39USAF WEAPONS REVIEW

LtCol Brandon E. Baker12th Reconnaissance SquadronBeale AFB CA

INTRODUCTION

Imagine yourself on a cold and rainy night, exposed to the elements and taking enemy fi re. You are a Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) and are responsible for calling in an air strike to put a stop to this nonsense. Your unit has been chasing a group of anticoalition militia (ACM), for most of the day. You are having diffi culty locating them due to the fact that every time you top the next hill, they surprise you with rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attacks or small arms fi re. They are also suspected to be responsible for nearly 100 improvised explosive device (IED) emplacements. The problem is you don’t have a clear picture of the surrounding area and lay of the land due to the weather conditions and attacks. What do you do? The answer is to bring up Mardam-Bey’s Internet Relay Chat (mIRC) and locate the nearest Global Hawk (RQ-4) aircraft by talking directly with the pilot!

The Global Hawk is the nation’s standalone unmanned aircraft system (UAS) that provides persistent high-altitude intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance (HAISR) of the global battlespace. The RQ-4’s unmanned and persistent attributes impart the unique capability to collect tactically-oriented time-sensitive targets (TST) simultaneously with an ongoing strategic target deck. The persistence provided by the RQ-4 is truly game-changing, but there are two root problems standing in the way of maximizing the RQ-4’s effectiveness: processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) agencies do not offer an acceptable avenue for the fast dissemination of imagery directly to the warfi ghter and deliberate packaging (cross-cueing) is minimally used despite past operational successes.

PED

RQ-4 PED agencies receive raw imagery from the aircraft through a common imagery processor (CIP) that processes the imagery for viewing as one fi le. The CIP is the only imagery processor in the Department of Defense (DoD)

INCREASING THE COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RQ-4

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program of record (POR). RQ-4 sensors take images faster than the CIP can process them, resulting in backlogs of 15 minutes or more during periods of high sensor usage. Posting to a secret internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) viewing program such as Image Access Solutions (IAS) or Web-Based Retrieval Portal (WARP) would take additional time (currently 25 minutes or more) before the image is available to the customer. In fact, if focused properly, the RQ-4 could double its daily target deck, but currently collection capacity is limited by ‘exploitation’ manning. In other words, images are not shot because they won’t be exploited.

Potential customers stated unexploited raw imagery in less than 10 minutes would satisfy a previously unfulfi lled gap in ISR coverage; this requirement is the RQ-4’s direct support (DS) role. During DS operations, customers wait for imagery before making their next move; a ≥25-minute time lag is unacceptable. Out of this limitation came an adaptation of an automatic target cuing program called the Joint Targeting Attack and Assessment Capability (JTAAC). JTAAC processes RQ-4 imagery and posts the unexploited imagery to a SIPRNET website within 3 minutes to 6 minutes after the aircraft takes the image. From there, anyone with SIPRNET access may view the unexploited imagery.

For example, following Operation ROCK JACKHAMMER a US Army collection expert stated the “Global Hawk provides an extremely quick method of identifying infrared (IR) signatures throughout a fairly large area and provides high-quality imagery that is available almost instantly to the customer.” However, this operation and most other DS operations utilize JTAAC without true PED assistance. In many cases, the customer has imagery analysts available and simply needs the raw imagery to exploit.

Despite the unmatched capability of JTAAC, due to the current fi scal realities, there is great resistance to adopt another imagery processor outside the POR regardless of the added capability it may bring. For strategic images that do not have rapid dissemination requirements, the CIP and associated DGS PED is outstanding. However, with a requirement of pushing a quickly exploited image or an unexploited raw image to the customer, the existing PED system becomes a chokepoint.

This chokepoint has been signifi cant enough that targeteers will take the JTAAC image, which they can’t use as a primary source for targeting, over waiting for a primary source image from the PED system. The targeteers can correct for the error in JTAAC imagery in less than a minute, signifi cantly faster than if they were to receive a raw image through the PED system. The end result is

targeteers can and have moved annotated imagery suitable for targeting to the cockpit of an attack aircraft in less than 20 minutes – less time than it takes for the PED system to deliver raw imagery during high sensor usage.

ISR PLATFORM PACKAGING

Deliberate ‘packaging’ (aka cross-cuing) facilitates massing of ISR capabilities in time and space over a common objective. This concept pairs two or more airborne ISR platforms with complementary sensors together over an objective to create a more complete picture of the battlespace. Operation ROCK JACKHAMMER is one of many recently documented cases demonstrating the merits of purposeful ISR platform integration and its ability to meet the customer’s desired effects. Regarding this operation, SPC Yarum of the 4/2 SBCT was able to use the synergies of air tasking order (ATO)-planned ISR packages to dramatically reduce the kill chain. SPC Yarum said “…our basic plan allowed Global Hawk to identify IR signatures, and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) was able to confi rm or deny movement. If the signature needed further investigation, the Predator or an Aerial Weapons Team (AWT) could be dispatched to investigate.” This operation netted numerous IR signatures over a large area alerting troops to the possibility of IED emplacement. This is just one of many documented ISR packaging successes that yielded little to no cost to the RQ-4’s ability to successfully complete its preplanned target deck. Most daily cross-cue opportunities are the result of aircrews working within the system to maximize the effectiveness of their platform on an individual level instead of an intentional, planned effort that is tasked from the combined air and space operations center (CAOC) to capitalize on the synergistic impact of multi-intelligence packages. The result is that ground forces do not receive the full spectrum of ISR capability in support of their operations.

