5...To present the Bi-SC final report on the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study...

NATO UNCLASSIFIED Releasable to North Macedonia and IP

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

SH/SDP/JS/PLP/VC/19-004748 (INV)

TO: See Distribution

ACT/CAPDEV/REQS/TT-2061/SER:NU0503

SUBJECT: Bl-SC FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT AIR POWER STRATEGY INTEROPERABILITY STUDY (JAPS-IS)

DATE: /5 January 2020

REFERENCES: A. PO(2018)0047, NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy, dated 02 February2018.

BACKGROUND

B. IMSM-0068-2018, NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation,dated 14 March 2018.C. IMSM-0513-2018, ACT's Request for Extension to Deliver the Bi-SCJAPS Implementation Report on Interoperability Considerations, dated 03December 2018.D. 5000/TSC FCR 0010/ACT-0924/Ser:NU-0057, Interim Joint AirPower Strategy (JAPS) Interoperability Study Report, dated 07 February2019.E. SH/SDP/JS/PLP/VC/19-002091, NATO's Joint Air Power StrategyImplementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report,dated 18 April 2019.F. ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-1020/Ser:NU-0300, Interim Report - NATO'sJAPS Interoperability Study, dated 30 August 2019.G. NIAG-D(2019)0022, Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation -Interoperability Considerations, dated 24 October 2019.

1. At Reference A, the Council approved NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS) andprovided additional guidance for the implementation of the strategy. The guidance includedtasking the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) to identify potential interoperability considerationsand challenges, including those from an operational perspective, and to providerecommendations on a process to address them. This would then inform the Conference ofNational Armament Directors (CNAD), supported by the Air and Missile Defence Committee(AMDC), to identify mitigation measures and solutions.

2. At Reference B, the Strategic Commands (SCs) were tasked to provide the requiredinput for the implementation of JAPS. In particular, the SCs, with ACT in the lead, were taskedto identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges between new and oldgeneration platforms, systems and capabilities, including from an operational perspective, andprovide recommendations on a process of how to address these.

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe B-7010 SHAPEBelgium

1

Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Norfolk, Virginia, 23551-2490 United States of America

NATO UNCLASSIFIED


3. At Reference C, the International Military Staff (IMS) acknowledged that the study will be delivered in several steps in order to cover the entire spectrum of interoperability in joint Air Operations. ACT and ACO delivered intermediate reports with References D, E and F, which have already been presented to the Nations.

AIM

4. To present the Bi-SC final report on the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study (JAPS-IS), as provided at enclosure 1.

SCOPE

5. The JAPS Interoperability Study Final Report presents the results of a two-year long effort specifically focussed on the area of interoperability and connectivity. It provides NATO with analysis, conclusions and recommendations on the way forward regarding the implementation of the JAPS.

6. The report considers relevant interoperability challenges concerning JAP and provides specific recommendations on a process to address these challenges. However, it does not specifically address cyberspace or space as domains of operations, as these are separate ongoing initiatives outside of the scope of the original IMS tasking. As tasked by the Council, the MC is taking the JAPS into account in its assessment and approval process of the NATO Air Command and Control (C2) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Additionally, the Joint C2 CONOPS will inform the domain-specific C2 CONOPS. The JAPS-IS Final Report is meant to complement this effort by underscoring the importance of Air C2 capabilities, constraints and vulnerabilities.

7. The JAPS Interoperability Study Final Report summarizes the main interoperability considerations and challenges between old and new generation platforms/systems identified in the different documents and proposes a process to mitigate the gaps and some recommendations.

a. Three main ideas are to be considered: [1] Speed is critical; JAPS adaptation is not keeping pace with the rapidly changing security environment and developing technology, [2] Lack of information sharing impedes operational effectiveness, [3] We are relearning the same lessons, some issues identified have been previously noted.

b. The proposed process to address the identified issues is a JAPS Interoperability Roadmap that provides a holistic approach to correct the most pressing interoperability concerns, capitalizes on ongoing NATO initiatives to the maximum extent possible and details action items in seven lines of effort (LOEs): [1] Defence planning, [2] Policy, [3] Doctrine, [4] Standardization, [5] NATO ETEE, [6] Organization, [7] Enterprise C41SR Architecture Strategy.

c. The recommendations are presented in three different categories: [1] Recommendations for NATO to take action without significant additional resourcing or organizational changes, [2] Recommendations for NATO to consider which may require additional resourcing and/or organizational changes, [3] Recommendations for Nations to take action.

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RECOMMENDATION

8. The MC is invited to endorse the conclusion of the JAPS Interoperability Study, initiate and govern the proposed process to deal with interoperability challenges in the implementation of JAPS, and consider the recommendations appropriately.

FOR THE SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDERS, EUROPE AND TRANSFORMATION:

p~~ Paul M Bennett CB OBE Vice Admiral, GBR N Chief of Staff If" /0 I /1.D

arkus Kneip General, DEU A Chief of Staff //31#11

ENCLOSURE:

1. Bi-SC Final Report on the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study

DISTRIBUTION:

External:

Action:

DGIMS

Information:

NATO HOIDGIMSIDIR P&C SACTREPEUR SACEUREP JFCNP JFCBS JFCNF AIRCOM LANDCOM MARCOM NSHO JWC JAPCC NAEW&C Forces NAGSF NATO Standardization Office Ali NMRs ta HO SACT All NMRs to SHAPE

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Internal:

Information:

SACT: OCOS CAPOEV ACOS REQ ACOS CAPS

SHAPE: SOP SEM STREN PD CYBER MGT Oir osa SACEUR OSACEUR

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ENCLOSURE 1 TO SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 (INV) ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU0503 DATED 15 JAN 20

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Bi-SC Final Report of the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study


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PREFACE

In February 2018, Defence Ministers endorsed the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS).1 It provides the Alliance with an enduring direction for the future development and employment of Joint Air Power (JAP) capabilities to fulfil NATO’s core tasks.2

JAPS is authoritative and guides and informs all existing and future NATO airpower activities and capability development. The JAPS underscores a number of areas, in particular the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) as central to the implementation of the JAPS. Other areas include policy and doctrine, strategic communications and capability development.

The key to NATO JAP effectiveness is to force generate assets that are interoperable on Day-Zero. This requires an unremitting focus on interoperability. Nations continue to pursue modernization, therefore interoperability between new and old generation platforms, systems and capabilities is increasingly important for Nations to exploit the full potential of JAP and maximize combat effectiveness.

In consideration of the implementation of JAPS, the Strategic Commands (SCs), with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the lead, were tasked to identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges between new and old generation platforms, systems and capabilities including from an operational perspective, and to propose a process on how to address them. ACT recommended to the International Military Staff (IMS) to deliver the JAPS Interoperability Study in increments, in order to address the entire spectrum of interoperability in joint air operations through the prism of three lenses – Transformational, Operational and Industrial.

In February 2019, ACT provided the first increment of the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study with the delivery of an Interim JAPS Interoperability Report,3 which identified a number of interoperability challenges associated with JAP capabilities and the command and control (C2) of air power.

In April 2019, NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) provided a second increment to the Joint Air Power Strategy - Interoperability Study (JAPS-IS) with the delivery of the report entitled "NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation, ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report".4 This report provides the overall Bi-SC JAPS-IS with an essential operational view by highlighting key issues that currently affect NATO operations. It was informed by survey responses from several Nations, expertise from a

1 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (Reference 63) 2 The three core tasks of NATO are: Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security 3 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39) 4 NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation – ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68)


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number of subject matter experts and Centres of Excellence (COEs), as well as an in-depth interoperability study conducted for the Combined Air Interoperability Programme (CAIP).5

Commissioned by ACT in June 2019, the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study Group 240 (SG240) provided another increment to the Bi-SC JAPS-IS, with the delivery of the report,6 “Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations”, in October 2019. Leveraging experts from 18 companies and 11 different nations, SG240 provides the Bi-SC JAPS-IS with an important industrial view. The report is available on the NATO Headquarters’ Defence Investment web portal at https://diweb.hq.nato.int/niag/Pages_Anonymous/Default.aspx.

In August 2019 ACT delivered another increment to the Bi-SC JAPS-IS with an interim report 7 entitled, NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study, focused on incorporating main themes of the JAPS-IS findings into the NATO Defence Planning Process. The interim report had two major components. Firstly, it provided findings regarding interoperability considerations and challenges, within each of the four JAP core roles.8 An updated accounting of this information is provided in Part II of this report. Secondly, the interim report provided an in-depth assessment of JAPS-related interoperability recommendations and considerations that have already been or should be incorporated into the NDPP Capability Codes and Statements (CC&CS). This information is summarized in Annex D.

Throughout the development of this study, in addition to the aforementioned increments, the Strategic Commands delivered verbal updates to the MCWG, in February 2019, June 2019 and October 2019.

The Strategic Commands work on this report is a collective effort. From SHAPE, J5 Plans & Policy Branch, Colonel Manuel Santos and Lieutenant-Colonel Valerie Capot; and from Headquarters SACT, Federated Interoperability Branch, Mr. Terry McCoy, Mr. Chris Brunett and Mr. Peter Woudsma.

Moreover, this work had not been possible without the persistent dedication and contributions from across the entire NATO establishment, as well as nations, think tanks, academia and industry. The development process was continuously inclusive and transparent, ensuring all feedback and inputs were taken into account and incorporated. It was informed by other strands of work related to JAP, including, inter alia, the Joint C2

5 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference 23) 6 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47) 7 Interim Report - NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study (Reference 38) 8 The four JAP core roles are: Counter-Air, Attack, Air Mobility, and Air Contribution to JISR


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Concept of Operations,9 the Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities,10 Joint Air Power Competence Centre’s (JAPCC) paper on JAP’s urgent priorities,11 the Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) capability project and the advice of NATO Force Commands (specifically, AIRCOM and MARCOM) and Nations.

9 The Joint Command and Control Concept of Operations (Reference 48) has been approved by the Military Committee under condition of some minor refinements, currently being worked on at SHAPE. 10 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21) 11 Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit - Urgent Priorities (Reference 45)


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CONTENTS

PREFACE .................................................................................................................................. 2

CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................... 5

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 7

PART I - CONTEXT ................................................................................................................... 9

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 9

Interoperability ..........................................................................................................................11

Report Structure ........................................................................................................................12

PART II - INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN JAP ROLES .......................................13

Introduction ...............................................................................................................................13

Joint Air Power Core Roles .......................................................................................................14

Interoperability Considerations for DOCTRINE .........................................................................17

Interoperability Considerations for ORGANIZATION .................................................................25

Interoperability Considerations for TRAINING ...........................................................................28

Interoperability Considerations for MATERIEL ..........................................................................33

Interoperability Considerations for LEADERSHIP .....................................................................41

Interoperability Considerations for PERSONNEL ......................................................................42

Interoperability Considerations for FACILITIES .........................................................................44

PART III - INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN NDPP ...............................................47

Introduction ...............................................................................................................................47

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area PREPARE ..................................................48

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area PROJECT ..................................................51

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area ENGAGE ....................................................52

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area C3 ..............................................................52

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area SUSTAIN ....................................................53

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area PROTECT ..................................................53

Interoperability Considerations for Capability Area INFORM .....................................................54

PART IV - ANALYSIS OF CONSIDERATIONS .........................................................................55

Introduction ...............................................................................................................................55

Original Data Set .......................................................................................................................56

Analysis of Affinity .....................................................................................................................56

Analysis of Prioritization ............................................................................................................57


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Pull Through .............................................................................................................................59

PART V – JAPS INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP ..................................................................60

Introduction ...............................................................................................................................60

Principles ..................................................................................................................................61

Lines of Effort ............................................................................................................................62

PART VI - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................................................74

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................74

Recommendations ....................................................................................................................75

Final Thoughts ..........................................................................................................................80

ANNEXES

ANNEX A - ACRONYMS

ANNEX B - TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

ANNEX C - JAP-RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS

ANNEX D - JAP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NDPP

ANNEX E - ANALYSIS RESULTS

ANNEX F - REFERENCES


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In February 2018, Defence Ministers endorsed the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS).12. It provides the Alliance with an enduring direction for the future development and employment of Joint Air Power (JAP) capabilities to fulfil NATO’s core tasks.13

The Joint Air Power Strategy is considered authoritative to guide and inform all existing and future strands of work related to JAP.14 The JAPS underscores areas such as policy and doctrine, command and control, strategic communications and capability development. It has an impact on the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP).

The key to JAP effectiveness in NATO is to generate assets in the air domain that are interoperable on Day-Zero. This requires an unremitting focus on interoperability. Nations continue to pursue modernization, therefore interoperability between current and new generation platforms, systems and capabilities is increasingly important for Nations to exploit the full potential of JAP and maximize combat effectiveness.

In consideration of the implementation of JAPS, the Strategic Commands (SCs), with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in the lead, were tasked to identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges between new and old generation platforms, systems and capabilities including from an operational perspective, and to propose a process on how to address them.

The JAPS Interoperability Study (JAPS-IS) Final Report presents the results of a two-year long effort specifically focused on the area of interoperability and connectivity. To address the entire spectrum of joint air power interoperability, the SCs studied the problem from three different perspectives - Transformational, Operational and Industrial.

Three high-level conclusions are presented. First, speed is critical. Adaptation of JAPS is not keeping pace with the rapidly changing security environment and developing technology. To adapt more rapidly, the Alliance must pursue and adopt innovative approaches to capability planning and development, including the adoption of emerging disruptive technologies and business practices. Second, lack of information sharing impedes operational effectiveness. Information sharing restrictions and national caveats limit interoperability solutions and reduce operational effectiveness across the domains. Third, we are relearning the same lessons. Many of the issues identified in this study have been previously noted in other studies, activities or reports.

Recommendations are presented in three different categories - things NATO can do now, things NATO should consider, and things Nations can do now.

12 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (Reference 62) 13 The three core tasks of NATO are: Collective Defence, Crisis Management and Cooperative Security 14 NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 67), paragraph 4


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The first category of recommendations consists of things NATO can do now, without significant additional resourcing or organizational changes. These actions include a JAPS Interoperability Roadmap that provides a deliberately repeatable process, with seven lines of effort: LOE-1 for Defence Planning; LOE-2 for Policy; LOE-3 for Doctrine; LOE-4 for Standardization; LOE-5 for Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE); LOE-6 for Organization; and LOE-7 for Enterprise C4ISR Architecture Strategy. Also included in this category are inputs to be considered by other ongoing JAP activities such as assessments for Air Basing Selection, Aircraft Cross-Servicing, and NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS).

The second category of recommendations consists of things NATO should consider, but may require additional resourcing and/or organizational changes. They include proposals for: collaboration with the Combined Air Interoperability Programme (CAIP); a NATO-EU interoperability standards roadmap; a NATO leadership development programme; and a NATO JAP procurement strategy. Also included in this category is a proposal for the development of a NATO Air Warfare Centre, NATO Live/Virtual (LV) Mission Training through Distributed Simulation with MTDS LV Backbone, and a NATO Integrated Battle Lab.

The third category of recommendations consists of things Nations could do now, which include a review of national caveats, national information sharing constraints and national industry information sharing policies.

Finally, the SCs recommend NATO provide an updated and relevant Interoperability Policy to drive a deliberate, innovative, and agile approach to identifying and addressing interoperability challenges with speed and urgency. The policy must leverage emerging technologies and business practices and distinguish the various levels of interoperability, including de-confliction, coordination, collaboration and integration. Also, it must establish methods to measure interoperability to support interoperability certification standards. In the end, and most importantly, it must drive a shift in culture to adopt an interoperable by design approach and consider interoperability at the very beginning of capability development.


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PART I - CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

1. Approved by Council in February 2018, the NATO Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS), provides NATO with a comprehensive Joint Air Power (JAP) vision, fully consistent with NATO’s Strategic Concept and other high-level political guidance, including the strengthened deterrence and defence posture, and efforts to project stability. It also provides direction for the future development and employment of air power capabilities to fulfil NATO’s core tasks, identify effects and objectives, and improve joint air power’s contribution to the resolution of future crisis and conflict situations.15

2. Utilizing an "Ends, Ways, Means" construct, the JAPS delivers the Alliance necessary clarity on JAP functions and roles and the JAP contribution to NATO’s three core tasks and other agreed political objectives. It begins by providing a definition of JAP that captures the collective capabilities of air, land, maritime and Special Operations Forces, and properly addresses the joint nature of air power. It then conveys the key characteristics of JAP; the anticipated security and operating environment in which JAP is likely to be employed; JAP’s support to the achievement of NATO’s three core tasks; and, the core roles of JAP and its employment in a multi-domain environment.

3. The JAPS is authoritative to guide and inform all existing and future JAP related activities, including capability development.16 In the implementation of this strategy, there are three areas of importance: policy and doctrine; capability development, mainly in the NDPP context; and strategic communications. In addition, the following aspects are of particular importance: space; cyberspace; interoperability and connectivity, Air Command and Control (Air C2); operating in contested and degraded conditions; and quantity versus quality.

4. This JAPS Interoperability Study (JAPS-IS) Final Report presents the results of a two-year long effort specifically focused on the area of interoperability and connectivity. It provides NATO with analysis, conclusions and recommendations on the way forward regarding the implementation of the JAPS.

Aim

5. This Final Report represents the final increment for the Bi-SC JAPS Interoperability Study directly addressing the IMS tasking,17 “…The SCs, with ACT in the lead, are requested to identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges between

15 NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy (Reference 62) 16 NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 67), paragraph 4 17 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 67), paragraph 8


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new and old generation platforms, systems and capabilities, including from an operational perspective, and provide recommendations on a process of how to address these.”

6. It integrates the findings, conclusions and recommendations of all aforementioned JAPS-IS increments into a single core document to provide the collective advice of the SCs to the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and specifically the Air and Missile Defence Committee (AMDC), on the implementation of the JAPS.

Scope

7. This report considers relevant interoperability challenges concerning JAP and provides specific recommendations on a process to address these challenges. However, it does not specifically address cyberspace or space as domains of operations, as these are separate ongoing initiatives outside of the scope of the original IMS tasking. As tasked by the Council, the MC is taking the JAPS into account in its assessment and approval process of the NATO Air Command and Control (C2) Concept of Operations (CONOPS). Additionally to the JAPS-IS Final Report, the Joint C2 CONOPS will inform the domain-specific C2 CONOPS. The JAPS-IS Final Report is meant to complement this effort by underscoring the importance of Air C2 capabilities, constraints and vulnerabilities. The JAPS-IS Final Report does not address strategic communications (StratCom) principles on JAP.

Method

8. For the purpose of the analysis of interoperability considerations and challenges in JAPS implementation, the study looked at the problem scope from three different perspectives:

a. Operational. Provided by subject matter experts from NATO Allied Command Operations (SHAPE and its subordinate operational commands, particularly AIRCOM and MARCOM), and relevant Centres of Excellence (COEs), the operational view describes the tasks and activities, operational elements, and information exchanges required to conduct operations at strategic, operational and tactical levels. ACO’s overall aim is to contribute to Allied defence and security by maintaining the integrity of Alliance territory, safeguarding freedom of the seas and economic lifelines, and to preserve or restore the security of its members. As the integrators of the various assets that are made available by Nations, ACO has a vested interest in keeping the interoperability gaps to a minimum.

b. Industrial. The NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) provides Industry’s advice to the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) and other NATO bodies on how to foster government-to-industry and industry-to-industry armaments co-operation within the Alliance. The NIAG assists the development of military capability requirements and the fielding of interoperable solutions; fosters



the Trans-Atlantic defence technological and industrial cooperation; and, provides advice on the adoption of open source standards.

c. Transformational. Provided by subject matter experts from Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and relevant Centres of Excellence, the transformational view focuses on the adaptation of Alliance and partner nations’ capabilities to meet future operational requirements in the most efficient and effective manner. This is driven by a continuous process of developing, integrating and training innovative concepts, lessons learned from operations, doctrines and capabilities in order to improve the effectiveness and interoperability of nations’ military forces.

9. The study team compared and then integrated the various contributions into this Final Report to provide a comprehensive and harmonized response to the assigned task.

INTEROPERABILITY

10. For the purpose of this report, interoperability is defined as the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied objectives.18 This NATO definition is one of the strongest in any dictionary and/or encyclopaedia as it clearly articulates the importance of interoperability and the force multiplying effect it can have in terms of operational effectiveness and cost efficiency.19

11. Interoperability is achievable through common doctrine, procedures and technical means, and, enhanced by cultural awareness, interoperability spans the full spectrum of the DOTMLPF lines of development, and is essential for the success of NATO JAP. Since Nations will deliver capabilities to NATO at differing generational and technological levels, this means that the integration of upgrades to legacy communications, identification and information systems, including technical validation and verification processes, will be critical to achieve seamless interoperability.

12. Interoperability is not limited to just technological interoperability. A well-balanced investment in people, procedural and technological interoperability is required to fulfil the ambition implied by NATO's definition.20

18 AAP-6 - NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (Reference 56) 19 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 2.a 20 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 2.e



REPORT STRUCTURE

13. There are six parts to the JAPS-IS Final Report:

a. Part I - Context - provides background and context of the study, itsorigination and methodology.

b. Part II - Interoperability Considerations in JAP Roles - provides ananalysis of interoperability considerations and challenges regarding JAPS acrossthe DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personneland Facilities) capability lines of development.

c. Part III - Interoperability Considerations in NDPP - provides an in-depthassessment of JAPS-related interoperability recommendations and considerationsthat have already been or should be incorporated into the NDPP Capability Codesand Statements (CC&CS).

d. Part IV - Analysis of Considerations - is a systematic assessment of thefindings in Parts II and III to support the development of conclusions andrecommendations.

e. Part V – JAPS Interoperability Roadmap - is a proposal for a process thatprovides a holistic and coordinated approach to correct the most pressinginteroperability concerns with a sense of urgency. It capitalizes on existing andongoing NATO initiatives to the maximum extent possible and details several linesof effort (LOE) with associated action items.

f. Part VI - Conclusion and Recommendations - provides pull through fromthis interoperability study in a conclusion and a set of detailed recommendations,the first of which is for a process of how to address potential interoperabilityconsiderations and challenges.



PART II - INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN JAP ROLES

INTRODUCTION

14. The effectiveness of Allied forces in peace, crisis or in conflict depends on the ability of the forces provided to operate together coherently, effectively and efficiently. Allied joint operations should be planned, prepared for and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths of the capabilities and forces made available for an operation. 21 Since Nations deliver capabilities at differing generational and technological levels, interoperability is an unending endeavour - a constant drive to improve our joint and multinational force common doctrine, procedures and technical means and enhanced by cultural awareness.22 The success of JAP, therefore, requires continuous adaptation across the spectrum of DOTMLPF lines of development.

Aim

15. To present the Bi-SC findings of potential JAP interoperability considerations and challenges between new and old generation platforms, systems and capabilities, including from an operational perspective.

Scope

16. This analysis is limited to the four JAP core roles - Counter-Air, Attack, Air Mobility, and Air Contribution to JISR - and it does not include other JAPS Implementation lines of effort such as Space, Cyberspace, Air Command and Control (Air C2), etc.

Method

17. For each of the four JAP core roles, the Strategic Commands have exposed interoperability considerations and challenges using an examination of lessons identified, extensive literary review, advice from NATO force commands (specifically, AIRCOM and MARCOM) and Centres of Excellence (COEs), national and multinational organizations, and the ACO Operational Assessment,23 which includes the results of a multinational workshop and national surveys.

18. For the purpose of further research and analysis, every consideration in the following chapters have a unique identifier that expresses the initial of the applicable DOTMLPF line of development, an incremental number for that line, and an initial to

21 AJP-01 - Allied Joint Doctrine (Reference 13), pages 1 and 2 22 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (Reference 62), Appendix 1, paragraph 41 23 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68)



identify the JAP core role (with "G" for general items, "C" for Counter-Air, "A" for Attack, "M" for Air Mobility and "J" for Contribution to JISR).

19. Often interoperability findings span more than one JAP core role and impact more than one capability characteristic. In these cases, the finding is included in the most relevant section. Interoperability findings that span all four JAP core roles are included separately as general considerations.

20. New generation platforms, such as F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), are multi-mission capable and span more than one of the core roles (e.g. Counter-Air, Attack, JISR). This notwithstanding the fact that various existing platforms that not qualify as "new generation", also are multi-role capable. For the purposes of this report, challenges related to new generation platforms and their integration with legacy but still capable platforms (e.g. F16 and Typhoon) can be found in the Attack subsection and are sometimes referred to as "multi-generation" challenges.

21. The topic of Air Command and Control is beyond the scope of this task; however, Air C2 is integral to all JAP core roles and adjoins them. Therefore, it is impractical to discuss JAP interoperability without some mention of Air C2 and conversely.

JOINT AIR POWER CORE ROLES

22. The core roles of JAP are defined in the Joint Air Power Strategy itself and in NATO Joint Doctrine24 as:

a. Counter-Air;

b. Attack;

c. Air mobility; and

d. Air contribution to JISR.

23. Counter-Air. Control of the air helps shape the operational area wherein friendly operations can proceed at the optimum place and time without prohibitive air interference, while providing force protection.25

24 AJP-01 - Allied Joint Doctrine (Reference 13) 25 AJP-3.3 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Reference 15), Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, paragraph 1



a. Offensive Counter-Air. Offensive Counter- Air (OCA) consists of offensiveoperations to destroy, disrupt or degrade adversary air and missile capabilities asclose to their source as possible, both before and after launch.26

b. Defensive Counter-Air. Defensive Counter- Air (DCA) operations protectfriendly forces and vital interests from adversary air and missile attacks; as such itis mainly, but not strictly synonymous with air and missile defence (AMD).27

24. Attack. Attack lies at the heart of air power’s capacity to create effects by changingbehaviours or the course of events. Air attack is coercive in the broadest sense of theterm as it creates tactical, operational and strategic effects through the threat, and use,of force.28

a. Strategic Attack. A strategic attack is an operational level-directedoffensive action against a target, whether military, political, economic, or other, thatis specifically selected to achieve military strategic objectives.29

b. Air Power Contribution. These operations comprise air power contributionto land operations and air power contribution to maritime operations and areconducted to: defeat adversaries fielded forces; destroy their supportinginfrastructure; or generate psychological effects to shatter their cohesion or will tofight.30

(1) Air Power Contribution to Land Operations. Air PowerContribution to Land Operations (APCLO) are operations flown in supportof land operations are conducted as part of the overall joint campaignstrategy and the specific circumstances of the conflict. Operations generallyfall under two mission types: Air Interdiction (AI) and Close Air Support(CAS).

