1/26/2016 Isthereasubstantivedisagreementhere?ReplytoChemero&Cordeiro

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Isthereasubstantivedisagreementhere?ReplytoChemero&Cordeiro*

bySusanL.Hurley

DepartmentofPhilosophyUniversityofWarwick(UK)

I begin with Chemero and Cordeiros claim that I have misunderstood dynamicalsystems theory, in two respects. First, I use the concepts of input and output indescribingsubpersonalrelations.Second,Iusetheconceptofcausation.Both,theyclaim, are foreign to dynamic systems theory. Therefore, I get no support fromdynamical systems theory in describing subpersons as I understand them asdynamicsingularities.

It ishard to locate thesubstantive,asopposed toverbaldisagreementhere,andIsuspecttheremaybeverylittle.Oursympathiesareobviouslyveryclose.Attheveryendof their commentary theyexpressoverall agreementwithmymainpoints andsaythatgenerallyIrejecttheInputOutputPicturefortherightreasons.Theycomeclosest to substantive disagreement in saying, at the end of their section A, thatthough they agree with my conclusion, my arguments against the InputOutputPicturearesuperfluous.TheyrehearsemanyofthepointsIemphasize,suchastheway in which dynamic singularities includemore than just the organism. But theydont like the language I use in arguing for these views, since it does notalreadyincorporatethedynamicalreconceptualization.

However,formypurposesitwouldnotworktoparachuteintotheconceptualizationofdynamicalsystemstheory.Rather,Itrytobuildabridgetothesubstanceofitfrommore conventional views about the mind. In particular, I argue against the InputOutput Picture in ways that dont presuppose the dynamical conceptualization.Therefore,Istartwiththecommonplacephilosophicalconceptionofthesubpersonalasthemerelycausallevelofdescription,ofmechanismsandfunctions,asopposedtothenormativeorpersonal levelofdescription.AndIstartwith thecommonplaceconception of perception as input to brains, central nervous systems, and/ororganisms,andactionasoutputtherefrom(seeforexample,Devitt1990).

From that starting place, I try to persuade someone to abandon the InputOutputPictureasaconceptual framework.Myargumentsareaddressed topeople in thatplace.Iwanttoshowthatthispicture isunsatisfactory,evenifwegrant itsstartingpoint.Havingclimbedthe ladder,wecangoontokick itaway: thoughthegenericconcepts of input and output I use are commonplace in neuroscience (see, forexample, their use inDeacon1997), it turns outwe dontneed these concepts ofinputandoutputtocapturetherelevantsubpersonalstructure,afterall.Thus,Istartwithinputtoorganismsorcentralnervoussystemsorbrains(itvariesdependingonthe precise context of argument) and showwhy perception cannot be captured intermsofsuchinput.Theresultdoesindeedbringintoquestiontheveryideaofinput,byblurringrelevantboundariesforexplanatorypurposes,asweagree.AndIagreethattheideaofadynamicalsingularitydoesnotneed, in itsownterms, inputsand

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outputs relative to certain boundaries. But it helps to convey this rather alienconception to thosewhoarestill immersed in the InputOutputPicture toargue forandexpresstheideaofadynamicalsingularityinthefirstinstanceintheverytermsthat itmakesunnecessary, in termsof inputsandoutputsand feedback relative tothe very boundaries whose explanatory value is brought into question (as in myFigure8.17).

My book is doing exactly that first instance, bridgebuilding work, while they areurgingmetogetonwithkickingtheladderaway.ButnothinginwhatChemeroandCordeiro say persuade me that this bridgebuilding work is philosophicallysuperfluous, given the still pervasive influence of the conceptual framework I amtryingtodislodge.Ofcoursethereareotherkindsofargumentfordynamicalviews,whichdonotstart fromhere:empiricalarguments.Butempiricalargumentsdonotmakephilosophicalargumentsforconceptualtransitionssuperfluous.

