5-20-16 -- James Sexton Reply Brief

8/16/2019 5-20-16 -- James Sexton Reply Brief

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Appeal No. 14-50583

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

United States of America,

Plaintiff and Respondent ,

v.

James Sexton,

Defendant and Appellant .

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Hon. Percy AndersonOrig. Case No. 2:13-CR-00819-PA-5

APPELLANT JAMES SEXTON’S REPLY BRIEF

THOMAS P. O’BRIEN (SB# 166369)

KATHRYN C. WANNER (SB# 269310)PAUL HASTINGS LLP

515 South Flower Street,Twenty-Fifth Floor

Los Angeles, California 90071-2228

Telephone: 1(213) 683-6000Facsimile: 1(213) 627-0705

Attorneys for Appellant

James Sexton

Case: 14-50583, 05/20/2016, ID: 9984665, DktEntry: 48, Page 1 of 41


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Table of Contents

Page

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I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL SUMMARY ....................................... 1

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE “MIXEDMOTIVE” INSTRUCTION. .......................................................................... 4

A. Obstruction of Justice Requires a Predominantly Corrupt

Purpose. ................................................................................................ 4

B. Under the Fair Warning Doctrine and the Rule of Lenity,

Ambiguity in Section 1503(a) Should Have Been Resolved inSexton’s Favor. ..................................................................................... 7

III. THE DISTRICT COURT ALLOWED THE GOVERNMENT TO

PRESENT AN INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING TRANSCRIPT. ..... 10

A. Portions of Sexton’s Grand Jury Testimony Should Have Been

Admitted under the Rule of Completeness. ....................................... 10

B. Selectively Editing Sexton’s Testimony was Not Harmless and

Objectively Misled the Jury. .............................................................. 16

IV. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSEDSEXTON’S GRAND JURY TESTIMONY FOR FAILURE TO

PROVIDE A TARGET WARNING. ........................................................... 17

A. The Government Objectively Knew Sexton Was a “Target.” ........... 18

B. The USAM Explicitly Requires Prosecutors to Provide Target

Warnings. ........................................................................................... 21

C. Due Process Requires Federal Courts to Exercise Supervisory

Authority over Grand Jury Procedural Rules GoverningDefendants. ......................................................................................... 22

V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONYREGARDING THE GOVERNMENT’S WITHDRAWAL OF A

WRIT. ........................................................................................................... 25

A. Evidence of the Writ’s Withdrawal Was Permitted During theFirst Trial, but Excluded from the Second. ........................................ 25

B. The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Evidence Related to theWithdrawal of the Writ. ..................................................................... 26

VI. CONCLUSION. ............................................................................................ 31



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Table of Authorities

Page(s)

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Cases

Gollehon v. Mahoney,626 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2010) .............................................................................. 8

Griffith v. Kentucky,

479 U.S. 314 (1987) ....................................................................................... 25,27

Ingram v. United States,

360 U.S. 672 (1959) .............................................................................................. 5

Marks v. United States,

430 U.S. 188 (1977) .............................................................................................. 9

Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S.436 (1966) .................................................................................. 18, 19,20

United States v. Banks,

514 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2008) ......................................................................... 4, 5,6

United States v. Bonds,

784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015) ................................................................. 6, 9, 28,29

United States v. Chu Kong Yin,935 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1991) .............................................................................. 27

United States v. Collicott ,92 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1996) ...............................................................11, 12, 15,16

United States v. Conley,

186 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 1999) ................................................................................... 10

United States v. Crocker ,568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977) ............................................................................. 25

United States v. Estepa,

471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972) ............................................................................. 24

United States v. Flores,

802 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2015) ............................................................................ 17



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(continued)Page(s)

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United States v. Jacobs,

547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976) ............................................................................... 23

United States v. Ladum,141 F.3d 1328 (9th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 29

United States v. Lanier ,

520 U.S. 259 (1997) .............................................................................................. 7

United States v. Liu,731 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................................................................ 4

United States v. Macias,789 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2015) ....................................................................... 17,30

United States v. Mandujano,

425 U.S. 564 (1976) ............................................................................................ 23

United States v. Marbella,73 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1996) .............................................................................. 28

United States v. Marshall,

767 F.2d 293 (6th Cir. 1985) .............................................................................. 10

United States v. Millan,230 F.3d 431 (1st Cir. 2000) ............................................................................... 11

United States v. Mullins,22 F.3d 1365 (6th Cir. 1994) .............................................................................. 10

United States v. Ortega,

203 F.3d 675 (9th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................. 16

United States v. Rasheed ,663 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................. 29

United States v. Ryan,455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1971) ................................................................................ 5



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(continued)Page(s)

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United States v. Santos,

553 U.S. 507 (2008) .............................................................................................. 7

United States v. Smith,424 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................ 5

United States v. Tham,

960 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1992) ....................................................................... 20,28

United States v. Thompson,37 F.3d 450 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 30

United States v. Thompson,728 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2013) .............................................................................. 8

United States v. Wallace,

848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988) ....................................................................... 17,18

United States v. Washington,431 U.S. 181 (1977) ............................................................................................ 24

United States v. Wilkerson,

84 F.3d 692 (4th Cir. 1996) ................................................................................ 16

United States v. Williams,504 U.S. 36 (1992) .............................................................................................. 24

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) .......................................................................................... passim

Other Authorities

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) .............................................................................................. 16

Fed. R. Evid. 106 ..................................................................................................... 11

Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) ................................................................................................. 15



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I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL SUMMARY

The Government’s opposition brief presents a simple story: the conviction

should be affirmed because Appellant James Sexton confessed. The Government

is wrong. This appeal is not about whether Sexton—a young former Los Angeles

County Deputy Sheriff caught in a turf war between the Los Angeles County

Sheriff’s Department (“LASD”) and the FBI—confessed. This appeal is about

whether that “confession” should have ever come into evidence. This appeal is

about whether the Government’s excerpting of Sexton’s Grand Jury testimony

violated the Federal Rule of Evidence’s Rule of Completeness, when Sexton’s

more complete testimony showed neither the “confession” the Government relies

on so heavily nor a dominant purpose to impede or to obstruct justice. This appeal

is about whether the District Court got the law right, or whether the District

Court’s mixed motive instruction allowed the jury to convict Sexton without

showing his dominant purpose was to obstruct justice.

