Tank Shipping before 1967

HISTORIC

The 2,300 tonne Glückauf, built in the UK in 1886, was the first “petroleum steamer”, using a combination of sail and coal to carry cargoes of refined oil products in separate tanks serving a growing demand for kerosene for lighting and gasoline for newly introduced automobiles. The size and design of ships evolved rapidly in the early 20th century, leading to increasingly common occurrences of oil washing up on shorelines. The rapid increase in the number of oil fired ships replacing coal, along with an increasing number of tank vessels, led to a recognition that work was needed to establish the consequences of spilling oil into the sea. In the interwar years, the League of Nations Committee of Experts coordinated early research into the extent to which oil persisted and drifted at sea.

Oil tankers played an important role in the Second World War and the seaborne oil trade grew steadily in the 1940s and 1950s as a result of increased demand in the industrialised world. The construction of oil refineries in consuming rather than producing countries and the growing importance of the Middle East as an oil producing region meant that more and more crude oil was being transported by sea.

The closure of the Suez Canal in 1956 resulted in larger ships to address the economics of longer journeys around the Cape of Good Hope. Advances in engine design, improved steel quality and the move to welded rather than riveted construction, allowed tankers of 100,000 dwt. By 1966, Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) of over 200,000 dwt were in service.

The rising number of instances of operational discharges of oil from ships led the UK to organise a conference in 1954, resulting in the adoption of the first international treaty addressing oil pollution from ships. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil (OILPOL) did not address accidental pollution, but the fact that the Convention was adopted at all was an achievement because only eight of the 32 countries attending said they regarded oil pollution as a problem and some saw no requirement for a Convention at all.

The Convention’s primary purpose was to establish a series of zones where the discharge of oily wastes was prohibited, an approach that had been used by individual countries since the 1920s. Countries were required also to provide port facilities for the reception of oil waste from non-tankers (there was no such requirement for tankers).

The International Maritime Consultative Organisation (now IMO), established in 1948, took over responsibility for OILPOL. Evidence showed that the Convention was not as effective as hoped, and IMCO called a conference in 1962 to amend OILPOL. These amendments entered into force in May 1967 – but by then government and public attitudes towards oil pollution changed following events in March that year.Drawing made by G.J. Frans Naerebout

and published in Op de Lange Deining

At 297 metres long, Torrey Canyon was one of

the largest vessels in the world at the time. The

tanker was carrying a cargo of 119,000 tonnes

of Kuwaiti crude oil for discharge at Milford

Haven in Wales when she ran aground on the

Seven Stones Reef in the south-west United

Kingdom on 18th March 1967. Investigations

into the accident showed the grounding was a

result of operational errors and misjudgments

by the crew.

Attempts at salvaging the ship were

unsuccessful and any decision to remove the

cargo was hampered by poor weather and the

limited availability of resources. The ship broke

up over the 12 days following the grounding,

and the cargo was lost which affected the

coasts of south-west England, the Channel

Islands and Brittany, France.

Oil pollution at sea was a recognised problem

by 1967, but the scale of the release of oil

from this incident was unprecedented and was

to have profound consequences. The incident

caught the governments of the affected

countries unprepared and the new medium of

television transmitted images which resulted in

immense public pressure to find solutions.

HISTORIC

The world’s first major oil spill Incident

Without suitable plans, the response was

largely improvised and techniques developed

prior to the incident were overwhelmed by the

volume of spilled oil. Attempts were made to

mitigate the spill by bombing the casualty in an

attempt to burn it. The oil did ignite initially,

but the limitations of burning oil at sea that we

now understand became very evident.

Clean-up in the UK focused primarily on the

application of a variety of degreasing agents to

oil floating at sea and stranded on the beaches.

This technique did serve to assist with oil

removal but additional environmental damage

also resulted. In France, degreasers were used

to a lesser extent in favour of other techniques,

including the early use of oil recovery

skimmers at sea.

The oil affected a wide variety of wildlife and

economic activities, notably tourism and

shell-fisheries. Liability for the costs of the

response and pollution damage was disputed

and compensation was made available only

after a protracted legal process. Faced with the

potential recurrence of such an incident, the

British Prime Minister at the time called on the

Council of IMCO (now IMO) to meet in

extraordinary circumstances to consider

possible changes in maritime law and

international regulations.

IMCO met subsequently in May 1967 and

drafted 21 “proposals for study”, including

suggestions requiring all vessels to carry

compulsory liability insurance; to make

shipowners responsible for the damage done by

their vessel without consideration of

negligence; a call for studies leading to less

toxic detergents, and the enforcement of

international agreements.

Ten points from the meeting addressed the

prevention of accidents at sea directly:

• Introduction of traffic lanes at sea

• Introduction of areas off-limits to tankers carrying hazardous cargoes

• Shore stations to control ships approaching and leaving port

• More navigational aids on large tankers

• A speed limit on large shipswhen close to land

• Periodic tests of shipborne navigational equipment

• Stronger tankers, with double hulls to prevent leakage from accidents

• Equipping tankers with flaps or drogues to assist stopping at sea

• Requiring ships to carry adequate charts and sailing directions

• Tougher regulations on navigational training for crews and officers

These recommendations were greeted with

mixed reviews at the time but set in motion

many of the regulations and features taken for

granted today.

