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    The Challenge of

    Biometrics

    AJ Tech TeamHyd.

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    Proposition

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    Agenda Biometrics some definitions

    Technical background

    What are the issues?

    Solutions?

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    Definition - 1 a general term for technologies that

    permit matches between a live digital

    image of a part of the body and a

    previously recorded image of the same

    part usually indexed to personal or

    financial information(Alterman - 2003)

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    Definition - 2 measuring relevant attributes of living

    individuals or populations to identify active

    properties or unique characteristics(Mordini - 2004)

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    Definition 3 (mine!) unique physical characteristic capable of being

    matched automatically

    possible to match at acceptably low rates oferror

    possible to perform automatic one-to-manyidentification matching, with a high accuracy(near 100%) against a reference database

    consisting of tens or hundreds of millions ofrecords;

    accepted in a court of law as a legal proof ofidentity

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    Authentication Identification selection of one from many

    e.g. fingerprints from a crime scene

    Verification I am who I claim to be e.g.

    passports or ID cards

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    The Technologies - Types Fingerprints

    Hand/Finger geometry

    Voice print

    Signatures

    Facial Recognition

    Vein Patterns

    Iris Recognition

    Retina Scans DNA

    Others

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    The Technologies - Concepts

    Generic method

    Accuracy

    General concerns

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    Generic Method - Enrolment Measure

    Generate template

    Record

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    Generic Method - Operation

    Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society (2005)

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    Accuracy?

    Biometric Product Testing: Final report, Issue 1.0 (2001): CESG/BWG

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    Performance Improvements

    - Facial Recognition

    Phillips et al. FRVT 2006 and ICE 2006 Large-Scale Results. (2007)

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    7Pillars of(biometric) Wisdom

    Universality

    Uniqueness

    Permanence Collectability

    Performance

    Acceptability Circumvention

    EC report: Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society (2005)

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    7Pillars of(biometric) Wisdom

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    The Technologies - Challenges Spoofing / Mimicry / Residual Images

    Usability

    Accessibility

    Hygiene

    Safety

    Secondary use

    Public Perception

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    DNA Physical sample required

    Slow to process

    Lowest FAR & FRR

    FTE & FTA of 0%

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    DNA Uniqueness?

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    97% were happy to include a photograph

    79% fingerprints

    62% eye recognition (no distinction was made

    between iris and retina scans)

    41% approved of the inclusion ofDNA details

    Hiltz, Han, Briller. Public Attitudes towards a National Identity "Smart Card:" Privacy and

    Security Concerns (2003)

    DNA Acceptability?

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    DNA Foolproof? Scene of crime samples in particular may be

    contaminated, degraded, and misinterpreted(especially if mixed). Human errors (e.g. samplemix-ups) will occur.

    Need for corroborating evidence.

    Expanding databases could lead to an over-reliance on cold hits.

    Increased potential for framing of suspects? The forensic use of Bioinformation: ethical issuesNuffield Council on Bioethics (2007)

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    Privacy Assessment - 1

    Overt1. Are users aware of the system's

    operation?Covert

    Optional 2. Is the system optional or mandatory? Mandatory

    Verification3. Is the system used for identification

    or verification?Identification

    Fixed Period 4. Is the system deployed for a fixedperiod of time?

    Indefinite

    Private Sector5. Is the deployment public or private

    sector?Public Sector

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    Privacy Assessment - 2Individual,

    Customer6. In what capacity is the user

    interacting with the system?

    Employee,

    Citizen

    Enrollee7. Who owns the biometric information?

    Institution

    Personal

    Storage 8. Where is the biometric data stored?

    Database

    Storage

    Behavioral 9. What type of biometric technology is

    being deployed?

    Physiological

    Templates 10. Does the system utilize biometric

    templates, biometric images, or both?

    Images

    InternationalBiometric Group www.bioprivacy.org

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    Risk Assessment - DNAPositive Privacy

    Aspects

    Negative Privacy

    Aspects

    Bioprivacy Technology

    Risk Rating

    Currently slow and

    complex to process

    Analysis device nonportable

    Unchanging over

    subjects whole lifetime

    Use in forensicapplications

    Strong identification

    capabilities

    Not unique for identical

    twins

    Samples can be

    collected without

    consent/knowledge

    Possible to extract

    additional genetic

    information

    Identification: H

    Covert: H

    Physiological: HImage: H

    Databases: H

    Risk Rating: H

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    Legal Background Enabling Legislation

    Constraints

    Uses and Abuses

    Challenges

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    Enabling Legislation NDNAD's

    UK 3.8 million samples by Jan 2007(6%)

    Canada

    Australia

    NZ

    USA

    Prum: Member States shall open and keep nationalDNA analysis files for the investigation of criminal

    offences

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    Constraints Privacy

    Human Rights

    US Constitution

    Common Law

    Privacy Acts

    Data Protection Law

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    Challenges UK via HRA 1998 Articles 8 and/or 14

    R v Marper now at ECHR (27 Feb 2008)

    US via 4thAmendment

    US v Kincade

    Johson v Quander

    Canada via s.8 of CCRF

    R v Rodgers

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    Uses and Abuses Collection and Retention

    Forensic DNAD's

    OtherDNAD's

    Data Sharing

    Privacy Challenges

    Evidence

    Scope Creep

    Ethics - What is identity?

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    Conclusion ID fraud becomes worse if there is a single

    strong identifier

    Biometrics do not offer non-repudiation

    Biometrics should be confined to smart

    cards or encrypted if on databases

    Biometrics are useless once compromised