Birth of 4th Infantry Division

4th Infantry (Diamond) Division came into being based on the new concept

and reorganization plan of GHQ, AFP, the right after the deactivation of 4th

Military Area, as it originates from the activated 10h Military District before World

War II sometimes on 1936. With its area of responsibility (A0R) covered the whole

Mindanao Island to include the island of Sulu.

Activation / Deactivations and renaming of Units

On 01 February 1970, IVMA/ID was deactivated and 4th Infantry Division was

activated on same date, pursuant to Section IV, General Orders Number 237,

GHQ, AFP dated 01 February 1970 and pursuant to Section IV, General Orders Nr

101, HPA dated 02 February 1970.

It was at this time when the “Diamond Star” was born as the Commands

insignia. The symbol that now shines on the shoulders of the officers and men of

this Command signifying the unit‟s steadfastness and determination in

protecting and defending the people including the vast resources of Mindanao

and Sulu that remains to be tagged as the “The Land of Promise”.

During this period, the defunct Headquarters & Headquarters Coy, IVMA, PA

was also deactivated and Headquarters & Headquarters Company, 4th Inf Div,

PA was activated. All equipments, supplies and records were absorbed from

HHCo, IVMA, PA with 48 officers, 208 Enlisted personnel and Trainees.

GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATIOIN OF 4TH INF DIV, PA AOR

The 4th Infantry Division with its Headquarters based in Camp Evangelista,

Cagayan de Oro City it is then biggest ground force in Mindanao, wherein half

of the entire island of Mindanao comprising 40,000 kms of Zamboanga

Peninsula. Basilan Island and Northern Mindanao embraced the AOR of the

command with 3.7 million populations.

Its terrain consists mainly of mountains cut by streams, creeks and rivers. It has

narrow plains and long coastal areas covered by second growth forest, shrubs

and cogon grasses, which are remnants of indiscriminate cutting of logs,

coconut plantations on the hills and rice PAddies on plains that gave a touch

verdant of life to the area.

The bulk of population are found on Cagayan de Oro City, BukIDnon, Cotabato,

Iligan City, PAgadian City, Ozamis City, Dipolog City, Dapitan, Tangub and the

socially and culturally Mediterranean of the south-Zamboanga City. The native

of the region consists of Tausogs, Yakans, Samals, Higaonons, Manobos, Banwa-

on, Tirurays, Tisadays, Maguindana-on, Iranons, Maranaos and Subanons who

are mostly thriving on farming business and fishing.

People from Visayas Island and Luzon who migrated to Mindanao to look for a

greener Pasture, has helped develop the island. They lived together with the

ethnic groups. Life went on unmolested for years.

Upon the deactivation of IVMA to 4th Infantry Division, on 01 February 1970,

BGen JUAN B CRUZ was the first Commanding General of 4th Infantry Division up

to 16 January

1972. He was instrumental in steering the newly organized unit of the Philippine

Army in Southern Philippines.

4ID Mission

The primary combat mission of the division is to destroy or capture enemy

military forces and to control assigned territory including population and

resources. The term “destroy” in the division’s mission is not limited to physical

destruction but defeating the enemy force so decisively until they no longer

have the capability or will to fight.

In addition to its primary combat mission, the division is employed in a variety of

other missions that contribute to the country’s attainment of national goals and

objectives, These include truce enforcement, advisory assistance, peace-

keeping mission and other related operations designed to maintain, restore or

establish a climate of order wherein a responsible government can function

effectively to serve the country and people.

Tactical units

Pursuant to Section1, General Orders 4, Headquarters 4th Infantry Division,

Philippine Army dated 6 February 1970, and 27th BCT was reorganized and

became the 27th Infantry Battalion with Col LORETO CORTEZ. As the

commanding officer.

Upon the deactivation of the 4th Military Area, on 02 Feb 70 pursuant to Sec 111,

GO # 101, HPA and H4ID, PA pursuant to Sec 1, GO # 3 dated 03 Feb 70, the

15TH Field Artillery Battalion was deactivated and renamed Fire Support

Battalion under CPT NOEL C AGOS (FA) PA.

On the early 70‟s, the backdrop of student activism and political bickering, was

added with the trouble erupted in Mindanao as triggered by MNLF secessionist

insurgents that are later called for stronger force to meet them. The 4th Infantry

(Diamond) Division which was activated on 1 February 1970 from the defunct

4th Military Area was the first military unit to counter the first solid blows of the

insurgents that threatened the safety of the Republic from the hands of the

armed lawless elements, before the reinforcement from Cebu and Luzon arrived

in Mindanao. The two (2) organic Infantry Battalions; 26IB and 27IB backed up

by combat and service support units, without lift-up, fought the enemy in the

hinterlands and coastal areas of Cotabato, Lanao, Basilan, Zamboanga

Peninsula and Jolo. Though the command was still at its stage of building and

refurbishing its forces, manned by inexperienced troops in unconventional

warfare. That withstood the heavy onslaught of the enemy.

Before, the 3rd Infantry Division of Cebu and 1st Infantry Division of Luzon

occupied Cotabato and Jolo, the AOR of Diamond Division was too big and

wide enough to be contained by the 4ID troopers, having only two Infantry

Battalions to occupy the Island of Mindanao. In this regards, it necessitates to

commit other military forces in areas that warrants the situation as needed.

When peace was established in the area, the troops were withdrawn and

deployed to other troubled areas. To all of these, the deployment of troops

demised the enemy’s strength.

On 16 January 1972, BGen FLORENCIO J PALACIOS assumed command as the

2nd Commanding General of 4th Infantry Division who led the command for

four months from Jan 16, 1972 up to 28 May 28, 1972, likewise the Commanding

General of Task Force Pagkakaisa.

On 28 May 1972, BGen ANTONIO N VENADAS assumed the command as the

Commanding General of 4th Infantry Division, and assumed also the

Commanding General of Task Force Pagkakaisa; He served the command up to

26 Jan 1973.

During the time of BGen VENADAS, the two maneuvering units; 26IB and 27IB

(Reinforce) was involved, upon the creation of the Task Force Pagkakaisa and

Task Force Alfa that was stationed at Bus-bus, Jolo and to the deployment of the

Tactical Brigades in different areas.

4th Infantry Brigade was created under Col ALCOSEBA and later

transformed it to 1/4 Infantry Brigade (Provisional). On 1971, 4th Infantry Division

established an Advance Command Post (ACP) Zamboanga City.

2/4 Infantry Brigade was created and deployed in PAgadian City with Col

PEDRO ABANGAN as the unit commander..

3/4 Infantry Brigade was created and deployed in Zamboanga Peninsula with

Col ALEONAR as the unit commander, with the following staff of the unit; 1LT

ESTEBAN EBO as the Intelligence officer, Maj FELOMINO RAYPON as the

operations officer.

Upon the creation of the 1/4 Infantry Brigade, the division adopted the

“KAMAGONG CONCEPT” with 60 % Trainees and 40% Regular (60%-40%) as the

unit composition. 28th Infantry Division was then created and the first

Kamagong unit.

Creation of Additional Tactical & Combat Support Units

During the period, the two (2) maneuvering unit namely, the 26th BCT and 27th

BCT, were then renamed to 26th Infantry Battalion and 27th Infantry Battalion.

Creation of the Tactical Infantry Brigades followed; the 1/ 4, 2/4 & 3/4 Brigades

with additional Infantry Battalions 28TH IB,29th IB & 30TH IB respectively. SaID

maneuvering were distrIButed to the different tactical Brigades

FSBn

On 02 Feb 70, upon the deactivation of the 4th Military Area, pursuant to Sec

111, GO # 101, HPA and the creation of H4ID, PA pursuant to Sec 1, GO # 3

dated 03 Feb 70, the 15TH Field Artillery Battalion was deactivated and renamed

Fire Support Battalion under CPT NOEL C AGOS (FA) PA.

CESH

On 01 July 1971, the Army Station Hospital was renamed to Camp Evangelista

Station Hospital (CESH) as an authorized one hundred (100) bed caPAcity

hospital and later became an attached unit to 4th Infantry Division.

On 23 Jan 1973, Col ALFONSO E ALCOSEBA assumed the command as the

Division Commander. Upon his assumption of command, additional three (3)

Infantry Battalions was activated, namely; 36th Infantry Battalion, 9th Infantry

Battalion and the 40th Infantry Battalion. These newly created additional

maneuvering units were also distributed to the different tactical brigades that

form as integral Part of the unit and one Division Training Unit called the

Reconnaissance Training Group (RTG), which was activated on the later Part of

1972. These units have contributed big accomplishments to the Division during

the height of its campaign against the MNLF secessionist.

