6-1. Moravcsik Taking Preferences Seriously a Liberal Theory of International Politics

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TakingPreferenceseriously:ALiberalTheory fInternational oliticsAndrewMoravcsik

This rticleeformulatesiberalnternationalelationsIR)theoryna nonideologicalndnonutopianormppropriateoempiricalocial cience. iberalR theorylaboratesheinsighthat tate-societyelations-theelationshipf tates o the omesticnd ransna-tional ocial ontextn whichheyreembedded-have fundamentalmpactnstatebehaviornworld olitics.ocietaldeas,nterests,nd nstitutionsnfluencetateehaviorby hapingtate references,hats, he undamentalocial urposesnderlyinghe trate-gic alculationsfgovernments.or iberals,he onfigurationf tatereferencesattersmostn world olitics-not,srealistsrgue,he onfigurationfcapabilitiesndnot, sinstitutionaliststhats,functionalegimeheorists)aintain,he onfigurationf nforma-tion nd nstitutions.his rticleodifieshis asic iberalnsightnthe ormf hreeoretheoreticalssumptions,erives rom hem hree ariantsf iberal heory,nddemon-strateshathe xistencef coherentiberalheoryas ignificantheoretical,ethodologi-cal, nd mpiricalmplications.estatedn hisway,iberalheoryeservesobe treatedsa paradigmaticlternativempiricallyoequalwith nd nalyticallyore undamen-tal han he wodominantheoriesncontemporaryR scholarship:ealism nd nsti-tutionalism.

Fordetailedommentsndcriticisms,amgratefulboveall toAnne-Marielaughter,howas therefrom he eginning,ndtoLea Brilmayer,awrence roz,MarcBusch,James aporaso, ale Copeland,David Dessler,Jeffryrieden,Martha innemore,harlesGlazer,MichaelGriesdorf,tefanoGuzzini,ErnstHaas, StanleyHoffmann,tephenHolmes,TedHopf,AlanHouston, avid Lumsdaine, obertKeohane, uenKhong, arry ramer,avidLong, teven ukes,JamesMarquart,isaMartin,onathanMercer,HenryNau,KalypsoNicolaidis,JamesNolt,JosephNye,JohnOdell,Kenneth ye,RobertPaarlberg, aniel Philpott, ideonRose, Judithhklar, avid Skidmore, llison tanger, anice tein,AndrewWallace, elesteWallander,tephenWalt, lexander endt, ark acher,areed akaria,MichaelZirn, ndthreenonymouseferees.thanklsotwootherritics: eterKatzensteinncouragedmoredirect omparison ith onstructivistpproachesndJohnMearsheimernvitedme to state he iberalcase vis-a-vis ealismna series fpublicdebates. amalso indebted oparticipantsn seminarst the

Programn nternationalolitics, conomics,ndSecurityPIPES),UniversityfChicago;UniversityfKonstanz; niversityfToronto; niversityfCalifornia,anDiego;Olin nstitutendCenter ornter-national ffairs,arvard niversity;nternationalurisprudenceolloquium, ew YorkUniversityawSchool;Fletcherchool,Tufts niversity;nd theEuropean niversitynstitute.or researchupport,thank mit evak,Brian ortnoy,ndPIPES. Formore etailed nddocumentedersions fthis rticle,seeMoravcsik 992.

Internationalrganization1, 4,Autumn997,pp.513-53? 1997byThe10 FoundationndtheMassachusettsnstitutefTechnology



514 Internationalrganization

Groundingiberal heoryn a setofcore ocialscientificssumptionselps ver-comea disjunctureetween ontemporarympiricalesearch nworld oliticsnd

the anguage mployed y scholars o describeR as a field. iberalhypothesesstressingariationn state referenceslay n ncreasinglyentralole n R scholar-ship.These nclude xplanationstressinghe ausal mportancef state-societye-lationss shaped ydomesticnstitutionsfor xample,he democraticeace"),byeconomicnterdependencefor xample,ndogenousariffheory),ndby deas boutnational,olitical,ndsocioeconomicublicgoodsprovisionfor xample,heoriesabout herelationshipetween ationalismndconflict).iberalhypotheseso notinclude, or easons larifiedater, unctionalegimeheory.etthe onceptualan-guageof R theory asnot aught pwith ontemporaryesearch.R theoristson-tinue ospeak s if hedominantheoreticalleavage nthe ieldwere hedichotomybetween ealismnd "neoliberal") nstitutionalism.he result:iberalR theoryfthekind utlinedarliersgenerallygnoreds a major aradigmaticlternative.

Worse,ts ack ofparadigmatictatus as permittedritics ocaticatureiberaltheorys a normative,ven utopian,deology. ostwar ealist riticsuch s HansMorgenthaundE. H. Carr ook hetoricaldvantagef iberalism'sistoricalole san deologyo contrasttspurportedltruism"idealism," legalism," moralism,"or "utopianism") ith ealism's theoreticaloncernwith uman atures itactu-

ally s [and]historicalrocessess theyctuallyakeplace." Forty ears ater,ittlehas changed. obert ilpin'snfluentialypologyn nternationalolitical conomyjuxtaposes positivemercantilistiew "politicsdeterminesconomics") gainstnarrowernd conspicuouslyormativeiberal ne ("economics houlddeterminepolitics").KennethWaltz, realist ritic,sserts hat ifthe ims .. ofstates e-comemattersf . . centraloncern,henwe areforced ack othe escriptiveevel;andfromimple escriptionso validgeneralizationsanbe drawn."2

Liberals averespondedo such riticismsotbyproposingunifiedetof positivesocial cientificssumptionsnwhich nonideologicalndnonutopianiberalheoryan

bebased, shasbeen onewith onsiderableuccess or ealismnd nstitutionalism,utbyconcedingts heoreticalncoherencendturningnstead o ntellectualistory.t swidelycceptedhatnynontautologicalocial cientificheory ust egroundedn setofpositivessumptionsrom hichrguments,xplanations,ndpredictionsan be de-rived.3et urveysf iberalR theoryitherollect isparateiewsheld y"classical"liberalublicistsrdefineiberal heoryeleologically,hats,accordingo tspurportedoptimismoncerninghe otentialor eace, ooperation,nd nternationalnstitutionsnworld istory.uch tudiesffern ndispensableourcef heoreticalndnormativenspi-ration. udgedy hemore arrowlyocial cientificriteriadoptedere, owever,heydo notustifyeferenceo distinctliberal"Rtheory.

Leading iberalR theoristsreelyoncede he bsence f coherent icrofounda-tional ssumptionsut oncludeherefromhat liberalR theorynthe ocial cien-

1. See Morgenthau960,4; Keohane1989, 8,n. 17;andHoward 978,134.2. SeeWaltz1979, 5, 27; Gilpin 975, 7 (emphasisnoriginal);ndGilpin 987.3. See BuenodeMesquita 996, 4-65; andKeohane1986.



Liberal heoryf nternationalolitics 515

tific ensecannot xist.RobertKeohane, n institutionalistympathetico liberal-ism,maintainshat in contrastoMarxismndRealism, iberalismsnot ommitted

to ambitiousnd parsimonioustructuralheory." ichaelDoyle, pioneer nana-lyzing he"democraticeace,"observeshatiberalR theory,nlike thers,acks"canonical" oundations.arkZacher ndRichardMatthew,ympatheticiberals,assert hatiberalismhould e consideredn "approach," ot theory,ince"itspropositionsannot e ... deducedfrom tsassumptions."4ccurate hough hismaybe as a characterizationf ntellectualistoryndcurrentheory,t s second-best ocial cience.

I seek tomove beyond hisunsatisfactoryituationy proposing setof coreassumptionsn which general estatementf positive iberal R theoryan begrounded.n thefirstection fthe rticle argue hat hebasic iberalnsightboutthe entralityf state-societyelationso world olitics an be restatedntermsfthree ositive ssumptions,oncerning,espectively,henatureffundamentalo-cialactors,he tate,ndthe nternationalystem.

Drawing n these ssumptions,then laborate hreemajorvariants fliberaltheory-each roundedna distinctiveausalmechanisminkingocialpreferencesand statebehavior.deationaliberalism tresses he mpact n statebehavior fconflictndcompatibilitymong ollective ocialvalues r dentitiesoncerninghe

scope andnaturef publicgoodsprovision.ommercialiberalismtresseshe m-pactonstate ehaviorfgains nd osses to ndividualsndgroupsnsociety romtransnationalconomicnterchange.epublicaniberalism tresseshe mpact nstate ehavior f varyingormsfdomesticepresentationndtheresultingncen-tives or ocialgroupsoengagenrenteeking.'

Finally,demonstratehat he dentificationfcoherentheoreticalssumptionssnot implynabstractndsemanticmatter.t hassignificantethodological,heo-retical,ndempiricalmplications.he utilityf a paradigmaticestatementhouldbe evaluated nthebasis of four riteria,achrelevantothe mpiricalesearcher:

superiorarsimony,oherence,mpiricalccuracy,ndmulticausalonsistency.First, theoreticalestatementhould egeneral ndparsimonious,emonstrat-

ing hat limitedumberfmicrofoundationalssumptionsan ink broad ange fpreviouslynconnectedheoriesndhypotheses.hisrestatementoessobyshow-inghowliberalismrovides generaltheory f R linkingpparentlynrelatedareasof nquiry.hetheoryutlined ere pplies qually o iberal nd nonliberalstates, conomic nd national ecurityffairs,onflictualnd nonconflictualitua-tions,ndthebehavior oth f ndividualtates"foreign olicy")and ofaggrega-

tions f states"internationalelations"). iberal heory, oreover,xplainsmpor-tant henomenaverlookedy lternativeheories,ncludinghe ubstantiveontentofforeign olicy, istoricalhange, nd thedistinctivenessf interstateelationsamongmodernWesterntates.

4. See Keohane 1990,166, 172-73;Doyle 1986,1152;Zacher nd Matthew 992,2; MatthewndZacher 995,107-11,117-20;Hoffmann987,1995; ndNye1988.

5. Forotheruchdistinctions,eeKeohane1990; ndDoyle1983.




Second, theoreticalestatementhould erigorousndcoherent,fferingcleardefinitionf its ownboundaries. his restatementoes so by demonstratinghat

institutionalistheoriesf regimes-commonlyreateds liberaldue to deologicaland historicalonnotations-aren actbasedon assumptionsloser orealism hanto iberalism.hishelps oexplainwhyRtheoristsavefoundtdifficulto distillsetofcoherent icrofoundationalssumptionsoriberal heory.

Third, theoreticalestatementhould emonstratempiricalccuracy is-a'-visother heories;t should xpose nomaliesnexisting ork, orcingeconsiderationofempirical indingsnd theoreticalositions. hisrestatementf liberal heorymeetshis riterionyrevealingignificantethodologicaliases nempiricalvalu-ations frealist heories f "relative ains-seeking"ndconstructivistnalyses fideas nd Rduetothe missionf iberal lternatives.f hese iaseswere orrected,liberal ccountsmight ell supplantmanywidely ccepted ealistnd nstitutional-ist, s wellas constructivist,xplanationsfparticularhenomenan world olitics.

Fourth, theoreticalestatementhould emonstrateulticausalonsistency.yspecifyinghe ntecedentonditionsnderwhich t s valid and theprecise ausallinks o policy utcomes, theoryhould pecify igorouslyow t can be synthe-sizedwith ther heoriesnto multicausal xplanationonsistent ith enets ffundamentalocial heory.hisrestatementoes sobyreversinghenearlyniversal

presumptionmong ontemporaryR theoristshat systemic"heoriesikerealismand nstitutionalismhould eemployeds ananalyticalfirstut,"with heoriesf"domestic" referenceormationroughtnonly oexplain nomalies-a prescrip-tion hats bothmethodologicallyiased ndtheoreticallyncoherent.n itsplace, hisrestatementictateshe everse:iberal heorys analyticallyrior oboth ealismndinstitutionalismecause tdefineshe onditionsnder hichheirssumptionsold.

If thisproposed eformulationf iberalR theorymeets hese our riteria,s Iargue tdoes,there s goodreason o accord t a paradigmaticositionmpiricallycoequalwithnd nalyticallyriororealism nd nstitutionalism,s well s construc-

tivism,ntheoryndresearchn world olitics.

CoreAssumptionsfLiberalIR Theory

Liberal R theory'sundamentalremise-thatherelationshipetweentates ndthe urroundingomesticnd ransnationalocietynwhichheyre mbedded riti-cally hapes tate ehavior y nfluencinghe ocialpurposes nderlyingtate ref-erences-can be restatednterms fthree ore ssumptions.heseassumptionsre

appropriateoundationsf ny ocialtheoryf R: they pecifyhenature fsocietal

actors,he tate,ndthe nternationalystem.

Assumption: ThePrimacy fSocietalActors

The undamentalctors n nternationalolitics re individualsndprivate roups,whoare on the veragerational nd risk-aversend whoorganize xchangendcollectivectiontopromote ifferentiatednterestsnder onstraintsmposed ymaterialcarcity,onflictingalues, ndvariationsn ocietal nfluence.



Liberal heory f nternationalolitics 517

Liberal heory ests n a "bottom-up" iewof politics n which hedemands findividualsnd societal roups re treateds analyticallyrior o politics. olitical

action s embedded n domestic nd transnationalivil society, nderstoods anaggregationfboundedlyationalndividuals ith ifferentiatedastes, ocialcom-mitments,nd resource ndowments.ociallydifferentiatedndividualsefine heirmaterial nd ideationalnterestsndependentlyf politics nd then dvance hoseinterestshrough olitical xchange nd collective ction.6ndividualsnd groupsare ssumed o actrationallyn pursuitfmaterialnd deal welfare.7

For iberals, hedefinitionfthe nterestsf ocietal ctors s theoreticallyentral.Liberal heoryejectshe topian otion hat nautomatic armonyf nterestxistsamong ndividualsnd groups n society; carcitynd differentiationntroduceninevitable easure fcompetition. here ocial ncentivesor xchangendcollec-tive ction reperceivedoexist,ndividualsndgroups xploit hem:hegreaterheexpected enefits,he trongerhe ncentiveo act. npursuinghese oals, ndividu-als areonthe verage isk-averse;hats, they tronglyefend xistingnvestmentsbut emainmore autious bout ssumingost ndrisknpursuitfnewgains.Whatis true boutpeopleonthe verage, owever,s notnecessarilyruenevery ase:some ndividualsn anygiven ocietymayberisk-acceptantr rrational.

