5.Title vs. Certificate of Title; Duty of LRA

7/30/2019 5.Title vs. Certificate of Title; Duty of LRA

1/7

1

CASTILLO vs. ESCUTIN

FACTS:

1. Petitioner is a judgment debtor of a certain Racquel K.Moratilla.

2. To satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner discoveredthat Racquel, her mother, Urbana and sister Perla, wereco-owners of a certain parcel of land, Lot 13713.

3. Petitioner sought verification of the ownership of the land.She was able to secure an Orded issued by DAR

converting certain several agricultural landholdings

including the lot co-owned by the Moratillas to residential,

commercial and recreational uses.

4. She was also able to get a certification from the CityAssessor of Lipa stating that the lot was covered by a

Tax Declaration under the names of the co-owners.

5. Lastly, the Register of Deeds of Lipa City issued aCertificate attesting that the lot was not covered by a

certificate of title whether judicial or patent or subject to

the issuance of a Certificate of Land Ownership Award or

patent under the CARP.

6. Petitioner then proceeded to levy on execution saidparcel of land.

7. Before the scheduled public auction, she learned that thelot was inside the Summit Point Golf and Country Club

Division owned by Summit realty. When she went to the

office of Summit Realty, its Vice-President, Orense, did

not show her any document to prove ownership of the

subject lot.

8. The public auction pushed through on May 14, 2002 andpetitioner bought Racquels 1/3 pro-indiviso share in the

said lot.

9. On June 4, 2002, petitioner had the sale recorded in theRegistry of Deeds of Lipa City in accordance with Act No.

3344.

10. Subsequently, petitioner was issued by the City Assessorof Lipa City Tax Declaration 00942-A over the property.

11. When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes forher share in the lot, she found out that, without giving her

notice, Tax Declaration 00942-A in her name was

cancelled.

12. The lot co-owned by the Moratillas was said to beencompassed and overlapping with Lot 1-B, covered by a

transfer certificate of title and a tax declaration under the

name of Francisco Catigbac.

13. The TCT in the name of Catigbac bore three entriesreflecting the supposed sale on July 22, 2002 of Lot 1-B

to Summit Realty by Leonardo Yagin who was issued a

special power of attorney by Catigbac to sell the land.

14. On July 25, 2002 at 2:30 pm, TCT No. 129642 in thename of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT No. T-134609

was issued in the name of Summit Realty in place

thereof. The Deed of Absolute Sale between Summit

Realty and Yagin was presented before and recorded by

the Register of Deeds of Lipa City at exactly the same

date and time TCT No. T-134609 was issued to Summit

Realty.

15.

Catigbacs property used to form a bigger parcel of land,Lot 1, covered by TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac.

16. After Catigbacs death, Lot 1 was subdivided and partsthereof were sold to different vendees.

17. Summit Reality acquired portions of Lot 1 identified asLot 1-B.

18. The owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 was lost.Subsequently, Summit Realty filed with the RTC of Lipa

City a Petition for the Issuance of New Owners Duplicate

of TCT No. 181 in Lieu of the Lost One.

19. The RTC then directed the issuance of a new ownersduplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac.

20. Summit Realty then requested the cancellation of TCTNo. 181 covering Lot 1 and the issuance of a new

certificate of title for Lot 1-B resulting to the issuance of

TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac which was later

on cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the

name of Summit Realty.

21. Petitioner questioned why, despite cancellation of TCTNo. 129642 in the name of Catigbac and the issuance in

its place of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit

Realty, it was the formed cancelled title which was used

as basis for cancelling petitioners Tax Declaration No.

00942-A.

22. After filing her complaint, petitioner attempted to have theSheriff Deed of Final Sale/Conveyance of her pro-

indiviso share in Lot 13713 registered with the Register of

Deeds of Lipa City and the annotation of her Affidavit of

Adverse claim on TCT No. T-134609 of Summit Realty.