In the year of 1973, the situation demand’s for a bigger force to fill-up the

Tactical Brigades and Battalions. Tour of duty of young men were called for

military training and extended pursuant to the Training Utilization Law. The

“KAMAGONG CONCEPT” was adopted to recruit 3rd Class Trainees, with a six (6)

months basic training. They have to undergo, with a rigorous Commando

training, designed for an special warfare. This special warfare course makes

them skillful and better soldier in preparation for combat before for their

absorption to Infantry Battalions. This Kamagong Concept, extends‟ the duty

service of the trainees to filled- up Infantry Battalions under the 4th Inf Division,

namely; 8th, 9th, 23rd, 28th, 29th, 30th, 36th, 40th and 41st in addition to the

original two (2) units 26th & 27th Inf Bns, without discount of its combat and

services support. The command had mustered enough strength to negate the

enemy nefarious activities in seceding Mindanao from the Republic of the

Philippines.

It employed two-phases of strategies: 1st is the Pacification and 2nd is

rehabilitation. In this Pacification drive, force was used as an ultimate means

and it resulted to the destruction of the enemy mass base in Jolo sometime in

February 1974 and the isolation of enemy insurgents in some areas. Displaced

people in trouble areas were rehabilitated to include rebel surrenderees. The

government assisted them on self-helped project. Civic actions like Dental and

Medical offered free treatment to civilians to include medicine. Infrastructure

project and socio-economic development were initiated by the command. As

a result, hundreds‟ of rebel surrendered together with their Fas. The rebel

surrenderors massed to the processing centers and returned to the fold of the

laws, for they believed in sincerity of the government in its crusade to build a

new and better society. Hard core rebels remained on the mountains and were

at gun battle with the Diamond Troopers from time to time.

Continuous of Activations, Deactivations & renaming of units

HHCo, 4ID, PA

On 20 April 1974, HHCo, 4ID, PA was deactivated and HHSBn, 4ID, PA was

activated pursuant to PAra 111, GO #386 AID, PA dated 21 April 1974 with a

strength of 43 Officers, 183 Enlisted personnel and 31 Trainees.

4TH FABN, 4ID PA

On 19 Jan 74, pursuant to sec 7, Sub PAra 2, GO # 498, H4ID, PA. Fire Support

Battalion was reorganized and renamed to 4th Field Artillery Battalion, 4ID, PA.

On 01 Apr 1978, 4th Field Artillery Battalion was deactivated and upgraded as

4th Field Artillery Regiment pur to PAra 2, Sec 11, GO # 71 dated 01 Apr 78.

Following the organization of 4th FAR, the 10th Field Artillery Battalion was

activated on Oct 78 pur to Sec 1A, GO # 01, H4FAR dated 20 Sep 78.

Office of the AC of S G5, 4ID (Home Defense)

During this period, the office of G5, 4th Inf Div (Home defense) Provisional was

activated as one of the 4ID General Staff effective on 01 September 1978.

Employment of Tactical Units

1/4 Infantry Brigade:

On 1971, 4th Infantry Division established an Advance Command Post (ACP)

Zamboanga City. At this juncture, 1/4 Infantry Brigade (Provisional) was then

organized with Col ALFONSO P ALCOSEBA as the brigade commander. With the

following brigade staff officers:

- LT OCAMPO

- LT ESTEBAN EBO

- CPT FRANCISCO P CALIBO

3/4 Infantry Brigade:

3/4 Infantry Brigade was created and deployed in Zamboanga Peninsula with

Col ALEONAR as the commander with the following staff of the unit; 1LT ESTEBAN

EBO as the Intelligence officer, Maj FELOMINO RAYPON as the opns offr. 3/4

Infantry Brigade, first operation was conducted at Sta Maria, Siocon,

Zamboanga Del Sur. With the mission to conduct search and destroy operations

addressed against the armed lawless elements.

2/4 Infantry Brigade:

On 15 July 1973, 2/4 Brigade of the 4th Infantry Division, Philippine Army was

organized pursuant to General Orders 41, Hqs 4ID, PA dated 15 July 1973. With a

“Mission to provide command and control and supervise all ground forces in

Basilan and its adjacent islets”. Its birth came during the height of the Moro

National Liberation Front secessionist movement in mainland Mindanao and the

surrounding islands of Basilan, Sulu and PAlawan. On April 16, 1988, the 2/4 Bde

was re-designated 402nd Infantry Brigade pursuant to General Orders Nr 199

HPA dated 20 April 1988.

Since then, the command post of 2/4 - 402nd Inf Bde was transferred to different

areas namely; Basilan, in 1973, 1974 and 1981, PAgadian City in 1976,

Zamboanga City in 1980 and 1983, Maria Cristina, Iligan City in 1994 before the

Bde was transferred to its present base in New Leyte, Awa ProsperIDa, Agusan

Del Sur on 15 July 2002

The Significant Activities of 4th Infantry Division since 1970-78

4th infantry Division, undertook several activities that resulted to positive

accomplishments. These activities are ranging from what are basic as the

guardian of peace and as a Partner in National Development that contributed

much to the success of the 4ID, PA as what we called the significant events.

There have been numerous goals, tasks and missions the unit has fulfilled which

made it as harbinger of peace and people’s trust as well thru its genuine interest

in their welfare. During its formative period, the command activities were

geared mostly on Civil Assistance Operations in coordination with the

government and private sectors.

Significant Accomplishments

Anti-smuggling and Anti-piracy operations were launched by the elements of

the 26th Inf Bn. One of the 4ID‟s premier Infantry unit. In the turbulent waters of

Basilan and Sulu, which was attached operationally with SOWESCOM. The unit

also established a detachment at Linao, Lebak, Cotabato to protect and

secure the Joloanos surrenderees and settlers North of Pesa Point Cotabato.

During the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention, the

command organized four (4) Provisional Companies composed of 26 officers,

204 EP and 507 ROTC cadets who assisted the COMELEC in the depressed areas

of Mindanao.

Civic Action were also conducted like putting up of pre-FAB buildings,

construction of roads, water wells, bridges, fencing and farm demonstrations, in

order to uplift the economic and social conditions in the rural areas. Seminars on

manpower training were carried out in coordination with PACD and other

civilian agencies.

The command assisted in setting up of a total of 245 self-help projects in the

different provinces of Mindanao. The Medical Team treated a total of 24,573

civilians‟ Patients while the dental Teams in 76 municipalities and 186 barrios

attended others to.

Before the Mindanao uprising

After the reactivation of the 27th Inf Bn, 4th ID, PA on 6 February 1970, the unit

under the reign of Col LORETO CORTEZ was operationally attached with Task

Force Habagat in Cotabato, and it was stationed at PC Hill Cotabato city. The

unit has still to prePAre, supervise and train 20-year-old trainees then at Camp

PAulino Santos Training Center at Alamada, North Cotabato and subsequently

conducted AADT the at Cotabato city.

On 1 July 1971, all units of the 27th Inf Bn were consolIDated at Kabacan, North

Cotabato and subsequently was placed attached operationally to Task Force

PAgkakaisa pursuant to Letter of Instruction 1/71 (MARS Alfa 4) Hqs 4ID, PA

dated 28 June 1971. This newly organized TF PAgkakaisa assumed operational

control of the following municiPAlities of the province of Cotabato: Pikit,

MIDsayap, PAgalunan, Alamada, Kabacan, Carmen, Matalam, Magpet,

PresIDent Roxas, KIDaPAwan, Makilala, M‟lang, Tulunan, Columbio, Lutayan,

Tacurong and Sultan Sa Barongis.

Insurgent uprising & AFP Major Combat Operations

In the early PArt of 1971, a conflict between the CHRISTIANS armed groups

called as “ILAGAS‟ and the local MUSLIM Politicians armed group called

“BLACKSHIRT/BARACUDAS” became rampant in the area driving the local

Christian resident to leave their homes.

The 4th Infantry Division immediately responded by deploying combat troopers

in those troubled spots, with only to (2) Infantry Battalions, the 27th Inf Bn was

deployed in the Municipalities of Cotabato and was attached operationally to

“Task Force PAgkakaisa” IV PCZ pursuant to Letter of Instructions 1/71 MARS

ALFA Hq 4ID, PA dated 28 June 1971.

On August 3, 1971, the town of Buldon, North Cotabato was controlled by the

lawless elements. The PC troopers were ambushed at Borra Crossing, inflicting

several casualties. This incident prompted Task Force “PAGKAKAISA” to secure

reinforcement coming from 27IB (R) and to form one (1) Provisional Company.