Liberal heory eeksto generalize boutthesocial conditions nderwhich he

behavior f elf-interestedctors onvergesowardooperationrconflict.onflict-ual societal emandsnd thewillingnesso employ oercionnpursuitf them reassociatedwith number ffactors,hree fwhich re relevant othisdiscussion:divergentundamentaleliefs,onflictver carcematerial oods, nd nequalitiesin political ower. eep, rreconcilableifferencesn beliefs bout heprovisionfpublicgoods, uch s borders,ulture,undamentalolitical nstitutions,nd ocalsocialpractices,romoteonflict,hereasomplementaryeliefs romotearmonyandcooperation.xtremecarcityends o exacerbate onflictver resources yincreasinghewillingnessf social actors o assume ost and risk o obtain hem.

Relative bundance,y contrast,owers hepropensityor onflicty providingheopportunityosatisfy antswithoutnevitableonflictndgivingertainndividualsandgroupsmore odefend. inally, herenequalitiesnsocietalnfluencere arge,conflicts more ikely.Where ocialpower s equitably istributed,hecostsandbenefitsf actions remore ikely o be internalizedo individuals-forxample,throughhe xistencefcomplex, ross-cuttingatternsfmutuallyeneficialnter-action rstrongnd egitimateomesticoliticalnstitutions-andhe ncentive orselective rarbitraryoercion s dampened. ycontrast,here ower symmetriespermit roupsoevadethe osts fredistributingoods, ncentivesrise or xploit-ative, ent-seekingehavior,ven f he esults inefficientor ocietys a whole.

6. This does not mply "pre-social" onceptionfthe ndividual nencumberedy nation,ommu-nity, amily, r other ollective dentitiesut onlythat hese dentitiesnter hepolitical ealmwhenindividualsndgroupsngagenpoliticalxchange n the asisof hem; ee,for xample, oleman 990.

7. Kant1991, 4.8. MilgromndRoberts 990, 6-87.




Assumption: Representationnd State references

States orother

oliticalnstitutions)epresentome ubset fdomesticociety,n

thebasisofwhose ntereststateofficialsefinetate referencesnd actpurpo-sivelynworld olitics.

In the iberal onceptionf domestic olitics,he tatesnot n actor ut repre-sentativenstitutiononstantlyubject o capturendrecapture,onstructionndreconstructiony oalitionsf ocial ctors. epresentativenstitutionsndpracticesconstitutehe riticaltransmissionelt"bywhichhepreferencesnd ocialpowerof ndividualsndgroupsretranslatednto tate olicy.ndividualsurn othe tate

toachievegoalsthat rivate ehaviors unable oachieve fficiently.9overnmentpolicy s thereforeonstrainedytheunderlyingdentities,nterests,ndpower findividualsnd groupsinside nd outside he tate pparatus) hoconstantlyres-sure he entral ecisionmakersopursue olicies onsistentith heir references.

This s notto adopt narrowly luralist iew of domestic oliticsnwhich llindividualsndgroups ave equal influencen state olicy, orone inwhich hestructuref tate nstitutionss irrelevant.o governmentests n universal runbi-ased political epresentation;verygovernmentepresentsome individualsndgroupsmore ullyhan thers.nan extreme ypotheticalase, representationight

empower narrow ureaucraticlass oreven single yrannicalndividual,uch san deal-typicalol PotorJosef talin. etween heoreticalxtremesftyrannynddemocracy, any epresentativenstitutionsndpracticesxist, ach ofwhich rivi-leges particularemands; encethenature fstate nstitutions,longside ocietalinterestshemselves,s a keydeterminantfwhat tates o internationally.

Representation,n the iberal iew,s not imply formalttributef tate nstitu-tions utncludes thertable haracteristicsfthe olitical rocess, ormalr nfor-mal, thatprivilege articularocietal nterests. lientalisticuthoritarianegimes

maydistinguishhosewith amilial, ureaucratic,r economic ies o thegoverningelitefrom hosewithout.ven where overnmentnstitutionsreformallyair ndopen, relativelynegalitarianistributionfproperty,isk,nformation,rorgani-zational apabilitiesmaycreate ocial or economicmonopoliesble to dominatepolicy. imilarly,heway nwhich state ecognizesndividual ightsmayshapeopportunitiesorvoice.'0Certain omestic epresentationalrocessesmaytend oselect s leaders ndividuals, roups, ndbureaucraciesocializedwithparticularattitudesowardnformation,isk,nd oss.Finally,ost-effectivexit ptions,uchas emigration,oncompliance,r the ransferfassets o new urisdictionsr uses,

insofars they onstrainovernments,aybe thoughtf as substitutesor ormalrepresentation.

9. Representativeolitical nstitutionsnd practices esult rom rior ontractsnd can generally etaken orgrantedn explaining oreign olicy;butwhere heprimarynterestsnd allegiances f ndi-viduals ndprivate roups re ransferredo ubnationalr upranationalnstitutionsmpoweredorepre-sent hem ffectively,liberal nalysiswouldnaturallyhift o theseevels.

10. Doyle 1997, 51-300.11. NorthndThomas 973, 7.




Societal ressuresransmittedyrepresentativenstitutionsndpracticeslter statepreferences."his term esignates n orderingmongunderlyingubstantiveut-

comesthatmayresult romnternationalolitical nteraction.ere t s essential-particularlyiven he nconsistencyf common sage-to avoid conceptualonfu-sion by keeping tate preferences"istinctrom ational strategies,"tactics,"and"policies," hats, theparticularransientargainingositions,egotiatinge-mands, r policygoalsthat onstitutehe verydayurrencyf foreign olicy. tatepreferences,s the oncepts employed ere, omprise setoffundamentalnterestsdefinedcross states ftheworld." referencesrebydefinitionausallyndepen-dent f the trategiesfother ctors nd, herefore,rioro specificnterstateoliti-cal interactions,ncludingxternalhreats,ncentives, anipulationf nformation,orotheractics. y contrast,trategiesndtactics-sometimeslso termed prefer-ences" ngame-theoreticalnalyses-arepolicy ptions efinedcross ntermediatepolitical ims, s whengovernmentseclare n "interest"n "maintaininghebal-ance ofpower," containing"r "appeasing" n adversary,r exercisinggloballeadership."2Liberal heoryocuses nthe onsequencesor tate ehaviorf hiftsin fundamentalreferences,otshiftsn thestrategicircumstancesnderwhichstates ursue hem.

Representativenstitutionsndpracticesetermineotmerely hich ocialcoali-

tions rerepresentednforeignolicy, uthowthey re represented.wo distinc-tions recritical. irst,tatesmay ct neither unitaryr"disaggregated"ay. nmany raditionalreasof foreignolicy, politics tops t thewater's dge," andtheres strongoordinationmongnational fficialsndpoliticians.notherreas,the tatemaybe "disaggregated,"ith ifferentlements-executives,ourts,en-tralbanks, egulatoryureaucracies,ndruling arties, or xample-conductingsemiautonomousoreign olicies nthe ervice fdisparateocietalnterests.'3 ec-ond,domestic ecisionmakingmaybe structuredo as togeneratetate referencesthatatisfystrongationalityondition,uch s transitivityrstrictxpected tility

maximization,r so as to satisfynlythe weaker ationalityriterionf seekingefficient eans.Recently,ormalheoristsave derived pecific onditionsnderwhich onunitarytate ehavioran beanalyzed as if" twere nitaryndrational,implyinghatmuch uperficiallynonrational"r "nonunitary"ehavior houldactually eunderstoodntermsfshiftingtate references.4

Taken ogether,ssumptionsand2 implyhat tates onot utomaticallyaxi-mize fixed, omogeneousonceptionsf security,overeignty,r wealth er e,asrealistsnd nstitutionalistsend o ssume.nsteadheyre,nWaltzianerms,func-

tionally ifferentiated";hats, they ursue articularnterpretationsndcombina-

tions fsecurity,elfare,ndsovereigntyreferredy powerfulomestic roups

12. Thephrase country changedts preferencesn response o an action y country" is thusmisuse fthe erm s defined ere,mplyingessthan onsistentlyational ehavior; eeSebenius 991,207.

13. See Slaughter 995; ndKeohane ndNye 1971.14. Achen 995.




enfranchisedy representativenstitutionsnd practices.5As ArnoldWolfers,ohnRuggie, nd others ave observed,henature nd ntensityfnationalupport or

any tate urpose-even pparentlyundamentaloncernsike hedefense fpoliti-cal and egal overeignty,erritorialntegrity,ationalecurity,r conomic elfare-varies ecisively ith he ocialcontext.'6t s notuncommonor tates nowinglyto surrenderovereignty,ompromiseecurity,rreduce ggregateconomicwel-fare. nthe iberal iew, rade-offsmong uchgoals, swell s cross-nationaliffer-ences ntheir efinition,re nevitable,ighly aried,ndcausally onsequential.'7

Assumption: Interdependencendthenternationalystem

The onfigurationf nterdependenttate referenceseterminestate ehavior

Forliberals, tatebehavior eflectsaryingatternsf statepreferences.tatesrequire "purpose," perceivednderlyingtakenthemattert hand,norderoprovoke onflict,ropose ooperation,rtake nyother ignificantoreign olicyaction. heprecise aturefthese takes rives olicy. his snot oassert hat achstate imply ursuests dealpolicy,blivious fothers;nstead,ach state eeks orealize tsdistinctivereferencesnder aryingonstraintsmposed y theprefer-

encesof other tates. hus iberal heory ejects otusttherealistssumptionhatstate referencesust e treateds ifnaturallyonflictual,ut qually he nstitution-alistassumptionhat hey houldbe treated s iftheywerepartiallyonvergent,compromisingcollectivection roblem.18o the ontrary,iberals ausally rivi-lege variationnthe onfigurationf state references,hile reatingonfigurationsofcapabilitiesnd nformations if heywere ither ixedonstraintsrendogenousto state references.

The criticalheoreticalinkbetween tate references,n theonehand, nd thebehavior fone or more tates, n theother,s provided ytheconcept fpolicy

interdependence.olicy nterdependences definedere s the etof costs ndben-efits reated or oreignocietieswhendominantocialgroupsn a societyeek torealize heir references,hat s,thepatternftransnationalxternalitiesesultingfromttemptsopursuenational istinctiveurposes. iberal heoryssumes hatthepatternf nterdependenttate referencesmposes bindingonstraintnstatebehavior.

Patternsf nterdependencerexternalitiesnduced y ffortsorealize tate ref-erences anbe divided nto hree roadcategories,orrespondingo the strategic

situationthepatternfpolicy xternalities)hat esults.'9Wherepreferencesrenaturallyompatiblerharmonious,hats,wherehe xternalitiesfunilateraloli-

15. Ruggie 983, 65.16. Ruggie1982,1983.17. On the ontradictionsithinWaltz's fforto avoid hese mbiguities,ee Baldwin 997, 1-22.18. Keohane 1984, 10; 1986,193. Note that hese re all "as if" assumptions.he worldmust e

consistent ith hem,utneednot ulfillhem recisely.19. See Stein1982;Snidal 1985; ndMartin 992.




cies are optimal or thersor nsignificant),here re strongncentivesor oexist-encewith ow conflict.

Where, ycontrast,nderlyingtate referencesre ero-sumrdeadlocked,hatis, where n attemptydominantocialgroupsn one countryorealize heir refer-ences hroughtate ction ecessarilymposes osts negativexternalities)n domi-nant ocial groups n other ountries,overnmentsace bargainingamewith ewmutual ains and a highpotentialor nterstateension nd conflict. he decisivepreconditionor ostly ttemptstcoercion, or xample,s neither particularon-figurationfpower,s realists ssert, or funcertainty,s institutionalistsaintain,but configurationfpreferencesonflictualnough o motivate illingnessoac-cepthigh ost ndrisk.20nother ords,ntense onflictequireshatnaggressorrrevisionisttate dvancedemands o which ther tates re unwillingo submit.Revisionist references-underlying,ocially roundednterestsn revisinghe ta-tusquo-are distinctrom evisioniststrategies,"hat s, a needto alter he tatusquo toprotectnduringnterestsnder ewstrategicircumstances.iberals ocusontheformer,ealistsand nstitutionalists)n the atter. encewhile oth heoriespredict ecurityonflict,hey o so under ifferentircumstances.orexample,n-creasedmilitarypendingnresponseoanadversary'srms uildups a changenstrategy ith ixed referencesonsistentith ealism;ncreasedpendingnitiated

bya newrulinglite deologicallyommittedoterritorialggrandizementsa pref-erence-inducedhangenstrategyonsistent ith iberalism.21Where, inally, otives re mixed uch that n exchange fpolicy oncessions

throughoordinationrprecommitmentan improvehe welfare fbothpartiesrelative o unilateralolicy djustmenti.e.,a collective ction roblem),tates avean incentiveonegotiate olicy oordination. ames ike coordination,ssurance,prisoner's ilemma,ndsuasionhave distinctiveynamics,s well as imposepre-cisecosts, enefits,ndrisks n theparties.Withinachqualitativeategory,ncen-tives ary urtherccordingothe ntensityfpreferences.

