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58th Army (III Formation) (1995-present)

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Active 1941 - current CountrySoviet Union, Russia Branch Red Army,Russian Ground Forces

Type Field army

Size several corps or divisions Part ofNorth Caucasus Military District

Garrison/HQ Vladikavkaz

Engagements1940-1944 Chechnya insurgency,

Second Chechen War, South OssetianCrisis Commanders Notable

commanders General-Colonel Anatoliy

Nogovitsin

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58th Army The 58th Army is a field army; first of the

Soviet Union's Red Army andsubsequently (since 1995) of theRussian Ground Forces.

It was first formed in theSiberian Military District in November

1941, including the 362nd, 364th, 368th,370th, 380th, and 384th Rifle Divisionsand the 77th Cavalry Division and movedto the Archangelsk Military District, butthen the Army was redesignated the3rd Tank Army in May 1942. It wasreestablished within the Kalinin Front in

June 1942, and in July included the 16th

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World War II

It was reformed in theTranscaucasian Frontfrom the 24th Army on August 28 1942, underGeneral Khomenko of the NKVD. Much of itssenior cadre also came from the NKVD, andamong its missions was to keep order in theCaucasus, particularly in the Groznyi andMakhachkala regions.[2] This was because of aChechen rising that had gone on since 1941(see 1940-1944 Chechnya insurgency). 58thArmy later joined the North Caucasus Front. On

1 November 1942 it consisted of the 271st and416th Rifle Divisions, and the MakhachkalaDivision of the NKVD.[3] Prior to the NorthCaucasus Front putting its main effort into theKerch-Elti en O eration November 1943 the

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Second Chechen War

The headquarters was reformed in1995 in the North Caucasus MilitaryDistrict from the 42nd Army Corps at

Vladikavkaz.During the Second Chechen War, theArmy was commanded by General

Vladimir Shamanov

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2008 Ossetia War

On 4 August 2008, five battalions ofthe Russian 58th Army commandedby General-Colonel Anatoliy

Nogovitsin were moved to thevicinity ofRoki Tunnel that linksSouth Ossetia with North Ossetia[6].

On 8 August 2008 [7][8][9] the Armymoved to South Ossetia and engagedin combat with Georgian forces in

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Order of Battle, 2003 The Army operates in a close coordination with the

4th Air Force and Air Defence Army of the district, andincludes:

19th Motor Rifle Division - Vladikavkaz

205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade- Budenovsk

136th Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade- Buynaksk,Dagestan

135th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment- Prochladny,Kabardino-Balkaria

291st Separate Artillery Brigade- Maikop- (equipped with2A65)

943rd Multiple Rocket Launcher Regiment Krasnooktabrsky(Uragan 220mm MRL)

1128th Anti-Tank Regiment- Maikop 67th Separate Anti-Aircraft Rocket Brigade (SAM)- Volgograd

area (SA-11 'Buk' SAM)

487th Separate Helicopter Regiment (Mi-8/Mi-24)- Budenovsk

11th Separate Engineer Regiment- Kavkazskay 234th Separate Signals Regiment Vladikavkaz

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Structure 58th

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( )black sea naval

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,

. ,

. 1x2 130-

AK-130, 6 6-30- -630

16 (16 -1000 ) 8x8

-204 - -

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""-16 -500, 500 ,

- "" (68 ), -130 - 25 ,

- "-" (2 ) 10-15 , 2 , 6 -630, 30 , 5,

, 1

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gemebi

- .

- " " "

-

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TU-22 Blinder

G l h i i

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General characteristics

Bomber:

Crew: three - pilot, navigator, weapons officer

Length: 41.60 m (136 ft 5 in)

Wingspan: 23.17 m (76 ft 0 in)

Height: 10.13 m (33 ft 3 in)

Wing area: 162 m (1,742 ft)

Empty weight: kg (lb)

Loaded weight: 85,000 kg (187,390 lb)

Max takeoff weight: 92,000 kg (202,400 lb)

Powerplant: 2 Dobrynin RD-7M-2 turbojets Dry thrust: rated 107.9 kN (24,250 lbf) each