23. However, respondent Escutin, denied petitionersrequest.

24. Petitioner then charged public respondend includingprivate respondents, Leviste and Orense, before the

Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for violation of RA

3019. Petitioner avers that respondents were negligent in

their administrative functions and impartial towardsSummit Realty for having cancelled her tax declaration

and issuing a TD in the name of Catigbac knowing that

the TCT of Catigbac was already cancelled and therefore

not entitled to a new tax declaration.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS:

Atty. Escutin, Register of Deeds of Lipa City


2/7

2

Escutin emphasized that in accordance with Section 56 of PD 1529

otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, his duty as

Register of Deeds was purely ministerial. If the document was legal

and in due form, and there was nothing mutilated or irregular on its

face, the Register of Deeds had no authority to inquire into its

intrinsic validity based upon proof aliunde. It was not true that he

allowed the registration of the Deed of Absolute Salenotwithstanding the absence of the required documents supporting

the application for registration thereof as all the required document

were submitted. Regarding the certification of the Register of

Deeds attesting that Lot 13713 was not covered by a certificate of

title, Escutin explained that the Register ofDeeds was not

technically equipped to determine whether a cadastral lot number

was within a titled property or not. Lastly, Escutin denied conspiring

or participating in the cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration for

the Register of Deeds was not concerned with the issuance or

cancellation of tax declarations.

Aquilina Mistas, Assistant City Assessor for Administration ofthe Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City

Mistas maintained that she was not the custodian of records of the

Office and she should not be held liable for the missing documents.

Her main function was control and management of all phases of

administrative matters andsupport. She had no hand in the

cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration and the issuance of

Catigbacs Tax Declaration for such function pertains to another

division which she had no authority whatsoever. Thus it was not

within her function to demand the presentation of certain

documents to support the cancellation of petitioners Tax

Declaration or to cause the annotation of petitioners interest inCatigbacs Tax Declaration.

Marietta Linatoc, Local Assessment Operation Officer II of the

Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City

With respect to the transfer of a tax declaration from one name to

another, her duty was limited only to the act of preparing a new tax

declaration and assigning it a number, in lieu of the cancelled tax

declaration. It was a purely ministerial duty. She had no authority to

demand the presentation of any document or question the validity

of the transfer. Neither was it within her jurisidiction to determine

whether petitioners interest should have been annotated inCatigbacs TD. The flow of the work mandated her to cancel

petitioners TD and to prepare and release Catgibacs TD after the

transfer has been reviewed and approved by other divisions of the

Office. It was also not true that the TCT under Catigbacs name

was already cancelled when it was presented before the Office of

the City Assessor.

Leviste, Executive VP of Summit Realty and Orense, VP of

Summit Realty

Summit Realty had every reason to believe that the property it

purchased from Yagin was indeed owned by Catigbac on the basis

of the latters Certificate of Title over the same. Catigbacs right as

registered owner of Lot 1-B under TCT No. 181/ No. 129642 was

superior to petitioners which was based on a mere tax declaration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cancellation of petitioners tax

declaration was a violation of Section 109 of PD No. 1529.

HELD:

The Petition at bar is without merit.

Petitioner invokes Section 109 of the Property, Registration

Decree which provides:

SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate

certificate. In case of loss or theft of an owners

duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall

be sent by the owner or by someone in his behalf to theRegister of Deeds of the province or city where the land

lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a

duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be

produced by a person applying for the entry of a new

certificate to him or for the registration of any new

instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or

destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other

person in interest and registered.

Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person

in interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing,

direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, whichshall contain a memorandum of the fact that it is issued in

place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all

respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original

duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all

purposes of this decree.

Petitioner argues that the RTC, in LRC Case No. 00-0376, only

ordered the issuance of a new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181 in

lieu of the lost one. However, respondents did not only issue a new

owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but also cancelled petitioners

Tax Declaration No. 00942-A and issued in its place Tax

Declaration No. 00949-A in the name of Catigbac. Respondents

did not even annotate petitioners existing right over 5,000 square

meters of Lot 1-B or notify petitioner of the cancellation of her Tax

Declaration No. 00942-A. Petitioner maintains that a new

owners duplicate of title is not a mode of acquiring

ownership, nor is it a mode of losing one. Under Section 109

of the Property Registration Decree, the new duplicate of title

was issued only to replace the old; it cannot cancel existing

titles.


