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Situating Police and Military in conteMPorary Peace oPerationSDr B.K. Greener and Dr W.J. Fish

Disclaimer:

the views expressed in this Civil-Military Occasional Paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of aPCMCOE or of any government agency. authors enjoy the academic freedom to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues.

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iSBN: 978-1-921933-15-8

Published 2011.

Situating Police and Military in Contemporary Peace Operations 3

aBStractthere appears to be a growing convergence between the police and the military of Western developed states. this has been argued to be problematic for a number of reasons, including the fact that this is out of step with current post-conflict peacebuilding efforts that aim to ensure a strict separation of these two agencies. this paper investigates the police-military relationship in contemporary peace operations from a number of different angles. it considers points of convergence and divergence both in theoretical terms and in different case studies, and investigates doctrinal developments that have been undertaken in recent efforts to demarcate these two roles more clearly. the paper argues that there are continuing significant functional and symbolic differences between these two agencies. Furthermore, there are practical and normative advantages to be gained from utilising police and military in distinctive ways in contemporary peace operations, and more needs to be done to establish what those appropriate ways for utilising those different agencies actually are in various security contexts.

Key words: police, military, peace operations, post-conflict

Dr Greener is Senior lecturer in international relations at Massey University and has published widely on international security-related matters; her book The New International Policing was published in 2009. Dr Fish is an associate Professor in Philosophy at Massey University.

4 Civil-Military occasional papers

Situating Police and Military in conteMPorary Peace oPerationSEvidence seems to suggest that there is a growing convergence between the police and the military of Western developed states (Campbell and Campbell 2010; Friesendorf 2009; Schmalleger 2008).1 this has been argued to be a problematic development for a number of reasons, one of which is that it appears to be out of step with current post-conflict peacebuilding efforts that aim to ensure a strict separation of these two agencies (OECD 2007). in light of this, there has been an urgent call for scholars and researchers to undertake further research on what has been termed ‘third generation civil-military affairs’, and the issue of police-military cooperation in peace operations is at the heart of this agenda (rosen 2009).2

this paper investigates the police-military relationship in contemporary peace operations from a number of different angles. We begin by investigating the different dimensions of what we call the traditional ‘police–military divide’ and show how the developing roles of these agencies suggest that this divide is becoming blurred. Following on from this, we go on to focus on the specific issue of police-military interactions in peace operations, highlighting some of the problems that have arisen in particular case studies, before outlining recent UN and EU doctrinal developments to see how these institutions have attempted to create a clearer division of labour in efforts to address operational confusion over police and military roles. these efforts to demarcate a division of labour are vital as, despite some instances of blurring of the police-military divide, there are continuing significant functional and symbolic differences between these two agencies. Moreover, this differentiation is critical in that the ongoing differences between police (in both civilian and constabulary form) and the military help to provide for a broader range of options in responding to the challenges faced in post conflict peace operations. there are, therefore, practical and normative advantages to be gained from utilising police and military in particular and distinctive ways in contemporary peace operations. the challenge is to establish appropriate and legitimate uses of police and military agents in each particular case.


a Blurring of the Police – Military divide?the Police – Military divide, we argue, has four main features. the first is function, followed by additional differences in terms of main focus, sources of legitimacy and underlying culture, and these main differences are represented in the table below.3

Table 1: The police-Military Divide

ciVilian police MiliTarY

core Function Controlling crime and maintaining public order by prevention or, failing that, through apprehension.

Securing the state against external threat through deterrence or, failing that, military action.

Focus internal. External.

source of legitimacy representatives of the community / law.

agents of the incumbent government.

institutional culture Professional, value-oriented, individual responsibility high.

Professional, value-oriented, hierarchical, responsibility allocated top down.

as shown in table 1, it is clear that there are some instances of similarities and differences inherent within the main functions of these two agencies. Historically, police forces were developed to play a security role that militaries were either unable or unwilling to perform.4 Prominent theorists of police, David Bayley (1990: 18) and allan Silver (2005: 10), identify the same two roles as the cornerstones of police function: crime prevention and public order maintenance. Military forces, on the other hand, are war-fighting institutions tasked with protecting the state and its interests through the use of deterrent effect or lethal force.5

Moreover, although the definitions in table 1 have both preventive and active aspects, police work emphasises more proactive forms of prevention in attempting to detect problems before they arise or before they become more entrenched as constituting a core policing task. the military is arguably more passive in its preventive measures in that ‘active’ forms of deterrence such as military exercises


may occur but are less integral to the overall raison d’etre of defence forces. Further generalisations include the notion that police action through apprehension involves a great deal of constabulary discretion, and is more tailored to context and the individual crime, whilst military action typically involves a much more complicated, hierarchical and large-scale response to significant threats to the national interest. admittedly these are highly reductionist principles, but they constitute fundamental differences at play in the core functions of the police and military. What is more, this difference in the roles the two agencies are intended to play also has the consequence that police have a focus internal to the society to which they belong whilst militaries have come to be seen as the main actors for the protection of a state’s external sovereignty. there are exceptions under ‘aid to Civil authorities’ arrangements, where militaries do have an internal role in in-extremis support in counter terrorism operations, but typically these actions require emergency powers and still require a post-event police investigation. the Navy and airforce also play significant roles in Search & rescue operations, and all Services typically assist in disaster response.