Thrust with afterburner: 161.9 kN (36,376 lbf) each

Performance

Maximum speed: 1,510 km/h (938 mph, Mach 1.42)

Range: 4,900 km (3,045 mi) Service ceiling: 13,300 m (40,540 ft)

Rate of climb: m/s (ft/min)

Wing loading: 525 kg/m (107 lb/ft)

Thrust/weight: 0.38

Armament

Guns: 1 AM-23 23 mm cannon in tail turret

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76th Airborne DivisionR i

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Active September 1, 1939

present Country Soviet Union Russia

Branch Airborne TroopsType Paratroopers

Role Parachute Infantry Size 6-8,000

Garrison/HQ PskovEngagements World War II

Soviet-Afghan War

First Chechen WarSecond Chechen War2008 South Ossetia war

Th 76th G d Ai b Di i i (76

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The 76th Guards Airborne Division (76- - ) is an airborne division ofthe Russian Airborne Troops based in Pskov. Itoriginally formed as the 157th Rifle Division in 1939.On 1 Mar 1943 it became the 76th Guards RifleDivision. It fought at Chernigov, Odessa, Brest, andDanzig. With 70th Army of the 2nd Belorussian FrontMay 1945. Soon after the war it became an airbornedivision, by 1946 as part of the 15th Airborne Corps.

The 76th Division originally had three regiments, the104th, 234th, and 237th, with the 237th GuardsAirborne Regiment disbanded circa 2002.

After an experimental period, the 104th ParachuteRegiment of the 76th Airborne Division became the

first Russian ground forces regiment that was fullycomposed of professional soldiers (and not of"srochniki" - the conscripted soldiers aged eighteen).

Elements of the 104th Regiment were ambushed inChechneya in March 2000.

In 2008 the 76th Airborne Division was involved in

U i 2009

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Units 2009

76th Guards Airborne Division in Pskov 23rd Guards Airborne Regiment in Pskov (newly

raised regiment) 104th Guards Airborne Regiment in Cherekha

234th Guards Airborne Regiment in Pskov

1140th Guards Artillery Regiment in Pskov

4th Air Defence Regiment in Pskov 107th Air Defence Regiment in Pskov

165th Air Defence Battalion in Donskoy (fromdisbanded 106th Guards Airborne Division)

656th Engineer Battalion in Pskov 728th Signal Battalion in Pskov

7th Maintenance Battalion in Pskov

242nd Military Transport Aviation Squadron in

Pskov

h i b i i i

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98th Airborne Division

A ti D b 1943

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Active December 1943

present Country Soviet Union/Russian Federation Branch Soviet, laterRussian Airborne Troops

Type Division

Role Airborne force Part ofRussian Airborne Troops

Garrison/HQ Ivanovo

Engagements World War II2008 South Ossetia war

Th 98th G d Ai b Di i i (98

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The 98th Guards Airborne Division (98- - ) isan airborne division of the

Russian Airborne Troops, stationed in Ivanovo. Ittook part in the 2008 war against Georgia. During the Second World War, the formation

began its existence as the 98th Guards RifleDivision. It incorporated 296th Guards Rifle

Regiment (formerly the 18th Independent GuardsAirborne Brigade), 299th GRR (fmr 19 IGAB),302nd GRR (fmr 20 IGAB). Formed in December1943-January 1944 at Demitrov in theMoscow Military District.[1] It was part of the 37th

Guards Airborne Corps, 9th Guards Army on theKarelian front (May 1944), on the Svir river (June1944) and near Budapest in February 1945. Thedivision ended the war near Prague.