The ambush of the reinforcement team led the military to launch an offensive

against the lawless elements at Buldon. On 13 August 1971, 27IB under the

command of COL CESAR BATILO jumped-off towards Buldon with elements of

the Combat Support Company 4th Field Artillery under LTC NOEL AGOS (then

CPT) who provided fire support to the unit. The unit suffered four (4) KIA and six

(6) WIA. This operation was terminated upon the formal surrender of MAYOR

ARATUC of Buldon together with his followers to the Secretary of National

Defense HON JUAN PONCE ENRILE on 25 August 1971.

On these eventualities, rampant hostilities were made between the armed

groups of “ILAGAS” and the “BARACUDAS”, inflicting losses on the lives and

properties of innocent civilians in the municipalities of Lanao del Norte,

prompting the command to deploy troops. On 30 Sep 71, the elements of 26TH

Inf Bn under the command of late COL GONZALO SIONGCO established its

headquarters at KaPAtagan, Lanao del Norte. It was operationally attached to

Task Force “PAGARI” LANCAF. The unit waged intensive operations to neutralize

the hostile activities of the lawless group. However, on 26 Oct 71, the elements

of Bravo Company, 26IB were ambushed by a heavily armed Muslim group at

Tilunod Bridge in Magsaysay, Lano del Norte, while on their way to reinforce a

platoon size detachment in Magsaysay town that was attacked by another

Muslim armed band. This incIDent resulted in the death of three (3) officers and

fourteen (14) EP and wounding five (5) others. This violent incident, perpetrated

by the armed lawless, led to a search and destroy operations along Tangkal-

Magsaysay complex utilizing the elements of 26IB as the maneuver force and

4th Field Artillery to provIDe fire support. After the conduct of the search and

destroy operations, peace and order was restored and civilians returned to their

homes.

On the middle Part of year 1972, the 4th Infantry Division recruited 650 ex-

trainees for enlistments, in order to strengthen the capabilities of its fighting units

and beef-up its INF Bns. The trainees underwent a “Modified Ranger” training

prior to their deployment to the combat areas.

Upon the declaration of Martial Law on 22 Sep 72, the command campaigned

for the surrender of loose and unlicensed firearms. The Muslim who held the bulk

of high-powered weapons were slow to respond. Instead some of their political

leaders opposed the new set-up of the government. Various Muslim

organizations were formed in the provinces and terroristic activities against the

government started showing up.

On 20 Oct 72, a Muslim armed group led by Abdul Khayer Alonto attacked

Camp Amai PAk-PAk and seized the government owned Mindanao State

University in Marawi City. The troopers of 26IB, Marines and Constabulary,

contained this display of terroristic activity.

Towards the later PArt of 1972, the peace and order deteriorated in the

province of Basilan and Jolo, Sulu. Prompting the 4ID to deploy troops in the

areas. The contingent of the 26IB under the command of COL TOMAS NANQUIL

was pulled out from Lanao del Norte and was sent to Basilan province. The units

conducted a search and destroy operations against the rebel forces and Mt

Batungal-Tumahubong and Tipo-Tipo. After its brief stay there, it \was pulled out

for deployment in Jolo.

Major Combat Operations

On 25 Dec 71, 4ID‟s Infantry Brigades took over the Jolo campaign and it started

at the SIBalo Hill operation. An offensive operation was conducted utilizing small

units. SIBalo Hill was strategically situated near site in Sulu‟s Panama District,

easily became the rebels stronghold. It was the 2nd Marines BLT failed to occupy

on 21 Nov 72. This operation that 12 teams of Scout Rangers, two (2) coy of

Marines, one reinforce Company of 11th Inf Bn, one Pltn 105HOW of the 4thy

Field Artillery, one Mortar Pltn of Marines and component of Navy RPS 69 and

two PAF Helicopters. After the lighting maneuvers spearheaded by the Ranger

Teams. However, SIBalo Hill was seized, leaving minimal losses on the

government‟s side and scored of accounted casualties.

Right after the SIBalo Hill operation it was followed by another successful guerilla-

type operation at Labagan, Zamboanga del Sur the town which was occupied

by rebels in the mIDdle of March „73, but was recaptured on March 23,1973 by

a Task Group code named “CHARLIE” that composed of eight Ranger Teams

led by CPT SANGAAN of SRCG, ”C” Coy, 26IB, one Company of Marines, 4th

COSAC, ZSCC, 461PC Coy and Navy components RPS 69 and BLT 68 OPORD 8,

6TH Bde is tasked to conduct an offensive against the rebels at TAGUISA-TRANS-

TOROGAN complex in Lebak town. This operation was one of the major

operations conducted in North Cotabato. This was executed by 6th Inf Bde, 4ID

under the command of late COL GONZALO H SIONGCO. This operation was

made possIBle thru the elements of 27IB, 22nd IB, 21st IB, 25th IB, ICIB and

Dagohoy CHDF Bn of Lebak. On 23 June 1973, 27th Inf Bn under Col RODRIGO M

ORDOYO, moved from Kabacan to Lebak with a mission to search and destroy

the rebels within the three barrios of Lebak namely; Taguisa, Tran and Turogan.

The operation was launched on 26 Jun73 by elements of the 27IB with the

support of the two (2) Armored Personnel Carrier. Its main task was to clear and

contain the enemy forces at TAGUISA, to prevent enemy escape and block the

probable routes of withdrawal from TOROGAN. Upon reaching the vicinity of

barrio TAGUISA GC164612, the elements of Charlie and Bravo Coy of 27IB

encountered the main rebel forces. Stiff opposition met the government forces.

The ensuing battle crippled one APC. Although, outnumbered, the troopers of

27IB fought back ferociously and repelled the counter attack launched by the

enemy. The unit suffered losses both in lives and properties, but it has proven its

mettle with the leadership of Col ORDOYO. For three (3) days of combat at

TAGUISA, 87 were killed on the enemy sIDe while the government forces suffered

6 KIA and 11 WIA. This later led to the surrender of 2,000 rebels. The unit‟s

PArticiPAtion in this combat operation in Lebak complex has earned for itself the

most coveted decoration and become the recipient of PRESIDENTIAL STREAMER

AWARD.

A rebel attack the Rubber Plantation at Basilan that led Tactical Command

“CHARLIE” to organize operation “BANAT” conducted on 12 Apr 73 to 06 Jul 73

utilizing the elements of the 24th Inf Bn and 2nd Inf Bn, with the 23rd Inf Bn as

reserve force.. With this operation the TUMAHUBONG Goodrich Plantation was

recaptured inflicting heavy losses on the enemy sIDe; 296 killed and 240

wounded while on the government sIDe suffered 6 KIA and 30 WIA.

The increasing number of rebels in eastern Lamitan, Basilan prompted the

command to organize another operation code named “TOOTHHPICK”. The

Tactical Command Charlie under the command of COL TOMAS NANQUIL

executed this operation on 07-21 Jul 73. The Marines BLT conducted an

amphIBious assault on the enemy occupied shores of TUBURAN, while elements

of 24IB and 23IB launched a clearing operation at CANAS and SINANGKAPAN

complex with the support of 4th field Artillery and components of Navy and Air

force. This operation was very significant, for killing 615 enemies and the

government suffered only 22 casualties including 6 ICHDF.

On 01 Jul 73, the 28IB and ICHDF of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur decIDed to stop the

activities of the rebels operating along the coastal areas of Ipil by attacking

MAGDAUP-PALIOD, the rebel‟s sanctuary and supply point and Passage station

from TUBURAN-SACOL towards Alicia. The operation resulted in the seizure of

several assorted ammunitions and documents.

On 17 Jul 73, the rebels retaliated when they ambushed the elements of the 30IB

at vicinity of Km 13 in Basilan Province. The ambush inflicted several casualties

on the government sIDe. Immediately, the command launched operation

“PILAYAN”, to clear the western portion of the island. Operation “PILAYAN”

employed four (4) Infantry Battalions (30IB, 2IB, 24IB & 2BLT Marines) and

components of PAF and Navy. The Marines 2BLT and 2IB attacked the rear of

objective. Strong rebel stronghold composed of Tausog and Yakan trIBes under

the leadership of TUPAY KALBI and YASIN Brothers were successfully handled by

the government forces and recaptured of TAIRAN Plantation that was held by

the rebels for almost a year. Later on, TUPAY KALBI surrendered and was

appointed as Vice-Governor of Basilan, Province. On the enemy sIDe, about 120

were killed while in the government sIDe 4 KIA, 15 WIA. On Sep 73, the

command, composed of troopers from 24IB, 2BLT Marines, PC SULU, SSDF/CHDF

of Siasi and the 4th Field Artillery launched a clearing operation at SIASI Island.