In the recent past, cross-cue and operational support occurred by a grassroots approach with CAOC RQ-4 liaison offi cers & fl ight crews working together with ground forces to collect targets to meet customer requirements on a noninterference basis to the strategic deck (internal ad hoc). However, the CAOC removed authorization to provide this sort of support at the request of theater collection managers. The result is centralized control and centralized execution where all requests must go through the entire chain of command regardless of whether or not the ad-hoc requests interfere with planned

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The issue of outages and lost data must be addressed now to provide a reliable, timely and assured architecture.

As the space weapons offi cer, you reference your ZAOD troubleshooting matrix. Through coordination with the JSpOC, you identify the problem as a loss of SIPRNET connectivity at the JSpOC. The backup TCS is switching to primary. You inform the JICO so they can properly confi gure the JRE. You notify the SODO of the outage and set the timeline for recovery at 30 minutes so they can make adjustments as required to the airborne assets.

ENDNOTES1 Maj Brian Affl erbaugh, Small Diameter Bomb Tactical Employment, 422 Test and Evaluation Squadron F-15E Division, 2 Nov 06, 4.2 USCENTAF A6/SCMI, Status Update on Small Diameter Bomb and ASI, e-mail, 26 May 06.3 Ibid.4 Lt Adam Fisher, Introduction of an Innovative New GPS Service for Global Military Operations, PowerPoint presentation, GPS Operations Center, 28 Apr 06.5 Maj David L. Bullard, Talon NAMATH Operational Assessment Final Report, 17th Test Squadron, 30 Nov 06, 5.6 HQ AFSPC/A3 MEMO, Operational Acceptance of Talon NAMATH System, nd.7 14th AF/CC MEMO, Declaration of Operational Availability of Talon NAMATH (TN) System, 20 Dec 06.8 USCENTCOM CAOC/TSIC, First SDB Employment with TN, e-mail, 8 Jan 07.9 NAVSYS, ZAOD Closeout Briefi ng, PowerPoint presentation, NAVSYS, 31 Oct 06.10 Lt Adam Fisher, Introduction of an Innovative New GPS Service for Global Military Operations, PowerPoint presentation, GPS Operations Center, 28 Apr 06.11 JSpOC/GSTT, More TN Information, e-mail, 6 Apr 07.12 GPSOC DOK/DOKI, Talon NAMATH, e-mail, 5 Apr 07.13 JSpOC/GSTT, TN Information, e-mail, 21 Feb 07.

deck targets. This centralized control signifi cantly reduces the ability of ISR assets to support ongoing operations while providing 24-hour presence across the AOR.

The CAOC does a good job at ‘spreading out’ ISR assets across geographical regions and using the full 24-hour time spectrum to hunt the enemy. However, this paradigm completely misses the mark on fully utilizing operational effectiveness. A planning paradigm which prioritizes coverage over operational objectives quickly loses sight of the operations on the ground. Instead, the focus should be on supporting active operations while lives are at stake. Since these taskings do not occur every day, strategic deck targets wouldn’t suffer very much. Due to the persistent nature of the RQ-4, it is possible to support active operations while also collecting the strategic target deck currently provided by the CAOC – a capability demonstrated in Operation VALIANT PURSUIT and numerous DS operations since then. Scheduling ISR assets in time, space and purpose over an objective will place the assets where the ground commander needs them, thereby exponentially expediting sensor-to-shooter imagery and maximizing cross-cuing opportunities. The current CAOC ISR tasking and prioritization system must migrate from a total area/time focus to one that is operations centric. The CAOC must support the highest priority operations with the appropriate mass of ISR assets—placing those assets in contact with the supported ground units to shift targets as the operation unfolds. While supporting these units, RQ-4 crews would collect the strategic target deck on a noninterference basis with dynamic TST.

CONCLUSION

The RQ-4 has the ability to provide game-changing persistence to the joint battle space. That this asset be tasked in a manner that best utilizes its persistence is vital. Maintaining the capability currently resident in JTAAC and shifting the focus from area-and-time coverage to operation coverage will begin to better utilize these capabilities.

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“The basic difference between an ordinary person and a warrior is that a warrior takes everything as a challenge while an ordinary person takes everything as a blessing or a curse.”

—Carlos Castaneda, Author