6 de Bruyn - European Commission · 2016. 11. 23. · Paper G raphci s R efni erei s Petrochem ical...
Transcript of 6 de Bruyn - European Commission · 2016. 11. 23. · Paper G raphci s R efni erei s Petrochem ical...
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Voorpagina CE
Impacts on competitiveness of EU ETS
September 2008, Sander de Bruyn
An analysis of the Dutch industry for post-2012 EU ETS
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Study design
• Question: which sectors of industry face serious impacts on competitiveness in NL?
• Partial analysis (no direct estimation of CL!)
• Study I: industry• Study II: aviation• Industry finished Jul 2008, aviation
Oct 2008.
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Set up in the Netherlands
CE
Partial analysis
Which sectors face potential impacts on competitiveness
CPB
General equilibrium analysis
Carbon leakage, impacts on welfare
X
Industry reactions
Discussion in parliament
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Analytical framework
Potentialcost price increase
Effects: competitiveness carbon leakage
Compensation mechanisms
CO2 target + EU-ETS price
QualitativeQuantitative
allocation mechanism
Impacts on profits (net cost priceincrease)
Impacts onprices
Pass throughpossible Effects:
lower demand
Pass throughnot possible
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ScenariosExogenous price of CO2• €20 (sensitivity of €50/ ton CO2)Two allocation scenarios: (a) full acutioning; (b) partial grandfathering (only non-electricity part industry)Time dimension: 2005 with targets 2020Sectors:19 sectors and subsectors (2,3,4 digit)Unit of analysis: Cost price increase instead of GVA (links closer
to product prices)
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Potential cost price increase
Two cost components1. Direct costs: costs of buying CO2
emission rights2. Indirect costs: higher electricity
price• Electricity model: at €20/tCO2,
electricity prices increase at €14/MWh for industry (LT contracts)
• CHP crucial and data difficult to get
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Results: potential cost price increase, auctioning
0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%
10%
Nutrit
ionTe
xtiles
Wood
Pape
rGr
aphic
sRe
fineri
es
Petro
chem
ical
Fertil
izer
Othe
r Bas
e Che
mica
ls
Anorg
anic
Chem
icals
Chem
ical p
roduc
tsGl
ass
Build
ing m
ateria
ls
Ceme
nt, ca
lcium,
gyps
um
Ceram
ics ne
c
Iron a
nd st
eel
Alumi
nium
Othe
r non
-ferro
meta
ls
Othe
r indu
stry
Direct ETS CostsIndirect ETS Costs
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Potential cost price increase auctioning versus part.grandf.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
Nutrit
ionTe
xtiles
Wood
Pape
rGr
aphic
sRe
fineri
es
Petro
chemi
cal
Fertil
izer
Othe
r Bas
e Che
micals
Anorg
anic C
hemi
cals
Chem
ical p
roduct
sGla
ss
Buildi
ng m
ateria
ls
Ceme
nt, ca
lcium,
gyps
um
Ceram
ics ne
c
Iron a
nd ste
elAlu
miniu
m
Othe
r non
-ferro
meta
ls
Othe
r indu
stry
Additional costs auctioningCosts of grandfathering
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Sectors or subsectors
0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%
Chem
ical s
ector
24Ba
se ch
emica
ls 24
1
Chem
ical p
roduc
ts 24
2_24
7
Othe
r Bas
e Che
mica
ls 24
11, 2
412
Inorga
nic C
hemi
cals
2413
Petro
chem
ical 2
414,2
416,2
417
Fertil
izer 2
415
Cos
t pric
e in
crea
seDirect ETS CostsIndirect ETS Costs
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Subsectors or products?
0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%
10%11%12%13%14%15%16%17%
Alumin
ium 27
42 (6
0 com
panie
s
Produ
ct prim
ary alu
minium
(2 c..