The extraordinary session of the Council of IMCO (now IMO) in May 1967 recognised some of the problems arising from the incident were legal in nature and established an ad-hoc Legal Committee that met for the first time in June 1967. Representatives of 22 countries and observers from five non-governmental organisations gathered to examine:

• The definition of the evil to be remedied

• Legal aspects of preventive action including the questions raised when a State is threatened by or affected by a casualty

• Liability and remedies

• Emergency measures - governmental or inter-governmental - including salvage procedures

• The rights of coastal States to intervene

The liability of ship and cargo owners for damage to third parties caused by spills of oil or other hazardous and noxious substances were at the heart of the discussions along with consideration of the need for a new international system of liability incorporated in a multilateral convention. Details included:

• The kind of damage which should be covered by a convention for the purposes of compensation

• The issue of whether strict liability should be introduced

• Adjustments to the existing system of limitation of liability

• Requirements for compulsory insurance

• What courts should have jurisdiction

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

The Legal Committee of IMO

These issues formed the basis of the work of the Legal Committee for years to come and led to the adoption by IMO of a comprehensive international liability and compensation regime, as well as the conclusion in 1969 of the Intervention Convention. This liability and compensation regime began with the adoption of the Civil Liability Convention in 1969, followed by the adoption of the Fund Convention in 1971.

Subsequent work of the Legal Committee resulted in the creation and adoption of a number of key conventions, including:

• The Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974, and its Protocol of 2002

• The Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976, and its Protocol of 1996

• The 1984 and 1992 Protocols to the Civil Liability Convention and Fund Convention to increase the limits of liability

• The Salvage Convention 1989

• The HNS Convention, 1996, and its Protocol of 2010

• The Bunkers Convention 2001

• The Protocol of 2003 to the Fund Convention, 1992

• The Nairobi Wreck Removal Convention, 2007

The Torrey Canyon incident exposed the

difficulty for a coastal State to respond to a

marine casualty on the high seas without the

permission of the shipowner. In 1967, the UK

government was unable to respond directly to

the release of oil until the shipowner was

satisfied that all attempts at salvage had been

exhausted, by which time the vessel was

deemed a constructive total loss. The balance

at that time was in favour of protecting the

interests of shipowners, cargo owners and in

supporting the principle of the freedom of the

high seas.

To alleviate the situation, the International

Convention Relating to Intervention on the

High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties

was adopted in 1975. A later Protocol

extended the convention to include marine

pollution by other substances. Today the

convention has 89 State parties.

The Intervention Convention affirms the

right of a Coastal State to take measures on

the high seas that are necessary to prevent,

mitigate or eliminate danger to its coastline or

its related interests from pollution, or the

threat of pollution, following a marine

casualty.

The Coastal State can only take action that is

necessary and must consult with interested

parties, like the Flag State of the ship

involved, the owners of the ship and cargo and

suitable independent experts. If a Coastal

State takes measures beyond those permitted

under the Convention it is liable to pay

compensation for any resultant damage.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Intervention Convention

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

Industry Compensation Schemes

Settlement signing ceremony for the claims of the French and UK governments

Claims were made by the governments of the UK

and France against the owner of the vessel but it

had no assets in the UK. The UK and French

governments presented their claims in a United

States district court which applied the US

Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. This Act

limited the liability of the owners to the value of

the vessel after the incident. As the vessel had

been lost, there was no residual value. The

governments appealed the liability judgment and

agreed a settlement of some US$ 9 million. At the

The aftermath of the Torrey Canyon incident in

1967 highlighted the need to establish an

international and uniform system to compensate

those affected by oil pollution from tankers.

At the time of the incident there was much

relevant legislation in the affected territories of

France and the UK, but some of this legislation

was conflicting and it was clear that obtaining

compensataion for the clean-up operations and

damage caused by the incident would

be difficult.

time it was the largest settlement for a ship-sourced

oil pollution damage claim.

This difficult situation led to pressure to develop a

system, funded by the oil industry and shipowners,

that would guarantee sufficient compensation for

future oil pollution incidents. Representatives of

industry proposed an interim solution in the form of

two private compensation schemes and these were

to remain in operation until new international

conventions came into force.

The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning

Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) was established

and administered by ITOPF Ltd. It was signed in

1969 by seven major oil companies who operated a

significant part of the world’s tanker fleet, to provide

compensation for the costs of clean-up operations

and damage caused by tankers.

Shipowners’ liability under TOVALOP was originally

limited to a maximum of US$10 million per

incident. A supplementary scheme was introduced

by the oil companies, increasing the compensation

available to US$30 million per incident.

This second scheme was known as CRISTAL

(Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to

Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution). Both schemes

remained in operation until 1997.

In the 1960s there was a rise in awareness of, and concern for, environmental issues. It was against this backdrop that the extraordinary meeting organised at IMCO (now IMO) in May 1967 proposed a number of changes in ship design and operations that led directly to the development of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). MARPOL is the main international convention addressing prevention of pollution of the marine environment by ships from operational or accidental causes.

MARPOL expanded on the elements of the earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no longer adequate to address a changing industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers pollution by oil and initially developed the requirements for continuous monitoring of oil-water discharges, shore-based reception facilities and segregated ballast tanks, as well as establishing a number of Special Areas geographically that further restricted discharges of oil in specified zones.

PREVENTION

Pollution Prevention - MARPOL

The 1978 Protocol further developed these provisions and required new larger tankers to be fitted with “Crude Oil Washing” systems to minimise the quantity of oil remaining on board after discharge. Later developments to Annex 1 in the 1990s introduced a mandatory requirement for double hulls for tankers.

The Convention, in its modern form and much amended, also incorporates requirements preventing pollution from chemicals transported in bulk and packaged form, sewage, garbage and air emissions(including CO2) from ships.