(2) Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations. Air PowerContribution to Maritime Operations (APCMO) are operations flown insupport of maritime operations extend the application of air power into thehigh seas or the littoral and its adjacent waters. Such operations usually

26 AJP-3.3 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Reference 15), Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, paragraph 3 27 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, paragraph 4 28 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 1 29 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 2 30 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 3



contribute to two specific maritime warfare areas: Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW).31

c. Air-delivered Information Activities. Such activities primarily focus on non-lethal effects to influence an adversary’s will, understanding and subsequent capability behaviour.32

25. Air Mobility. Air mobility enables the deployment, sustainment and recovery of military and civilian personnel and material by air. It is critical to the success of joint operations. At the operational level air mobility operations fall into two fundamental categories: Air Transport (sometimes referred to as airlift) and Air-to-Air refuelling.33

a. Air Transport. Air Transport (AT) allows a Joint Task Force (JTF) to move and sustain forces anywhere in the world and across the entire range of operations. AT operations are typically classified as inter- or intra-theatre.34

b. Air-to-Air Refuelling. Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) is an air support operation consisting of the in-flight transfer of fuel between an airborne tanker and suitable receiver aircraft.35

26. Air Contribution to JISR. Air contribution to Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) is an integrated intelligence and operations set of capabilities, which synchronizes and integrates the planning and operations of all collection capabilities with tactical collection, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TCPED) of the resulting information in direct support of planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Air and space based ISR-assets can be used strategically to build an early understanding of potential crisis points and enhance the quality of political and high-level military decision-making. At the operational and tactical levels it allows observation of an adversary’s actions and dispositions (including battle damage assessment), thereby enabling commanders to identify dependencies, vulnerabilities and strengths.36

31 Although not specifically mentioned, APCMO does also include Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Amphibious Operations. 32 AJP-3.3 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Reference 15), Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.4 - Attack, paragraph 4 33 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.5 - Air Mobility, paragraph 4 34 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.5 - Air Mobility, paragraph 3 35 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.5 - Air Mobility, paragraph 5 36 Ibidem, Chapter 3.3 - Control of the Air, Chapter 3.6 - JISR, paragraph 1



INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR DOCTRINE

Doctrine Considerations (General)

27. [ D-01-G ] Lagging Allied Publications. There are a significant number ofongoing JAP-related work strands currently being worked in NATO that will haveimplications on existing strategies, policies, doctrines and plans. However, JAP-relateddoctrines in the Allied Joint Publications (AJP) have not yet explicitly implemented JAPS,as the current revision cycle commenced before the approval of the strategy. The nextcycle is due to begin with the revision of the AJP-01,37 “Allied Joint Doctrine”, starting atthe end of 2019. Subsequent revision of JAP-related AJPs is planned for 2022.38 Thespeed with which NATO doctrine (and the overarching policy that guides it) evolves isinadequate to keep pace with rapidly changing operational environment and emergingtechnologies. The cross-domain characteristic of JAPS implies the need to ensure alldomains incorporate changes into relevant AJPs. An overview of the JAP-related AJPs ispresented in Annex C with their respective promulgation dates.

28. [ D-02-G ] Outdated concepts. With the Joint C2 Concept of Operations(CONOPS) signed by SACEUR in December 2019, the delivery of the domain-specificC2 CONOPS will be the next step. These domain-specific C2 CONOPS must be alignedand reflect a truly joint approach to NATO operations. While NATO is well versed invertical C2, it must consider and be able to achieve horizontal collaborations andsynchronization across multiple domains, commands and joint operating areas (JOAs).The management of scarce resources is an enduring challenge for operationalcommanders during any operation. The ability to seamlessly share information betweendomains, commands and JOAs help manage those resources and reduce duplication ofeffort. It requires NATO to provide commanders and NATO forces with effective, commonand protected means of information sharing and information management. This isparticularly important between Maritime and Air C2 CONOPS noting that both domainsare key contributors to NATO Air Defence, NATO Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA)and Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO). The Air C2 CONOPS will be of pivotalimportance to several JAP-related work strands, as it will describe the conceptualapproach to NATO Air C2 across the three NATO core tasks. Ideally, new generationwarfare concepts should precede the introduction of next generation platforms intoAlliance exercises and operations. Aircraft such as the JSF have been in developmentfor over two decades and are now being introduced into several Alliance national airforces; however, NATO has yet to even define the characteristics, capabilities andlimitations of new generation air platforms. Definitions are a prerequisite to the commonlanguage doctrine is intended to provide. NATO must find a way to decrease the cycle-time between identifying emerging requirements to adapting our policies, concepts anddoctrines. NATO tends to employ new platforms and systems in the roles associated with

37 AJP-01 Allied Joint Doctrine (Reference 13) 38 2019 Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report (Reference 2)



legacy platforms and systems. Planners and operators, who do not fully understand a new platform or system, may not exploit the full range of its capabilities. Likewise, a failure to provide the right level of support for a new platform or system similarly prevents the full exploitation its capabilities.

29. [ D-03-G ] Lagging TTPs. Updates to NATO’s Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) do not keep pace with the arrival of new generation platforms or capabilities. Lacking overarching guidance, Nations develop their own TTP using a baseline provided by the aircraft/capability manufacturer. These TTPs are not always shared directly with NATO and may not be aligned with current NATO TTPs. This is especially relevant when employing new generation and legacy assets in a joint operational context. Moreover, the lack of NATO consistent doctrine and TTPs for multi-generation platform usage negatively affects standardized training across platforms.39 Some specific examples are included in the following sections. A comprehensive review of JAP-related Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) reveals several TTPs requiring update. Whilst the process to deliberately review and update these documents at a planned periodicity schedule slowly improves NATO’s TTP library, it is neither flexible nor agile enough to complement the pace with which new technology and processes are introduced into Alliance air forces. Annex C presents the current JAP-related TTPs in the form of ATPs and their respective promulgations dates.

30. [ D-04-G ] Restrictive information sharing policies. A principle interoperability challenge is lack of proper knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and operational requirements of new generation platforms, which links directly to information sharing constraints within new generation programme offices. This knowledge deficit impedes joint operational planning and execution.40 For example, the ability of new generation platforms to acquire a wide range of spectral information enables potentially more complete and accurate system displays. New generation platforms may even provide C2 for some small-scale and specific engagements. However, the capability to share this more accurate picture is reduced by information sharing restrictions between old and new generation platforms.41

31. [ D-05-G ] Missing a JAP oriented security and protection concept. NATO lacks JAP oriented security/protection policy, concept, doctrine and TTPs (including cyber). Cyber and electronic warfare systems currently are significant threats for the Alliance air operations. Protection of the network must be as important as the protection of the platform. Measures must be taken to protect networks against manipulation of data and information (trust, spoofing) and denial of service.42

39 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 5 40 Ibidem, paragraph 5 41 Ibidem, paragraph 7 42 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.1.2



32. [ D-06-G ] Missing a JAP oriented operational and doctrinal framework. NATO lacks a JAP oriented NATO operational/doctrinal framework that also focus on personnel selection and leadership, addressing the complexity challenges posed by the possible threat and by the potential capabilities of own advances assets. The evolution of the NATO doctrine and TTPs, as well as the selection/education of personnel and leaders, must accelerate to keep pace with technological innovations, both from threats and nations.43

33. [ D-07-G ] Slow adoption of doctrine and training to changes in operational environment. NATO doctrine, organization, training schemes struggle to keep pace with the rapidly evolving JAP operational environment. Lessons learned are routinely collected and assessed in the "local" operational environment, but transferring them into a NATO wide generalized education and new standardized training schemes currently requires a much longer process. NATO lacks a centralized NATO structure to coordinate and execute JAP training and education, making best use of the Mission Training through Distributed Simulation (MTDS) capability for a realistic Live/Virtual (LV) training.44

Doctrine Considerations for Counter Air

34. [ D-08-C ] Revised IAMD policy. The revised Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) Policy45 represents a positive example of NATO policy responding to JAPS. As part of the effort to increase the readiness and ability of the Alliance to operate decisively across all operational domains, the revised policy underlines the importance of IAMD, using language from and responsive to the JAPS.46

35. [ D-09-C ] Improved AEA and SEAD concepts. In September 2018, the CNAD approved the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Concept of Employment (CONEMP), which defined the SEAD effects that will be required by 2030. Its recommendations are being examined by the International Staff and NATO’s Military Authorities.47 The Airborne Electronic Attack (AEA) CONEMP is expected to be delivered shortly. Once agreed, the second and third steps of the Short-Term Capability Programme (Capability Audit and Gap Analysis) will begin with the aim to be complete by September 2021.48

Doctrine Considerations for Attack

36. [ D-10-A ] Lack of multi-generational operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs. Lack of common operational concepts (e.g. CONOPS, CONEMP, etc.) and TTPs 43 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.1.4 44 Ibidem, paragraph 4.2.1 45 Policy for Integrated Air and Missile Defence (Reference 72) 46 2019 Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report (Reference 3), paragraph 15 47 NAFAG Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 5454), paragraph 10.a 48 2019 Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report (Reference 3), paragraph 28



prevent optimizing the capabilities of multi-generational weapon platforms, systems and capabilities. As previously stated, operational concepts, doctrines and TTPs provide a common language for the Alliance and are the primary prerequisite for interoperability. The adoption of new generation technology and the enhanced capabilities they provide, requires a fundamental shift in thinking regarding the conduct of multinational combined JAP operations, particularly in the congested, contested and connected future operating environment. Incorporating these advanced capabilities requires conceptualization and articulation on how to best integrate these new systems with legacy platforms and conventional C2 structures. Concepts facilitate the development of doctrines and TTPs that enable operators to interoperate. Within NATO, however, there is an acknowledged lack of shared experience related to planning and executing Joint multi-domain, offensive and defensive operations utilizing multi-generational platforms, systems and capabilities.49

37. [ D-11-A ] Lack of multi-generational Air C2 operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs. Lack of NATO Air Command and Control CONOPS, doctrine and TTPs for the Command and Control of new generation systems prevent the exploitation of the full operational capabilities provided by a combination of old and new generation weapon systems. NATO multi-domain C2 CONOPS, doctrine and TTPs will be the primary method we use to address interoperability risks and issues. The NATO domains' C2 CONOPS are currently in development and should be delivered shortly. It is extremely important these CONOPS are delivered rapidly, are horizontally aligned and that there is a sense of urgency to the follow-on work.

38. [ D-12-A ] Impact of new generation aircraft capabilities on National Caveats. National caveats regarding information sharing of essential knowledge about features, TTPs and capability of new generation platforms continue to prevent the building of a multinational force that is fully interoperable on Day-Zero.50 Further, NATO lacks a common understanding of the impact of new generation capabilities on factors including rules of engagement, target engagement authorities and collateral damage estimates.51 The ability to seamlessly share information between domains, commands and JOAs help manage those resources and reduce duplication of effort. It requires NATO to provide commanders and NATO forces with effective, common and protected means of information sharing and information management.

39. [ D-13-A ] Security protocols restrict exchange of information. Although there are various arrangements that enable user nations of current and new generation air platforms to operate together within caveats and releasability constraints, national policies for information sharing have a significant impact on the ability to achieve adequate levels 49 Final Record of Decisions of the Military Committee Air Standardization Board (MCASB) Meeting (Reference 30), paragraph 30 50 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 8 51 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference 23), Annex B, pages 87 and 88



of interoperability. The possibility to share sensitive information when deemed necessary is a prerequisite for a successful planning and execution of multinational air operations.52

With the exponential increase in the confidence level of positive identification available through the combination of multiple sensors on new generation platforms ("fusion"), Rules of Engagement (ROEs) must be re-evaluated in terms of positive identification (PID) and electronic identification (EID). The changes to exercise/scenario ROEs will need to consider who should be allowed to authorize the release of ordnance, in order to maximize the advantages given with these systems. These changes in ROEs will only be possible if countries owning the new generation platforms are willing to share a common understanding of system capabilities and limitations, in order for countries without the new generation platforms to agree to the changes.53

40. [ D-14-A ] No common procurement strategy. The expense of new generation platforms or systems is cost-prohibitive for some nations. Mass delivers a quality in warfare and the advent of new generation technology into many nation's inventory will replace not add to the existing platforms and systems; in all likelihood resulting in smaller numbers of platforms and systems than present. Some nations may be better served and provide better contributions to the Alliance by continuing to field current generation systems. NATO has provided little guidance as to how nations can contribute to the future air battle.54

41. [ D-15-A ] Need for concepts and procedures for JAP employment in the multi-domain environment. The increased complexity of modern warfare requires NATO to be prepared to fight as a Joint Force in a multi-domain and multi-threat environment in order to achieve desired effects space at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. JAP is arguably the key contributor to multi-domain operations. However, cross-domain operational concepts, doctrines and especially TTPs do not adequately address current and future multi-threat, multi-domain operations in a contested/denied environment. Specifically, more thought should be given to how JAP fixed wing and rotary wing aviation assets (traditional and non-traditional) support Broadband Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS); how manned and unmanned maritime air assets contribute to JISR; how traditional and non-traditional air assets support MIO and/or mine warfare operations (including mine laying and mine countermeasures).

Doctrine Considerations for Air Mobility

42. [ D-16-M ] AT and AAR Doctrines and TTPs do not reflect multi-role platforms. The ATP for Air Transport Doctrine55 was updated in April 2018 and for Air- 52 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference 23), Annex B, pages 66 and 67 53 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 7 54 Air Warfare Communication in a Networked Environment (Reference 9) 55 ATP 3.3.4 Volume I - Air Transport Doctrine (Reference 12)



to-Air Refuelling Doctrine56 in April 2019. Their section titles suggest that they can be used as a TTP manual; however, the information is general in nature and does not contain the level of detail found in many national or aircraft-specific TTP manuals.57 They cover AT and AAR as separate disciplines and not when simultaneously employed in a single mission in support of a multinational coalition.58 Capable of conducting tanker, receiver, and transport operations, the A400M Atlas is a significant capability gain for mobility fleets of the Alliance. Launched in 2003, the A400M conducted its first flight more than a decade ago and the ever growing fleet is a significant contributor to current and future strategic airlift, tactical airlift and AAR operations. Nonetheless, NATO doctrine and TTPs are still not addressing this platform's multi-role capability, which complicates planning and execution, and contributes to interoperability challenges.

43. [ D-17-M ] Lack of A3R policy. One of the latest developments in AAR includes Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling (A3R), the ability of refuelling aircraft without human at the controls with any possible combination of manned or unmanned aircraft for the tanker/receiver pairing. The mechanical interface (boom mating to a receptacle of probe mating to a drogue) constitutes one essential requirement for interoperability, while a second essential requirement is standardized procedures. Recommended A3R procedures are already in development, led by the international Aerial Refuelling Systems Advisory Group (ARSAG). A draft CONOPS was submitted to the NATO Air-to-Air Refuelling Working Group for consideration and alignment. Information from the CONOPS should be eventually included in the ATP-3.3.4.2 for NATO AAR.59 A3R will require the use of precision navigation, sensors, and AAR systems combined with a networked data link. Therefore, a specific set of precision navigation, informational, and system status data will need to be shared between platforms to conduct A3R successfully. At a minimum, requirements for accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability of the underlying sensors and systems will need to be defined. At the core is the ability to accurately determine a system’s precise location in a reference coordinate frame. All data link message format and content will need to be defined in a common approved standard. Additionally, clearing tanker and receiver pairings for A3R will require significantly more data compared to today’s systems. Overall the path to operational A3R will be made easier by standardizing the equipment and airworthiness requirements, as well as the procedures, now.60

44. [ D-18-M ] Lack of future rotorcraft concepts. Rotorcraft - meaning helicopters and tilt rotor aircraft - bring indispensable capabilities to the battlefield. Their unique characteristics provide critical support to commanders for all types of tactical operations

56 ATP 3.3.4 Volume II - Air-to-Air Refuelling Doctrine (Reference 10) 57 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 7.a 58 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference 11), paragraph 5.2 59 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 7.c 60 Standardising Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling (Reference 78)



and their effects are often of operational and even strategic importance. Rotorcraft will remain instrumental to mission success in the Future Security Environment (FSE), especially within congested urban areas.61 Some nations have yet to commit to train, organize, and equip rotorcraft borne forces specifically to operate within urban areas. Similarly, rotorcraft support to littoral operations is a key factor in successful operations from the sea. The Nations with a littoral capability are developing programmes that will replace legacy with next generation of rotorcraft. It is envisaged that many NATO member nations will refurbish or retire their current helicopter fleets in the 2025-2030 timeframe. Several groups, however, including the NATO Future Rotorcraft Capability Team and the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) have done and are doing significant thinking about the future battlefield rotorcraft and have contributed greatly to the dialogue regarding material specifications and technical requirements. A holistic effort is needed to conceptualize how to fully exploit the capabilities of the future rotorcraft in multi-domain operations in a denied environment.

45. [ D-19-M ] Lack of UAS, RPA and Autonomous Rotorcraft systems conceptsand procedures. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)or fully autonomous rotorcraft systems will increasingly be able to work in coordinationwith manned aircraft and ground stations. By adopting the use of safe and reliable roboticssystems and/or artificial intelligence risk levels to aircrew life can be reduced andpersonnel resource employed where needed. However, these developments will raiselegal and ethical questions and how these developments could be affected by theapplication of the law of armed conflict needs to be considered.62

Doctrine Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR

46. [ D-20-J ] Incoherent Air C2 and JISR concepts and doctrine. Air C2orchestrates air forces to achieve air decision superiority. A primary means to achievedecision superiority is attaining information superiority, which is the realm of JISR.Therefore, Air C2 and JISR are inextricably linked, interdependent and complementary.NATO has a vested interest in understanding how current and planned Air C2 and JISRsystems and concepts support exploiting JAP to the maximum extent.

a. Contemporary NATO JISR practices focus almost exclusively on convertingcustom-collected data to create tailored intelligence products for specific, knownaudiences at the operational and strategic level. NATO lacks concepts, doctrinesand TTPs that promote coherence and integration among Air C2, JISR, andEffects, especially at the tactical level.

b. AJP-2.7, 63 “Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance andReconnaissance”, captures the overarching concept to steer the traditional

61 Future Battlefield Rotorcraft Capability (Reference 33), paragraph 2.5.3 62 Ibidem, paragraph 2.5.3 63 Allied Joint Publication for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (Reference 20)



activities of ISR areas into a joint streamlined synchronization and integration of intelligence and operations. It details JISR fundamentals and process, but does not provide contextual understanding for the air power contribution to JISR. Perhaps more importantly, air-related doctrine and TTPs are strikingly deficient on details of how air power contributes to JISR.

c. The key to JAP JISR integration is not only the networking of various ISR data sources, but also the operational integration, command and control (C2), and tactical employment of ISR capabilities. This is not possible without a sound and mature body of doctrine and TTPs for those who will operate, employ, integrate, and control JISR.

47. [ D-21-J ] Lack of concepts and TTPs for new generation Air C2 and JISR. Traditional command and control approaches lack the agility required for increasingly complex and dynamic 21st century missions. As the changing character of war becomes immersed in the digital age, future conflicts will be decided by those who are fastest at collecting, correlating, fusing, analyzing and securely transporting the right decision quality data across multiple domains to the right decision-maker. C2 approaches that are agile and take full advantage of all the available information and assets, are better suited. Lack of concepts and procedures for the C2 of new generation platforms, systems, and capabilities prevents the exploitation of the full operational capabilities provided by a combination of current and new generation weapon systems.

48. [ D-22-J ] Lack of tactical, dynamic information sharing supporting PED. NATO JISR lacks an operational warfighting focus. Current NATO JISR lacks dynamic, real-time warfighting ISR processes that are adaptive and interoperable across all domains. The adoption of new generation platforms, systems and capabilities, exacerbates this interoperability gap, especially when there is a lack of understanding regarding the level of quality and quantity of real-time information sharing between new and old generation platforms. New generation platforms may require an exponential growth in the volume of data to be Processed/Exploited/Disseminated (PED). Legacy systems, if not upgraded, will be unable to PED this new volume of data.64 NATO lacks knowledge of the type, volume and accuracy of the data that can be collected by new generation platforms.

49. [ D-23-J ] Need for a Future C4ISR Vision. NATO C4ISR architectures are often limited to address the technological aspects of capabilities and primarily for shore-based operational and strategic level connectivity rather than tactical data links and networks. Although intended for joint operations, they are often developed in a stove-piped fashion, internal to NATO projects or programmes service oriented and with limited deliberate consideration of cross-domain coherence between national systems and other NATO systems. Moreover, with the stove-piped view, architectures are developed at the system 64 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 10



level, with no consideration of adjacent architectures. Furthermore, no architecture at the capability and enterprise level exists to support alignment of NATO C4ISR capabilities across the business, information, applications, and technology domains. A coherent C4ISR strategy vision would enable the integration of tactical C2 and surveillance functions to support decentralized decision-making and allocate decision rights dynamically, which will be required in a future operational environment where decision cycles are squeezed. Additionally, it is quite necessary to establish strategic to tactical situational awareness, understanding and anticipation, through the dynamic access and flow of information across domains and functions. This is possible when fully integrating all NATO and national C4ISR capabilities (over time also including Alliance Future Surveillance and Control, AFSC) and connecting their architectures in a seamless Federated Mission Networking environment. NATO needs a dedicated effort to assess the problem of C4ISR coherence/integration and address it by developing a way ahead.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR ORGANIZATION

Organization Considerations (General)

50. [ O-01-G ] Need for more adaptive organizational constructs. NATO must improve JAP’s modular organization to provide maximum agility and the ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the future security environment. The structure and qualifications of staff in NATO headquarters have to evolve to take into account features of new capabilities. 65 Suitably trained, qualified and experienced personnel to operational headquarters should be a consideration across the DOTMLPF spectrum during the development and procurement stage of any new platform, system or capability.

51. [ O-02-G ] Need to leverage closer relationships with partner countries. Cooperation with partner countries of NATO during recent operations achieved significant progress transforming some partners into more interoperable air forces capable to fight with NATO forces and eager to train with them. During recent NATO operations, such as Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP), the presence of very different contributing partners provided not only legitimacy, but also some very useful capabilities. Additionally, the participating nations were pleased with the interoperability and experience they obtained as a NATO partner.66 Despite these benefits, there exists no NATO exercise that includes member and partner nations and exploits the full range of JAP capabilities. Force structures should be designed to maximize the contributions of member nations and partner countries. Future force generation should consider what national contributions are required to build and interoperable fighting force.

65 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 12 66 Future Vector Project, Future Vector - Part II (Reference 35), page 12 and page 105, chapter 5



52. [ O-03-G ] National limitations to collaborative relationships with other multinational organizations. Various international and supranational institutions are accepted collaborative partners for NATO. They extend the membership of the respective organizations, improve standardization, enhance interoperability and partially mitigate gaps between national research and development programmes. In many cases, we are working on the same challenges. The Combined Air Interoperability Programme (CAIP) is a complementary multinational collaborative effort by the European Air Group (EAG), focused directly on interoperability issues regarding 4th and 5th generation fighters. Although participation in the EAG does not include all NATO nations, the interoperability challenges identified by the CAIP are analogous to those the Alliance faces and therefore, its work is extremely relevant to NATO. National constraints often impede full collaboration with organizations like the EAG. NATO would benefit from improving collaboration with the programme to mitigate knowledge gaps and harmonize the defence capability planning and development activities of NATO in collaborative partnerships.67

53. [ O-04-G ] National limitations to collaborative relationships with industry. Some nations are supported by specialized industries for the maintenance of their platforms/systems. The introduction of new generation platforms, inter alia, increases the participation of industries in the maintenance and sustainment processes. The constraints and limitations imposed by industry on the operation of the platform may not be fully understood by NATO air planners operations.68 This lack of understanding may induce misunderstanding and interoperability issues.

54. [ O-05-G ] Need for a dedicated Air Warfare Centre. NATO lacks a dedicated Air Warfare Centre (AWC) that can interconnect with National Air Warfare Centres to support: [1] sharing of knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and operational requirements of new generation platforms; [2] development of agreed CONOPS and TTPs between nations; and [3] validation of operational use of new generation systems in exercises.69

55. [ O-06-G ] Need for an Air Warfare Centre Network for NATO and industry cooperation. NATO lacks provisions and procedures for Nations and Industry to cooperate thorough an Air Warfare Centre Network (AWCN). National AWCs should feed the NATO AWCN providing new NATO doctrine, TTPs, Lesson learned and capabilities. Secure information exchange procedures are required between NATO and National AWC to mutually improve doctrines, TTPs, technical interoperability and performance.70

67 Future Vector Project, Future Vector - Part II (Reference 35), pages 9 and 10 68 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 8 69 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.1.1 70 Ibidem, paragraph 4.1.3



56. [ O-07-G ] Need for JAP oriented information exchange and simulation standards. NATO needs a framework to work with industry to develop standards for information exchange and distributed mission simulation, thereby leveraging industry skill, knowledge and best practices. JAP interoperability requires the adoption of common NATO standards for the exchange of information. However, without an appropriate NATO-industry framework, the desire to protect corporate intellectual property developed by industry, especially Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), prevents the adoption of open system architectures needed.71

57. [ O-08-G ] Missing a joint roadmap for NATO and EU on Interoperability standards. NATO lacks a joint roadmap with the European Union on interoperability standards, along with a robust venue for Nations and Industries to test and evaluate compliance. Such a NATO-EU Roadmap would strengthen the mutual trust between NATO Nations and the EU Member States and increase overall interoperability, especially at the strategic level and between Industries.72

Organization Considerations for Counter Air

58. [ O-09-C ] Insufficient Missile Defence connectivity. Although a national responsibility, the horizontal connection between the Combined Air Operations Centre (COAC), Control and Reporting Centres (CRC) and Surface-Based Air and Missile Defence (SBAMD) units must be established when needed. This is hampered by the use of legacy capabilities and a lack of access to suitable communications and tactical data links. Operational collaboration is further deprived by the limited availability of experienced Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)-allocators at the CRC.73

Organization Considerations for Attack

59. No significant findings identified.

Organization Considerations for Air Mobility

60. [ O-10-M ] Lack of governance regarding AAR Issues. There is no single office or focal point within the current NATO Command Structure to coordinate multinational AAR issues. The drafting of doctrine, equipment standardization agreements, tactical procedures, common qualification and currencies and the training of planning staffs is being undertaken by a number of national and multinational organizations, agencies and individuals. This lack of central coordination has led to AAR lessons being repeatedly re-learned during the initial phases of air operations.74

71 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.5.2 72 Ibidem, paragraph 4.5.3 73 Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit - Urgent Priorities (Reference 45), page 156 74 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference 1111), paragraph 1.1.2



Organization Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR


INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRAINING

Training Considerations (General)

62. [ T-01-G ] Lack of trained personnel. Interoperability is not only about standards, it is also about preserving the ability to work together. There is a lack of adequately qualified and experienced personnel in NATO headquarters who have the required subject matter expertise to effectively integrate multi-generational platforms into a joint battlespace. 75 The coexistence of multiple generations of platforms requires specific skill-sets to enable safe and effective integration of these capabilities. The required SME training for support infrastructure staff should be considered as part of the development and delivery of new and upgrading capabilities. Job descriptions should reflect this requirement.

