hands of the state. Plato explores the possible value of this inBooks 2 and 3 of the Republic.

Whatthe state can do, Plato imagines, is to make literaturemorally responsible. This has become the standardjustification forliterary censorship.Plato claims for the state the right to lay downgeneralguide-lineswhich all fictional stories must follow. He him-self suggests certain moral and religiousprinciplesto serveas guide-lines. And he stamps them with his own seal of truth. We shall seepresently how he envisagestheir operation in sorting out goodfictions from bad. Wenaturallyassume that stories exemplifyingthe principleswill be approved,those incompatible with theprinciples disapproved.But there is one assumption which Platohas to make. It is that stories approvedin this way will have therequiredemotional effects on those who read them or listen tothem. The stories must consistently foster the right emotionalattitudes. For this is the real aim of the exercise. Conformablyagainwith his literary theory, Plato sees that it is what is directlyportrayed that counts in getting these effects. No hidden meanings,no allegoricalnonsense, he says in effect in Book 2 (378 d). Hegrantsthat generalprinciplesand guide-linesare needed to helpthe censor to sort out good fiction from bad. But the job of thestories themselves is to promote by direct influence on youngpeople the right emotional dispositions. WhatPlato is trying to doin fact, in Books 2 and 3 of the Republic, is to harnesshis literarytheory to his educational schemes.Now to some of the detail. Plato makes clear at the start that heis dealingwith imaginativestories, with tales (muthoi) which heranks as fictional and false (377 a-b; cf. 382 d). He deals especiallywith what Homer, Hesiod, and the tragedians say about the behav-iour of gods and heroes. He does not deal in detail with what thesepoets tell of human behaviourand human fortunes. But he putsthis part of their subject-matteras well into the category ofmuthologia, the telling of stories which are false (392 b). All thesestories are examples of what the theory of Book 10 gradesmeta-physically as phantoms. The censor's task is to try to ensure thatstories of this kind have the right emotional effects.And there is one thing in Plato's approachto the vetting of thesestories which immediately strikes us as odd. It is not that his mainconcern is with the effect on audience or reader of what is directlyportrayed, of what I shall call the direct-levelstatements of thestories. KnowingPlato's literary theory, we expect that. The strikingthing is his concern with the truth-value of these direct-level state-ments: e.g., he emphasizes that Zeus did not in fact throw Hephaestus

161

8/8/2019 642701

10/17

PLATO ON POETRYout of heaven when he was trying to save his mother from a beat-ing, that Hector's body was not in fact trailed round the graveofPatroclus, that Theseus did not in fact rape Helen, and so on (378b-d; 391 b-e). Indeed, he seeks to demonstrate that this or thatstatement in a particulartale is false (380 b-c, 381 b-e, 391 e).It is as if a critic of OliverTwist, while accepting that the tale isfictional and the statements made by Dickens in the course of itfalse, yet proceeds to demonstrate that Oliverdid not in fact askfor more. Wedo not expect this. Whatis the point of it? Thestories are admittedly fictional. So the particularstatements whichmake them up are all on exactly the same footing as far as truth-value is concerned. They are all equally false. So their truth-valueis not a possible basis for sorting out the sheep from the goats:e.g., if Plato was deciding between, say, Middlemarch and Womenin Love, we would think it pointless for him to bother with thequestion whether in fact Dorothea marriedWillor whether in factBirkinwept over Gerald'sfrozen body. How could that possiblyhelp him to answerthe question: which of these two stories ismore likely to foster desirable emotional attitudes?A possible explanation of this concern with the truth-valueofparticularfictional statements is that Plato wanted to disabusethose who believed that the stories were or might be true. Certainlythe Greek'sdistinction between imaginativeand non-imaginativeliteraturewas, in Plato's time, much less clear-cut than our own.The Greek'sattitude to the rapingof Helen by Theseus would notbe at all the same in this respect as the Victorian Englishman'sattitude to Dorothea marryingWill. Indeed, some Greeksacceptedas literally true the stories about gods and heroes which Plato takesto be fictional. Euthyphro, e.g., in Plato's dialogue, says that hebelieves that the gods actually did what the poets say they did(Euthyph. 6 b-c). It is impossible to estimate how many Euthyphrosthere were in Athens. But it seems safe to say-and Plato certainlyassumes it-that the gods and heroes of the poets were popularlytaken to be real gods and heroes, and the stories told about themto be stories of what they did in an unrecordedpast.If so, we can readily see a significant difference between thestatement that Theseus rapedHelen and the statement thatDorothea marriedWill. For the Greekthe first statement appliesto somebody. It might be true. For the Victorian Englishmanthesecond statement applies to nobody. It cannot possibly be true.Theseus and Willare in different metaphysical leagues. Nowadays,of course, we readily enough place the ancient Greekgods andheroes, considered as individualpersons, in a common imaginative