This resulted in the restoration of civilian government in Siasi and the

reinstatement of the military supervisor (MAYOR)

The 3/4 Brigade also launched a major operation against rebel forces at

SIRAWAI, SICON & SIBUCO area. This operation was Participated in by the

elements of the ICIB, 14IB, 1st PC Bn, ZNCC, RTG, 4TH FAB with components of

the PAF and Navy who will have to provide fire support. The ICHDF in the area

supported the operation by providing guides to the regular troops towards the

enemy strongholds. More so, the result of the operation led to the surrender of

some 900-rebel sympathizers at Fort Sta Maria. This operation was launched on 2

Nov 73 and terminated on the 10 Nov 73.

The biggest and most decisive victory ever scored on the JOLO rebels came as

a result of the operation “CENTURION”.

On 4 Feb 74, the 1/4 Brigade under the command of COL ALFEO RILLERA

launched the operation “BAGSIK” in Jolo. It was develop into full-scale offensive-

defensive and counter-offensive operations against the MAOIST rebels. A total

of nine (9) Infantry Battalions, two (2) Marines BLT, PC SULU and components of

PAF and Navy were deployed in the area. The amphibious landing at

MAIMBONG by the Marine BLTs signaled the start of the operation and was

followed by the clearing operation at PARANG.

On 07 Feb 74, MAOIST rebels launched an attack against the BUSBUS Command

complex, which led to the burning of JOLO town proper and the destruction of

90 % of the commercial center. There the “DIAMOND” troopers led by BGen

ALFONSO E ALCOSEBA (then COLONEL) launched a counter offensive attack

spearheaded by the elements of the 14IB & 26IB that drove the MAOIST out of

Jolo town proper. This operation was followed by a massive clearing operation

along the vicinity of Jolo town proper. One of the significant events recorded by

the command was the captured of BUD DATU HILL, the so-called bastion of the

rebels. COL JAIME ECHEVERRIA, the Commanding Officer of the 2IB, engineered

this daring action. The unit seized and occupied the area and captured the

81MM Mortar that barrage the BUSBUS command complex and the Hqs of the

Sulu PC command at Asturias. Other high-powered weapons captured were a

one (1) MG Cal 50, assorted firearms and anti-personnel mines.

The counter-offensive and massive clearing operation conducted by the

command resulted in the disintegration of the main rebel forces.

Remnants of the rebel forces began to regroup in the eastern Jolo area. After

the “CENTURION” operation the command was force to launch another major

operation. It was materialized on 27 May 74. OPLAN “KAPATID” was executed by

2nd Inf Bde of the Ist Inf Div operationally controlled by the command. As the

operation commenced and it was supported by the 14IB, 15IB, 18IB & 24IB. The

operation resulted in containing trouble in the KAMBING complex and the

clearing of LAHING-LAHING area.

Meanwhile in Cotabato area, the mission of the 27th Inf Bn (R) never end at

Lebak complex, as it moved to its ACP at Home Base, Kabacan, North

Cotabato, rebels in Reina Regente then became more ferocious, disrupting

peaceful citizens of Pikit, North Cotabato. Then the unit with its full force

launches massive operations up to the two line of the rebel defense awaiting at

PAIDu Pulangi. It eventually not end there, as initial 1 month of 1974, Salunayan,

MIDsayap, North Cotabato was under attacked only to see the whole force of

27th Inf Bn ® in action again. It was a hand to hand fight with the rebels

attacking the barrios of Nas, Glan, Baliki, Kapinpilan and Salunayan that left two

famous officer of the unit: 1LT ROGELIO REYES and 2LT HERMIE DAPON with 14

jungle fighters.

After the shocking incIDent at Kapinpilan- Saluayan complex, the unit then was

tasked to see action at Buldon. The 27th Inf Bn was then attached to 2/3 Infantry

Brigade that was subjected to attack by the rebel forces. History salutes that

that throughout the life of officers and men of 27th Inf Bn, for it was on these

battlefield that you need not go far the enemies are just clinging on you. As

rebel mortar fires interrupted peace and tranquility of Cotabato City, the 27th

Inf Bn was then directed to move to Cotabato city to secure the area. With the

assigned task and mission and with the zeal to accomplish, the unit lost one

good officer 2LT ANTONIO ROXAS believed capture by enemies. With the unit

achievements it became a recipient of CEMCOM STREAMER AWARD in 1975.

After having exposed to too many combat operations in Cotabato, the mother

unit of 27th Inf Bn, the 4th Inf (Diamond) division with the concurrence of

Commanding General, Central Mindanao command, where it is operationally

attached conducted retraining program, as still does, initially handled then by

1LT CRISTOLITO B BALAOING as the Training Director and 2LT ALFREDO REPOLLO

assisting.

With firmness of purpose the 27th IBR continue to achieve the assigned mission,

civil assistance operation in support of and in coordination with other

government and civic agencies for the national welfare has been in continuous

efforts. The conduct of medical-dental treatment and allied civic activities to

the neighboring municiPAlities of the Province of North Cotabato, Maguindanao

have been continuously made. Negotiations and Administrations of returnees in

coordination with other government agencies have been sought, are but a few

of the too may civil assistance extended in furtherance to the objectives of the

New Society.

On the other hand, the ramPAnt ambuscades conducted by the rebels against

civilian‟s commuters along the PAGADIAN-ZAMBAONGA route prompted the

2/4 Bde to launch clearing operations in the area. This operation, code named

“WALIS” was conducted on 14 Aug 74 at SACOL Island, the rebels‟ sanctuary.

The operation was assisted by the elements of the 9IB, 36IB, 4TH LABn and 2BLT

Marines. It resulted to the reopening of interdicted routes of PAgadian-

Zamboanga City.

The attack and seizure of Balabagan town proper by the rebels prompted the

Command to launch an offensive and rescue operation. On 19 Aug 74, the

rebels occupied the town proper of BALABAGAN and simultaneously attacked

the detachment of „A” Co 26IB at the LOBREGAT Compound. For eleven (11)

days, the unit withstood the seized until the rescue elements arrived. On 1Sep 74,

3/ 4 Bde launched an operations utilizing the 26IB under the command of COL

ROMULO RODRIGUEZ and the 23IB with the support of 4FAB. The following day,

the 2BLT Marines at Balabagan penetrated the town proper and destroyed the

enemy strongholds while troopers of the 26IB maneuvered at the rear. These

combined forces facilitated the early recaptured of the occupied town.

Operation “MALIGAYA” was also conducted by the command on November

and December 74 against the rebels at TIPO-TIPO, Basilan. This operation was

undertaken by the 2/1 Bde of Ist Inf Div and the elements of the 2BLT Marines,

14IB, 24IB, 26IB and 34IB. During the operation, the government forces

encountered skirmishes along the route leading to BADJA, the main rebel camp.

Another operation was conducted by the command geared for the clearing at

LINGUISAN PENINSULA, on 2 Dec 74 that harnessed the 9IB, 36IB and 4LAB. This

operation resulted to capture of the MNLF ammo dump by the elements of 4LAB

led LT LUDIVICO VALENCIA. Additionally, this was simultaneously followed by the

operation code named “BUNCAG”, to clear SIRAWAI-SIBUCO-PAWIRAN-

PANGIAN & LANTAWAN areas.

This operation succeeded in the breaking-up of the rebel groups in these areas

and the persistent threats of rebels attack against the military installations at

Zamboanga City.

The existence of rebel elements at TaglIBi prompted the 1/4 Bde to launch a

search and destroy operation under code name “TADJAK ALFA” to drive out

rebels from the TAGLIBI proper. The elements of 2BLT Marines dID the operation

on 14 Jan 75.

On 22 Feb 75, OPLAN “BIROKEN -1” was launched against the rebel forces of Mt

MAKAM, Maimbong and Lumping hill, Luuk. The maneuvering units were the

elements of Task Force Luuk and Marine BLT- 1. These were followed on 23 May

75 by the 1/ 4 Bde as they conducted a search and destroy operation at Datu-

Puti, Indanan destroying the enemy forces and installations. OPORD 75-1 was

likewise executed to track down the rebels along Timangan-Indanan road.