The Government’s simple story, in other words, is simply wrong.

In 2011, the Federal Government was conducting an undercover

investigation of the LASD. (Sexton’s Excerpts of Record (“ER”) ER183 at

574:10-12.) During the investigation, the FBI provided a cellular phone to an

extremely dangerous inmate, Anthony Brown, who had been sentenced to more

than 400-years imprisonment. (ER183 at 574:11-19.) A cellular phone in the



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hands of an inmate is exceptionally dangerous, as it can be used in a variety of

crimes, including killing witnesses. (Government’s Excerpts of Record (“GER”)

GER779 at 1020:8-19; GER432 at 673:9-12.) When former Sheriff Leroy Baca

and former Undersheriff Paul Tanaka discovered the planted phone, they ordered a

counter-investigation into the FBI (concerned a law may have been breached) and

sought to protect Inmate Brown and their investigation. (ER207 at 846:10-12;

ER204 at 813:8-14; and ER240-241 at 885:23-886:4.)

Sexton did not participate in any meetings or conversations with Sheriff

Baca or Undersheriff Tanaka—or any other official—pertaining to the FBI’s

investigation or the LASD’s counter-investigation. Instead, his commanding

officers directed Sexton, a low-level deputy (GER121 at 362:9-16), to change

Inmate Brown’s name in the LASD’s inmate locator system and to relocate Inmate

Brown to different facilities, a commonplace practice to ensure the safety of “high-

profile and at-risk inmates.” (ER250-254 at 1020:23-1030:3 and GER 277-278 at

518:12-519:11.) As had been done “hundreds” of times to remove such inmates

from the LASD computer system, see id., Sexton followed facially-valid orders

issued by his commanding officers, consistent with LASD policy. (ER181-182 at

507:13-508:7; ER214-241 at 859-886:1; and ER245-246 at 890:18-891:9.)

Ultimately, a full-scale jurisdictional, tit-for-tat, turf war erupted between the FBI

and the LASD—and while that conflict is a tragedy in and of itself—it led to



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another tragedy. It led to the prosecution and ultimate conviction of a junior

deputy for following his commanding officers’ lawful orders. (ER490-507.)

But that is not all. The Government’s turf war mentality led them to

disregard their own rules. No one disputes that Sexton fully cooperated with

federal prosecutors and investigators, meeting with the Government more than 30

times and testifying before the Grand Jury twice. Yet despite relying almost solely

on that testimony to charge and prosecute Sexton, the Government never told him

prior to his Grand Jury appearances that he was a target of their investigation,

notwithstanding the United States Attorney’s Manual (“USAM”) mandate to do so.

The Government’s turf war mentality also led it to selectively edit Sexton’s

testimony—deleting his comments demonstrating he was not intending to obstruct

justice—in his second trial; after presenting the full and complete story led to an

evenly-split, hung jury in his first trial.

This appeal, in short, is about much more than Sexton’s supposed

“confession.” It is about whether the law was properly followed in the trial below

and the events that led up to it, and, ultimately, about fairness. In his opening

brief, Sexton gave this Court numerous independent grounds to reverse. The

Government’s opposition brief says nothing that should change the result.

Sexton’s conviction should be set aside.



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II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE “MIXED

MOTIVE” INSTRUCTION.

In his opening brief, Sexton explained why the District Court erred in

providing a mixed motive instruction. See AOB31-43. Properly construed, 18

U.S.C. § 1503(a), requires that the Government prove the defendant had a

predominantly corrupt purpose in obstructing justice and not that this purpose was

“more than merely incidental” as the District Court instructed the jury. The

Government cannot meet that standard here and thus unsurprisingly argues for a

lower standard. Government’s Answering Brief (“GAB”) at 35-36.1 As shown

below, the Government is wrong and reversal should follow. United States v. Liu,

731 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversal warranted where an instructional error

is not harmless).

A. Obstruction of Justice Requires a Predominantly Corrupt

Purpose.

The Government first attempts to recast this Court’s decision in United

States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2008). (GAB at 39-42.) Sexton showed in

his opening brief that Banks supports reversal. (AOB at 36-37.) It still does.

1Despite the Government’s contention (GAB34 n.9) that the parties agreed to this

instruction, the parties only agreed to the first two paragraphs of this instruction.(ER255-56; ER33.) Over Sexton’s objection, the court added the third paragraph

to the parties’ jury instructions stating that the Government need only prove thatthe defendant had a more than incidental purpose of obstruction. (ER58-59.) This

was error.



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In Banks, this Court discussed the elements required for a conviction

regarding racketeering, including the defendant’s “purpose” —mirroring the mens

rea question under Section 1503(a). Id. at 966, 968. Banks demonstrates that

when a criminal statute speaks of purpose as an important element of the crime,

that purpose must be “more than merely incidental.” Indeed, Banks establishes

that a corrupt intent must be “integral” to the defendant’s purpose. Banks, 514

F.3d at 969-70 (the Government must prove that defendant’s “dominant” purpose

was to commit the underlying offense). Relevant here, this Court has already

explained that Section 1503’s use of the word “corrupt[ly]” “means for an evil or

wicked purpose.” United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir. 1971). As

the obstruction charge requires proof of purpose as an important element of the

crime, this Court’s analytical approach in Banks confirms that it is the

Government’s burden to show Sexton’s alleged “corrupt” purpose was the

“dominant” or “integral” purpose.2

2The Government also claims that the level of intent for a conspiracy charge neednot be substantial, see GAB at 37, but this misstates the law. As a case the

Government relies on confirms, “‘[c]onspiracy to commit a particular substantiveoffense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the

substantive offense itself[,]’” meaning that on the 371 charge, the Government hadto meet Section 1503’s mens rea. Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672, 678

(1959) (emphasis added). The Government’s other claims, about the non-exclusivity of intent for the 1503 charge, see GAB at 36-37, are equally

inapposite. The cases the Government invokes do not answer the question. Whilethey discuss non-exclusivity, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 424 F.3d 992, 1010-

11 (9th Cir. 2005), they do not meaningfully address the relative importance



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The court’s “mixed motive” or “more than merely incidental” instruction

meant that the jury could ignore that Sexton’s dominant purpose was to follow

what appeared to be lawfully-issued orders as required by the LASD hierarchy.