63. [ T-02-G ] Lack of multinational live exercises that train the full-spectrum of NATO JAP.

a. Military exercises help ensure the Alliance is ready and able to defend itself against any threat. Exercises test NATO’s decision-making processes, systems, doctrine, TTPs, and Alliance interoperability, as well as with partner nations. This year, the exercises led by NATO and Nations include around 25 exercises primarily focused on the land domain, 27 exercises focused on the air domain and 12 exercises focused mainly on maritime operations.76

b. The success of an operation combining old and new generation platforms will abet an adaptation of the NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) Policy to include new capabilities’ specificities, constraints and requirements. Nations would be encouraged to incorporate NATO’s ETEE Policy into their own training and education policies to conduct training in a more realistic environment.77

c. NATO lacks adequate multinational exercises that test the full spectrum of JAP missions including Long-Range Bombing, Close Air Support (CAS), Air Policing (AP), Air-to-Air Combat, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), AAR, and cross-domain coordination with Maritime and Land air operations. Some

75 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 5 76 http://www.nato.int/factsheets, February 2019 77 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 12



air forces in the Alliance are unable to contribute to all areas of JAP and are reliant on Nations to conduct these operations. It is essential that all allied air forces continue to prepare for high-intensity air warfare and NATO should pay particular attention to providing joint exercises and training designed to incorporate multinational capabilities into a single battlespace under an unfamiliar command structure. These training and exercises must, where practicable, provide operators and planners the opportunity to be tested in large scale joint exercises offering situations close to combat.78

64. [ T-03-G ] Lack of multinational live exercises focused on FSE. NATO frequently executes live training at the component level only. The training often overlooks the benefits of joint live training and fails to focus on the Future Security Environment (FSE), including Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). Consequently, current live exercises do not adequately compel component interoperability. Component Commands are currently re-learning the basics of passing the Recognized Air Picture (RAP) due to technological advancements that have not been synchronized during development. NATO must develop training and exercises focused on: maximizing Joint and multinational participation; providing interoperability challenges to operators and planners; the use of latest technologies/capabilities and reversionary modes of operation to ensure effective information exchange and management in realistic operating environments. Training and exercises should expose command groups and senior staff to the challenges that realistic operating environments impose on a Joint Task Force (JTF) and the means by which these challenges can be mitigated. NATO must improve synchronization across the Force, to include joint targeting and joint prioritization of effort. Integration of stealth and other new generation technology with legacy capabilities is critical. NATO needs to "train as it means to fight" and to do so, exercises should be Joint in nature wherever possible. Additionally, NATO should allocate sufficient time in exercises to allow end to end training rather than controlling activities through scripted activity.

65. [ T-04-G ] Under-classification of NATO exercises. NATO exercises are routinely conducted in an unclassified environment to allow the inclusion of non-NATO nations. However, new realistic scenarios must include collective defence operations facing a near peer opponent. Unfortunately, the unclassified environment does not allow the required exchange of sensitive operational information among the participants, limiting the quality of the training event.79

66. [ T-05-G ] Achieving agreed training standards. Many Nations have fallen below agreed standards in terms of training (specific and/or core) capabilities. Many member nations do not meet the NATO-required flying hours for pilots. This has a second- 78 Future Vector Project, Future Vector - Part II (Reference 35), pages 106 to 112, chapter 5 79 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 5



order effect in the training loss experienced by associated specialists. For example, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), who require a certain number of terminal controls, including control of a fast-moving jet, to obtain and maintain their qualifications.80 NATO must review the relevance of these and other training standards as Nations develop smarter training curricula using multiple benchmarks.

67. [ T-06-G ] Missing training to focus on JAP interoperability. NATO lackstraining that focuses directly on JAP interoperability and maximizes joint participation,both national and multi-national.81

68. [ T-07-G ] Missing training to focus on proper language proficiency. Effectivejoint training proper language proficiency, including common Technical and Operationallanguages (Military Air Terminology). Such training will compensate for the variedbackgrounds of Alliance personnel, including: educational, cultural generational, service,and technical.82

69. [ T-08-G ] Need for distributed simulation in mission training. NATO lacksJAP-oriented Live/Virtual (LV) MTDS capability to support simulated and live training. Thesynthetic environment can be as effective as live training, while reducing risk and cost. Inaddition, it can contribute to the de-scoping of complex live exercises, especiallynetworked sensor to shooter events and/or the coordinated employment of multi-generational assets in any JAP Core Role. However, live platforms have no specificcommon interfaces dedicated to receive simulation data, and there are security issuesrelated to connection of live platforms to a simulation network.83

70. [ T-09-G ] Missing a multinational persistent simulation backbone network.NATO lacks a multinational persistent MTDS backbone to allow LV rehearsal andexercises to run on-demand 84 in a plug-and-play 85 environment. Rehearsal andexercises based on LV technologies are key enablers to allow sufficient training to NATOtroops in an era of tight defence budgets.86

80 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 5 81 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.2.2 82 Ibidem, paragraph 4.2.2 83 Ibidem, paragraph 4.2.3 84 On-demand refers to a type of simulation that runs on remote servers and streams directly to a user’s device, or more colloquially, running simulations from a cloud. 85 Plug-and-play denotes or relates to software or devices that are intended to work perfectly when first used or connected, without reconfiguration or adjustment by the user. 86 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.3.3



Training Considerations for Counter Air

71. [ T-10-C ] Need for joint multinational IAMD training at all levels. IAMD is one of the most complex and challenging missions for NATO because it encompasses all domains and requires flawless cooperation and collaboration between multiple nations and NATO entities. A successful execution of an IAMD mission depends heavily on interoperability, connectivity and a shared common understanding of doctrine, concepts of operation and TTPs. The complexity of IAMD necessitates extensive training at all levels to support Baseline and Current Operations (BACO) up to Maximum Level of Effort (MLE).

a. NATO organizes two main IAMD exercise series: in even years exercise STEADFAST ALLIANCE and in odd years exercise STEADFAST ARMOUR. STEADFAST ALLIANCE is a computer assisted exercise (CAX) / command post exercise (CPX) from strategic to tactical level exploiting the current version of the IAMD Standing Defence Plan and offering opportunities to exercise political control over IAMD/BMD missions in parallel and up to Council level. STEADFAST ARMOUR puts an emphasis on the operational execution down to the tactical level aspects of NATO IAMD.

b. Apart from the above NATO exercises there are several national exercises for joint multinational IAMD training. As examples, Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW), FORMIDABLE SHIELD (FOSH), European Missile Defence Exercise (EAMDEX), and TOBRUK LEGACY (TOLY) have been introduced in recent years to provide unique opportunities to exercise, experiment and practice IAMD concepts. From threat identification to interceptor firing, IAMD involves all levels of decision making and incorporates both NATO and national systems. Linking of exercise scenarios and participation of NATO personnel in national IAMD exercises could be considered to extend training opportunities for the Alliance.87

Training Considerations for Attack

72. [ T-11-A ] Need for new generation education and training. The success of JAP depends greatly on a common knowledge and understanding of new generation capabilities and their contribution to joint air operations. Lack of knowledge of new generation capabilities by leaders and decision makers increases interoperability risk and limits NATO’s ability to exploit the full operational capabilities provided by a mix of multi-generational weapon systems. NATO lacks deliberate training and education programmes focused on new generation platforms, systems and capabilities and how they integrate into a multi-generational force. In August 2019, Headquarters AIRCOM promulgated "5th generation Air C2 Awareness, Education and Training Requirements" 88 and directed such training to ensure a higher quality of operational preparation, inviting 87 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference 37), page 52 88 5th Generation Air C2 Awareness, Education and Training Requirements (Reference 5)



the EAG to participate. This is a promising first step and should be scaled to include other domains and operators at all levels, tactical to strategic.

73. [ T-12-A ] Lack of high-end multi-generational integration training and exercises. Multinational training and exercises are among the most effective tools to learn/identify interoperability issues/risks and to improve awareness. They support the development of common concepts of operations, TTPs, build trust and promote a shared culture amongst planners, operators and support personnel from different nations. Additionally, multinational training and exercises help to identify technical interoperability gaps and support development of mitigation options and operating procedures. Lack of frequent and consistent Combined Air Operations training and exercises that include new generation operational concepts, limits the development and improvement of multi-generation interoperability. Multinational training and exercises coherent with the development of current and new generation requirements need to be identified and planned.89

74. [ T-13-A ] Lack of adequate training infrastructure. NATO lacks available opposition forces capable of replicating current and future threats to fully test TTPs during multi-generational training and exercises.90 Furthermore, there is a lack of adequate training infrastructure: simulators; ranges; airspace; emitters; and, targets. NATO does not have a common approach to the provision of these through a NATO sponsored multi-generational JAP training plan or requirement.

Training Considerations for Air Mobility

75. [ T-14-M ] Insufficient integrated AAR training. Pre- and post-strike or ingress/egress AAR should be planned and practised to more accurately represent the Joint operational demand, even if the training aircraft do not require any additional fuel to complete the training mission. The participation of joint multinational force elements can only improve levels of standardization and interoperability. NATO joint collective training should regularly and deliberately include training/exercise opportunities to integrate AAR planning and execution.91

76. [ T-15-M ] No common AAR qualification and currency standards. NATO has no common qualification and currency standards for AAR receiver pilots and boom operators. Individual nations determine their own respective standards. This induces risk and contributes to interoperability challenges.92

89 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 8 90 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference 23), Annex B, page 48 91 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference 11), paragraph 3.7.3 92 Ibidem, paragraph 3.7.2



Training Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR

77. [ T-16-J ] Lack of realistic training opportunities for JISR tactical operators.Current NATO JISR practices and training focus almost exclusively on converting custom-collected data into tailored intelligence products for specific, known audiences at theoperational and strategic levels. However, the process of producing collection plans togather that data is unrealistic in comparison to that which is required during operationsand campaign planning. While the intelligence cycle must continue unabated during anoperation, the Alliance must also have the agility to get real-time ISR data into the handsof analysts who can rapidly fuse that data with others, make quick assessments on theidentification and intentions of opposing forces, and feed those assessments to decisionmakers for rapid action. A NATO JTF must be organized, trained, and equipped to planand execute the JISR process, the JTF must also be set up for, connected to, and well-versed in the process of real-time coordination inside the execution phase. NATOoperators lack skills, qualifications and experience to manage dynamic ISR processessuch as Time Sensitive Targeting (TST), cross-cuing, etc. NATO lacks common trainingstandards and protocol to teach, train and exercise these skills.

78. [ T-17-J ] Lack of NATO and multinational exercises that train JAPcontribution to JISR. Trial UNIFIED VISION is a biennial NATO exercise that aims totest and improve the interoperability of JISR assets and involves fast jets, UnmannedAerial Vehicles (UAVs), frigates, under-water gliders, maritime vehicles, etc. By design,these trials focus on technical capability development efforts, such as on the effective useof Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS), and do not train or exercise NATO participants.Although no exercises, since 2016 NATO has started to organize Focus CollectionActivities (FCAs), where NATO, member and partner nations can perform realisticactivities with real assets against real targets.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR MATERIEL

Materiel Considerations (General)

79. [ M-01-G ] Lack of information sharing regarding platform and systemscapabilities and limitations. Material development is the foundation for the developmentof new capabilities. Interoperability requires compliance with NATO standards. Newgeneration platforms/systems programme offices and their corresponding nations shouldshare information with NATO concerning new generation platforms capabilities.93 NATOshould continue to exploit the Smart Defence (SD) and the Connected Forces Initiative

93 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 12



(CFI), which allow partners to share capability development opportunities with Nations to enable their national forces to operate alongside NATO forces.

80. [ M-02-G ] Material standards need improvement. JAP specific standards and Measures of Performance/Measures of Effectiveness for NATO readiness must be improved for the Alliance to train, exercise and operate under within the FSE.94 Current NATO standards are often: open to interpretation; a secondary consideration; an after-thought following adoption of new technologies. This is inadequate for achieving assured interoperability between international multi-generational technologies.95

81. [ M-03-G ] Lack of compliance with standards. The NATO standardization process does not force nations how and when to implement a NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) when ratified. Moreover, in many STANAGs there is no minimum requirement list of equipment to be standardized. This results in important differences and interoperability gaps between platforms since STANAGs are invariably developed after a new technology has been introduced and has entered service.96

82. [ M-04-G ] C4ISR capability incompatibility. The success of JAP requires strategic to tactical situational awareness through the flow of information across domains and functions while fully integrating Communication, Computers, Command and Control and ISR (C4ISR) capabilities and seamlessly connecting NATO and Non-NATO, military and civilian, architectures. NATO C4ISR architectures are often developed in a stove-piped fashion, internal to NATO projects or programmes with limited deliberate considerations of cross-domain coherence. To improve integration and interoperability of such systems, NATO must adopt an ‘Interoperable by Design’ approach that focuses on interoperability during development and acquisition processes.97 The Alliance Future Surveillance and Control (AFSC) initiative was started to provide advice on the delivery of a follow-on to the NATO E-3 capability. It is required to be interoperable and capable of interacting with the Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) and JISR capabilities and assets such as AGS and Maritime Situational Awareness (MSA). It will consider the need for an Open Architecture and flexibility in design to allow maximum opportunity for scalable, modular, configurable and interoperable elements, which will seamlessly collaborate and integrate with national and NATO C4ISR.98

83. [ M-05-G ] C2 communications systems incompatibility with non-NATO bodies. NATO C2 communications systems do not link effectively to current European bodies and systems such as European Air Transport Command (EATC), European 94 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21), paragraph 7.4.1.1.1 95 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 11 96 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 5 97 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21), paragraph 7.4.8.1.4 98 Ibidem, paragraph 9



Tactical Airlift Centre (ETAC), Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE), European Planning and Coordination System (EPACS), the Management European Air Transport (MEAT) application and others.99

84. [ M-06-G ] Lack of NATO programmes that enable and standardize the interoperable use of COTS technology. NATO lacks a deliberate programme that maximizes the use of interoperable commercial off the shelf (COTS) capabilities and equipment. 100 This enables the introduction of national COTS systems that are incompatible with others systems and increase vulnerability and risk.

85. [ M-07-G ] Need for a System Engineering and Integration testbed. NATO lacks a System Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Test Bed dedicated to JAP. All NATO systems should be validated using a common test bed to ensure they are interoperable.101 Therefore, it is necessary to define a common and shared reference system for System Engineering and Integration efforts within NATO:

a. To enable flexible data links for sensors (self-declaration of services and data) between JISR, C2 and Effects systems.

b. To consider use of adaptive multi-sensor data fusion between sensor nodes or C2 for collaborative surveillance.

c. To define, test and propose for standardization interoperable COTS and equipment, in particular for communications, Digitally Aided Close Air Support (DACAS), etc.

d. To define, test and propose for standardization data link for targeting handover between CAOC, CRC and SBAMD units.

e. To improve the use of NATO and national exercises/experiments to reduce existing shortfalls in interoperability regarding various NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS) components, particularly regarding standards, interfaces, protocols, reliability and validating procedures.

f. To develop, test and experiments self-protection capabilities of platform (BMD systems, AFSC, AAR, etc.) in relation to other programs such as ACCS, AFSC, Integrated Test Bed (ITB, managed by the NATO Communication and Information Agency, NCIA) and national IAMD exercises.

99 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 6 100 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21), paragraph 7.4.8.1.8 101 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.3.1



g. To develop and propose standardize processes and tools for Tactical,dynamic information sharing supporting Processed/Exploited/ Disseminated(PED).

h. To open appropriate NATO test environments to test effectivecommunications with current European bodies and systems such as EATC, ETAC,MCCE, EPACS, MEAT application and others.

i. To validate interoperability compliance between all C2 systems (AirCommand and Control System (ACCS), Air C2 Information Services (AirC2IS) andnational JFACs, recognizing further interoperability measures through FederatedMission Networking).

86. [ M-08-G ] Missing a JAP oriented standard to apply for interoperabilitydesign. NATO lacks a JAP System Engineering & Standard to apply an Interoperabilityby Design approach for all new generation systems. It is far more efficient to addressInteroperability issues at the earliest stages in the Product development rather than in thesubsequent phases. NATO Industries should engage with the production of a JAP SystemEngineering & standard to drive an Interoperability by Design approach.102 This couldinclude, but is not limited:

a. To define a brand-new NATO standard for a data link supporting legacy Link16 messages typology and new generation information requirements, e.g. fullmotion video (FMV) or ISR.

b. To ensure STANAGs exist for information exchange and distributed missionsimulation.

c. To define standards for COTS and equipment solution supporting currentto new generation.

87. [ M-096-G ] Lacking a common approach for supply support. NATO lacks acommon approach of supply support for new generation systems. New generationplatforms, systems and capabilities (PSCs) are imposing radically different logisticsapproaches, based on new concepts that combine the activities and reciprocal obligationsfrom all stakeholders. New repair concepts, significantly different from "classic" onesemployed for previous generations, are likely to be fielded. The definition of a commonlyshared logistic concept, to be used as a design developmental baseline, is essential toimprove intersystem sustainment approaches and commonality.103

88. [ M-10-G ] Lacking a common approach for modernization of legacy PSCs.NATO lacks a common approach to modernize legacy PSCs. Multinational

102 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.3.2 103 Ibidem, paragraph 4.4.1



interoperability of same PSCs (primarily relevant for Air Mobility platforms) is jeopardized by different configurations adopted by nations and/or services, or even within the same service, making cost and downtime for retrofitting to common configurations unaffordable for nations. For similar platform fleets, NATO should pursue common modernization schemes aimed to interoperability.104

89. [ M-11-G ] Need to streamline procurement strategy. NATO JAP needs a morestreamlined procurement strategy. The Alliance lacks a common procurement strategycapable of handling the rapidly evolving JAP technologies and operational environments.Such a strategy would harmonize NATO procurement agencies (NCIA and the NATOSupport & Procurement Agency, NSPA), EU agencies and national ministries of defence,in order to facilitate interoperability of platforms and systems and multinationalprocurement. It would also, reinforce existing NCIA procurement for NATO ACCS toimprove standardization for multinational BMD procurement.105

Materiel Considerations for Counter Air

90. [ M-12-C ] NATO IAMD System interoperability shortfalls. NATO BMDsystems must be robust enough to fully utilize all available sensors and interceptors andoperate fluidly as part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System(NATINAMDS). However, there are shortfalls in interoperability regarding variousNATINAMDS components, particularly regarding standards, interfaces, protocols,reliability and validating procedures. 106 NATINAMDS and its key pillar, SBAMD,connectivity is impaired by missing horizontal connections between SBAMD units andcritical national support elements, the up-link connections and landline dependency andthe degraded interoperability with existing CRC.107

91. [ M-13-C ] Lack of standardization for multinational SBAMD procurement.Member states can purchase platforms that do not necessarily comply with the NATOstandards for technological and operational interoperability. From the perspective ofdefence planning, it is the responsibility of Nations to make sure that those forces thatcan be assigned to the NATO Force Structure (NFS) - including the PSCs that theseforces are equipped with - are interoperability within the Alliance. In those cases, BMDplatforms assigned to NATO should have the technical ability to interoperate as part ofNATINAMDS. 108 Multinational procurement of new SBAMD assets can preventinteroperability gaps.

104 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.4.2 105 Ibidem, paragraph 4.5.1 106 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 9 107 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 5 108 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference 37), page 53



92. [ M-14-C ] Lack of BMD self-protection. Not all BMD systems are able to assure their own force protection when engaging a threat, requiring external protection. NATO lacks TTPs to reflect this need.109

Materiel Considerations for Attack

93. [ M-15-A ] C2 systems non-compliance. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) endorsed Federated Mission Networking (FMN) initiative contributes significantly to C2 system interoperability by addressing the "how" through spiral specifications, the "who" through FMN affiliated Nations and organizations and the "when" through an interoperability roadmap based on a 10-year rolling vision implemented incrementally through 2-year spirals. However, the Air Command and Control System (ACCS) and the Bi-SC AIS Air Functional Service Air C2 Information Services (Air C2IS) are not in full compliance with the FMN Spiral Specifications. Currently, national JFACs are not using ACCS as their standard equipment to advance operator interoperability nor are they utilizing Air C2IS to its intended extent, due to known and routinely highlighted interoperability issues such as: national security compliance; flight plan integration; and incomplete or delayed information exchange. This underlines the importance of interoperability as a force multiplier that may streamline national efforts to become a design feature in all NATO and national systems.

94. [ M-16-A ] Lack of datalink interoperability. Lack of Tactical Data Link (TDL) interoperability. Limited data interoperability between old and new generation systems has the potential to impede full information exchange by multi-generational air systems and degrade the common operational picture (COP).110 The success of JAP relies on TDL to communicate and share situational awareness and targeting data, a truism that is put at risk by the introduction of the latest communication data links methodology (e.g. Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) vice Link 16). It is unclear as to whether this technology will continue to share information via the existing and agreed NATO STANAGs for TDL. Failure to fully exploit new generation surveillance and information exploitation capabilities would impact on overall mission effectiveness, the completeness of the COP and increase risk of fratricide.

95. [ M-17-A ] Potential targeting difficulties. As a result of new sensors and weapons, the targeting process for new generation platforms will be different from that used with older generation platforms and, consequently, is likely to create targeting management difficulties during multi-generation missions.111 NATO has not yet identified a preferred technical or procedural solution to address this issue.

109 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 10 110 Ibidem, paragraph 7 111 Ibidem, paragraph 7



96. [ M-18-A ] Undefined bandwidth and connectivity requirements. The lack of a NATO Enterprise and Alliance wide spectrum utility strategy has led to the inability of a JFC to achieve the connectivity and bandwidth required to support JAP in contested operations against peer or near-peer adversaries.

97. [ M-19-A ] Non-standard maintenance requirements. Non-standard maintenance requirements. There are many characteristics of new generation aircraft that separate them from older generation aircraft. These include, but are not limited to: multi-spectral low observable (LO) design features; integrated avionics that autonomously fuse and prioritize the aircraft’s multi-spectral sensors and off board data; advanced on-board diagnostics; and, resilient communications, navigation and identification tools; robust networks. While new generation aircraft require the same maintenance considerations as legacy aircraft (such as maintaining flight systems and engines), there are additional unique maintenance requirements that are not fully understood or known within NATO. This is most likely due to the lack of bi or multi-lateral information sharing agreements between the nations that operate these aircraft. Lack of full knowledge leads to interoperability challenges at the operational and tactical levels.

98. [ M-20-A ] Digitally Aided Close Air Support interoperability issues. Digital systems in aircraft and Digitally Aided Close Air Support (DACAS) ground kits provide significant benefits that improve CAS planning and execution. DACAS allows the use of digital messages to expedite communications, rapidly build shared situational awareness, reduce human error and shorten the CAS kill-chain. The NATO Air Force Armaments Group (NAFAG) reviewed the requirements for NATO on the use of DACAS and identified several interoperability concerns including: the lack of interoperability amongst industrial solutions, lack of doctrine and TTPs; a lack of robust training and exercises; and the lack of conceptual thinking regarding the future of CAS in a contested environment.112

99. [ M-21-A ] Lack of air-launched weapon systems interoperability. The NAFAG identified several interoperability issues regarding weapon systems interoperability caused by the different interfaces used between aircraft and air-launched weapons. Each time a new air-launched weapon is introduced for NATO operations; an integration activity is performed that includes the modification and requalification of the aircraft operational flight programme (OFP) as well as the modification of the weapons themselves.113 This can be a lengthy process, delaying the use of modern air-launched weapons and weapon systems. An incremental approach to weapon systems development (akin to FMN spiral specification development) and testing could potentially reduce such delays and improve interoperability.

112 NAFAG Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 54), paragraph 9.a 113 Ibidem, paragraph 9.b



Materiel Considerations for Air Mobility

100. [ M-22-M ] AAR systems standardization. NATO does not own any AARtankers and is reliant upon the nations to provide this capability. With no commonprocurement strategy, nations have acquired AAR tankers in accordance with their ownnational policy. The requirement for both AAR fuel transfer systems on the same aircrafthas been stimulated by the increasing pressure for greater levels of interoperabilityamongst NATO Nations faced with purchasing fewer of the new generation of multi-roletanker transport aircraft.114 NATO has ratified the standardization of the two existing fueltransfer systems that are not compatible: the probe and drogue; and, boom systems.However the use of a Boom Drogue Adaptor (BDA) fitted on the ground pre-flight and thepurchase of dual system tankers (fitted with both probe and drogue and boom equipment)addresses the needs of current receivers.115 Various receiver configurations as well asnational caveats create significant challenges for AAR mission planners. For example,during OUP over Libya, AAR planners managed tanking and receiving assets availableagainst a list of 240 caveats.116

101. [ M-23-M ] AAR tankers that lack self-protection. Most legacy tanker aircraftlack self-protection suites and are anything but stealthy, meaning that contested/deniedoperating environments will require the AAR station to be further away from the operatingareas of their receivers. This induces performance and time challenges in operationalplanning and execution and will only be exacerbated in an FSE. Operator workarounds,such as orbiting a tanker farther from the receiver’s orbit area, lead to coverage gaps,resulting in risk to mission accomplishment.117

Materiel Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR

102. [ M-24-J ] Lack of interoperable of JISR, C2 and Effects systems. NATO'sability to leverage JAP to its fullest extent will be limited by the interoperability of its JISRand C2 capabilities. While existing standards provide a mechanism for agreeinginteroperability needs, these standards are not always implemented fully by the NATOCommands or the Nations.118

103. [ M-25-J ] Need for Interoperable by Design approach to AFSC. The NATOAirborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) fleet is scheduled to retire byapproximately 2035. The AFSC initiative was started to provide advice on the delivery ofa follow-on to the NATO E-3 capability. While it may be still unclear to what extent theAFSC capability will complement existing and planned capabilities, it is certain that it willbe an integral part of NATO's C4ISR capability. As such, it is required to be interoperable

114 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference 11), paragraph 2.3.3 115 Ibidem, paragraph 2.3.2 116 A400M: Europe’s Interoperability Poster Child (Reference 6) 117 Aerial Tanking in 2035 (Reference 8) 118 Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 39), paragraph 5



and capable of interacting with the IAMD and JISR assets and capabilities and with assets such as BMD, AGS and MSA.