For iberals,he orm,ubstance,nddepthfcooperationepends irectlynthenaturefthese atternsfpreferences.encewhere Pareto-inefficient"utcomesare observed-trade rotections a commonlyited xample-liberals urn irstocountervailingocialpreferencesndunresolvedomesticnd ransnationalistribu-tional onflicts,hereasnstitutionalistsndrealists,espectively,urn ouncertaintyandparticularonfigurationsf nterstateower.22

LiberalTheorys Systemicheory

These iberal ssumptions,nparticularhe hird-in ssence, what tateswant stheprimaryeterminantfwhat hey o"-may seem ommonsensical,ven auto-logical.Yet mainstreamR theory asuniformlyejecteduchclaimsfor hepast

20. Note that ome rationalistnalyses ismiss uchrisk-acceptantreferencess "irrational"; eeFearon 995.

21. For xample, anEvera1990-91, 2.22. Grieco's tudy fNTB regulations discussed ater.




half-century.t theheart f the wo eading ontemporaryR theories,ealismndinstitutionalism,s thebelief hat tate ehavior as ironic onsequences.23Power

politics nd nformationalncertaintyonstraintates opursue econd- nd third-best trategiestrikinglyt variancewith heir nderlyingreferences.24husvary-ing tate referenceshould e treateds if heywere rrelevant,econdary,r ndog-enous. n hisclassicdefinitionfrealismMorgenthauontraststto "twopopularfallacies: he oncern ithmotives ndthe oncern ith deological references."25NeorealistWaltz'scentral bjection oprevious, reductionist"heoriess thatnworld oliticsresultschieved eldomorrespondothe ntentionsf ctors"; ence"no validgeneralizationsan logically e drawn" romn examinationf inten-tions.26hough he nterestst assumes redifferent,eohane's nstitutionalisme-lies on a similar s if ssumption:t "takes he xistencefmutualnterestss givenandexamineshe onditions nderwhich heywill eadtocooperation."27nshort,Powellobserves hat structuralheories.. lack a theory f preferencesverout-comes."28What tates o isprimarilyeterminedystrategiconsiderations-whatthey angetor what hey now-which nturn eflectheirnternationaloliticalenvironment.nshort,ariationnmeans, ot nds,matters ost.29

Liberal heoryeverses his ssumption: ariationn ends,notmeans,mattersmost.Realists nd nstitutionalists,s wellas formal heoristshoseekto ntegrate

the wo, riticizehis ore iberal ssumptionecause tappears t first lance oreston whatWaltz erms "reductionist"atherhan "systemic"nderstandingf R.Inotherwords, iberalismppears o be a purelydomestic" r "unit-level"heorythat gnoreshe nternationalnvironment.n particular,ealists re skepticalfthisviewbecause tappears tfirstlance obegroundednthe topianxpectationhatevery tate an do as it pleases.Thiscommonplaceriticisms erroneous or woimportanteasons.

First, tate references ayreflect atternsf transnationalocietal nteraction.While tate referencesre bydefinition)nvariantnresponse ochangingnter-

state oliticalnd trategicircumstances,heymaywellvarynresponseo chang-ing ransnationalocialcontext.nthe oliticalconomy or oreignconomic olicy,

23. What boutMarxism?Marxism rovides istinctiveormativensightsDoyle 1997),but tsnon-teleological ositive ssumptions-theentralityfdomesticconomicnterests,he mportancef rans-national nterdependence,he tate s a representativef dominantocial forces-arequite ompatiblewith his estatementf iberalism.orexamples, ee the ontributiony Frieden ndRogowski nKeo-hane ndMilner 996.

24. Waltz1979, 0-67,93-97.25. The resultingautonomyf thepolitical" n geopolitics ivesrealism ts "distinctiventellectual

and moral ttitude"; eeMorgenthau960,5-7. Thefact hatMorgenthauistinguishedonrealistle-ments f his own thoughtllustrates furtheranger f definingealism ot ntermsf social scientificassumptions,ut n termsf ts ntellectualistory,hats, assuming hat verything"realist"wroteconstitutescoherentealistheory;ee Morgenthau960, , 227.

26. WaltzfollowsMorgenthaulmost erbatim:Neo-realism stablisheshe utonomyf nterna-tional olitics nd thusmakes theorybout tpossible";see Waltz1979,29, and also 65-66, 79, 90,108-12,196-98, 71.

27. See Keohane1984, ; andHellmannndWolf 993.28. Powell 1994, 18.29. Ruggie1983,107-10.




for xample, ocial demands re derived otsimply rom domestic" conomicassets nd endowments,utfrom herelative osition fthose ssets nd endow-

mentsn globalmarkets.imilarly,he ositionfparticularalues na transnationalcultural iscoursemay helpdefine heirmeaningn each society.n thisregard,liberalismoesnotdraw strictinebetween omestic ndtransnationalevelsofanalysis.30

A second ndmoreWaltzian easonwhy he harge f"reductionism"s errone-ous s thatccordingo iberal heoryhe xpected ehaviorfany ingle tate-thestrategiest selects ndthe ystemiconstraintso whicht adjusts-reflectot im-ply tsown preferences,ut he onfigurationf preferencesf all states inked ypatternsfsignificantolicy nterdependence.ational eadersmust lways hinksystemicallybout heir ositionwithin structureomposed f thepreferencesfother tates. incethepatternf and nterdependencemong tate references,ikethedistributionf capabilitiesnd the distributionfinformationnd ideas, iesoutside he ontrolf any ingle tate,t conformsoWaltz's wndefinitionfsys-temic heory, herebynterstatenteractionsre explained yreferenceo "how[states] tandnrelationo one another."'31 ence thecausal preeminencef statepreferencesoesnot mplyhat tateslwaysgetwhat heywant.

One mplicationf iberalism'systemic,tructuralualitysthat,ontraWaltz,t

canexplainnotonly he"foreign olicy"goalsofindividual tates utthe "sys-temic" utcomesf nterstatenteractions.hat ystemicredictionsan follow romdomesticheories f preferenceshould e obvious imply y nspectinghe itera-ture n thedemocraticeace.32naddition, y inkingocialpurposeothe ymme-tryndrelativentensityfstate references,iberalismffers distinctiveoncep-tion fpolitical ower nworld olitics-somethingraditionallyonsideredniqueto realistheory.

The liberal onceptionf power s basedon an assumption ore onsistent ithbasictheories fbargainingndnegotiationhan hose nderlyingealism: amely

that hewillingnessf tatesoexpend esourcesrmake oncessionss tselfrimar-ilya functionfpreferences,ot apabilities.nthis iew-the foundationf Nashbargainingnalysis,which as beenextendedo R byAlbert irshman, eohane,Joseph ye, ndothers-bargainingutcomes eflecthenature ndrelativenten-sity f actor references.33he "win-set,"he"best lternativeonegotiatedgree-ment,"hepatternf"asymmetricalnterdependence,"he elativepportunityostofforgoingnagreement-allhese ore ermsnnegotiationnalysis eferodiffer-ent spects fthe elationshipfbargainingutcomesnthepreferenceunctionsfthe ctors. hecapability-basedower o threatenentral o realismnters he qua-tionnspecificircumstancesndonly hroughinkageothreatsnd ide-payments.Even where apability-basedhreatsndpromisesreemployed, reference-baseddeterminantsf he oleranceor earing argainingosts,ncludingifferentialem-

30. For xample,ee Gourevitch976.31. Ruggie 983, 0-91.32. For more eneral rgument,ee Elman1996, specially 8-59.33. See Harsanyi 977;Hirshman945; ndKeohane ndNye1987, 33.




poraldiscount ates, isk-acceptance,ndwillingnesso acceptpunishment,emaincentral.34

The iberal laim hat hepatternf nterdependencemong tate referencess aprimary eterminantot ust of individual oreign olicies,butof systemic ut-comes, s commonsensical. ations re rarely reparedoexpend heir ntire co-nomic r defense apabilities,r to mortgageheir ntire omesticovereignty,npursuit f any ingle oreign olicygoal.Fewwars retotal, ewpeacesCarthagin-ian.Treatinghewillingnessf tates oexpend esourcesnpursuitfforeignolicygoals as a strict unctionf existing apabilitieshus eemsunrealistic. n themar-gin, hebinding onstraints instead enerallyresolve"or "determination"-thewillingnessfgovernmentsomobilize nd xpendocialresourcesor oreignolicypurposes.

Extensive mpiricalvidence upportshis ssumption.ven in "least ikely"cases,where oliticalndependencendterritorialntegrityreat stake ndmilitarymeans re deployed,elative apabilities onotnecessarily etermineutcomes."strong referenceor he ssue tstake ancompensateor deficiencyncapabili-ties," s demonstratedyexamplesike heBoerWar,Hitler's emilitarizationftheRhineland, ietnam, fghanistan,ndChechnya.neach case the elativentensityofstate referenceseshapedheoutcome othe dvantagef the "weak."35 uch

examples uggesthathe iberal iewofpower olitics, roperlynderstood,ener-atesplausible xplanationsotustofharmonyndcooperationmongnations,utof thefull ange fphenomenaentral o the tudyf world olitics,rom eacefuleconomicxchangeobrutal uerrilla arfare.

Variants ofLiberal Theory

Like their ealist nd nstitutionalistounterparts,he hree ore iberal ssumptions

introducedarlierrerelativelyhin r content-free.akenby themselves,hey onotdefine single nambiguous odel r setofhypotheses,ot eastbecause heydonot pecify recise ources fstate references.nstead heyupporthreeepa-ratevariants f iberal heory,ermed ere deational,ommercial,nd republicanliberalism.ach rests na distinctivepecificationfthe entral lementsf iberaltheory:ocialdemands,he ausal mechanisms herebyhey re transformedntostate references,ndthe esultingatternsfnational referencesnworld olitics.Ideationaliberalismocuses n the ompatibilityf ocialpreferencescross unda-

mental ollectiveoods ikenationalnity,egitimateoliticalnstitutions,nd ocio-economic egulation.ommercialiberalismocuses n ncentivesreatedyoppor-tunitiesor ransborderconomic ransactions.epublicaniberalismocuses n thenature f domesticepresentationnd the esultingossibilitiesor ent-seekinge-havior.

34. See Raiffa 982;Sebenius 991;Evans,Jacobson,ndPutnam 993; andKeohane ndNye 1977.35. See Morrow 988, 3-84; andMack1975.




Ideational iberalism:dentityndLegitimateocialOrder

Drawing n a liberal raditionating ack toJohn tuartMill, GiuseppeMazzini,andWoodrowWilson, deationaliberalismiews he onfigurationfdomestico-cial dentitiesndvalues s a basicdeterminantf tate referencesnd, herefore,finterstateonflictnd cooperation.Social identity"s defineds the etof prefer-ences hared y ndividualsoncerninghepropercopeandnaturefpublicgoodsprovision,hichnturn pecifieshenaturef egitimateomestic rder y tipulat-ingwhichocial ctors elong othe olity ndwhat sowed hem.36iberals akenodistinctiveositionn the rigins f ocial dentities,hichmay esult rom istori-cal accretionrbe constructedhroughonscious ollective rstate ction, oron

the uestionfwhetherhey ltimatelyeflectdeationalrmaterialactors.37Three ssentiallementsfdomesticublic rder ftenhaped y ocial dentitiesaregeographicalorders,olitical ecision-makingrocesses,nd socioeconomicregulation.ach can be thoughtf s a public rclubgood;the ffectivenessfeachtypicallyequires hat tbe legislated niversallycross jurisdiction.38ecall thatfor iberals,ven thedefense f or, essobviousbutno lesscommon,hewillingcompromisef)territorialntegrity,olitical overeignty,r national ecuritys notanend n tself,ut means f realizing nderlyingreferencesefined y thede-mands f societal roups. ccordingo assumption, social actors rovide upport

tothegovernmentn exchange or nstitutionshat ccordwith heirdentity-basedpreferences;uch nstitutionsretherebylegitimate."oreign olicywill thus emotivatedn part yan efforto realize ocialviews bout egitimateorders,oliti-cal institutions,ndmodes f ocioeconomicegulation.

The consequencesf dentity-basedreferencesor R depend, ccording oas-sumption,on thenatureftransnationalxternalitiesreated y ttemptsorealizethem.Wherenational onceptionsf egitimateorders, oliticalnstitutions,ndsocioeconomicqualityrecompatible,hus eneratingositive rnegligiblexter-

nalities, armonys likely.Where ational laims an be mademore ompatibley

reciprocalolicy djustment,ooperations likely.39 here ocial dentitiesre n-compatiblend create ignificantegativexternalities,ensionnd zero-sumon-flicts more ikely. arallel redictionsbout nternationalolitics ollow romachofthe hree ssentialources f deationalreferences:ational,olitical,nd ocio-economicdentity.40etusbrieflyonsider ach.

36. This concepts similar utnarrowerhanRuggie's legitimateocial purpose" ndKatzenstein's"collectivedentity";ee Ruggie1983;Katzenstein996a, .

37. Here s a point ftangency ith ecent onstructivistork; eeKatzenstein 996a,5; Finnemore1996, 7-28; andWendt 996,7.Whetherhe iundamentalources f ocietal referencesre deationalsthe ocus f a debate mong eneral ocialtheoristsorwhichR theoristsack anydistinctiveompara-tive dvantage.

38. Fearon 995.39. Oye 1986.40. Liberal heory eednot nd ngeneral oes not laimthat hareddentitiesmerge romhance

interactionsmong atomistic"ndividuals,r that ationality ust eflecttimeless" actorsike an-guage, eligion,r thnicity.dentitieseed nly e translatednto olitical referenceshroughndividualandgroup ommitments;ompare innemore996,147.