Ambuscades to military troops transporting supplies were stopped. The OPORD

75-3 followed on 8 May 75, which destroy the enemy forces in PArang, Indanan

and Maimbong with intensified operations in Karawan, Bud KapPAng and

LIBohong. On 19 May 75, the 1/4 Bde launched and implemented the ACP, 4ID,

PA OPLAN “KATARUNGAN”. This operation utilized the SULU ground Force that

destroyed the enemy forces at Kandiamak, Maligaya and Tambang all at

PAtikul and Buanza/Mangalis area in Indanan. Then OPLAN “SIPA” began

tracking down the rebels at Bud KapPAng and Tumatagis area up to Mabusing,

as the final target of these operation. Elements of the 5IB, 8IB, 9IB, 30IB 32IB, 36IB

and 1BLT Marines manned this operation. The combat operations conducted

against the rebel forces in Jolo had recorded seventy-four (74) encounters and

scored 564 killed on the enemy sIDe with additional an unaccounted number of

casualties. At the same time, the rebel‟s threats against the government forces

in the Lanao Provinces also prompted the command to conduct a search and

destroy operation. On 18 May 75, the 3/ 4 Bde launched „MANGOSTEEN SOUTH”

operation with the 33IB. This operation cleared upper Balabagan, Lanao Sur and

linked it with the elements of 2/ 3 Bde in the boundary of Lanao Sur and

Cotabato.

On 9 Aug 75, operation “BIRADA” was conducted by the 2/4 Bde together with

the troopers of the 9IB, two (2) comPAnies of 21IB, 16IB, 467th PC Co and

PAramilitary forces under LT SALI WALI to capture the Labantan-Diwa Tantawan

complex at Siay, Alicia Lanicawan, Malangas and Ticala Island San PAblo, all of

Zamboanga Sur. This operation “BIRADA” Bravo was simultaneously followed on

Sep 785 at Pisaan Island and Simbulawan-Manda-Balut Island also in

Zamboanga Sur. The government forces successfully engaged the rebels in

eleven encounters

The command also conducted a recovery operation against the rebel forces

that hijacked the JaPAnese cargo vessel SUEJERO MARU on 26 Sep 75 while

cruising along the Malasugat Bay (GS 3435) Zamboanga City, and demanded

one million pesos as ransom money for the ship and its crew and five custom

officials on board. The recovery operation utilized the 2/4 Bde and its operating

units. Troopers of 26IB and 22IB set up a blocking position along the coastal

towns of Balubungan, Lo-ok, PAhinangan and Tigbucay to prevent the hijackers

from escaping inland. Elements of 9IB and 4LABn boarded the Naval Craft LP 68

and lay alongside of the hijacked vessel, ready to board it. After protracted

negotiations the 37 hijackers surrendered to the government forces together

with their assorted firearms without collecting a single centavo of the supposed

ransom money. Seven rebel commanders and 30 followers surrendered to the

armed forces during this operation.

Another terrorist activities was made by the rebels when the non-combatant

forces of 544 Engineering Battalion and civilian workers installed power

transmission grID lines around the localities of Lake Lanao. An operation code

name “TASK FORCE ENGINEER” was undertaken by the 3/4 Bde to clear the

National Highway around the lake composed of 29IB, 10IB and APC of 1LAB

personnel.

2/4 Bde executed another major operation of the command under code

named “RANCHO VILLA”. This operation employed the troopers of 9IB, to clear

the areas along Taguite-PAloPAlo-Pirlosan in Zamboanga City, and 14IB to clear

Linguisan area in Tungawan, Zamboanga Sur. Meantime, 28IB established

blocking position along Tigbucay-Limbaguhan shorelines to support the 41IB

while the 61st PC BN cleared Anungan-PAnganuran shorelines for the Phase 1

operation. During the Phase 11, the 9IB seized and occupied Lintawan. 21IB (-)

Secured Tictapul and established blocking position in Tungawan, probable route

of withdrawal by the dissIDents while the 41IB seized and occupied Lunday

Valley. In Phase 111, the 9IB troopers seized and occupied objective X-Ray in

Upper Anungan. 36IB took objective YANKEE the Upper Kawit while the PC

troopers of 61 PC BN penetrated objective ZEBRA in Picas but objective

UNIFORM and WHISKY were beaten by the elements of 41IB at upper Lunday.

For Phase 1V, all units conducted mopping/clearing operation within their

respective assigned sectors. This operation started on 09 Nov75 and ended on

22 Jan 76 recording combat encounters against the enemy forces. As result of

this offensive operation, the rebels concentration camp in Zamboanga

Peninsula, the common boundaries of Zamboanga del Sur- Zamboanga del

Norte- Zamboanga City complex were battered.

The continuing harassment of the rebel forces against the gov‟t forces in Jolo,

Sulu forces prompted the command to launch a search and destroy operation,

code name OPLAN “LIPPASEN”. 1/4 Bde with the elements of 32IBn, 36IBn &

30IBn undertook this operation. This was followed by OPLAN “LIPPASEN-1”,

designed to conduct an offensive operation in pre-designated areas. The Task

Force “BAGAY” also conducted a search and destroys operation at Mt. Mahan-

Mt Tukay and Karawan complex. Luuk Task Force likewise conducted similar

offensive at Tayungan-PAtIBulan as 30IBn attacked the enemy camp at Mt

Daho. Another operation by the Bde called the OPLAN “LIPPASEN-11” tracked

down the rebels and the Mt. Sinuma-an- Mt Daho complex through the

assistance of Task Force Bagay, 8IBn, 30IBn and 32IBn. Then two battalion-sized

operations followed destroying the enemy forces at Tandawan-Laab area.

OPLAN “LIPPASEN-111” Participated by the 8IBn and 30IBn also moved in OPLAN

“LIPPASEN 111-A”mannedby Task Force “CANSEN”, the combined forces of

28IBn and 32IBn, tracked down the rebel forces at Mt Sinama-an- Mt Daho

complex who evaded the government forces during on previous operation. This

operation at Jolo, resulted 870 killed on the enemy sIDe and seized of 48

assorted FAS while the gov‟t forces recorded 137 KIAs and 214 WIAs

3/4 Infantry Brigade

The upsurge of violence and enemy build-ups around the localities of Lake

Lanao prompted the command to launch a search and destroy operations

under code name “BULOVA” to be undertaken by the 3/4 Bde and

complimented by the 40IB and ICIB as workhorse elements that started from 23

Feb 76 to 01 Apr 76. The command deployed “BULOVA” operation when the

elements of 544 ECB were ambushed at MaPAntao killing several Christian

workers on Dec 75 and the NPC Substation at Pindulunan, Lanao del Norte on

24 Feb 76. The operation was executed at Masui, the rebel‟s stronghold under

the

“ULAMAS” group. On 17 Mar 76, Masui was already under the control of the

government forces but it encountered with stiff opposition from the enemy

forces at this time, gov‟t forces enforced the camPAign of firearm collection

and registration of fire arms owned by government personnel.

Operation code name “PASOKIN” was launched on 08 May 76 by the 2/4 Bde

against the rebel sanctuaries in the Zamboanga Wood Logging areas in upper

Siraway, Siocon, Labason, Surabay and Tictapul. This operation was a battalion-

sized operation conducted in their respective AORs with brigade area

objectives, harnessing the four Bns as its main compliment. Other battalions also

intensified PAtrol actions in their AOR. The 23IBn seized and occupied objective

ALFA in the vicinity of Surabay; the 41IBn overpowered Objective BRAVO at

upper Tictapul. Meantime the 61PC Bn cleared objective CHARLIE at upper

Tomasikan and Siraway while the 36IBn seized and occupied objective DELTA in

upper Siocon PAssing thru upper Labason. This operation terminated on 19 May

76, which resulted in five encounters against the enemy, which incurred 35

rebels, killed, while the gov‟t suffered 3 KIA.

Another terrorist activities of rebel elements was the hijacking of PAL BAC 111

from Davao bound for Manila which was divested by seven hijackers to

Zamboanga City on 21 May 76. The command PArticiPAted in the recovery and

rescue operation. All throughout the negotiations, the hijackers were persistent

in their demand for $375,000 and for the pilot to fly them to LIBya and

threatened to kill the PAssengers and crew if the government would not grant

their demand. On 23 May 76, relatives of the hijackers were brought in to

negotiate for the release of the aircraft. As a result, 11 PAssengers and three

hijackers were killed, and three hijackers were captured and the aircraft was

destroyed.

1/4 Infantry Brigade

On 30 May 76, 1/ 4 Bde launched FRAGO 05-96-76, operation against the rebels

at Tandawa. This operation was conducted by elements of 30IB and 10IB. This

was followed on 22 June 76 by FRAGO 06-96-76 for the clearing of Jolo-

Timbangan road. Involved were the troopers of 8IB and 56 PC Bn & 51 PC Bn.