Today, its two regiments, the 217th and 299th,are stationed near the Ivanovo Severny military-

U it 2009

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Units 2009

98th Guards Airborne Division in Ivanovo 137th Guards Airborne Regiment in Ryazan

(from disbanded106th Guards Airborne Division)

217th Guards Airborne Regiment in Ivanovo

331st Guards Airborne Regiment in Kostroma

1065th Guards Artillery Regiment in Kostroma

318th Air Defence Battalion in Ivanovo

661st Engineer Battalion in Ivanovo 674th Signal Battalion in Ivanovo

15th Maintenance Battalion in Ivanovo

243rd Military Transport Aviation Squadron inIvanovo

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45th SeparateR nn i n R im nt

A ti 1994

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Active 1994

present Country Russia

Branch Airborne Troops (directsubordination)GRU (operational subordination)

Type Paratroopers

Role Special operations and reconnaissance

Garrison/HQ Kubinka, Moscow Oblast

Engagements Second Chechen War War in South Ossetia

45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment of VDV

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45th Detached Reconnaissance Regiment ofVDV(Russian: 45- or 45- )is an airborne regiment of theRussian Airborne Troops based in Moscow.

It was raised in 1994 on the base of 901st DetachedLanding Assault Battalion (Raised in 1979) and 218thDetached Battalion for Special Operations ofVDV,raised in 1992. Warfare.ru attributes to it 690personnel with 15 BTR-80, and 1 BTR-D; the 218thBattalion is homebased in Sokolniki.

The unit is part of the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV)and directly subordinated to VDV Headquarters.However it is also operationally subordinate to theGRU.

The Regiment fought in the First andSecond Chechen Wars, and in 1994 it fought forDolinsky, Argun, and Groznyy, sending 400 personnel,of which losses were 43 personnel, including 15

Critical Assessment of Russian Military Campaign

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Critical Assessment of Russian Military CampaignBy Igor Dzhadan, Agentstvo Politicheskikh

Novostey 14/8/08Aug 18, 2008 - 4:09:21 PM

We admit that we vacillated, is it worthwhile to initiate

a conversation about the problems, when the bodies ofthe deceased soldiers and victims of the Georgianaggression have not yet been interred. But we stilldecided not to put it off and to raise a number of

serious questions already now.It doesn't make sense to delay the "post-flight analysis"precisely because the obvious success of the military

operation is present.The findings can be interesting to all people, who are

interested in Russia's victory in the information

level of equipment of the Russian soldiers

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level of equipment of the Russian soldiersand the enemy.Beginning with the uniforms: Russiansoldiers do not have a standard uniform and

are frequently dressed in whatever isavailable. But then again, the matterconcerns not only the soldiers of the lineunits but also the elite - Spetsnaz (special

forces), who are dressed in uniforms ofvarious generations, from Soviet to thenewest, which began to enter the troops justlast year.If you compare the current situation with the

diverse nature of Russian soldiers' clothingof the times of the first and second Chechencampaigns, no progress whatsoever hasbeen noted in this regard, except that the

"imitation-leather boots" have finally ceasedto exist. And reall the militar uniform -

The servicemen often appear to be unconvincing due to their

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The servicemen often appear to be unconvincing due to theirold washed-out uniforms. Some of the photographs make noless than a dispiriting impression, which does not at allpromote the confirmation of the hypothesis about theRussian victory in the eyes of the unsuspecting observer.

The variety of ammunition also attests to the inadequatelevel of discipline in the troops.Things have reached the point that certain soldiers haveAmerican helmets perched on their heads, which they tookaway from Georgian soldiers, which categorically contradictsthe regulations. There are also photographs of this "playingto the gallery".Incidentally, the use of elements of enemy uniforms andhelmets also contradicts the international rules of theconduct of war.

The question arises: how did it come about that thepractically constantly fighting 58 th Army has ended upwithout a normal uniform?

Why, after the two Chechen wars, has the situation notmoved off of dead center in this regard?And if this is so difficult, why has the Georgian Armymanaged to resolve the issue about the transition to a newuniform for the entire army in literally three years?

The uniform issue - is not yet that important. Later - more.

