502.Heidt Silber Peterson Keenan.neg.7week Juniors Space Neg

8/7/2019 502.Heidt Silber Peterson Keenan.neg.7week Juniors Space Neg

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Michigan 7Week Juniors2k6

*****Index****'.........................................................................................................................................................................................................1................................................................................................................................................................................1NC Space Guard Counterplan 2

1NC Space Guard Counterplan................................................................................................................................................................................... 31NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit....................................................................................................................................................................... 41NC Air Force Overstretch Net-benefit .............................................................................................................................................................................5Space Force + Air Force Overstretch......................................................................................................................................................................... 6Air Force Key to Hegemony.............................................................................................................................................................................................71NC Ban Space Counterplan ............................................................................................................................................................................8

.......................Ban Space Solves Hegemony ...............................................................................................................................................9...................Ban Space Solves Hegemony ............................................................................................................................................................10.........................Ban Solves China Relations .............. ..............................................................................................................................................11Space Ban = Executive Authority ......................................................................................................................................................................12....................................................................................................................................................Space Force Won't Solve .............................. 1 3..A2: Mlll tarization Inevitable ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 4

.. ......................................................................................................................................................................................A2: Mlll tarization Inevitable 15. . ..........................................................................................................................................................Space Mllltarization Bad- HegemonyIArms Race 16. .Space Mll~tariza tionBad- Hegemony..................................................................................................................................................................... 17

Space Militarization Bad- Extinction ........................................................................................................................................................................... 18. . ................ .............................................................................................................................................Space M~lrtarizationBad- Russia ... 19........................................................................................................................................................................Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC 21

Space Militarization Bad- China 1NC ......................................................................................................................................................................... 22.. ...............................................................................................................................................................Space Mllrtarization Bad- China Extensions 23..Space Mtl~tarizationBad- Economy.........................................................................................................................................................................24

.. .....................................................................................................................................................A2: Space Mllltarization Good- Asteroid Deflection 25Spending Links- Industry Trade-off..............................................................................................................................................................................26RMA Links ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................27.. ...................................................................................................................................................................................Space Mllltarization Unpopular 281NC Incentives Counterplan..................................................................................................................................................................................29

Heidt/KeenanlPeterson/Silber


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Michigan7 Week Juniors2k6

1NC Space Guard CounterplanCounterplan Text: The United States Federal Government should establish a new separate branch of the Armed Forces, TheUnited States Space Force, and transfer responsibility over all space operations currently tracked under the national spacepolicy's mission areas of space support, force enhancement, and space control it to it. All personnel should come from NASA,DOT, FAA, and should be trained by general officers. Funding and enforcement guaranteed.

Solves hegemony better and avoids the net-benefits- establishment of the Space Guard would give the US control over spacewithout any risk of eroding the Air Force superiorityMcKinlev,commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado,2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director ofthe commander's action group at AFSPC. A graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, published articles in AviationWeek and Space Technology, Space News, and an essay in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Air UniversityPress, 1999) Spring, 'The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century" Aerospace Power Journal,http://www.airpower.maxwelI.af.mil/airchronicles/apjlapj00/spr00/mckinley,htm)The Unaed States Coast GuardBehveen1915 and 1942, the United Stales go ve mm t c onsoldae d the functional responstbiiies of f ie separate government services to form the Unlled States Coast Guard. It combmed the "sea services" types of functmns under oneorganizationto provide better service to the nat nn and lo ensure that the Navy wasnot encumbered by responsibilitiesthat lay beyondk core competency of prosecuting campaigns and defeating other navies.The k s t Guard's rw b reach back to 1789 wl h the formation ofthe Lighthouse Senrice. Although all seafarers depended upon its suppon, the service was not assigned to the Navy. Instead, a separate federal service had the responsibi iy torguiding seafarers through the dark ot night and fog of day. During the course of the next one hundred years, the Treasuly and Justice Departments wganized four other sea-related federal services--the Revenue Cutler Service, SteamboatInspeclion Service. Life-Saving Service, and Bureauof Navigatbn-to satisfy the pressing needs of our nation. Consolidationof these five federalservices began in1915, when the Revenue Cutler Seivic e and Life-Saving Servlce combinedto formthe Coast Guard. The fmal consoliilw ns occurredbetween 1939 and 1942, whenWe Coast Guard assumed respons~bilkyfor the Lighthouse Service. Steamboat Inspection Sewce, a nd Bureau of N avgatian .Throughout its history, the Coast Guard has Rexed wah the needs ofthe nation. In times of peace, it a ttachedto Ihe Dep arhe nt of the Treasury (from 1915 until 1967) or the Departmemiof Transpoltation (DOT) (from 1967to the present);when thenation was at war during those spans of time, i t served under the command of the Navy. During each war fmm the War of 1812b the Persian Gulf War of 1991, Coaa Guardsmen stood shwlder-to-shou lderwith the Navy's sailo rs tohght far ournation's interests. Each time, they complementedthe Navy's mpabil'iies to providethe ful array of sea-related military tools needed by our nation.Justas important as the 0bSe~ atio nthat the Navy and Coast Guard can complement each other wWm the sammedium (Ihe sea) is the parallel between Coast Guard missions and current or emerging space missions. The evolution and formationof the Coast Guard's missions reflect the importanceof sea-based trade to the economy, of access to the sea by private citizens, and of the sea itself to national secu rii. OM a l space now has that same level of importance to America's economy.standardofliving.andnatio~lsecurity.A quickC O I ~ P ~ ~ ~ S O ~of traditional Coast Guard responsibilities and space requirements provides a tel linq Stow (tab1e2).What lumps out isn?just the s~milariilyin functions, but also the realizationthat the Coast Guard m d e l represents the best organizaiional structure to accomplish these tasks. ~tprovides services 10 severaldepartments of government and Sectors of the economy. asmissconresponsibiMiesrepresentpublitg~ods.Atallfimes,the aovernment retains the option to desiqnate theCoast Guard as a war-fiqhtinq component when it needs to do so for national security, oiparlicularnote, the Guard bridaes the tenuous area created whenit becomes necessary to ernplov military forces in a zone designated for peaceful exploits. Forexample, no one seriouslv considers that a Coast GuardpESerICe "militarizes"the Great Lakes. Finally.the Coaa Guard'sabiliy toshilt between DOTand the DepanmentofDefense (DOD) stows h at n oseam exists on the water, despite having two sea-faring sewces.look ing at the above list ot Coast Guard missions, one might ask whether ilwould make senseto place those missmns in Ihe Navy if we were l o stall today with a Clean slate. The answer is n wbecaus e of the same core competency, war fightingversus must-pay support, and organizationaltensions outlined eadier.The United States @ace Guardio ol ti ig at the space side 01 that list, we must ask the inevitable qu es ti i, Should these existinq and emerqinq space functions reside separately across several deoartments?The answer is no--there must be a better Way, what tol~owsis a suggested organizationalstructure tor the nation's space assets. The pro pod off ers the potential of satistyingm d resohing the competing civil, military,and cornmeicral interests and inherent tensions. #frees the Air Force to realize its vision to become a fully capable aerospace force, and itgoes well beyond the '$west a program here, outsource a program there" methods currently underconsiderat~on.The recommended orqanizational structure for space services is the United States Space Guard (ussc), a fusion of civil, commercial, and militarySpace personnel and I ~ ~ s s ~ o ~ s .Alhough an armed setvice and a ready instrumentof national policy. the USSG would rema~nan operating adm~nktra tionof the DOTfor d ay-today operations. In times of crisis. lmay bede~igna~edasanarm~ftheunited~tate~A I ~F O ~ .The Space Guard's funding should come not only from DOD coffers, but also from all militarv, civil, and ~0mmercialenterprises that benefit from its services.Inthenearterm, the Space Guard's responsibilities should include all space operations currentlv tracked under the national space policy's mission areas ofspace support, force enhancement, and space control. It should work existinq issues such as spaceport safetv and securitv, satellite design, debrisminimization, and more. Likethe historical evolution ofits coastatcountetpart, the USSG should soon assume responsibility for missions such as fixinq disabled satellites,resupplvinq stations, refuelina satellites, eliminatinq space debris, conductina astronaut search and rescue, monitorinq treaties and sovereiqntvissues, arbitratina spectrum and sovereiantv issues, arbitratins spectrum interference, and controllina sDace lanes.Its personnel should come from exist inq space structures such as those found within the military, NASA, DOT, FAA, and others. Regardingfhecareer~essimUSSG personnel, they will have space services opportunities ranqinq from space launch and ranqe operations, to satellite trackinq and commandinq,to on-orbit mission specialties. The Space Guard will at all times be commanded by aeneral officers schooled, trained, and experienced in space~peclalfi s . Space profess~o nalsw~llhave a clear and broadened career path, and other space specialists wfll lead them.