104. [ M-26-J ] Progress with JISR Technical Standards. There has been some progress regarding NATO technical standards related to JISR, for example:

a. STANREC 4777119 "NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA)" was promulgated in January 2018. This document describes the NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA), which defines how NATO and national ISR assets can achieve an overall interoperable ISR capability.120

b. STANAG 7085 121 "Interoperable Data Links for ISR Systems" was promulgated in April 2018. This agreement removes the limits to interoperability that arise through the use of dedicated, proprietary data links to support ISR sensor systems.122

c. STANAG 4559123 "NATO Standard ISR Library Interfaces and Services" was promulgated in March 2018. It promotes interoperability of NATO ISR library interfaces and services for the exchange of shared ISR data, products and schemas.124

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEADERSHIP

Leadership Considerations (General)

105. [ L-01-G ] Need for more deliberate leadership development. The success of JAP relies upon the ability to make and implement more informed and more accurate decisions at a rate faster than the adversary. The introduction of new platforms, systems and capabilities can enhance or be detrimental to the process if not properly integrated and controlled. The level of knowledge of decision-makers on new generation systems and capabilities will be reflected in the quality of: planning, execution, and information exchange and management processes needed to ensure commanders receive timely information to enable tactical, operational and strategic decision making.125 NATO needs

119 STANREC 4777 - NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (Reference 57) 120 NAFAG Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 54), paragraph 12.a 121 STANAG 7085 - NATO Interoperable Data Links for ISR Systems (Reference 58) 122 NAFAG Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 54), paragraph 12.c 123 STANAG 4559 - NATO Standard ISR Library Interfaces and Services (Reference 61) 124 NAFAG Annual Report (October 2017 - September 2018) (Reference 54), paragraph 12.b 125 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 12



robust, realistic and deliberate leadership building programme that leverages joint experimentation, training and exercises, to improve decision-making at every level.

Leadership Considerations for Counter Air

106. [ L-02-C ] Need for senior leader participation in IAMD and BMD exercises. IAMD and BMD operations require rapid decision making from the Strategic and Policy levels and throughout the entire C2 chain. Leaders at all levels must be involved during relevant multinational BMD exercises.126 NATO IAMD and BMD exercises should require the participation of strategic-level decision makers.

Leadership Considerations for Attack


Leadership Considerations for Air Mobility


Leadership Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR


INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR PERSONNEL

Personnel Considerations (General)

110. [ P-01-G ] Lack of qualified personnel. Personnel with the accurate level of knowledge on new generation platforms will be the key enablers to reach an efficient and effective JAP. Essential information regarding new generation platforms, systems and capabilities is not sufficiently disseminated by nations and programme offices through NATO Headquarters, leading to knowledge gaps. 127 NATO fails to consider training subject matter experts (SMEs) as part of a capabilities development and procurement process. NATO should review JAP manning processes and develop policies that will support more efficient use of existing manpower, improve interoperability and standardization and identify future manpower shortages.128

126 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference 37), page 53 127 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 12 128 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21), paragraph 7.4.6.1.1



Personnel Considerations for Counter Air

111. [ P-02-C ] Insufficient BMD training and acculturation. NATO BMD personnel are not adequately trained and acculturated through BMD and IAMD courses, summits and conferences. Human interoperability is critical for ensuring those serving in BMD positions can work together while spread across the entire NATO European territory. Acculturation into the BMD mission allows personnel to better operate with one another. NATO needs to increase opportunities for BMD personnel to attend exercises, summits and courses, such as the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Course and the Surface Based Air Defence course at the NATO School in Oberammergau. Providing opportunities for NATO to come together can enable better communication and understanding of how different nations operate.129

Personnel Considerations for Attack

112. [ P-03-A ] JFAC manning. Sustaining an operational JFAC-structure over a long period requires a considerable amount of trained Air C2 specialists. JAPS relies on JFACs that are trained to the same standard. Interoperability challenges emerge when national JFAC personnel are not trained to the same standards as personnel in the NATO Command Structure (NCS).130

Personnel Considerations for Air Mobility

113. [ P-04-M ] Lack of AAR experience on operational staffs. NATO not only has an over-reliance on U.S. tankers but also an over-reliance on the provision of US Joint Force Air Component Commanders, functional Air Operations Centres (AOC) and AOC personnel, specifically AAR planners. The lesson identified by Headquarters AIRCOM from OUP that the NATO JFAC lacked expertise in a number of key areas, has not been adequately addressed.131

Personnel Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR

114. [ P-05-J ] Lack of trained, qualified and experienced personnel. Recent Alliance operations and defence planning efforts have identified NATO JISR as having: scarce JISR assets; a lack of efficient intelligence sharing processes for dynamic targeting; insufficient JISR dedicated staff preparedness; and, over-dependence on a few nations for subject matter experts trained in dynamic targeting operations.132 While NATO has made great strides in balancing the contributions of Nations to operations in other mission areas (particularly in precision-strike and electronic warfare), the enabling

129 Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability (Reference 37), page 54 130 Future Vector Project, Future Vector - Part II (Reference 35), page 95, chapter 4 131 Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update (Reference 11), paragraph 3.6.1 132 Letter from the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Integration Interoperability Coalition to NATO Secretary General (Reference 49)



capabilities such as air mobility, command and control, and ISR in particular remain areas of over reliance on the United States. During Operation ALLIED FORCE, the bulk of mobility, C2, and ISR capacity came from the United States. The Alliance also relied on the United States to provide the communications networks, trained personnel, and the body of tactical expertise needed to integrate those capabilities into a coherent operation. To be truly interoperable at Day-Zero, NATO needs a pool of trained and qualified JISR specialists readily available and able to respond.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR FACILITIES

Facilities Considerations (General)

115. [ F-01-G ] Unknown support and security requirements. The successfulexecution of JAPS depends on adequate and secure basing. All air platforms haverequirements concerning maintenance and support facilities. The introduction of newcapabilities will inevitably require changes to NATO air basing facilities and havesignificant cost and time impact. Often these changes are not socialized prior to newcapabilities entering into service and, therefore constrain/limit deployability andinteroperability. This implies the need to enhance facilities planning within a newcapabilities design, development and procurement process and greater focus ondeveloping adequate support infrastructure and subject matter expertise.

116. [ F-02-G ] NATO air facilities are not yet modernized, equipped, or hardenedto support the full spectrum of JAP capabilities. Depending on the end user, supportrequirement standards for older and newer capabilities are not implemented at the sametime and therefore do not account for their interoperability with each other. 133 Forexample, support requirements for new generation platforms are not known to NATO.New generation aircraft like the F-35 JSF don't comply with STANAG 3430, 134

“Responsibilities for Aircraft Cross-Servicing”, level C (minimum requirements) in termsof cross-servicing.135 This can be exacerbated by the lack of adequate knowledge andagreements for dual use (civilian and military) facilities/installations.

117. [ F-03-G ] Lacking an integrated testbed and battle lab for interoperabilitytesting. NATO lacks a JAP-oriented integrated testbed as central node of a network oftestbeds or battle labs to increase interoperability and maximize joint participation, as well

133 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 8 134 Responsibilities for Aircraft Cross-Servicing (Reference 75) 135 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report (Reference 68), paragraph 86



as to improve national and multi-national abilities to address new sensors and data sharing capabilities.136

118. [ F-04-G ] Missing agreements between NATO and EU for logistics and sustainment. NATO-EU lacks a cooperative agreement on logistics and sustainment and to develop of a common approach of Supply Support for new generation systems. EU capabilities for logistics and sustainment reinforce NATO capabilities. New generation systems require completely new sustainment concepts, models and procedures. The definition of a new commonly shared logistic concept, to be used as a developmental design baseline for ongoing new generation NATO/EU developmental efforts, would be essential in order to improve intersystem sustainment commonality.137

Facilities Considerations for Counter Air


Facilities Considerations for Attack

120. [ F-05-A ] Multinational ACS shortfalls. AIRCOM reactivated the Aircraft Cross-Servicing (ACS) programme in 2017. ACS increases flexibility and acts as a force enabler for NATO air forces. ACS is defined in three different stages: stage A which enables an aircraft to be flown in another mission from a Host Base without change of weapons configuration, stage B which enables an aircraft to be flown on a subsequent mission from a Host Base and stage C which enables an aircraft to continue to its final destination. Though NATO is currently re-invigorating its logistics and cross-servicing arrangements, those procedures are not yet codified. Interoperability issues result from multinational agreements for training, maintenance and legal issues. ACS procedures differ depending on the arrangement between user nation and industry. Different users have different arrangements with industry suppliers and maintenance contracts differ from nation to nation, making cross-servicing a significant interoperability challenge.138

121. [ F-06-A ] Unknown or undeveloped physical and information security requirements for new generation aircraft. The success of JAPS depends upon the seamless integration of JAP platforms, systems and capabilities into force protection planning and execution. Unknown security requirements for new generation aircraft impede effective force protection. Doctrine and standards should be updated to reflect these new security requirements.139

122. [ F-07-A ] Non-optimized Supply Chain Management. Maintenance and sustainability of the logistics supply chain is essential to optimize multinational operational 136 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47), paragraph 4.5.4 137 Ibidem, paragraph 4.5.5 138 Air Warfare Communication in a Networked Environment (Reference 9) 139 Combined Air Interoperability Programme (Reference 23), Annex B, pages 57 and 58



efficiency and effectiveness in support of JAP. Unknown or non-standard supply chain requirements introduce interoperability challenges for NATO. For example, the JSF’s supply chain has a unique design. Rather than individual air forces or units owning the spare parts for their aircraft, nine international partners and other foreign military sales customers share a common global pool of JSF parts that are managed by the prime contractor. This can lead to spare parts shortages and limited repair capabilities. Additionally, the global network to move JSF parts is immature resulting in long wait times for repair. Without a detailed logistics supply chain management (SCM), Nations will not be able to optimally support the introduction of JSF.140

Facilities Considerations for Air Mobility

123. [ F-08-M ] Need for tanker facilities review. Although the new generation of NATO tankers are not significantly larger in physical dimensions than the current fleet, tanker bed-down spots should be reviewed to ensure they can fully support newer platforms.

Facilities Considerations for Air Contribution to JISR


140 F-35 Aircraft Sustainment - DOD Needs to Address Substantial Supply Chain Challenges (Reference 29)



PART III - INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS IN NDPP

INTRODUCTION

125. The Bi-SC Capability Hierarchy (CH) is the agreed means by which NATO groups and organizes capabilities. It describes a functional breakdown of capabilities and is used as a framework to support the expression of capability requirements at differing levels of detail. The Capability Hierarchy is used primarily within the NDPP to provide a coherent structure to support the expression of the Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR) and for the aggregation of shortfalls.141

126. The top tier of the Capability Hierarchy is comprised of seven main capability areas: Prepare; Project; Engage; Consult, Command and Control (C3); Sustain; Protect; and Inform. Each tier 1 capability is decomposed into either tier 2 or tier 3 capabilities, which provide the hierarchical framework for structuring capabilities.

127. One of the most effective ways to introduce new concepts in the NATO Alliance is to instil the essential characteristics of the concept in the NDPP products that ultimately drive the level of ambition in the individual contributions of the Nations and the NATO Command Structure. In the case of the JAPS, related interoperability issues and recommendations need to be reflected in principal or enabling Capability Statements.

Aim

128. To present a stocktake of the JAPS-related interoperability recommendations and considerations that have already been or should be incorporated into the NDPP in general (and into steps 2, 4 and 5 to be more precise).

Scope

129. Recommendations are limited to the four JAP Core Roles and do not include other JAPS Implementation considerations such as Space, Cyberspace, Air C2, etc.

Method

130. Prior to the official endorsement of JAPS in 2018, the SCs were tasked to provide recommendations for a long-term approach to inform the future development of JAP and identify the medium to long-term JAP capability requirements that should be included in the context of the NDPP. The resultant report 142 , the “Bi-SC Final Report on JAP Capabilities”, published in December 2015, provided the results of a comprehensive and inclusive gap analysis of the NDPP. It included specific recommendations for renewed

141 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4) 142 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21)



focus on existing capability requirements and new capability requirements that would require further development. The SCs used these recommendations as a baseline to evaluate the current NDPP Capability Codes and Capability Statements (CC&CS) and other data found within the Frozen 2020 Capability Requirements Review (CRR20).143

131. As a first step in this analysis, the SCs compared the findings within the CRR16 against the CRR20 to determine differences since the introduction of JAPS 2018. Next, the SCs compared those changes to the aforementioned recommendations drawn from the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report. Next, the SCs compared those changes to the aforementioned recommendations drawn from the 2015 Bi-SC report. Noted below and within Annex D are the results of this analysis in the form of JAPS-related improvements that should be considered in the Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR).

132. It should be noted that defence planners have made significant progress with the 2020 NDPP CRR, developing new CC&CS implied by newly identified tasks, especially taking into account the A2/AD environment, the JAPS, the Cyberspace Roadmap, NATO NCS adaptation, and other relevant policy and/or doctrine, etc. The following recommendations are for consideration by defence planners and could possibly be incorporated in the Minimum Capability Requirement 2020.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA PREPARE

133. Definition. Capability area PREPARE covers the capabilities to establish, prepare and sustain sufficient and effective presence at the right time, including the ability to build up forces, through appropriate and graduated readiness, to meet any requirements, keeping sufficient flexibility to adapt to possible changes in the strategic environment. These also include the capabilities to contribute to deterrence and defence, resilience and projecting stability.144

134. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAP145 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area PREPARE. In several cases, this is already reflected in the NDPP. The paragraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities146, and the complete accounting for these recommendations are in Annex D.

135. Recommendation. The issues and recommendations in this section appear to be outstanding from the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report and have not yet been portrayed in a Minimum Capability Requirement or found any other form of fulfilment.

143 Frozen Set of Capability Codes and Capability Statements (Reference 32) 144 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "R" 145 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51) 146 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21)



a. Through effective and realistic education, training, exercises, and evaluation programmes, ensure an adequate number of personnel are trained and proficient in JAP TTPs and on the systems used in conducting operations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2)

b. Conduct live exercises that provide training environments and experiences that more closely resemble potential operational situations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.1)

c. Conduct realistic operational simulation, leveraging new modelling and simulation technologies, based on up to date operational scenarios, when live exercises cannot properly emulate the required environment. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.2)

d. Research, develop, and acquire innovative and leading-edge equipment (e.g. improved lift capability) in sufficient supply to enable the effective and timely conduct and sustainment of Joint air operations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3)

e. Ensure sufficient equipment (e.g. weaponry and armour) and supplies (e.g. fuel and consumables) are immediately available to allow timely deployment of forces to various environments, ensuring efficient and effective JAP operations. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.1)

f. Ensure sufficient supplies (e.g. precision munitions) are available to sustain forces deployed to various environments while regular and recurring sustainment is established. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.2)

g. Review standardization with respect to sustainment and establish, improve or update requirements to enable better interoperability and integration of Alliance JAP. (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.4)

h. Review, upgrade or develop new information sharing systems that take advantage of future technologies in order to improve assurance and better enable command and control while enhancing decision making processes in the future (paragraph 6.5.1.2.2.3.5)

i. Improve JAP-specific standards and the Measures of Performance (MOP) and Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) for NATO readiness for the Alliance to train, exercise and operate under within the future security environment. (paragraph 7.4.1.1.1)

j. Current Air C2 policy should undergo periodic review across the NCS and NFS to ensure that Air C2 keeps pace with changes to the FSE in order to better enable the effective employment of NATO JAP. (paragraph 7.4.1.1.2)

k. Improve JAP’s modular organization and interoperability in order to cover a wide range of contingencies while offering maximum agility and providing the



ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the FSE. (paragraph 7.4.2.1.1)

l. Develop a robust NATO training plan that improves the realism of and incorporates all levels of leadership in joint experimentation and exercises. (paragraph 7.4.3.1.1)

m. Continue to develop training and simulations that leverage Alliance connectivity, maximizing the use of simulators, distance learning and existing or new training infrastructure. (paragraph 7.4.3.1.2)

n. Develop NATO training that enhances interoperability and maximizes joint participation, both national and multinational. (paragraph 7.4.3.1.3)

o. Conduct research in areas of material technology that will enhance survivability of NATO equipment, personnel, facilities, and infrastructure. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.1)

p. Conduct research in areas of material technology that enhance NATO sustainability. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.2)

q. NATO should invest in Alliance JAP leadership through deliberate leadership building programmes. Specific recommendations regarding leadership as well as C2 of JAP are addressed in the doctrine and training sections (7.4.1 and 7.4.3 respectively). (paragraph 7.4.5.1.1)

r. Review JAP manning processes and develop policies that will support more efficient use of existing manpower, improve interoperability and standardisation, and identify future manpower shortages. (paragraph 7.4.6.1.1)

s. Continue to support the Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) and Smart Defence (SD) projects with particular emphasis on JAP interoperability. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.1)

t. Conduct training that focuses on interoperability. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.2)

u. Improve integration and interoperability of all NATO CIS. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.3)

v. Increase focus on interoperability during acquisition processes. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.4)

w. Review, revise, and enforce relevant NATO STANAGS for JAP. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.5)



x. Establish and enforce language proficiency requirements. (paragraph7.4.8.1.6)

y. Improve cultural awareness along with inter-service and cross-culturaltraining that will enhance the Alliance’s abilities in multinational efforts. (paragraph7.4.8.1.7)

z. Develop programmes that maximize the use of interoperable COTScapabilities and equipment. (paragraph 7.4.8.1.8)

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA PROJECT

136. Definition. Capability area PROJECT covers the capabilities to conduct strategicdeployment of both NATO and national headquarters, forces and capabilities in supportof any Alliance mission. These also include the capabilities to contribute to NATOdeterrence.147

137. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAP148

has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in thecapability area PROJECT. In several cases, this is already reflected in the NDPP. Theparagraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities149,and the complete accounting for these recommendations are in Annex D.

138. Recommendation. The following issues and recommendations in this sectionhave not yet been portrayed in a Minimum Capability Requirement in regards tointeroperability for JAP, or found any other form of fulfilment.

a. Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures that facilitate interoperabilityand intra-Alliance movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. (paragraph7.4.4.1.3)

b. Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures to optimize interoperabilityby the use of standardized, distributed, and pre-positioned personnel, equipment,and supplies. (paragraph 7.4.4.1.4)

c. Review, improve, or standardize existing NATO air facilities in order tohandle the full spectrum of air power capabilities. (paragraph 7.4.7.1.1)

d. Modernize hardened facilities to enhance operational capability,survivability, sustainability, and resilience. (paragraph 7.4.7.1.2)

147 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "D" 148 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51) 149 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21)



e. Review existing agreements for utilizing and/or develop new agreements for establishing dual use (civilian and military) facilities/installations and airspace. (paragraph 7.4.7.1.3)

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA ENGAGE

139. Definition. Capability area ENGAGE (E) covers the capabilities to perform the tasks which contribute directly to the achievement of mission goals within the context of collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. It includes all capabilities required to defeat, if necessary, adversaries as well as other capabilities such as, inter alia, those necessary to evacuate non-combatants, prevent the use of force by opponents, train local security forces and participate in stabilisation and reconstruction.150

140. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAP151 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area ENGAGE. In several cases this is already reflected in the NDPP. The complete accounting for this recommendation is in Annex D.

141. Recommendation. Renewed focus or emphasis on the air power interoperability in the Minimum Capability Requirement.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA C3

142. Definition. Capability area CONSULT, COMMAND AND CONTROL covers the capabilities of NATO commanders to exercise authority over and direct the full spectrum of assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission, including: to communicate and coordinate with other actors which are present or involved in the operational area and effective information exchange with the political and military leadership; to plan, employ and coordinate civilian activities with other actors and organizations; and to perform nuclear planning and political consultation that allow the rapid development of nuclear employment options in crisis and war, should circumstances so dictate.152

143. Assessment. A review of the Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's JAP153 has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the capability area CONSULT, COMMAND AND CONTROL. In several cases, this is already reflected in the NDPP. The complete accounting for this recommendation is in Annex D.

150 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "E" 151 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51) 152 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "C" 153 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51)



144. Recommendation. Renewed focus or emphasis on the air power interoperabilityin the Minimum Capability Requirement.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA SUSTAIN

145. Definition. Capability area SUSTAIN covers the capabilities to plan and executethe timely support and sustainment of forces, including: essential military infrastructure;movement and transportation; military engineering support; contracting; supply,maintenance and services management; basing support; and health and medicalsupport.154


has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in thecapability area SUSTAIN. In several cases this is already reflected in the NDPP. Theparagraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities156,and the complete accounting for these recommendations are in Annex D.


a. Ensure sufficient personnel, equipment, supplies, and munitions areavailable to sustain long-term, high-intensity operations. (paragraph 6.5.4.2.1)

b. Rapidly implement, operate and maintain both an expeditiously dynamicand steady state supply and combat support capability. (paragraph 6.5.4.2.2)

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA PROTECT

148. Definition. Capability area PROTECT covers the capabilities to minimize througha common multinational and holistic approach of Force Protection the vulnerability ofpersonnel, facilities, material and activities to any threat and in all situations, to includetowards the effects of Weapons of Mass destruction (WMD), whilst ensuring the Nationsfreedom of action and contributing to mission success. During deployed operations, itincludes lines of communication and lines of supply and cyber space.157


has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in the

154 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "S" 155 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51) 156 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21) 157 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "P" 158 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51)



capability area PROTECT. In several cases, this is already reflected in the NDPP. The complete accounting for this recommendation is in Annex D.

150. Recommendation. Renewed focus or emphasis on the air power interoperabilityin the Minimum Capability Requirement.

INTEROPERABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CAPABILITY AREA INFORM

151. Definition. Capability area INFORM covers the capabilities to establish andmaintain the situational awareness and level of knowledge required to allow commandersat all levels to make timely and informed decisions.159


has provided a list of recognized interoperability issues and recommendations in thecapability area INFORM. In several cases, this is already reflected in the NDPP. Theparagraphs below correspond to the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Capabilities161,and the complete accounting for this recommendation is in Annex D.


a. Conduct robust and resilient processing, exploitation, and distribution ofinformation gained through persistent ISR operations and integrate it into C3,decision making, and strategic awareness for the Alliance. (paragraph 6.5.7.2.2)

159 2019 Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy (Reference 4), Annex A, row "I" 160 Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power (Reference 51) 161 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21)



PART IV - ANALYSIS OF CONSIDERATIONS

INTRODUCTION

154. The purpose of Part II - Interoperability Considerations in JAP Roles - was to present the Bi-SC findings of potential interoperability considerations and challenges for the implementation of the Joint Air Power Strategy between old and next generation platforms, systems and capabilities, including from an operational perspective.162 As a result, it shows a collection of interoperability considerations, mapped against the seven DOTMLPF lines of development.

155. In a similar way, Part III - Interoperability Considerations in NDPP - aimed to present a stocktake of the JAPS-related interoperability recommendations and considerations that have already been or should be incorporated into the NDPP.163 Those considerations are mapped against the seven top domains of the Capability Hierarchy.

156. These results provide a compelling data set of identify potential interoperability considerations and challenges between old and next generation platforms, systems and capabilities from an operational, industrial and transformational perspective. NATO needs to address these considerations and challenges. As tasked by the MC, the Strategic Commands need to propose a process how to address them.164 For that, it is necessary to further analyze the data set.

Aim

157. To analyze interoperability considerations and challenges for JAPS implementation in order to be able to develop a process how to address them.

Scope

158. The analysis uses the potential interoperability considerations and challenges identified in Part II, providing context for the implementation of the strategy in all four JAP core roles.

Method

159. Using proven analysis techniques, the data set of identified considerations and challenges will be rearranged into sizeable logical groupings. The possible responses on these groupings are prioritized in order to distinguish topics that are recurring in nature

162 Paragraph 15 163 Paragraph 128 164 NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation (Reference 67)



and can be accommodated in a process, and those that are unrepeatable to be addressed in a single occurrence.

ORIGINAL DATA SET

160. The first step in the analysis was to capture the potential JAP interoperability considerations and challenges between old and next generation platforms, systems and capabilities, including an operational perspective. These considerations are listed in Section 1 of Annex E to this report.

161. For the purpose of further research and analysis, the considerations were assigned a unique identifier that expresses the initial of the applicable DOTMLPF line of development, an incremental number for that line, and an initial to identify the JAP core role (with "G" for general items, "C" for Counter-Air, "A" for Attack, "M" for Air Mobility and "J" for Contribution to JISR). Those identifiers helped in sorting and selecting the considerations in the other steps of the analysis.

ANALYSIS OF AFFINITY

162. The second step in the analysis was to organize the interoperability considerations into groups with common themes or relationships. This was executed with the use of an affinity diagram, which proved to be a convenient tool for analyzing large amounts of data and discovering relationships that allowed the discovery of various directions for further resolution.