Sites of legitimacy of the military is founded in their role as agents of the incumbent government and civil authority, whilst police forces created in the anglo-american model have typically sought to locate their legitimacy elsewhere, so as to avoid being seen as an internal political tool. in the civilian policing model, this has been through a combination of being seen as representatives of the community being policed and being seen as representatives of the abstract ‘law of the land’, or enforcing the ‘rule of law’. and, finally, these differences in focus and function in turn give rise to broadly different institutional arrangements and cultures in the police and military.

the warfighting function of the military has resulted in personnel typically being utilised as parts of military units ranging from platoons to armies, with a strong emphasis being placed on leadership, highly structured decision-making processes and hierarchy within these units (Seiler 2009). this emphasis on hierarchy, and an accompanying focus on discipline, has been seen to be necessary for a number of reasons; not least in order to be able to direct individuals to both use lethal force themselves against an enemy and to follow orders that may result in loss of their own life. Civilian police, on the other hand, though sometimes lumped in with


military forces under the descriptor ‘disciplined forces’ often see themselves more akin to other civilian emergency services such as fire or ambulance services rather than ‘little soldiers’ of any sort (discussions with australian and New Zealand Police 2010/2011). For some police forces, however still in the post-colonial era of their evolution, the concept of police as another ‘disciplined force’ is the dominant one. in african states experiencing conflict, for example, the distinction between police, gendarmerie and military becomes especially blurred. imbued with a sense of individual responsibility and the key tenet of ‘constabulary discretion’, civilian police may often have similar values to military personnel (courage, commitment to the job, desire to contribute to society and some levels of institutional hierarchy) but, in general terms, the overarching institutional culture of policing is much less hierarchical with greater emphasis being placed on individual responsibility and initiative.

So we find the traditional police – military divide has (at least) these four different dimensions – differences in function, differences in focus, differences in source of legitimacy, and differences in culture. yet in 2001, prior to the events of September 11, andreas and Price (2001: 32) claimed that “one of the most important blurrings of traditional boundaries occurring in the post-Cold War era is that between an internally oriented domestic police sphere and an externally oriented military sphere”.

this blurring is in part due to the fact that the advent of globalisation has brought a number of security challenges – such as terrorism, transnational crime and human trafficking – that obscure the distinction between an internal and an external sphere of operation. Furthermore, the blurring of the police – military divide is particularly notable in peace operations, where it has been claimed by rosen (2009: 11) that:

a defining feature of third-generation civil-military relations is the vanishing difference between military and civil work areas. this could also be described as the vanishing of the functional differences between military and other tools of international politics. the vanishing differentiation contrasts with first- and second- generation civil-military relations, which generated a perception of a clash between ‘military’ and ‘non-military’ that sustained the conceptual distinction between two areas of governance.


One key aspect of this blurring is that it is becoming relatively common for the military to be tasked with components of the police function in peacekeeping operations. in Panama, for example, “the US military, as the only entity in the country with the capacity to provide the level of stability required, had to deal with the lack of a viable and functioning [host nation] security and [law enforcement] apparatus” (Jayamaha et al 2010: 21) and they dealt with this in the obvious way – by doing it themselves. in Haiti too, for example UN military personnel were deployed to fight the organised street gangs in Port au Prince and Cite Soleil, which resulted in very confrontational but ultimately fairly successful results.

the involvement of the military in traditional policing roles has continued in recent years, with the US military playing “a key role in law enforcement and related issues, even if not specifically tasked with a law enforcement mandate” (Jayamaha et al 2010: xiii) and with undertaking the tasks of police training, mentoring, and institutional reform (rosen 2009: 11). More recently, however, there has been a move from merely suggesting that it is possible for the military to undertake policing tasks, to a suggestion that it may actually be desirable. the early stages of afghanistan, for example, US army Colonel Kimberley Fields (2002: 3) has suggested that “if the mainstream military invested energy in gaining a degree of comfort with [civil-military organisation] issues and in building relationships with civilian partners, real coordination and power sharing could result in targeted, efficient, and short-term humanitarian and reconstruction interventions by the military.” Much of the rationale for the US military role in police training in afghanistan and iraq is, however, due to the simple fact that the US does not have a national police force that is mandated to undertake international deployments (see Perito 2004)

the blurring of the police-military divide has also taken a converse form from the perspective of police. at the same time as the military have been tasked with policing roles in peace operations, there has also been an increase in the number of sworn police officers deployed in these missions. For example, over 17,000 police have been mandated by the Security Council to contribute to 14 peacekeeping operations and 4 peacebuilding operations (UNDPKO 2011). although police are typically deployed to play policing roles (so their function remains the same), they are being deployed in an external, as opposed to an internal, environment.


So whilst the military are being asked to remain in their “home” environment but play police roles, police are being asked to play their ‘home’ roles in military space. this development, it has been argued, challenges the very concept of police being internal security agents who uphold the rule of law within a domestic setting (Greener 2009).