162

8/8/2019 642701

11/17

realmwith Don Quixote and SarahGamp. If it is stated, e.g., thatthe Olympian gods have very naughty propensities we readily treatthis as a statement in the same fictional league as the statementthat Dorothea marriedWill. But Plato could not afford to treat itlike that. Certainly, from his own viewpoint, the statements are inthe same fictional league. These gods, immortal creatures with earthybodies, cannot, he says in the Phaedrus,be conceived on anyrational grounds as existing (246 c-d). Weimagine (plattomen)gods of that kind. They arepart and parcel of muthoi plasthentes,creatures of fiction, of fancy. So there is no question of any state-ments about them being true. Yet, from what Plato apparentlytakes to be a common Greekviewpoint, some of the poets' state-ments about them might well be true. So there would be somepoint in knocking that idea on the head, not merely by emphasiz-ing that all the poets' stories about them are fictional and falsebut by providinga demonstration of the falsity of some of theirstatements. And this would, possibly, explain why Plato pays somuch attention to the truth-valueof direct-level statements in thepoets.But it is by no means a sufficient explanation. It is, I think, anessential part of the backgroundof Plato's argument.And it is theexplanation which we would like to be sufficient. It assumesagenuine concern for the truth on Plato's part. But the argumentinBook 2 soon makes it apparentthat it is not Plato's serious viewsabout this imaginativeworld of the behaviour of gods and heroes,and indeed of human behaviour,which is the basis of his concernwith the truth-valueof the poets' statements. Plato does not wantto pit his own view that all these statements are fictional andequally false againstthe view that some of them are or might betrue. Certainlyhe wants some fictional statements to be rejectedas false. But at the same time he wants some to be accepted asliterally true. He proposes to sanction as true those statementswhich he thinks will have good emotional effects, to condemn asfalse those which he thinks will have bad effects (377 c, 381 d-382 d, 389 b, 391 b-392 a). True fictions aregood fictions. Falseones are bad. If imaginativeliterature is to have any educationaluse, then a necessarycondition, in Plato's view, is that its storiesare accepted as literally true.It is this view which lies behind Plato's prescriptionof principlesto be used by the state as true principles in its control of literature.He is attempting to justify his curious distinction between true andfalse fictions. His procedure is this. He proclaims the truth ofcertain generalprincipleswhich are to serve as the state's guide-lines