The first undamentalype f social dentityentral othedomesticegitimacyfforeign olicy ompriseshe etoffundamentalocietal referencesoncerninghe

scopeofthe"nation,whichn turn uggesthe egitimateocation fnational or-ders nd the llocation f itizenshipights.heroots fnationaldentity ay eflecta shared et f inguistic,ultural,rreligiousdentificationsr shared et fhistori-cal experiences-oftennterpretedndencouragedyboth rivate roupsndstatepolicy.nexplainingonflictndcooperationverbordersnd citizenship,ealismstressesherole of relative ower, ndinstitutionalismtresses heroleofsharedlegalnorms, hereasdeationaliberalismtresseshe xtent owhich orders oin-cidewith henationaldentitiesfpowerfulocialgroups.41 here ordersoincidewithunderlyingatternsfidentity,oexistencendevenmutual ecognitionremore ikely.Where, owever,nconsistenciesetween ordersndunderlyingat-ternsf dentityxist, reaterotentialor nterstateonflictxists.nsuch ircum-stances,ome ocialactorsndgovernmentsre ikely ohavean nterestnunitingnationalsn appropriateurisdictions,erhaps hroughrmed ggressionr seces-sion;other overnmentsay ntervene ilitarilyopromoterhinderuch fforts.Morethan wentyears eforeonflicteemergedntheformerugoslavia,MyronWeinerermedhe esultingisruptiventernationalehavior-arecurrentomplexofaggression,xacerbationf nationalistdeologies, ffensivellianceformation,

andrisk cceptancenforeignolicy-the"Macedonianyndrome."42Strongmpiricalvidenceupportshepropositionhat isjuncturesetweenor-ders nd dentitiesre mportanteterminantsf nternationalonflictndcoopera-tion. n earlymodern urope, nterstateonflict eflectednpart hecompetitionbetween wocommunaleligiousdentities-each fwhich,t eastuntil omesticand nternationalorms ftolerancepread,wasperceiveds a threato the ther.43Over he ast enturynd half, rommid-nineteenth-centuryationalistprisingsolate-twentieth-centuryationaliberationtruggles,hedesire or ational utonomyconstituteshe most ommonssue overwhichwarshavebeenfoughtndgreat

powernterventionas taken lace;theBalkan onflictsrecedingWorldWar andsucceedingheCold War reonly hemostnotoriousxamples.44hepost-WorldWar I peace nWesternurope ndthe eintegrationf Germanynto uropewereassisted ythe eestablishmentfborderslong thnicines n the aar and Alsace-Lorraine,s well as much fEastern urope. ven eading ealists ow concede-thoughtin nowayfollows rom ealist remises-that isputes etween inter-mingled rdivided ationalities"re themost robable atalystorwar n EasternEurope ndthe ormerovietUnion.45

41. SeeJackson990; ndGilpin 989.42. See Weiner 971; ndPillar1983, 4-26.43. Philpott996.44. Holsti 991.Eventhosewho tress he bsence fcredible ommitmentechanismsnexplaining

nationalistonflictsoncede he mportancefunderlyingdentities;ee Fearon 996, 6.45. To be sure,Mearsheimereroicallysserts hat ationalisms a "second-orderorceninterna-

tional olitics," ith "largely.. international"ause,namelymultipolarity;ee Mearsheimer990, 1.This s testable:s violent ationalism ore f an internationalroblemnCentralnd Eastern uropethan nWesternurope, s liberalismredicts,r nequal problemnboth reas, s realism redicts?




consumer rotection,ultural romotion,nd many ther ublicgoods ncreasinglydiscussedn nternationalconomic egotiations.

In the iberal iew, tate referencesoncerningegitimateocioeconomic rac-tices hape nterstateehavior hen heir ealizationmposes ignificantransborderexternalities.vidence rom he uropean ommunityEC) suggestshatubstantialprioronvergencefunderlyingalues s a necessaryrerequisiteor ooperationnregulatoryssue areas ike environmentalnd consumerrotection, any ax andsocialpolicies,mmigration,ndforeignolicy,s well as for ignificanturrendersof sovereignecisionmakingosupranationalourtsndbureaucracies.egulatorypluralismimits nternationalooperation,n particularconomic iberalization.

Courts,xecutives,nd

parliamentsutuallyecognize legitimateifferences"f

policynforeignurisdictions.52oncernsbout heproper alancebetween olicycoordinationnd egitimateomestic egulationregiving iseto even more om-plexformsf cooperation. enceregulatoryssuesplayan increasinglymportantrole n nternationalconomic egotiationsuch s the1992 nitiativeftheEC, theUruguay ound fGATT,NAFTA, ndtheU.S.-Japan tructuralmpedimentsni-tiative.53

Commercialiberalism:conomic ssets ndCross-Borderransactions

Commercialiberalismxplainshendividualnd ollective ehaviorf tates asedon thepatternsfmarketncentivesacing omestic nd transnationalconomicactors.At itssimplest,he commercialiberal rguments broadly unctionalist:Changes n the structuref thedomestic ndglobaleconomy lter he costs andbenefitsftransnationalconomic xchange,reatingressuren domestic overn-ments ofacilitater blocksuchexchangeshroughppropriateoreign conomicandsecurityolicies.

It s tempting,articularlyor ritics,o associate ommercialiberal heory ithideological upportorfree rade. etas theoryatherhan deology,ommercialliberalismoes notpredicthat conomic ncentivesutomaticallyenerateniver-sal free rade ndpeace-a utopian ositionritics hotreatiberalisms an ideol-ogyoften ronglyttributeo t-but instead tresses he nteractionetweenggre-gate ncentivesor ertainolicies ndobstacles osedbydomesticnd ransnationaldistributionalonflict.54hegreaterhe conomic enefitsor owerfulrivatec-tors, hegreaterheirncentive,ther hings eing qual,topressgovernmentso

facilitateuch transactions;hemore ostly headjustmentmposed y economicinterchange,hemore ppositions likely o arise.Rather han ssuming hatmarketstructurelways reates ncentivesor ooperationmong ocialactors s well asstates,rfocusingxclusivelyn thosessueareaswhere t does, s do some iberal

52. Burley 992.53. Ruggie 995.54. Compare ilpin 975, 7.




ideologies,iberal R theoryocuses nmarkettructures a variable reatingncen-tives or oth pennessndclosure.

Accordingly,any ommercialiberal nalyses tart ith ggregate elfare ainsfrom rade esultingrom pecializationnd functionalifferentiation,hen eektoexplain ivergencesrom oreignconomic nd securityolicies hatwouldmaxi-mize thosegains.To explain herejection f aggregate ains, ommercialiberalsfrom dam Smith o contemporaryendogenous" ariffheoristsook todomesticand nternationalistributionalonflicts.he resultingommercialiberal xplana-tion frelative-gainseekingnforeignconomic olicys quite istinctromhat frealism, hich mphasizesecurityxternalitiesndrelativehegemonic) ower, rthat f nstitutionalism,hich tressesnformationalnd nstitutionalonstraintsninterstateollectivection.55

One source fpressureorprotections domestic istributionalonflict, hichariseswhen he osts ndbenefitsfnational olicies renot nternalizedothe ameactors,hus ncouragingent-seekingffortso seekpersonal enefittthe xpenseof aggregatewelfare.n thisview,uncompetitive,onopolistic,r undiversifiedsectorsrfactorsose themost romiberalizationndhave n ncentiveooppose t,inducing systematicivergenceromaissez faire olicies. mith imselfemindsus that the ontriversf mercantilismre] theproducers,hose nterestasbeen

so carefullyttendedo .. ourmerchantsnd manufacturers"-aiew echoedbymany iberals ince.56 ecent esearch upportsheviewthat rotectionistressurefrom ent-seekingroups s most ntense recisely here istributionaloncernsfconcentratedroupsre trongest,or xample, hen ndustriesreuncompetitiverirreversiblenvestmentsasset pecificity)mposehigh djustmentosts n concen-tratednterests.ree trade s more ikelywhere trongompetitiveness,xtensiveintra-industryrade, r trade n intermediateoods, argeforeignnvestments,ndlow asset pecificitynternalizehenetbenefitsffree rade o powerfulctors,husreducinghe nfluencefnet osers romiberalization.57

The distributionalonsequencesf globalmarketmperfectionsreate secondsort fdisjunctureetween he ggregateenefitsfeconomic nterdependencendnational olicies.Modern rade heorydentifiesncentives or trategicehaviorwherencreasingeturnso cale,high ixedosts, urplus apacity,rhighlyoncen-tratedources fsupply endernternationalarketsmperfectlyompetitive.irmshoping o create or break nto) globaloligopoly r monopoly,or xample,mayhavean incentiveoengage npredatoryumpingbroadwhile eeking omesticprotectionnd subsidizationthome, venthoughhis mposes ostsondomestic

consumersndforeign roducers.uchpolicies ancreate ubstantialnternationalconflict,incegovernmentnterventionoassist irmsan mprove elfare or oci-ety s a whole, hough sually ot or ll societies nvolved.58

55. Grieco1988;Gowa 1989; ndKeohane1984.56. Ekelund ndTollison 981, 5.57. Milner 988.58. Keohane ndMilner 996.39.




Commercialiberalismas mportantmplicationsorecurityffairsswell.Tradeis generallyless costlymeans faccumulatingealthhanwar, anctions,rother

coercivemeans, ot eastdueto theminimizationf collateral amage. etgovern-mentsometimesavean incentiveoemploy oercivemeans ocreate nd controlinternationalarkets.o explain hisvariation,omestic istributionalssues andthe tructurefglobalmarketsreagain ritical. ommercialiberals rgue hathemore iversifiedndcomplexhe xistingransnationalommercialies ndproduc-tion tructures,he esscost-effectiveoercions likely obe.59 ost-effectiveoer-cionwas most rofitablenanerawhere hemain ources f conomic rofit,uch sfarmland,lave abor, awmaterials,r formalmonopoly,ouldbeeasily ontrolledinconqueredrcolonial conomies. et conomic evelopmentends o ncreasehematerialtake f ocial ctorsnexistingnvestments,herebyeducingheir illing-nessto assume he ost ndrisk f coercionhrougharor sanctions.60s produc-tion ecomesmore pecializedndefficientndtradingetworks ore iverse ndcomplex,oliticalxtractionfor xample, ar nd mbargoes)ecomemore isrup-tive, ndprofitableonopoliesver ommercialpportunitiesecomemore ifficulttoestablish.oth ross-culturalnthropologicalvidencendmodernross-nationalevidence inkwarfareo theexistence fmonopolizableesources; verthepastcentury,thasremainedhemajor eterminantfboundaryisputes.61 et he dvent

of modernndustrial etworks,articularlyhosebasedonpostindustrialnforma-tional xchange, as ncreasedhe pportunityosts fcoerciveactics angingrommilitaryggressionocoercive ationalization.62

Republican iberalism: epresentationnd Rent eeking

While deationalndcommercialiberal heory,espectively,tress emands esult-ingfrom articularatternsfunderlyingocietal dentitiesndeconomic nterests,republicaniberal heory mphasizesheways n whichdomestic nstitutionsnd

practices ggregatehosedemands,ransforminghemnto tatepolicy.The keyvariablenrepublicaniberalisms themodeof domestic olitical epresentation,which etermineshose ocialpreferencesre nstitutionallyrivileged. henpo-litical epresentations biased nfavor fparticularisticroups,hey end o "cap-ture"governmentnstitutionsndemploy hem or heirnds lone, ystematicallypassing nthe osts ndrisks o others. heprecise olicy fgovernmentsependsonwhich omestic roups rerepresented.hesimplestesultingredictions thatpolicysbiased nfavor fthe overningoalitionrpowerfulomesticroups.

A more ophisticatedxtensionf this easoning ocuses n rent eeking.When

particularisticroupsreableto formulateolicywithout ecessarilyrovidingff-setting ainsfor ocietys a whole, heresults likely o be inefficient,uboptimal

59. VanEvera 1990.60. Realist heory,ith ts ssumptionsfa unitarytate ndfixed references,imply resumeshat

thegreaterhewealthndpower f state, he ess themarginalostofdeployingt, hus educingowertocapabilities.iberal heoryuggests ifferentredictions.he two retestable.

61. SeeHuth 996; ndKeeley1996.62. See VanEvera1990,14-16,28-29; andKaysen1990, 3.




policies rom he ggregateerspective-one orm f whichmaybe costlynterna-tional onflict.63hilemany iberal rgumentsre concerned ith heseizure f

statenstitutionsyadministratorsrulers,rmies,ndbureaucracies),imilarrgu-mentspply o privilegedocietal roups hat capture" he tate, ccordingoas-sumption,or simplyct ndependentlyf t. f,followingssumption,most ndi-viduals ndgroupsn society, hile cquisitive,end lsoto berisk-averseat eastwhere hey ave omethingo ose),themore nbiased he ange fdomesticroupsrepresented,he ess likely heywillsupportolicies hatmposehighnet ostsorrisks n a broadrange f socialactors. hus aggressive ehavior-thevoluntaryrecourseocostly rriskyoreignolicy-is mostikelyn undemocraticr negali-

tarian olitieswhererivilegedndividualsan easilypasscosts n to others.64

This does not, fcourse,mply he xistencefa one-to-oneorrespondencee-tween hebreadthfdomesticepresentationnd nternationalolitical reconomiccooperation,or woreasons. irst,nspecificases,elitepreferencesaybemoreconvergenthan opular nes. fcommercialr deational referencesre conflict-ual,for xamplewhere ypernationalistrmercantilistreferencesrevail, broad-ening frepresentationayhavethe ppositeffect-apoint o which willreturn.Elites,uch s thoseeadershat onstructedheConcertfEurope r imilarrrange-mentsmong fricaneaders oday, avebeen ttributedotheir onvergentnterests

inmaintaininghemselvesnoffice. econd, he xtent fbias nrepresentation,otdemocraticarticipationer e, s the heoreticallyritical oint. irect epresenta-tionmay verrepresentoncentrated,rganized,hort-term,r otherwiserbitrarilysalientnterests.redictableonditionsxist nderwhich overninglitesmayhavean incentive orepresentong-termocialpreferences oreunbiasedlyhandoesbroad pinion.65

Despite hese otentialomplexitiesnd caveats, epublicaniberalismonethe-less generatesarsimoniousredictionshere onflictualoliciesmpose xtremelyhigh osts ndrisks nthemajorityf ndividualsn domesticociety.With espect

to extremeuthistoricallyommon olicies ikewar, amine,nd radical utarky,fair epresentationends o nhibitnternationalonflict.nthisway, epublicanib-eraltheoryashelped oexplain henomenas diverse s the"democraticeace,"modern nti-imperialism,nd nternationalrade ndmonetaryooperation. iventheprima acieplausibilityf the ssumptionhatmajorwar mposesnet ostsonsocietys a whole,t snot urprisinghathe rominentepublicaniberal rgumentconcernshe "democraticeace,"which ne scholar astermedas close as any-thing e have o a law n nternationalelations"-one hatpplies otribalocieties

as well s tomoderntates.66iberal emocraticnstitutionsend ot oprovokeuchwarsbecause nfluences placed nthehands f thosewhomust xpend loodandtreasurendthe eaders heyhoose.67

63. EkelundndTollison 981.64. MilgromndRoberts 990.65. See Keohane ndMilner 996, 2-53;andWooley 992.66. Levy1988, 62.67. Byanalogy oHirshleifer987.