Despite the “rumors” and “innuendo” permeating the LASD concerning the

planted cellular phone and the FBI’s undercover operation, the jury should have

been allowed to consider evidence permitting it to infer that Sexton’s actions

regarding Inmate Brown did not establish the necessary corrupt specific and

dominant intent.

Moreover, contrary to the Government’s assertion (GAB40), a narrow

reading of Section 1503 is required to avoid the risk of creating “status crimes,”

wherein any investigatory act by a state or local law enforcement agency that may

overlap with a federal investigation may be deemed obstruction of justice. There is

no indication that Congress intended that the mere existence of competing or

conflicting law enforcement investigations should become a “status offense”

paralyzing local law enforcement agencies from taking any action where there may

be overlapping federal jurisdiction. Such a reading would endanger parallel

investigations across the country. Cf. United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582, 584

(9th Cir. 2015) (Kozinski, J. concurring) (“[S]ection 1503 poses a significant

among non-exclusive purposes. Banks does that expressly, see Banks, 514 F.3d at

968, and Banks confirms reversal is appropriate.



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hazard for everyone involved in our system of justice, because so much of what the

adversary process calls for could be construed as obstruction.”).

B. Under the Fair Warning Doctrine and the Rule of Lenity,

Ambiguity in Section 1503(a) Should Have Been Resolved in

Sexton’s Favor.

The District Court’s confusing “mixed motive” instruction (as well as its

previous denial of Sexton’s motion to dismiss on the same legal question, see

AOB23, and ER33) was based on a statute which, under the Fair Warning doctrine,

should have been interpreted in Sexton’s favor. United States v. Lanier , 520 U.S.

259, 267 (1997) (fair warning is “whether the statute, either standing alone or as

construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant’s

conduct was criminal”). Likewise, under the rule of lenity, ambiguity in the

statutory language should have led the Court to instruct the jury that the

Government had to show that Sexton’s dominant purpose was to obstruct justice.

United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).

Where, as here, the statute uses a term like “corruptly” that on its face

conveys a gravity of wickedness, but the statute does not define the necessary

depth of wickedness required for conviction, the statute is ambiguous. When a

statute contains ambiguous language a defendant should not be held criminally

liable when his actions were not and could not have reasonably been understood to



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have been covered by that statute. United States v. Thompson, 728 F.3d 1011 (9th

Cir. 2013).

In Thompson, the defendants used a thermal tool to cut through metal during

a robbery, and were convicted for larceny with a statutory sentencing enhancement

for “using fire” during the felony. Id. at 1013-14. This Court reversed, holding

that the defendants did not have “fair warning” that under the statute their actions

would subject them to the enhanced sentence. Id. at 1020. This Court focused on

the fact that the Government failed to identify any other cases where the sentencing

enhancement was applied in cases involving thermal cutting tools. Id. Similarly

here, the Government has not identified any other prosecutions for obstruction of

justice where defendants were following lawful job-related orders while having

merely incidental ill-will towards the Federal Government.

The Government ignores Thompson and incorrectly relies on Gollehon v.

Mahoney to argue that Sexton understood his actions to constitute obstruction of

justice at the time he was given and followed lawfully-issued orders. 626 F.3d

1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010). In Gollehon, the defendant brutally murdered another

inmate in prison and there was no evidence that the defendant had a good faith

basis to believe, “at the relevant time,” that his actions may have been lawfully-

issued by a superior. Id. at 1028.



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Here, despite all the “rumors” and “innuendo,” there is no evidence that

Sexton knew or had fair warning, at or prior to the time the orders were issued, that

he could or should object to his commanding officers’ orders, particularly when

relocating an at-risk inmate and changing his name in the locator system had

occurred “hundreds” of times to protect inmates. (ER250-254 at 1020:23-1030:3

and GER 277-278 at 518:12-519:11.) Given the ambiguity in the statute regarding

the mens rea requirement, the Fair Warning Doctrine confirms that it should have

been interpreted in Sexton’s favor—that was true at the instructions phase, see

ER255-256 at 1049:22-1050:15; ER58-59, and when Sexton moved to dismiss.

ER455-456. Either reversal or remand is appropriate. See Marks v. United States,

430 U.S. 188, 196 (1977) (applying fair warning doctrine to jury instructions); see

also Bonds, 784 F.3d at 582 (Kozinski, J. concurring) (“The amorphous nature of

the statute is also at odds with the constitutional requirement that individuals have

fair notice as to what conduct may be criminal.”).

The Government likewise asserts that Sexton’s arguments (see AOB at 42-

44) have not identified a textual ambiguity justifying the imposition of the rule of

lenity where ambiguous criminal laws are interpreted in favor of the defendant.

(GAB42.) This, too, is incorrect. The parties hotly dispute the scope and breadth

of the word “corruptly” in the statutory language. Either Sexton is right in his

reading or there is statutory ambiguity here.