These three operations left 302 rebels killed while gov‟t suffered 108 KIAs and 214

WIAs.

Lanao Sur to Munai, Lanao Norte

The shift of operation from the lake areas of Lanao Sur to Munai, Lanao Norte

originally planned to follow operation “BULOVA” was deferred with the

assumption into office of Gov ALI DIMAPORO last 04 April 76. But a new

approach was initiated, at this time, negotiations for the return of rebels started

with renewed vigor rebel group around the localities of lake Lanao started

coming out from their hIDeouts. But very few came from Munai. Finally, on 19

July 76, 3/4 Bde launched operation MANGOSTEEN WEST with 26IB, 219IB and

Lanao Norte Constabulary Command (LNCC), while 2/3 Bde‟s operation SLEEPY

HALLOW utilized the 12IB as the main effort to attack Munai. On 7 Aug 76, Brig

Gen ALCOSEBA was directed by COMSOUTHCOM to take over the control of

the operation of the two Brigades and ACP SOUTHCOM together with other

support units was set-up at Camp Overton, Iligan City. This operation was latter

dubbed “HOLLOW WEST” operation with elements of 30IB and 25IB augmenting

the command. On 19 Aug 76. MANGOSTEEN

Police Punitive Actions/Operations

At the beginning of Calendar year 1977, the command enforced the ceasefire

agreement effective 24 Dec 76. However, the truce was dilated by he rebels in

form of kIDnapping for ransom, extortion, illegal collections (tong), sea jacking

and piracy and to extent of going on harassment to the military detachments

stationed in the far flung areas. These incIDents prompted the command to

launch once again combat POLICE PUNITIVE operations that took effect on 20

January. The command issued directives to all units for its strict observance of

the cease-fire accord. Brigade and Battalion Commanders were all directed to

prePAre contingency plans and to be operationally ready at all times to

preempt the outbreak of any hostility in case the cease-fire bogs down.

Due of the cease-fire, actual confrontation between government forces and

the MNLF was held to a minimum stance from January to June 1977. At this point

in time, the main activities of the units were securing the population centers

seats of government, industrial installations for the purpose to preempt

movements and massing of rebel forces. Civic actions were also conducted.

The MNLF/ BMA took advantage of the cease-fire accord. They beefed up their

forces through training and recruitment, increased their logistical requirements

by staging ambuscades and raIDs in far-flung military detachments to capture

FAs and ammunitions. KIDnap for ransom of civilians, extortion, asking support

through coercive means. The rebels also resorted to seajacking and other

means of getting supplies by force.

On the later PArt of 1977, enemy terroristic activities reach to an alarming and

intolerable situation with surreptitious landing of arms and ammunitions along

Caromatan shoreline that heightened its activity. The intermittent attacks and

ambuscades against government troopers on PAtrols and of military

detachments, sightings of armed groups and enemy concentration to various

areas of Zamboanga. The imminent threat of rebel attacks in Zamboanga City

and the willful violation of the cease-fire accord were then observed. All of

these acts of the MNLF showed of its proofed for their intention to pursue its

goals to secede from Mindanao. With this situation 4th Infantry (Diamond)

Division was compelled to launch large-scale police punitive operations in the

AOR. Thus, OPORD “KAMANDAG I” PArticiPAted by 1/4 Bde, 2/4 BDE and 3 /4

Bde that took effect on 20 October. It lasted to 6 November 1977.

Operation “KAMANDAG I” resulted to the killing of eight (8) rebel commanders

and the destruction of the impregnable MNLF GHQ defense at Tabon. It upset

their timetable for their organization build-up activities of a division size force in

mainland Mindanao. The confIDence and trust of the people to the AFP

caPAbility has gain stance in its pursuit and destroy the MNLF forces. Their

command structure was temporarily crushed thereby isolating them into small

bands/groups.

While the Division was clinching its iron hand in punching recalcitrant rebels at

Tabon, Basilan, Jolo and in some PArts of Zamboanga Peninsula and Lanao

Provinces. It also softened its heart to welcome returnees with open arms.

Human resettlement projects in Combo-Labangan, Zamboanga del Sur and in

Munai in Lanao del Norte were established for these people. The command

assisted them in putting up their villages. Modern methods of agriculture

including livestock were introduced to help established self-sustaining villages.

The command also helped people affected by natural calamities such as the

“Tsunamis” tIDal wave a destructive typhoon that hit and affected eastern and

northern Mindanao and fires that blazed Cagayan de Oro City and other

places in Misamis Oriental. To this, the Diamond Division was always in its stance

ready to assist people in distress and in trouble. To quote BGEN ALFONSO

ALCOSEBA AFP statement now retired, as saID: ”AFTER SOME PERIODS OF TRIAL,

WE HAVE ONCE AGAIN TRUIMPHED OVER THE ENEMIES OF OUR REPUBLIC

THEREBY, ENHANCING A FEELING OF SECURITY AMONG OUR PEOPLE WHO WE

ARE COMMITTED TO SERVE”

What BGEN ALCOSEBA AFP have done in the PAst, for the good of the

command was reinforced and strengthened by BGEN ANGELO C QUEDING AFP

who assumed command of the 4th Infantry Division on 01 May 1978. Through this

stewardship, for building were erected with total cost of P370,000.00. These

building included the Medical and Dental, accounting and Auditing,

Commands reception and Bowling Lanes which were inaugurate by MGEN

FORTUNATO U. ABAT AFP on the occasion of 4ID`s 9th anniversary on 01 February

1979.

The command achievements include not only construction of buildings but also

the enforcement of military discipline and changing of the attitudes and

behavior of soldiers through motivations and enlightenment in carrying out the

commands by word: „PAGLILINGKURAN SA TAO ANG BAYAN‟. With this as

guIDance, more rebel commanders with their followers came down from the

hills with their firearms and surrendered to the Brigades and Battalions of the

command. To mentioned few like Jianie MAKAKILING, an MNLF Rebel

Commander together with his eight (8) followers in Piagapo, Lanao del Sur

surrendered to COL. OLIVER C. AMBRAY, CO, 40IB AND COL MADRUñO MUÑOZ,

CO, 3 /4 BDE.

What the Diamond Division achieved throughout Nine (9) years of existence can

be summarized in the words of MGEN ABAT AFP, CG, PA when he saID:

“THROUGH THE YEARS, THE DIAMOND DIVISION HAS BEEN SYNONYMOUS WITH

EFFICIENT AND COMBAT POWER. IN THE CRITICAL TIMES OF OUR RECENT HISTORY

IT HAS PROVEN ITSELF AND COMPROMISING VANGUARD AND PAVING THE WAY

TOWARDS A SECURED AND STABLE NATION. PERFORMING MAGNIFICENTLY IN THE

BATTLE AREAS IN MINDANAO AND SULU WITH HONOR AND VALOR. IT HAS

RIGHTFULLY CLAIMED THE PRIZE OF PEACE FROM A GRATEFUL AND HAPPY

CITIZENRY. TRULY, THE DIAMOND DIVISION HAS FOUND ITS SHINING MOMENTS IN

THE HEARTS OF THE PEOPLE IT HAS SERVED, A PEOPLE PROTECTED AND ASSURED

OF A PEACEFUL LIFE.”

As a result of the effective leaderships and administrative prowess of the

incumbent commander, the IG Teams from HPA and GHQ rated the 4th Infantry

Diamond Division superior in 1978 and outstanding in 1979. GEN ROMEO C

ESPINO, Chief of Staff AFP personally commended BGEN QUEDING for these

achievements.

For heroism, gallantry and exemplary performance and devotion to duty, the

4ID issued appropriate orders on awards and decorations to its personnel. These

awards include, Mindanao and Sulu Peace CamPAign Medal and RIBbon, Anti-

dissIDent CamPAign Medal and RIBbon, Combat Kagitingan Badge, Long

Service Medal, Bronze Cross Medal, Military Merit Medal and Wounded

Personnel Medal. For awards of higher

category, the command recommends to higher headquarters the issuance of

appropriate orders.

Recipient of the Distinguished Conduct Star issued by GHQ, AFP were BGEN

ALFONSO E. ALCOSEBA, AFP (RET), COL JAIME ECHEVERIA, PA, COL BERNARDO

A. RAMOS, PA AND CPT ROMEO FORCIL, PA. Enlisted personnel who earned this

award were Tsg Jose Buenafe, PA and Cpl Ambrocio Beltran, PA.

BGEN ANGELO C. QUEDING AFP earned the Distinguished Service Star for

eminent meritorious and valuable service rendered in the position of major

responsIBility as Bde commander, 1st Bde, 4ID, PA from 22 July „76 to 1 May ‟78.