What is more, this blurring of focus and function is compounded by two further features of contemporary peace operations. First is that these missions often involve concurrent counter-terrorism (typically an effort led by law enforcement strategies) and counter-insurgency (typically a military task, though again these are generalisations) operations. indeed, the emphasis on counter-insurgency in afghanistan has seen Kilcullen (2009: 130) suggest that the military operation is “less like conventional warfare and more like police work: cops patrolling a beat to prevent violent crime”.

the second feature of contemporary peace operations is that they may involve significant levels of civil disorder, often involving armed protagonists. the problem with such scenarios is that a ‘capability gap’ is perceived to exist between civilian police and the military when it comes to dealing with this kind of situation. Dziedzic (2003: 2) argues that:

Military forces are ill suited to engage in confrontations with civilians because, with the exception of constabulary or military police units, they are generally not trained in the measured use of force, control of riots, negotiating techniques, or de-escalation of conflict. individual [civilian police] are not capable of handling such large-scale, strategic challenges, either.

in response to the perception that such a capability gap exists, people have argued that a force that has elements of both police and military is required: a paramilitary constabulary force such as the French gendarmerie or the italian carabinieri; forces which are “characterised by paramilitary organisation and weaponry tailored for use in internal security and policing operations” (Mendee and last 2008: 18).

in Bosnia in the late 1990s, this led to NatO developing ‘Multinational Specialist Units’ (MSU) in order to help bridge military and civilian police capabilities. an MSU consisted of:


Police Forces with military status who perform duties including civil disturbance operations. this type of force focuses on the civilian population, employs minimum force and often employs small units to accomplish the mission. However, the MSU is not a replacement for the [Bosnia and Herzegovna] Police Forces and does not conduct criminal investigation beyond the scope of the SFOr mandate (NatO 2004).

Further commentary highlights that the experience with the MSU in Bosnia had knock-on effects even to the point whereby;

international peacekeeping operations have in the past been labelled constabulary missions, calling for gendarme rather than military capabilities, although throughout the Cold War they were conducted primarily by military forces. Since 1996, beginning with the Multinational Specialised Unit in Bosnia, forces like the italian Carabinieri and the Dutch Marechaussee have been in demand to deal with the combination of organised crime and ethnic extremism that complicates protracted social conflicts (Mendee and last 2008: 18).

Constabulary forces, then, can seem appealing in postconflict situations as they are seen as capable of performing both ‘cooler’ military and ‘hotter’ police functions and can be assigned “in either a military or civilian capacity” (Perito 2004: 47). these kinds of developments in terms of the increasingly complex nature of operations have led, in turn, to changes in the culture or ethos of police and military forces. in considering how militaries have been impacted upon, andreas and Price (2001: 48) draw attention to the fact that, post Kosovo in particular, “the military [now] faces pressures to treat foreign civilians as individuals with rights rather than as enemies on a battlefield”. Martin Shaw has similarly emphasised the importance of the criminalisation of war as driven by an emphasis on rights, legal regulation and excessive litigation. Most importantly Shaw talked of the fact that criminalising war;

involves treating war like any other human activity, no longer de facto or even de jure excluded from norms that apply in all other fields. taking “thou shalt not kill” seriously, in the context of war, does indeed threaten to make the practice of war very difficult (2004).


an emphasis on the ‘criminalisation’ of conflict through making military action potentially ‘illegal’ and stressing the notion of individual responsibility for conduct necessitates an understanding and application of the rule of law.

Michael Walzer (1992: 42) says that, whilst soldiers are not responsible for the war itself, they are responsible for the conduct of it, and that “war is distinguishable from murder and massacre only when restrictions are established on the reach of battle” and, more specifically, that “negative intention ought to be required from soldiers; it is the domestic equivalent of what the lawyers call “due care” in domestic society” . Because of this, adam roberts has gone so far as to claim that a ‘humanitarian war’ is “an oxymoron that may yet become a reality” (1993: 429).

in addition to absorbing and responding to these increased legalisation processes, military forces have in recent years also been subject to a number of other significant processes such as civilianisation, equal opportunity policies, outsourcing and subcontracting that have impacted upon aspects of traditional military culture (Caforio 2003). these processes have created more permeability between the military and civilian worlds, helping to demystify the role of military forces somewhat, thereby altering how the military is perceived and received by society, and deemphasising traditional tenets of military life – including hierarchy (Moskos 2000).6 though the military remains a ‘military’ despite civilianisation, and though the continuing emphasis on hierarchy remains a key point of difference from civilian police, these sorts of developments also bring military and policing agencies a little closer together.

at the same time as the military is becoming more civilianised and being required to adjust to being answerable to the law as well as their commanding officer, there have also been concerns voiced in a number of Western liberal democratic countries from the US, to the UK, australia and New Zealand, that we are seeing an increased ‘militarisation’ of domestic police services (Kraska and Kappeler 1997; McCulloch 2001 and 2004; Broad 2010). the creation of various special tactics groups with increased firepower, more regular police involvement in counter-terrorism roles, and an increased willingness to arm police have been cited as evidence of such militarisation. Moreover, as we have noted, as more police are being used in international settings there has been a rising reliance on the use of constabulary-type forces such as gendarmerie or more specifically-tasked Formed


Police Units (FPUs) that specialise in public order (Dziedzic and Stark 2006). recent assessments of FPUs in the UN setting have identified that the record regarding use of these FPUs to date has been somewhat mixed (Carpenter 2010) and the consequences of the default use of these Units remains under-researched.

all of these developments have meant that police and military roles in contemporary peace operations have often become confused through misinterpretation of roles or through sheer necessity in requiring the military, in particular, to undertake policing roles as the main or only capability in situ at the time.