163. The analysis with the affinity diagram helped to identify related topics in the interoperability considerations, which were then grouped in several arrangements until a comprehensive set of overarching subjects could be determined. As a result, the considerations were consolidated in the following groupings:

a. Aviation Basing - Considerations for Aviation Basing are related to the Air Basing Selection (ABS) Review that is currently underway in NATO.

b. C4ISR - Considerations for C4ISR are related to integration of C2 and surveillance capabilities of new generation PSCs.

c. Doctrine - Considerations for C4ISR are related to allied doctrine and concept development.

d. Exercises - Considerations for C4ISR are related to aspects of JAP in multinational and multi-generational exercises.

e. Leadership - Considerations for leadership are related to the development of command and management leadership.



f. Materiel - Considerations for materiel are related to tangible shortcomings in PSCs to comply with contemporary JAP capability requirements.

g. Organization - Considerations for organization are related to possible changes in the organization to better support the execution of JAP operations, exercises and related capability development.

h. Personnel - Considerations for personnel are related to manning issues.

i. Policy - Considerations for policy are related to policies, to TTPs and to concept at a strategic level.

j. Standards - Considerations for standards are related to the appropriate definition of JAP requirement and the compliance to relevant standards.

k. Targeted Training - Considerations for targeted training are related to the shortcomings in specific task- or role-defined education and training.

l. Testbed - Considerations for testbed are related to a specific proposal for a System Engineering and Integration testbed.

m. Miscellaneous - All other considerations are grouped as "miscellaneous".

164. The groupings of interoperability considerations in the affinity data set are listed in Section 2 of Annex E to this report.

ANALYSIS OF PRIORITIZATION

165. The third step in the analysis was to review the groupings of interoperability considerations and try to map them in a certain resolution space. This was executed with the use of a prioritization matrix, in with possible resolutions were plotted against feasibility in NATO and in Nations on one axis, and against the likelihood that a consideration would require a single or a long-term, recurring resolution.

166. The analysis with the Prioritization matrix helped to map the groupings from the previous step in terms of feasibility and priority, and identify which pull-through would require a persistent effort and which were one-time and unique. Focusing on possible resolution spaces, it was necessary to split the groupings up in several independent efforts. These efforts were distributed in a prioritized list for either recurring or singular actions.

167. The recurring topics were identified as possible topics for lines of effort (LOEs) in a process to address JAP-related interoperability considerations in a deliberate and persistent effort.



a. Defence Planning - Mitigation of the considerations for defence planning is related to, and needs to be synchronized with, the NATO Defence Planning Process in order to express the capability statements for JAP interoperability. Recognizing that some progress has already been achieved following the Bi-SC Final Report on JAP Capabilities,165 as stipulated in Part III, there still are plenty of opportunities for improvement.

b. Policy - Mitigation of the considerations for policy needs to empower the Senior Policy Committees (SPCs) at NATO Headquarters and the Strategic Commands to incorporate interoperability in new and existing policies.

c. Doctrine - Mitigation of the considerations for doctrine needs to promote the inclusion of interoperability enhancement in new and existing doctrine documentation such as MC directives and Allied Publications.

d. Standardization - Mitigation of the considerations for standardization needs to incorporate various aspects of interoperability in NATO, national and international standards.

e. ETEE - Mitigation of the considerations for ETEE needs to inform training developers and exercise planners to integrate interoperability aspects in their planning and make sure these are taken into consideration for new trainings and exercises.

f. Organization - Mitigation of the considerations for organization needs to make leadership aware of the opportunities to improve interoperability by regular adaptation of organizations for the introduction of new PSCs and techniques.

g. C4ISR Architecture - Mitigation of the considerations for C4ISR Architecture needs to lay the foundation for enterprise-level requirements and architectures for ongoing efforts related to the JAPS and support a coherent strategy to enable the integration of tactical C2 and surveillance.

168. The one-time topics were identified as opportunities that were either related to already ongoing activities for which a line of effort in a new process would be counter-productive, or a required a unique and one-time resolution.

a. Aviation Basing.

b. Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD).

c. Mission Training through Distributed Simulation (MTDS).

165 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21)



d. Procurement.

e. Integrated testbed and battle lab.

f. All other miscellaneous topics are allocated to be translated into recommendations for either NATO or Nations.

169. The groupings of interoperability considerations in the prioritized data set are listed in Section 3 of Annex E to this report.

PULL THROUGH

170. The pull through of this analysis is solidified in two ways.

171. First, the seven topics that resemble a recurring effort are translated into as many lines of effort (LOEs), as described in Part V - JAPS Interoperability Roadmap. This roadmap forms the process proposal on how to deal with all JAPS related interoperability considerations and challenges, and this will be the first and foremost recommendation from this report.

172. Second, the other topics are translated into a number of recommendations for NATO and for Nations, following the report conclusion in Part VI - Conclusion and Recommendations.



PART V – JAPS INTEROPERABILITY ROADMAP

INTRODUCTION

173. Following extensive analysis by the Strategic Commands supported by various subject matter experts (SMEs), a determined process is needed, for which NATO and Nations must demonstrate commitment and support. This JAPS Interoperability Roadmap proposal addresses this process, which will transform the Alliance approach to interoperability from a reactive to a more deliberate, proactive one that implements interoperability by design and with a sense of urgency.

174. The JAPS Interoperability Roadmap will inform future work on the implementation of the Joint Air Power Strategy, through forums such as the Conference of National Armament Directors (CNAD) and supported by the Air and Missile Defence Committee (AMDC) to identify mitigation measures and solutions.

Aim

175. This Bi-SC Roadmap proposal for JAPS Interoperability is intended to outline recommended actions to be taken to address potential interoperability challenges, including those from an operational perspective.

176. The proposed JAPS Interoperability Roadmap outlines a holistic and coordinated process to urgently address the most pressing interoperability concerns. It capitalizes on existing and ongoing NATO initiatives to the maximum extent possible and it details the lines of effort (LOE) with associated action items.

177. Having the process focus on interoperability will reinforce air capabilities that:

a. Can operate in all types of environment, including highly-contested ones, where air superiority is not necessarily assured.

b. Support the detection, identification and targeting aspects, when operating in a congested environment, and enhance civil-military airspace coordination and integration to ensure a safe and secure air environment.

c. Ensure readiness through persistence, resilience and sustainability; focus on joint competencies in training and exercise programmes; and, exploit live and virtual exercise and training opportunities.

d. Use conceptual and technical innovation in the development of future JAP capabilities. Particular attention should be paid to the interoperability and connectivity of different generations of platforms.



e. Adopt a balanced approach between quality and quantity when developingand acquiring new capabilities.

Scope

178. The roadmap will incorporate the results from the analysis of recurringinteroperability considerations in Part IV.

179. The Roadmap details the lines of effort with associated action items, which accountfor the basic building blocks of this effort, but it intentionally avoids a level of granularitywhich could prematurely limit future activities.

180. The Roadmap primarily focuses on the implications within the NCS but identifiespossible implications to the NATO Force Structure (NFS) as well.

181. The Roadmap does not preclude other JAP activities and initiatives currentlyunderway unless expressly stated.

PRINCIPLES

182. The JAPS Interoperability Roadmap is organized along seven distinct andcomplementary lines of effort (LOEs), which are intended to run concurrently. Each LOEis defined in the following paragraphs with a concise description, the proposed end stateand a general approach for the associated action items.

183. As these lines of efforts are based on recurring efforts that result from the analysisof interoperability considerations in Part IV - Analysis of Considerations - it is clear thatthis roadmap is a continuing effort. It will be based on an incremental approach that willgrow the maturity of JAPS interoperability over time.

184. NATO has gained experience with incremental development in a large programmewith Federated Mission Networking (FMN). The FMN approach is based on time-boxedspirals, where the stakeholders in the process (in the case of FMN these are called"Affiliates") agree on the objectives for each spiral that are realistic and feasible in a pre-defined fixed time slot (for FMN, 2 years). This results in a situation where the Affiliateshave a common understanding of what can and needs to be achieved in that time slotand where they can run their own capability development to synchronize their effortswithin the boundaries of mutually agreed spiral specifications.

185. In a similar way, it would be advisable to identify the stakeholders for the JAPSInteroperability Roadmap and have them agree on a mutually coordinated andsynchronized approach for the incremental development of JAPS interoperability.Considering the potential of the NDPP for the synchronization of national ambitions, itseems logical to try and synchronize this roadmap with the NDPP cycle and aim for the



delivery of the tangible outputs of the roadmap in time for NDPP to be considered in Step 1. This means that the first set of results must be ready by the middle of 2021.

186. The proposed set up of the roadmap with lines of effort is similar to that of the Cyber Defence Action Plan (CDAP). Following this construct, it is clear that appropriate governance and management are required to guarantee an effective execution of the roadmap, as well as change management of future developments.

187. The following definitions of the lines of effort do not include suggestions for responsible, accountable, consulted and informed (RACI) roles in the Alliance. The identification of the key responsibilities in the planning and execution of the LOEs is not a part of the tasking and beyond the scope of this report.

LINES OF EFFORT

188. The seven LOEs detailed below are presented as a means of organizing the various efforts required to improve JAP interoperability. They are derived from the JAPS Interoperability Study and have been cross-referenced with the DOTMLPF lines of capability development as well as the Capability Hierarchy.

189. As long as nations continue to develop capabilities at different rates, interoperability gaps will persist, thus requiring continuous, incremental, progressive and prioritized efforts to increase efficiency and effectiveness through cross-functionality, optimized processes and professional programme management.

190. The following lines of effort are recommended:

a. LOE-1 for Defence Planning.

b. LOE-2 for Policy.

c. LOE-3 for Doctrine.

d. LOE-4 for Standardization.

e. LOE-5 for Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE).

f. LOE-6 for Organization.

g. LOE-7 for Enterprise C4ISR Architecture Strategy.

LOE-1 - Defence Planning

191. Description. Capable, trained, interoperable forces are essential for the Alliance to be able to deter and, if necessary, defend against and defeat threats to the Alliance. Interoperability, therefore, underpins NATO defence planning and Nations should take



into account interoperability from the start. The NDPP assumes 100 percent interoperability of platforms, systems and capabilities (PSCs). Accordingly, at any given time and step in the process, the value of the NDPP directly correlates to the interoperability of NATO forces.

192. Desired End State. JAP-related Interoperability concerns identified by operational planners need to be integrated by defence planners into every step of the NDPP resulting in realistic, practical and meaningful targets for nations.

193. Approach. Operational planners can utilize the JAPS-IS to better understand interoperability challenges for the implementation of JAPS, and subsequently inform force standards. For example, air-launched weapons systems interoperability requirements and/or aircraft tanker lack of self-protection should be defined by the operators and ultimately, influence the requirements in the NDPP.

a. NDPP Step 1 (Establishing Political Guidance). Ensure JAPS-IS considerations are taken into account in SCs’ proposals for the MC input to the Political Guidance, the Political Guidance, the Military Committee Supplemental Guidance and in the Guiding Principle and Planning Assumptions as appropriate.

b. NDPP Step 2 (Determine Requirements). Incorporate appropriate JAPS-IS identified requirements into the development of the Minimum Capability Requirements.

c. NDPP Step 3 (Apportion Requirements and Set Targets). Ensure to include aspects relevant to identified considerations that are already incorporated in CC&CS, in targets for realization through NDPP.

d. NDPP Step 4 (Facilitate Implementation). Consider how to correct issues identified in the JAPS Interoperability Study through NDPP Step 4 (i.e. identify the JAPS related aspects in NDPP Targets and facilitate/monitor their progress).

e. NDPP Step 5 (Reviewing Results). Use the JAPS-IS to inform the Suitability and Risk Assessment (SRA).

LOE-2 - Policy

194. Description. In order to execute JAPS effectively, NATO must identify, adjust and improve policies and concepts related to JAP. Policies that improve the ability of the Alliance to share intelligence and information will provide adequate, accurate and timely intelligence and information to support NATO’s Air decision-making process. It is essential that Nations remain committed to implementing and adhering to these policies. In addition to the ongoing work regarding policies such as aircraft cross-servicing, exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and movement of resources across



Alliance internal borders, the JAPS-IS revealed several policy gaps that should be considered by NATO.

195. Desired End State. Policies in place that provide adequate, accurate and timely intelligence and information to support NATO’s Air decision-making process. Nations committed to implementing and adhering to these policies.

196. Approach. In addition to the JAPS-IS informing ongoing work regarding policies for aircraft cross-servicing (ACS), IAMD, Space, Cyber, exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and movement of resources across Alliance internal borders. It is recommended that the following NATO policies are developed or revised, as appropriate, are responsive to and include language from the JAPS:

a. JAP Security Policy. Cyber and electronic warfare systems currently pose significant threats to Alliance air operations. Measures must be taken to protect networks against manipulation of data and information (trust, spoofing) and denial of service. Protection of the network must be as important as the protection of the platform.

b. JAP Modernization Policy. NATO lacks a common approach to modernize legacy PSCs. Multinational interoperability of same PSCs is jeopardized by different configurations adopted by nations and/or services, or even within the same service, making cost and downtime for retrofitting to common configurations inefficient or unaffordable for nations. For similar platform fleets, NATO should pursue common modernization schemes aimed at maintaining interoperability.

c. Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling Policy. Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling (A3R) will require the use of precision navigation, sensors, and AAR systems combined with a networked data link. Therefore, a specific set of precision navigation, informational, and system status data must be shared between platforms to conduct A3R successfully. As a minimum, requirements for accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability of the underlying sensors and systems will need to be defined. The path to operational A3R is dependent upon standardizing the equipment and airworthiness requirements, as well as the procedures.

d. COTS Policy. NATO lacks a deliberate programme that maximizes the use of interoperable commercial off the shelf (COTS) capabilities and equipment - except for C3 capabilities and Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) services, for which the Alliance follows the Adopt, Buy of Create (ABC) principle.166 This enables the introduction of national COTS systems that are incompatible with others systems and increase vulnerability and risk. Scaling similar principles

166 C3 Capabilities and ICT Services Lifecycle Management Policy (Reference 22)



beyond C3 NATO procurement activities could provide a mechanism to adopt interoperable COTS solutions more quickly and effectively.

e. NATO-EU Logistics Collaboration Framework. Create a NATO-EU cooperative agreement on logistics and sustainment and develop a common approach to supply support for new generation systems.

f. NATO-Industry Collaboration Framework. NATO needs a framework to work with industry to develop standards for information exchange and distributed mission simulation, thereby leveraging industry skill, knowledge and best practices. JAP Interoperability requires the adoption of common NATO standards for the exchange of information. However, without an appropriate NATO-industry framework, the desire to protect corporate intellectual property developed by industry, especially Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM), prevents the adoption of the necessary open system architectures.

LOE-3 - Doctrine

197. Description. Capable, interoperable forces are essential for the Alliance to be able to deter and, if necessary, defend against and defeat threats to the Alliance. Well written doctrine is the basis of interoperability, underpinning NATO’s and Nations’ effectiveness as well as easing the incorporation of other countries into coalitions. Therefore, the findings of the JAPS Interoperability Study regarding doctrine should inform all those stakeholder’s processes that either deal with air doctrine directly or from a multi-domain perspective.

198. Desired End State. A coherent "bookshelf" of allied joint doctrine publications that provide relevant, accurate, timely guidance to the operational commanders and staffs across all warfare areas.

199. Approach. JAPS Interoperability Study informs the elaboration of the Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan167 in order to take its findings into account when sequencing the different work strands. JAPS-IS findings disseminated through the community in order to: [1] modify when appropriate the programs of work at all levels; [2] incorporate the findings in the content of new and updated publications; and, [3] study the feasibility to improve the current doctrine development process introducing more agility to the general process and to avoid the creation of different and incompatible configurations. Specifically, the following concepts and doctrines should be evaluated against the JAPS-IS and updated or initiated as appropriate.

a. Concepts:

167 The Joint Doctrine Campaign Plan is maintained by the ACT Joint Doctrine and Lessons Learned (JDLL) Branch.



(1) NATO Joint C2 CONOPS.

(2) NATO Air C2 CONOPS.

(3) NATO Maritime C2 CONOPS.

(4) NATO Land C2 CONOPS.

(5) NATO Special Operations Forces C2 CONOPS.

(6) NATO Cyber Operations C2 CONOPS.

(7) NATO Logistic C2 CONOPS.

(8) NATO Future Rotorcraft Capability.

(9) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Concept.

(10) Air Contribution to JISR Concept.

b. Doctrines:

(1) AAP-47 - Allied Joint Doctrine Development.168

(2) AJP-3.3 - Allied Joint Publication for Air and Space Operations.169

(3) AJP-3.3.1 - Allied Joint Publication for Counter-Air Operations.170

(4) AJP-3.3.2 - Allied Joint Publication for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction.171

(5) AJP-3.3.3 - Allied Joint Publication for Air-Maritime Coordination.172

(6) AJP-3.3.5 - Allied Joint Publication for Airspace Control.173

c. Annex C presents the current JAP-related NATO Doctrines and TTPs in the form of Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) and Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) and their respective promulgation dates. A comprehensive review of JAP-related ATPs

168 AAP-47 - Allied Joint Doctrine Development (Reference 14) 169 AJP-3.3 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations (Reference 15) 170 AJP-3.3.1 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Air Operations (Reference 19) 171 AJP-3.3.2 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction (Reference 18) 172 AJP-3.3.3 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination (Reference 16) 173 AJP-3.3.4 - Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control (Reference 17)



should be conducted to prioritize those requiring update based on the findings in the JAPS-IS.

LOE-4 - Standardization

200. Description. Standardization is one of the key tools in delivering and providing solutions to interoperability requirements, coming from the NDPP, agreed Alliance initiatives, NATO operations planning (top-down), or from lessons learned, exercise and evaluations processes (bottom-up). However, too many of NATO’s standards are now outdated, and not enough standardization activities are aligned with NATO’s planning priorities.

201. Desired End State. Allied standardization activities aligned with NATO’s planning priorities and initiatives. Interoperability requirements clearly defined and solutions identified. Nations’ capabilities effectively operate alongside each other in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.

202. Approach.

a. NATO Standards. Make available JAPS-IS findings to NATO Standardization Boards, Panels and Working Groups across the standardization community to consider the findings, when planning their programme of work and the content of new doctrine. Specifically:

(1) ACO to include Nations’ use of NATO standards to measure interoperability as a central element of the "enhanced Readiness Reporting System".

(2) SCs and the NATO Office of Standardization (NSO) to promote and deliver exercise observations into MC standardization working groups.

(3) SCs and NSO to address Nations’ use of NATO standards in the Suitability and Risk Assessment.

(4) Include roles and responsibilities for interoperability and standardization in updating MC 324174 "NATO Military Command Structure" and the Strategic Commands’ terms of reference.

b. National Standards. Make available JAPS-IS findings to National Standardization communities for consideration, when planning their programme of work as well as the content of new doctrine. Specifically:

174 NATO Military Command Structure (Reference 59)



(1) Nations to review and report on their forces’ use of NATO standards,with a focus on the critical standards included in the Bi-SC CapabilityCatalogue.

(2) Nations to make their national exercises more attractive and invitingfor multinational participation, and share their exercise reports with therelevant Standardization Boards.

(3) Nations to emphasize interoperability and incorporate compliancewith agreed standards (STANAGs) central to objectives and specificationsfor exercises (national, multi-national and offered to NATO).

(4) Nations to leverage exercises, real-world operational activities, andtrial events (e.g. trial UNIFIED VISION) to improve information exchangeand train on procedures.

(5) Nations to increase national experts’ participation in developingNATO standards - particularly CIS, tactical-level TTP and joint doctrine.

LOE-5 - NATO Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation

203. Description. Strengthen the NATO ETEE Policy to include joint and multinationalexercises that test the full spectrum of JAP missions across all domains in a complexA2/AD environment. Strengthen Joint and multinational interoperability verification effortsthrough events to ensure practical rather than theoretical interoperability. Allied air forcesprepare for high-intensity air warfare with exercises and training designed to incorporatemultinational capabilities into a single battlespace under an unfamiliar commandstructure. These training and exercises must provide, where practicable, operators andplanners the opportunity to be tested in large-scale Joint exercises offering situationsclose to combat.

204. Desired End State. NATO and Nations synchronize their ETEE processes tomaximize JAP interoperability. National training centres are certified to deliver coursesfor all NATO Nations. NATO multinational exercises test the full spectrum of JAPmissions.

205. Approach. The NATO ETEE Policy will more likely be adapted to include new JAPcapabilities specificities, constraints and requirements, when these can be supported bysuccesses in the field. E.g. the success of an operation combining old and new generationplatforms. Nations should be encouraged to incorporate NATO’s ETEE Policy into theirown training and education policies to conduct training in a more realistic environment.Specifically, consideration should be given to the following recommendations:

a. Targeted training. NATO should improve or develop targeted training to:



(1) Scale Headquarters AIRCOM's training and education programmes focused on Air C2 Awareness to include other domains and operators at all levels, tactical to strategic.

(2) Include training for the support staff responsible for the operation and maintenance of infrastructure that is being affected by newly delivered or upgraded capabilities, specifically focused on developing skill-sets to enable safe and effective integration of multiple generations of platforms.

(3) Update training standards according to the introduction of Live Virtual Constructive (LVC) systems.

(4) Update training standards for JTACs.

(5) Ensure JFAC personnel are trained to the same standards as the NCS personnel.

(6) Encourage effective language proficiency, including common Technical and Operational languages (Military Air Terminology) for the varied backgrounds of Alliance personnel.

b. NATO multinational JAP exercise. NATO should provide multinational Joint exercise(s) that test the full spectrum of JAP missions including Long-Range Bombing, Close Air Support (CAS), Air Policing (AP), Air-to-Air Combat, Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD), Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and cross-domain coordination with air operations in the Land and Maritime domains. Training and exercises must provide, operators and planners, when practicable, the opportunity to be tested in large-scale Joint exercises offering situations closely resembling combat. Live Joint training should:

(1) Progress beyond component level to encourage and evaluate component interoperability.

(2) Expose Command Groups and Senior Staff to the challenges that realistic operating environments impose on a Joint Task Force (JTF).

(3) Integrate stealth and other new generation technology with legacy capabilities.

(4) Be based on realistic scenarios, including collective defence operations facing a near peer opponent.

(5) Be classified appropriately to enable the required exchange of sensitive operational information among the participants.



(6) Require the sharing of essential information by nations regardingnew generation PSCs.

(7) Deliberately include training/exercise opportunities for AAR planningand execution, including pre- and post-strike or ingress/egress AAR.

(8) Establish and evaluate common qualification and currency standardsfor AAR receiver pilots and boom operators.

(9) Leverages JAP-oriented Live/Virtual (LV) MTDS capability to supportsimulated and live training.

c. NATO IAMD and BMD Training and Exercises. Integrated Air and MissileDefence (IAMD) and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) are complex and challengingmissions for NATO because they encompass all domains and require flawlesscooperation and collaboration between national and NATO entities. Successfulexecution of these missions depends heavily on interoperability, connectivity anda shared common understanding of doctrine, concepts of operation and TTPs.NATO should consider:

(1) The participation of strategic-level decision makers in IAMD andBMD exercises.

(2) Linking NATO and national exercise to develop the understanding ofIAMD C2 from the strategic level of military-political leadership within theAlliance down to tactical level.

(3) Ensure BMD personnel receive adequately training and awarenessthrough BMD and IAMD courses, such as the NATO Ballistic MissileDefence Course and the Surface Based Air Defence.

d. NATO JISR Training and Exercises. Improve NATO JISR Training andExercises, to develop a pool of trained and qualified JISR specialists readilyavailable and able to respond. Specifically, NATO JISR Training and Exercisesshould:

(1) Evaluate the Alliance’s ability to get real-time ISR data to analystswho can rapidly fuse, assess, and then push their assessments to decisionmakers for rapid action.

(2) Evaluate a NATO JTF’s ability to plan and execute the JISR process.

(3) Focus beyond technical capability development efforts and includethe integration of air power operators.



(4) Include common training standards and protocols to teach, train and exercise operators’ ability to manage dynamic ISR processes such as Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) and cross cuing.

e. NATO Training Infrastructure Assessment. NATO should conduct a deliberate assessment of Training and Exercise infrastructure, that includes:

(1) Opposition forces capable of replicating current and future threats.

(2) The availability of ranges, airspace, emitters and targets.

(3) The availability of Live/Virtual (LV) MTDS capability to support simulated and live training.

LOE-6 - Organization

206. Description. NATO must improve JAP’s modular organization to provide maximum agility and the ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the future security environment.

207. Desired End State. NATO organizations provide maximum agility and the ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the future security environment.

208. Approach.

a. Operational Headquarters Assessment. Evaluate the structure and qualifications of staff in NATO's operational headquarters to ensure suitably trained, qualified and experienced personnel to execute JAP operations in support of the Alliances objectives. Force structures maximize the contributions of member nations and partner countries.

b. Cooperation with NATO Partner Countries. Force structures should define national contributions that are balanced to build an interoperable fighting force. The JAPS should inform all policies dealing with training, exercising, as well as the operational planning and execution.

LOE-7 - Enterprise C4ISR Architecture Strategy

209. Description. Develop C4ISR enterprise-level requirements and architectures for ongoing efforts related to the JAPS. NATO needs a coherent C4ISR strategy to enable the integration of tactical C2 and surveillance functions in order to support decentralized decision-making and allocate decision rights dynamically. Such a strategy will help to develop strategic to tactical situational awareness through the seamless flow of information across multiple domains and functions, while fully integrating all C4ISR capabilities and connecting their architectures seamlessly. This will help to determine how



capabilities overlap, interact, and where potential gaps exist in capability requirements and architectures. It will also help to identify the core services, communications, data management and applications that must be developed.

210. Desired End State. JAP-related capability architectures aligned andcomplementary with each other. Core services, communications, data management andapplications requirements identified.

211. Approach.

a. C4ISR capability map. Develop a C4ISR capability map/breakdown to beagreed by the NAC, and to form the basis for a coherent life cycle management ofall related capabilities.

(1) Strengthen the use of architecture in support of capability life cyclemanagement as a method to increase coherency of governance andmanagement activities by providing structure and re-use (in line with theestablishment of enterprise architecture discipline as agreed by NAC in theAlliance C3 Strategy).

(2) Investigate who should be tasked and how to request to developmentof this C4ISR enterprise architecture - with the Architecture Capability Team(ACaT) giving guidance and support.

b. Air C2 Capability Architecture. Develop a comprehensive NCS Air C2Capability Architecture and associated designs.

(1) Achieving a comprehensive NCS Joint Force Air C2 capability isconstrained by the common practice of expressing operational needsexclusively through the presentation of requirement statements, typicallyfocused on the development of one, or a few, systems. This approachprovides an incomplete depiction in that it does not provide a full,comprehensive presentation of all operational processes, inter-dependencies and information exchanges to be supported at aprogrammatic level. This limits the understanding of operational needs,resulting in a number of adverse consequences, such as the delivery offragmented capabilities, increased acquisition costs, schedule over-runs,and over-reliance on burdensome proprietary solutions.