Often verlookeds the heoreticalorollaryf"democraticeace" theory: re-publicaniberal heoryfwarthat tressesbnormallyisk-acceptanteaders nd

rent-seekingoalitions. ubstantialvidence howsthat heaggressors hohaveprovokedmodem reat owerwars end itheroberisk-acceptantndividualsntheextremer ndividuals ell bleto nsulatehemselvesromhe osts fwar rboth.Most eadersnitiatingwentieth-centuryreat owerwars ostthem;AdolfHitlerand SaddamHussein, or xample,nitiatedonflictsgainst oalitions armorepowerfulhan heir wn.68n thesame vein,Jack nyder as recentlyeepenedHobson's lassic ent-seekingnalysisf mperialism-wherebyhemilitary,ncom-petitiveoreignnvestorsndtraders,ingoistic olitical lites, ndothers hoben-efit rom mperialismre particularlyell-placedo influenceolicy-by linking

unrepresentativendextremeutcomeso ogrollingoalitions. onsistent ith hisanalysis,hehighlynrepresentativeonsequencesfpartial emocratization,om-binedwith he isruptionfrapidndustrializationnd ncompleteoliticalocializa-tion,uggesthat emocratizingtates,f ubject othese nfluences, ay eparticu-larlywarprone. uchfindings ay hallengeomevariantsf iberaldeology utareconsistentith iberal heory.69

The linkbetween reat-power ilitaryggressionnd small-groupnterestsnnonrepresentativetates mpliesneithernceasing elligerencey autocratice-

gimesnor unquestioningacifismydemocraticnes.Enlightenedespotismrdemocraticggressionemains ossible. he more reciseiberal redictions thusthat espotic ower, ounded yneitheraw nor epresentativenstitutions,ends obe wieldedn a more rbitrary anner ya wider ange f ndividuals,eading othto a wider ange fexpectedutcomesnda more onflictualverage.Nonetheless,liberal heoryredictshat emocratictatesmayprovoke reventive ars n re-sponse o direct r indirecthreats,gainst eryweakstateswithno great owerallies, r nperipheralreaswherehe egalandpolitical reconditionsor radendother ormsfprofitableransnationalelationsrenotyetnplace.70

Scholars lsooftenverlook recisenalogs othe democraticeace" nmattersofpoliticalconomy.he iberal xplanationor he ersistencef lliberalommer-cialpolicies,uch sprotection,onetarynstability,nd ectoralubsidization,heresuchpoliciesmanifestlynderminehegeneralwelfarefthe opulation,s pressurefrom owerfulomestic roups.71hus n the iberal iewthe reationndmainte-nance fregimesssuringree rade ndmonetarytabilityesult otprimarilyromcommonhreatsonationalecurityr ppropriatenternationalnstitutions,ut romthe bilityf tatesoovercomeomestic istributionalonflictsna way upportiveofinternationalooperation.hismayultimatelyeflectheeconomic enefitsfdoing o,as commercialiberal heoryuggests,ut tcan alsobedecisively elpedorhinderedybiases nrepresentativenstitutions.here uchbiasesfavor hel-tered roups,ndsubstantial isrepresentationf this ype s seenas endemic o

68. See Kaysen1990, 9; andMueller 991, 3-44.69. See MansfieldndSnyder 995;Snyder 991; ndVanEvera1990,18,20.70. Hopkins 980.71. For noverview,eeKeohane ndMilner 996.




most ontemporaryepresentativenstitutions,ent-seekingroupsre ikely o gainprotectionhroughariffs,ubsidies, avorableegulation,r competitiveevalua-

tion.Where olicymakersre nsulatedromuchpressures,hichmay nvolve essdemocraticutmore epresentativenstitutions,rwhere ree rade nterestsomi-nate olicy,penpolicies remore iable.72

Broader mplications fLiberalTheory

Do labelsmatter? haveexplored hree ariants f iberal heoryhathare setof

assumptions. hat s gained ysubsuminghem nder single ubric,s proposedhere?To demonstratetsutilityor mpiricalesearchndtheoreticalnquiry,paradig-

matic estatementuch s thismustmeet our riteria.irst,ts ssumptionshouldhighlightnexploredonceptualonnectionsmong reviouslynrelatediberal y-potheses.econd,t hould learly efinetsown onceptualoundariesn a mannerconformingofundamentalocial theory,n this ase clearly istinguishingiberalhypothesesromdeologicallyr historicallyelated ypothesesasedon differentsocialscientificssumptions.hird,t should eveal nomaliesnpreviousheories

andmethodologicaleaknessesnpreviousesting,reatingewpresumptionsbouttheproperheoriesndmethods hat tructurempiricalesearch.ourth,tshoulddefine owthe heorynquestionanbe combined igorouslyatherhan andomlywith therheoriesoform oherent ulticausalxplanations.

Liberalisms a GeneralTheory: arsimonyndCoherence

One advantagef this estatements thattsuggests theoryfworld olitics hatparsimoniouslyonnects wide ange fdistinctivendpreviouslynrelatedypoth-eses concerningreas unexplained y existingheories. hesehypothesesrenotlimitedocooperationmongiberal tates, ut ubsumeiberal ndnonliberaloli-ties, onflictualndcooperativeituations,ecurityndpolitical conomyssues,andboth ndividual oreign olicy ndaggregateehavior.tskeycausal mecha-nisms anbe generalizedomany ssueareas.Thus iberal heory hallenges heconventionalresumptionhat ealism s themost ncompassingndparsimoniousofmajorR theories. lthoughot ll iberal heoriesreeasytospecify,ypothesesabout ndogenousariffetting,hedemocraticeace,and nationalistonflictug-

gest hat iberalismenerates any mpiricalrgumentss powerful,arsimonious,and "efficient"s those frealism.73Notonlydoes iberal heorypply cross widedomain fcircumstances,ut ts

three ariants-ideational,ommercial,ndrepublicaniberalism-aretrongeraken

72. See Wooley1992;Bailey et al. 1997; contributionsy Garrettnd Langeand by Haggard ndMaxfieldnKeohane ndMilner 996;andMoravcsik 994.

73. Onthe fficiencyriterion,ee King,Keohane,ndVerba 994,182-87.




togetherhan eparately. otonlydo they hare ssumptionsndcausalmecha-nisms, uttheirmpiricalmplicationsggregaten interestingays. t is widely

accepted, or xample, hat conomic evelopmentas a strongnfluencen theviabilityfdemocraticovernance, ithtspacificmplications;iberal emocraticgovernmentsendnturnosupportommerce, hich romotesconomic evelop-ment.74arlDeutsch, rnst aas,andNye, mongmany thers,aveexplored oweconomicnteractionan eadtotransnationalommunicationnd he isseminationof cientificnformation,hichmaynturn romoteecularizingognitivend deo-logical hange.75

Liberal heoriesan be analyticallyeinforcingvenwhere hey o notmakepar-allel predictions.nomalieswithinnevariantf iberal heory ayberesolved yconsideringthervariants. ositivemovement longone liberaldimension-patternsfnationaldentity,emocraticarticipation,r ransnationalconomicrans-actions-maycondone r exacerbatehenegative istortionslong notheriberaldimension.76orman ngell,whose ommercialiberal laims reoften arodiedysecondhandritics, aintainedhat iswell-knownunprofitabilityfwar"thesisnno way mplies the mpossibilityf war," doctrineedismissed or epublicanliberal easons s a "ridiculousmyth."77 here epresentativeias permitsent-seeking roups o control olicy, ggregatencentivesorwelfare-improvingrade

are ikely ohave ess effect.ndeed, ecent tudies eveal hat hecorrelatione-tween conomicnterdependencendpeaceholdsonly ormost trongly)mongliberaltates.78onversely,here emocratizationeightensocioeconomicnequal-ity, ationalistleavages, neven atternsfgains, nd ossesdueto nterdependenceorextremeeterogeneityf nterests-asmayhaveoccurredn the ormerugosla-via-it may xacerbatenternationalconomicndpoliticalonflict.79uch nterac-tion ffectsmongiberal actorsfferpromisingreaformore etailednalysis.

Liberal heorylso illuminatest east hreemajor henomenaorwhich ealismand nstitutionalismfferew,f ny, redictions-anotherndicatorfgreaterarsi-

mony. irst,iberal heoryrovides plausible heoreticalxplanationorvariationin the ubstantiveontentfforeignolicy.Neitherealism or nstitutionalismx-plains hechangingubstantiveoalsandpurposes verwhich tates onflictndcooperate; oth ocus nstead nformal auses, uch s relativeower r ssueden-sity,ndformalonsequences,uch s conflictndcooperationer e.80 ycontrast,liberal heoryrovides plausible xplanationot ustfor onflictndcooperation,

74. Huntington991, 6-72.75. See Deutsch 954;Haas 1989;andNye 1988.

76. Realist riticsend ooverlookhis.Howard's rilliantolemic gainstiberal heoriesfwar ftenemploys neliberal heoryo debunk nother;or xample, he xistence fnationalistrredentismsevidence gainst heclaimthat reaterconomic evelopmentnd democratizationead topeace; seeHoward 986, 8-99,130-31;compareMansfieldndSnyder 995.

77. Angell 933, 3,268-70.78. Oneal1996.79. Fearon 996.80. YetRuggie oncedes oomuchwhen e observeshat powermaypredicthe orm fthenterna-

tional rder, utnot ts ontent,"ecause iberal heoryoeshelppredict argainingutcomesnd nstitu-tional orm;eeRuggie 982, 82.




butfor he substantiveontentfforeign olicy.Major elementsfinternationalordermphasized,utnot xplained,nrecent riticismsfrealism nd nstitutional-

ism nclude hedifferenceetween nglo-American,azi, and Sovietplansfor hepost-World ar I world;U.S. concernbout fewNorth orean, raqi, r Chinesenuclearweapons, atherhan hegreaterrsenals eldby GreatBritain,srael, ndFrance; he ubstantialifferencesetween he ompromisef "embedded iberal-ism" underlyingrettonWoodsand arrangementsnder heGold Standard; iver-gencesbetween conomic ooperation nder he EC and the CouncilforMutualEconomicAssistance; nd thegreater rotectionismf theOrganizationorEco-nomic ooperationndDevelopment'sgriculturalolicy, s compared o ts ndus-trial rade olicy.81iberal R theory ffers lausible, arsimoniousypothesesoexplain achofthese henomena.82

Second, iberal heoryffersplausible xplanationorhistorical hange n theinternationalystem.he static uality fboth ealist nd nstitutionalistheory-theirackofan explanationor undamentalong-termhangenthenature f nter-national olitics-is a recognized eakness.nparticular,lobal conomic evelop-ment ver hepastfivehundred earshas beenclosely elated ogreater ercapitawealth, emocratization,ducationystemshat einforceewcollectivedentities,andgreaterncentivesor ransborderconomic ransactions.83ealist heoryc-

cords hese hanges o theoreticalmportance.heoristsikeWaltz,Gilpin,ndPaulKennedyimit ealism othe nalysis funchangingatternsfstate ehaviorrthecyclical ise nddecline fgreat owers. iberal heory,ycontrast,orges directcausal linkbetween conomic, olitical, nd social change ndstatebehaviornworld olitics.Hence,over hemodern eriod heprinciplesf nternationalrderhavebeendecreasinglyinked o dynasticegitimacynd ncreasinglyied o factorsdirectlyrawn romhe hree ariants f iberal heory:ational elf-determinationand ocialcitizenship,hencreasingomplexityf conomicntegration,nd iberaldemocraticovernance.84

Third,iberal heoryffersplausible xplanationorthe istinctivenessfmod-ernnternationalolitics. mong dvanced ndustrialemocracies,stable ormfinterstateolitics asemerged,roundednreliablexpectationsfpeaceful hange,domestic ule f aw, table nternationalnstitutions,nd ntensiveocietal nterac-tion.This s the condition eutsch erms "pluralisticecurityommunity"ndKeohane ndNyetermcomplex nterdependence."85

Whereas ealistsand constructivists)ffer ogeneral xplanationor he mer-gence fthis istinctive odeof nternationalolitics,iberal heoryrgues hat heemergencef a large ndexpanding loc ofpacific, nterdependent,ormativelysatisfiedtates as beena preconditionor uchpolitics. onsider,or xample,hecurrenttate fEurope.Unlike ealism,iberal heoryxplainshe tterackofcom-

81. See Ruggie 982; andWendt 994.82. Moravcsik 992, orthcoming.83. Huntington991.84. See BarkinndCronin 994; ndKeohane ndNye,1971.85. See Deutsch 957; andKeohane ndNye1977, hap.2.




petitivelliance formationmong he eadingdemocraticowers oday. or ex-ample, he bsence f serious onflictmongWesternowers verYugoslavia-the

"WorldWar scenario"-reflectsn arge art shared erceptionhat he eopoliti-cal stakesmong emocraticovernmentsre ow.Similarly,iberalism akesmoresense of the sudden eversal f East-West elations, shiftmade possibleby thewidespreadiew mongRussian fficialsso interviewatareveal) hatGermanysethnicallyatisfied,oliticallyemocratic,ndcommerciallynclined.86

TheConceptual imits fLiberalism:Whyunctional egime heoryIs NotLiberal

A second dvantage f thereformulations to clarifyhefundamentalivergencebetweenheories f state referencesndmodern heoriesf nternationalegimes.This divergenceelps xplainwhy iberals avefailed o dentify coherentetofsocial cientificssumptionsnderlyingxistingliberal"R theory.