The situation with individual rotective ear from bullets and

We all know that they are in the TOE in all 58 th Army

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We all know that they are in the TOE in all 58 th Armyunits; however the commanders do not require theirsubordinates to wear helmets or body armor. The Armyspetsnaz - is another matter, helmets are inconvenient

in a number of cases there, which impede hearing inoperations in the forest, and do little to help from thebullet of a sniper weapon.However, there are quite a few photographs, whichprove that in a number of cases 58 th Army soldiersand line motorized rifle subunits in a combat situation,not to mention a march in columns, are in general notwearing protective gear. With the fact that according tothe statistics, a helmet and body armor permit a

manifold reduction of irretrievable losses from theshrapnel of mortar rounds and projectiles. According tothe official statements, these losses totaled 74 menwith 19 missing in action, without taking the woundedinto account. What then can you call that situation ifnot official crimes by commanders, who are not

For example why was the 58 th Army commander himself

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For example, why was the 58 th Army commander himselfdriving through the combat operations area in an ordinaryarmy motor vehicle and not in an armored transport vehicle,as that is appropriate according to the TOE? As a result ofthe Georgian commandos' attack, he himself was wounded

and his chauffer was killed. It is impossible to call thisanything other than the criminal negligence of thecommander himself. The commanders of that level must bepainstakingly concerned both about the safety of theirsubordinates and also about their own safety, and not givethe example of boyish bravado.

We can imagine what the enemy side's propaganda successwould have been if the Georgian saboteurs had managed toshoot the very operation commander at that time! Let's Shift

To Small Arms.

In this case, both sides turned out to be armed with

approximately identical types of automatic weapons. In themajority of cases - these are various modifications of theKalashnikov system of assault rifles and machineguns. In thecontext of the comparison of goals and capabilities, in ouropinion, this also speaks not in Russia's favor. Russia has anumber of more advanced developments which are already

undergoing testing in the units and that have already beenofficiall acce ted into the inventor but the also did not

For Russia with its leading positions in the small arms

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For Russia with its leading positions in the small armsdevelopment sphere, the Kalashnikov assault rifle - is not anentirely adequate response to contemporary needs. Georgiais another matter: Saakashvili quite recently announced thetotal rearming of his army from Kalashnikov assault rifles toAmerican M4 carbines, "the best in the world", as they weretold. However, now we have ascertained that the Americancarbines have turned out to be not that good. First of all,they are inadequately reliable and we have the opportunityto observe that even Saakashvili's bodyguards are armedwith those same Kalashnikov assault rifles together withEuropean small arms.

The Georgian Army, including the elite units, are armed withthose same AK-74M assault rifles, which were copied byBulgaria and illegally sold to Tbilisi.

It is also unfavorable for Russia that the Georgian Army has

overtaken the Russians based upon the level of saturationwith sniper rifles of the leading designs and nightemployment sights. Based upon their level of training,Georgian snipers also turned out to be head and shouldersabove.

h i i i diffi l id i

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But then again, it is difficult to provide a precisecomparative assessment in this context: a number ofRussian spetsnaz subunits have a very, very strongsniper staff, about which the Russians' regular

victories at European army sniper competitions atleast attest.

However, according to our information, state-of-the-art facilities for sniper training are still absent in anumber of cases. In any case, that concerns certainspetsnaz subunits. The soldiers of one such subuniteven appealed to the RF president with an open letteron this score approximately a year ago.

And that situation is especially sad. It turns out that

the generals haven't learned anything since the twoChechen wars...

Right now, as we all know, the situation with thedevelopment and production of advanced sniperweapon systems in Russia is far from splendid. Thereare a total of a few firms, which are involved with

These rifles are being produced in inadequate quantities and a monopoly

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ese es a e be g p oduced adequa e qua es a d a o opo ysituation permits a few manufacturers to exorbitantly raise prices. Along anumber of positions, it is cheaper for the Ministry of Defense and themilitarized departments to purchase sniper rifles abroad, which they aredoing, however, in a clearly inadequate amount.

So, it isn't surprising that in a number of photographs, which are beingdisseminated on the Internet, users can note British-made sniper rifles inthe hands of Russian spetsnaz personnel.

The situation is very "interesting" in the sphere of night sights for sniperweapons.

Russia is among the countries, which manufacture the most state-of-the-art optical night vision sights for small arms. A large portion of thisproduction is being exported. Three firms throughout the world makethird-generation electro-optical matrices for them; two of them are locatedin the United States and one - in Russia. Nevertheless, for some strange

reason it has turned out that it is precisely the Georgian spetsnaz that hada predominant number of these devices, which permitted the Georgians toshoot up the roads during the course of the three days of engagementsand to effectively maintain a humanitarian blockade of Tskhinvali.