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Michigan 7 Week Juniors2k6

1NC Space Guard CounterplanThe counterplan solves for civilian military relations, Air Force overstretch, the global economy, and hegemonyMcKinley,commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado, 2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director ofthe commander's action group at AFSPC. A graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, published articles in AviationWeek and Space Technology, Space News, and an essay in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Air UniversityPress, 1999) Spring, "The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-first Centuryi1Aerospace Power Journal,http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apjOO/sprOOlmckinley.htm)Looking at the spaceskie of that list, we must ask the inevhablequestion, Should these existing and emerging space functions reside separately across several departments?The answer is no--there must be a better way. What follows is asuggestedoganizainnalstruclureforthenation'sspaceassets.The proposal offers the potential of satisfvinq and reso!vinq the competinq civil, military, andcommercial interestsandinherent tensions. It frees the Air Force to realize its vision to become a fullv capable aerospace force, and it aoes well beyond the "divest a proqramhere, outsource a proqrarn there" methods currently under consideration.The reconmended oga nizaimn al structure for space services is the Unned States Space Guard (USSG), a fusion of civil. commercial, and manary space personrd and missb ns. Although an armed service and a ready instfument of national policythe USSG would remain an operattngadministrationoi the DOTfar day-to-day operations. In tlmes of crisis,1may be designated as an a n of the United States Air Force. The Space Guard's flndl ng should come not only from DODcoffers.butalso from ail military, civil, and commercial enterprises that benefit from its selvtces.In the near term, the Space Guard's responsibilities should include all space operationscurrently tracked under the national space policy's mission areas of space support, force enhancement, and space corrtrol, IIshould work e x~ si igissues suchas spacepon safety and se cu w, satellie design, debris mmimrzation, and more. L~k ethe historicalevolution of ~t scoastal counterpan, the USSG should soon assume rwpo nsib ilq for rmssions such as fixing disabled satelhtes, resupplying stationrefuelng satellites, elim nating space debris, conducting astronaut search and rescue, monitoringlrea ies and sovereignty issues, arbitratin gspectrum and sovereignty issues, arbiira tingspectrum interference,and controlling space lanes.Its personnel shouid come from exi sti g space structure$ such as those found whhin the miiitary.NASA,WT,FAA, and others. Reg atin g the career pogression of USSG personnel,they will have space sewice s oppotlu nitiesranging from spacelaunch and range operations, to satellne hackin g and commanding. to on-orbi im~ssonspec~ailies.The Space Guard will at all times be commandedby general officers schooled,trained. and experienced in space specian'ies. Space professb nalswill have a clear and broadened career path, and other space specialists will lead them.Pursuinq the above recommendation results in an orqanization dedicated to civil space concerns, acceptabletomanyspacestakeholden, and involved in nationalsecuritv--all the while allowinq other orqanizations to focus on their core competencies.lmplementingthepropowdmadelandprepar in~Our nation's Space forces forthe future require the Air Force to return to its roots, to retocus itsattentionon itsc ore war-fig~ingre~p~nsibilitand to accept the factthat it must kt evelythtng lying outside the framework of glo bal reach and global power find a new hwne. In short. R means that the Air Force must accept the imperative for afundamental divestiture of all space services. BVdivestinq space services, the Air Force will be free to focus on its core war-fiahting rewonsib ilities. ~will be unencumberedby the enormous financial responsibilaiesof administeringthe nation's space services. Its C U ~ ~ U T ~will enCOmpaSS the flvtna and fiqhtinq Corps that has served it SO wellthrouqhout its history. And it will be able to dedicate its space efforts to developing the future space force application systems that will finally allow it toclaim the aerospace title. Onabrgerscale, the nation will have reduced the size of its force structure while improvinq its abilitv to exploit space for nationalbenefit.Space systems alfect eachd us daii. We learn of world events, communicate, and conduct bu sh es via satelli e lin ks, vlew distant galaxies via space-based telescopes: and consider it inevitable that we will eventually mine asteroids and planets timprove lhfe on Earth.m ore than ever before, Space is mn ec ti ng the far reaches of our planet exponentially increasing the rate of learning, and becominq the aatewav to world economic qrowth.The imperative for Our 0riqinal Space team 10 divest ISinescapable. We must do this ~ ~ l yand in a manner that supporls the needs of our na tima nd the space sectors. The only rema ning decisionentailslintimgthemodelthatoffersthebesthopeforsuccess. The common qround of space ISan internationallv exploited domain, and Our nation needs a multianencvorqanization to oversee its interests there.The strenqth of the Space Guard concept lies in the fact that it takes space services in the same direction as space exploitation, resolves long-standinq challennes, and frees the Air Force and others to refocus on organizational core competencies. It solidifies our space effort, clarifiesorqanitational responsibilities, and unifies the manv, disparate drumbeats demandinq change.The timeforactinn is now. The USSG is the riqht orqanization for S U C C ~ S S ~ U ~exploitation of space in the twentv-first centurv. AS the expMation of spacechanges,SO must ourspacefwceschange. The aovernment must retain oversiqht of the space services that both enable warfare and can be viewed as public aoods. The commercialsector must stay ahead of its international competitors.A civil-military space service-the Space Guard-is our best hope for satisfvinq thecompetinn interests of all aovernment and commercial sectors.


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1NCAir ForceOverstretch Net-benefitUS Space Force would overstretch the Air Force- the Space Guard is key to maintaining Air Force strengthm,professor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and Mueller, Associateprofessor of comparative military studies at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, 2001(Lt Col Peter, Dr. Karl, February, "GoingBoldly-Where? Aerospace Integration, the Space Commission, and the Air Force's Vision for Space"http:llwww.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicleslapj/apj0l /sprOl lhays.htm#)One of the most surprising aspects of the At debate is that both its proponents and the advocates of a separate space force or corps are so quick toassume that militarv space assets ouqht to be centralized in a sinqle organization. After all, US national securitv space assets are currently dividedbetween the Air Force and the NRO, and whether or not this arranqement is ideal, it is certainlv one that both parties have accepted with little publiccomplaint for many years.This tendencv is particularly visible in the debate surroundinq the most innovative concept for future US space orqanization to appear in somew - L t Col Cynthia McKinley's recent Aerospace Power Journal article titled "The Guardians of Space."46 In a strikingly original proposal,McKinlev advocates usinq economic criteria to separate the direct war-fiqhtinq and support functions currently performed by US militarv spaceassets, retaining the former in the Air Force while makinq the latter into a United States Space Guard closely based on the organizational model ofthe US Coast Guard.47 This new oraanization would fall under the management of the Department of Transportation in peacetime and revert to AirForce control durinq war or national emerqency. McKinley's suggestion in many ways is crafted to promote Al and would remove from the Air Forcea number of current functions (such as operating the GPS sateltite constellation) for which the service seems to have only limited enthusiasm.Whether or not McKinley's specific proposal is a good idea-and it does have at least as much to recommend it as do the organizational options thatthe Space Commission's charter called for it to co nsid eri t reminds us how important the development of the commercial aviation sector was toearly airpower theorists such as Billy Mitchell. It also points out that those who simply assume that mititaw space assets must be combined in asinqle service or oraanized in wavs similar to existinq military structures are not lookina beyond a verv narrow sDectrum of choice. It is possible thatcentralization of military space will promote the most rapid innovation and development of US space power (whatever that turns out to look like), butit is at least equally plausible to suggest that healthy competition among rival organizations will be far more effective at achieving this goa1.48 It isworth noting that Al advocates do not typicallv arque that the division of US militarv aviation amona multiple services has retarded the developmentof American airpower thouqht and emgloyment.

Air Force power is key to readiness overall, is critical to our strategic flexibility, diplomacy, fighting terrorism, and deterringconflictThomas Drohan,Commander and Permanent Professor in the 34th education group,20M),Airman Scholar, Vol. 6 Spring giglio

Modem air power can attack strengths or weaknesses bevond the reach. capacitv and responsiveness of friendlv surface and naval forces. In theprevious era, "strategic bombing" was a blunt instrument. Now, in distinct operations, PGMs have transformed the bludgeon into a rapier which, onmany occasions, may be wielded directly in supportof policy with a fraction of the resources previously required. It mav be brandished for deterrence or coercion. It rnav be inserted or withdrawn incadence with diplomatic and other coordinated pressures. Distinct, direct air action can be taken at all levels, from response to state inspiredterrorism, to specific strikes in larqe scale conflicts. Its targets rnav range from the centre of government to an isolated and otherwise inaccessibleterrorist trainina base. An air force which is known to have a lona reach, with or without flight re-fueling, can directly influence policy by its veryexistence. An increase in alert states and augmentation of front line personnel are the modern equivalent of Mahan's "fleet in being," except thatdiplomacy may now be supported without the expense of surface deployment. Deterrence by air power is as relevant to peace inducement as it is tomaior nuclear or conventional confrontation, provided it is accompanied by a manifest determination to use it, if necessary.