(2) Since January 2018, the NATO Architecture Framework (NAF)version 4 175 defines the NATO standard for developing and describingarchitectures. While the guidance for, and the recognized value of,architectures exists, the development of comprehensive NATO Air C2

175 NATO Architecture Framework 4 (Reference 55)



Capability Architectures and associated designs have never been accomplished.

(3) NCS Joint Force Air C2 Target Capability Architecture designs that enable the comprehensive representation of all processes, inter-dependencies and information exchanges to ensure key stakeholders have a holistic understanding of Air C2 operational needs and support:

(a) Viewing Air C2 Capability holistically across existing programme boundaries.

(b) Improving accuracy, quality, timeliness, cost, and risk management.

(c) Harmonization of current Capability Packages (CPs) and any future Capability Programme Plans (CPPs).

c. Air C2 Service Capabilities. Develop Minimum Level of Air Command and Control (C2) Service Capabilities in Support of NATO Joint Air Power Operations.

(1) The MC 0593176 "Minimum Level of Command and Control (C2) Service Capabilities in Support of Combined Joint NATO Led Operations" is a framework document for combined joint C2 in NATO-led operations at strategic and operational levels. It develops the C2 Services and related interoperability requirements, and presents the corresponding high-level C2/Communication and Information System (CIS) organizational principles. Service specific MC documents cover the tactical level, such as MC 0640,177 "Minimum Level of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Capabilities at Land Tactical Level", and MC 0195,178 "NATO Minimum Interoperability Fitting Standards for CIS Equipment On-board Maritime Platforms". The Air domain, however, has not yet developed similar tactical level guidance.

(2) A comprehensive and coherent MC document that defines the tactical level C2 Services and related interoperability requirements, and CIS organizational principles in the Air domain.

176 MC 0593 - Minimum Level of C2 Service Capabilities in Support of Combined Joint NATO-Led Operations (Reference 52) 177 MC 0640 - Minimum Level of CIS Capabilities at Land Tactical Level (Reference 53) 178 MC 0195 - NATO Minimum Interoperability Fitting Standards for CIS Equipment Onboard Maritime Platforms (Reference 60)



PART VI - CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSION

Speed is Critical

212. There are several ongoing strands of work (e.g. standards, doctrine development, defence planning, or defence investment) related to the identification and correction of JAPS interoperability challenges. However, progress is not keeping pace with the rapidly changing security environment and developing technology.

213. To adapt more rapidly, the Alliance must pursue and adopt innovative approaches to capability planning and development, including the adoption of emerging disruptive technologies and business practices. Speeding up operational decision-making in a crisis is critical, especially when considering hybrid warfare scenarios that are designed to be ambiguous, complicate attribution and delay decisions. In fact, there are significant ongoing efforts in the Alliance aimed at improving and accelerating operational decision making. It is perhaps just as important, however, to speed up the NATO processes that drive strategy, policy and the use of resources.

214. The scale and scope of today’s challenges put significant stress on the Alliance, specifically with regards to its ability to navigate around contemporary political obstacles and the maintenance of the military posture under constrained defence budgets. To remain relevant, the Alliance must urgently adapt to contend with the dramatic changes in the security environment and exploit the opportunities of new technologies.

Lack of Information Sharing Impedes Operational Effectiveness

215. At times, high-level policies, such as information sharing restrictions and national caveats, limit interoperability solutions and reduce operational effectiveness across the domains.

216. To fully implement the JAPS and gain full benefit from legacy and new capabilities commanders, planners and operators must be provided with a comprehensive understanding of platform/system capabilities and limitations. A continued policy of limiting knowledge sharing from the Nations owning new capabilities will prevent full exploitation of capabilities.

217. Command and staff subject matter expertise must be considered a key deliverable within any new capability's design, development and procurement cycle to ensure proper use of the available assets to their fullest potential.



Relearning Lessons

218. Many of the identified possible interoperability considerations and challenges in this study were previously noted in comprehensive studies, including the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on JAP Capabilities 179 and the 2016 Urgent Priorities for JAP Following the Warsaw Summit.180

219. Rather than more studies, NATO and Nations need to take action in the implementation of outstanding recommendations and to be proactive in providing relevant support infrastructure to fully exploit new capabilities. To fully implement the JAPS, NATO needs a holistic and coordinated approach with speed and agility to rapidly identify and correct interoperability concerns. It would be beneficial to put a greater reliance on Lessons Learned and Lessons Identified (LL/LI).

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for NATO to Take Action

220. Execution of the JAPS-IS Roadmap. The Roadmap will provide a holistic and coordinated approach to correct interoperability concerns with a sense of urgency. It is constructed in a manner that capitalizes on existing and ongoing NATO initiatives to the maximum extent possible and details lines of effort (LOEs) with associated action items.

221. Air Basing Selection Review. The successful execution of JAPS depends on adequate and secure basing. All air platforms have requirements concerning maintenance and support facilities. The introduction of new capabilities inevitably requires changes to NATO air basing facilities and will have significant cost and time impact. Often these changes are not socialised prior to new capabilities entering into service and, therefore constrain/limit deployability and interoperability. This implies the need to enhance facilities planning within a new capabilities design, development and procurement process and greater focus on developing adequate support infrastructure and subject matter expertise. The JAPS-IS should be made available to appropriate authorities conducting the Air Basing Selection (ABS) Review so that findings can be incorporated into this ongoing work:

a. Unique support requirements for new generation platforms like the F-35 JSF that may not comply with STANAG 3430, 181 "Responsibilities for Aircraft Cross-Servicing”, level C (minimum requirements) in terms of aircraft cross-servicing (ACS).

179 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities (Reference 21) 180 Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit - Urgent Priorities (Reference 45) 181 STANAG 3430 - Responsibilities for Aircraft Cross-Servicing (Reference 75)



b. Although the new generation of NATO tankers are not significantly largerthan the current fleet, tanker bed-down spots should be reviewed to ensure theycan fully support newer platforms.

222. Aircraft Cross-Servicing Review.

a. Aircraft Cross-Servicing (ACS) increases flexibility and acts as a forceenabler for NATO air forces. Interoperability issues result from multinationalagreements for training, maintenance and legal issues. ACS procedures differdepending on the arrangement between user nation and industry. Although NATOhas re-invigorated logistics and cross-servicing arrangements, the proceduresshould be codified as soon as possible.

b. Maintenance and sustainability of the logistics supply chain is essential tooptimize multinational operational efficiency and effectiveness in support of JAP.Unknown or non-standard supply chain requirements introduce interoperabilitychallenges for NATO. For example, the JSF’s supply chain has a unique design.Rather than individual air forces or units owning the spare parts for their aircraft,nine international partners and other foreign military sales customers share acommon global pool of JSF parts that are managed by the prime contractor. Thiscan lead to spare parts shortages and limited repair capabilities. Additionally, theglobal network to move JSF parts is immature resulting in long wait times for repair.Without a detailed logistics supply chain, Nations will not be able to optimallysupport the introduction of new generation PSCs like JSF.182

223. NATINAMDS Assessment. NATO should conduct a comprehensiveassessment of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS)and supporting national systems to identify and prioritize shortfalls and makerecommendations for urgent resource allocation to ensure the operational effectivenessof the system.

a. NATINAMDS and its key pillar, Surface-Based Air and Missile Defence(SBAMD), connectivity is impaired by missing horizontal connections betweenSBAMD units and critical national support elements, the up-link connections andlandline dependency and the degraded interoperability with existing CRCs.

b. BMD systems must be robust enough to fully utilize all available sensorsand interceptors and operate fluidly as part of the NATINAMDS. However, thereare shortfalls in interoperability regarding various NATINAMDS components,particularly regarding standards, interfaces, protocols, reliability and validatingprocedures.

182 Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability Considerations (Reference 47)



c. Not all BMD systems are able to assure their own force protection when engaging a threat, requiring external protection. NATO lacks TTPs to reflect this need.

d. Member states can purchase platforms and systems that do not necessarily comply with the NATO standards for technological and operational interoperability, and therefore create a possible inconsistency with NATO’s coordinated collaborative defence. When forces equipped with those platforms and systems are assigned to the NATO Force Structure, it is the responsibility of the respective Nation to make sure its IAMD forces have the technical and operational ability to interoperate as part of NATINAMDS. Multinational procurement of new BMD assets can prevent interoperability gaps.

Recommendations for NATO to Consider

224. Collaboration with European Air Group Combined Air Interoperability Programme. The Combined Air Interoperability Programme (CAIP) is a multinational collaborative effort by the European Air Group (EAG), focused directly on interoperability issues regarding 4th and 5th generation fighters. Although participation in the EAG does not include all NATO nations, the interoperability challenges identified by the CAIP are analogous to those the Alliance faces. NATO should consider increasing its collaborative relationship with the CAIP to mitigate knowledge gaps and harmonize the defence capability planning and development activities.

225. NATO-EU Interoperability Standards Roadmap. NATO lacks a joint roadmap with the European Union on interoperability standards, along with a robust venue for Nations and Industries to test and evaluate compliance. Such a NATO-EU Roadmap would strengthen the trust between NATO Nations and the EU Member States and increase overall interoperability, especially at the strategic level and between Industries.

226. NATO Leadership Development Programme. The success of JAP relies upon the ability to make and implement better informed and more accurate decisions at a rate faster than the adversary. The introduction of new PSCs can enhance that decision-making process, or could be detrimental if not properly integrated and controlled. Understanding the impact of new generation systems directly influences the ability of leaders to plan, manage, inform and execute operations and share information at all levels of command. NATO should develop a robust, realistic and deliberate leadership development programme that leverages joint experimentation, training and exercises, to improve decision-making at every level.

227. NATO JAP Procurement Strategy. NATO JAP needs a more streamlined procurement strategy. The Alliance lacks a common procurement strategy capable of handling the rapidly evolving JAP technologies and operational environments. Such a strategy would harmonize NATO procurement agencies (NCIA and NSPA), EU agencies and national ministries of defence, in order to facilitate interoperability of platforms and



systems and multinational procurement. It would also, reinforce existing NCIA procurement for NATO ACCS to improve standardization for multinational BMD procurement. The expense of new generation platforms or systems is cost-prohibitive for some nations. Consequently, it is expected that the advent of new generation technology in many nations inventory will replace, not add to, the existing generation systems, in many cases in smaller numbers than exist today. Perhaps some nations would be better served to provide a better contribution to the Alliance continuing to field current generation systems. NATO has provided little guidance how nations can contribute to the future air battle.

228. NATO Air Warfare Centre. NATO lacks a dedicated Air Warfare Centre (AWC) that can connect with National Air Warfare Centres to support: [1] sharing of knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and operational requirements of new generation platforms; [2] development of agreed CONOPS and TTPs between nations; [3] validation of operational use new generation systems in exercises. Current arrangements in JWC, JFTC and Headquarters AIRCOM may help to develop and build such an organization. What is also lacking are provisions and procedures for Nations and industry to cooperate through an Air Warfare Centre Network (AWCN). This network could be used to exchange information between NATO, nations and industry, and provide a conduit for the improvement of doctrines, TTPs, technical interoperability and performance.

229. NATO Live/Virtual (LV) Mission Training through Distributed Simulation. NATO lacks JAP-oriented Live/Virtual (LV) Mission Training through Distributed Simulation (MTDS) capability to support simulated and live training. The synthetic environment can be as effective as live training, while reducing risk and cost. In addition, it can contribute to the de-scoping of complex live exercises, especially networked sensor to shooter events and/or the coordinated employment of multi-generational assets in any JAP Core Role. However, live platforms have no specific common interfaces dedicated to receive simulation data, and there are security issues related to connection of live platforms to a simulation network.

230. NATO MTDS LV Backbone. NATO lacks a multinational persistent MTDS backbone to allow LV rehearsal and exercises to run on demand in a plug & play environment. Rehearsals and exercises based on LV technologies are key enablers to allow sufficient training of NATO troops in an era of tight defence budgets.

231. NATO Integrated Battle Lab. NATO lacks a JAP-oriented System Engineering and Integration (SE&I) Testbed as central node of a network of testbeds or battle labs to increase interoperability and maximize joint participation, as well as to improve national and multi-national abilities to address new sensors and data sharing capabilities. NCIA's Integrated Testbed (ITB) is more general in design and misses the focus on a specific domain. All JAP systems should be validated using a common testbed to ensure they are interoperable. Therefore, it is necessary to define a common and shared reference system for System Engineering and Integration efforts within NATO.



a. To enable flexible data links for sensors (self-declaration of services anddata) between JISR, C2 and Effects systems.

b. To consider use of adaptive multi-sensor data fusion between sensor nodesor C2 for collaborative surveillance.

c. To define, test and propose for standardization interoperable COTS andequipment, in particular for communications, DACAS, etc.

d. To define, test and propose for standardization data link for targetinghandover between CAOC, CRC and SBAMD units.

e. To improve the use of national exercises for joint multinational IAMD trainingin order to complement and improve interoperability in various NATINAMDScomponents, particularly regarding standards, interfaces, protocols, reliability andvalidating procedures.

f. To develop, test and experiment on self-protection capabilities of platforms(for instance, for BMD, AFSC, or AAR) in relation to other programs such as NATOIAMD, ACCS and AFSC, exploiting opportunities in NATO and national exercises.

g. To develop and propose standardized processes and tools for tactical,dynamic information sharing supporting Processed/Exploited/Disseminated(PED).

h. To open a JAP-oriented SE&I Testbed to test effective communications withcurrent European bodies and systems such as EATC, ETAC, MCCE, EPACS,MEAT application and others.

i. To validate interoperability compliance between all C2 systems (FMN,ACCS, AirC2IS and national JFACs).

Recommendations for Nations to Take Action

232. National Caveats Review. National caveats regarding information sharing ofessential knowledge about features, TTPs and capability of new and future generationplatforms continue to prevent the building of a multinational force that is fully interoperableon Day-Zero. Furthermore, NATO lacks a common understanding of the impact of newgeneration capabilities on factors including rules of engagement, target engagementauthorities and collateral damage estimates, impeding optimal planning and executionprocesses.

233. National Information Sharing Constraints. A principle interoperability challengeis the lack of proper knowledge of the capabilities, limitations and operationalrequirements of new generation platforms, which links directly to information sharingconstraints within new generation programme offices. This knowledge deficit impedes



joint operational planning and execution. For example, the ability of new generation platforms to acquire a wide range of spectral information enables potentially more complete and accurate system displays. New generation platforms may even provide C2 for some small-scale and specific engagements. However, the capability to share this more accurate picture is reduced by information sharing restrictions between old and new generation platforms.

234. National Industry Information Sharing. Some nations are supported by specialized industries for the maintenance of their platforms/systems. The introduction of new generation platforms may increase the participation of industries in the maintenance and sustainment processes. The constraints and limitations imposed by industry on the operation of the platform may not be fully understood by NATO air operations planners. This lack of understanding may induce misunderstanding and interoperability issues.

FINAL THOUGHTS

235. Final Conclusion. NATO interoperability - the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied objectives - is absolutely essential to the effectiveness in and beyond operations. It enables forces, units and/or systems to operate together, communicate with each other, and share common doctrine, procedures, infrastructure and bases. It also reduces duplication of effort, enables pooling of resources and produces synergies among the Nations. In addition to the increasing multi-nationality of the Alliance, technological developments are emerging more rapidly than ever before. With these technological and often disruptive advances will come new challenges to Alliance interoperability that will radically change how ready forces act together. The Alliance must learn and adapt more quickly than ever before. However, ad hoc interoperability workarounds, such as liaison teams or adapted communications systems, tend to dominate the solution space and typically cost additional money, time, or reduced capabilities. We must not continue to see the interoperability of capabilities as an afterthought; we know that it is too late to consider interoperability after a crisis has been identified and the men and women of our Alliance forces have been called upon to fulfil a mission.

236. Final Recommendation: NATO Interoperability Policy and Strategy. NATO requires a deliberate, innovative, and agile approach to identifying and addressing interoperability challenges with speed and urgency. The NATO interoperability policy should be inclusive - applying to every aspect of NATO business. It should leverage emerging technologies and business practices. It should distinguish the various levels of interoperability, including de-confliction, coordination, collaboration and integration. Also, it should establish methods to measure interoperability to support interoperability certification standards. Finally, and most importantly, it should drive a shift in culture to adopt an “interoperability by design” approach and consider interoperability at the very beginning of capability development.


ANNEX A TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 DATED: JAN 2020

A-1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX A - ACRONYMS

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial A3R Automated Air-to-Air Refuelling AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling AAW Anti-Air Warfare ABC Adopt, Buy or Create ABS Air Base Selection ACaT Architecture Capability Team ACC Air Command and Control ACCS Air Command and Control System ACO Allied Command Operations / Airspace Control Order ACS Aircraft Cross-Servicing ACT Allied Command Transformation AD Air Defence AEA Airborne Electronic Attack AEW&C Airborne Early Warning and Control AFSC Alliance Future Surveillance and Control AGS Alliance Ground Surveillance AI Air Interdiction / Artificial Intelligence AIR C2 Air Command and Control AIRCOM Air Command AJP Allied Joint Publication AMD Air and Missile Defence AMDC Air and Missile Defence Committee AOC Air Operations Centre AP Air Policing APCLO Air Power Contribution to Land Operations APCMO Air Power Contribution to Maritime Operations ARSAG Aerial Refuelling Systems Advisory Group ASUW Anti Surface Warfare

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/ACT_(acronym)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/AMD

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/AMDC

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/APCLO

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/APCMO

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/ASUW


A-2NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare AT Air Transport ATP Allied Tactical Publication AWC Air Warfare Centre AWCN Air Warfare Centre Network BACO Baseline and Current Operations BAMS Broadband Area Maritime Surveillance BDA Boom Drogue Adaptor Bi-SC Bi-Strategic Commands BMD Ballistic Missile Defence C2 Command and Control C2IS Command and Control Information System C3 Consultation, Command and Control C4ISR Communication, Computers, Command and Control and ISR CAIP Combined Air Interoperability Programme CAOC Combined Air Operations Centre caps/lims Capabilities and limitations CAS Close Air Support / Calibrated Air Speed CAX Computer Assisted Exercise CC&CS Capability Codes and Statements (NDPP) CCIR Commanders Critical Information Requirement CFI Connected Forces Initiative CH Capability Hierarchy (NDPP) CIS Communications and Information Systems CNAD Conference of National Armaments Directors COE Centre of Excellence • Common Operating Environment COG Centre of Gravity CONEMP Concept of Employment CONOPS Concept of Operations COP Common Operational Picture COTS Commercial of the shelf CP Capability Package CPP Capability Programme Plan CPX Command Post Exercise CRC Control and Reporting Centre CRR Capability Requirements Review CSO Collaboration Support Office (STO)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/CAS

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/CC/CS

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/CCIR

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/CIS

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/CNAD

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/COE_(acronym)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/COG

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/CSO


A-3NATO UNCLASSIFIED

DACAS Digitally Aided Close Air Support DCA Defensive Counter Air / Dual Capable Aircraft DI Defence Investment DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materiel, Personnel, Facilities DPPC(R) Defence Planning and Policy Committee (Reinforced) EAG European Air Group EAMDEX European Missile Defence Exercise EATC European Air Transport Command EID Electronic identification EPACS European Planning and Coordination System ETAC European Tactical Airlift Centre ETEE Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation EU European Union EW Early Warning / Electronic Warfare FAC Forward Air Controller FAC(A) Forward Air Controller - Airborne FFAO Framework for Future Alliance Operations FMN Federated Mission Networking FMV Full Motion Video FOSH Exercise FORMIDABLE SHIELD FSE Future Security Environment HQ Headquarters HVAA High Value Airborne Asset I&W Indicators and Warnings IADS Integrated Air Defence System IAMD Integrated Air and Missile Defence ICT Information and Communication Technologies IMS International Military Staff ISAF International Security Assistance Force ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JAP Joint Air Power JAPCC Joint Air Power Competence Center JAPS Joint Air Power Strategy JAPS-IS JAPS Interoperability Study JFAC Joint Force Air Component JISR Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance JOA Joint Operational Area

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/DI

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/DOTMLPF

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/DPPC(R)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/FFAO_(acronym)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/HVAA

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/I%26W

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/JAPCC

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/JAPS_(acronym)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/JAPS_(acronym)


A-4

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

JPOW Joint Project Optic Windmill JSF Joint Strike Fighter JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller JTF Joint Task Force LL/LI Lessons Learned and Lessons Identified LO Low Observable LOE Line of Effort LV Live / Virtual LVC Live / Virtual / Constructive MADL Multifunction Advanced Data Link MC Military Committee MCCE Movement Coordination Centre Europe MCR Minimum Capability Requirement MCWG MC Working Group MEAT Management European Air Transport MIO Maritime Interdiction Operations MLE Maximum Level of Effort MOE Measure of Effectiveness MOP Measure of Performance MSA Maritime Situational Awareness MTDS Mission Training through Distributed Simulation NAC North Atlantic Council NAFAG NATO Air Force Armaments Group NATINAMDS NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System NCIA NATO Communications and Information Agency NCS NATO Command Structure NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process NHQC3S NATO Headquarters Consultation, Command and Control Staff NIAG NATO Industrial Advisory Group NIIA NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture NMA NATO Military Authority NSO NATO Standardization Office OCA Offensive Counter Air OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer OFP Operational Flight Programme OUP Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR PED Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/NHQC3S_(acronym)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/NIAG_(acronym)

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/NMA

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/NSO

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/OCA

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/PED


A-5

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

PGM Precision Guided Munitions / Precision Guided Missiles PID Positive Identification PSC Platforms, Systems and Capabilities RACI Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed RAP Recognized Air Picture ROE Rules of Engagement RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft RSOM Reporting, Staging and Onward Movement RSOMI Reporting, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SBAMD Surface-Based Air and Missile Defence SC Strategic Command SCM Supply Chain Management SD Smart Defence SE&I System Engineering and Integration SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defences SFA Strategic Foresight Analysis SG Study Group (NIAG) SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (ACO) SME Subject Matter Expert SPC Senior Policy Committee SRA Suitability and Risk Assessment STANAG NATO Standardization Agreement STO Science & Technology Organization StratCom Strategic Communications TCPED Tactical Collection, Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination TDL Tactical Data Link TOLY Exercise TOBRUK LEGACY TST Time Sensitive Targeting TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures UAS Unmanned Air System UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/PGM

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/RPA

https://tide.act.nato.int/tidepedia/index.php/SFA_(acronym)


ANNEX B TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 DATED: JAN 2020

B-1NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX B – TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Absolute height The height of an aircraft directly above the surface or terrain over which it is flying. (NATOTerm)

Agility Ability to move quickly and easily. (Oxford Dictionary) The ability to effectively respond to dynamic and complex operational challenges as well as seize opportunities with appropriate and timely actions. (Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018 Report)

Air Interdiction Air operations conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, degrade or destroy an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively and at such distance that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and manoeuvre of friendly forces is not required. (NATOTerm)

Air Mobility A capability of airmobile forces which permits them to move by air while retaining the ability to engage in ground combat. (AAP-06 Edition 2018)

Air Power The ability to use air capabilities to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Air Superiority That degree of dominance in the air battle of one force over another which permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, sea and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Air Supremacy That degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Airspeed The speed of an aircraft relative to the air through which it is moving. (Oxford Dictionary)

Area of Operations (AOO)


B-2

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

An area defined by the joint force commander within a joint operations area for the conduct of specific military activities. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Army Organic Air Defence Air defence units that are organic of land units. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space

Operations)

Artificial Intelligence (AI) Capability of a non-biological system to achieve any complex goal by using processes

comparable to human cognitive processes such as perception, deduction, recognition, memorization and learning. (NIAG SG231)

Automated Operation Pre-programmed operation that does not require human intervention for normal operation.

(NIAG SG205)

Autonomous Capability The ability of an intelligent system to independently compose and select among different

courses of action to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation. The Autonomous Capability (associated with a specific platform, or distributed between a platform and other parts of the system), may be achieved using a variety of behaviors (functions), which may include reasoning and problem solving, adaption to unexpected situations, self-direction, and learning. (Naval Postgraduate School, March 11, 2016)

Autonomous Operation One mode of operation of a unit in which the unit commander assumes full responsibility for

control of weapons and engagement of hostile targets. This mode may be either directed by higher authority or result from a loss of all means of communication.

Autonomous Weapon System (AWS) A System with Autonomous Functions (SAF) used in combat that, once activated, can select

and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. (NIAG SG231)

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Defence of NATO European territory against ballistic missiles. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine

for Air and Space Operations)

Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) The assessment of effects resulting from the application of military action, either lethal or non-

lethal, against a military objective. (NATOTerm)

Battlespace The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to apply combat power,

protect a force or complete a mission successfully. Note: It includes the land, maritime, air and space environments; the enemy and friendly forces present therein; facilities; terrestrial


B-3

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

and space weather; health hazards; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment in the joint operations area and other areas of interest. (NATOTerm)

Calibrated airspeed Indicated airspeed corrected for instrument and installation errors. (NATOTerm)

Campaign A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a

given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Centre of Gravity (COG) Characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or

other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Close Air Support (CAS) Air action against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which

require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. (NATOTerm)

Collective Training Procedural drills and the practical application of doctrine, plans, and procedures to acquire

and maintain tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities. (Bi-SC Directive 75-3)

Combat Cloud Overarching meshed network for data distribution and information sharing within a

battlespace, where each authorized user, platform, or node transparently contributes and receives essential information and is able to utilize it across the full range of military operations. (USAF)

Combined Multinational. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations) Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more

than one nation participate (NATOTerm)

Communication and Information Systems (CIS) Collective term for communication systems and information systems. (NATOTerm)

Component Command In the NATO military command structure, a third-level command organization with specific air,

maritime or land capabilities that is responsible for operational planning and conduct of subordinate operations as directed by the NATO commander. (NATOTerm)

A functional component command or service component command responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air, special or other operation as part of a joint force. (NATOTerm)


B-4

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Component Commander (CC) A single-service or functional component commander at the third level of the NATO military

command structure. (NATOI) A designated commander responsible for the planning and conduct of a maritime, land, air,

special or other operation as part of a joint force. (NATOI)

Concentration A close gathering of people or things. (Oxford Dictionary)

Concept of Operations (CONOPS) A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to

accomplish his given mission. (NATOTerm)

Constructive Simulation Constructive simulation involves simulated people in a simulated environment; all entities and

activities are simulated. (NIAG SG215)

Control The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate

organizations, or other organizations not normally under his command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. (NATOTerm)

Course of Action (COA) In the estimate process, an option that will accomplish or contribute to the accomplishment of

a mission or task, and from which a detailed plan is developed. (NATOTerm)

Cybersecurity Preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information in the Cyberspace.