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The Government tries to bolster its argument by citing a string of cases in

which law enforcement officers have been prosecuted. (GAB at 43-44.) The

Government tellingly discusses none of these cases’ facts, none of which mirrors

the facts here, where a junior deputy follows what he believes to be lawful orders

of his commanding officers only to be prosecuted following a turf war between

agencies. See, e.g., United States v. Conley, 186 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1999)

(withholding information during testimony); United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d

1365, 1367 (6th Cir. 1994) (defendant giving instructions, not following them);

United States v. Marshall, 767 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1985) (“defendant had

extorted money from the store owner”). The clear factual discrepancies between

the cases the Government relies on and this case shows why both the Fair Warning

Doctrine and the rule of lenity support reversal.

III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ALLOWED THE GOVERNMENT TO

PRESENT AN INCOMPLETE AND MISLEADING TRANSCRIPT.

A. Portions of Sexton’s Grand Jury Testimony Should Have Been

Admitted under the Rule of Completeness.

As Sexton explained in his opening brief, the District Court incorrectly

excluded potentially exculpatory, non-hearsay portions of Sexton’s Grand Jury

testimony that should have been admitted pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence

106. (See AOB at 44-49.) The rule of completeness provides:

If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded

statement, an adverse party may require the introduction,



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at that time, of any other part – or any other writing orrecorded statement – that in fairness ought to be

considered at the same time.

Fed. R. Evid. 106 (emphasis added). Admitting additional portions of a

defendant’s statement is appropriate to “correct a misleading impression of a prior

statement created by taking [the defendant’s] comments out of context.” United

States v. Collicott , 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Millan, 230

F.3d 431, 434 (1st Cir. 2000) (“a party wishing to introduce only a portion of a

recorded statement may be precluded from doing so”).

The Government does not dispute that during Sexton’s first trial—which

resulted in an evenly split hung jury—the District Court admitted a relatively

complete recitation of Sexton’s Grand Jury testimony. (See ER395-453.) In the

second trial, the Government requested, and the trial court excluded in violation of

the rule of completeness, critical context for Sexton’s alleged confession and other

key evidence, resulting in a guilty verdict. (ER11-12.) This was not harmless

error.

The Government focuses on Sexton’s purported confession and contends

everything else is irrelevant. It further argues that Sexton “has never explained

how any particular statement was ‘taken out of context’” to mislead the jury.

(GAB51-52.) These contentions collapse under their own weight.



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In his opening brief, Sexton identified exemplars of his Grand Jury

statements introduced in the first trial and omitted in the second trial. (AOB at 22-

23.) These statements related to the basis of Sexton’s understanding of the source

of the information to which he allegedly “confessed.” For example, the

Government read a portion of the Grand Jury transcript to the jury discussing

Sexton’s understanding of an email regarding transferring Inmate Brown to

another station jail. (ER157-159 at 59:14-61:1.) During that same discussion,

Sexton explained that the LASD is “all about innuendo and nuance[.]” (ER158 at

60:24.)3

The Government excised this entire statement, upon which a reasonable

juror could have inferred that the basis of Sexton’s knowledge and understanding

regarding the FBI investigation was not premised upon personal knowledge.

Selectively editing the transcript—including significant context—allowed the jury

to be misled. United States v. Collicott , 92 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 1996).

Similarly, the Government eliminated numerous other statements clarifying

Sexton’s intent and knowledge behind his alleged confessions. As described in the

Opening Brief, the Government withheld from the jury numerous statements

3During Sexton’s closing argument in his first trial, counsel identified fourteen

such statements regarding Sexton’s lack of knowledge or basis for his claimedunderstanding of the LASD’s motivations. (ER100-170.) In the second trial, the

Government removed half of these statements. Sexton provided the District Courtwith a redline showing the Government’s selectively stricken testimony. (See

ER100-170.)



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regarding Sexton’s actual lack of foundation for his alleged confessions, such as:

“there were rumors,” “we as young deputies were speculating,” “I was not

privileged to the entire information,” “I had conversations about this with . . . my

peers and just trying to establish what we were doing,” “innuendo,” “we’re baby

faced in there,” “I’m not going to detain a U.S. Attorney at gun point,” and “[t]his

is our Sheriff’s Department . . . [i]t’s all about innuendo and nuance.” (AOB22-

23.)

These were not the only sections of excluded testimony making Sexton’s

Grand Jury transcript misleading in the second trial. Others include:

Omitted Statement Relevance of the Omitted Statement

“Prior to the meeting a cellphone was

discovered in the most secure area thatwe have amongst the most dangerous

inmates.” (ER104.)

The statement shows Sexton’s state of

mind with respect to the dangers of placing a cellular phone into the prison,

including the belief that a lawfully-issued order to investigate the same was

reasonable under the circumstances.

“They were still piecing that togetherthrough interviewing both the inmate

and the deputy, and I was not privilegedto the entire information of that. I was

having to put it together on my own.”(ER106.)

The statement is probative of Sexton’sstate of mind and actual knowledge

regarding the FBI investigation by providing context to the alleged

confession that Sexton admittedly knewvery little about the investigation or the

machinations of Sherriff Baca and/or

Undersheriff Tanaka with respect to thesame.

“I had conversations about this withRathbun and my peers and just trying to

establish what we were doing and why

we were doing it. But they [more senior

LASD officers] had the handle on the

Sexton explained that other, high-levelofficials “were the leaders” of the

LASD’s counter-investigation into the

placement of the cellular phone into the

prison. A reasonable juror could infer



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Omitted Statement Relevance of the Omitted Statement

investigation. They were the leaders ofthe investigation. They made that clear

that at the direction of our unitcommander Lieutenant Thompson that

they were ramrodding what OSJ wasdoing with regards to this inmate, and

they set a very adversarial tone towardsthe federal government in a don’t ask,

don’t tell kind of policy. Your need toknow, right to know.” (ER108-109 at

10:28-11 through 11:12.)

from the statement that Sexton followedfacially lawfully orders and he did not

believe he could question hiscommanding officers regarding the

same.