The question arises: at that time, where were the widely advertised

Russian automated systems for sniper detection and blinding their optics

However, the reason for that ratio - is tactical errors. One could say that

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, ythe Georgians repeated all of the Russian Army's errors, which were madeduring the storming of Groznyy in the First Chechen Campaign. The tankswere cut off from the infantry and destroyed by RPG attacks from the sideand rear axes. There was no coordination of the operations between thetank crews of the Georgian tanks and the infantry subunits.

In contrast to the Georgians, the 58 th Army tank grouping operatedcorrectly in a tactical context and took into account the experience of thetwo Chechen campaigns, so there were insignificant armored vehiclelosses.

But it is too early to be happy: if we compare the technical level of thetanks, which were employed in the operation with the Georgian tanks, we

see that the Georgian tanks either correspond or substantially surpass theRussian tanks based upon their technical level. At a time when obsolete T-72B and T-62 tanks constitute the primary portion of the 58 th Army's tankfleet, the modernization of the T-72 SIM1, which was supplied to Georgiaby Ukraine, is substantially more "advanced". These tanks have state-of-the-art thermal imaging sights, in all likelihood with the use of the Frenchsecond-generation camera, which permits the gunner to identify targets,both during the day and at night, but then again, behind a smoke screen.

What is even more unpleasant is that the Georgian T-72 SIM1 tankspossess a gun stabilizing system, that is, they can fire on the move. TheUkrainian specialists have adapted their Kombat guided weapon system-antitank missiles to these tanks, which are launched directly from the tankgun's tube. That system is newer than the similar Svir System of the 58 thArmy's T-72B tanks.

At the same time, we must point out the fact that the Georgian tank's

We must point out that as before the 58 th Army's armored vehicles are

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p yprimarily for the conduct of a counterterrorist war. Although tandemantitank grenades and missiles are now being actively employed even inthat war, against which the old tanks are absolutely defenseless from anyaxis of attack.

No one has attempted to improve that situation even in light of the

unconcealed Georgian military preparations of recent years.

Despite a significant increase of qualitatively new threats, as before wepresent the upgrade of the Russian 58 th Army with "modernized" 40-year-old T-62 tanks, with anti-shaped charge screens along the sides, as agigantic "leap forward". Now we were able to behold all of these "tin cans"in South Ossetia. This is the kind of junk that the Russian military budgetis being spent on now!

It remains only to guess why the latest generation Russian tanks, whichare being manufactured by Uralvagonzavod, are not coming to theconstantly fighting North Caucasus Military District, but only to the"ceremonial" Moscow divisions.

The same thing concerns light armored vehicles : All of the Russian

armored infantry and airborne assault vehicles that were noted in SouthOssetia completely turned out to be old Soviet-generation vehicles withupdated service lives.

Where are the BMP-3s? Where are the BMD-4s? They all remained at theirpermanent deployment locations.

The generals' depraved psychology is present here: we will save the latestweapons for a parade and for now the Army is fighting with old

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The active employment of unmanned aerial vehicles - is one more

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p y"anticipated surprise", to which the Russian Army also failed toreact for some reason, although the degree of predictability of thistype of threat was approximately the same in this case as thedegree of predictability of the arrival of Tuesday after Monday. Ingeneral, we don't understand what the generals are thinking about

on this score!It is impossible to explain the delay with the introduction ofunmanned aerial systems in the troops either by the expense (theyare an order of magnitude cheaper than manned aircraft) or by atechnological lag (there are adequately many firms in Russia,which offer their product at the highest level).

It remains to deduce that only tunnel vision and shortsightednessis impeding the introduction of these extremely effective andeconomical reconnaissance and strike systems in the troops.

The operation's aviation component turned out to be significant.