Ballast water is taken on board ships to maintain stability, to allow steerage and for safety in bad weather conditions. Fifty years ago, ballast water was carried in a tanker’s cargo tanks, resulting in the discharge of oily water overboard. However, ballast water is now carried in segregated ballast tanks and remains free of cargo oil or fuel oil and can be discharged overboard.

The 1978 MARPOL Protocol introduced the concept known as "protective location of segregated ballast tanks". This meant that the ballast tanks, which are empty on the cargo-carrying leg of the voyage and only loaded with ballast water for the return leg, are positioned where the impact of a collision or grounding is likely to be greatest and, by doing so, reducing the risk of a spill of the amount of cargo released if there is an incident.

Subsequent amendments in 1983 took this segregation concept further by banning the carriage of oil in the forepeak tank, the ship's most vulnerable point, in the event of a collision.

PREVENTION

Segregated Ballast Tanks

MARPOL expanded on the elements of the earlier OILPOL Convention, which was no longer adequate to address a changing industry. Annex 1 of MARPOL covers pollution by oil and initially developed the requirements for continuous monitoring of oil-water discharges, shore-based reception facilities and segregated ballast tanks, as well as establishing a number of Special Areas geographically that further restricted discharges of oil in specified zones.

The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, and its successive revisions, is generally regarded as the most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships. The first version of SOLAS was adopted in 1914, in direct response to the sinking of the Titanic, with subsequent revisions in 1929, 1948 and 1960. The fifth and current version, which has been much amended, was adopted in 1974.

The objective of the SOLAS Convention is to specify minimum safety standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships. Flag States are responsible for ensuring that ships under their flag comply with the requirements, and a number of certificates are prescribed in the Convention as proof that this has been done. Governments that are signatories to SOLAS are allowed to inspect ships of other signatory states if there are clear reasons for believing that the ship and its equipment do not comply with the requirements of the Convention. This procedure is known as Port State Control.

PREVENTION

Safety Of Life At Sea - SOLAS

SOLAS covers the full range of safety issues that may affect the ship, including fire protection; life-saving appliances and arrangements; radio communications; safety of navigation; managing the safe operations of a ship and the carriage of cargoes and dangerous goods, in particular mandating inert gas systems and imposing stricter regimes for surveys and certification. These measures, together with the related Codes that underpin the implementation of SOLAS, provide a comprehensive safety framework for international maritime transport.

SOLAS is well-supported by shipping industry initiatives such as the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide which is the definitive industry publication on best practice for safe navigation. Two additional industry publications: the IACS Common Structural Rules and the OCIMF and ICS International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals, are described elsewhere in the exhibition.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, IMCO

(now IMO) adopted two international treaties

to ensure that adequate compensation was

available to people who suffer damage resulting

from spills of persistent oil

from tankers.

The treaties share the cost of marine oil

spill incidents between the shipowner and

the oil receivers and they established the

first International Oil Pollution Compensation

Fund (IOPC Fund), creating what is now known

as the international liability and compensation

regime.

The regime places the liability for damage on

the owner of the ship from which the polluting

oil escaped or was discharged. It is strict

liability with some specific exceptions.

It means that the owner has to pay for

admissible claims resulting from pollution

damage regardless of fault. In return, the

owner has the right to limit liability to a certain

amount in respect of any one incident. Ships

are required under the relevant Convention to

maintain insurance or other financial security

in sums equivalent to the owner's total liability

for any one incident.

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

The Legal Framework for Compensation

This regime is now complemented by the

Bunkers and Wreck Removal Conventions,

and potentially the 2010 HNS Convention,

which offer separate compensation schemes for

other types of incidents at sea than those

covered by the original regime.

The first tier of compensation is paid by the

shipowner’s insurer. It is usually the third party

liability Protection and Indemnity Club (P&I

Club) of the owner of the ship involved in the

incident. The second tier of compensation is

paid by an international fund, the IOPC Fund

which is financed by receivers of oil after sea

transport in those States party to the relevant

treaties which are:

• The 1992 Civil Liability Convention (1992 CLC) - 136 States Parties

• The 1992 Fund Convention- 114 States Parties

• The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol (which provides an optional additional layer of compensation) - 31 States Parties

The human element remains the most important contributing factor in maritime accidents. The causes of marine casualties include collisions, groundings, fires, explosions and other accidents, which in the majority of cases are a result of human error.

To address this, the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers was adopted in 1978 to promote the safety of life and property at sea and the protection of the marine environment by establishing agreed common international standards of competence for seafarers.

PREVENTION

Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW)

A major revision to the Convention in 1995 further enhanced Port State Control measures allowing mutual oversight and consistency in the application of standards; quality standards systems (QSS); oversight of training, assessment, and certification procedures and new training requirements. Responsibility was placed on parties, including those issuing licenses and Flag States employing foreign nationals, to ensure seafarers meet objective standards of competence and observe the rest period requirements for watchkeeping personnel.

Another major revision in 2010, known as the "The Manila Amendments", brought training standards in line with modern day requirements, requiring updated and improved training to meet new developments in ship technology, operation and security.

ISGOTT is a comprehensive guide to the safe

transport and handling of crude oil and refined

products on tankers and at terminals. It was first

published in 1978, combining the contents of the

“Tanker Safety Guide (Petroleum)” published by

the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and

the “International Oil Tanker and Terminal Safety

Guide” published by the Oil Companies

International Marine Forum (OCIMF).

Revised editions have been regularly published

under the oversight of ICS, OCIMF and the

International Association of Ports and Harbors

(IAPH) to ensure that the guide continues to reflect

current best practice and legislation.