Another probably verbal quarrel is over the use of "causal". Here I think we aresimplyworryingdifferentbones.Icharacterizethesubpersonallevelofdescriptionasthatappropriatetomerelycausalexplanations,thebusinessofscience,tocontrastitwith the personal level of description employed by folk psychology, whereconsiderations of rationality and normativity are distinctively appropriate. (Reasonsmaybecauses,but if so theyareaspecial kind.) Ipleadacommonplacegenericusage, according to which covering law explanations are paradigms of causalexplanations,asopposed to rationalexplanationsor interpretationsor justificationsor some of the other thingswe get up to.Merely causal explanations predict andexplainbysubsumingundergeneralizationsthatmaybelawlike,but,incontrastwithreason explanations, are not normative and do not express rationality.Many suchregularities, in physics and elsewhere, are expressed mathematically. In this thinnoncommittal sense, Newtonian mechanics is a paradigm of causal explanation.Similarly, theWattgovernoraccountprovidesa causal explanation, in this genericsensediscretepushesandshovesarenot required.Kelsocomments that circularcausalityistypicalofallselforganizingsystems(1995,pp.89seealsoClark1997,pp.107108).ChemeroandCordeiroemphasizethat there isnoreferenceatall tocausation in theWattgovernorstory.But it isnotobvious thatcausalexplanationsmustthemselvesusetheconceptofcausation.

As indicated, this thin, generic sense of "causal explanation" functions for mypurposes to set up a contrast with the different level of description at whichnormativelyconstrained interpretationsof rationalagentsare inplay.Thisusageisfound in many textbooks of philosophy of psychology and philosophy of socialscienceitisnoteccentric.Butitsimplyblursover,doesnttakeon,thefinergrainedissues about different kinds or accounts of explanation that may fall within thegenericcategoryofnonrationalcausalexplanation.ChemeroandCordeiroseemtousingamuchricherormorespecificsenseof"causal"thanIam.Nowmaybethereareindeedgoodreasons todrawfurtherdistinctionshere,andgoodcriticismsofarich conception of causal explanation and maybe these points are linked to adynamicalperspective.Butthat,Isay,isanotherargument.Myprojectdoesntneedany such rich sense of "causal", as they point out. So why attribute it? ThecommonplacethinnotionwilldowhatIneed,andasfarasIcanseemyuseofitisnotdeeplyincompatiblewithadynamicalperspective,eventhoughitsimplydoesnttakeonthesefurtherissues.

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I now move on to Chemero and Cordeiros claim that I misunderstand Gibsonsecologicalviewinclaimingthatitviewstherelationsbetweenperceptionandactionasmerelyinstrumental.MyprimarybasisforthisisGibsonsrejectionoftheviewthatinternalmotorsignalsplayaroleinperception,whichIseeaspartofhishostilitytoinformationprocessingingeneral.(Indeed,IdonotseeGibsonsviewasaviewatthesubpersonallevel,butratheratthepersonal(oranimal)level,soampuzzledbyChemero and Cordeiros phrase "ecological subperson".) In Gibsons view,efferenceafference relations are not necessary for an organism tomake the selfworlddistinction,sincehigherorderpatternsofstimulusinformationwouldnormallydotheneededwork.Movementmakesthosepatternsavailable,butitcouldaswellbepassivemovementasmovementinvolvingintentionalaction.ThiswasthesenseinwhichIclaimedthatintentionalactionplaysaninstrumentalroleforGibson,asameanstoperception.

Inthiscleariflimitedsense,Gibsonseesactionasameanstoperception.ChemeroandCordeirochidethatGibsonsviewofthecontentofperceptionsupportsaviewofperceptionandactionasconstitutivelylinked:inparticular,hisviewthataffordancesforactionareperceived.Now,IwascertainlyawareofthisaspectofGibsonsview.And,moregenerally,Iwascertainlyawarethatecologistshavemadestrongclaimsfortheintimatelinksbetweenperceptionandaction(Icitedsome,inmybook,essay10). But the sense in which the perception of affordancesmaymake the relationbetween perception and action constitutive is, at least at on the surface, verydifferentfromthesenseIwasconcernedwith.