PLATO ON POETRY 163

8/8/2019 642701

12/17

for literature (379 a ff.). Literarystatements exemplifying theprinciplesare approvedand may justifiably be propagatedasliterally true; literarystatements incompatible with the principlesare condemned as false and disallowed (379 c ff.). So that we have,on the one hand, reprehensiblyfalse literarystatements (e.g. 381e, 386 c, 391 d) and, on the other, what Plato describesas approxi-mately true ones (382 d). This is analogous in its logic to the com-mandment about the equality of animalsin Animal Farm. It assumesthat, while all fictional statements are false, some are more falsethan others. Plato's further step is to assume that, if a statementapproximates to the truth, then it qualifies to be propagatedasliterally true and will thereby be sure to have the right emotionaleffect on those who listen to it or read it. So we now have at leastpart of the explanation we were seeking of Plato's curious preoccu-pation with the question of the truth-valueof direct-levelliterarystatements. He thinks that only statements which are taken to betrue are 'good-effect' statements; statements which can be shownto be false are 'bad-effect' statements.Here is an illustration of how the distinction works, taken fromBook 2 (381 b-d). There are certain true principlesabout thenature of gods and heroes. Thus gods are perfectly good andchangeless, incapable of deceit or injustice or evil of any kind. Sothat if Homer or Hesiod or whoever describesa god doing some-thing incompatible with those attributes, then he is stating what isfalse. Such an action, Plato says, is impossible. Hence it did notoccur. So Proteus did not in fact change, as Homer says he did,into a lion and a snake and a tall, flowering tree when Menelausand his friends came rushingat him. Changeless beings cannot dosuch things. Similarlyit is demonstrably false that Hector's bodywas trailed round the graveof Patroclus, that Theseus rapedHelen,and so on. This is the way in which Plato criticizes admittedly fic-tional stories for the literal falsity of the statements they contain.In the same way one could arguethat the MarchHaredid not infact ask Alice if she would like some wine. Hares cannot do suchthings. Ora critic of Tess of the D'Urbervillescould apply to itPlato's main guide-line for the portrayalof human fortunes, theprinciple of moraljustice (392 b). The critic could arguethatTess, as 'a pure woman', does not deserveto suffer misfortune andthat, since God is a guarantorof moraljustice, it is impossible thatshe did suffer misfortune; so she was not in fact executed, andMr.Hardy'sstatement that she was executed is false.Plato decrees that all such statements, which he illustrates abun-dantly and which he condemns as at once false and harmful,are

164 PLATO ON POETRY

8/8/2019 642701

13/17

to be struck out of imaginativeliterature.Homer is the principaltarget of his criticisms. And Proclus is, understandably enough,again unhappy. For he had contrived to pull Homer out of the fir-ing line of Plato's literary theory, to take him out of the class ofimitators. Yet Homer is now under severe attack for the falsity andharmfulnessof what he directly portrays, as if what he directlyportrays in his fictions is what really matters, i.e. as if he is animitator. In meeting this difficulty Proclus' ingenuity is remarkable.He says that Plato has no alternative but to treat Homeras if he isan imitator and to concentrate his criticism on Homer's direct-levelstatements (Kroll. i.76.24-81.27; cf. 44.14--17; 74.16-30). Theexplanation is, he says, that it is only childrenand adolescents withwhom Plato is concerned here and the effect of imaginativelitera-ture on them. And the only effect relevant in such cases is thedirect effect of what is directly portrayed. Children and adoles-cents, Proclus says, are incapable of perceivingthe truth which liesbehind the fictions (plasmata)presented to them. They do notlook beyond the veil. That is why it is important to censor veryseverely what poets like Homer directly portray when consideringtheir tales as educational material for youngsters.

Proclus emphasizes, however, that this does not entail in anyway that Homer's real purpose is to entertain youngsters in thisdirect way with his fictions. In fact, Proclus argues,Plato talksabout poets elsewhere in the dialogues in a way which implicitlyascribes to Homer a far loftier purpose than this (Kroll. i.180.4-196.13). In elaborate and vastly entertainingdetail he illustrates thehigh allegoricalsignificance of the direct-level statements in Homerwhich Plato condemns. This part of Proclus' commentary is oneof the most entertainingthings in Greekliterature.My favouriteexample is his interpretation of a passageof the Iliad (14.292-351)severely censuredby Plato (390 b-c). It is the passage describingthe impetuosity of Zeus in makinglove to Heraon Mount Ida.Homer describesthe passion of Zeus as too great to allow him totake Hera to the decent privacy of the bedroom. Proclus (Kroll.i.132.14 ff.) explains their union in terms of the first principlesofPythagoreanand Platonic philosophy. He associates Mount Ida, asthe place of the union, with Plato's realm of Forms (Ide with idea).A wonderful and utterly absurdinterpretation. There is one impor-tant question which Proclus fails to ask. If imaginativeliterature ofthe calibreof the Iliad is of such high significance, if it can reallyinitiate grown-upsinto the truth of things, and if, further, Plato isimplicitly assumingthat it can, why does Plato exclude it completelyfrom highereducation?