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Michigan 7 Week Juniors

1NCAir Force Overstretch Net-benefitTurns case- air power is key to sustaining hegemony and prevents conflicts from escalatingPeters,Acting Secretary of the Air Force,9 (John, 7/28, Palm Beach Post, p. lexb)Killina the F-22 is simplv not acceptable. It is wronn for national securitv. It is bad economics. And it would put American service members atunnecessary and unacceptable risk. Operation Allied Force in the skies over Kosovo illustrated that air superiority is the foundation for victorv onland, at sea and in the air. As we rapidlv deplov decisive combat forces from the United States to the scene of hostilities, fiqhter lets will be the first toarrive. Thev will help us deter an adversary from attackinq and, if deterrence fails, to fiqht on the qround and in the air, and win. The F-22 wouldguarantee success in these vital missions for decades to come. Some critics of the F-22 contend that our country 's relatively easy victories in thepast 10 years prove that we don't need a new fighter. They insist that our air power is already far superior to that of any potential enemy. TodayAthough, at least six other aircraft - the Russian MiG-29, SU-27 and SU-35, the French Miraqe 2000 and Rafael and the European Consortium'sEurofiqhter - threaten to surpass the aqinq F-15, our current top-of-the-l ine air-to-air fiqhter. These aircraft are marketed agnressivelv around theworld to our allies and potential adversaries. Without the F-22, the United States runs the risk of allowino our air superioritv to atrophv to the pointthat an adversary could inflict areat harm on our previouslv superior Air Force. Alreadv, manv nations, amonq them Iran, lraa and North Korea, areconstructinq so~histicatedair defenses built around surface-to-air missile systems such as the Russian SA-10, SA-12 and SA-20. All these missilesvstems are available on the market today. Our current aircraft, such as the F-15 and F-16, lack the F-22's stealth and supercruise abilities and willbe unable to evade or destroy these air defenses without riskinn heavv losses.


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Space Force + Air Force OverstretchA single unified Space Force would fracture the Air Force- killing it readiness and space superiorityMcKinley, commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado,2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director ofthe commander's action group at AFSPC. A graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, published articles in AviationWeek and Space Technology, Space News, and an essay in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Air UniversityPress, 1999) Spring, "The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Century" Aerospace Power Journal,http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicleslapj/apj001spr00/mckinley.htm)

The third tension occurs among organizations. Orqanitational frictions arise as the domain draws more players and competing interests. As they goabout their business, the players define niches and defend equities. For the space arena, the number of players and their linkaqes depict a tanqledunderqrowth. It is often difficult to know whom to consult to resolve policy issues, answer questions, or qet help. The flip side is equallv difficult. Theorqanization receivinq the call often does not know how to (or even whether it should) respond. For example, is it an Ai r Force responsibility toprovide orbital collision avoidance data or analysis of satellite malfunctions to commercial interests? If not, to whom should these companies turn?With the maturing of space exploitation, these three tensions are creating a universal sense of frustration. Commercial oruanizations feel hindered bygovernment oraanizations that are not keepinq pace with their rush to market. Civil organizations feel overburdened by essential operations that liebeyond their equities. And military visionaries who see future space operations as kev enablers of a revolution in warfare feel tethered by aseeminqlv unsupportive infrastructure.The path our nation should follow for successful space exploitation must strike a balance between mission requirements, core competencies, visions,and qovernment responsibilities. It must account for the "common qround" space environment; reduce inherent tensions; resolve competing civil,military, and commercial interests; increase opportunities; allow the Air Force to achieve its vision to become an aerospace force; and continue toprovide the space services upon which our nation depends. Arrivino at the optimal orqanizational structure requires analysis of the space functions oftoday and the near future (table 1). Space Services Functions * Range Management 'Navigation Spaceport Securitv * Orbital SlotProtection * Spectrum Use Monitoring * Dealing with Piracy * Dealina with Interference * Space Surveillance * Collision Avoidance *Debris Mitiqation and Cleanup Space Environment Research Terrestrial Weather * Solar Research * Astronaut Rescue * Satellite RepairThese functions are currently performed by a variety of organizations throughout the three space sectors. As a result, no unifying organizationalstructure exists, and there is no possibility of these functions workinq seamlessly toward a national-level space exploitation objective. Interestingly,for another environmental medium, our nation has pulled similar functions together under the rubric of one organizational structure. This pastsuccess offers a notional organizational guide for our space future.


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Michigan7Week Juniors2k6

Air Force Key to HegemonyThe Air Force IsKey ToUs Power Projection And War Fighting Abiiities-Increasing Personnel Is Key To EffectivenessStcokbauer 2003 (Bette, "Rebuild ing America's Defenses"- A Summary, http:llwww.countercurrents.orglus-stockbauerO70503.h~)"Although air power remains the most flexible and responsive element of U.S. military power, the Air Force needs to be restructured, repositioned,revitalized and enlarged to assure continued 'global reach, global power'' (p. 31). "Because of its inherent mobility and flexibility, the Air Force will bethe first U.S. military force to arrive in a theater during times of crisis; as such, the Air Force must retain its ability to deploy and sustain sufficientnumbers of aircraft to deter wars and shape any conflict in its earliest stages. Indeed, it is the Air Force, along with lhe Army, that remains the core ofAmerica's ability to apply decis ive military power when its pleases. To dissipate this ability to deliver a rapid hammer blow is to lose the keycomponent of American military preeminence" (p. 37). "A gradual increase in Air Force spending back to a $110 billion to $115 billion level isrequired to increase service personnel strength; build new units, especially the composite wings required to perform the 'air constabulary missions'such as no-fly zones; add the support capabilities necessary to complement the fleet of tactical aircraft; reinvest in space capabilities and begin theprocess of transformation" (p. 37). "The ability to have access to, operate in, and dominate the aerospace environment has become the key tomilitary success in modern, high-technology warfare. Indeed, as will be discussed below, space dominance may become so essential to thepreservation of American military preeminence that it may require a separate service. How well the Air Force rises to the many challenges it faces-even should it receive increased budgets-will go far toward determining whether U.S. military forces retain the combat edge they now enjoy" (pp.38-39).

Air Power Is A Prerequisite To Other Forms Of Power ProjectionGoure,VP Lexington Institute,2005 (Daniel, QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW CQ Congressional Testimony, Sept. 14, p. lexis)An example of the problem inherent in the co nc e~tof overmatch is US . tactical air power. Air dominance is the sine qua non of success in modernmilitary operations.'~ithoutabsolute control of the air operations Enduring reed om and Iraqi Freedom would have been quite different, if they couldhave been pursued at all. Without air dominance, the U.S. military can do nothing else. Once air dominance is achieved, the full weiqht of U.S. airassets can be fully applied as a joint capability. furthermore, tactical air airpower is a fungible asset. It can transition seamlesslv from establishinq airdominance to interdictinq hostile forces, to providing air and missile defenses and conductina close air support. So-called overmatch capabilitieswere created and sustained because they were and remain absolutely vital to DoD's ability to achieve its strategic objectives and to engage inconflicts in a manner we prefer. Overmatch capabilities can dissuade potential adversaries from acquirinq certain capabilities or channel theiracauisitions in directions we find les threatening. An excellent example of this is the fleet of nuclear attack submarines created during the Cold War.For years U S, and NATO planners worried about the threat that the Soviet submarine fleet would pose to the trans-Atlantic shipping lanes in theevent of hostilities. The United States engaged in a competitive strategy, matching our strength against their weakness, our SSNs against their ASW.The Navy deployed its superior submarine capability, its overmatch, in Northern waters to threaten the Soviet fleet at home. The Soviet reaction wasto pull back, spending enormous effort to protect bastions that we never planned to attack.