“Q: What was the idea about howthe LASD was going to treat AnthonyBrown after this meeting with everyone

at Hero’s Park?A: The bosses had come up with

the idea to sequester him. Just cut off

his access to everybody and that wouldinclude FBI and vice versa.

Q: When you say ‘the bosses,’

who is that?A: . . . . the greater powers that

be.” (ER118 at 20:5-26.)

By excluding Sexton’s statementsrelated to the “bosses” or “greater powers that be” who were controlling

the LASD’s counter-investigation, the jury could have been left with the false

understanding that Sexton had more

control over the investigation than heactually possessed.

Coupled with the improper “mixed motive” jury instruction requiring a

corrupt purpose that was simply “more than merely incidental,” the exclusion of

significant portions of Sexton’s testimony permitted the jury to find culpability on

an incomplete and misleading record. The trial court should have permitted the

jury to consider evidence contextualizing Sexton’s over-zealous assertions

concerning the potential for impeding the FBI investigation and his role in the



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same. Sexton’s basis of knowledge was limited. The jury could have reasonably

inferred that, at the time of the lawfully-issued orders, Sexton believed the orders

to be reasonable given the dangers inherent to placing a cellular phone into the

prison with an at-risk inmate. Such an inference would have negated the mens rea

required to show a corrupt purpose here, particularly without a faulty “mixed

motive” instruction.

Finally, contrary to the Government’s assertions (GAB at 49-50), the

portions of Sexton’s Grand Jury transcript that he sought to admit during the

second trial were not inadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) (exception from

general hearsay exclusion for statements of the “declarant’s then-existing state of

mind (such as motive, intent, or plan)”). Indeed even if the statements were not

admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay exclusion, Collicott

clarifies that hearsay statements become relevant and admissible when the

opposing party has admitted other portions of that material, “such that

misunderstanding or distortion can be averted only through presentation of another

portion.” 92 F.3d at 983 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 172

(1988)).4 The omitted statements demonstrated Sexton’s state of mind and basis

4United States v. Ortega, cited by the Government (GAB49), concerned an

officer’s testimony regarding the defendant’s unrecorded oral statements, unlike

the recorded transcript at issue here. 203 F.3d 675, 682 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Becausethe officer’s testimony concerned an unrecorded oral confession, the rule of

completeness does not apply”). Similarly, United States v. Wilkerson dealt with an



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for his admitted statements and should have been included under the rule of

completeness.

B. Selectively Editing Sexton’s Testimony was Not Harmless and

Objectively Misled the Jury.

The Government bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness. See Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52(a). It has not done so. No other evidence, beyond his own omitted

statements, explained the basis for Sexton’s testimony to the Grand Jury.

Furthermore, contrary to the Government’s assertion (GAB at 54-55), the

difference in verdict between the two trials is illustrative of the harm occurring

from selectively editing Sexton’s Grand Jury testimony.

The Government now claims that any error that occurred due to editing his

statements was harmless because such statements were cumulative of other

evidence offered in the matter. (GAB at 53.) The Government, however, fails to

show any examples of admitted evidence addressing Sexton’s own state of mind

and how the same relates to whether he formed the requisite specific intent to

commit obstruction. Instead, the Government selected a few instances where the

transcript referenced “unofficial statements” and “innuendos,” but these statements

were so divorced from context— i.e., the purported confession—that they lacked

meaning, particularly with regard to Sexton’s state of mind. (GAB 52-53 (citing

out of court conversation, not a recorded statement. 84 F.3d 692, 696 (4th Cir.1996) (holding that “when the rule does apply, its purpose is to prevent a party

from misleading the jury”).



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TT750, TT751, and TT754-55) (more than twenty (20) pages of testimony separate

these statements from the alleged confession).)

The Government’s reliance on United States v. Flores, 802 F.3d 1028 (9th

Cir. 2015) (GAB55) is misplaced. Flores did not concern two trials of the same

defendant with different results due to differences in the evidence presented to the

jury. See id. at 1034 (concerning prosecutorial misconduct and prejudicial

evidence). This Court has already held that where “[t]he jury hung at the first trial,

and the material difference between the two trials was the admission of [certain

evidence]” the error is not harmless. United States v. Macias, 789 F.3d 1011, 1028

(9th Cir. 2015).

United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988) is likewise

instructive. This Court explained that it was “particularly troubled by the possible

cumulative effect of those errors which go to the credibility of the witnesses[.]” Id.

at 1476. Similarly, while each of the stricken portions of Sexton’s testimony

constitutes error, when taken as a whole, the cumulative effect of those errors

likely altered the outcome of the second trial. Reversal is the appropriate remedy.

Id. at 1475.



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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE SUPPRESSED SEXTON’S

GRAND JURY TESTIMONY FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE A

TARGET WARNING.

It is insufficient for the Government to argue that Sexton’s purported

confession renders meaningless its obligations under the USAM. Like a

confession obtained by violating a defendant’s Miranda rights would be

suppressed, so, too, should a confession obtained incident to the Government’s

failure to advise a defendant of his/her target status. Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S.436 (1966). Unless this Court admonishes the prosecutors for their behavior,

no remedy exists to prevent prosecutors from deliberately putting known targets of

an investigation before the Grand Jury and subjecting them to either confessing

(under oath) in that coercive atmosphere or committing perjury.

A.

The Government Objectively Knew Sexton Was a “Target.”

The USAM defines a target as “a person as to whom the prosecutor or the

Grand Jury has substantial evidence linking him or her to the commission of a

crime and who, in the judgment of the prosecutor, is a putative defendant.”

(ER476.) By any objective standard—and regardless of whether this is a question

of law or question of fact—it cannot be meaningfully disputed the Government

knew Sexton was a “target” of the Grand Jury investigation. The Government

claims that, prior to his second Grand Jury appearance on November 28, 2012,

Sexton was not considered a “target” because he only had been “interviewed on



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topics unrelated to [Inmate] Brown.” (GAB56.) This is patently untrue and any

claim to the contrary would be wrong under either a clearly erroneous or a de novo

standard.