PREVENTION

The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals (ISGOTT)

The Guide provides operational advice

to help personnel involved in tanker and

terminal operations and it is a general

industry recommendation that a copy of

ISGOTT is kept and used on all tankers and

at every terminal, so that there is a

consistent approach to operational

procedures when ships are at terminals.

An understanding of the fate and behaviour of spilled oil and of the equipment and techniques used in pollution response have improved significantly in the past fifty years. Scientific teams established in the 1970s conducted research programmes which, combined with practical lessons learned from spills, have resulted in the development of enhanced strategies for response and the development of improved equipment such as booms, skimmers, dispersant and oil spill models.

The use of chemical dispersants has changed over time. Industrial machinery de greasers were adopted initially for oil spill response. However, their application at large incidents led to inappropriate dosing and their use was not always successful and in some cases led to adverse impacts. However, with proper planning and well designed application equipment the potential of chemical response was recognised. Manufacturers developed a range of dispersants to meet national standards, that are intended specifically to disperse oil into droplets in the water column which would then break down naturally. Continuous development of dispersants has ensured their major role in marine oil spill response in many countries.

Studies of large scale releases of oil demonstrated that oil slicks eventually disperse naturally, with some oils persisting longer than others. These studies led to the grouping of hydrocarbon oils according to their assay characteristics, allowing easier reference when deciding response strategies in future incidents. As a result, a more rapid and accurate assessment of the potential of a spill to affect a shoreline can be made.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Oil Pollution Response

Experience and research has also highlighted the advantages of limiting clean-up in sensitive areas, such as mangroves and salt marshes, and has led to the promotion of natural cleaning on appropriate shorelines. Other techniques have been developed for effective oil spill response in cold climates. Advances have improved remote sensing enabling it to become an important tool in the detection and evaluation of oil contamination. Developments with radiation scanners and satellite based radar, together with rapid interpretation of images, have encouraged their effective use as operational tools.

Organisations such as Oil Spill Response Limited, established by four oil companies and now with 42 oil company Members and ~100 Associates Members, are prepared to respond to oil spills globally. The Global Response Network and International Spill Control Organisation ensure their response contractor members are at the forefront of response technology. ITOPF is funded by the shipping industry to provide technical advice to promote effective response to pollution in the marine environment.

Great improvements have been made in oil spill response in the 50 years. Nevertheless, this remains challenging and continued research and development, together with effective knowledge transfer, remain key objectives.

Port State Control is the inspection of foreign ships in national ports to verify that the condition of the ship, its equipment, manning and operation comply with the requirements of international Conventions such as SOLAS, MARPOL, and STCW.

In 1982, the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU) established the system of Port State Control which today covers 26 European countries and Canada. Building on the foundation of the Paris MoU, other regional MoUs were signed, covering the Pacific Ocean, South and Central America, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, West and Central Atlantic Africa, the Black Sea and the Middle East Gulf.

Many of IMO’s most important technical conventions contain provisions for ships to be inspected when they visit foreign ports to ensure that they meet IMO requirements.

PREVENTION

Inspection and Enforcement – Port State Control (PSC)

To facilitate the implementation of Port State Control, IMO adopted the Resolution on “Regional Co-operation in the Control of Ships and Discharges Promoting the Conclusion of Regional Agreements”. Ships visiting a port in one country will normally visit other countries in the region, and it is more efficient if inspections can be closely coordinated to focus on sub-standard ships and to avoid multiple inspections. It also prevents ships being delayed by unnecessary inspections.

The primary responsibility for the standard of ships rests with the Flag State - but Port State Control provides a valuable additional tool to identify substandard ships.

PREVENTION

Inert gas systems

The oil and refined products carried by tankers can produce flammable vapours and gases in cargo tanks. Fire is a major threat to the safety of tanker operations, as just a single spark can cause a devastating explosion if it ignites the vapour from an oil cargo.

Harmful or dangerous flammable gases can also be present in empty cargo tanks. When the vapour produced by an oil cargo is mixed with air and is exposed to an ignition source, it can cause an explosion resulting in loss of life, damage to ship and other property and the possibility of marine pollution.

To prevent such explosions and to ensure the safety of the ship and its crew, tankers employ “inert gas systems” to reduce the oxygen content in cargo tanks. The normal method is to fill these tanks with

non-explosive/non-reactive inert gas from the ship's boiler flue. The flue gas is scrubbed or cleaned and then pumped into the empty tanks, or into the spaces left above the oil in loaded tanks, to minimise the risk from fire or explosion on board. Other systems employ a separate inert gas generation plant to supply the gas.

Oil companies have employed inert gas systems in their tanker fleets in an ad-hoc manner since the mid 1930s. In 1985, SOLAS introduced a requirement for inert gas systems to be fitted to all oil tankers of 20,000 tonnes dwt and above. From January 2016, this requirement has been extended to all new tankers of 8,000 tonnes dwt and above. The engineering specifications for inert gas systems are set out in the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code).

PREVENTION

Global Maritime Distress and Safety System

The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) is an international network which uses terrestrial and satellite technology and ship-board radio-systems to ensure rapid, automated alerts are sent to shore-based communication and rescue authorities in the event of a marine incident. Other ships in the vicinity of an incident are also alerted. The system was introduced and is required under amendments made in 1988 to SOLAS. GMDSS is mandatory on all ocean-going pas-senger ships and cargo ships of 300 or more gross tonnes and which are engagedon international voyages. The vessel mustbe equipped with radio equipment that con-forms to the international standards set out in the system.