Police – Military interaction in Peace operations in 2001 Michael Pugh suggested that all civil-military relations in peace operations had tended to subordinate humanitarian action to military necessity – pointing to the Western European Union’s draft Civil-Military Cooperation (CiMiC) document from 1999 that stated CiMiC was to “create civil-military conditions that will offer the Commander the greatest possible moral, material and tactical advantages” – but he also noted that alternative CiMiC models were being formulated that were more balanced in their approach towards coordinating state servants in conflict zones (2001: 346). indeed CiMiC is now often a priority rather than merely an afterthought as humanitarian and development agendas have risen to balance the military imperative. recent UN reports therefore call for an increased focus on and resourcing of civilian contributions to UN peace operations, symbolising a changing approach to the balancing of security and development needs in complex peacebuilding and peace support operations (UN News release 2011).

in assessing how police and military, in particular, operate together in peace operations, there are some useful models to be considered from past experience before identifying and assessing contemporary emphases. in early missions, such as Cambodia in the mid 1990s, there were a number of complaints that the entire UN mission was overly dominated by the military, and by military imperatives. the military component in UNtaC was ostensibly there to provide a ‘neutral political environment’ and key tasks for the military included monitoring the ceasefire, disarmament, regroupment, and the demobilisation of factional forces. the civilian police component, on the other hand, was tasked with ‘stabilising the security


situation’, and an important part of this particular role was the regulation of existing police forces in Cambodia. in practice, however, there was a lack of clarity in the Cambodian case about how these roles could be demarcated from one another in terms of day to day operations, and the relevant jurisdictions of the two agencies. this highlighted the difficulties in establishing a clear division of labour between the two forces, particularly as military affairs tended to dominate to the extent that military aspects of the mission ‘pervaded almost every aspect of UNtaC’s mandate’ (Kim and Metrikas 1997: 108). the overbearing emphasis on the military aspect of the mission also contributed to a lack of planning and preparation for the civilian police aspect of the operation (Maley 2005: 300).

as was noted above, in 1998 NatO deployed the first ‘Multinational Specialist Unit (MSU) in Bosnia to help bridge military and civilian police capabilities. in response to a disastrous episode involving friction between the MSU and military Commanders in late 1998, NatO developed the Blue Box / Green Box concept. this demarcated who was to have precedence in different situations. When public order was threatened, the on-site MSU commander would command his own unit and other forces present within what would be designated the ‘Blue Box’ (a particular area of operations). Forces outside the area of responsibility remained under the command of the most senior military officer present to support the constabulary policing efforts of the MSU within the Blue Box area, and this surrounding area was the ‘Green Box’ zone (Perito 2004: 164–5).

this operational model reflected the need to distinguish whether or not the MSU or military commander had precedence, and in certain situations gave constabulary forces the tactical freedom to deal with unrest, including the freedom to decide whether or not to use force. this highlights the preventative role for police – one particular study from the US army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations institute, suggested that the MSU had, by 2000, managed to resolve 261 or 263 interventions without use of force through deterrence, dissuasion and negotiation (2000: 10) – and the idea of an MSU was therefore judged to work fairly successfully on a number of occasions (Friesendorf 2009: 47–8) Similar models were then utilised in Kosovo – particularly for responding to riots and public disorder – but a number of problems occurred in this case.


two main problems arose in Kosovo with respect to police-military relations and operations. the first was that a significant predicament arose in terms of duplication of function and intelligence sharing problems between the MSU which consisted of 300 members from italy, France and Estonian EStPatrOl military police, and UNMiK’s Special Police Units (SPUs). the mandates for the SPU and the MSU were overly similar and UNMiK in particular complained that MSU did not share intelligence (Friesendorf 2009: 97). as a general rule the SPUs were generally used for static facility and protective security roles with the MSUs focusing on riot control and high risk policing functions (Perito 2004). in addition to this overlap, the US too used their military police as a constabulary type force, further complicating the mix of actors and functions available. though originally tasked with traditional roles such as military traffic control, area security and prisoner of war operations, the roles of US MPs increased to encompass: deterring looting and other crimes; running police stations and detention centres; facilitating the return of refugees; and maintaining a great deal of responsibility for law and order in particular sectors (Jayamaha et al 2010: 115).

another problem emerged with respect to a lack of comprehensive planning for less than lethal force. With regards to NatO’s strategic and operational planning for dealing with Kosovo, thomas Mockaitis (2004: 31–1) argues that:

KFOr entered Kosovo prepared for only two scenarios, neither of which occurred: a fighting entry to expel the yugoslav army and paramilitaries, and a peaceful hand over of the province. instead a power vacuum opened between the retreating army and the occupying force.

KFOr was therefore “faced with an atypical crisis in which crowd behaviour had become a key component” (assembly of the WEU 2006). Serbian paramilitaries burned and looted albanian homes as KFOr troops stood by and watched, and later returning albanians attacked Serbian homes and property in retaliation, again without response from KFOr which was ill equipped to deal with such instances of public disorder as opposed to organised warfighting. British troops increased foot patrols a la Northern ireland to decrease the intensity and frequency of such occurrences, whilst French Gendarmerie were deployed to set up a battalion tasked with preventing crimes and offences and maintaining public security (though not law enforcement). later planning for violent public disorder intended that the Kosovo


Police Force (KPS) riot police would be the front line; then UNMiK; then the MSU; then the military Kosovo Force (KFOr), but again it transpired that there was not enough foresight with regards to how to effectively deal with large-scale riots as demonstrated by the poor response to the 2004 riots (Friesendorf 2009: 102).