On August 29, 2012, Sexton met with FBI Special Agents and an AUSA.

(GER1783.) At this meeting, according to the Government, Sexton allegedly

explained that he “participated in LASD’s attempts at hiding inmate Anthony

Brown (“Brown”) from FBI Agents.” Id. On November 16, 2012, two weeks

before the second Grand Jury appearance, the prosecutor and two FBI Special

Agents again interviewed Sexton. (GER1799-1807.) According to the FBI

memorandum memorializing the interview, Sexton specifically admitted, inter

alia, to following Undersheriff Tanaka’s orders regarding Inmate Brown’s

treatment (particularly, in view of the federal Writ), including using the LASD

computer system to alter Inmate Brown’s name and edit his file “jacket.”

(GER1800-03.) At this same meeting, Sexton described how a cellular phone was

found in Inmate Brown’s possession and that “[a]fter the phone was found,

[Inmate] Brown was frequently moved around[.]” (GER1801.)

Additionally, the Government contends that prior to his second Grand Jury

appearance, Sexton never admitted that a “federal writ or court order” motivated

Inmate Brown’s movements and name changes within the LASD system, and thus



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the Government did not know he was a target of their investigation. (GAB57,

emphasis added.) Again, this is demonstrably false.

At the same November 16, 2012 meeting with the FBI and AUSA, and

according to the FBI’s own record of the conversation, Sexton explained that he

had “heard there was a federal writ issued for [Inmate] Brown, [and] it was [his]

understanding that . . . LASD was attempting to play a dueling court order game.”

(GER1803.) Sexton proceeded to tell the FBI agents and AUSA that “[o]ne day

after the writ was issued, [Deputy] Smith called . . . OSJ deputies to tell them they

should take whatever steps necessary if the FBI or United States Attorney came to

take Brown into their custody.” Id.

The fact that Sexton told the Government about his knowledge of the

“federal writ” weeks before he was ordered before the Grand Jury was more than

sufficient for the prosecution to have determined that he was a target of their

investigation into obstruction of “some aspect of the Government’s judicial

function.” United States v. Tham, 960 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992). The

Government, therefore, was not allowed to summon Sexton to testify before the

Grand Jury because he was a “putative defendant” or target of the investigation.

(ER476 (citing USAM, §9-11.151).)

Further, during the second trial, the Government made numerous references

to Sexton’s alleged confessions prior to his second Grand Jury testimony,



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disproving its own argument that the Government did not consider him to be a

target prior to his November 28, 2012 Grand Jury testimony:

•

“First interview, Agent Dahle:

5

‘Sexton took part in hiding AnthonyBrown from the FBI.’” (GER925.)

• “November 16, 2012 . . . So Leah Marx’s first interview of James

Sexton: Sexton talked about how he was involved in this early[.]”(GER923-24.)

•

“Sexton also talked about his concealment. This is his guilty conscience .

. . November 16th interview, Leah Marx: ‘Sexton took steps to ensurethat Brown’s name was not in the LASD books.’” (GER926.)

•

“What about his own corrupt intent? His own corrupt intent? Remember

him – you heard this in the interview that Leah Marx [November 16,

2012] conducted of him. Sexton said that he would use Deputy Teixeirato get around Deputy Tara Hadley Adams.” (GER928.)

• “Agent Dahle interviews Sexton ten days later [November 26, 2012, two

days before Sexton’s second Grand Jury appearance]. He says somethingentirely consistent.” (GER924.)

The record belies the Government’s claims that Sexton did not become a

target of the investigation until after his second Grand Jury appearance.

B. The USAM Explicitly Requires Prosecutors to Provide Target

Warnings.

The USAM states that while a Grand Jury may properly subpoena a subject

or target of an investigation, that right is limited due to the potential for the

appearance of unfairness. (ER474.) Thus, before a target is subpoenaed, it is

United States Department of Justice policy to “advise a Grand Jury witness of his

5Agent Dahle interviewed Sexton on August 29, 2012. (GER1770.)



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or her rights if such a witness is a ‘target’ or ‘subject’ of a Grand Jury

investigation.” (ER476.)

The Government may not now attempt to sidestep the notice requirement by

claiming that it had not decided to prosecute Sexton until after he testified before

the Grand Jury. The USAM is not so limited. A target must be notified of his

status and rights prior to being subpoenaed for Grand Jury testimony. That did not

occur here. The Government specifically advised Sexton, and his counsel, that he

was not a target of the investigation (a claim that was false). (ER458 at ¶¶ 4-5;

ER459 at ¶ 9 (Sexton’s prior counsel stated under penalty of perjury that “it was

obvious to me that I had been misled and James Sexton had always been a target

defendant”).)

By its own admissions—particularly given its reliance on the evidence at

trial—the Government believed it had sufficient facts linking Sexton to a crime. It,

therefore, had a duty to notify Sexton (or counsel) of his target status prior to

obtaining a sworn “confession.”

C.

Due Process Requires Federal Courts to Exercise Supervisory

Authority over Grand Jury Procedural Rules Governing

Defendants.

It is only under the federal courts’ supervision that the United States

Attorney’s Office may use the Grand Jury’s investigatory power, and that power is

limited by the courts’ responsibility to ensure that the “assurances of the United



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States Attorneys [are translated] into consistent performance by their assistants.”

United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 778 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing United States v.

Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (emphasis in original)). The Grand Jury has

historically been a “shield against arbitrary or oppressive action, by insuring that

serious criminal accusations will be brought only upon the considered judgment of

a representative body of citizens acting under oath and under judicial instruction

and guidance.” United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976).