Cos
t pric
e in
crea
se a
nd p
rodu
ct p
rice
incr
ease
Direct ETS Costs
Indirect ETS Costs
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Cost pass through
• Trade intensities with Annex-I and non-Annex I;
• Qualitative and semi-quantitative analysis on cost-pass through (literature review)
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Trade intensities•
8 digit level (C
OM
TRAD
E)•
Export and im
port markets
Figure: Export
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Nutrition
Textiles
Wood
Paper
Graphics
Refineries
Petrochemical
Fertilizer
Other base chemical
Inorganic
Chemical products
Glass
Building materials
Cement, calcium and gypsum
Ceramics nec
Iron and steel
Aluminium
Other non-ferro
Other industry
non A
nnex1 n
on E
UA
nnex 1
non-E
UE
U27_IN
TR
A
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Qualitative analysis
• Cost pass through depend on transport costs, market niches, market structure, etc.
• EU market: rates depend on literature studies and degree of existing imports from non-Annex I countries
• Exports to non-Annex I countries: no pass through possible
• Exports to Annex-I countries: in between EU market results and non-Annex I countries
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Cost pass through (lit.review)
Sector Net cost price increase (%)
Fertilizer Most likely scenario: 0% cost pass through 8,1 Iron and steel Most likely scenario: 50% cost pass through 3,1 Worst case: 6% cost pass through 5,8 Other inorganic chemicals Most likely scenario: 50% cost pass through 2,5 Worst case: 25% cost pass through 3,8 Refineries Most likely scenario: 75% cost pass through 0,2 Worst case: 25% cost pass through 0,6 Cement Most likely scenario: 100% cost pass through 0 Worst case: 50% cost pass through 4,3 Paper Most likely scenario: 30% cost pass through 0,6 Worst case: 0% cost pass through 0,8
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Net cost price increase
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Compensation measures
• Free allocation• Border tax adjustments• Recycling of revenues- Corporate taxes- Labour taxes- Energy saving investment subsidies
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Compensation measures: recycling corporate taxes
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Nutriti
on
Textil
esWo
odPa
per
Graphi
cs
Refine
ries
Petro
chemic
a l
Fertili
ze r
Base
Chem
ical ne
c
Anorg
anic
Chem
ical pr
oduct
sGla
ss
Buildi
ng ma
terials
Ceme
nt, ca l
cium
and gy
psum
Ceram
ics ne
c
Iron a
nd ste
el
Alumin
ium
Other
non-f
erro
Other
indust
ry
without compensationwith compensation
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Compensation measures: energy saving subsidies
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
Nutr iti
onTe
xtiles
Wood
Paper
Graphi
cs
Refine
ries
Petroc
hemica
l
Fertiliz
e r
Base
Chem
ical ne
c
Anorg
anic
Chem
ical pr
oductsGla
ss
Buildi
ng ma
terials
Ceme
nt, ca l
cium
and gy
psum
Ceram
ics ne
c
Iron an
d stee
l
Alumin
ium
Other
non-fer
ro
Other i
ndustry
without compensationwith compensation
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Conclusions: effects on economy and environment• Total direct economic costs small
(0.2% of GDP). • Indirect economic effects differ
between free allocation and auctioning;
• Indirect effects free allocation: higher costs of CO2 compliance;
• Indirect effects auctioning: impacts on competitiveness and CL.
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What should we have done different if we could start it all over again?• Using products instead of sectors for
homogenous subsector outputs• Using subsectors for non-
homogenous sector outputs. • Try to model economic costs of free
allocation in order to suggest break even point for free allocation: e.g. if CL is larger than x%, free allocation does more harm than good.
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achterpagina CE
Thank you!
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CE Delft
• Independent, non-profit research & consultancy
• Transport, Energy, Economy
• 40 employees. • Economy: team of 10
environmental economists • Internationally: transport
and inclusion of aviation in EU-ETS
• In the Netherlands: environmental economics
www.ce.nl
Voorpagina CEStudy designSet up in the NetherlandsAnalytical frameworkScenariosPotential cost price increaseResults: potential cost price increase, auctioningPotential cost price increase auctioning versus part.grandf.Sectors or subsectorsSubsectors or products?Cost pass throughTrade intensitiesQualitative analysisCost pass through (lit.review)Net cost price increaseCompensation measuresCompensation measures: recycling corporate taxesCompensation measures: energy saving subsidiesConclusions: effects on economy and environmentWhat should we have done different if we could start it all over again?achterpagina CECE Delft