Heidt/Keenan/Peterson/Silber


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Michigan 7 Week Juniors2k 6

1NC Ban Space CounterplanCP Text: The Pr esident of the United States should establish an international treaty banning all acts of war an d attack in anyspace platform

It Solves- the counterplan avoids an arms race and maintains U S hegemony- other nations would followDeBlois, Division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office1998(Lt Col Bruce, Winter, "Space Sanctuary:A Viable National Strategy" Aerospace Power Journal, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.millairchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html)

Who Is in Charge? Before structuring a national space strateav, we must address the issue of command [authority and responsibility to set strategy)and control (authority and responsibility to execute strategy). The broad impact of space access and the issues it raises clearly warrant top-leveloversight. Because the executive powers of the president were established for just such circumstances, the president should be "in charqe." Vestedin that "charqe" is both responsibilitv of providing vision and authoritv to set strategy to pursue that vision.What Is the Vision? The president must produce and communicate a clear vision of where the future of the United States in space will be. John F.Kennedy's vision of an American man on the moon by the close of the 1960s best illustrates a president's ability to focus a nation toward nationalgoals in space. The twenty-first-century vision should include the United States as world leader in a peaceful space environment characterized byboth extensive, multinational, exploratory ventures and intense commercial endeavors.What Is the Best Strategy for Pursuing That Vision? To pursue that vision, the president retains the power to set strateqy. Based upon the argumentpresented above, the best strateqv for qettinq to that vision is one of space sanctuary. As stated, this is not a do-nothing strategy. We need toundertake intense diplomatic efforts to convince a world of nations that space as a sanctuary for peaceful and cooperative coexistence and stabilitybest serves all. Treaties must address exactly what constitutes a space weapon, commitments to not employ them, mechanisms ofverificationlpolicing, and assurances of punitive response for violations. A treatv with the clause "the positioninq of any weapon in space or attackinqany space platform will be considered an act of war aqainst all sianatories of this treatv" would provide formal and instant coalition (or collectivesecurity) aaainst any actor seekincl the weaponization of space and would be a natural extension of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Clearly,theUnited States has the opportunitv and means to lead the diolomatic ventures, as well as the resources to lead in developinn the methods and tools ofverification37 and punitive response.38


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Ban Space Solves HeqemonvSpace weaponization ban is key to US hegemony, and the economy- the alternative will inevitably result in war and arms raceGarwin, Senior Fellow for Science and Technology Council on Foreign Relations, New York and IBM Fellow Emeriius, '49 (Richard, Oct 25, 'TowardInternational Security: The Role of Space Weapons, Antisatellite Weapon Tests, and National Missile Defense" http:llwww.fas.orglRLG/102599-lakhdhir-htm)

Now is the time for nations to discuss and possibly to negotiate a ban on weapons in space and on antisatellite tests. The U.S. Conaress shouldthink more deeply than it has yet about the threats to the United States and the cost and effectiveness of various defenses. SincetheresourcesewendedforNational Missile Defense could have been used for competing m~lilaryneeds, as well as for other needs of the society that NMD is supposed to pmec t, major anention shouM be given to cheaper and more eh di ve systems such as bwst- phaseintercept (BPI) for National Miss~l eDefense.IHundredsof satellaes now pres mt in space benefit the people of the world bo th economicallyand by their contributi to international securiiy. Sate!l~tesrange from those that broadcast television and radio. to voice and data communicalion,toGPS and GLONASS for precision nawgation,to weather an d commercial imagery satellites, to high-pedormancereconnaissancesatellites. In addition, satellites routinely detect the launch of ba llistic missiles, a capabilty that is increasingiybeingshared amono nation s.Sc~eniiiicsaleilites for astronomy and for Earth 0bse ~a tio nare revolutionizingour understandingof the unrverse an d d our planet. Thusfar, activities in space have proceededwithout much con flict. Means have been foundfor regulationandagreementto minimtze htwfere nce inthe radio spectrum, while making more ef li ch t use of limited spectrum resources. The Outer Space Treaty bars thestationtng of nuclear weapons in space, or "other weapons of massdestruct~on."And nations are responsible for damages that their space activities may cause to others, pehaps including destruction of the space assets of another n ai in . The situation is co mol~ca tedbv the fact that there is now so much prlvatecommerctal activity in space, onen in the form of international consortia in large mmp lexes of communicationsatellites, in the prcduction of commerc~alimagery, and the like.The prospect of denial of peaceful use of space is what led the nations of the world to adopt the Outer Space Treaty. Inream. stafioninq a few nuclearweapons in space is far more costly than providinq for their delivery aqainst targets on Earth, asneeded. Beyondnuclear weapons, there have beenproposals for stationinq thousands of small interceptor rockets in space, to destroy ballistic missiles in fliaht traiectorv, and there is a good deal ofenthusiasm for stationing powerful lasers in space for attack of tarsets in space, in the air, and on the qround. Again, if one had a sinale laser inspace, it miqht take hoursordays for the Earth to rotate and the laser to be at an appropriate point in its orbit to threaten a tarqet on the qround or in theair. However, a subs!anllal number ilweapons in space mtght be able to destroy targets withtn minutes of the command to do so, ifthe large ls were visible and not below clouds. The prospect of such weapons in space leads-immediatelv to the consideration of counters to space weapons.JU S~because space weapons. ~n opp o~ ed,can have signiintcapabilay, both those con temp la tin^ the deployment of such weapons and those who miqht be on the receivinq sidehave long considered how to counter them. In the Cold War era, it was perfectly clear that deployment of space weapons by the Soviet Union wouldhave led to effective ASAT deployed by the United States; conversely. the Soviet Union was fully capable ot providing the necessaryASATIO counterU.S. space weapons xiwas true even in the case ofwhat were supposed to be relatively low cost 'bri lliant pebbles",deployed by the many thousands in order to counter Soviet ICBMs and submarinelaunched ballistic missles (SLB Ms). But a simple analysisshaw lhat if is far easier andcheaper to destroy such satellites by qround-based ASAT. as their population is beina built up in space.(l)Neither the motivation nor the capability isSO clear ifl a world in which Russia no l0nqer is all enemv of the United States, andvic e versa. Therefore, no individual nation has SO stmngamotivationaspreviousiytocounterthe deploymentofspaceweapons. To the extent that space weaponrv would be seen to confer heqemony, nations orconsofiiaotnations would oppose them. t heab~en~e~f adequa t eimernationalagreements to protect its actbit~e sin space (a nd the United States government is not at present apparently seeking such agreements).the United States Department of Detense has launched a Space Control Technology Program thatwill include elements of "protection,prevention. negaio n. and suweillance"of various space actvities. The goal ISolten stated as "space control." which conjures up the vision of antisatellite we a n s (ASAT) that could destroy satellites at will. In1999(2)Bob Bel l of the U S. National Security Council spoke about space wntm l as toliows: ''We need not be victim lo old think', The old-think Cold War mental ly was that we envision space control as ASAT, and we equate ASAT wilh a dedicatedsystem that went up and destroyed somethin g.Vppa rentlyBell emphasizes options such as destroyrng or jammtng the link between an adversary's satellne and the Earl h Unforlunatety, many satellites are extem ehj vulnerable to destruction byweapons launched from the ground- ASAT or antisatelllie weapons. The Sovtet Union tested many times a soca lled co-orbhal ASAT, which was launched into an orb# similar to that of the qu arry satellfie, and afler an oh11or so moved closeenough so that an explosion could propel pellets o l the ASAT wamead to destroy the qu arv satellite. The Un led States has had developmem programs lor ASAT weapons. It h ad dephyed two nuclear-armedASAT systems but destroyed them longago More recently n developed the miniature hommg vehicle (MHV) technology.for a weapm that couldbe launched ham an F-15 or other aircraft, that would not enter ob it but that would simply arrive at the right time to meet asatellite in low-Earlh orbit (LEO) and colirde with il . This is the same technology that is being deployed wi h the Patriot short-range Theater M~ssileDefense (TMD) system, and has been chosen for longer-rangeTMD and for the interc eptorfor the proposedNatlonal Missile Defense (NMD) system. Destroying a satellte IS far simpler than destroyinga warhead carrie don a reentry vehicle ior several reasons: o The satellite is far more tragile than is a nuclear warhead equipped with reentry vehicle. o Thesatellne follows a highly predictableIrajectory. o The satell ie is considerably largerthana warhead. o The intercept time can be chosen, lor the most part, at the convenience of the attacker, and the altack can take place within a short range ofaround-based radars or laser svstems to atd ihe attack.TheoDtimum ASAT system w ould be a ground-launchedrocket carrying an MHV- capable simply of rising toanatiude of 500 km or so to be able to reach the satellite lhat would be underattack. It is not so easy to destroy a satellitem geosmchronous orbit, such as-are most ot the TV broa dcaa satellnes, some weather satellites, or even in intermediateEarlh orbit (MEO)such; Ihe naviga tion sate llie s- GPS. But many valuab lesvstems are i n LEO, and some of them in small numbers and o fthe greatest importance to internationalsec urii . These include the systems long known as National Technical Means (NTM) that are protecled aqalnst bilatera lattack by the ABMTreatyof 1972 and the SALTAgreements. In 1983, I te ti ie d to the Senate Foreign Relations ca mi tte e in supportof a draft treatv limitins antisatellite weapons, presemedtoihatsame Commiitee in May 1983 by theUnion of Concerned Scient~sts.Ihad played a roi e in drafting the proposed treaty.(3]The firsttwo ArticlN ofthe drail Article I "Each Parh, undertakes not to destroy, damacre, render inoperableor chanqe the fliqht trajectory of space obiects of other States.' s me 11"t. Each Party undertakes not to place in orbit around the Earth weapons fordestroyinq, damaqinq, renderinq inoperable, or chanqina the fliqht traiectorv or space obiects, or for damaqinq obiects in the atmosphere or on theground. "2. Each Party undertakes not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. "3.Each Party undertakes not to test such Weapons in Space Or against Space obiects." ~hhoughsome padicipants in the CDargue thatthe re is al present no arms race inspace and no reasontonegoia teoreven~~discuss~pacea rmsmntrn~ .Ibelievethatthe best time to introduce such treaties and ~ e q ~ l a t i ~ n sis when there is not active conflict or even anapproach to conflict in space. Tothis end. Iquote the final paragraph In mytestlmony of ~ a yia, iga3. " ... we can urgently neaotiate a treatv alona the lines of the Draftpresented here, or we can see the wealth and security of our nation imperiled by a needless conflict in space, brouqht about by a qreater desirefor advantaqe than for mutual benefit, and fostered by emer~i ngdoctrine and organizations which regard soace as an opportunitv for conf lic t ratherthan the marvelous tool and environment which it is. We can trv to make space safe for all non-weapon activities, or we can risk our o wncontinued militarv and civil use of space. Neqotiation,wfihouttuflhsrASATtests, is an opportunitv we will no t have much lonqer." Ibeltevelhatacansensushasevoivedsince i 9 8 4 t 0 t h ~ e f l e c i t h a t m i l i t a ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ e p e r m i d ~ d .butthat weapons in space are problematical and could be verv destabitizinq. ~yow nv iew is t ha tif there are weapons inspace, then there will be extensive development and de~lovmentof ASAT, in order to neqate those weapons. Funhemre, it is relativeiy easy. as I indicated in my previouswritings, to deploy 'space mines' which mul d be very smalland relatively crude satellies that could provide a rap~dcapability of destroying valuable space assets. I believe that the time is now for the nations capable ofdevelopinq ASAT or of puttino weapons into space to discuss such matters and to draft aareements with the aim of preventinq deployment of spaceweapons and of preventinq tests of antisatellite weapons.