in light of the difficulties faced on the ground in previous years, a number of states, regional and international institutions have begun to develop much stronger guidelines and doctrine regarding police-military interaction and roles in peace operations. the UN, in particular, has taken up a more strategic outlook in recent years, concerned by the adverse effects of the previous ad hoc approach to providing security in post-conflict settings. the developments at the UN represent efforts to identify and attribute a clear division of labour between police and military personnel, whilst the EU’s policy development has also explicitly considered the role of the new European gendarmerie force.

codifying Police – Military interaction: doctrinal developmentUN guidelines for its peace operations state that both troop Contributing Countries (tCC) and Police Contributing Countries (PCC) should be guided by the tasks assigned by the Security Council mandate, the concept of operations (CONOPS) and accompanying mission rules of Engagement (rOE) for the military component, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component in order to establish a suitable police-military operational relationship (UN 2008: 14; UN 2009: 25).

rOE and DUF should clearly outline the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used, and any authorisations that must be obtained by Commanders, and mission leadership should ensure that these rOE and DUF are well understood by all relevant personnel in the mission and are being applied uniformly such that the “credibility and freedom of action” of the UN field mission is upheld in the implementation of its mandate (UN 2008: 35). these rOE and DUF evolve out of separate military and police CONOPS which are strategic planning documents which outline the “key security objectives, requirements and tasks” of military and police as per their role in fulfilling the UN mandate, which are developed predominantly by


the Military Planning Service and the Police Division of DPKO, and which may be augmented by additional documentation such as a Military Operations Plan (‘Operation Order’) (UN 2009: 26).

it is significant to note that separate CONOPS exist because:

Military and police use force for different purposes in peacekeeping operations. the military uses force to deter or remove a security threat from armed forces or groups, while the police use force to arrest civilians and address criminal behaviour. the use of force by military and police are therefore also governed by different sources of law (the military is governed by humanitarian law and the police by human rights and domestic criminal law) (UN 2009a: 64)

More explicitly, the UNDPKO (2002: 2) has a specific Civil-Military Coordination Policy that provides guidelines to “ensure that the military and civilian police components can concentrate on their primary task of security but, where needed, can contribute in the most effective manner to non-security tasks, specifically those related to humanitarian and development activities”. the policy emphasises that military or civilian police are supposed to be used only for the pursuit of peace and security whereas humanitarian relief and development activities are to be performed by civilians – though it provides potential for military and civilian police to be involved in these tasks if: they are consistent with the mandate; don’t interfere with or compromise security related tasks; and are coordinated fully within the mission (further constraints include that this would only occur if the capability required is unique, unable to be provided in a timely manner by civilians and a last resort) (UN 2002: 3).

in terms of command and control, military and civilian police remain under established command and control – namely the Secretary General’s Special representative / HOM must approve the use of military and civilian police for non-security related tasks, although efforts to plan and coordinate with regards to humanitarian needs rests with the Humanitarian Coordinator (UN 2002: 5). More specifically, the Head of Military Component (HOMC) exercises ‘UN operational Control’, may delegate ‘UN tactical Control’ of military personnel to subordinate military commanders, and may also be the HOM in ‘traditional’


missions. the Head of Police Component (HOPC) similarly exercises ‘UN Operational Control’, may delegate specific authority to individual officers and to FPUs through their commanding officer, and is ‘normally appointed’ as the mission Police Commissioner (UN 2009a: 42). Significantly, recent UN peacekeeping training material stresses the importance of military, police and civilian personnel all understanding the “main tasks and functions of the different components in a mission” (UN 2009a: 46). the main tasks of military and police, the training material suggests, can be described as follows:

Table 2 Military, police and civilian Tasks in contemporary Un peace operations7

Military component traditional PK Operations

Multi-dimensional Operations

Monitor or supervise military arrangements that parties to a conflict have agreed upon.

Create a secure and stable environment for other elements of the peace process to be implemented.

police component Can be deployed either as individual UNPOl or as Formed Police Units to either traditional or multi-dimensional peace operations.

Play a role in establishing public safety and preventing crime as well as facilitating role of law.

Collaborate closely with civilian components such as human rights, judicial and civil affairs and corrections.

civilian component limited number in traditional peace operations but more in multidimensional operations.

Have roles in political affairs, civil affairs, human rights, gender, public information etc. Provide logistical and administrative support too.


Even more specifically, military functions and activities have been denoted as: security sector involvement and provision of secure environment (through patrolling, establishing and operating checkpoints, securing major routes to facilitate mobility, securing key facilities such as hospitals and power plants) (UN 2009a: 57). Police functions and activities have been described as: restoration of the rule of law; reform of host country police services; vetting, training and mentoring of host police; providing public order and responding to public security challenges (through static guards and close protection for dignitaries; preventive patrols and checkpoints; tactical support for high risk operations and security for demonstrations); and provision of executive policing when an established national police force is not present (UN 2009a: 57).

