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Anatomy of a crisis Why valuation is so important

New Model Adviser Retreat 2013

September 2013

Stephanie Butcher

This presentation is for Professional Clients

only and is not for consumer use.

Fund Manager, European Equities

Joel Copp-Barton

Product Director

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Investment approach

Strong emphasis on valuation as the key determinant of future returns

No inbuilt country, sector, stock, style or market cap bias

Conviction based

Long term investment horizon

Bottom up fundamental analysis within a “top down” framework

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Valuation is fundamental to long term investor returns

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R² = 0.8

-5

0

5

10

15

20

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10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

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-Year T

ota

l R

etu

rn

CA

GR

(%

)

MSCI Europe Cyclically Adjusted PE (X)

14.9x Now

Source: Citi, Thomson Datastream as at 31 July 2013. Each square on this chart shows returns over the following decade from a range of cyclically adjusted PEs. The period covered in the chart is from 1980. Background data used to create the chart is from 31 December 1969.

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It’s all about cycles…

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Source: Bofa Merrill Lynch European Quantitative Strategy – back testing period from Jan 1992 to Jan 2012.

Europe has been in slowdown/recession for 5 long years

‘Quality’ and ‘low risk’ became investment mantras

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The Eurozone Crisis – key questions

Would the Eurozone break up?

Would we see currency redenomination?

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The crisis – what was being priced in?

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Source: JP Morgan Cazenove, Thomson Datastream. All data is based on MSCI indices expect for EMU which is based on a Thomson Datastream index, as at 13 August 2013. All underlying data starts from 31 January 1970, unless separately highlighted. 1Underlying data started from 30 November 1995. 2Underlying data started from 30 January 1973. Pre-draghi speech data as at 25 July 2012.

Cycle adjusted PEs for different geographies

Current Shiller PE (x)

LT Median (x)

Discount (%)

Europe 15.1 20.0 -24%

US 23.3 22.4 4%

Asia Pacific exc Japan1 18.4 21.9 -16%

EMU2 13.6 20.8 -35%

UK 14.9 18.5 -19%

Germany 17.5 20.4 -15%

France 14.9 23.4 -36%

Italy 8.8 26.1 -66%

Spain 10.0 20.3 -51%

Portugal 10.7 15.2 -30%

Cycle adjusted PEs for different geographies

Current Shiller PE (x)

LT Median (x)

Discount (%)

Europe 12.0 20.2 -41%

US 19.2 22.5 -15%

Asia Pacific exc Japan1 16.4 22.6 -28%

EMU2 9.3 21.0 -56%

UK 12.7 18.7 -32%

Germany 14.2 20.8 -32%

France 11.2 24.1 -54%

Italy 6.4 26.3 -76%

Spain 6.5 20.8 -69%

Portugal 7.6 16.6 -54%

Current Valuations Pre-Draghi speech

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The crisis – what was being priced in? Focus was purely on ‘safety’

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Source: ASR, Thomson Datastream as at 24 May 2013. High and low quality baskets are based on 5 years volatility of earnings, 20 year volatility of return on equity, current earnings uncertainty and current level of return on equity. Based on time-series data.

“… just as TMT involved extrapolating super-normal growth to infinity and beyond, the attraction of High Quality relies on the ‘new normal’ and the assumption of no-growth being pushed out forever into the future.” ASR, 30th April 2013

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100

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300

350

400

Jan 0

4

Jul 04

Jan 0

5

Jul 05

Jan 0

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Jul 06

Jan 0

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Jan 0

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Jan 0

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Jan 1

0

Jul 10

Jan 1

1

Jul 11

Jan 1

2

Jul 12

Jan 1

3

Jul 13

Jan 1

4

Jul 14

Jan 1

5

Jul 15

US technology sector relative performance to US market ex-TMT advanced 149 months (based on Thomson Datastream Index, rebased to 100)

European high quality index relative performance to low quality index (as compiled by ASR, rebased to 100)

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The Eurozone Crisis – action plan

Meetings with key decision-makers across Europe

Politicians

Central bankers

Economists

Companies

Our judgement; a Eurozone breakup was highly unlikely. It was in no-one’s interest

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Current positioning…

Overweight Spain 17.5% of the portfolio versus benchmark 6.7%.

Underweight Germany 10.1% of the portfolio versus benchmark 19.5%

Overweight Financials 32.9% of the portfolio versus benchmark 22.4%

Underweight Consumer Goods 7.2% of the portfolio versus benchmark 19.1%.

How did we get to these positions?

Source: Invesco Perpetual as at 28 August 2013. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund.

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Spain stood out on valuation, and progress on structural reform

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85

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95

100

105

110

115

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130

99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

Germany [Feb-13 = 86.8]

France [Feb-13 = 104.8]

Italy [Nov-12 = 115.0]

Spain [Nov-12 = 103.2]

Index of relative labour unit costs (Feb 1999=100)

Source: ASR, left hand chart as at 13 August 2013. Data used is latest available: For Germany and France as at 28 February 2013. For Italy and Spain as at 30 November 2012. Right hand chart: ASR, data used is latest available, as at 31 March 2013.