10/29


Ban S ~ a c eSolves HeaemonvBanning space weapons and ASATs solves hegemony and US space developmentHitchens, CDI Vice President,2002 (Theresa, April 18 'Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S.Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons", http:ilwww.cd~.orglmissile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)

The potentia l for strategic consequences of a space race has led many experts, including within the military, to tout a space arms control regime asan alternative. A ban on space weapons and ASATs could help preserve-at least for some time -the status quo of U.S. advantaoe (especially ifcoupled with U.S. moves to shore up passive satellite defenses). In a recent article in Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Jeffrey Lewis, agraduate research fellow at the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, makes a good case for an arms controlapproach, arguing: "If defensive deplovments in space cannot keep pace with offensive developments on the around, then some measure ofrestraininq offensive ca~abil itiesneeds to be found to even the playinq field."In any event, it is clear that U.S. policy-makers must look at the potential strateaic and direct military risks, and the costs, of weaponizinq space.

Space Weaponization would lead to a global arms race with nuclear super-powers.Only banning the deployment can solve forinternational tensions and maintain US hegemony.Caldicott and Eisendrath 2k5 [Dr. Helen, Craig, 'No Weapons in Space', The Baltimore Sun, May 19&[http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/fileslnuclearlBaltimore%20Sun%2Oarti~1e%2Oby%2OHe1en%2OCaldi~0tt%2Oand%2OCraig%20Eisendrath.doc][If one genie is already out of the bottle for space militarization, another genie can and must be contained by preventingspace weaponization. Weapons do not now orbit in outer space. There are powerful reasons why such weapons should beforbidden. First, placin~weapons in space inevitably would provoke an arms race there. Such a race eventualIy wouldconsume hundreds of billions of dollars. It is simply inconceivable that the United States could place weapons in outerspace without provoking other nations such as China. Russia, Japan and countries in the European Union to do the same.Second, most space-based weapons are inefficient in relation to those based on the ground or in the atmosphere. If wewant to destroy a missile site or a troop deployment or bomb a nuclear reactor, it is far more effective to do this with aground-based missile or pilotless aircraft. Space-based weapons are also radically more expensive than land-basedweapons or aircraft. Third, the United States is already the dominant military power in the world, spending about $500billion a year on the defense budget, including money for current wars, with technologv that far exceeds any possible&,including Russia and China. Adding outer space as a new dimension of our military presence is simply notnecessary. Such a move adds a new gesture to our military posturing without increasing our security. Finally, a resuonseto any possible arms race in outer space is alreadv available: a draft international treaty forbidding space weaponizationthat was proposed by Russia and China in 2002. The United States has been alone among the great powers in refusing toendorse U.N. General Assembly resolutions on outer space and the draft treaty. Other countries are eager for anagreement,- just as they are for a nuclear test ban that includes underground testing, an international criminal court, anagreement on global warming as well as treaties on land mines, smaIl arms and chemical and biological weapons. Inrefusing to s im a treaty on space weaponization and these other significant international accords, the United States isvirtually alone in thwarting the world in its efforts to achieve disarmament and environmental sanity through multilateralagreements. In 1967, the United States led the world in pursuing the Outer Space Treaty, which forbids the orbiting ofweapons of mass destruction - but not non-WMD. Today, we are the ones obstructing the world in its desire to seal offspace as a potential area of weaponization.U.S. policv is driven not by a need to ensure our security but by lobbyists whoneed to secure contracts for their defense industry corporate employers. It is beyond time for the United States to agree tosign an international treaty to prevent weapons from being deployed in outer space, a policy that would serve the countryand not a select group of corporations.The issue of space weaponization is a test case for this administration to reach outto other nations and to set the safest and most sensible direction for the nation and, indeed, the world.

Heidt/Keenan/Peterson/Silber


11/29


Ban Solves China RelationsBanning Space Weapons is key to US-China RelationsZhanq 2k5 [Hui, 'Action/Reaction: U .S . Space Weaponization and China', Arms Control Today, December, Accessed atProquest.]

Given the possibility of effective and cheap countermeasures, it seems foolish to many Chinese that the United Stateswould bother to deploy hiphly expensive space-based weapons or anti-satellite technologies. If Washington really wantsto reduce the potential vulnerability of its space assets, there are a number ways to improve space security, includingtechnical approaches, rules of the road, and arms control agreements. By contrast, weaponizing space can only furtherworsen space securitv. As Hu emphasized recently, "[F] or ensuring security in outer space, political and legalapproaches...can still be effective, while resorting to force and the development of space weapons will only be counter-productive."In China's view, the most effective wav to secure space assets would be to aqree on a ban on space weaponization. As its workingpaper to the CD emphasizes, 'Onlv a treatv-based prohibition of the deplovment of weapons in outer space and the prevention of thethreat or use of force aqainst outer space obiects can eliminate the emerqinq threat of an arms race in outer space and ensure thesecurity for outer space assets of all countries which is an essential condition for the maintenance of world ~ eace."China's stance onbanninq weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985 when it first introduced a working paper to the CD on its position onspace weapons. China's most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations:


12/29


Space Ban = ExecutiveAuthoritySpace policies are determined by the president, they are his inherent authorityLogsdon,Research Professor of Space Policy and International Affairs at George Washington University (John, Professor Emeritus of PoliticalScience and International Affairs, NoDate "The Politics of Space: Understanding Space Policymaking" http:l lwwwl .jsc.nasa,govlerlseh/political.htmlAs an area of government activity, the U.S. space proqram has been prominent for a quarter centurv. The qovernment has made and implementednumerous decisions about the objectives, pace, and management of various elements of the US, space proqram, and policymakers continue toaddress and resolve many such concerns. (The focus on government decisions does not deny the importance of diverse private sector space-relatedecisions, but until recently the government-sponsored activity dominated the U S ,space program.) Political scientists have developed a variety ofapproaches to understand and analyze the policymaking process, and such methods can be applied directly to comprehending the formulation ofspace policy.Unfortunately, the public policy decisionmaking process is extremely difficult to study. Space policies, particularly those of hiqhest siqnificance, aredetermined within the executive branch of the qovernment, often without public or even Conqressional participation. President John F. Kennedy onceargued that the factors that influence the most prominent national policy discussions never could be completelv understood: "There will alwavs bethe dark and tangled stretches in the decisionmakinq process