165LATO ON POETRY

8/8/2019 642701

14/17

So much for direct-levelstatements incompatible with the rules,statements which occupy virtually all Plato's attention in his dis-cussion of the proper content of literature.This still seems to leaveplenty of room for approved fictions. And in fact Plato says (383 a)that there are many of Homer's statements which are all right. Buthe gives precious few examples. One of the only two or threeexamples he gives (389 e) is the statement in the Iliad (4.412) thatDiomedes told his friend to sit down and keep quiet and listen towhat he is told. Obviously a statement worthy to be propagatedtoyoung lads as literally true. An excellent example to set to them.Later in the Republic there is what Plato considers a really grandexample of a fictional tale (muthos) which qualifies to be propagatedas literally true. It is the tale about the earth-bornmen of differentmetals (414 b-415 d). Admittedly it is a tale to be put out as liter-ally true by the founders of the state, not a tale made up by a liter-ary artist under the state's guidance. But Plato ranksit under thesame generalhead of 'justifiable lies' as the ones the literary artistmight be permitted to make up. So it will serve as an illustration.In this manipulation of fictions it is difficult to find any genuineconcern for the truth. Admittedly Plato declares that the generalprinciples to be used as guide-linesby the state are true principles.And we have seen that it is conformity or lack of conformity withthese principleswhich he himself uses as a criterion of the truthor falsity of particularfictions in his criticism of the tales of thepoets. Is this not evidence of genuine concern for the truth?Obviously it would be if Plato allowed this criterionto stand onits own feet. But he does not. The overridingcriterion is the moraleffect of particularfictions on audience or reader.It is clear through-out the discussion that considerations of moral benefit or harmfinally determine whether particularfictions are to be propagatedas true or suppressedas false. Plato admits this (378 a, 383 d, 389 b;similarlyLaws 660 d-e, 661 c, 663 d-664 a). And he admits itwith full awarenessof the fictional status of all the tales he is deal-ing with. He is aware that the statement that Zeus decided to senda baneful dream to Agamemnon is on the same truth-valuefootingas the statement that Mr.Winkletook the dreadful resolve to acceptthe challenge of Dr. Slammerof the 97th.Plato's final justification, then, for his proposal to propagateapprovedfictional statements as literally true is that the moral endjustifies these means. As we saw in explaining his preoccupationwith the truth-valueof particular iterarystatements, he thinks thatapprovedfictions are likely to foster the right moral dispositionsonly if they are accepted as literally true. But why does he think so?

166 PLATO ON POETRY

8/8/2019 642701

15/17

Why does he not simply assume that tales exemplifying his guide-lines will have the right emotional effect? There is a pointer to theanswerin his literary theory. In that theory one aspect of theartist as imitator of phantoms is his role of illusionist (598 b-599 a,601 a-b). The painter can make people imagine that they are look-ing at a real bed. The poet can make people imagine that what heportrays is real, that his fictions are true. This, as Socrates suggeststo the rhapsode Ion, is how you achieve the greatest emotionaleffect on your audience. The reason for this is that conviction ofthe literal truth of tales told of gods and men carriesits ownemotional charge. In the Laws (679 c, e) Plato recognizes theimportant moral influence of these tales if they carrythe convic-tion that they are true. Withthis conviction, he says, they canengendera simple sort of faith which he counts as one of thefoundations of the moral goodness of men of an earlierage. If thisis so, then fictional tales acquire importance as instruments ofmoral education. And if the state is to control that education andgain the moral effects it thinks desirable, it must control the con-tent of the fictions. Moreover,it must propagate approvedfictionsas literally true.