85

105

125

145

165

185

205

05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13

Goods Non-tourist services Tourism services

Spain – Exports of Goods and Services (Index 2005=100)

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Overweight Spain

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Source: Invesco Perpetual as at 31 July 2013. Active sector positions compared to FTSE Europe ex UK index. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund.

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Jan-0

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Apr-

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Oct-

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Jan-1

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Apr-

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Oct-

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Jan-1

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Apr-

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Oct-

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Jan-1

3

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Jul-

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Spain – overweight position relative to benchmark (%) Valuation in aggregate for the Spanish

market became very cheap – we added throughout the sovereign debt crisis

Draghi’s ‘Whatever it takes’ speech was, for us, the indicator that the market could move on from binary discussions about Eurozone break-up. Valuation became important again.

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Spain (continued)

Positions raised aggressively in December 2012, post Draghi’s speech, and a 2 day trip to Madrid and Barcelona meeting 10 companies.

Added to existing positions in BBVA, OHL

New positions in Mediaset Espana, Bankinter, Indra

All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund.

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Mediaset Espana

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Source: Bloomberg as at 14 August 2013. 1Consensus as compiled by Bloomberg as at 14 August 2013. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund. For illustrative purposes only.

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4.5

6.5

8.5

10.5

12.5

14.5

16.5

18.5

20.5

22.5

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Dec 0

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Dec 1

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Dec 1

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Mediaset Espana share price

In 2007 the company made an EBIT of €478m. There were 6 players in the market

In 2012 the company made an EBIT of €32m. There are currently 2 players in the market

Since the peak in 2007 the Spanish advertising market is down 60%

For 2015E consensus has an EBIT of €149m1

€

Position initiated in December 2012

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Bankinter

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Source: Bloomberg as at 28 August 2013. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund. For illustrative purposes only.

• Best asset quality in Spain as per Oliver Wyman review

• Top end of mass market client profile

• 100% ownership of Linea Directa insurer with ROE of 23% and solvency above 30%.

• In December 2012, the company traded at implied 0.6x P/TBV on the bank for a 2013 ROE of 7.6% - assuming the insurance business was worth zero.

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Bankinter share price

Position initiated in December 2012

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Indra

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Source: Bloomberg as at 14 August 2013. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund. For illustrative purposes only.

Indra share price

High quality IT service and solutions company

C.60% sales international growing double digits – strong position in Latin America

C.40% sales from Spain with revenues down c.50% from peak. Analysts have little to no recovery in models

Working capital at peak – government policy now aimed at easing the system

Trades at 0.8x EV/S with analysts cautious on top-line, margin and working capital

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Apr

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Aug 1

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Dec 1

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Apr

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Aug 1

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Dec 1

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Apr

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Aug 1

3

Position initiated in December 2012

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Why underweight Germany?

Source: HSBC, MSCI, Thomson Reuters, World Bank as at 31 January 2012. Chart data refers to period 1974 to 31 December 2011. Key to countries: AS = Austria, BG = Belgium, CN = Canada, DM = Denmark, FR = France, GE = Germany, JP = Japan, NL = Netherlands, NW = Norway, SD = Sweden, SW = Switzerland, UK = United Kingdom, US = USA. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund.

AS

BG CN

DM

FR GE

JP

NL

NW

SD

SW UK

US

y = -1.7121x + 10.144

R² = 0.11

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5Real equity r

etu

rns,

%

Real GDP growth, %

We find cheaper markets elsewhere

We are agnostic/ negative on large index positions; RWE, EON, Deutsche Bank, Allianz, BASF.

The correlation of GDP growth rates and stock performance is very low

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Overweight financials

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10

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Jul-

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Sep-1

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Jan-1

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Mar-

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Nov-1

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May-1

3

Jul-

13

Financials Banks Nonlife Insurance Life Insurance

Source: Invesco Perpetual as at 31 July 2013. Active sector positions compared to FTSE Europe ex UK index. P&C = Property & Casualty. All data relates to Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund.

Valuation together with dividend potential saw a rotation since the beginning of 2011 from P&C insurance, through Life insurers, and since early this year, towards banks.

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%

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Progress on capital build means banks have potential to pay significant dividends

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6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

11%

12%

13%

-300

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-100

-50

0

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250

2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E

Cap

ital

Su

rp

lus/

(d

efi

cit

) €

bn

B3 Capital Surplus / (Deficit)

B3 CET1

European Banking sector*: capital deficit turning to a surplus, 2011-2015E (€bn)

Source: Citi as at 9 May 2013. B3 capital Surplus/(deficit) is calculated before dividends. For illustrative purposes only. *Stocks included: KBC, Erste Bank, Raiffeisen Bank Int’l, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole, Natixis, Societe Generale, Commerbank, Deutsche Bank, Banco popolare, BP Milano, Intesa Sanpaolo, Monte dei Pacshci, UBI Banca, Unicredit, Danske Bank, DnB, Nordea, SE Banken AB, SHB, Swedbank, Credit Suisse, UBS, Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking group, RBS and Standard Chartered. For illustrative purposes only.