The famous Grach - Su-25 armored ground attack aircraft, whichdistinguished themselves already in the first and second Chechenwars, bore the primary load. It is precisely they that conductedprecision strikes against the reconnoitered positions of theGeorgian infantry and artillery. In Georgia, they also conducted"free hunt" against enemy troop columns, while sowing panicamong the Georgian soldiers. This class of aircraft is ideal foroperations under mountain conditions: the Su-25's speed is higher

' On the other hand - the speed of this aircraft is not too high, and it is

bl f i l i b h i k hil

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p gcapable of actively maneuvering between the mountain peaks, whileinflicting precision strikes with a diving trajectory.

But then again, we don't understand what is arriving to replace thisaircraft. New aircraft are already not being manufactured in Russia andright now the question has been raised about in general not eliminating

the mothballed Su-25 production capacity.

The Georgian side also employed these aircraft, which were allegedlymodernized with Israel's participation. It turns out that Russia did notpossess technical supremacy in this class of weapons during the course ofthe conflict.

Judging by everything, Tu-22M3 high-altitude, supersonic, Long RangeAviation bombers were also employed, however the nature of theoperations with their participation has not been explained. We can assumethat the mission to suppress the Georgian air defense system and aircraftwas assigned to this class of aircraft.

The air force handled this mission with a 3+. Why Russian aircraft andtactical missiles did not tear apart all of the Georgian takeoff and landing

strips in the very first days of the conflict remains incomprehensible.One of the Tu-22M3 aircraft, which was involved with reconnaissancebased upon the Russian military leaders' assertion, was even shot down.

We must acknowledge the total level of losses - four aircraft - to besatisfactory for this type and scale of operations, and also while takinginto account the powerful air defense, which was developed based uponthe Soviet medium-range Buk and long-range S-200 systems, which were

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On the other hand, it would be even more ridiculous in the 21 st century to

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continue to fight using Soviet models, without attempting to completelyrenew the arsenal.In general, we must adhere to the golden rule: THE ARMY OF THEVICTORIOUS COUNTRY ALSO MUST LOOK LIKE A VICTOR.Otherwise, the deterrence factor is subjected to erosion. The enemy onceagain can erroneously think that Russia is weak. And really it has alreadyoccurred: in 1812, 1941, and now with Georgia...However, we are not learning: our soldiers frequently seem to be ground-down "weaklings", although they move mountains on the battlefield, andthe tanks and aircraft look like a heap of rusty iron, which has been lightlycovered with peeling paint.

"Obsolete weapons" can be adequately effective if you judge from thepurely utilitarian point of view. However, in the process, its externalappearance and age do not at all promote the formation of the deterrencefactor. And really, as it was pointed out long ago: the ideal weapon - thatis the weapon, which will do it in such a way that you will not have toemploy it.

The latest events have shown that Russia's deterrence factor hasexperienced significant corrosion in the last two decades and its needs"urgent resuscitation". If such a country as Georgia dared to attack theRussian Armed Forces and Russian citizens, the situation, as they say, "hasreached the breaking point". Some sort of Latvia, while fulfilling theAmerican pre-election order and relying on NATO's protection, will begin a

military operation at some time for the "return" of Pytalovkskiy Rayon," "

The Russian leadership must seriously think about how it can restore thed t f t H i b d R i l

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deterrence factor. Having never been used even once, Russian nuclearweapons are devaluing their deterrence potential with time and arebecoming an ineffective investment of resources.

The Georgian swagger is one of the examples, which confirms thatassertion.

And here it is impossible to get by with words or with military maneuvers.

Russia will have to unambiguously demonstrate in deeds at some pointthat its leadership is adequately strong in order to employ all of theweapons that it has in its arsenal, also not excluding nuclear weapons.What's the sense of possessing these destructive weapons, if thereadiness to employ them has not been demonstrated in 60 years?!

If Russia's leadership is actually concerned about a fundamental increaseof the return from its growing military expenditures in the context of theeffective deterrence of aggression and ensuring a stable peace, it mustfind the capability to demonstrate its resolve through the employment ofnuclear weapons.

We will consider this task to be the next "test" for the new president.Otherwise, stronger states than Georgia will attempt to repeat aggressionagainst Russia sooner or later, while relying on their more state-of-the-artand more numerous conventional armed forces.Source:Ocnus.net 2008