BGEN ANGELO C. QUEDING, AFP was responsIBle for 27 major operations and

police action resulting in the 137 combat encounters with the enemy and which

accounted for 237 enemy troopers killed, 19 captured and surrendered and 155

assorted firearms captured.

Other officers assigned with 4ID who received the Distinguished Service Star

were COL MADRUñO C. MUÑOZ, COL JAIME C. ECHEVERIA AND COL ROMULO

C. RODRIGUEZ.

The Bronze Cross Medal went to BGEN PEDRO T. ABANGAN, AFP for heroism

displayed as CG, 2/4 Bde during operations “KAMANDAG” in Vitali-Tabon

Complex in Zamboanga Peninsula last 16 October ‟77 to 6 November ‟77.

Unmindful of his safety he was on continuos control of the situation with his

subordinate commanders steadily maintaining the momentum of the attack

until the Tabon Hills, MNLF headquarters and its hIDe out for MNLF rebel force

was captured and destroyed. The command received five (5) citations as will on

the neutralization of this MNLF HQS.

Other commanders who were recipient of the Bronze Cross Medal during the

“KAMANDAG” Operation includes: LTC ANTONIO S. NALE, PA, CO, 28IB: LTC

LORETTO M. DEUS, PA, CO, 23IB; COL VICENTE S. LUCERO, PA, CO, 36IB; COL

DOMINGO P. VILLANUEVA, PA, former CO, 41IB: MAJ VOLTAIRE T. GASMIN, INTEL

SECTION, ACP, 4ID, PA and CPT DOMINGO PANGANIBAN. PA, CO, RTG.

(REF: GO NR HQS 4ID, PA date 27 Jan. ‟78).

LTC WOODROW B. ESTRERA PA also earned the Gold Cross Medal for heroism

and gallantry in action as CO, 30IB, 4ID, PA when the unit was operationally

attached to 2nd Infantry Bde of the 1st Infantry Division during its conduct of

clearing operations against well-entrenched rebel forces of Tipo-Tipo, Tuburan,

Lamitan, Basilan Province from 20 December ‟77 to 6 January ‟78. The unmindful

of his personal safety, LTC ESTRERA displayed professional competence in

leading his men in the execution and supervision of a series of combat

operations in the island province of Basilan, resulted to 26 enemies killed, 36

enemies wounded and the capture of 13 FAs and assorted ammos. Other

personnel who received the Bronze Cross Medal were SSgt Danilo Porras, PA,

SSgt Ernesto Noval, PA, all of 26IB. COL ABRAHAM MANUEL and Lt Col

FRANCISCO CALIBO, PA.

Other Gold Cross Medal Awardees were: COL VICENTE S. LUCERO, CPT ROGELIO

NAVARRO PA, 2LT ARSENIO TECSON PA, 1LT GREGORIO CAMILING JR, CPT

RODULFO MAGNAYE PA, 2LT RUPERTO TUMADA PA, 2LT NESTOR GARNACE

PA, SSG Rodrigo Guevara PA, Cpl Mario Narag PA, CPT GREGORIO CORDERO,

1LT WILFREDO APOLINAR and Cpl Cornelio M. Talamera (Posthumous).

On the occasion of the 9th Anniversary of 4ID on 01 Feb 1979, officers and

enlisted personnel including ICHDF and civilians received various awards.

Acclaimed as Junior Officer of the Year 1978 for outstanding performance of

duty and exemplary leadership as 1st Pltn leader, “A” Coy, 9IB from 01 Jan 78 to

31 Dec 78 was 2LT NESTOR C. GARNACE PA and he received a certificate of

Merit. Another certificate of merit was given to SSgt Fernando A. Pusta PA of 28IB

as enlisted man of the year 1978.

(Ref: Go Nr 16 H4ID dtd 15 Jan 78).

1/4 Bde had conducted thirteen (13) combat (Police) punitive operations within

its AOR, It recorded forty nine (49) combat encounters with the insurgents and

inflicted eighty one (81) killed (body count), 24 wounded and seizure of thirty

nine (39) assorted firearms, twenty six (26) pump boats and voluminous

documents, The government forces suffered 18 KIA and 21 WIA and lost 6 FAs.

What was significant was the surrender of 503 insurgents to the brigade.

The same achievement scored at the AOR of the 2/4 Bde, independent

battalion operations were also conducted within their AOR to check teroristic

activities of the rebels in that area.

On 1 July 77, the 9IB conducted surprise screening /search operations at Mariki,

Zamboanga City, this operation caught the rebels and its symPAthizer flatfooted

which resulted in the confication of seven (7) cal 30 M1 Garand, one (1)

Thompson Cal .45, 253 rounds of M16 and five (5) watt hour without any

resistance hurled against the government forces. The screening and search

operation was also conducted simultaneously by the elements of 28IB at

Campo Muslim and Rio Hondo, Zamboanga City – the rebels meeting places in

the City. The troopers confiscated four (4) assorted firearms and 276 assorted

ammunitions.

On 07 Aug 77, the 36IB implemented the LOI 03-77 (DAKOP) operation in the

northern PArt of Zamboanga Peninsula. The maneuvering elements of the unit

encountered a group of rebels at Kawit-Kawit, Zambo Norte and killed fourteen

(14) enemies and seized three (3) assorted FAs and 110 items of materials and

assorted documents. A total of 224 dissIDents were reported killed during the

police punitive operations.

On 19 Oct 77, the 9IB conducted another screening and search operations

against the rebel suppliers and symPAthizers at Canelar and Baliwasan Grande.

Zambo City. The unit recovered three (3) M16 rifles, one (1) Cal 30 Carbine, one

(1) Cal 45, two (2) Cal 30 Garand and five (5) Cal .38 revolvers and a total of

2,619 rounds of assorted ammunitions. On the following day, the unit conducted

same operation at Rio Hondo and Mariki complex. The rebel rendezvous area in

Zambo City, that resulted to the recovery of nineteen (19) assorted FAs and the

government forces seized 2,190 assorted ammunition.

During the same period, the 27IB operation ally attached to CEMCOM

conducted police punitive operations along the areas of Limbalud, Carmen

North Cotabato, Nanungan, PAgalungan, Maguindanao-Pinto Mountain,

Kabakan, North Cotabato. It launched seventy- (70) combat PAtrols and met

seven (7) encounters with the rebels. The unit scored twenty-

five (25) enemies killed and nine (9) enemies wounded with two (2) FAs

captured. But its own troops suffered five (5) KIA three (3) WIA. These operations

covered the period from 01 January to 31 December1977

On the first week of Oct 77, there was an upsurge of violence in the Zamboanga

Peninsula PArticularly at Anungan and Kawit-kawit, Zambo Norte. Simultaneous

attacks of the rebels had reached an alarming situation. That prompted the

command to launch a large-scale police punitive operation. On 20 Oct 77,

operation code name “KAMANDAG” commenced with the 2/4 Bde, 1/ 4 Bde

and six (6) Infantry Battalions as the workhorse elements. In the early stage of

the operation, maneuvering forces attacked the enemy strongholds at Muti-

Taguite-Vitali-and Cuy both of Zambo Peninsula with the support of the 15th

Strike Wing, PAF that bombed the fortified defense of the rebels. Then massive

mopping and clearing operations followed which pushed the rebels towards

their jungle concentration and finally holed up in Tabon. During this period, the

operating units ringed the complex and sealed off the possIBle avenues of

withdrawal. All the units were in the position. The 36IB coming from the north

spearheaded the assault while the elements of 28IB, 41IB and 23IB penetrated

other lines of approaches from the west, south and east direction. After 13 days

of relentless combat operations, the fortified camp of the MNLF GHQ at Tabon

was finally overrun and they vaunted impregnable MNLF defense at Tabon was

destroyed including their main forward bases.

Eight rebel (8) commanders were killed and several assorted FAs and

voluminous documents were also recovered. It also upset the rebels time table

of the organization and build-up operations of the division size force in Mainland

Mindanao, and at the same time upheld the confIDence and trust of the

people on the caPAbility of the Armed Forces to pursue and destroy the MNLF

forces.

The stirring capture of the MNLF Headquarters at Tabon by the Army‟s 4ID

troopers has gained for the government its biggest victory since the recent

resurgence of the rebel terroristic activities in Southern Mindanao. As a punitive

police and defensive action, Operation “KAMANDAG” has decIDedly foiled the

MNLF „s dubious plan to pursue the establishment of “Bangsa Moro Republic”

through violent and bloody means. At its very core, the dismantling of the

rebels‟ command structure and nerve center has brought about a demoralizing

defeat that will immobilize the MNLF movement for along time.