-5%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Nord

ics

Fra

nce

Sw

itzerl

and

Italy

Spain

UK

Benelu

x

Austr

ia

Germ

any

B3 Capital Surplus / (Deficit) - Post-Dividends 2015E

Cum. Cash Dividend 2012-15E

European banking sector* by country: Capital surplus position as a % of market cap (€bn)

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Nordea

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10.5%

11.8%

13.8% 14.7%

15.5%

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E

Nordea: Actual Basel 3 ET1 2011-2012, JPM’s estimated Basel 3 ET1 with a 65% dividend payout ratio for 2013E-2015E1

Source: 1Nordea company reports to 2012, JP Morgan Cazenove estimates 2013-2015E, as at 15 August 2013. For illustrative purposes only.

0.26

0.34

0.53

0.59 0.64

40% 44%

65% 65% 65%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

0.00

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0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

2011 2012 2013E 2014E 2015E

EU

R

DPS (EUR) Dividend payout (RHS)

Nordea: Actual DPS and dividend payout 2011-2012, JPM’s estimated DPS and dividend payout ratio for 2013E-2015E1

High quality pan-Nordic bank, with industry-leading capital ratios

Realistic ROE targets, with history of stable returns through-out recent crisis

Earnings upside from key divisions in Finland, Denmark and Shipping

Likely to lift pay-out ratio in response to stronger capital position. A 65% pay-out ratio in 2014 would equate to a yield >6%

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Underweight consumer goods

Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream as at 30 June 2013.

Great companies. They just got too expensive.

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130

140

150

160

Q32003

Q22004

Q12005

Q42005

Q32006

Q22007

Q12008

Q42008

Q32009

Q22010

Q12011

Q42011

Q32012

Q22013

MSCI Europe Consumer staples 12mth fwd P/E ratio relative to MSCI Europe (x)LT Average

20

PE ratio indexed

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Consumer Goods Expensive with downgrades is a poor combination

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-0.25

-0.20

-0.15

-0.10

-0.05

0.00

0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

0.25

Jun07

Sep07

Dec07

Mar08

Jun08

Sep08

Dec08

Mar09

Jun09

Sep09

Dec09

Mar10

Jun10

Sep10

Dec10

Mar11

Jun11

Sep11

Dec11

Mar12

Jun12

Sep12

Dec12

Mar13

Jun13

Source: Left hand chart1: UBS European Equity Strategy, Thomson Datastream as at 20 July 2013. Earnings momentum defined as: (Number of estimates upgraded in last 3 months minus number of estimates downgraded in last 3 months) divided by the total number of estimates.) Based on 3 months average of 1 month absolute earnings momentum.

MSCI Europe Food Producers/Beverages/Tobacco vs. Financials: 3 mths earnings momentum1

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The challenges in using our approach

Tendency to be early in. In times of true macro stress the market can ignore valuation for a period of time. Q2 2012 was very difficult.

Tendency to be early out. A valuation focus means we will often sit out the momentum stage of a bull market

Backward looking volatility measures can look higher than peers

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The benefits of our approach

A tendency to be early, with preparatory valuation work already done on how the cycle may develop.

A close and experienced fund management team adds depth of analysis

Work done on the intrinsic value of a stock allows more conviction to add to positions in times of volatility

Valuation discipline means we have no pre-conceived ideas about what is and is not investable

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Important information

This presentation is for Professional Clients only and is not for consumer use.

The value of investments and any income will fluctuate (this may partly be the result of exchange rate fluctuations) and investors may not get back the full amount invested.

Past performance is not a guide to future returns.

Where Stephanie Butcher and Joel Copp-Barton have expressed opinions, they are based on current market conditions and are subject to change without notice. These opinions may differ from those of other Invesco Perpetual investment professionals.

Where securities are mentioned in this document they do not necessarily represent a specific portfolio holding and do not constitute a recommendation to purchase or sell.

The Invesco Perpetual European Equity Income Fund may use derivatives (complex instruments) in an attempt to reduce the overall risk of its investments, reduce the costs of investing or generate additional capital or income, although this may not be achieved. The use of such complex instruments may result in greater fluctuations of the value of the fund. The Manager, however, will ensure that the use of derivatives within the fund does not materially alter the overall risk profile of the fund.

For more information on our funds, please refer to the most up to date relevant fund and share class-specific Key Investor Information Documents and the Supplementary Information Document. This information is available using the contact details shown.

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Issued by Invesco Fund Managers Limited Perpetual Park, Perpetual Park Drive, Henley-on-Thames, Oxon, RG9 1HH, UK Authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.