Similar doctrine has been developed in other institutions as efforts to coordinate the different actors required for multi-dimensional or complex peace operations or statebuilding and peacebuilding exercises – whatever the term that reflects the complexity of modern operations may be at the time – have increased in intensity and focus. Most significantly, the EU has developed some interesting practices as it has increasingly focused on civilian-heavy security operations.

in response to demands arising throughout the 1990s that saw European states deploy police, military and constabulary forces in attempts to quell challenges to peace and security in the Balkans in particular, the EU agreed to create a pool of 5,000 police officers, with 1400 of these deployable within 30 days. Central to this idea was the creation of a European Gendarmerie Force (EUrOGENDFOr). EU documents reinforce the notion that the gendarmerie forces of participating states are police with military status; at home the Gendarmeria, Carabinieri and Guardia Civil are civilian police forces that fall under the authority of interior Ministries and that are internal security forces as opposed to military police who are responsible for discipline within the armed forces (assembly of the WEU 2006: 10).

the use of police and the EUrOGENDFOr for crisis prevention, crisis management and other peace operations supports the EU’s 2008 Civilian Headline Goal. this sets out the EU’s main tasks and objectives, where it is explicitly stated that the EU must be able to deploy civilian capabilities as well as military means at the outset of the operation, and that these civil capabilities must be deployable either autonomously, in close cooperation with or even jointly with military


operations. in terms of police involvement, it is envisaged that the EU may deploy civilian police for: preventive roles (to advise local police in area in crisis); alongside military intervening force to stand in for local police, to provide for public security and law and order; peacekeeping roles where military are deployed whereby the range of tasks will be broad and varied depending upon mandates; and lastly in reconstruction or stabilisation phases as expert advisors.

according to its Declaration of intent (2004), the EUrOGENDFOr is to be “operational, pre-organised, robust and rapidly deployable, in order to perform police tasks” to help “facilitate the reactivation of security facilities, particularly during the transition between the military and the civilian operational environment”. the EUrOGENDFOr can deploy 800 officers in 30 days, and given its nature “can carry out all types of missions in crisis management operations, taking part in the military phase of a crisis, acting during the transition period from a military to a civil operation, and participating in prevention missions” (Ministeria de Defensa de Espana n.d). in particular, EUrOGENDFOr’s police function can “be developed under civilian or military chain of command”, whereby: during the initial phase of the operation the EGF could “enter the theatre along with the military force in order to perform its police tasks”; during the transitional phase could “continue its mission alone or together with a military force, facilitating co-ordination and co-operation with local or international police units”; and during the military disengagement phase could “facilitate the handing over of responsibilities to civilian authorities and agencies taking part in the co-operation efforts, if necessary” (EUrOGENDFOr 2004).

Significantly, then, at an operational level, during a phase being conducted under military responsibility the EGF is incorporated into the military chain of command, whilst during a phase under civil responsibility the EGF Headquarters will “establish a procedure for coordinating” with the Secretariat of the EU Council (or equivalent body if an international organisation is in charge). at a tactical level, the EGF Force Commander will command operations in either a civilian or military chain of command, though if carrying out an autonomous police operation the Commander would be answerable to the highest civilian authority (assembly of WEU 2006: 16).

the development of these models and policies for coordinating military and policing efforts in peace operations highlight a number of things. First of all they underscore the increasing importance of utilising a comprehensive approach to the security


aspects involved in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Secondly they recognise the increased role of police (including gendarmerie) in peace operations. thirdly, they represent an effort to identify a clear division of labour between police and military. this final point is vital as it brings us to the argument that fundamental divisions between police and military still do exist, as argued above, and, moreover, that these divisions are in fact very useful in the field.

normative questions: differences Still?in recent years, a number of analysts (in the US in particular) have begun to argue that, when there are inadequate numbers of international or domestic police, then international military forces may have to undertake policing activities (Mockaitis 2004; Jones et al 2005; Jayamaha et al 2010; Keller 2010). this recommendation usually comes with the additional caveats such as: not only should such military forces respect judicial principles when undertaking such activities, but they should also hand over all law enforcement responsibilities to the police as soon as it is viable to do so.

However, significant concerns regarding the use of military in law enforcement-type tasks remain as, whilst they may be in situ with useful capabilities, policing activities are not the core business of the military. For example, Michael Pugh (2001: 350) has argued that it is “not the military’s job to empower those vulnerable to abusive states or warlords”. Partly because policing is not the military’s core role, there are also institutional reasons for not utilising the military in policing activities. For example, the military experience in afghanistan has demonstrated that some basic skill sets simply are not in situ with the military being “seen to be especially weak in the areas of monitoring, procedures, and record-keeping or continuity”, whilst institutional problems such as bureaucratic heaviness, rapid staff turnover and security restrictions bedevilled military efforts to engage in non-military activities (Fishstein 2010: 28 and 45–7).

Such considerations have led Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr. to claim that there are “surprisingly few synergies between law enforcement and military missions”, and suggest that “using military forces for tasks that are essentially law enforcement requires a fundamental change in orientation” (2005: 790–1). likewise General Wesley Clark contends that “experience in peace operations has proven that


good soldiers, no matter how well equipped, trained, organised and led cannot fully perform police duties among local populations” (cited in Smith 1999: a17). these claims are further supported by a recent american study, which considered the difference between street cops and combat troops.

in their assessment of the difference between soldiers and police in a US context, Campbell and Campbell (2010: 338) suggest that policing and police work are best captured by the role of the generic entry level street cop position, whilst the core military role is captured by the private soldier. they therefore compared the key attitudes, skills and roles of Police Officer i and Combat rifle Crew member categories, and some of their findings are summarised in the following table:

Table 3 acquiring skills and acquiring attitudes: comparison of role orientation and role Demands source: campbell & campbell 2010