3/7

3

Petitioners position on this issue rests on extremely tenuous

arguments and befuddled reasoning.

Before anything else, the Court must clarify that a title is different

from a certificate of title. Title is generally defined as the lawful

cause or ground of possessing that which is ours. It is that

which is the foundation of ownership of property, real or

personal.[40] Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that

which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or

which is the foundation of ownership of property.[41]

Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of

ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.[42] Under the

Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate

of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration;

or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original

registration.

Summit Realty acquired its title to Lot 1-B, not from the

issuance of the new owners duplicate of TCT No. 181, but

from its purchase of the same from Yagin, the attorney-in-fact

of Catigbac, the registered owner of the said property.

Summit Realty merely sought the issuance of a new owners

duplicate of TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac so that it

could accordingly register thereon the sale in its favor of a

substantial portion of Lot 1 covered by said certificate, later

identified as Lot 1-B. Catigbacs title to Lot 1-B passed on by

sale to Summit Realty, giving the latter the right to seek the

separation of the said portion from the rest of Lot 1 and the

issuance of a certificate of title specifically covering the same.

This resulted in the issuance of TCT No. 129642 in the name of

Catigbac, covering Lot 1-B, which was subsequently cancelledand replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit

Realty.

Petitioners reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration

Decree is totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the

issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way,

be related to the cancellation of petitioners tax declaration.

The cancellation of petitioners Tax Declaration No. 00942-A

was not because of the issuance of a new owners duplicate of

TCT No. 181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed

the 5,000 square meters petitioner lays claim to, was alreadycovered by TCT No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No.

129642) in the name of Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is

an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the

property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It

is binding and conclusive upon the whole world.[43] All

persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance of

the registration.[44] Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No.

129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the

ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax

declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already

covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac,

accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or

portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported

by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be

cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice

collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the

same property.

As between Catigbacs title, covered by a certificate of title,

and petitioners title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the

former is evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any

other certificate of title to the same property, conclusive and

indefeasible as to Catigbacs ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbacs

certificate of title is binding upon the whole world, including

respondent public officers and even petitioner herself. Time

and again, the Court has ruled that tax declarations and

corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to prove title to or

ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are not conclusive

evidence of the same.[45] Petitioner acquired her title to the5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor

who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration

to evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly

observed that, [c]uriously, as to how and when petitioners alleged

predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-

owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in

TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent.[46]

Petitioners allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot

1-B to Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbacs attorney-in-fact, arebeyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for

Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had

already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its

name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible

evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be

collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary

investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman for

Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree

categorically provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject

to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled

except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. For this

same reason, the Court has no jurisdiction to grant petitionersprayer in the instant Petition for the cancellation of TCT No. T-

134609 in the name of Summit Realty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Revie

is hereby DENIED.

GOMEZ vs. CA

FACTS:


4/7

4

1. Petitioners sought to register certain parcels of landbefore the CFI (now RTC) of Pangasinan.

2. The lots were among those involved in Government ofthe Philippine Islands vs. Abran where the Court declared

Consolacion M. Gomez as owner of certain lots.

3. Petitioners are the heirs of Teodoro Gomez (father ofConsolacion) who together with Consolacions son, LuisLopez, inherited from her the subject parcels of land.

4. Petitioners alleged that after the death of Teodoro, theybecame absolute owners thereof by virtue of a Quitclaim

executed in their favor by Luis Lopez.

5. On August 5, 1981, the court rendered its decisionadjudicating the subject lots in petitioners favor.

6. On October 6, 1981, the court issued an order statingthat the August 5, 1981 decision of the court has become

final and executory and directed the Chief of the General

Land Registration Office to issue the corresponding

decrees of registration over the lots.

7. Silverio Perez, the Chief of the Division of OriginalRegistration, Land Registration Commission (now the

National Land Titles and Deeds Registration

Administration), submitted a report to the court a quo

stating that several parcels of land which sought to be

registered by the petitioners were already covered by

homestead patents issued in 1928 and 1929 and

registered under the Land Registration Act. He

recommended that the decision of August 5, 1981 and

the order of October 6, 1981 be set aside,

8. On March 25, 1985, the lower court set aside its August 5decision and October 6 order.

9. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamuswith the SC which in turn referred the same to the CA.