13/29

Michigan 7Week Juniors2k 6

Space ForceWon't SolveIncreasing the size of the Space Force won't solve- conflicting culturesand identity m ake it incompetentm,commander of the 21st Operations Support Squadron, Peterson AFB, Colorado,2000 (Lt Col Cynthia A. S., USAF, ex-deputy director ofthe commander's action group at AFSPC. A graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College, published articles in AviationWeek and Space Technology, Space News, and an essay in Beyond the Paths of Heaven: The Emergence of Space Power Thought (Air UniversityPress, 1999) Spring, 'The Guardians of Space: Organizing America's Space Assets for the Twenty-First Centu ry Aerospace Power Journal,http:llwww.airpower,maxweIl.af.millairchronicleslapj/apjOO/spr00/mckinley,htm)Organizations are ueat edl o a ccomplish a unique set of missions. As l s members embrace those responsb il ities , a cu ltu re that ep itomizes ~ o n se n of identity fonns around those core missions. When the organization begms loextend ilseil beyond this raison #&re, cultural tensions qulckly emerge.The Air Force, for example, was formed to "fly and fight," and the words globa l reach, glcbal power best convey its sense of identity. With its flyand-fight self- hage, a degree of friction has atways existed between the Air Force's air and spacecultures. At the hearl of this discord lies the fact that today's space capab ~li iesremam outside the Air Force's sense of identity.During the past demde and a haH,this &cord has been thrust into the spotlight each time the service's leadership has attempted to erase the cultural gap by force-fiing space operations inlo me Ar F ~ ce 'ssense of identity. The Air Force'smethods have included attempts to operationatze. n om iu e, and, of late, Integrate space weralion s. The first two did not bridge the gap, and the last, despite its far more aggressive execution, will have the same result--but b r reasons lhat bearexplicationFirst, a fundamental cultural dichotomy separates today's air and space communities: the difference between war fighting and support--between war-fighting and non-war-fighting cultures. Both war fiahtinq and support are essential for national security, but the world in which each operates@different demands and expectations. At the most basic level, air warriors think in airpower war-fiahfna terms: operatinq and sustaininq aircraft atbases, flvina to taraets, accomplishinq a mission, and returning to base. They think in terms of campaign planning, operational art, and tacticalsuccess. Today's space operators think in terms of space services support: placinq a satellite on orbit, continuously exploitinq its data, and sendinqits critical data to people who need it. These characteristics represent two equally important yet distinct cultures: one based upon a war-fiqhter mind-set and the other upon a support mind-set. Like trying to mix oil and water, it is, quite simply, unrealistic to expect the two to become one.The dnve lo rreegelhesp two d,s tnd cvtu res mrnugh mtegratlm nas ns roots m the fall 10% m o n a meerinc o'lne Ar Force s senor leaders. AHhwgh they criglnallr vieweo lnteg-allon as a methoo by v;hich to guarantee cn!lnue d An Forcestewardshipof srace, wInln months of h e meet ng. nlegrat nn was neing inte rpr 44 as tne necessa y and sun clent cond~tionby ivnicfi the Air Force could seze t ie oppcrlunly1c ca; ~tseHan aerospace forceAt the outset, a's imDonant to note that the Air Force is the premier mil'ilaryorganizahon fw exploiting the aerospace.Na other sewice can cUm to have a war.f~htingculture or vision that so fully embraces aemsoace oaver. From dav one.the AirForces culture, core competencies and sense of laen!lty have been wrapp edin ns aoil11.y lo provide globa l react and power on beha?of our national Imerests. Inaeec, the Air Force's transfomlatlon ,nto an aerospace krc e sh3u d ocdr swnerrather than later, sur lo erect the rans sf or ma ti or, the Air Forne must grasp the true meanlng and ~ndcatotonof being an aerospace pober. IP ak l't ~onto ks ~nabilityt o b~dg ethe chasm Serheeq war-+~~;hll ngand nowwar-tighmgculures--regardlessofthe level of m i l m e n 1and awareness--mtegrationw~ilnot transform the Air Force inm an aerospace power for at least two reasonslntearatinq space capabilities and personnel into mainstream Air Force operations and staffs neither equates to nor creates aerospace power in itsmost visionarv sense. We will achieve aerospace power when we take the revolutionary leaps to foster new ways of employing forces and new waysof conducting warfare. We will achieve it when we directly employ space-warfare platforms to achieve military objectives.In addn~on,Be Air Force lsnt alone ~nIsquesl to better Integrate Vac e capabllles All of the ml lary sewlces face sm~larntegratlon challenges and opporluntles the e m state of wn.ci IS spelled o v In Jo~ntVs~on20102To say that Lsn g spaceservices to lmorcve almvte r makes tt e Alr Force an aerosaace -orce inpans that us~nqsp aceto nnprove landD. sea power makes the km r a land-space force and 1 k Navy a marnme-space force Crovmmg onlv soace SewIceS and lP lwra nno, . e .those sewice; ~n mmainstream alr operatmns will not create aerospace power A ym , me key to bem mng a n aerospace power l~ esIn the operatanal use of space as a war-fighllng med~um.The Air Force will ach~ev eits vision of becoming an aerospace force, but it must firs1 have aerospace power capablilies--that is, the anainment of aerospace power must precede the service's claims of being an aerospace force. Throughout ournation's use of orbl al space for national security, the Air Force's war-fghling operations have been restricted to atmospheric war hghting. This will change early in the first h l f of the twenty-first century. The capabilities that will allow operationalexpbiiationof the entire aerospace medium, create aerospace power, and allow the Air Fo rce to change its moniker to Aerospace Force are already on the drawing board.The most obvious exampk is the Space Operatmns Vehicle (SOV).3 Wthin two de cde s. this vehicle will allow me Uniled States to pm jed power, not in the severa lhours it does today but in minvles . It will allow the United States 10 project power.not just within the atmosphere but in orbita l space, in the atmosphere,and to the sulfate of the planet. Th is, along with other future capabilkies,win naturally extend the war-fighting responsibihtiesof airmen into the enhre aerospace medium. Inshort, ~nthe next couple of decades, the Air Force's core competenciesand visionary concepts win transform it from an air force into an aerospace force that operationally employs both air an d space platlorms to achieve our nation's militaryobjectives.But we are speaking of the future--not the present. Despite valiant efforts to force the Air Force's air and space cultures to merqe, the qap betweenthe service's sense of identitv and its current space responsibilities remains. For the Air Force to achieve its vision of becoming an Aerospace Force,it must focus its space efforts on those systems that fit within its olobal reach, alobal power identity. Furthermore, it must relinquish its noncore, non-war-fighting responsibilitiesfor providing space services.Although the Air Force's leadership has not realized this fact or the magnitude of its implications, evidence exists that some senior leaders arebeginning to discover it. During the past couple of years, the Air Force's senior leadership has found itself concurrently defending its spacestewardship role white questioning, for example, its primary management of launch ranges--especially now that commercial activity outpacesgovernment launches. It is becoming increasingly obvious that few of todav's s~ace-relatedactivities fall within the Air Force's core competencv ofprovidinq qlobal reach and power.Similar cultural tensions are a~ pa re ntin other sectors of the space community. NASA faces internal struqqles when it contem ~late sroutine shuttleservices, continuous replenishmentof the international space station, astronaut rescue, and satellite repair instead of stickinq to its science,research, and exploration charter. NASA questions how providing routine space shuttle operations--especially to the international space station--fitswith its traditional focus on exploration. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) questions its potential role as provider of both air- andspace-traffic control.These cultural stresses are na tural.When organizationsextend themselves beyond their se ns ed identity, cuRural frictions inevilably arise. These tensions do not lessen the relative value of the missions in question. Qute the cmtrary, the missionsremain vilal and essenltnl. Conducting shuttle flights and manag ng launch ranges are clear examples.Butas the missions extend beyond the organization's ratson d'gtre, cultural tensions will and must emerge.


14/29

Michigan7 Week Juniors2k6

A2: Militarization InevitableTheir militarization and arms race inevitability claims are a self-fulfilling prophecy- we should only plan where and how theIJS should go into spaceDeBlo is, Division chief of Strategic Studies and Assessments at the National Reconnaissance Office1998(Lt Col Bruce, Winter, "Space Sanctuary:A Viable National Strategy" Aerospace Power Journal, http:liwww.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98ldeblois.html)

If we continue to assume that maior qlobal warfare between nations is inevitable and prepare for it accordingly, we condemn ourselves to that future.Doinq so assumes determinism-that the future will happen and that we have to optimize our position in it. That assumption is not necessarily trueand runs counter to the American spirit. The future is what we make it. Perhaps we need to spend a little less time creatina weapons to protectourselves in a future that we are destined to stumble into and a little more time buildinq the future we would want to live in. More than challenqins aflawed assumption, this article suqqests a replacement-an assumption that is both more optimistic about the nature of people gnJ one thatresonates with the American spirit: "The United States will lead the world into space; we only need to decide where and how to go."