I can now sum up very briefly my explanation of Plato's proce-dures in trying to determine the place of imaginativeliteratureineducation. He has a very definite view of the properaim of suchliterature. He has a very definite view of the proper aim of theeducation of young people. The question he asks is whether it ispossible to accommodate the first aim to the second. And hisprocedure in answeringit is to work out the necessary conditionsfor that accommodation. Whatis surprising s that, for all theimportance he appearsto attach to the use of imaginativeliteraturein early education and for all the attention he gives to distinguishing'true' fictions from 'false', he finally decides that there is no placefor such literature in his ideal state. Limited censorship cannotguaranteethe moral benefit of the fictions it thinks permissible.As becomes clear in Book 10 Plato's inherent mistrust of this sortof literature-for the unpredictability of its moral effects and forits essentially emotional appeal-leads him to rule it out. It is toodangerous.There is to be no course at all in Greekliteraturein theeducational curriculum.All that Plato finally allows the poet totry his hand at, subject always to censorship, are hymns to the godsand praisesof good men, preferablydead ones (607 a; cf. Laws801 e-802 a). Whichmeans, in effect, that there is to be no imagin-ative literature in Plato's ideal state. Humdrumhymns and humdrumeulogies hardly count.

PLATO ON POETRY 167

8/8/2019 642701

16/17

I have discussed at some length Plato's attempt in the earlybooks of the Republic to determine the educational value ofimaginativeliterature.My main reason for doing this is that I con-sider these books important for an appreciationof the literarytheory of Book 10. In their curious but emphatic way they under-line severalimportant features of the theory, in respect of bothwhat the literaryartist portrays and what he aims to achieve. More-over, a clearunderstandingof the relation between the theory andits application to educational issues is an antidote to much mis-understandingof the theory itself. The point is that in the Republicthe theory is applied in a context which almost inevitably worksagainstan unbiased assessmentof its merits. Indeed, an importantreason for the theory's generallybad presshas always been itsassociation with the special political and educational issues of theRepublic. In the Republic Plato was seriously determined to settlewhat he calls the quarrelbetween poetry and philosophy (607 b).He settles it in favour of the philosopher and turns the tables onthe poet. Imaginative iterature, considered as a means of nurtur-ing moral excellence, gets a very low value-rating rom him;philosophy gets a very high rating. It is this low value-rating orliteraturewhich has prompted many to frown upon the literarytheory.So, in defence of the theory, I will conclude my discussion witha few remarkson this important question of value-rating.I will takefor grantedthat most people disagreewith Plato's abysmally lowvalue-ratingof Greek imaginativeliterature.But it is important torecognize that our most intense disagreementon this score can gohappily hand in hand with complete acceptance of Plato's literarytheory. For the theory does not itself entail any particularvalue-rating, high or low, for imaginativeliterature. So we must not letour disagreementabout Plato's value-ratingof it automaticallyspill over on to his theory about its aims. Wemust look at thetheory in its own right, apartfrom the special idealismsof theRepublic. I happen to think that it is originaland important as atheory about the distinctive aim of the work of the literaryartist,the man who entertains us with his imaginativefictions as opposedto the man with the didactic writer'sjob of givingus factual infor-mation or an explanatory theory. The literaryartist's work gets itslow value-rating rom Plato only in relation to Plato's scheme ofmoral and political values. And we may well reject that scheme.Wemay disagreewith Plato's intellectualistic conception of moralexcellence. Wemay be out of sympathy with his puritanicalattitude to the emotional excitements afforded by the works of the

168 PLATO ON POETRY

8/8/2019 642701

17/17

literary artist, especially of the dramatist. If we look at Plato'sliterary theory through our own evaluativespectacles we may wellgive imaginativeliteraturea high value-rating.So let us not be distracted by value-ratings n assessingPlato'scontribution to literarytheory. Keep our eyes fixed on the theoryitself. It is obviously wrong to throw out the baby with the bathwater before we have given the baby a careful examination.

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORSNIGELB. CROWTHER:weightlifting champion, and Associate Pro-fessor of Classics,University of Western Ontario.P. E. EASTERLING:Fellow of Newnham College, Cambridge.G. E. M. DE STE.CROIX: meritus Fellow of New College, Oxford.W. GEOFFREY ARNOTT: Professor of Greek, University of Leeds.NORMAN GULLEY:Professor of Classics, St. David's UniversityCollege, Lampeter.BARBARA E. STIRRUP:Principal Lecturer in Latin, PortsmouthPolytechnic.J. W. GARDNER: was Head of Classics,Kingswood School, Bath.

PLATO ON POETRY 169