10. CA dismissed the petition stating that prior to theissuance of the decree of registration, the respondent

Judge has still the power and control over the decision

he rendered. The finality of an adjudication of land in a

registration or cadastral case takes place only after the

expiration of the one year period after entry of the final

decree of registration. When the respondent Judge

amended his decision after the report of the respondent

officials of the Land Registration Office had shown that

homestead patents had already been issued on some ofthe lots, respondent cannot be faulted because land

already granted by homestead patents can no longer be

the subject of registration.

11. Having been denied their motion for reconsideration,petitioners came to this Court.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONERS:

Since the decision of August 5, 1981 has long been final and

executory it may no longer be reopened, reviewed or set aside.

They anchor their claim on Section 30 of PD 1529 which provides

that after judgment has become final and executory, the court shall

forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land Registration

for the issuance of a decree of registration and certificate of title.

Petitioners contend that Section 30 must be read in consonance

with Section 32 of PD 1529 which provides that once the judgment

becomes final and executory under Section 30, the decree ofregistration must issue as a matter of course.

ISSUES:

1. Whether respondnent Judge has jurisdiction to set asidethe August 5, 1981 decision and October 6, 1981 order

2. Whether or not respondents from the Land RegistrationCommission have no other alternative but to issue a

decree of registration pursuant to the August 5, 1981

decision and October 6, 1981 order, their duties being

ministerial.3. Whether or not the decision in Government of the

Philippine Islands vs. Abran is the law of the case which

held that lands adjudicated to Consolacion Gomez were

not public lands and therefore could not be acquired

through homestead patents.

HELD:

1. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land ina cadastral or land registration proceeding does not

become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until

after the expiration of the 1 year period after the entryof the final decree of registration. As long as a final

decree has not been entered by the Land

Registration Commission (now the NLTDRA) and the

period of 1 year has not elapsed from the date of

entry of such decree, the title is not finally

adjudicated and the decision in the registration

proceeding continues to be under the control and

sound discretion of the court rendering it.

2. Petitioners contend that the report of respondent SilverioPerez should have been submitted to the court a quo

before its decision became final. But were we to sustain

this argument, we would be pressuring respondent landregistration officials to submit a report or study even if

haphazardly prepared just to beat the reglementary

deadline for finality of the court decision. Thus, the duty

of respondent land registration officials to render

reports is not limited to the period before the courts

decision becomes final but may extend even after its

finality but not beyond the lapse of one (1) year from

the entry of decree.


5/7

5

Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land

registration officials to issue the decree is purely

ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act

under the orders of the court and the decree must be

in conformity with the decision of the court and with

the data found in the record, and they have no

discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubtupon any point in relation to the preparation and

issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the

matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as

officials of the court and not as administrative

officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are

specifically called upon to "extend assistance to

courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration

proceedings.

3. A reading of the pertinent and dispositive portions of the

aforesaid decision will show, however, that the lots earlier

covered by homestead patents were not included among thelands adjudicated to Consolacion M. Gomez.

The report of respondent land registration officials states that

the holders of the homestead patents registered the lots in

question in the years 1928 and 1929. The decision in

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abran was

promulgated on 31 December 1931. Hence, the subject lots are

specifically excluded from those adjudicated by the aforesaid

decision to Consolacion M. Gomez.

It is a settled rule that a homestead patent, once registered under

the Land Registration Act, becomes indefeasible andincontrovertible as a Torrens title, and may no longer be the

subject of an investigation for determination or judgment in

cadastral proceeding.

The aforecited case of Government vs. Abran, therefore, is not "the

law of the case", for the lots in question were not private lands of

Consolacion M. Gomez when homestead patents were issued over

them in 1928-1929.

ANGELES vs. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

FACTS:

1. On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of

them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion

Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional

share in the parcels of land commenced a special civil action for

partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as

Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on

April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City.

2. Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer

Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate.

They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was

registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage

Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals, reiterated in Heirs of Luis J.

Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals, the Court held that OCT No. 994

dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title byvirtue of the prior registration rule.

3. The RTC issued an Order granting the partition and accounting

prayed for by plaintiffs and directed the respective Registers of

Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer

certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including

petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land and ordered that said

parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court and

the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their

respective interests in the property.

4. The Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City

refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still

awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding.

5. The LRA Administrator through a letter-reply informed counsel of

petitioner that the request cannot be granted because the 1 st

Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 issued by then DOJ

Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11

issued to all Registers of Deeds disclosed that as a result of the

inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee

(created under DOJ Department Order No. 137), there is a finding

that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal

Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919).

6. The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee

Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on

Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the

following findings:

i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and

this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]

ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent.

7. The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and

was being kept in the LRA to prevent its alteration and tampering.

CONTENTION OF PETITIONER

Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st

Indorsement,[13] made a substantive modification of the ruling

made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis

Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that [n]ot even

the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or

alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land.

According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed to have


6/7

6

made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which

was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and

not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions

of this Court on what is the valid OCT No. 994. Petitioner

contends that [t]he rule is well settled that once a decision

becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less

set aside the same and that respondent Guingona usurped judicialfunctions and did a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no

effect. Petitioner further alleges that compliance with a final judicial

order is a purely ministerial duty.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT

Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ

Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a

committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the

Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the

complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by

the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions

involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was

tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry.

Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the

purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding

investigation was merely administrative to formulate and

recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the

DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other

agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the

proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the

Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committees report

dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsementwhich spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action

which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only with

respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the

Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title

as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an

administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it

altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court.

CONTENTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENTS

Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are

not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint forpartition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs

and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion

Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994,

and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership,

and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI

to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to

deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of

the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the

result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office

of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that

petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of

new transfer certificates of title in their names.

ISSUE: whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to

perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer

certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case

No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and

enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the

issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents.

HELD:

We find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse

compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of

them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie

and the petition must be dismissed.

It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the

performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel

the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issueto enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a

substantial doubt exists.

Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to

refuse to grant petitioners request?

As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the

issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not

a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such

would result to the double titling of the same parcel of

land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which

involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the

Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to

comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer

certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and

there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for

the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA

Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the

Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit

in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his

letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by

respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate

Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant

petitioners request.[31] There was, therefore, sufficient basis

for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC

Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents,

that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and

her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights,

did not exist.

The controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the

question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally

laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994,
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn31http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn31


7/7

7

such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions

set forth in said resolutions.

As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on

previous cases decided by this Court[34]which have held that there

are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from

which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derivedtheir rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior

title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand

on.

Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT

No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually

exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the

2007 Manotokcase:

First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As itappears on the record, that mother title wasreceived for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3 May 1917, and that should bethe date which should be reckoned as thedate of registration of the title. It may also beacknowledged, as appears on the title, thatOCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of thedecree of registration on [19] April 1917,although such date cannot be considered asthe date of the title or the date when the titletook effect.

Second. Any title that traces itssource to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917is void, for such mother title is inexistent.

The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles madespecific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated[19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity ofsuch titles since they refer to an inexistentOCT. x x x.

Third. The decisions of this Courtin MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzagav. Court of Appeals cannot apply to thecases at bar, especially in regard to theirrecognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19April 1917, a title which we nowacknowledge as inexistent. Neither could

the conclusions in MWSSorGonzaga withrespect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April1917 bind any other case operating underthe factual setting the same as or similar tothat at bar.[36] (Emphases supplied.)

To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and

Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the

2007 Manotokcase, this Court constituted a Special Division of the

Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand

Thus, in the 2009 Manotokcase, this Court evaluated the

evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the

latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and it s

subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding

that there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which

had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April

1917 and categorically concluded that OCT No. 994 whichreflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null

and void.

It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of

a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed

for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings

quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit

earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.

The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the

writ ofmandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we

dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DISMISSED.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/march2010/142549.htm#_ftn34

5.Title vs. Certificate of Title; Duty of LRA

Documents

Transcript of 5.Title vs. Certificate of Title; Duty of LRA