Space weaponization is not inevitable-the ball is in theUS courtMueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, http:llwww.isanet.oralnoarchive/mueller.html~

On the other hand, it is also clear that space weaponization is not inevitable in the very near term for the simple reason that onlv theUnited States possesses the resources and capabilities that would be required to deplov space weapons in a serious way before theend of the decade, and probably for some years beyond 201 0. In manv of the historical precedents that tend to be compared to spaceweaponization, such as the development of ironclad warships in the 1860s, Dreadnought battleships after 1900, or atomic weapons inthe 1940s, the same technology was being eagerly developed in several major countries at once, so the leading state simply faced achoice between leadinq the revolution and followinq in its wake.[l I ] In this case, in contrast, the United States can unilaterallv choosewhether space will be weaponized, at least for a while.

Space weaponization is not inev itab le the costs outweigh the benefits-no country will jump on boardMueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, http:l/www.isanet.orqinoarchive/mueller.html]The premise that states are selfish rational actors in an anarchic world actually predicts little about what their specific policies will be inthe absence of additional information or assumptions. In fact, warfare and states' preparations for war are often limited by a widevarietv of rational considerations, most of which have little to do with formal arms control negotiations. Deplovinn space weaponswould involve a variety of potential political costs and benefits, both domestic and international, and is far from unreasonable to thinkthat states miqht shy awav from such a course even if it promised to increase their absolute militaw capabilities, depend in^ on thecomplete set of incentives and disincentives facina them. As the space weapons debate itself proves, the norm of space as anunweaponized sanctuaw that has evolved during the past forty-five years is far from politicallv insignificant. Of course, the moreimportant a military innovation appears to be to a state's security, the more likely it is to be adopted, even if the price for doing so isfairly high, while it is relatively easy to give up military opportunities of limited value. For example, the longstanding success of themultilateral 1957 treaty prot-libiting military bases in Antarctica, often cited as an example of an effective sanctuary regime, would bemore impressive if the signatory powers had strong incentives to establish bases on that continent. Yet even so it flies in the face ofthe idea that weaponization will follow wherever people go; the argument that space weapons in particular will have military utility toogreat to resist is a different proposition from the contention that weapons always spread everywhere, and will be later in this e s s a y avariety of weapons have fallen into disrepute over the last centuw, While they have not yet disappeared, chemical and bioloqicalweapons have been shunned by all but renegade states. Anti-personnel land mines are followinq in their wake. Manv states that couldeasily have developed nuclear weapons have opted not to do so, in some cases in spite of apparently vew ~ o o dmilitary reasons to gonuclear.[l5] Perhaps most strikingly of all, even amonq space weapons advocates one does not find voices arquinq that the placemenof n~ckarweapons in orbit is inevitable based on the rule that weapons always spread. The fact that this has not happened is due to many factors othethan the Outer Space Treaty's prohibitionon such weaponization, but if some weapons do not necessarily follow wherever people go, the idea that a law of human nature requires thatothers will do so should not be taken very seriously.


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Michigan7 Week Juniors

A2: Militarization Inevitable~ea~onizat ihnis not inevitable-the US can protect its interests without spaceMueller,2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?', March 27, http://www.isanet.orqlnoarchivelmueller.htm~~These are all reasonable arguments, but to conclude from them that space weaponization is inevitable, rather than merely possible oreven likelv, is unwarranted, for several reasons. There is no question that space systems are a key center of gravity (or perhapsseveral) US. militarv capabilities. An enemy that attacked them miqht be able to impair U.S. militaw operations very seriouslv, andthis ranks hiqh amonq threats that concern U.S. strategists. It need not follow from this that the enemies of the United States will doso, or invest in the weapons required to do so, however. The U.S. armed forces possess many important vulnerabilities that-adversaries have often, even consistently, opted not to attack in past conflicts. To cite but one widely-discussed example, duringOperation Allied Force in 1999, Serbia apparently did not attempt to mount special forces attacks against key NATO airbases in Italy orto use manpoltable missiles to shoot down aircraft operating from them during take-off or landing, although such an action could haveprofoundly disrupted the Alliance's bombing campaign.[35] Moreover, it is quite possible that if a potential enemy did want to developthe ability to attack US. space svstems, it would choose to do so in wavs--such as investing in ground-based ASAT lasers orcomputer network attack capabilities-that would not involve weaponizinq space, and against which the logical defensivecountermeasures would not involve placing U.S. weapons in orbit either. For military as well as commercial satellites, "bodyguardweapons in space would offer protection only from certain sorts of attacks, while the terrestrial links in satellite systems would remaininviting targets. Again it is the transition to larger networks of smaller satellites that will do the most to reduce vulnerability, perhapstogether with supplementing satellite platforms for some military functions with new types of terrestrial systems, such as highendurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),[36] and improving terrestrial weapons with which to attack ground-based ASATs andsatellite launch and control facilities. Conversely, if the United States decides that it must have the ability to deny an enemy the use ofits satellites,itquite possible that the most attractive means for doins this will prove to involve non-space weapons and, to an evengreater extent, tools that are not weapons in the conventional sense at all.

Space Weaponization inevitable claims are false and do not justify US actionMueller, 2k2 [Karl, RAND institute, 'Is the Weaponization of Space inevitable?',March 27, htt~:/lwww.isanet.o~lnoarchivelmueller.html~

The weaponization of space is not inevitable, at least insofar as we can discern the future at this point. Whether weaponization willoccur, and if so when and kw hom, is uncertain, and it will certainly be affected by the decisions of U.S. military space policvmakers in--the cominq decade. If these decisions are to be sound ones, it will be vital to base them upon far more solid qround than prophecies ofinevitable weaponization that have been offered too freely, and accepted too uncritically by too manv, often based upon little more thansuperficial historical analoqies and glib strategic aphorisms.[44] These must qive way to substantial, detailed arguments and criticalanalvsis, for the choices that lie before us are too important to permit anything less.


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Space MilitarizationBad- HeqemonylArms RaceSpace militarization would result in an arms race and killing hegemony- outweighing any potential short term benefits ofdeveloping first, our evidence is comparativeHitchens,CDI Vice President, 20M (Theresa, April 18 "Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette? The Policy Implications of U.S.Pursuit of Space-Based Weapons", http:llwww.cdi.orglmissile-defenselspaceweapons.cfm)China and Russia lona have been worried about possible U.S. breakout on space-based weaponry. Officials from both countries have expressedconcern that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed not at what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballisticmissiles, but rather at launching a long-term U.S. effort to dominate space.Both Russia and China also are key proponents of negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty toban all types of weapons. The effort to start talks known as PAROS, for "prevention of an arms race in outer space," has been stalled due in largepart to the objection of the United States. For example, in November 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the others were Israel andMicronesia) to refuse to vote for a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of space.It is inconceivable that either Russia or China woutd allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons. "Once a nationembarks down the road to qain a huae asvmmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that aap. An arms race tends to develop aninertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article in Airpower Journal.Chinese moves to put weapons in space would triclaer regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for ~a r i t vwithIndia. Even U S, allies in Europe miaht feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine @course of a _new arms race inspace that would be nearlv as destabilizinq as the atomic weapons race proved to be.Such a strateqic-level space race could have neqative consequences for U S , security in the long ru n that would outweiqh the obvious (andtremendous) short-te rm advantaqe of beinci the first with space-based weapons. There would be direct economic costs to sustaining orbitalweapon systems and keeping ahead of opponents intent on matching U S.space-weapon capabilities -raisins the proverbial question of whetherwe would be startinq a game we might not be able to win. (It should be remembered that the attacker will always have an advantage in spacewarfare, in that space assets are inherently static, moving in predictable orbits. Space weapons, just like satellites, have inherent vulnerabilities.)Again, the price tag of space weapons systems would not be trivial-with maintenance costs a key issue. For example, it now costs commercialfirms between $300 million and $350 million to replace a single satellite that has a lifespan of about 15 years, according to Ed Comet, vice presidentof Booz Allen and Hamilton consulting firm.Many experts also argue there would be costs, both economic and strategic, stemminq from the need to counter other asvmmetric challenqes fromthose who could not afford to be participants in the race itself. Threatened nations or non-state actors miqht well look to terrorism usina chemical orbiological aqents as one alternative.Karl Mueller, now at RAND, in an analysis for the School of Advanced Airpower Studies at Maxwell Air Force Base, wrote, "The United States wouldnot be able to maintain unchallenqed heqemonv in the weaponization of space, and while a space-weapons race would threaten internationalstability, it would be even more danqerous to U S, security and relative power projection capabilitv, due to other states' sianificant ability andprobablv inclination to balance symmetrically and asymmetrically against ascendant U.S. power."Spurrinq other nations to acquire space-based weapons of their own, especially weapons aimed at terrestrial targets, m c e r t a i n l y undercut theability of U.S. forces to operate freely on the around on a worldwide basis- neqatinq what today is a unique advantaqe of beina a militarysuperpower.