GMDSS consists of a number of components including Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) equipment and search and rescue locating devices or transponders and

an automated system for distributing mari-time safety information.

The system enables rapid alerting and loca-tion of the casualty and assists with coordina-tion of search and rescue efforts.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Maritime Salvage

The practice of marine salvage and the

international legal framework under which

salvage services are delivered have developed

significantly. With the exception of a small

number of coastal states which provide

state-funded emergency towing vessels, marine

salvage is undertaken by commercial

operators.

The priority in any salvage operation has

always been saving life. Saving property – the

ship and its cargo – used to be the next

priority with little thought for the marine

environment. Over the decades the priorities have

shifted with protection of the environment now

more important than saving property. The salvor

will immediately consider how to minimise the risk

to the environment from the cargo or bunker fuel

onboard a casualty.

In the past five decades, salvage craft have

become more powerful and more manoeuvrable.

Towing practice has developed and advances, like

the introduction of the “Smit Bracket” in the

1970s, have improved the process of controlling a

casualty. Firefighting methods and the introduction

of “hot tapping” to remove cargo and bunkers

have been major developments. The salvage

industry is capable of removing potential

pollutants even from sunken vessels lying at

considerable depth. More recently the

introduction of damage stability software and

the use of air portable salvage equipment and

teams from central locations have enhanced

casualty response.

The legal framework for marine salvage is

underpinned by the 1989 Salvage Convention.

It introduced the idea of “special

compensation” to encourage salvors to assist

ships, which, because of the limited likelihood

of successful salvage or low residual values,

might not otherwise have been commercially

worthwhile to attend.

The Salvage Convention was incorporated into

the most commonly used salvage contract,

Lloyd’s Open Form in its 1990 edition. Special

Compensation evolved into the Special

Compensation P&I Club Clause, known as

SCOPIC, which was introduced in 1999. Under

SCOPIC the salvor receives a tariff rate − and

an “uplift” − for equipment and personnel used

in providing a salvage service even if the

service is unsuccessful. SCOPIC has been a

great success in encouraging commercial

salvors to provide services to casualties that

otherwise might have been left to the

elements.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Regional Cooperation and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response (OPRC)

National governments are often more able to

prepare and respond to pollution incidents when

they work with neighbouring countries, in order

to share expertise, experiences and resources.

The first regional agreement for oil pollution was

signed in Bonn, Germany in 1969 by countries

bordering the North Sea. Many other such

agreements are now in place globally, a number

of which are arranged through the IMO and the

United Nations Environment Programme

(UNEP) under regional conventions. The first of

these, the Barcelona Convention adopted in

1976, led eventually to the formation of a

regional coordination centre in the

Mediterranean Sea. Other regional centres

coordinate preparedness and response around the

world.

The International Convention on Oil Pollution

Preparedness and Response OPRC ’90 came into

force in 1995 to provide for the first time a global

framework to facilitate international cooperation and

mutual assistance for major marine pollution

incidents. OPRC encourages states to develop and

maintain a preparedness and response capability of

their own, while recognising the importance of

regional cooperation and joint working with the oil

and shipping industries to deal with major pollution

emergencies.

States which ratify OPRC commit to the

following key obligations:

• Require ships under the national flag, as well

as operators of offshore units, ports and oil

handling facilities, to have oil pollution

emergency plans.

• Oblige ships to report incidents of pollution

to coastal authorities.

• Establish stockpiles of oil spill response

equipment; conduct oil spill response

exercises and develop contingency plans for

dealing with pollution incidents. Designated

national authorities and focal points

responsible for oil pollution preparedness

and response must be identified.

• Provide assistance to others in the event of a

pollution emergency and provision is made

for the reimbursement of any assistance

provided.

IMO works with governments and industry to

enhance the capacity of States to meet the

requirements of the Convention by providing

manuals, guidelines, training aids and courses

and technical assistance. At present, 109

states representing 74% of the world’s

tonnage are party to OPRC.

The Global Initiative (GI) launched in 1996, is

an umbrella programme under which

governments, through IMO, and the oil

industry, through IPIECA, work together to

assist countries in developing national

structures and capability for oil spill

preparedness and response.

SouthAsianSeas

West andCentralAfrica

South-EastPacific

North-EastPacific

PacificPacific

EastAsianSeas

NorthwestPacific Northwest

Pacific

ROPMESea AreaRed Sea

& Gulf ofAden - PERSGA

EasternAfrica

Black Sea

Mediterranean

North-EastAtlantic

In 1992, MARPOL was amended to require all new tankers of 5,000 dwt and above to be built with double hulls, to reduce the risk of the release of cargo, notably oil, in the event of grounding or collision.

PREVENTION

The Introduction of Double Hulls –A New Era in Ship Construction

The requirement for double hulls was also applied to existing ships under a programme that began in 1995, which meant all tankers would have had to be converted, or taken out of service, when they reached a certain age (up to 30 years old). This measure was initially to be phased in over a number of years, allowing a smooth transition from single to double hulls and uninterrupted trade. However, the need to introduce double hulls more quickly led to stricter accelerated timetables for the phasing-out of single-hull tankers. 2015 marked the final phase out of single hull tankers, with all tankers engaged in international trade now of double hull construction.