(ISO/IEC 27032:2013)

Data Link Continuity Probability that an operational communication transaction or position report delivery can be

completed within the communication transaction time. (NIAG SG222)

Data Link Integrity Assurance of the accuracy and consistency of data over its entire life-cycle. (NIAG SG222)

Defensive Counter Air (DCA) Active and passive defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or

make ineffective forces attempting to attack or to penetrate friendly airspace. (AAP-06 Edition 2018)

Deliberate Targeting It is the normal process running the standard ATO production cycle (36 hours) to hit TGTs

fully analyzed by the related TGT Folders during the Joint Targeting Board activity and therefore included in the JPTL. (NIAG SG240)


B-5

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Digitally Aided Close Air Support (DACAS) Would add to Close Air Support (CAS) the machine-to-machine exchange of required CAS

mission data (e.g., aircraft check-in, CAS brief, BDA) between JTAC and CAS platform (or C2 node) for the purpose of attacking a surface target. (U.S. Joint Publication 3.09.3)

Doctrine Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives.

It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. (NATOTerm)

Dynamic Targeting Process similar to the Deliberate Targeting with the only difference that the reason why the

strike is considered so urgent to be incompatible to be included in the regular ATO Production Cycle and so it is normally managed directly by the Current Operation Division (COD) of the Air Operation Centre (AOC) reporting to the JFACC. (NIAG SG240)

End State The political-strategic statement of conditions that defines an acceptable concluding situation

to be attained at the end of a strategic engagement (NATOTerm)

Force Protection (FP) All measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and

operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force. (NATOTerm)

Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) Equipment, special tooling, or special test equipment that is provided to a contractor for use

on a Government contract. (U.S. Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 45)

Ground speed The horizontal component of the speed of an aircraft relative to the earth's surface.

(NATOTerm)

Height The vertical distance of a level, a point, or an object considered as a point, measured from a

specified datum. (NATOTerm)

Host Nation (HN) A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations

operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes. (NATOTerm)

Information Operations A staff function to analyse, plan, assess and integrate information activities to create desired

effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and North Atlantic Council approved audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)


B-6

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Intelligence The product resulting from the directed collection and processing of information regarding the

environment and the capabilities and intentions of actors, in order to identify threats and offer opportunities for exploitation by decision-makers. (NATOTerm)

Interoperability The ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve Allied tactical,

operational and strategic objectives. (NATOTerm)

Joint Adjective used to describe activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least

two services participate. (NATOTerm)

Joint Air Power (JAP) The ability to coordinate, control, and exploit the air domain in the pursuit of Alliance objectives

(NATOTerm)

Joint Fires Fires applied during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated

action toward a common objective. (NATOTerm) Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated

action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (U.S. Joint Publication 3-0 Joint Operations)

Joint Force Commander (JFC) A general term applied to a commander authorized to exercise command authority or

operational control over a joint force. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Joint Operations Military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified

command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 3-0 Joint Operations)

Live Simulation A simulation involving real people operating real systems, such as a soldier on a field training

mission or air combat training where real aircraft are operating in the real world against real advisories (NIAG SG240)

Live Training "Live" training can refer to an individual operating a system within the exercise scenario. The

second meaning of "live" can refer to live effects on live systems within the exercise scenario. (NIAG SG240)


B-7

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Man Machine Teaming (MMT) Cooperation between Humans and Machines which adapt its activities according to their

special abilities in such a way that they collectively perform a designated task in the best possible way. (NIAG SG231)

Mission A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (NATOTerm) One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one particular task. (NATOTerm)

Mission Training through Distributed Simulation (MTDS) A shared environment that includes a blending of Live, Virtual, and Constructive simulations

within a common synthetic environment that will allow war fighters to train individually or collectively at all levels of war. (NIAG SG215)

Multi-Level Security (MLS) In a Multi-Level Security (MLS) architecture, all information is stored in a trusted system that

is trusted to contain sensitive data of various security levels. The trusted system can release data to each external system (or user) based on “need-to-know”. The release mechanism, often referred to as Trusted Guard, may be based on the classification and information content. (NIAG SG215)

Multinational Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organizations, in which elements of more

than one nation participate. (NATOTerm)

Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) An operation mounted to destroy, disrupt or limit enemy air power as close to its source as

possible. (NATOTerm)

Operation A sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose. Notes: 1. NATO operations are

military. 2. NATO operations contribute to a wider approach including non-military actions. (NATOTerm)

Operation Plan (OPLAN) A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in

succession. It is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation `plan’ is usually used instead of ‘order’ in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order. (NATOTerm)

Operational Command The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate

commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as the commander deems necessary. Note it does not include responsibility for administration. (NATOTerm)


B-8

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Operational Control The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander

may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (NATOTerm)

Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination (PED) Processing, Exploitation, Dissemination (PED) is a process that supports intelligence

operations by converting and refining collected information for reporting to commanders, decision-makers, intelligence analysts, and other consumers through a collection of related functions. (U.S. Army Intelligence COE. PED Requirements Supporting U.S. Army, version 4.0)

Reach The extent or range of something's application, effect, or influence. (Oxford Dictionary)

Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) A Remotely Piloted Aircraft, its associated remote pilot station(s), the required command and

control links and any other components as specified in the type design. (NATOTerm)

Resilience The ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the presence of

faults or errors. (NATOTerm) Having sufficient capability, capacity, and will to endure adversity over time, retain the ability

to respond, and to recover quickly from strategic shocks or operational setbacks. (Framework for Future Alliance Operations 2018 Report)

Rules of Engagement (ROE) Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and

limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. (NATOTerm)

Speed The rate at which someone or something moves or operates or is able to move or operate.

(Oxford Dictionary)

Supported Commander A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher

NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (NATOTerm)

Supporting Commander A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who

develops a supporting plan. (NATOTerm)


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Surface Based Air Defence (SBAD) Air Defence units that are organic of JFAC. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space

Operations)

Swarm of Autonomous Systems Deliberately structured and coordinated way to carry out various defensive or offensive

autonomous missions in all domains/directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire in which multiple robotic platforms can cooperate with each other and with humans in the performance of military missions. (Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy, June 2017)

System with Autonomous Functions (SAF) System with variety of behaviors (functions) allowing it to operate independently in a proper

or particular way which may include reasoning and problem solving, adaptation to unexpected situation, self-direction, and learning. (NIAG SG231)

Tactical Command (TACOM) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the

accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (NATOTerm)

Tactical Control (TACON) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. (NATOTerm)

Targeting The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to

them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. (NATOTerm) Joint targeting determines desired effects necessary to accomplish operational objectives;

selects targets that achieve those effects; and selects or task the means, lethal or non-lethal, with which to take action upon those targets. (AJP-3(A) Allied Doctrine for Joint Operations)

Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) Protection of deployed forces and assets from ballistic missile attacks. (AJP-3.3 Allied Joint

Doctrine for Air and Space Operations)

Ubiquity The fact of appearing everywhere or of being very common. (Oxford Dictionary) The combination of height, speed and reach of air power, and its increasing persistence,

enabled by air-to-air refuelling and high endurance unmanned aircraft, offer the theoretical potential to be everywhere, hence the attribute of ubiquity. This enables aircraft to pose or counter threats simultaneously and across a far wider area than surface capabilities, offering the ability to deliver overwhelming force whenever and wherever it is required. (Joint Doctrine Publication 0-30 UK Air and Space Power Doctrine)

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to

provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or


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NATO UNCLASSIFIED

recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. (NATOTerm)

Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) A system whose components include the unmanned aircraft, the supporting network and all

equipment and personnel necessary to control the unmanned aircraft. (NATOTerm)

Virtual Simulation A simulation involving human operators controlling simulated systems. (NATOTerm)


ANNEX C TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 DATED: JAN 2020

C-1

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ANNEX C – JAP RELATED ALLIED PUBLICATIONS

The tables in this annex to the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study Report summarize the Allied Joint Publications (AJPs) and Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs) that promote a NATO standardization of Joint Air Power related doctrine.

ALLIED JOINT PUBLICATIONS

Information drawn from the NATO Standardisation Office (NSO) portal on 20 August 2019.

Short Title Long Title Promulgated

STANAG 2437 Ed: 8 Allied Joint Doctrine 28 FEB 2017

AJP 01 Ed. E Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine 28 FEB 2017

STANAG 7107 Ed: 3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 11 JUL 2016

AJP 2.7 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 11 JUL 2016

STANAG 2490 Ed: 4 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 11 FEB 2019

AJP 3 Ed. C Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations 11 FEB 2019

STANAG 3700 Ed: 8 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations 08 APR 2016

AJP 3.3 Ed. B Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations 08 APR 2016


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STANAG 3880 Ed: 6 Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Air Operation 09 JUL 2010

AJP 3.3.1 Ed. (B) Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter Air Operations 09 JUL 2010

STANAG 3736 Ed: 11 Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction 11 SEP 2009

AJP 3.3.2 Ed. A Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction 11 SEP 2009

STANAG 3703 Ed: 9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air Maritime Coordination 02 DEC 2014

AJP 3.3.3 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Air Maritime Coordination 02 DEC 2014

STANAG 3805 Ed: 9 Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control 08 MAY 2013

AJP 3.3.5 Ed. B Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control 08 MAY 2013

STANAG 6018 Ed: 3 Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare 05 JUL 2012

AJP 3.6 Ed. B Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare Doctrine 05 JUL 2012

STANAG 6511 Ed: 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel in a Hostile Environment 23 FEB 2016

AJP 3.7 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Recovery of Personnel In A Hostile Environment 23 FEB 2016

STANAG 2524 Ed: 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting 08 APR 2016

AJP 3.9 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting 08 APR 2016

STANAG 2526 Ed: 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations 11 FEB 2019

AJP 5 Ed. A Ver. 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Planning of Operations 24 MAY 2019

STANAG 2525 Ed: 2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems 28 FEB 2017

AJP 6 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems 28 FEB 2017


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ALLIED TACTICAL PUBLICATIONS

Information drawn from the NATO Standardisation Office (NSO) portal on 20 August 2019.


STANAG 1242 Ed: 19 Naval Mine Warfare Principles 05 JUN 2019

ATP 06 I Ed. D Ver. 3 Naval Mine Warfare Principles 01 OCT 2015

STANAG 1243 Ed: 20 Naval Mine Countermeasures Operations Planning and Evaluation 05 JUN 2019

ATP 06 II Ed. D Ver. 3 Naval Mine Countermeasures Operations, Planning and Evaluation 01 OCT 2015

STANAG 1132 Ed: 23 Naval Mine Countermeasures Tactics and Execution 26 SEP 2016

ATP 24 I Ed. D Ver. 1 Naval Mine Countermeasures Tactics and Execution 26 SEP 2017

ATP 3.2.2 Ed. B Ver. 1 Command and Control of Allied Forces 15 DEC 2016

STANAG 7144 Ed: 5 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction 10 APR 2019

ATP 3.3.2.1 Ed. D Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction 10 APR 2019

STANAG 3797 Ed: 7 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Programme 08 SEP 2016

ATP 3.3.2.2 Ed. B Ver. 2 Joint Terminal Attack Controller Programme 10 JAN 2018

STANAG 7185 Ed: 1 Air Maritime Coordination Procedures (AMCP) 03 AUG 2005

ATP 3.3.3.1 Air Maritime Coordination Procedures (AMCP) 01 MAR 2005

STANAG 7207 Ed: 1 Air Transport (AT) and Air To Air Refuelling (AAR) Doctrine 22 APR 2013

ATP 3.3.4 I Ed. A Ver. 2 Air Transport (AT) Doctrine 12 APR 2018

ATP 3.3.4 II Ed. A Ver. 2 Air To Air Refuelling (AAR) Doctrine 03 APR 2019

STANAG 7213 Ed: 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Movements 11 JAN 2018


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ATP 3.3.4.1 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Movements 11 JAN 2018

STANAG 3971 Ed: 8 Air To Air Refuelling 17 JAN 2019

ATP 3.3.4.2 Ed. D Ver. 1 Air To Air Refuelling 26 APR 2019

ATP 3.3.4.2.1 Ed. A Ver. 1 A Guide to Obtaining Air to Air Refuelling Clearances and Compatibility Assessments

18 JUL 2019

ATP 3.3.4.2.2 Ed. A Ver. 1 Recommended Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) Aircrew Certification and Currency 18 JUL 2019

ATP 3.3.4.2.3 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tanker Capabilities 18 JUL 2019

ATP 3.3.4.2.4 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tanker/Receiver Clearance Technical Compatibility Matrix 18 JUL 2019

STANAG 3998 Ed: 5 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Transport Operations 26 OCT 2017

ATP 3.3.4.3 Ed. B Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Air Transport Operations 26 OCT 2017

STANAG 7214 Ed: 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Airborne Operations 12 FEB 2018

ATP 3.3.4.4 Ed. A Ver. 1 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for NATO Airborne Operations 12 FEB 2018

STANAG 7191 Ed: 1 Air to Air (Aerial) Refuelling Equipment: Boom Receptacle System and Interface Requirements

03 JUN 2013

ATP 3.3.4.5 Ed. A Ver. 1 Air to Air Refuelling Equipment: Boom Receptacle System and Interface Requirements

03 JUN 2013

STANAG 3447 Ed: 5 Air to Air (Aerial) Refuelling Equipment: Probe Drogue Interface Characteristics 28 JUN 2016

ATP 3.3.4.6 Ed. A Ver. 1 Air to Air (Aerial) Refuelling Equipment: Probe Drogue Interface Characteristics 28 JUN 2016

STANAG 7215 Ed: 1 Air to Air Refuelling Signal Lights in Hose and Drogue Systems 27 MAR 2013

ATP 3.3.4.7 Ed. A Ver. 1 Air to Air Refuelling Signal Lights in Hose and Drogue Systems 27 MAR 2013


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STANAG 7189 Ed: 2 Joint Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 27 APR 2016

ATP 3.3.5.1 Ed. A Ver. 1 Joint Airspace Control Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 27 APR 2016

STANAG 1183 Ed: 6 NATO Qualifications for Fixed Wing Above Water Warfare/Aerospace Surveillance and Control System (AWW/ASACS) Aircraft Controllers

09 MAY 2017

ATP 3.3.5.2 Ed. A Ver. 1 NATO Qualifications for Fixed Wing Above Water Warfare/Aerospace Surveillance and Control System (AWW/ASACS) Aircraft Controllers

09 MAY 2017

STANAG 7217 Ed: 1 force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations 08 APR 2016

ATP 3.3.6 Ed. A Ver. 1 force Protection Doctrine for Air Operations 08 APR 2016

STANAG 4670 Ed: 5 Minimum Training Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operators and Pilots

08 MAY 2019

ATP 3.3.8.1 Ed. B Ver. 1 Minimum Training Requirements for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Operators and Pilots

08 MAY 2019

STANAG 3873 Ed: 6 Electronic Warfare in Air Operations 14 AUG 2015

ATP 3.6.3 Ed. A Ver. 1 Electronic Warfare in Air Operations 14 AUG 2015

STANAG 6519 Ed: 1 NATO Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Doctrine 13 JUL 2017

ATP 3.6.4 Ed. A Ver. 1 NATO Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) Doctrine 13 JUL 2017

STANAG 1167 Ed: 21 NATO Above Water Warfare Manual 12 OCT 2018

ATP 31 Ed. E Ver. 1 NATO Above Water Warfare Manual 12 OCT 2018

STANAG 3920 Ed: 4 Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and Reporting 23 JUL 2004

ATP 47 Ed. (A) Ver. 1 Handbook for Air Reconnaissance Tasking and Reporting 01 FEB 2000

STANAG 2999 Ed: 10 Use of Helicopters in Land Operations Doctrine 03 MAR 2016


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NATO UNCLASSIFIED


ATP 49 Ed. G Ver. 1 Use of Helicopters in Land Operations Doctrine 03 MAR 2016

STANAG 7030 Ed: 3 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 20 NOV 2000

ATP 62 Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 01 FEB 2000

STANAG 1455 Ed: 6 Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations 20 SEP 2013

ATP 71 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Maritime Interdiction Operations 20 SEP 2013

STANAG 1154 Ed: 12 NATO Qualifications for Helicopter Controllers at Sea 21 NOV 2013

ATP 78 Ed. A Ver. 2 NATO Qualifications for Helicopter Controllers at Sea 20 MAY 2016

STANAG 2618 Ed: 1 Allied Doctrine for Ground Based Air Defence 31 JAN 2018

ATP 82 Ed. A Ver. 1 Allied Doctrine for Ground Based Air Defence 31 JAN 2018


ANNEX D TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 DATED: JAN 2020

D-1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX D - JAP RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NDPP

The tables in this annex to the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study Report summarize the recommendations from the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities 183. The first table arranges the capability recommendations by the seven areas of the Capability Hierarchy (CH). The second table is listed against the DOTMLPFI capability areas as recommendations that influence readiness and responsiveness. Each recommendation is linked to the corresponding paragraph in the 2015 report.

The portion of the tables on the left represent all the recommendations that were derived from the 2015 Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities. The portion on the right represent a notification whether these recommendations were covered in certain CH areas yet or need to be considered in the Minimum Capability Requirement (MCR) 2020.

JAP RECOMMENDATIONS AGAINST THE CAPABILITY HIERARCHY

Capability Hierarchy

Area 2015 Bi-SC Recommendation Paragraph

MC

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Prepare Review, develop and update doctrine and TTPs to include: 6.5.1.2.1 NO X

Prepare Near-term development of a NATO JAP Strategy, ensuring effective and efficient JAP operations. 6.5.1.2.1.1 NO X

183 5000/TSC FEF 0040/TT-151465/Ser:NU0069, Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities, 7 December 2015


D-2

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MC

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Prepare Development or clarification of NATO Space and Cyber policy to support joint operations. 6.5.1.2.1.2 NO X

Prepare

Through effective and realistic education, training, exercises, and evaluation programmes, ensure an adequate number of personnel are trained and proficient in JAP TTPs and on the systems used in conducting operations.

6.5.1.2.2 YES

Prepare Conduct live exercises that provide training environments and experiences that more closely resemble potential operational situations.

6.5.1.2.2.1 YES

Prepare

Conduct realistic operational simulation, leveraging new modelling and simulation technologies, based on up to date operational scenarios, when live exercises cannot properly emulate the required environment.

6.5.1.2.2.2 YES

Prepare Research, develop, and acquire innovative and leading-edge equipment in sufficient supply to enable the effective and timely conduct and sustainment of joint air operations.

6.5.1.2.2.3 YES

Prepare

Ensure sufficient equipment (e.g. weaponry and armour) and supplies (e.g. fuel and consumables) are immediately available to allow timely deployment of forces to various environments, ensuring efficient and effective JAP operations.

6.5.1.2.2.3.1 YES

Prepare Ensure sufficient supplies (e.g. precision munitions) are available to sustain forces deployed to various environments while regular and recurring sustainment is established.

6.5.1.2.2.3.2 YES


D-3NATO UNCLASSIFIED



MC

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Prepare Ensure sufficient capacity to operate in contested electronic warfare (EW) environments is established or developed. 6.5.1.2.2.3.3 NO X X X X X

Prepare Review standardisation with respect to sustainment and establish, improve or update requirements to enable better interoperability and integration of Alliance JAP.

6.5.1.2.2.3.4 YES

Prepare

Review, upgrade or develop new information sharing systems that take advantage of future technologies to improve assurance and better enable C2 while enhancing decision making processes in the future.

6.5.1.2.2.3.5 YES

Project Rapidly establish forward operating locations that may necessitate differing capabilities and differing levels of support.

6.5.2.2.1 NO X X

Project

Rapidly evaluate forward operating locations, that could be described as austere or not austere, nearby or far away, in permissive or non-permissive environments, to determine which combinations of capabilities will be best suited for achieving desired effects from those locations.

6.5.2.2.1.1 NO X X X X X

Project Deploy or redeploy, within required timelines, JAP and required support capabilities to a forward operating location. 6.5.2.2.1.2 NO X X

Project

Conduct missions at extended ranges, from main operating bases that may or may not be close in proximity to the area of operations, through the employment of air-to-air refuelling or other capabilities that provide improved endurance.

6.5.2.2.2 NO X


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MC

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Project Operate across all threat environments, integrating with land and maritime forces, to succeed in all operational scenarios to include hostile A2AD.

6.5.2.2.3 NO X

Project

Bring persistent ISR capabilities into the area of responsibility in support of air, land, or maritime forces in advance of operations to prepare the battlespace and improve situational awareness.

6.5.2.2.4 NO X X

Project Support Alliance objectives through control of airspace while delivering suitable command and control needed to achieve the commander’s desired effects.

6.5.2.2.5 NO X

Engage Conduct defensive and offensive joint air operations and operations in support of other instruments of power. 6.5.3.2.1 NO X X

Engage Establish and maintain control of the air in order to set conditions for joint military operations. 6.5.3.2.1.1 NO X X

Engage Conduct timely, precision kinetic or non-kinetic attack operations into conditions up to and including non-permissive.

6.5.3.2.1.2 NO X X

Engage Exert the desired degree of control over the electromagnetic spectrum. 6.5.3.2.1.3 NO X X X

Engage

Provide persistent ISR, distributed command and control, and EW capacity that enables a fully networked, integrated and interoperable force’s ability to operate in a congested, contested and complex environment.

6.5.3.2.1.4 NO X


D-5

NATO UNCLASSIFIED



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Sustain Ensure sufficient personnel, equipment, supplies, and munitions are available to sustain long-term, high-intensity operations.

6.5.4.2.1 YES

Sustain Rapidly implement, operate and maintain both an expeditiously dynamic and steady state supply and combat support capability.

6.5.4.2.2 YES

Sustain Rapidly establish, maintain, and/or repair infrastructure necessary to conduct JAP operations. 6.5.4.2.3 NO X X

C3

Rapidly establish C3 operations, to include properly integrated persistent ISR to provide strategic, operational and tactical awareness and support Alliance decision making.

6.5.5.2.1 NO X

C3 Conduct robust, resilient and scalable C3 of JAP, while enabling supported forces to achieve desired effects. 6.5.5.2.2 NO X

C3 Provide support to IAMD, which will require integrated C3 capabilities supported by surveillance, fused data, and information sharing (with military and/or civil authorities).

6.5.5.2.3 NO X

Protect Integrate air and missile defence to protect territory, populations, and (deployed) forces, against the full spectrum of future air threats.

6.5.6.2.1 NO X X X

Protect Ensure high survivability against the full spectrum of future threats through redundancy, resistance, and resilience. 6.5.6.2.2 NO X

Protect Organically support force protection requirements. 6.5.6.2.3 YES


D-6

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Protect Conduct and provide support to joint personnel recovery operations. 6.5.6.2.4 NO X X

Inform Conduct persistent airborne ISR operations as required to support Alliance decision making. 6.5.7.2.1 NO X

Inform

Conduct robust and resilient processing, exploitation, and distribution of information gained through persistent ISR operations and integrate it into C3, decision making, and strategic awareness for the Alliance.

6.5.7.2.2 YES

JAP RECOMMENDATIONS AGAINST THE DOTMLPFI CAPABILITY AREAS

DOTMLPFI 2015 Bi-SC Recommendation Paragraph

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Doctrine

Improve JAP specific standards and measures of performance/effectiveness for NATO readiness for the Alliance to train, exercise and operate under within the future security environment.

7.4.1.1.1 YES

Doctrine

Current Joint Air Command and Control (Air C2) policy should undergo periodic review across NCS and NFS to ensure that Air C2 keeps pace with changes to the future security environment in order to better enable the effective employment of NATO JAP.

7.4.1.1.2 YES


D-7NATO UNCLASSIFIED


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Organization

Improve JAP’s modular organization and interoperability in order to cover a wide range of contingencies while offering maximum agility providing the ability to rapidly adjust the scale and capability of JAP response in the future security environment.

7.4.2.1.1 YES

Training Develop a robust NATO training plan that improves the realism of and incorporates all levels of leadership in joint experimentation and exercises.

7.4.3.1.1 YES

Training

Continue to develop training and simulations that leverage Alliance connectivity, maximizing the use of simulators, distance learning and existing or new training infrastructure.

7.4.3.1.2 YES

Training Develop NATO training that enhances interoperability and maximizes joint participation, both national and multinational.

7.4.3.1.3 YES

Materiel Conduct research in areas of material technology that will enhance survivability of NATO equipment, personnel, facilities, and infrastructure.

7.4.4.1.1 YES

Materiel Conduct research in areas of material technology that enhance NATO sustainability. 7.4.4.1.2 YES

Materiel Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures that facilitate interoperability intra-Alliance movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

7.4.4.1.3 YES

Materiel

Develop logistics policy, plans, and procedures to optimize interoperability by the use of standardized, distributed, and pre-positioned personnel, equipment, and supplies.

7.4.4.1.4 YES


D-8

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Leadership

NATO should invest in Alliance JAP leadership through deliberate leadership building programmes. Specific recommendations regarding leadership as well as command and control of JAP are addressed in the doctrine and training sections (7.4.1 and 7.4.3 respectively).

7.4.5.1.1 YES

Personnel

Review JAP manning processes and develop policies that will support more efficient use of existing manpower, improve interoperability and standardization, and identify future manpower shortages.

7.4.6.1.1 YES

Facilities Review, improve, or standardize existing NATO air facilities in order to handle the full spectrum of air power capabilities.

7.4.7.1.1 YES

Facilities Modernize hardened facilities to enhance operational capability, survivability, sustainability, and resilience. 7.4.7.1.2 YES

Facilities Review existing agreements for utilizing and/or develop new agreements for establishing dual use (civilian and military) facilities/installations and airspace.

