5923363
-
Upload
ayush-vardhan-babu -
Category
Documents
-
view
223 -
download
0
Transcript of 5923363
-
8/7/2019 5923363
1/29
The Challenge of
Biometrics
AJ Tech TeamHyd.
-
8/7/2019 5923363
2/29
Proposition
-
8/7/2019 5923363
3/29
Agenda Biometrics some definitions
Technical background
What are the issues?
Solutions?
-
8/7/2019 5923363
4/29
Definition - 1 a general term for technologies that
permit matches between a live digital
image of a part of the body and a
previously recorded image of the same
part usually indexed to personal or
financial information(Alterman - 2003)
-
8/7/2019 5923363
5/29
Definition - 2 measuring relevant attributes of living
individuals or populations to identify active
properties or unique characteristics(Mordini - 2004)
-
8/7/2019 5923363
6/29
Definition 3 (mine!) unique physical characteristic capable of being
matched automatically
possible to match at acceptably low rates oferror
possible to perform automatic one-to-manyidentification matching, with a high accuracy(near 100%) against a reference database
consisting of tens or hundreds of millions ofrecords;
accepted in a court of law as a legal proof ofidentity
-
8/7/2019 5923363
7/29
Authentication Identification selection of one from many
e.g. fingerprints from a crime scene
Verification I am who I claim to be e.g.
passports or ID cards
-
8/7/2019 5923363
8/29
The Technologies - Types Fingerprints
Hand/Finger geometry
Voice print
Signatures
Facial Recognition
Vein Patterns
Iris Recognition
Retina Scans DNA
Others
-
8/7/2019 5923363
9/29
The Technologies - Concepts
Generic method
Accuracy
General concerns
-
8/7/2019 5923363
10/29
Generic Method - Enrolment Measure
Generate template
Record
-
8/7/2019 5923363
11/29
Generic Method - Operation
Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society (2005)
-
8/7/2019 5923363
12/29
Accuracy?
Biometric Product Testing: Final report, Issue 1.0 (2001): CESG/BWG
-
8/7/2019 5923363
13/29
Performance Improvements
- Facial Recognition
Phillips et al. FRVT 2006 and ICE 2006 Large-Scale Results. (2007)
-
8/7/2019 5923363
14/29
7Pillars of(biometric) Wisdom
Universality
Uniqueness
Permanence Collectability
Performance
Acceptability Circumvention
EC report: Biometrics at the Frontiers: Assessing the Impact on Society (2005)
-
8/7/2019 5923363
15/29
7Pillars of(biometric) Wisdom
-
8/7/2019 5923363
16/29
The Technologies - Challenges Spoofing / Mimicry / Residual Images
Usability
Accessibility
Hygiene
Safety
Secondary use
Public Perception
-
8/7/2019 5923363
17/29
DNA Physical sample required
Slow to process
Lowest FAR & FRR
FTE & FTA of 0%
-
8/7/2019 5923363
18/29
DNA Uniqueness?
-
8/7/2019 5923363
19/29
97% were happy to include a photograph
79% fingerprints
62% eye recognition (no distinction was made
between iris and retina scans)
41% approved of the inclusion ofDNA details
Hiltz, Han, Briller. Public Attitudes towards a National Identity "Smart Card:" Privacy and
Security Concerns (2003)
DNA Acceptability?
-
8/7/2019 5923363
20/29
DNA Foolproof? Scene of crime samples in particular may be
contaminated, degraded, and misinterpreted(especially if mixed). Human errors (e.g. samplemix-ups) will occur.
Need for corroborating evidence.
Expanding databases could lead to an over-reliance on cold hits.
Increased potential for framing of suspects? The forensic use of Bioinformation: ethical issuesNuffield Council on Bioethics (2007)
-
8/7/2019 5923363
21/29
Privacy Assessment - 1
Overt1. Are users aware of the system's
operation?Covert
Optional 2. Is the system optional or mandatory? Mandatory
Verification3. Is the system used for identification
or verification?Identification
Fixed Period 4. Is the system deployed for a fixedperiod of time?
Indefinite
Private Sector5. Is the deployment public or private
sector?Public Sector
-
8/7/2019 5923363
22/29
Privacy Assessment - 2Individual,
Customer6. In what capacity is the user
interacting with the system?
Employee,
Citizen
Enrollee7. Who owns the biometric information?
Institution
Personal
Storage 8. Where is the biometric data stored?
Database
Storage
Behavioral 9. What type of biometric technology is
being deployed?
Physiological
Templates 10. Does the system utilize biometric
templates, biometric images, or both?
Images
InternationalBiometric Group www.bioprivacy.org
-
8/7/2019 5923363
23/29
Risk Assessment - DNAPositive Privacy
Aspects
Negative Privacy
Aspects
Bioprivacy Technology
Risk Rating
Currently slow and
complex to process
Analysis device nonportable
Unchanging over
subjects whole lifetime
Use in forensicapplications
Strong identification
capabilities
Not unique for identical
twins
Samples can be
collected without
consent/knowledge
Possible to extract
additional genetic
information
Identification: H
Covert: H
Physiological: HImage: H
Databases: H
Risk Rating: H
-
8/7/2019 5923363
24/29
Legal Background Enabling Legislation
Constraints
Uses and Abuses
Challenges
-
8/7/2019 5923363
25/29
Enabling Legislation NDNAD's
UK 3.8 million samples by Jan 2007(6%)
Canada
Australia
NZ
USA
Prum: Member States shall open and keep nationalDNA analysis files for the investigation of criminal
offences
-
8/7/2019 5923363
26/29
Constraints Privacy
Human Rights
US Constitution
Common Law
Privacy Acts
Data Protection Law
-
8/7/2019 5923363
27/29
Challenges UK via HRA 1998 Articles 8 and/or 14
R v Marper now at ECHR (27 Feb 2008)
US via 4thAmendment
US v Kincade
Johson v Quander
Canada via s.8 of CCRF
R v Rodgers
-
8/7/2019 5923363
28/29
Uses and Abuses Collection and Retention
Forensic DNAD's
OtherDNAD's
Data Sharing
Privacy Challenges
Evidence
Scope Creep
Ethics - What is identity?
-
8/7/2019 5923363
29/29
Conclusion ID fraud becomes worse if there is a single
strong identifier
Biometrics do not offer non-repudiation
Biometrics should be confined to smart
cards or encrypted if on databases
Biometrics are useless once compromised