Photo by John, GCaptain.com

When a ship is hired or chartered to carry a cargo, the charterer will take steps to ensure the ship is operated professionally, its certificates and insurances are valid, and that it is in a condition suitable to complete a voyage safely. Similarly, terminal operators, Port State Control authorities, insurers and underwriters will often require information on the ship to ensure only safe ships are allowed to berth. Vetting is the process by which all this information on a ship is gathered and professionally assessed and a decision on chartering is made. A significant part of this information is obtained by physical inspection of a ship by a marine professional.

Oil companies have had processes in place for vetting ships for many decades. In the 1970s and 1980s multiple ship inspections during a ship’s port call created a new risk, distracting ship’s crews from safely handling their cargoes. Something had to be done, so the major oil companies, through the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), collaborated to share inspection reports through the Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE) database. SIRE was launched in 1993 to provide a standardised inspection format, with objective reports that can be shared and used by, currently, nearly 400 vetting departments globally.

PREVENTION

Ship Vetting and Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE)

SIRE inspections take place around the world using a cadre of nearly 500 trained and accredited ship inspectors. At the heart of the system is a large database of technical and operational information about tankers used for carrying oil, gas and chemicals.

Since its introduction, more than 335,000 inspection reports have been submitted to the SIRE database. In excess of 20,000 inspections on more than 8,500 tankers have been conducted in the last 12 months. On average, more than 12,000 reports each month are download by the 400 users of the SIRE programme which includes 60 Port State Control agencies. OCIMF’s SIRE programme encourages ship operators to maintain high standards of ship management, and provides tanker charterers with the information necessary to hire the best quality tankers to carry their oil.

In parallel, a number of national administrations developed the EQUASIS database in 2000 to collate existing safety-related information on ships from both public and private sources for publication on the internet.

PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE

Contingency Planning for Oil Pollution

Effective response to a spill of oil depends

largely on the preparedness of the

organisations and individuals involved.

Response can be enhanced greatly by

developing and maintaining plans to address

all likely contingencies. In the late 1960s and

early 1970s, government authorities and the

oil industry initiated the development of

well-resourced and tested contingency plans at

local, national, and international levels.

Contingency plans are now widely accepted

and mandated by national law in many states

as required by the OPRC Convention. Robust

plans ensure effective notification, assessment

and response to marine spills and other

incidents by identifying in advance the

organisational arrangements and resources as

well as appropriate strategies that will be

needed.

In planning to cope with a range of scenarios from

localised, operational spills to complex

multi-jurisdictional incidents, industry and

governments developed the concept of “tiered

response”. It allows for a level of equipment and

resources proportionate to the risk to be

immediately available and for this to be

supplemented by additional resources and

capabilities, available both nationally and

internationally if needed.

Contingency planning has helped improve the

ability to respond to spills, but levels of

preparedness remain inconsistent across the

world. IMO and industry continue to work in areas

where contingency plans may be inadequate and

where personnel have limited training through

regional cooperation programmes, workshops and

regular exercises.

TIER 1 capabilities describe the operators’ locally

held resources used to mitigate spills that are

typically operational in nature occurring on or near

an operator’s own facility. The resources also

provide an initial response to spills that may

potentially escalate beyond the scope of Tier 1

initial actions and capabilities.

TIER 2 capabilities refer to additional, often

shared, national or regional resources necessary to

supplement a Tier 1 response or support an

escalating response. Tier 2 capability includes a

wider selection of equipment and expertise suited

to a range of strategic response options.

TIER 3 capabilities are globally available resources

that further supplement Tiers 1 and 2. They

complete the international resources for spills that

require a substantial external response due to

incident scale, complexity and/or impact potential.

The international liability and compensation regime is a successful solution to the lack of an international system for compensating victims of oil pollution damage brought to light in the 1960s.

When it was introduced the international compensation regime was a new concept and it remains unique. That is because the burden of the risk is shared between both the shipowner and the oil receivers, creating a compensation fund which is overseen by governments.

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

The Compensation Regime In Action

It is this spirit of cooperation that has enabled the continued success of the international system. Since 1978, 150 incidents have been dealt with and more than £600 million of compensation having been paid by the IOPC Funds alone.

Many more “first tier” incidents have been paid for by the P&I Clubs under the Civil Liability Conventions.

The Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) which are members of the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) insure over 90% of world ocean-going tonnage and over 95% of all ocean-going tankers.

The P&I Clubs undertake measures to promote vessel quality by commissioning P&I surveys of newly entered vessels over 12 years of age, and tankers over 10 years of age carrying heavy fuel oil, to ensure these vessels are of an acceptable standard for entry into a Club.

PREVENTION

The Role of the P&I Clubs – Loss Prevention

The individual P&I Clubs also maintain loss prevention teams to promote awareness of risk, by publishing loss prevention materials and statistics, and by illustrating how incidents may be avoided. These activities are supported by education and training initiatives by the P&I Clubs and the IG, for the officers, crew and managers of shipowner members.

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) are shore-based systems which range from the provision of simple information messages to ships, such as the position of other traffic or meteorological hazard warnings, to extensive management of traffic within a port or waterway similar to air traffic control. VTS is governed by SOLAS and also the Guidelines for Vessel Traffic Services adopted by IMO in 1997.

Generally, ships entering a VTS area report to the authorities, usually by radio, and may be tracked by the VTS control centre. Ships must keep radio watch on a specific frequency for navigational or other warnings and they may be contacted directly by the VTS operator if there is risk of an incident. In areas where traffic flow is regulated, the ship may be given instructions as to how it should proceed.

Typical VTS systems include the use of radar, closed-circuit television (CCTV), VHF radiotelephony and the Automatic

PREVENTION

Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) and Automatic Identification System (AIS)

Identification System (AIS) to keep track of vessel movements and provide navigational safety in a defined geographical area. Technologies to assist VTS operators are expected to continue to evolve and offer new levels of sophistication.