Affordancesforaction,thatis,generalabilitiestoact,arewhatisperceived:partofthecontentofperceptions,onGibsonsview.Theremaywellbeasense inwhichthisprovidesaconstitutivelinkbetweenperceptionandaction.Butthatbyitselfdoesnotmaketherelationbetweenthemtobenoninstrumental,inthesenserelevanttomy argument. For that, the relation of a perception to a particular movement orattemptatmovementneedstobeinquestion,notmerelytheperceptionofthatitispossibletoactinacertainkindofway.

SupposeIperceivesomeparticularaffordanceforaction:Iperceivethatitispossibleformetoactinacertainkindofway.Thatperceptionmayormaynotitselfdependonactualmovement(inthewaythatperceptionofinformationinthestreamingvisualarraydoes).Suppose theperceptionofanaffordance (anability toact)doesheredepend on some actual action, which makes information about that affordanceavailable.Thisactualactionmaybeofaquitedifferentkindfromthekindofwayinwhich I see it is possible to act. If there is no such dependence, my distinctiondoesntarise. If there is, thenextquestion is:wouldpassivemovementdo justaswellas intentionalaction,asameansofmaking informationabout thataffordanceavailable? If so, there is an instrumental relation between the content of thatperception and that intentional action. If a general claim is made that passivemovementwilldothejobjustaswellasintentionalaction,thenthisinstrumentalviewof relations between perception and action has been generalized. It makes nodifference to this sense of instrumental relation between perception and actionwhetherthecontentoftheperceptionisaboutaffordancesforactionornot.Inotherwords, perceptions are not constituted by actions for my purposes by beingperceptionsofabilitiestoact.

Thus,while I explainedGibsons view of affordances briefly inmy book, I did not

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dwellonthisaspectofhisview:asfarasIcouldseeitdidnotbearonmyargument,andIhavenoquarrelwith it.ChemeroandCordeiromayreply that thedoctrineofaffordances supports a different sense in which perception and action areconstitutively linked. That may be so, and perhaps it cuts across my sense ofperceptiondependinginstrumentallyonaction.ButthatwouldntshowthattheclaimIdidmakemisunderstoodGibson.

Moreover,ChemeroandCordeiroseemtomisunderstandmydiscussionofwhatitisforanintentiontobebasic,whichisunoriginalandborrowssubstantially fromworkbyDavidsonandHornsby.AsIemphasized, intentionsarebasicornotonlyunderdescriptions, not in themselves, just as actions are intentional or not only underdescriptions.Wespeakofpeople intentionallydoingone thingbydoingsomethingelse: I intentionally turn on a light by flipping a switch by moving a finger, forexample.Myactionisintentionalunderthesedescriptions.Itisnotintentionalunderotherdescriptions, even if they are true: I do not intentionally frighten the burglar,even ifhe is indeedfrightenedbymyturningonthe light.NordoI intentionallyfiretheneuronsthatcontributetoexplainingmyfingersmovement.

Basic intentions are where the chain begins of what I intentionally by doingsomethingelse.Idontfiremyneuronsintentionallyatall,soIdontmovemyfingerbyfiringneurons.ButIdofliptheswitchbymovingmyfinger,sinceIdomovemyfingerintentionally.Therecanbeborderlinecases,andbiofeedback,asIdiscussed,can relocate the distinction between descriptions under which my actions areintentionalanddescriptionsunderwhichtheyarenot.