Here, the Government misused the District Court’s authority over the Grand

Jury by compelling the Grand Jury testimony of a target of an investigation. The

Government also put three of Sexton’s co-defendants before that same Grand Jury

(without warnings) before subsequently indicting them. Such repeated and

egregious conduct justifies this Court exercising its supervisory power to suppress

Sexton’s Grand Jury testimony for the Government’s failure to follow binding

USAM guidance. See, e.g. , United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d at 778 (suppressing

Grand Jury testimony where defendant was not provided with a target notice);

United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1137 (2d Cir. 1972) (reversing following

improper presentation of evidence before the Grand Jury).

Contrary to the Government’s assertion, Sexton is not seeking to have this

Court impermissibly “prescribe” standards of prosecutorial conduct. (GAB62

(citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 45 (1992).) Williams is



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distinguishable. The issue there was whether a district court may dismiss an

indictment when the Government failed to disclose to the Grand Jury exculpatory

evidence in its possession. Id. at 37-38. Exculpatory evidence to the Grand Jury is

not at issue here. Instead, Sexton asks the Court to exercise its supervisory power

to ensure that this District’s USAO not compel putative defendants’ testimony

before the Grand Jury.

United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 190 (1977) is also inapposite. In

Washington, the Supreme Court found that target warnings are not constitutionally

required when the interrogation is not conducted in an “inherently coercive

setting.” Washington emphasized that the respondent was on notice that he was a

suspect because he was made “aware that his exculpatory version of events had

been disbelieved,” and the prosecutor made it clear during an interview that his

“implausible story” was not accepted as true. Id. at 189.

Unlike Washington, the Government knew that Sexton was a target and

deliberately misled him. (ER458 at ¶ 4.) Nor is there evidence, during Sexton’s

testimony to prosecutors, that he was “abundantly aware” that prosecutors found

him to be incredible. Much the opposite, Sexton believed he was not a target but a

witness, because that’s what the Government told his counsel.

The Government’s deliberate lulling of Sexton should not be countenanced.

“Lack of candor by government prosecutors in making disclosures can in some



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instances amount to a due process violation[;]” United States v. Crocker , 568 F.2d

1049, 1056 (3d Cir. 1977); and due process exists to ensure that similarly situated

defendants are treated the same. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987).

Here, the Government failed to follow its own publicly available USAM,6 and treat

Sexton with candor. Having been singled out for unfair treatment—another

indication of how far this turf war went—Sexton’s Grand Jury testimony should be

suppressed.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING TESTIMONYREGARDING THE GOVERNMENT’S WITHDRAWAL OF A WRIT.

A. Evidence of the Writ’s Withdrawal Was Permitted During the

First Trial, but Excluded from the Second.

On or about August 25, 2011, the Court issued a Writ compelling the

production of Inmate Brown for testimony before the Grand Jury on September 7,

2011. (ER257.)During the first trial, Sexton introduced evidence that, four days

after the Writ was issued, Sheriff Baca met with then-United States Attorney

André Birotte to discuss the investigation into the LASD. (ER200-203.)

Following this meeting, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Carlos Narro testified that

“there [were] discussions about holding off on some subpoenas and stuff.” (ER190

at 702:17-23.) Then, SSA Narro testified that AUSA Lawrence Middleton (who

6 The Supreme Court recently stated that the USAM is supposed to guide

prosecutors’ decisions. Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. ___, (2016) (“when U. S.Attorneys have jurisdiction, they are generally to defer to, rather than supplant,

state prosecutions of serious offenses. [citing the USAM]”.)



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was overseeing the investigation into the LASD) told him that, on August 29,

2011, “the writ for Anthony Brown had been withdrawn[.]” (ER354.) SSA Narro

explained:

Q: So Mr. Middleton told you that the writ had beenwithdrawn . . .

A. That was my understanding. The investigation as

a whole was going to be halted. . . .

. . .

Q. As you sit here today, do you have any informationthat would lead you to believe that that delay impededyour investigation?

A. Not that I know of.

(ER354-356 at 797:14-799:22.).7

Because the Writ was withdrawn four days after being issued, the

Government was not expecting Inmate Brown to appear for Grand Jury testimony,

and the FBI investigation had been suspended; it would have been reasonable for

the jury to infer that Sexton could not have committed obstruction.

Prior to Sexton’s second trial, however, the Government moved to exclude

evidence that the Writ had been withdrawn. (ER309-317.) During trial, the

7In Sexton’s second trial, AUSA Middleton disputed that he told SSA Narro theWrit had been withdrawn. (GAB66.) AUSA Middleton previously admitted,

however, that he told the Federal Marshals Service “not to pursue it [the Writ] untilfurther notice.” (GER1422 at 779:22.) The second jury was not allowed to hear

SSA Narro’s contrary testimony.



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District Court granted the Government’s motion, holding that because the Court

did not know of any evidence suggesting that the withdrawal of the Writ was

communicated to the LASD, the Court would preclude any evidence as to the

withdrawal. (ER41 at 650:8-21.)

B. The Trial Court Erred in Excluding Evidence Related to the

Withdrawal of the Writ.

The Government begins its defense on this issue by trying to lower this

Court’s standard of review. (GAB67.) Citing no law, the Government claims this

Court should review only under an abuse of discretion standard not a de novo

standard. While the Government loses regardless of standard, the Government is

wrong. Here, legal issues predominate regarding whether the LASD’s knowledge

of the termination of the Grand Jury investigation is sufficient to negate the

elements required to establish obstruction of justice. The District Court’s

suppression of evidence turned not on factual disputes, or discretionary

determinations. (ER41 at 650:8-21.) It turned on its understanding of the

underlying charge and materiality—legal questions requiring de novo review. Id.;

see also United States v. Chu Kong Yin, 935 F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1991)

(explaining de novo review); United States v. Marbella, 73 F.3d 1508, 1515 (9th

Cir. 1996) (same).