The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system for identifying and locating ships by electronically exchanging data with other nearby ships, AIS base stations, and satellites.

In 2000, IMO adopted new regulations as part of a revision of parts of SOLAS which require AIS to be fitted on all international voyaging ships of 300 or more gross tonnes and on all passenger ships regardless of size. The information provided by AIS equipment such as unique identification, position, course and speed can be displayed on a screen or an Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS).

The introduction of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code in 1998 was an important step in focusing on the "human element" of shipping operations, by providing an international standard for the safe management by shipping companies of ship operations including pollution prevention.

The objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular, to the marine environment, and to property. In order to comply with the ISM Code, which is mandatory under SOLAS, shipping companies and their vessels must have an operational Safety Management System, subject to both internal and external audit.

PREVENTION

International Safety Management (ISM) Code

All ships covered by the ISM Code must be issued with a Safety Management Certificate by their Flag State. Shipping companies must be issued with a valid Document of Compliance which is, in effect, an international licence to operate, confirming that there is a functioning Safety Management System in place. An important aspect of the ISM Code and the associated audits is that they embrace the concept of continuous improvement which is critical to the development of a safety culture and improved environmental performance.

Guidelines on Application of the ISM Code, produced by the International Chamber of Shipping and the International Shipping Federation also play a significant part in uniform implementation of ISM Code.

The response to wildlife affected by oil has been one of the least understood and most underestimated elements of oil spill response. Traditionally, rehabilitation of live animals was often attempted, but was only rarely successful. Despite the intensive care and good intentions of those involved, oiled wildlife was previously unlikely to survive cleaning, rehabilitation and release. Considerable efforts by scientists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to develop rehabilitation methodologies have resulted in a greatly improved situation.

Oiled wildlife response is the combination of activities that aim to minimise the impact of an oil spill on wildlife by both prevention of oiling and mitigating the effects when oiling has taken place. Targeted animals typically include marine, coastal and aquatic birds, marine reptiles, such as sea turtles, and marine and aquatic mammals, including seals, sea lions, otters and cetaceans.

PREVENTION

Response to Oiled Wildlife

Response activities include:• Assessment of the risks to wildlife• Real-time monitoring of the location of wildlife

in relation to spilled oil• Protection of nesting sites and land-based

sites occasionally used by marine wildlife • Deterring wildlife from the area of a spill• Pre-emptive capture and collection of

unaffected animals and their offspring or eggs• Removal of dead animals and necessary

euthanasia• Rehabilitation of live oiled animals, their

release to the wild and monitoring of post-release survival

Successful wildlife response relies upon formalised relationships between NGOs, governments and industry. A good example is the Global Oiled Wildlife Response System. Successful systems are in place in many regions and which have been effective in many instances in the last 20 years. However, there is still important work to do to ensure the response to oiled wildlife is as effective as possible.

The Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs) which are members of the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) insure over 90% of world ocean-going tonnage and over 95% of all ocean-going tankers.

Shipowner's liability cover provided by the IG Clubs, along with the IG's claims pooling and reinsurance arrangements, are a key factor in enabling world seaborne trade, protecting the marine environment and in meeting the interests of all those affected by oil pollution.

The international oil pollution compensation regime is underpinned by IG Club cover through the financial guarantees (“blue cards”) that the IG Clubs issue to shipowners for the purposes of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention. The Clubs also provide a unique claims handling service to manage the aftermath of a ship-sourced oil pollution incident.

The great majority of all cases of ship-sourced oil pollution damage are handled by the individual P&I Clubs alone. Shipowners rely on their P&I Clubs to handle claims both from a financial and administrative perspective. Incidents can be complex and involve a range of different parties and interests. Quick and fair resolution to the handling and settlement

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

The Role of the P&I Clubs − Compensation

of claims is important and the IG Clubs have extensive experience over many years of handling oil pollution damage claims within the international compensation regime.

The IG is an active representative body within the IOPC Funds system, and it works jointly with the IOPC Funds to ensure that the system operates for the benefit of all parties. This work has included the creation of the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement 2006 (STOPIA 2006) and the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement 2006 (TOPIA 2006).

These two voluntary agreements apply to tankers entered in P&I Clubs that are members of the IG and reinsured through the pooling arrangements of the Group.

For vessels in distress or in need of assistance there is often the need to find an appropriate location where the vessel can be stabilised or repaired. Such a “Place of Refuge” can be a port or a sheltered natural site. The shipping industry recognises that the risk of pollution is a sensitive issue for coastal States. However, failure to offer a place of refuge may mean the condition of the vessel deteriorating with the risk of pollution over a wider area.

In response to a series of incidents, IMO adopted two Resolutions in 2003 on “Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in need of Assistance” and on “Maritime Assistance Services” (MAS), recommending that all coastal states establish a maritime assistance service for receiving reports, monitoring a ship’s situation and serving as a point of contact.

PREVENTION

Places of Refuge

In 2007 IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee approved “Guidelines on the Control of Ships in an Emergency” which, along with the 1989 Salvage Convention and the 1979 Search and Rescue Convention, also bear on the issue of Places of Refuge.

In response to the IMO Resolutions, some countries and regions have identified and published complementary guidance as well as identifying potential locations for refuge. Other countries believe that the decision will need to be made on a case by case basis due to technical, political, and other factors and may require specific conditions to be met before a ship can use a port of refuge. Nevertheless, many in the shipping and salvage industries would like to see an improvement in response to requests for a place of refuge in other parts of the world.