Thosewhochoose o defineiberal heoryntermsf ts ntellectualistoryatu-rally onflatehebeliefninstitutionsith concernbout he ocietal ources fstate references.iberalisms an ideologyndpartisanmovementas often eenassociatedn thepopularmindwith dvocacy f nternationalaw andorganization,

despite heviewsofmanyeadingiberals.87thersink hese wo rgumentsdeo-logically: othseemto suggestn optimistic,meliorativerendnmodernworldpolitics.Whateverhereason, ontemporaryfunctional"heoriesf nternationalregimesre often eferredoas formsf "neoliberalnstitutionalism,"hought sfair o note hatKeohane, riginatorf "functionalegimeheory,"as abandonedthe erm. anielDeudney nd G. Johnkenberry'sttemptedestatementf iberal-ismgoes furthest,ssertinglatlyhat thepeaceoftheWest oes notderive implyormainly rom hefact hat tspolities reall democracies,"utfromnternationalinstitutions.88

ImreLakatosreminds s, however,hat he coherence f scientificheoriessmeasured otbytheir onclusions,utbythe onsistencyf their hard-core"s-sumptions.ythis tandard,eoliberalnstitutionalistheoryasrelativelyittlencommon ith iberalheorys elaboratedere, ecausemost fthe nalyticssump-tions ndbasiccausal variablesmployedy nstitutionalistheoryremore ealistthan iberal. ikerealism,nstitutionalismakes tate referencess fixed rexog-enous, eeksto explain tatepolicy s a functionf variationn the geopoliticalenvironment-albeitornstitutionalistsnformationnd nstitutionsndfor ealists

materialapabilities-and ocuses n theways nwhich narchyeadsto suboptimaloutcomes.

86. Wallander 993.87. Nearly ll treatmentsf iberal R theoryombine nstitutionalistnd preference-basedtrainsn

thisway;see Doyle 1997; Keohane1990; Russett 993; Matthews nd Zacher1995, 133-37;Risse-Kappen1996, 65; andDeudney 995,191-228.Despite seriousmisreadingfKant, he nglishchooltrichotomy,hich istinguishesrotiusrom ant,s more onsistent;or xample,ee Wight 991.

88. Deudneynd kenberry994.For liberal ritique,ee Moravcsik 996.




Liberalism,y contrast,hares oneofthese ssumptions.t permitstate refer-ences tovarywhileholding ower nd nformationonstant,xplains olicy s a

functionf the ocietal ontext,nd focuses n howdomestic onflict,ot nterna-tionalnarchy,mposesuboptimalutcomes.herefore,ontemporaryegimeheoryoughtmore roperlyo be termedmodifiedtructuralealism"as it wasinitially)or "institutionalism"as some now prefer),atherhan "neoliberal nstitutional-ism." 9 hisdivision ermitssto speak f coherentet f ocial cientificssump-tions nderlyingoth.Ratherhan reateds parts fthe ametheoreticalradition,the wo heorieshould e testedgainst neanotherrcarefullyraftednto xplic-itlymulticausalxplanations-optionsxplorednmoredetail nthenext wosec-tions.

This is not to imply, owever, hat iberal heorys of no utilityn analyzinginternationalegimes. o the ontrary,t contributeso such nalysisn at east wodistinctive ays.First, iberal heory xplainswhen nd why heconfigurationfstate referencesssumed y nstitutionalists-aixed-motiveollectivection rob-lem that an be overcome ythecentralized anipulationf nformationhroughcommon ules-is likely o emerge. ince,moreover,articularnstitutionaltruc-turesolve specific ollectivection roblems,he onfigurationfpreferenceser-mits s topredict etailed haracteristicsf nternationalegimes.90

Second, iberal heory eepens he nstitutionalistccount fregime tability.Realists rgue hat egime tabilitynd expansionre functionsfenduring ege-monicpower; nstitutionalistsaintainhat hehigh nterstateransactionostsofregime reation rrenegotiationxplain egime tability,ven f patternsffunc-tional enefits ouldrecommendenegotiation.iberal heoryuggestsnalterna-tivehypothesis:amely hatnternationalegimes re tablewhen ocietal ndividu-als and groups djust o as to makedomestic olicy eversaloreven stagnation)costly-as neofunctionalistegionalntegrationheoristsave ong rgued. his ac-counts consistent ith he ransactionostfoundationsf nstitutionalisteasoning

butgroundednsocietal lock n"effectsndthe esultingtabilityf state refer-ences,not he osts f nterstateargaining,onitoring,ndsanctioning.uch"so-cialembeddedness" ay ake heform f fixednvestmentsyprivate irms,deo-logicalcommitmentsy political arties oncernedbouttheir eputation,ostlyinstitutionaldaptationydomesticureaucracies,rgovernmentnvestmentn mili-tary efense.91

The liberal iewofregimess "socially mbedded" an be extended osuggestendogenousausesofregime hange vertime. nternationalegimeshat nduce

greaterocietal emands or ooperationremore ikely odeepen rexpand ver

time,whereas hose hat o not re ikely obe fragile. ne example s the iberalaccount f nternationalaw,which uggestshat nternationalules ndnormsremost ffectivelymplementeds "horizontalommitments"nforcedynationalcourts ndparliaments,ot "vertical ommitments"nforcedy supranationalc-

89. Keohane1985,1989.90. Martin 993.91. On nstitutionaldaptation,eeKeohane1991.




tors,ndthat uchhorizontalommitmentsangenerateelf-sustainingomentumover ime yempoweringarticularomestic roups.92

MethodologicalmplicationsfLiberalTheory:TheDangerofOmission

A third otentialdvantagef reformulatingsocial scientificheorys to ncreaseits alience,hus ompellingmpiricaltudiesogive erious onsiderationohypoth-eses drawn romt nddiscouragingmitted ariable ias.93owerfuliberal ypoth-esesexist o account ormanymajorphenomenan world olitics, et urprisinglyfew tudies irectlyonfrontealist nd nstitutionalistorconstructivist)ypotheseswith heiriberal ounterparts.nstead, mpiricaltudies end o treat ealismoroccasionallynstitutionalismr"rationalism")s an exclusive aseline. heresultsnot ust ncompletenalysis. t is omitted ariable ias that nflatesheempiricalsupportornewtheoreticalropositionsue to the xclusion f correlated)iberalones.Tworecentxamples-onerealist,neconstructivist-demonstratehe onsid-erable mpiricalignificancefthis ias.94

The firstxample omesfrom erhapshemost rominentebate n recent ealisttheory-namely,haturroundingoseph rieco's relative-gains"ritiquef nsti-

tutionalism.asedon ananalysis fthe mplementationf nontariffarrierNTB)provisions egotiatednthe okyoRound fGATT,Grieco eeks odemonstratehatsecurity oncerns bout relativegains,not fears of future heating,motivatenoncooperation,ven nforeignconomic olicy.95et nfocusingn nstitutional-ism, Grieco gnores iberalexplanations ornoncooperationased on domesticinstitutions,deas, nd distributionalonflictmong omestic conomic nterests.96Subsequentnterventionsnthe elative-gainsebate yformalheorists,hich avedone much oclarifyhe trategiconditions nderwhich articulartrategiesrelikely oemerge,xacerbatehisneglect y seeking o makea virtue f omission.

EmersonNiouand PeterOrdeshook ee preferencess "tangentialo a theory finternationalystems. . . We can conduct hisdiscussionwithout eferencesogoals."97 s a result,he elative-gainsebatehas remainedxtraordinarilyarrow.BothGrieco ndthosehecriticizesreat ationalnterestss fixed ndseekonly odetermine hich xternalolitical onstraint-capabilitiesr nformation-consti-tutes heprimaryeterminantfstate ehavior.

Thisneglectf iberal ypothesesouldbe ofonly bstractignificancead tnotled all participantsntherelative-gainsebate o overlook he xplanationfnon-

cooperationhatmost nalystsf nternationalrade olicy, ot omentionearlyllwhoactuallyonduct egotiationsfthiskind, onsider ecisive-namely, ressure

92. See Slaughter 995;Burley ndMattli 993; andMoravcsik 995.93. Tetlock ndBelkin 996,34.94. King,Keohane, ndVerba 994,168-82.95. See Grieco1988,1990;andBaldwin 993.96. Grieco oncedes his; eeGrieco1990, 86-88n.97. See Niou andOrdeshook994;Powell 1994, 18;andSnidal1991.




from articularisticomestic roupswith ntense istributionaloncerns. iberalpreference-basedxplanationsominatehe pecializedconomic, oliticalcience,

andpolicyiteraturen trade, articularlynpreciselyhose hreereaswhereGriecofindsrelative ains":governmentrocurement,ndustrialtandard-setting,ndad-ministrativerotection.etGrieco odesthese hreeritical asesof nterstatear-gaining ailures confirmingisaccount,without onsideringlternative otiva-tions or,xceptnoneminor ase,providingnydirect vidence fnationalecurityconcerns. tudiesnotherreas hat o testiberalheoriesgainst ealistlternativesreveal hat ressureromconomicpecial nterestsends o dominateecurityon-cerns, ven n "least ikely" ases like militaryrocurement.98ince theres goodreason o suspect mitted ariablebias,our theoreticalnderstandingf relativegains eekingwouldhavebeenfarmore eliablebut lso surely ar ess realist )fthe nitial esearchesign ad ncludediberal ypotheses.

A second xample fomittedariable ias s drawn rom ecent ffortso developa constructivistpproacho R. Constructivism,houghotyet ormulateds a theory,is a welcome fforto broadenR debates yfocusingn ideationalocialization.Yet, ikerealist laims boutrelative ains, onstructivistrgumentsre generallyemployedoas topreventonfrontationith reexistingiberal heory.he theoreti-cal introductiono a recent ollection f constructivistssays,TheCulture fNa-

tional ecurity,or xample,dentifiestwomajor nalytical erspectivesn IR":Waltzian eorealism ndthe "neoliberal" egime heoryf Keohaneand RobertAxelrod.With nly fewexceptions,ecent onstructivistork mploys hisdi-chotomy,hereforeeglectingiberal heories ocusingn therelationshipetweenconflictnddemocraticovernment,conomicnterdependence,nddomesticoali-tions-theories ecognizeds among hemostpowerfuln contemporaryecuritystudies.99

This sunfortunate.here regood priorieasons osuspecthatmittedariablebiasis inflatinghe mpiricalupportor nyconstructivistlaim hat emains n-

testedgainst liberal ypothesis.otonlydo both iberal ndconstructivistrgu-ments ocus n variationnstate references,utweknow hat he eceptivenessoparticulardeas sclosely orrelatedith uthoritativeomesticnstitutions,atternsof nterdependence,ndexisting atternsf culturaldentity.Systemic" onstruc-tivist laims-theviewthat ationaldeas and dentitiesesult romhe ocializing"feedback" ffectsfpreviousnternationaloliticalnteractions-are articularlyvulnerable o suchbias,becausedomestic referencesre thecritical ausal linkbetweenystemicocializationnd tate olicy.Withouttheoryfdomesticrefer-enceformation,owcan a constructivistpecify hich eedbackrocessesfsocial-izationmatter,et alone when nd how theymatter?ociologists ave ongsinceconcludedhat new nstitutionalist"nalyses fthiskind recrippled nless on-

98. Moravcsik 993.99. Typical f the iteraturere Katzenstein 996,3, 12-13,25, 37; andWendt 996.Finnemores a

welcome xception, hereasRisse-Kappennd Legroattemptyntheses;ee Finnemore996;Risse-Kappen1996;andLegro1996.




joinedwith reliable heoryf actors nd agency.100n short,n order otheorizerigorouslybout ystemicocialconstruction,efirstequire liberal heory.

Existingiberalhypotheses, oreover,ffer general ccount f variationnsocialization-atheoryf when hetransnationalransmissionf ideasmatters-somethingorwhich systemic"onstructivistss ofyetack nexplanation.ocial-ization ffects,iberals redict, illreflecthe xtentf convergencer divergenceamong reexistingomesticnstitutionsnd deas. or xample,ocializationowardon-vergentormstemsromonvergentomesticnstitutionsnd deas. iberalnstitutionsandnormsmay eparticularlyonduciveothe romotionfpeace nd ooperation,utthe rgumentmplieshat he onvergencef ertaintherortsfnonliberalalues,uchas monarchyn he oncertfEuroper Asian alues"nASEAN,may lsohave ignifi-cant,fgenerallyess triking,ffectsnworldolitics.