Dimension Traditional policing role

Traditional War-Fighting role

attitudes

• orientation to job• orientation to use

of force• orientation to work

environment

• protect/prevent• low or last resort• mostly benign

• overwhelm/pacify• high or first resort• typically hostile

conceptual skills

• importance of discretionary judgement

• importance of problem solving skills

• importance of investigative skills

• high/ongoing• high/relevant• high/necessary

• moderate/sporadic• moderate/less

relevant• low/less frequency

communicative skills

• importance of negotiation skills

• importance of communication skills

• importance of persuasive skills

• high/frequent• high/necessary• high/relevant

• moderate/infrequent• low/less relevant• low/less relevant


in considering issues arising in this study of police versus military roles, Campell and Campbell (2010: 339) suggest the core difference between the two jobs lies in the types of judgements required by the jobholders and the cognitive demands placed on them. they note that:

although both jobs are in protective service occupations, they differ significantly in terms of specific tasks and expectations. While police officers patrol and investigate wrongdoing, combat rifle crewmembers destroy or capture enemies; while police officers inspect, warn and arrest; rifle crewmembers fortify, camouflage, and repair weapons; while police officers report hazards, disperse unruly crowds, and write daily activity reports, rifle crew members place antitank mines and fire machine guns, and so on (2010: 339)

it is due to these differences in training and ethos that the authors also argue that when military units are required to undertake policing roles that they focus primarily on developing relevant skills, whilst police taking on more military oriented tasks tends to focus less on skill development and more on attitude adjustment (2010: 343).

these considerations suggest that there remain difficulties for the military in undertaking active policing roles. yet there are also reasons to be wary of the military’s playing a wider role in training and mentoring police forces too. Overly militarised approaches to training local police forces (including the mentoring of police officers by members of the military) can lead to the police force itself taking on militaristic features and militaristic priorities (Sedra 2006: 95; Bayley and Perito 2010: 4). training by the military is likely to be “oriented towards the elimination of an enemy threat and inherently engenders a much more militaristic attitude in civilian police bodies” (Campbell and Campbell 2010: 331).

this can lead to disconnection between the police force and the community that it is supposed to serve – particularly if such training is geared towards the security interests of external actors. in iraq, for example:

any iraqi policeman will tell you that the iraqi people are not satisfied with security provision; and the strength of the militias is at least in part a response to the failure of the state to provide security. the key mission of


the iraqi police is seen as fighting terrorism. this may seem reasonable to an outsider, but it is essentially a state-centric priority established with the occupying coalition (Martin and Wilson 2008: 90)

in iraq the focus on counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency as emphasised by the Department of Defence-sourced training they have received has resulted in a skewed approach to internal security.8 However, as Perito and Bayley (2010: 83) have argued, police contributions to security in these situations should prioritise enlisting the cooperation of the public and legitimating government, not ‘fighting terrorism’. indeed, as iraqi police are accustomed to a centralised chain of command and more military-oriented traditions than those in the West, it has been claimed that the police-military divide needed to be much more clearly circumscribed (Pfaff 2007: 6) and that “direct and deep relationships between international military forces and the domestic police in post-conflict countries are unhealthy” (Friesendorf 2009: 157–8).

Similar findings have been reported in the case of afghanistan. For instance, an international Crisis Group report (2007: 15) noted:

it is counter-productive to treat police as an auxiliary fighting unit in battling the insurgency, as has been happening with increasing frequency in the troubled south. afghanistan, like any other democracy, requires police service more than police force.... in countering an insurgency, the police are the first line of defence as the interface with the community. they have powers of stop and search, arrest and detention, and since they observe daily comings and goings, should be aware of the first signs of illegal activity. yet, as the interior minister rightly said, “it is not the responsibility of the police to fight [the insurgency]. the police are responsible for implementing the law, and we should not train our policemen with an inclination for war”.

the above case studies highlight some of the difficulties with the suggestion that the military might increasingly be involved in wider types of ‘policing activities’, such as training and mentoring:

Providing police forces with military training, equipment and intelligence may militarise domestic police, send the wrong signal to post-conflict countries and undermine efforts to create police forces guided by democratic norms.


Citizens in post-conflict countries have usually suffered from abusive, corrupt and militarised security forces. Fostering public trust in civilian policing thus depends on limiting the role of the military in internal security (Friesendorf 2009: 17; see also Mobekk 2005)

Despite recent claims as to the democratic benefits of US professional military education in terms of positive impacts upon other militaries (ruby and Gibler 2010: 339–364), much of the literature deplores the involvement of military forces in police training and reform, yet this involvement is still occurring and being encouraged. this is in large part capability-driven, in that the military tends to have the capabilities or the funds to undertake such a mammoth task, but unless there were significant changes to military forces – changes which would inevitably have a negative impact upon their ability to play their core roles – there will remain a reason to maintain the police – military divide both at home and in operational contexts. However, given the security gap issue that commonly arises in post-conflict situations, it seems plausible that some military roles might usefully be played in support of law enforcement. Potential roles include: static and personnel protection; security perimeters; checkpoint / dismantling illegal checkpoints; detaining of suspects for police; intelligence provision; seize assets; assisting police with raids; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDr) and demining. One branch of the military, the military police, might also potentially be able to undertake some constabulary roles, though this would need to be well thought through before military police are unquestionably offered up as the solution to the problem as there are not insignificant institutional differences between CivPOl and MPs. in particular, the primary task of Military Police is to ‘police’ the military, and in this they are more internal enforcers of discipline and behaviour, rather than protectors of community safety and rule of law.