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Space MilitarizationBad- HeqemonyThe best way to protect satellites in space is not to go there- militarizationwould cause an arms race that only makes problemsmore likely to occurKrepon 01

(Michael Krepon, President Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center and Co-Editor of Global Confidence Building: New Tools for TroubledRegions, "Lost in Space; The Misguided Drive Toward Antisatellite Weapons," Foreign Affairs, MayIJune 2001, lexis)

With the qlobal economy so intimately tied to assets in space, space-warfare initiatives bv the Bush administration could also create havoc withsatellite-dependent commerce. The extent of damaqe that the loss of a key satellite could cause was suqqested by the failure of a Galaxy IV satellitein Mav 1998.When the computer controllinq the satellite broke down, 80 percent of U.S. paqers -- affectinq37 million users -- went dead. Someradio and television stations were knocked off the air, while qas stations and retail stores found themselves unable to verify credit card transactions.The Rumsfeld commission cites this event as a harbinger of America's future vulnerability in space to malefactors and hence as another reason toimplement its recommendations. But the best wav to protect U.S. satellites and U.S. commerce would be to head off such warfare in space before itever got started, rather than to lead the charqe. Washinqton can avoid an arms race in space by keepinq national missile defenses limited andfocused on troubled reqions where missile threats abound. But because even properlv confiqured missile defenses would have residual ASATcapabilities, the Un~ tedStates must now pursue new initiatives against space warfare. Treaties on ASATs could take a long time to negotiate andwould still leave many issues unresolved. In the short run, informal agreements to ban all weapons in space and to bar the testinq and deployment of"dedicated"ASATS would be reassurinq, verifiable -- and very much in the national interest.Establishing "rules of the road" for activities in space is therefore now essential. Fortunately, a model exists: extant agreements that preventdangerous practices at sea. A U.S.-Soviet accord, negotiated in 1972 after a series of provocative naval incidents, has been widely replicated byother navies. These "IncSea" agreements are designed to prevent collisions, dangerous maneuvers or simulated attacks, blinding the bridges ofnaval vessels with lasers, and other reckless acts at sea, They work well and could be made to apply in space. Such rules, moreover, will beincreasingly necessary as missile defense programs mature. The "lncSea\greements were negotiated by senior military officers and were nevercodified as treaties, but they are still enormously useful. New accords to avoid incidents in space could take the form of executive agreementsbetween national authorities -- again avoiding the cumbersome treaty process.As the Rumsfeld report signifies, pressure is now mountinq on the Bush administration to reassess U.S. space policy. Washinqton must choose oneof two paths: dominance, which means puttin4 more and better weapons in space or on earth than anyone else can afford, or reassurance. Becauseof the threat of asymmetrical warfare, dominance would be very hard to achieve and would have many adverse effects. The best way to protectspace commerce and U S , national security, therefore, is to avoid ASATs and weapons in space in the first place.An arms race in space was avoided during the Cold War due in part to the assumption that the Kremlin would compete with and nullify Americanmoves. Now the sole remaining superpower may be tempted to slouqh off treatv constraints and to seek protection through unilateral initiatives. Ifthis strateav is pursued, it will no doubt be couched in flexible and reassurinq language. But U S , allies and potential adversaries will see it assomethino else: the hubris of imperial overstretch. And they will react accordinalv.


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Space Militarization Bad- ExtinctionSpace weaponization will encourage countries to destroy US satellites and cause a global war through accidental launchincluding nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponsMitchell,Associate Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh, Ayotte and Helwich,Teaching Fellowsin the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh,20N

(Dr. Gordon R., Kevin J., David Cram, lSlS Briefing on Ballistic Missile Defence, "Missile Defence: Trans-Atlantic Diplomacy at aCrossroads", No. 6 July, http:llwww.isisuk.demon.co.uklO811lisis/uk/bmd/no6.htmI)

A buildup of space weapons miqht beqin with noble intentions of 'peace throuqh strenqth' deterrence, but this rationale glosses over the tendencythat I.. . the presence of space weapons...will result in the increased likelihood of their use1.33This drift toward usaqe is strenqthened bv a strategicfact elucidated by Frank Barnabv: when it comes to arming the heavens, 'anti-ballistic missiles and anti-satellite warfare technoloqies qo hand-in-hand1.34-The interlockinq nature of offense and defense in military space technoloqv stems from the inherent 'dual capabilitv' of spaceborne weaponcomponents. As Marc Vidricaire, Delegation of Canada to the UN Conference on Disarmament, explains: 'If you want to intercept something inspace, you could use the same capability to target something on land'. 35 To the extent that ballistic missile interceptors based in space can knockout enemy missiles in mid-flight, such interceptors can also be used as orbiting 'Death Stars', capable of sendins munitions hurtlina throuah theEarth's atmosphere.The dizzvinq speed of space warfare would introduce intense 'use or lose' pressure into strateaic calculations, with the spectre of split-secondattacks creatinq incentives to rig orbiting Death Stars with automated 'hair triqqer' devices. In theory, automation would enhance survivability ofvulnerable space weapon platforms. However, bv takinq the decision to commit violence out of human hands and endowinq computers with authorityto make war, military planners could sow insidious seeds of accidental conflict.Yale sociologist Charles Perrow has analyzed 'complexly interactive, tightly coupled' industrial systems such as space weapons, which have manysophisticated components that all depend on each other's flawless performance. According to Perrow, this interlocking complexity makes itimpossible to foresee all the different ways such systems could fail. As Perrow explains, '[t lhe odd term "normal accident" is meant to signal that,given the system characteristics, multiple and unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable1.36Deplovment of space weapons with we-delegatedauthoritv to fire death rays or unleash killer proiectiles would likely make war itself inevitable, qiven the susceptibilitv of such systems to 'normalaccidents'.ItrsAccordinq to retired l t . Col. Robert M. Bowman, 'even a tiny proiectile reenterinq fromspace strikes the earth with such hiqh velocity that it can do enormous damaqe- even more than would be done bv a nuclear weapon of the samesize!'.37 In the same Star Wars technology touted as a quintessential tool of peace, defence analyst David Langford sees one of the most-destabilizing offensive weapons ever conceived: 'One imagines dead cities of microwave-grilled people1.38Given this unique potential fordestruction, it is not hard to imanine that anv nation subiected to space weapon attack would retaliate with maximum force, includinq use of nuclear,biological, andlor chemical weapons. An accidental war sparked by a computer glitch in space could plunqe the world into the most destructivemilitary conflict ever seen.


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Space Militarization Bad- RussiaPoor Russian intelligence warning would result in miscalculation on space debris and nuclear war with the USLewis, Post doctorate Fellow in the Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program,2004 (Jeffery, July "What if Space Were Weaponized?Possible Consequences for Conflict Scenarios" Center for Defense InformationThis is the secc ndof two scenariosthat consider how U.S. space weapons might create incentives for America's opponents to behave in dangerous ways. The previous scenariolooked at the systemic risk of accidents that could arise from keeping nuclear weapons on high alert to guard against a space weapons aliack. This section focuses on the risk that a single accident in Space, such as a piece ofspacedebrisstrikina a Russian earlv-warnina satellite, miaht be the catalvst for an accidental nuclear war.As we have noted in an earl~ersection, the United Stalescanceled I s own ASATp rogmm in the 1980s over concerns that Ihe deployment otthese weapons might be deeply destabilbing. For a ll the talk abo ul a "new relationship' between theUnited States and Russia, both sides retain thousandsof nuclear forces on alert and configuredm figM a nuclear war. When briefedabout the size and status of U.S. nuclea rforces.President Geoge W. Bush reportedly asked "What do we need allthese weapons for?"43 The answer: asIwas during the Cold War. is that the forces remain on alerl to m d u c t a n mb er of posslble contingencies, including a nuclear strike against RussiaThis fact. of course, is not lost on the Russian leadership, which has been (rcreasrngits reliance on nuclear weapons tocompen sateforthe coun try's declining military might. In the mid-1990s, Russia dropped its pledae torefrain from the "first use" of nuclear weapons and conducted a series of exercises in which Russian nuclear forces prepared to use nuclearweapons to repel a NATO invasion. InOclober2003, Russ~anDefenseMinisterSergeilvanovreiteratedthatMOSCOWmight use nuclear weapons "preempt

502.Heidt Silber Peterson Keenan.neg.7week Juniors Space Neg

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