Notwithstanding the standard of review, the Government asserts that, even if

the Writ had been withdrawn prior to Inmate Brown’s scheduled Grand Jury



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appearance, the withdrawal would not impact whether Sexton’s acts obstructed a

Grand Jury investigation. (GAB68.) This argument fundamentally misapprehends

the legal requirements for obstruction of justice, which demands that obstruction at

least be a theoretically possible result of the defendant’s actions. See 18 U.S.C. §

1503(a); see Tham, 960 F.2d at 1400 (“Obstruction of justice requires acts to

thwart some aspect of the Government’s judicial function.”).

While actual obstruction is not an element of proof, the act must be

“material” and have the “capability” of obstructing justice. United States v. Bonds,

784 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 2015). Specifically, the “government must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the charged conduct was capable of influencing a

decisionmaking person or entity—for example, by causing it to cease its

investigation, pursue different avenues of inquiry, or reach a different outcome.”

Id.

Here, the jury should have had the opportunity to hear evidence related to

the Writ’s withdrawal to make a determination regarding whether Sexton’s actions

could have impeded a Grand Jury that no longer sought Inmate Brown’s testimony.

Because the Writ had been withdrawn, Sexton’s actions likely had no consequence.

The Government’s reliance on United States v. Rasheed , 663 F.2d 843 (9th

Cir. 1981), is misplaced. In Rasheed , the defendant destroyed documents of which

the prosecutors were unaware and subsequently received a notice that her



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production duties under the Grand Jury subpoena had been satisfied. Id. at 853.

The Government focuses on the Rasheed court’s statement that the offense had

been committed when the order to destroy documents was issued. Id.

As above, Sexton did not issue, but simply followed, lawfully-issued orders.

In addition, there is no evidence that Inmate Brown would have never been made

available to the Grand Jury upon request (unlike the documents that were

destroyed). An analysis of materiality under Section 1503 requires an analysis of

the charged conduct and “the context in which [it was] made[.]” Bonds, 784 F.3d

at 585 (9th Cir. 2015) (Konzinski, J. concurring) (citations omitted). Here, that

context shows a defendant following orders he believed to be lawful, regarding a

witness the Grand Jury ultimately never wanted to hear from. The evidence was

material.

The same analysis applies to United States v. Ladum, 141 F.3d 1328, 1339

(9th Cir. 1998). In Ladum, the defendant created false records that were never

presented to the Grand Jury. No similar facts occurred here.

Rather, Sexton was charged with keeping a witness from the Grand Jury

when the facts—had the jury been allowed to hear them—would have shown that

the Grand Jury no longer wanted to hear from Inmate Brown. With a hung jury in

the first trial (when this evidence came in) and a conviction in the second (when

kept from the jury) this evidence is very probative and its exclusion was not



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harmless. Macias, 789 F.3d at 1028; United States v. Thompson, 37 F.3d 450, 454

(9th Cir. 1994) (previous hung jury is “persuasive evidence that the district court’s

error affected the verdict”).

Due to the District Court’s exclusion of testimony regarding the Writ’s

withdrawal, the trier of fact was precluded from determining whether Sexton’s

actions had the natural and probable effect of impeding the Grand Jury. See ER32

(“[T]he government must prove that the defendant’s actions would have had the

natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.”).

Such an error was not harmless, particularly in light of the six-to-six hung jury in

the first trial (where the information was admitted) and the conviction in the

second trial (where the information was excluded).

The prejudicial error warrants a reversal and remand here.



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VI. CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Sexton respectfully requests that this

Court reverse his conviction.

DATED: May 20, 2016 PAUL HASTINGS LLP

By: /s/

THOMAS P. O’BRIEN

THOMAS P. O’BRIEN (SB# 166369)

KATHRYN C. WANNER (SB# 269310)

PAUL HASTINGS LLP515 South Flower Street

Twenty-Fifth Floor

Los Angeles, California 90071-2228Telephone: 1(213) 683-6000

Facsimile: 1(213) 627-0705

Attorneys for AppellantJames Sexton



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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the attached Appellant’s Reply Brief uses a 14 point Times

New Roman font and contains 6,998 words, exclusive of the table of contents,

table of citations, addenda, and certificates of counsel, relying on the word count of

the computer program used to prepare Appellant’s Reply Brief.

DATED: May 20, 2016 PAUL HASTINGS LLP

515 South Flower Street

Twenty-Fifth FloorLos Angeles, CA 90071-2228

THOMAS P. O’BRIENKATHRYN C. WANNER

By: /s/

Thomas P. O’Brien

Attorneys for AppellantJames Sexton



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ADDENDUM OF RELEVANT CITED STATUTES

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) ............................................................ Addendum 1

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) ............................................. Addendum 2



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Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3)

Rule 803(3). Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay--Regardless of Whether

the Declarant Is Available as a Witness.

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether

the declarant is available as a witness:

. . .

(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition.A statement of thedeclarant's then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or

emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodilyhealth), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact

remembered or believed unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant'swill.

ADDENDUM 1



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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a)

Rule 52(a). Harmless and Plain Error.

Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rightsmust be disregarded.

ADDENDUM 2



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I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system

on (date) .

I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be

accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICEWhen All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System

I hereby certify that I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system

on (date) .

Participants in the case who are registered CM/ECF users will be served by the appellate

CM/ECF system.

I further certify that some of the participants in the case are not registered CM/ECF users. I

have mailed the foregoing document by First-Class Mail, postage prepaid, or have dispatched it

to a third party commercial carrier for delivery within 3 calendar days to the following

non-CM/ECF participants:

Signature (use "s/" format)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

When Not All Case Participants are Registered for the Appellate CM/ECF System

9th Circuit Case Number(s)

*******************************************************************************

NOTE: To secure your input, you should print the filled-in form to PDF (File > Print > PDF Printer/Creator ).

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s/Thomas P. O'Brien

14-50583

May 20, 2016


5-20-16 -- James Sexton Reply Brief

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