conclusionsthere are a number of arguments that suggest that the police–military divide is blurring, particularly in the international sphere. However we believe that fundamental differences remain. Moreover it is clear that strategic planning and doctrine has improved in terms of moves to develop a clearer understanding of an appropriate and workable division of labour between the two in undertaking various roles in contemporary and future peace operations.

these recent developments serve to reinforce the continuing existence of differences between police and military and are, for us, normatively important because of the underlying need to demilitarise and deescalate situations in post-conflict peace operations. there is a worrying trend in the literature, particularly in america, to admit that using military for policing roles is not ideal, but should be pursued simply because that is where most capabilities and resources are vested. We consider it plausible that there may be some roles that military could potentially undertake but what would be the broader or more symbolic issues raised by such involvement?

in an accompanying paper that considered first principles in policing and military spheres, for example, we argued that use of military personnel to perform policing functions is a more overtly political statement than using police and, in post-conflict environments in which these functions are played by outsiders, the regular use of the military in frontline policing runs the risk of making the population feel as though they are under occupation (Fish and Greener 2011). the use of military personnel also suggests that the country is still in a state of conflict or hostilities. as noted both in that paper and in this one, the ability of military personnel to perform policing functions remains limited.

Perhaps most importantly, though, the question of legitimacy is critical when it comes to the likelihood of a local police force persisting in situ, and therefore to the ability of interveners to exit from peace operations. if this legitimacy is threatened by a confusion of military and policing roles and functions in a post-conflict society, by either or both the interveners and the host government, the chances for a lasting and sustainable peace are considerably diminished. recent policy efforts by the UN and EU have begun to sketch out appropriate generic


roles for police and military personnel in peace operations and these constitute important contributions to the field. However, more detailed planning needs to take into consideration how military forces might support policing efforts within clearly circumscribed boundaries, and how police may be better supported to carry out international roles, in order to avoid the current push to use military forces in policing type roles when they are not suited to the task at hand. in particular, more work needs to be done in asking how military police may also fit into the equation. More therefore, needs to be done to consider how to achieve an appropriate and legitimate division of labour between police and military in the different contexts within which international actors engage their efforts.

endnotes

1 For example, Campbell and Campbell, p330 point out that SWat teams have gone beyond hostage

situations etc “into a range of activities normally handled by traditional police and tactics” and that

military involvement in constabulary activities and in police training has also increased. they suggest

on p331 that “such collaborative involvement is not limited to the development and transfer of

useful military skills, tactics and procedures but also often involves the transfer of military attitudes

and orientations”.

2 rosen claims that we are in a 3rd generation of civil-military relations: the first was a domestic

debate about the military and the soldier’s role in relation to the state; the second was the

literature on issues surrounding the military contribution to humanitarian interventions or complex

humanitarian emergencies; and the third is a deeper look at the multiagency roles played in

international operations.

3 although we could include additional categories such as ‘skill sets’ or ‘attitudes’ these are largely

derivative of these broader categories, having developed to play these roles and function well

enough within these institutions. Much of this work was developed through an earlier paper by W.J.

Fish and B.K. Greener, ‘First Principles in Situating Police and Military’ (unpublished manuscript 2011).

4 We note that the idea of ‘the military’ masks differences in the profiles of different services and

branches. the role of military police, of infantry, naval seaman and jet pilot will differ. this is an issue

that we will consider in more depth elsewhere, but to note, we do consider there to be enough

similarity here too to allow us to make these calls (for example naval officers have been deployed

to afghanistan villages to run Provincial reconstruction teams and even Special Ops teams are

increasingly subject to increased oversight and scrutiny). the role of Military Police, in particular, is

of significance but is explicitly not addressed in this paper in any great detail as it will be addressed

in later work.


5 the roles of military forces are clearly stated in various country acts which legislate the existence

and use of armed forces (such as the New Zealand Defence Act 1990, or the Australian Defence Act

1903 and its various amendments).

6 the contributors to Charles Moskos’ book discuss how a number of armed forces around the

world were being subject to such processes such that militaries were becoming less ‘masculine’

and hierarchical and more accepting of difference. More recent literature notes the impact of an

increased use of reservists in military operations and this has further closed the distance between

military and civilian spheres (on this phenomenon see the contributions to the a Special issue of

Armed Forces and Society 37 (2) 1 april 2011).

7 adapted from material from United Nations, UN Peacekeeping PDT Standards, Core Pre-Deployment

Training Materials, 1st Edition (New york: UN, 2009), Unit 2 – Part 2: How UN Peacekeeping

Operations Function, pp47–56.

8 this was compounded by confusion on the ground between different US agencies involved in

recreating iraq’s security agencies. robert Perito, ‘US Police in Peace and Stability Operations’,

USIP Special Report, #191, august 2007, pp10–11 points out that Justice Department officials sought

to create a lightly-armed police force with an emphasis on community policing, whilst at the same

time the US military were creating ‘heavy police units’ made up of former soldiers (Public Order

Battalion, Mechanised Police Unit and Emergency response Unit composed of unvetted Sunnis

with military weapons and counterinsurgency training) that were merged in 2006 to create the

iraqi National Police (iNP) and which was engaged in death squad activities.


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