Consider, or xample, he currentevival f interestmong onstructivistsnDeutsch's nalysis fhowtransnationalommunicationreates pluralisticecuritycommunities"PSGs) in whichgroups f states cease to contemplate" ilitaryconflict.SGs are said to demonstratehe mportancef the ocializing ower ftransnationaldeas, hemportancef "common. .we-feeling"atherhan conver-gent" nterests.101etDeutschhimselfiewed iberal actors-an utonomousivilsociety ithndividual obility,he ule f aw, nd ompetitiveolitics-asprecon-

ditionsor ransformativeffectsfhighevels f nternationalransactionsnd ommuni-cation.s itust oincidencehat f he f he welveuccessfulost-1750SGs dentifiedbyDeutsch,en r levenwere omposedf iberal rnearlyiberaltates?102

This nalysis osestwogeneralhallengesoconstructivism.irst,t uggestshatliberal ariablesre more undamentalhan onstructivistnes,because hey efinethe onditionsnderwhichhigh ates fcommunicationnd transactionlter tatebehavior. econd, t raises hepossibilityhat omesticiberal actorsmay xplainboth eaceandtransactions,enderinghe orrelationetweennternationalommu-nicationndpeacenot ust secondary,ut purious.103ithout irectlyonfronting

liberal heory,e cannot ismiss ither ossibility.urelyurunderstandingfworldpoliticswouldbe bettererved ymore igorousmpiricalonfrontationetweenconstructivismnd iberalism. etter etwould ea sophisticatedynthesis,sfoundin the "liberal constructivist"esearchprogramdvocatedbyThomasRisse-Kappen.Thisapproach-a "constructivistnterpretationf iberal heory"-backsawayfromhenotion hat aluesresult romnterstateocializationndarguesn-stead n a liberalvein that deas and communicationatter hen hey re mostcongruentith xistingomestic alues nd nstitutions.'04

These examples emonstratehy t s essential o treatiberalisms a constanttheoreticalaselineagainstwhich ither ealist r constructivistypothesesre

100. DiMaggio 1988,10ff.101. Adler ndBarnett,orthcoming.102. Deutsch 957, 9-30, 36,66-69, 123-24.103. Onealet al. 1996,13.104. Forexample, eeRisse-Kappen996,365; Legro 1996;Johnston995;BurleyndMattli 993;

Moravcsik 995; ndSikkink 993.




tested-thats,as a fundamentalaradigmaticlternativen R.Failure ocontrolorunderlyingariationn state referencesas confoundedecentttempts,uantita-

tive and qualitative,o testmonocausal ealist heorynmany ther reas.Theseinclude hestudy f deterrence,egemonicnfluence,llianceformation,nterna-tional egotiation,nternationalonetaryooperation, ultilateralooperation,co-nomic anctions,ndEuropean ntegration.05Similar riticismsouldbe directedtfunctionalegimeheory; aseline redictionsbout heprecise orm ndthe ubse-quent onsequencesf nternationalegimes ouldbe derived romiberalheory.106Failure o do so posesa clear hreatovalid mpiricalnference.

Wealreadyee realistsndconstructivistsborrowing"iberal ypotheses,venwhere tundermineshe hard ore" of theories. ealist tephenWalt uggestshat"intentions"hould eincluded longside ower, roximity,ndoffense ominancein theirpecificationf "threat." onstructivistlexanderWendts inretreatromhis "holistic" r "top-down"laim hat tatedentitiesre deationallyonstructedby nteractionfstates not ocieties)within he nternationalystem. ow he ac-ceptsa viewheavilydependentn "unit-levelhanges n the structuref state-societyelations,"mbeddedndomesticaswell s international)nstitutions,hichleadshimto embrace henomena orwhichwell-establishediberal heories avelongprovided idely cceptedxplanations,or xample, he emocraticeace,U.S.

fear fnuclearweaponsnthehands frogue tates utnot emocraticllies, nd he"distinctivenessf theWest."07Theprognosis: nbiased estswouldvery ikelysupplant umerousccepted ealist,nstitutionalist,ndconstructivistxplanationsof tate ehavior ithiberal ccounts.

Inthe ongrun, omparativeheoryestinghould e aimed t a clearer efinitionof theempirical omainwithinwhich achmajor heory erformsest.Detailedpredictionsoncerninghese mpiricalomains obeyond he copeof this ssay,since hey equiressue-specificnalysis f at east hreeheories.We can nonethe-less conclude hat ft-citedeneralizationsbout he copeofrealismnd iberalism

need oberevisedundamentally.iberalheoryemainsmportant,ven rimary,vennwhat recurrentlyonsideredleast ikely" ases, or xample, here here xist irectthreatsonationalecurity,ighevels f nterstateonflict,nd arge umbersfnonliberalstates.herestatementroposedere ims ofacilitatempiricalesearchhat ouldmoveusbeyondheseimplisticssertionsbout he imitedxplanatoryomainf iberalheory.

Liberalismnd Theory ynthesis:hePriorityfPreferences

Thepreviousection emonstrateshat, s a monocausalheory,iberalismfferstheoreticallyoherentnd empiricallyromisinglternativeo realism nd nstitu-

105. See Fearon, orthcoming;alt 1987, 21-28; Baldwin 1985; and Moravcsik, orthcoming.ninstructivexamplesMartin, hofindsiberal nd nstitutionalistactorsobe so closely orrelatedhatquantitativenalysis annot istinguishhem-a result onsistent ith he xistencefpotentialor ig-nificantmittedariable ias;see Martin 992.

106. Martin 993.107. See Walt 987; lman 996, 3;Wendt 996, -4, , 11, 8-30, 3-40,109ff,28-33, 44ff,00ff.




tionalism,s well as toconstructivism.et t s not lways ppropriateoemploymonocausal heory.fforeign olicymakings a process fconstrainedhoiceby

purposive tates, view shared y realist,nstitutionalist,nd iberal heory,heremaywellbe cases nwhich combinationfpreferencesndconstraintshapes tatebehavior.n such ases, multicausalynthesis,ne that reats hese heoriesot ssubstitutesut s complements,s required.f so,what ynthetic odel hould rop-erly e employed? undamentalheorieshould eformulatedo as toprovide igor-ous means fdefiningheir roper elationshipo other heories.

Afourthmportantdvantagef his heoreticalestatements thattoffersclearerand more nternallyonsistent odelformulticausal heory ynthesisn IR thancurrentlyxists.tdoesso, moreover,yreversinghenearlyniversalresumption

amongR theoristshat liberalismmakes ense s anexplanatoryheory ithinheconstraintsointedutby .. Realism." 08Waltz, eohane,ndmany thers ecom-mend hatwe synthesizeheoriesy employingealism irstwith referencess-sumed obeinvariant)ndthenntroducingompetingheoriesfdomesticolitics,state-societyelations,ndpreferencehanges needed o xplainesidualariance.109

Yetthis onventionalrocedureacks ny oherent ethodologicalrtheoreticaljustification. ethodologically,heprocedure vertlyntroducesmitted ariablebiasby arbitrarilyrivilegingealist xplanationsfanyphenomenahatmight e

explained yboth ealist nd iberal heories, ithoutver estinghe atterxplana-tion.Theoretically,heprocedures groundedn an incoherentnderlyingodel.The assumption f state ationality,entral o realism, nstitutionalism,nd mostvariants f iberalism,ught oimply reciselyheopposite:Once we accept hatboth referencesnd onstraintsre ausallymportant,iberal heorynjoys nalyti-calprioritynany ynthesis.

Tosee why his sso andwhatt mplies,ne need nlynote hat he ssumptionfrationalityr purposive ehavior entral o realismlike the "bounded ationality"claims f nstitutionalism)mplies ction n the asisofa prior,pecific,ndconsis-

tent et fpreferences.nlessweknowwhat hese referencesre thats,unlessweknow he xtentowhich tates alue he nderlyingtakes),we cannot ssessrealistor nstitutionalistlaims inkingariationntheparticular eans vailable ostates(whetheroercive apabilitiesrinstitutions)n interstateonflictrcooperation.Preferenceseterminehenaturend ntensityf he ame hat tates replayingndthus re a primaryeterminantfwhich ystemicheorys appropriatend how tshould e specified. ariationnstate referencesftennfluencesheway nwhichstatesmake alculationsbout heirtrategicnvironment,hereas he onverse-that he trategicituationeadstovariationnstate references-isnconsistentiththerationalityssumptionhared yall three heories."10n short,iberaltheory

108. See Keohane1990,192; andMatthewndZacher1996, 6.109. See Waltz1989, 1996,57. There s "somethingarticularlyatisfyingbout ystemicxplana-

tions nd bout he tructuralorms f systemicnd tructural]xplanations";ee Keohane1986,193.110. To be sure, s someconstructivistsnd neofunctionalistsrgue, reverse ffectmight ccurby

feedback ver ime rom revious ecisions, ut uch dynamic rocess till resupposesnunderlyingliberal heoryf tate ction.




explainswhen nd why he ssumptionsbout tate referencesnderlyingealismor nstitutionalismold,whereashe everses not he ase. nsituationshere hese

assumptionso nothold, ealism nd nstitutionalismas wellas some variants fconstructivism)renot ustof imitedmportance,hey retheoreticallynappropri-ateandthus mpiricallyrrelevant.

Itfollowshatn nymulticausalynthesisith ealist nd nstitutionalistheory-that s,any nalysis hat emainspen othepossibilityhat ariationnstate refer-ences, swellas power nd nstitutions,ightnfluencetate olicy-liberal heoryenjoys ausal priority.tevenKrasner'swell-known etaphoraptureshis nsight:If institutionalismetermineshether overnmentseach hePareto-frontier,ndrealism etermineshich oint n the areto-frontierovernmentselect,iberalism

defineshe hape fthePareto-frontiertself."'I urelyhe atterask sprimary.hisconclusionhould ardlye surprisingo political cientists,or t s theunambigu-ous lesson f the lassic iteraturenthemethodologyf studyingower nd nflu-ence,whethern local communitiesrglobal politics.RobertDahl's analysis fpower eaches s thatwecannot scertain hetherA influenced todosomething"(thats,influence)nlesswe know"whatB wouldotherwiseo" (thats, prefer-ences)."12The implicationor ealism s clear:Not onlydo we needtoknowwhatstate referencesre, ut nless heyre rrayedo that ubstantialnterstateonflict

of nterestxists nd thedeploymentf capabilitieso achieve marginal ain sacceptable,ealistheoryspowerlessoexplain tate ehavior.imilarly,nstitution-alistexplanationsf suboptimalooperationre appropriatenlyunder ircum-stancesn which tates avean interestnresolvingarticularnterstateollectiveaction roblems. enneth yedraws he mplication:Whenyouobserve onflict,thinkeadlock-the absence fmutualnterest-beforeuzzlingverwhy mutualinterestas not ealized."13

The analyticalriorityf iberalisms not implyn abstractequirementftheo-retical onsistency;t s empiricallyignificant.4 Realists nd nstitutionalistslike

areretreatingowhatKeohaneterms "fall-back osition,"whereby xogenousvariationn theconfigurationf state nterestsefines herange fpossibleout-comes,within hichapabilitiesnd nstitutionsxplain utcomes."5Ihis mplicitlyconcedesnotusttheneed formulticausalynthesis,utthe nalytical riorityfliberal heory.

Thepopularityf the"fallback" ositionlsodefuses practicalbjectionftenraised gainst societal" r"domestic"heories,amelyhat esearchnto omesticpreferencess overly emanding,fnot mpossible. o be sure, he nvestigationfnationalmotivationsosesparticularhallenges. tatepreferencesust e clearlydistinguishedromtrategiesndtactics nd thenmust e inferreditheryobserv-

111. Krasner 993.112. See Dahl 1969;Coleman 990,132-35; andBaldwin 989,4.113. See Oye 1986, ; andMorrow 994.114. This s not oprejudge hetheriberal xplanationsrovide reaterr esser xplanatoryower,

which san empiricaluestion.115. Keohane1986,183.




ing consistentatternsfstate ehavior rby systematicallynalyzingtable le-mentsnternalostates,s revealedn decision-makingocuments,rustworthyral

historiesnd memoirs,atternsfcoalitional upport,ndthe tructuref domesticinstitutions."I6et he xistence f suchdifficultiesoesnot onstitutevalidreasonto neglect iberal heory. o respectable hilosophyf science ecognizeshediffi-culty f performingelevant mpiricalesearch ith urrentechniquess a legiti-mate eason oabandon promisingcientificaradigm.nstead, cientificechniqueandtraininghould djust-an argumentor horoughrainingn anguagesndpri-mary-sourcenalysis, s well as in rigorousheoriesfcomparativeolitics.More-over, he opularityfthe all-back ositionemonstrateshathedifficultyf scer-taining referencess notunique o iberalism.We have seenthat venmonocausalempiricalests frealist nd nstitutionalistheoriesmust ontroleliablyor aria-tion nunderlyingreferencesnotuststrategies)f states. hisrequiresreciselythe amedetailed esearchntodomesticolitics. ucha baseline ontrols,more-over,most eliablewhere acked y nexplicitndgeneralizableheoryfdomesticpreferenceormation,hat s, a liberal heory.nshort,esearchnto omestic refer-enceformations unavoidable.