Most sea-going ships are “classed” to verify the structural strength and integrity of the ship’s hull and equipment, as well as the reliability of other essential systems. Classification Societies achieve this by developing and applying their own rules and by verifying compliance on behalf of Flag State Administrations with applicable international and national regulations throughout the life cycle of the ship.

Classification by a society recognised by the Flag State is a condition for certification under SOLAS and, in many cases, is a prerequisite for registration of a ship with the Flag State. Periodic surveys are undertaken to verify that a vessel is maintained in compliance with the relevant classification and related requirements.

The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) is an association of the leading Classification Societies which develops and promotes minimum technical

PREVENTION

Class and Common Structural Rules

standards, in part through Unified Requirements which include Common Structural Rules for different ship types. The IACS Common Structural Rules came into force in 2006, and cover double hull tankers with a length of 150 metres and greater and bulk carriers with a length of 90 metres or greater.

IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee confirmed in 2016 that the Rules submitted by each of the 12 IACS Member Societies for oil tankers and bulk carriers conform to the requirements of IMO’s Goal-Based Ship Construction Standards under SOLAS.

Use of Common Structural Rules that conform to the Goal-Based Standards drives improvements in safety by setting a standard for design and construction that an individual Classification Society must meet as a prerequisite for certifying oil tankers and bulk carriers under SOLAS.

The IMO Member State Audit Scheme is intended to provide an audited Member State with a comprehensive and objective assess-ment of how effectively it administers and implements those mandatory IMO instru-ments which are covered by the Scheme. Amendments to eight IMO instruments, including MARPOL, made audits of Member States mandatory from the beginning of 2016. The IMO Instruments Implementation Code provides the standards for conducting an audit.

The scheme addresses issues such as:• Conformance in enacting appropriate legisla-

tion for the IMO instruments to which a Member State is a party

• Implementation and enforcement of the ap-plicable laws and regulations by the Member State

• Delegation of authority to Recognised Or-ganisations (ROs)

• The control and monitoring mechanism of the survey and certification processes by the Member States

It is expected that the audit scheme will bring about other benefits, such as identifying where capacity-building activities − like the

PREVENTION

IMO Member State Audit Scheme (IMSAS)

provision of technical assistance by IMO to Member States − would have the greatest effect. In doing so, targeting of appropriate action to improve performance will be improved. The Member States themselves would receive valuable feedback to assist them in improving their own capacity to put applicable instruments into prac-tice. Generic lessons learnt from audits could be provided to all Member States to share the bene-fits more widely.

The shipping industry has developed complemen-tary audit and quality management schemes, an example of which is the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Quality System Certification Scheme (QSCS).

QSCS has its roots in a number of serious casual-ties at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. Many of these were the result of operational fail-ings, prompting IMO, in 1993, to adopt Guide-lines on the Enhanced Programme of Inspections during Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers. IACS responded by creating the QSCS, which is one of the key criteria for membership of IACS by a Classification Society. This remains central to the IACS ethos and compliance is mandatory for its Classification Society members.

Improvements have been made to the system of compensation over time. The IOPC Funds and the International Group of P&I Clubs (IG) have continued to work with international, regional and intergovernmental organisations − as well as the oil and shipping industry − to encourage the worldwide adoption of the oil pollution compensation regime. The continued aim is to provide the best protection to those affected by marine oil spills.

There is ongoing work to identify those regions or countries which require particular attention and support to help them adopt the regime or to ensure that it is properly imple-mented nationally. The work is informed by

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

Compensation − The Work Continues

analysis of factors such as trends in the pro-duction, transportation and import of oil as well as consideration of the risk of oil spills.

The collaborative efforts of the organisations involved in this outreach programme have been successful. The cooperation between the IOPC Funds, the IG, IMO and ITOPF shows the benefit of working together and drawing on each organisation’s areas of expertise to achieve wider coverage and better application of the regime. It forms part of the wider effort conducted by IMO to advocate the adoption of global maritime rules and standards and con-ventions in shipping.

The TORREY CANYON incident in 1967 highlighted the need to establish an international and uniform system to compensate those affected by oil pollution from tankers.

At the time of the incident there was much relevant legislation in the affected territories of France and the UK. However, some of this legislation was conflicting and it was clear that obtaining compensation for the clean-up operations and damage caused by the incident would be difficult.

Claims were made by the governments of the UK and France against the owners of the vessel but it had no assets in the UK. The UK and French governments presented their claims in an American district court which applied the US Limitation of Liability Act of 1851. It limited the liability of the owners to the value of the vessel after the incident. As the vessel had been sunk there was no residual value. The governments appealed the liability judgement and agreed a settlement of some US$ 9 million, at the time it was the largest settlement for an oil claim.

COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY

A clear warning

This difficult situation led to pressure to develop a system, funded by the oil industry and shipowners, that would guarantee sufficient compensation for future oil pollution incidents. Representatives of industry proposed an interim solution in the form of two private compensation schemes and these were to remain in operation until new international conventions came into force.

The Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution (TOVALOP) was established and administered by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Ltd (ITOPF). It was signed in 1969 by seven major oil companies to provide compensation to governments for the costs of clean-up operations and damage caused by tankers. Shipowners’ liability under TOVALOP was originally limited to a maximum of US$ 10 million per incident. A supplementary scheme was introduced by the oil companies increasing the compensation available to US$ 30 million per incident. This second scheme was known as CRISTAL (Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution). Both schemes remained in operation until 1997.