Whetheranintentionisbasicornotisnotamatterofwhetheritisvoluntaryorreflexlike.Nonbasic intentionsare just as voluntaryasbasic intentions.Voluntariness isnot the issue. Moreover, intentions, whether basic or not, may or may not beconscious.Consciousnessisnottheissue.Thereisnoparcellingoutofactivitiesorpartsofactivities.Therearejustdifferentwaysofdescribingtheorganismsactivity,asawhole:atthepersonallevelwedescribeaction,perceptionsandintentions,bothbasic and nonbasic, and at the subpersonal level we describe mere causes,mechanisms, functions. Moreover, I can agree that the boundary between thepersonallevelofintentionsandthesubpersonalisnotalwayssharp,mayshiftfromcasetocase,andmayadmitofdifferencesofdegree(seemyp.358,365,andmydiscussionsofbiofeedbackseealsothefinaltwoparagraphsofmyreplytoNo,thissymposium).

They describe an example in which involuntary eye movements are prevented,generatinganillusion,andimplythatitfollowsonmyviewthatbasiclevelintentionsdo not change in such a case. I dont follow them here. Basic intentions couldchange even if the entire body was paralyzed, so that neither voluntary norinvoluntarymovementswerepossible.Basic intentionsandattempts tomoveneednotbesuccessful.

SoI fearthat inthisareaalsowearesomehowtalkingpastoneanother.This isapity,sinceitwouldfurtherourcauseforthoseofusimpressedwiththeimportanceofadynamicalperspectiveonthemindtopresentaclearandunitedfront.Itisprobablyin part my fault: while my arguments are complex and have no one naturalaudience,amoreskilfulwritermighthaveavoidedsuchmisunderstandings.Butatleast,ifmydiagnosesarecorrectasfarastheygo,thereisnodeepdisagreement

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here.

Morepositively,Idothinkthatsomethingmoremightbemadeofthesuggestionthatthe concept of affordance links perception and action constitutively. My remarksabovehavebeenabout thesense inwhich, inGibsonsview,perceptiondependsinstrumentallyonaction.Butinwhatwaydoesactiondependonperception?

Inparticular,ifwefocusonperceivedaffordancesforactiononbasicintentions,suchas"reachrightward",thenitseemsplausibletomethatsuchaffordancescouldwellplay an role in showing how the contents of basic intentions can dependnoninstrumentally on perception, for example, in situations involving reversinggoggles(seemydiscussioninessay.9).Itwouldtakemoreworktoclarifyjusthowthe concept of affordance contributes to this demonstration of constitutivedependence.ButthisseemsapromisingareainwhichtomakeoutaninterpretationofGibsonasseeingperceptionandactionasconstitutivelyrelatedinasenserelatedtomyconcerns, after all. (I am indebted here to suggestionsmadebyErikMyin.)Suchaninterpretationwouldnotnegatethepoint Imadeabove,aboutthespecificsenseinwhichheseesperceptionasdependinginstrumentallyonaction.However,itmightput thatpoint intoabroadercontextwhich limits itssignificance.Moreover,showing justhowthecontentsofbasic intentionscandependnoninstrumentallyontheperceptionof affordancesmight also lead intoa converse specificationof howthe perception of affordances depends noninstrumentally on action. Thus, while Idont think that thepoint IdidmakemisunderstoodGibson, Iaccept thepossibilitythatImayhaveneglectedarelevantaspectofGibsonsposition,whichwouldputitclosertotheviewIfavorafterall.However,Isuspectthatworkingthesepossibilitiesoutrigorouslywouldrequiretheconceptofabasicintention.

*ImgratefultoErikMyinandDavidMillerfordiscussionoftheseissues.

References

Clark,A.(1997),BeingThere(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress)

Deacon,T.(1997),TheSymbolicSpecies(NewYork:W.W.Norton&Co.)

Devitt,M.(1990),'ANarrowRepresentationalTheoryoftheMind'inLycan,ed.,MindandCognition(Oxford:Blackwell)

Kelso, J. (1995),Dynamic Patterns: The SelfOrganization of Brain and Behavior(Cambridge,Mass.:MITPress)

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