7.4.7.1.3 YES

Interoperability Continue to support CFI and SD projects with particular emphasis on JAP interoperability. 7.4.8.1.1 YES

Interoperability Conduct training that focuses on interoperability. 7.4.8.1.2 YES

Interoperability Improve integration and interoperability of all NATO CIS. 7.4.8.1.3 YES

Interoperability Increase focus on interoperability during acquisition processes. 7.4.8.1.4 YES

Interoperability Review, revise, and enforce relevant NATO STANAGS for JAP. 7.4.8.1.5 YES


D-9

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MC

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Interoperability Establish and enforce language proficiency requirements. 7.4.8.1.6 YES

Interoperability Improve cultural awareness along with inter-service and cross-cultural training that will enhance the Alliance’s abilities in multinational efforts.

7.4.8.1.7 YES

Interoperability Develop programmes that maximize the use of interoperable COTS capabilities and equipment. 7.4.8.1.8 YES


ANNEX E TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 DATED: JAN 2020

E-1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX E – ANALYSIS RESULTS

The tables in this annex to the Joint Air Power Strategy Interoperability Study Report reflect the data sets of the identified possible interoperability considerations and challenges for the implementation of the Joint Air Power Strategy, in various stages of analysis. Each phase will change the grouping and order of the data set.

SECTION 1 - ORIGINAL DATA SET

This table lists all the potential interoperability considerations and challenges identified in Part II, providing context for the implementation of the strategy in all four JAP core roles.

Area Id Consideration Doctrine D-01-G Lagging Allied Publications

D-02-G Outdated concepts D-03-G Lagging TTPs D-04-G Restrictive information sharing policies D-05-G Missing a JAP oriented security and protection concept D-06-G Missing a JAP oriented operational and doctrinal framework D-07-G Slow adoption of doctrine and training to changes in operational

environment D-08-C Improved IAMD policy D-09-C Improved AEA and SEAD concepts D-10-A Lack of multi-generational operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs D-11-A Lack of multi-generational Air C2 operational concepts, doctrine and

TTPs D-12-A Impact of new generation aircraft capabilities on National Caveats D-13-A Security protocols restrict exchange of information D-14-A No common procurement strategy D-15-A Need for concepts and procedures for JAP employment in the multi-

domain environment D-16-M AT and AAR Doctrine and TTPs do not reflect multi-role platforms D-17-M Lack of A3R policy D-18-M Lack of future rotorcraft concepts


E-2NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Area Id Consideration D-19-M Lack of UAS, RPA and Autonomous Rotorcraft systems concepts

and procedures D-20-J Incoherent Air C2 and JISR concepts and doctrine D-21-J Lack of concepts and TTPs for new generation Air C2 and JISR D-22-J Lack of tactical, dynamic information sharing supporting PED D-23-J Need for a Future C4ISR Vision

Organization O-01-G Need for more adaptive organizational constructs O-02-G Need to leverage closer relationships with partner countries O-03-G National limitations to collaborative relationships with other

multinational organizations O-04-G National limitations to collaborative relationships with industry O-05-G Need for a dedicated Air Warfare Centre O-06-G Need for JAP oriented information exchange and simulation

standards O-07-G Missing a joint roadmap for NATO and EU on Interoperability

standards O-08-G Need for an Air Warfare Centre Network for NATO and industry

cooperation O-09-C Insufficient Missile Defence connectivity O-10-M Lack of governance regarding AAR issues

Training T-01-G Lack of trained personnel T-02-G Lack of multinational live exercises that train the full-spectrum of

NATO JAP T-03-G Lack of multinational live exercises focused on FSE T-04-G Under-classification of NATO exercises T-05-G Achieving agreed training standards T-06-G Missing training to focus on JAP interoperability T-07-G Missing training to focus on proper language proficiency T-08-G Need for distributed simulation in mission training T-09-G Missing a multinational persistent simulation backbone network T-10-C Need for joint multinational IAMD training at all levels T-11-A Need for new generation Education and Training T-12-A Lack of high-end multi-generational integration training and exercises T-13-A Lack of adequate training infrastructure T-14-M Insufficient integrated AAR training T-15-M No common AAR qualification and currency standards T-16-J Lack of realistic training opportunities for JISR tactical operators T-17-J Lack of NATO and multinational exercises that train JAP contribution

to JISR


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Area Id Consideration Materiel M-01-G Lack of information sharing regarding platform and systems

capabilities and limitations M-02-G Material standards need improvement M-03-G Lack of compliance with standards M-04-G C4ISR capability incompatibility M-05-G C2 communications systems incompatibility with non-NATO bodies M-06-G Lack of NATO programmes that enable and standardize the

interoperable use of COTS technology M-07-G Need for a System Engineering and Integration testbed M-08-G Missing a JAP oriented standard to apply for interoperability design M-09-G Lacking a common approach for supply support M-10-G Lacking a common approach for modernization of legacy PSCs M-11-G Need to streamline procurement strategy M-12-C NATO IAMD system interoperability shortfalls M-13-C Lack of standardization for multinational SBAMD procurement M-14-C Lack of BMD self-protection M-15-A C2 systems non-compliance M-16-A Lack of datalink interoperability M-17-A Potential targeting difficulties M-18-A Undefined bandwidth and connectivity requirements M-19-A Non-standard maintenance requirements M-20-A Digitally Aided Close Air Support interoperability issues M-21-A Lack of air-launched weapon systems interoperability M-22-M AAR systems standardization M-23-M AAR tankers that lack self-protection M-24-J Lack of interoperable of JISR, C2 and Effects systems M-25-J Need for Interoperability by Design approach to AFSC M-26-J Progress with JISR Technical Standards

Leadership L-01-G Need for more deliberate leadership development L-02-C Need for senior leader participation in IAMD and BMD exercises

Personnel P-01-G Lack of qualified personnel P-02-C Insufficient BMD training and acculturation P-03-A JFAC manning P-04-M Lack of AAR experience on operational staffs P-05-J Lack of trained, qualified and experienced personnel

Facilities F-01-G Unknown support and security requirements F-02-G NATO air facilities are not yet modernized, equipped, or hardened to

support the full spectrum of JAP capabilities



Area Id Consideration F-03-G Lacking an integrated testbed and battle lab for interoperability

testing F-04-G Missing agreements between NATO and EU for logistics and

sustainment F-05-A Multinational ACS shortfalls F-06-A Unknown or undeveloped physical and information security

requirements for new generation aircraft F-07-A Non-optimized Supply Chain Management F-08-M Need for tanker facilities review

SECTION 2 - AFFINITY DATA SET

This table lists the interoperability considerations and challenges in groupings that resulted from an analysis using an affinity diagram.

Identified groupings:

• Aviation Basing• C4ISR• Doctrine• Exercises• Leadership• Materiel



• Miscellaneous• Organization• Personnel• Policy• Standards• Targeted Training• Testbed

Grouping Id Consideration

Aviation Basing

F-01-G Unknown support and security requirements

F-02-G NATO air facilities are not yet modernized, equipped, or hardened to support the full spectrum of JAP capabilities

F-05-A Multinational ACS shortfalls

F-07-A Non-optimized Supply Chain Management

F-08-M Need for tanker facilities review

C4ISR M-04-G C4ISR capability incompatibility

M-05-G C2 communications systems incompatibility with non-NATO bodies

M-16-A Lack of datalink interoperability

M-17-A Potential targeting difficulties

M-18-A Undefined bandwidth and connectivity requirements

M-20-A Digitally Aided Close Air Support interoperability issues

M-24-J Lack of interoperable of JISR, C2 and Effects systems

M-25-J Need for Interoperable by Design approach to AFSC

Doctrine Introduction

D-01-G Lagging Allied Publications

D-02-G Outdated concepts

D-03-G Lagging TTPs

Doctrine D-06-G Missing a JAP oriented operational and doctrinal framework

D-07-G Slow adoption of doctrine and training to changes in operational environment

D-09-C Improved AEA and SEAD concepts

D-10-A Lack of multi-generational operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs

D-11-A Lack of multi-generational Air C2 operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs

D-15-A Need for concepts and procedures for JAP employment in the multi-domain environment


E-6

NATO UNCLASSIFIED


D-16-M AT and AAR Doctrine and TTPs do not reflect multi-role platforms

D-18-M Lack of future rotorcraft concepts

D-19-M Lack of UAS, RPA and Autonomous Rotorcraft systems concepts and procedures

D-20-J Incoherent Air C2 and JISR concepts and doctrine

Exercises T-02-G Lack of multinational live exercises that train the full-spectrum of NATO JAP

T-03-G Lack of multinational live exercises focused on FSE

T-04-G Under-classification of NATO exercises

T-12-A Lack of high-end multi-generational integration training and exercises

Leadership L-01-G Need for more deliberate leadership development

Materiel T-09-G Missing a multinational persistent simulation backbone network

M-12-C NATO IAMD system interoperability shortfalls

M-13-C Lack of standardization for multinational SBAMD procurement

M-14-C Lack of BMD self-protection

M-19-A Non-standard maintenance requirements

M-21-A Lack of Air-launched weapon systems interoperability

M-23-M AAR Tankers that lack self-protection

Miscellaneous D-12-A Impact of new generation aircraft capabilities on National Caveats

D-14-A No common procurement strategy

Organization O-01-G Need for more adaptive organizational constructs

O-05-G Need for a dedicated Air Warfare Centre

O-08-G Need for an Air Warfare Centre Network for NATO and industry cooperation

O-10-M Lack of governance regarding AAR issues

Personnel P-03-A JFAC manning

Policy D-04-G Restrictive information sharing policies

D-05-G Missing a JAP oriented security and protection concept

D-08-C Improved IAMD policy

D-13-A Security protocols restrict exchange of information

D-17-M Lack of A3R policy


E-7

NATO UNCLASSIFIED


D-21-J Lack of concepts and TTPs for new generation Air C2 and JISR

D-22-J Lack of tactical, dynamic information sharing supporting PED

D-23-J Need for a Future C4ISR Vision

O-02-G Need to leverage closer relationships with partner countries

O-03-G National limitations to collaborative relationships with other multinational organizations

O-04-G National limitations to collaborative relationships with industry

O-09-C Insufficient Missile Defence connectivity

M-01-G Lack of information sharing regarding platform and systems capabilities and limitations

M-06-G Lack of NATO programmes that enable and standardize the interoperable use of COTS technology

M-09-G Lacking a common approach for supply support

M-10-G Lacking a common approach for modernization of legacy PSCs

M-11-G Need to streamline procurement strategy

F-04-G Missing agreements between NATO and EU for logistics and sustainment

Standards O-06-G Need for JAP oriented information exchange and simulation standards

O-07-G Missing a joint roadmap for NATO and EU on Interoperability standards

M-02-G Material standards need improvement

M-03-G Lack of compliance with standards

M-08-G Missing a JAP oriented standard to apply for interoperability design

M-15-A C2 systems non-compliance

M-22-M AAR systems standardization

M-26-J Progress with JISR Technical Standards

F-06-A Unknown or undeveloped physical and information security requirements for new generation aircraft

Targeted Training Introduction

T-01-G Lack of trained personnel

T-05-G Achieving agreed training standards

T-08-G Need for distributed simulation in mission training

T-06-G Missing training to focus on JAP interoperability




Targeted Training

T-07-G Missing training to focus on proper language proficiency

T-10-C Need for joint multinational IAMD training at all levels

T-11-A Need for new generation Education and Training

T-13-A Lack of adequate training infrastructure

T-14-M Insufficient integrated AAR training

T-15-M No common AAR qualification and currency standards

T-16-J Lack of realistic training opportunities for JISR tactical operators

T-17-J Lack of NATO and multinational exercises that train JAP contribution to JISR

L-02-C Need for senior leader participation in IAMD and BMD exercises

P-01-G Lack of qualified personnel

P-02-C Insufficient BMD training and acculturation

P-04-M Lack of AAR experience on operational staffs

P-05-J Lack of trained, qualified and experienced personnel

Testbed M-07-G Need for a System Engineering and Integration testbed

F-03-G Lacking an integrated testbed and battle lab for interoperability testing

SECTION 3 - PRIORITIZED DATA SET

This table lists the interoperability considerations and challenges in groupings that resulted from an analysis using a prioritization diagram.

Identified recurring topics:

• C4ISR Architecture• Doctrine• ETEE• NDPP• Organization• Policy• Standardization

Pull through Id Consideration

D-21-J Lack of concepts and TTPs for new generation Air C2 and JISR


E-9

NATO UNCLASSIFIED


C4ISR Architecture

D-22-J Lack of tactical, dynamic information sharing supporting PED

D-23-J Need for a Future C4ISR Vision

O-09-C Insufficient Missile Defence connectivity

M-04-G C4ISR capability incompatibility

M-05-G C2 communications systems incompatibility with non-NATO bodies

M-16-A Lack of datalink interoperability

M-17-A Potential targeting difficulties

M-18-A Undefined bandwidth and connectivity requirements

M-20-A Digitally Aided Close Air Support interoperability issues

M-24-J Lack of interoperable of JISR, C2 and Effects systems

M-25-J Need for Interoperable by Design approach to AFSC

Doctrine D-01-G Lagging Allied Publications

D-02-G Outdated concepts

D-03-G Lagging TTPs

D-06-G Missing a JAP oriented operational and doctrinal framework

D-07-G Slow adoption of doctrine and training to changes in operational environment

D-09-C Improved AEA and SEAD concepts

D-10-A Lack of multi-generational operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs

D-11-A Lack of multi-generational Air C2 operational concepts, doctrine and TTPs

D-15-A Need for concepts and procedures for JAP employment in the multi-domain environment

D-16-M AT and AAR Doctrine and TTPs do not reflect multi-role platforms

D-18-M Lack of future rotorcraft concepts

D-19-M Lack of UAS, RPA and Autonomous Rotorcraft systems concepts and procedures

D-20-J Incoherent Air C2 and JISR concepts and doctrine

F-06-A Unknown or undeveloped physical and information security requirements for new generation aircraft

ETEE T-01-G Lack of trained personnel


E-10

NATO UNCLASSIFIED


T-02-G Lack of multinational live exercises that train the full-spectrum of NATO JAP

T-03-G Lack of multinational live exercises focused on the Future Security Environment (FSE), including Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)

T-04-G Under-classification of NATO exercises

T-05-G Achieving agreed training standards

T-06-G Missing training to focus on JAP interoperability

T-07-G Missing training to focus on proper language proficiency

T-08-G Need for distributed simulation in mission training

T-10-C Need for joint multinational IAMD training at all levels

T-11-A Need for new generation Education and Training

T-12-A Lack of high-end multi-generational integration training and exercises

T-13-A Lack of adequate training infrastructure

T-14-M Insufficient integrated AAR training

T-15-M No common AAR qualification and currency standards

T-16-J Lack of realistic training opportunities for JISR tactical operators

T-17-J Lack of NATO and multinational exercises that train JAP contribution to JISR

L-02-C Need for senior leader participation in IAMD and BMD Exercises

P-01-G Lack of qualified personnel

P-02-C Insufficient BMD training and acculturation

P-04-M Lack of AAR experience on operational staffs

P-05-J Lack of trained, qualified and experienced personnel

NDPP M-21-A Lack of air-launched weapon systems interoperability

M-23-M AAR tankers that lack self-protection

Organization O-01-G Need for more adaptive organizational constructs

O-05-G Need for a dedicated Air Warfare Centre

O-08-G Need for an Air Warfare Centre Network for NATO and industry cooperation

O-10-M Lack of governance regarding AAR issues

M-09-G Lacking a common approach for supply support


E-11

NATO UNCLASSIFIED


P-03-A JFAC manning

F-04-G Missing agreements between NATO and EU for logistics and sustainment

LOE Policy Introduction

D-08-C Improved IAMD policy

Policy D-05-G Missing a JAP oriented security and protection concept

D-17-M Lack of A3R policy

O-02-G Need to leverage closer relationships with partner countries

M-06-G Lack of NATO programmes that enable and standardize the interoperable use of COTS technology

M-10-G Lacking a common approach for modernization of legacy PSCs

O-06-G Need for JAP oriented information exchange and simulation standards

Standardization M-02-G Material standards need improvement

M-03-G Lack of compliance with standards

M-08-G Missing a JAP oriented standard to apply for interoperability design

M-15-A C2 systems non-compliance

M-22-M AAR systems standardization

M-26-J Progress with JISR Technical Standards Identified singular topics:

• Aviation Basing • IAMD • MTDS • Procurement • Testbed

Plus some separate topics for recommendation to NATO or Nations. Pull through Id Consideration

Aviation Basing F-01-G Unknown support and security requirements

F-02-G NATO air facilities are not yet modernized, equipped, or hardened to support the full spectrum of JAP capabilities

F-05-A Multinational ACS shortfalls


E-12

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

Pull through Id Consideration F-07-A Non-optimized Supply Chain Management

F-08-M Need for tanker facilities review

IAMD M-12-C NATO IAMD System interoperability shortfalls

M-13-C Lack of standardization for multinational SBAMD procurement

M-14-C Lack of BMD self-protection

MTDS T-09-G Missing a multinational persistent simulation backbone network

Recommendations to Nations

D-12-A Impact of new generation aircraft capabilities on National Caveats

D-04-G Restrictive information sharing policies

O-03-G National limitations to collaborative relationships with other multinational organizations

O-04-G National limitations to collaborative relationships with industry

D-13-A Security protocols restrict exchange of information

M-01-G Lack of information sharing regarding platform and systems capabilities and limitations

M-19-A Non-standard maintenance requirements

Recommendations to NATO

O-07-G Missing a joint roadmap for NATO and EU on Interoperability standards

L-01-G Need for more deliberate leadership development

Procurement D-14-A No common procurement strategy

M-11-G Need to streamline procurement strategy

Testbed M-07-G Need for a System Engineering and Integration testbed

F-03-G Lacking an integrated testbed and battle lab for interoperability testing


ANNEX F TO ENCLOSURE 1 TO ACT/CAPDEV/REQ/TT-2061/SER:NU SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-004748 DATED: JAN 2020

F-1

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX F - REFERENCES

1. AC/336-WP(2018)0008-REV1, "Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report" (NR), 12 April 2018

2. C-M(2019)0014 (INV), "Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report", 20 June 2019 3. AC/336-WP(2019)0009-REV6(INV), "Annual Comprehensive Joint Air Power Report",

Air and Missile Defence Committee, 14 June 2019 4. SH/SDP/SDF/CFR/DPF/19-003256, ACT/SPP/SEE/TT-1456/Ser: NU02682019, "2019

Bi-SC Agreed Capability Hierarchy", 1 August 2019 5. "5th Generation Air C2 Awareness, Education and Training Requirements",

Headquarters AIRCOM, August 2019 6. "A400M: Europe’s Interoperability Poster Child", JAPCC Journal 23, pages 63 to 68,

27 January 2017 7. IMSM-0513-2018, "ACT's Request for Extension to Deliver the Bi-SC Joint Air Power

Strategy Implementation Report on Interoperability Considerations", 15 November 2018 8. "Aerial Tanking in 2035", JAPCC Journal 27, page 30 9. JAPCC Perspective on the 5th generation Aircraft Discussion, "Air Warfare

Communication in a Networked Environment", JAPCC Journal 24, pages 62 to 66, 17 July 2017

10. ATP 3.3.4 Volume II, "Air-to-Air Refuelling (AAR) Doctrine", edition A, version 2, 3 April 2019

11. "Air-to-Air Refuelling Consolidation - An Update", JAPCC 12. ATP 3.3.4 Volume I, “Air Transport Doctrine”, edition A, version 2, 12 April 2018 13. AJP-01, "Allied Joint Doctrine", edition E, 28 February 2017 14. AAP-47, "Allied Joint Doctrine Development", edition C, 19 February 2019 15. AJP-3.3, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Air and Space Operations", edition C (draft) 16. AJP-3.3.3, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Air-Maritime Coordination", edition A,

2 December 2014 17. AJP-3.3.5, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control", edition B, 8 May 2013 18. AJP-3.3.2, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Close Air Support and Air Interdiction", edition A,

11 September 2009 19. AJP-3.3.1, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Air Operations", edition B, 9 July 2010


F-2 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

20. AJP-2.7, "Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance", edition A, 11 July 2016

21. SH/PLANS/JCAP/FT/15-311417, 5000/TSC FEF 0040/TT-151465/Ser:NU0069, "Bi-SC Final Report on Joint Air Power Capabilities", 7 December 2015

22. AC/322-N(2014)0161-AS1, "C3 Capabilities and ICT Services Lifecycle Management Policy", 11 December 2014

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25. SH/SEM/CCOMC/DOG/19-003664, "Comprehensive Report to the NAC on Integrated Air and Missile Defence-Related Exercises in 2019-2020" (NS), 2 September 2019

26. MCM-0272-2016(INV), "Conceptual Basis for NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 20 December 2016

27. AC/281-N(2017)0004(INV), "Conceptual Basis for NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 12 January 2017

28. PO(2017)0087(INV), "Conceptual Basis for NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 13 February 2017

29. GAO-19-321, "F-35 Aircraft Sustainment - DOD Needs to Address Substantial Supply Chain Challenges", U.S. Government Accountability Office, April 2019

30. NSO(AIR)0432(2019)ASB, "Final Record of Decisions (ROD) of the Military Committee Air Standardization Board (MCASB) Meeting", New NATO Headquarters (BEL), 6 March 2019, 3 April 2019

31. "Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO) 2018 Report", Headquarters SACT, 11 May 2018

32. 5000/FPR-0700/TTE-170961/Ser.NU, "Frozen Set of Capability Codes and Capability Statements", 13 September 2018

33. "Future Battlefield Rotorcraft Capability", JAPCC 34. "Future Vector Project, Future Vector - Part I", JAPCC, July 2014 35. "Future Vector Project, Future Vector - Part II", JAPCC, October 2014 36. "Future Vector Project, Present Paradox Future Challenge", JAPCC, March 2014 37. "Improving Ballistic Missile Defence Interoperability", JAPCC Journal 28, 2019 38. ACT/CAPDEV/REQITT-1020/SER:NU-0300, "Interim Report - NATO’s Joint Air Power

Strategy Interoperability Study", 30 August 2019 39. 5000/TSC-FCR-0010/ACT-0924/Ser:NU0057, "Interoperability Report - NATO's Joint Air

Power Strategy Implementation", 9 February 2019 40. IMSM-0077-2015, "Joint Air Power Capabilities" (NR), 6 March 2015 41. PO(2014)0816, "Joint Air Power Capabilities" (NR), 16 December 2014 42. PO(2014)0816-AS1, "Joint Air Power Capabilities" (NR), 19 December 2014


F-3 NATO UNCLASSIFIED

43. IMSM-0230-2015, "Joint Air Power Capabilities Program Implementation Plan" (NR), 17 April 2015

44. IMSM-0352-2015, "Joint Air Power Capabilities Program Implementation Plan, Roadmap, and Progress Report" (NR), 30 June 2015

45. "Joint Air Power Following the 2016 Warsaw Summit - Urgent Priorities", JAPCC, October 2017

46. AC/281-N(2018)0001 (R), "Joint Air Power Strategy", 10 January 2018 47. NIAG-D(2019)0022, "Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation - Interoperability

Considerations", NIAG SG-240, 24 October 2019 48. SH/SDP/SDF/DJ/19-002439(INV), “Joint Command and Control Concept of Operations”,

19 June 2019 49. "Letter from the Multi-sensor Aerospace-ground Joint ISR Integration Interoperability

Coalition to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen", 16 April 2012 50. MCM-0223-2019, "Military Advice on Comprehensive Report on Integrated Air Missile

Defence-Related Exercises in 2019-2020" (NS), 16 October 2019 51. MCM-0252-2015, "Military Advice on the Future Role of NATO's Joint Air Power" (NR),

18 January 2016 52. MC 0593, "Minimum Level of Command and Control Service Capabilities in Support of

Combined Joint NATO-Led Operations", 23 February 2015 53. MC 0640, "Minimum Level of Communication and Information Systems (CIS)

Capabilities at Land Tactical Level", draft 54. AC/259-D(2018)0038, "NATO Air Force Armaments Group Annual Report (October

2017 - September 2018)", NATO Air Force Armaments Group, 24 October 2018 55. AC/322-D(2018)0002, "NATO Architecture Framework 4 (NAFv4)", January 2018 56. AAP-6, "NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions", edition 2018, 8 November 2018 57. STANREC 4777, "NATO Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Interoperability

Architecture (NIIA)", edition 1, 9 January 2018 58. STANAG 7085, "NATO Interoperable Data Links for ISR Systems", edition 4, 23 April

2018 59. MC 324/3, "NATO Military Command Structure", 28 May 2004 60. MC 0195, "NATO Minimum Interoperability Fitting Standards for Communication and

Information Systems (CIS) Equipment Onboard Maritime Platforms", 6 March 2012 61. STANAG 4559, "NATO Standard ISR Library Interfaces and Services", edition 4,

2 March 2018 62. PO(2018)0047, "NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 2 February 2018 63. MCM-0257-2017, "NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 18 December 2017 64. PO(2016)0115, "NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 23 February 2016 65. IMSM-0127-2016, "NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy" (NR), 22 March 2016


F-4NATO UNCLASSIFIED

66. SH/PLANS/J5/PLP/TV/17-316334, 5000/TSC-FPP-0110/TT-161549/Ser:NU0847,"NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy", 9 November 2017

67. IMSM-0068-2018, "NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation", 14 March 201868. SH/SDP/J5/PLP/VC/19-002091, "NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation -

ACO Operational Assessment Interoperability Report", 18 April 201969. AC/259-D(2018)0030, "NATO's Suppression of Enemy Air Defences Concept of

Employment" (NR), 14 September 201870. PO(2018)0047, "NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy", 6 February 201871. MC 0400/4 (Final), "NATO’s Military Strategy Comprehensive Defence and Shared

Response", 22 May 201972. AC/336(2019)0003, "Policy for Integrated Air and Missile Defence", 11 April 201973. AC/281-N(2015)0026-REV8 (R), "Political Guidance 2015", 19 June 201574. 5000/TSC-FCR-0100/ACT-487/Ser:NU0704, "Request for Extension to Deliver the Bi-

SC Joint Air Power Strategy Implementation Report on Interoperability Considerations",3 December 2018

75. STANAG 3430, "Responsibilities for Aircraft Cross-Servicing (ACS)", edition 10,6 June 2003

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Conceptual Basis for NATO's Joint Air Power Strategy (Ends and Ways)",23 November 2016

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82. PR/CP(2014)0120, "Wales Summit Declaration", 5 September 2014

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