Thepriorityf iberalismnmulticausal odels f state ehaviormplies,urther-more, hat ollective tate ehavior houldbe analyzed s a two-stagerocessof

constrainedocial choice.States irstefine references-a tage xplained y ib-eral heoriesfstate-societyelations.hen hey ebate, argain,rfighto particu-lar agreements-a econd tage xplained y realist nd nstitutionalistas wellasliberal)heoriesf trategicnteraction.'1The two-stage odel ffers generaltruc-ture orresearch esign ndtheoreticalxplanation.n those ases where iberalfactorsnly nfluencetrategicutcomes irectly,hroughreferencesndprefer-ence ntensitiesa inFigure ), iberalisman be tested s a monocausal ypothesisagainst lternativeealist r institutionalistactorsc inFigure1). Liberalfactorsmay lso influenceutcomesndirectly,ecause henaturefpreferenceselpsde-

termineb inFigure1) thenature ndstrengthf thecausalrelationshipetweenstrategicircumstancesnd actions c inFigure1). Recallthat referenceso notsimply hape utcomes,heyellus which ealist r nstitutionalistactorsre mpor-tant ndhowthey elate o statebehavior.n suchcases,explainingor at leastcontrollingor)variationnstate referencess analyticallyrior oan analysis fstrategicnteraction.ithoutpriornalysisfpreferences,nlymonocausalormu-lations frealistr nstitutionalistheoryan betested."18

The primacyf iberal heorynsuchmulticausalxplanations ay ppear obean abstractdmonition,etpreciselyhis wo-stagepproach as characterizedib-eraltheoryndpractice rom ant'sphilosophyothepracticalalculationsytheAmericanrchitectsfthe ost-World ar I settlement.hroughout,ulticausalr

116. On themethodologicaldvantagesf analyzing corporate" atherhan personal" ctors,eeColeman 990, 13,933ff.

117. See Morrow 988;Ruggie1982; ndLegro1996.1 8. WatsonndMcGaw1970, hap.15.




variables Liberalfact s Realist nd institutionalist

(ideational ommercial factorsandrepubali,an ,ial (distributionfcapabilitiesndrepublican ariants) adifrainyarn, ~~andnformation)

V (b) (c)

Stages ntheStatepreferencesprocess f

interstate (a) Strategicnteractioninteraction

Outcome lvariable Systemic utcomes

FIGURE 1. Atwo-stage odel f tate ehavior

two-stageiberalism akes enseof what ave ongbeenconsideredontradictionsandambiguitiesn classic iberal houghtndmodem iberal tatecraft.

ConsiderWilson's roposal or heLeague ofNations, ften ited s the pitomeof iberal legalism" nd"utopianism." t first lance,Wilson's roposal eems oreflect naive confidencen internationalnstitutions.nderstoods an implicitsocialscience heory,ot deology, e see that twas neithertopian or undamen-tallynstitutionalist.t rested nstead na pragmaticwo-stageiberal iew, nd tsfailure ctually onfirmsiberal redictions.

From he tart,Wilsonwas skeptical bout he utonomousnfluencef nterna-tional nstitutions.e cared ittle bout heir recise orm,ecauseheviewed hem

as no more han a symbolicffirmationf the rightness'fdemocraciesn theirmutual elations."19hus, or xample, is nitial raft ftheCovenantncluded oprovisionsor nternationalawora supranationalourt; othwere ventuallyddedonly t the nsistencefmore onservativeandmore ynical) oreignnddomesticpoliticians.nsteadwhathe termed he "firstoint" orememberbout heLeaguewas not nstitutionalistut iberal:tsmembershipastobe restrictedothose oun-triesnjoying epublican overnmentndnational elf-determination.nsofars theLeaguewas torely npublic pinion,twastobe solely emocraticublic pinion.

Based on a multicausaliberal nalysis,Wilson xplicitlydentifiedset fnarrow

preconditionsnderwhichollectiveecuritynstitutionsould ucceed. heLeague,heargued, ould unctionnlyfnationallyelf-determiningemocracy as a nearlyuniversalorm fgovernmentmong reat owers,whichnturnontrolledn over-whelming roportionfglobalmilitaryower.n 1917,Wilson elieved his itua-tion o be imminent:There re notgoing o be many ther inds f nations or

119. Holsti 991.187.




long.... TheHapsburgsndtheHohenzollernsrepermanentlyut fbusiness."20GivenWilson's nderlyingheory,s it surprisinghat heLeaguehadbecomemori-

bund y 1936, fter welve uropeanountries admoved romemocracyodicta-torship?r that his hiftsolated emocraticrance ndBritain,xacerbatingheiroft-notedeopoliticalilemmasnManchuriandAbyssinia? ereweagain ee thevirtue fdefiningiberal heoryn nonideological anner: hefailure f he eague,often ited s a realistefutationf iberaldeology,nfact onfirmsiberal R theory.

Multicausaliberalismelps o xplain ot nly mbitiouschemesor ooperationikecollectiveecurity,ut realist"olicyutcomesike ower alancingnd ipolaronflict.Kant, or xample,ecognizedhe alancefpowers anunstable,econd-bestechanismsuitablenlyo particularet f ircumstancesefinedy iberalheory,amelyelations

among onrepublicantates.ntheoreticalerms,ealism as embeddedn a deeperndmore ncompassingranshistoricaliberalheoryfsocialdevelopment.hebalance fpowererves o imit he vigorous.. rivalry"mong tates,ermittinghe rogressiveemergencef epublicanovernmentnd ommerceaswell s, houghlearlyecondary,internationalules), hich ouldn urnteadilyiminishhe elevancef nterstatealanc-ing.LikeWilson, ant emainedkepticalfstrongnternationalnstitutions,ocusinginsteadnthe evelopmentf ocietal references.'2'

A form f multicausaliberalismery imilar o that spoused y Kantunderlay

thepost-World ar I U.S. policy fcontainment-a olicy raditionallyreatedsthe mbodimentfrealism. ontainmentas never imply ower alancing.twasan ntegratedulticausaliberal randtrategy,s made xplicitfterWorldWar byWilson ndJohn ewey, hen fterWorldWar I byGeorgeKennan.Kennan,n thisregard liberal,inked heEuropean hreato thenature f theSovietregime; t soften orgottenhatnine-tenthsf theseminal X" articlewas givenover to ananalysis f Soviet domestic eliefs.'22 Westernmilitaryeterrent ould be re-quired, eargued, nly ntil heBolshevik evolutionadrun ts ourse,whereupontheSoviet ystem ould ollapseof tsown accord.Thus thedecisiveWesternc-

tionsn theColdWar, ccordingoKennan,were he econstructionfGermanyndJapan s capitalistemocracieshrougholicies iketheMarshall lan.Thegoalofthe olicywas the ransformationf ocialpurposesnd tate referencesnWesterncountries,eitherfwhichwould ssumemuchmportancena purelyealistnaly-sis.Thismulticausaliberalnterpretationf containmentanishes arious mbigu-ities nd ensionsnKennan's houghthat avebedeviled iographers-noteasthissingularynthesisfbalance-of-powerhinkingndstridentntimilitarism.'23

The conduct nd conclusion ftheColdWarproceeded recisely s Kennan'stwo-stageiberalmodelhadpredicted.ealist ower alancingervedhroughouts

120. See Wilson n Foley 1923, 64-65, see also 58-59, 64-65, 74-87, 147, 198-99;Kuehl 1969,340-44; Foley 1923,129;andWolfersndMartin 956,178.

121. Kant1991, 9, 92, 112-14.122. See Kennan 947; ndGellman 984,37, 83-105, 130-38.123. "To nearly veryonewith n opinion n the subject, t seemsplainthat here ave been two

GeorgeKennans.... Kennan heCold Warriorand]Kennan hepeacemonger,hedovish istorian";eeGellman 984,xiii.




a static,nterimnstrumentomaintainhe tatus uo,but hiftingtate referencesexplain heoutbreaknd eventual assing ftheconflict.y 1959,standingna

Moscow xhibitfkitchenware,ichard ixon ndNikita hrushcheveclared hattheColdWarwouldbe won and ostnot hroughelativemilitaryapabilities,utthroughhe relative conomicprowess nd ideological ttractivenessf the twosuperpowers.conomic tagnationnda measure f deological hangen theEastpredatedoreignolicy hange. f theWest, s Khrushchevashly romised, adbeenburied nder he uperiorconomic erformancef he ast, he utcomemightwellhavebeendifferent.'24

These examples emonstratehe bility fmulticausaliberal heoryo explaincriticalwentieth-centuryoreignolicy ecisions,uch s those akenn1918,1947,and1989, venwhennational ecuritynterestsrefullyngaged.'25ninterpretingsuchcases,themajordifferenceetween ealists nd liberals ies not, s is oftenclaimed,nthe bservationhat tates re concernedbout ecurityhreatsndbal-ancing; hisfindings consistent ith multicausaliberal xplanation. here hetwotheories enuinelyiffers onthe ources fsecurityhreatshemselves, ithrealiststtributinghem o particularonfigurationsfpower,nstitutionaliststtrib-utinghem o uncertainty,nd iberals ttributinghem o deological,nstitutional,andmaterialonflictmong tate references.f iberalheoryontributesoexplain-

ing orerealistases such s bipolar onflict,heres goodreason o believe hathemost owerfulnfluencesnworld olitics oday re not hedeploymentfmilitaryforcer he onstructionf nternationalnstitutions,ut he ransformationfdomes-tic ndtransnationalocialvalues,nterests,nd nstitutions.

Conclusion:The Virtues fTheoretical luralism

Liberal R theorys not implyn ideological oilformore ealisticndrigoroustheories,s itscriticslaim,nor n eclectic ollectionfhypothesesinked nlybycommon ntellectualistorynd normativeommitment,s itsproponentsre cur-rently orced o concede. t is instead logically oherent,heoreticallyistinct,empiricallyeneralizableocial scientificheory-one hat ollows romxplicits-sumptionsndgeneratesrich ange frelated ropositionsboutworld oliticshatreach ar eyondasesofcooperationmong minorityf iberal tates. yreformu-latingiberalisms theoryatherhan deology, e haverepeatedlyeen thatwhatareoften reateds liberal ailures ecome iberal redictions.

Moreover,iberalismxhibitsonsiderableotentialor heoreticalxtension.sidefrom hemyriad pportunitiesor mpiricalestingndtheoreticalefinementfspecific ypotheses,numberfbroader reas repoisedfor heoreticalnnovation.Relaxing he ssumptionfunitarytate ehaviorwould upport range f "two-

124. Jervis996.125. King,Keohane, ndVerba 994, 09-12.




level"hypothesesbout hedifferentialbility fvarious omestic tate ndsocietalactors opursue emiautonomousransnationalctivities. elaxing he ssumption

that ecisionmakings staticwould upportnalyses fchange ver ime.Greaterattentiono feedback rom rior ecisionsmediated y nterveningiberal actorslikedomesticdeas, nstitutions,nd nterests ight rovide irmer icrofoundationsfor heories f regimetabilitynd change-an area of potentialollaborationithconstructivistsndhistoricalnstitutionalists.inally,he ich nteractionmong o-mestic nd transnationaldeas, nterests,nd institutionss onlybeginningobeexplored.

A finalword othose eaderswho object o using he ermiberal o distinguishthis estatement.uchpotentialritics all nto wo groups.One groups likely ofind his ormulationf iberal heoryoonarrow,he ther oobroad.

The first roup fcritics illprotesthathis estatementails o acknowledgehefull ichnessf the ntellectualistorynd, nparticular,henormativemplicationsof liberalism.his criticisms correct,uttheomission s deliberate.hisarticledoes not im oprovide comprehensiventellectualistoryfclassical iberal nter-nationalhought,or self-sufficientuide othenormativevaluationfpolicy,utto distill coherentoreofsocialscientificssumptionsor henarrowerurpose fexplainingnternationalolitics.26 heprojects bestudgedon tsownterms-the

four riteriautlinednthe recedingection-not tsfidelityo prior sage.The second roup fcritics ill omplainhatiberalism as toomany efinitionsas itstands,most oovague obeuseful. omereject ltogetherheuse of "isms"todesignateoundationalheoreticalositionsn IR. Thiscriticisms semanticatherthan ubstantive.ncontrastoother undamentalivisions-forxample,hose e-tween omestic ndsystemiclevels ofanalysis," ptimisticndpessimisticrog-noses, r realist,iberal, ndMarxistdeologies-the ripartiteivision mong eal-ism,iberalism,nd nstitutionalismsfullyonsistentithhe oundationfrationalistsocial heory,hich ivides he eterminantsf ocialbehaviornto hreeategories:

interests,esources,nd nstitutionsr nformation.'27hosewhoview state ehav-ior s the esultfa process fconstrainedhoicewoulddo welltochampionatherthan riticizeffortso mpose reaterheoreticaloherencend onsistencyntheo-ries frational tate ehavior.

Either ype fcriticmaynonetheless refero call liberal heory "societal,""state-society,"socialpurpose,"r"preference-based"heory.he central laimsofthis rticle,owever,emainntact. irst,majorRtheorieshould e dividedntothose hat tress he atternfstate references,he istributionfresources,ndtheinstitutionalrovisionf nformation.econd, reaterriorityhould egiven othefurtherevelopmentfthe irstategory.hisdevelopmenteednot roceedd hoc,but anbeachieved ygroundinguch ffortsnthe ommonssumptionsnd ausalprocesses roposed ere.Only urtheresearchan reveal heirull mpiricalower;yet xistingtudies-fromxplanationsf hedemocraticeacetoendogenousariff

126. Nonetheless,he mpiricallaims dvanced erehavenormativemplications;eeDoyle 1997.127. Coleman 990.




theoryotheorieselating omesticnstitutionsnd deasto foreign olicy-suggestconsiderableromise. hird, liberal heoryf state referencess themost unda-

mental ype f R theory.ypotheseshat ndogenizehangesnstate referencesdeserve qualtreatmentnmonocausal xplanationsndanalytical riorityn multi-causal ones,because iberal heory efineshe heoreticalnd empirical omainsnwhich t s appropriateven o considerealist nd nstitutionalistlaims. hus hosewho gnoreiberal heoryo not imply acrifice omprehensiveness;hey nder-minevalidempirical valuation f their wn theories. nlyby building n thesethree onclusions an liberals nd their ritics upplant ebates ver abels withdebates verdata.

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6-1. Moravcsik Taking Preferences Seriously a Liberal Theory of International Politics

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