Based to this captured document of the 14-PAge MISUARI letter written in Tripoli

and addressed to the MNLF central committee Secretary General ABBU BAKAR,

The general chief of Bangsa Moro Army, Ali AKBAR; the head of the war

planning board, Manfeik; BNA national field commander Gadafi Dungasan and

all senior cadre officers and commanders. Contain as follows;

establish a real fortress for the Bangsa Moro Revolution.

6-11 months war.

tablish intelligence networks within civil

government and military agencies.

depots.

To wipe out government forces by hitting them at their weakest point

full-scale war.

The capture of this document, confirmed the government‟s belief that it is not

only after the AUTNOMY for the Muslim areas in the south but independence for

what he called the Bangsa Moro national homeland of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu

and PAlawan.

In consIDering the totality of this achievement, there is no doubt that the

4ID command and its officers and men truly deserve the highest praise and

commendation for the successful accomplishment of the mission.

It is to be presumed, and rightly so, that a great deal of planning and

prePAration, as well as effective logistic and intelligence efforts, have gone into

the brilliant and daring execution of the operation. And by all means the

discipline, courage and determination that the troops have demonstrated have

by far exceeded our highest expectations. For the fact stands that not one life

has been lost despite the interminable dangers and hazards that characterized

the conduct of the operations. All these may well testify to the superior and

highly tested combat effectiveness of the Division as a while.

As a final assessment of the situation, descrIBed to the bold and inspiring

leadership exercised at all level of command. From the Commanding General

of the division down the battalion commanders, decisions have been handed

down with unerring imPAct and effectiveness in all stages of operations,

coordinating and welding together the vast machinery of men and weaponry

into one effective fighting body.

Thus, through this singular achievement, the 4TH Infantry Division has

demonstrated the caPAbility of the military to rise up the situation of crisis. By

meeting the challenge posed by the MNLF, it has distinctly and decisively drawn

the limit to the violence and terrorism being perpetrated by insurgent rebel

group.

Operation “KAMANDAG” gives ample evIDence that when exigency so

requires, the AFP is caPAble of meeting the conditions necessary for victory.

This operation brought forth that the command has the reason to be very proud

of its achievement of highest order. For many people in Luzon or in Visayas may

still be unfamiliar with the word “Tabon”. What is, what occurred there, nor its

significance? But in Mindanao, PArticularly in the Zamboanga Peninsula, it

evokes nothing short of victory and total peace of mind for the people who

have been thrown into a frenzy of fear and PAnic over the renewed gusts of

violence and terrorism that the MNLF had unleashed upon the Region.

The daring capture of the MNLF General Headquarters at the Tabon-Cuya

complex, along with destruction of its well-entrenched coastline bases at

Tictapul-Muti-Taguite and Vitali Island shattered whatever grand designs the

MNLF leadership and its forces had insIDiously and furtively planned, and

attempted to carry out, to attain their ends. At its very core, it formed the nerve

center of MNLF training, operations, intelligence and logistics activities, from

whence spewed out its deadly rituals of bloodshed and violence.

It would need more than the usual dose of luck and courage to even come

close of hitting it, and no less than a brilliant execution of force and strategy to

disgorge the enemy from its hitting place and destroy the lifeline of the

secessionist movement

In spite of the risk involved, the punitive police and defensive operations

launched by the 4ID command and its major units showed that it could be

done. The fall of Tabon, following the classic of encirclement and rapID capture

of the objective, struck a crippling blow to the vital source of the MNLF

movement: Militarily, politically, and psychologically.

Firstly – it upset their timetable in their training, troop ad logistic build-up

Secondly – it decIDedly foiled their operational plan relative to the

establishment of a Bangsa Moro Republic.

Thirdly - it blunted and immobilized their operational plan for Mindanao and

Sulu.

And in no uncertain terms, the successful accomplishment of this coup by the

4th Infantry Division underscored the caPAbility of the AFP to thwart rebel

attempts to pursue their secessionist goals and ambitions.

Once again, the myth of the enemy invincIBility had been broken.

The 4ID troopers who braved death at every turn as they fought inch by bloody

inch to capture their objective, the capitulation of Tabon into government

hands was a shining moment of courage, bravery and heroism. In the heat of

battle, one word would suffice to descrIBe the sense of the mission and

determination with which they plunged in their task. Guts. And steel nerves.

To come into Tabon meant cutting their way through the network of jungle that

perfectly conceal the enemy base from their possIBle view. It meant storming

through a series of comPArtmentalized strongholds that can be taken only

through the use of speed, secrecy and surprise.

In any language, it was no man‟s land. The uneven terrain barred any possIBle

used of armor for defensive cover. Moreover, the isolated distance of the

enemy base proved too much of a disadvantage for the effective use of

artillery and fir support. Whatever battle had to be fought had to be done the

hard way – by engaging the enemy in pitch battles. That enough, was a

challenge that served to bring out the best of each fighting man of the 4ID‟s

assault battalions. Man for man, they stood equal to the test as they pushed

through every conceivable obstacle that stood in their way – PAst the thick and

mire of cliffs, soggy marshes, underbrush and jungle entrapments into the very

doorstep of enemy territory.

The MNLF HQS is located right in the heart of the jungle that could hardly be

reached and IDentified by any of the government aerial reconnaissance. As the

command commences its combat operation for OPLAN “KAMANDAG” the

government troops were able seize several truck loads of food, medicines, a

generator set, cassette radios, color TV set, military communications equipment

and various types of ammunitions and gun PArts.

Voluminous documents of vital military significance fell also into the hands of the

government forces, confirming beyond doubt of NUR MISUARI‟s order to MNLF

forces to conduct all out attack on government troops and sow wIDespread

terror despite of the

ceasefire. Also found were operations report, taped proceedings of

conferences of top MNLF leaders, and troop disposition of MNLF units throughout

Mindanao area.

In conjunction with the OPN “KAMANDAG”, elements of 9IBn and 4MBLT

conducted zonal house-to-house search operations in Zamboanga City and

effected resources control. This was undertaken to preclude harassment being

conducted by terrorist in Zamboanga City and to prevent the flow of goods,

PArticularly foodstuffs, and gasoline to the terrorists. A series saturation drives in

suspected rebel lairs in Zamboanga City yielded prime rebel suspects, 14,481

rounds of ammunition, 110 assorted firearms, radio equipment, dynamites and

quartermaster items.

The 4th Infantry Division during this time, concluded the major phase

of the operations on 03 November 1977. The imPAct and significance of this

resounding achievement of the Diamond Division can only be measured by the

fact that it has irretrievably shaken the MNLF cause to establish a Bangsa Moro

Republic, a debacle that has proven entirely damaging to the rebel forces, and

leave a wIDe rift in their leadership and organization.

Meantime, the threatening situation posed by the rebels at Dinas swamp,

Zambo Sur compelled the command to launch a combat punitive operation in

the area. On 10 Nov 77, upon the termination of “KAMANDAG 1” operation. The

“KAMANDAG 11” operation with the PArticiPAtion of 1/ 4 Bde under the

command of BRIG GEN ANGELO C QUEDDING (then Colonel) with its workhorse

elements, the 8IB, 23IB, 30IB, and ICHDF and the reserved forces of the 2/ 4 Bde

and 3/ 4 Bde was deployed. On 13 Nov 77, all the assaulting elements

proceeded to their respective assembly areas, about two and a half kilometers

from the objectives, On 14 Nov 77, 3rd Air Wing made a prePAration bombed

for thirty (30) minutes to its designated target areas while the operating units

maneuvered towards their respective objectives. The elements of 8IB attacked

objective VIRGO, ARIES & CANCER, while 3OIB attacked objective DARIUS. The

government forces was able to overrun the rebel stronghold and inflicted 35

enemies killed, captured 3 assorted FAs, seized 4 pump boats and document

with high intelligence value, while on the government sIDe suffered 2 KIA and 8

WIA. On 19 Nov 77, the operation “KAMANDAG 11” was terminated.

At the 3/4 Bde AOR, actual confrontation between the government forces and

the MNLF was made from Jan to Jun 77. But in the later PArt of the period, the

enemy terroristic activities escalated to an alarming degree as arms and

ammunition were clandestinely landed along the Caromatan-Sultan

Gummander shoreline. On 7 Nov 77, 3/4 Bde conducted heavy police punitive

operations against the rebels who ambushed the elements of 26IB at the vicinity

of crossing katubuan-Rebocon area GS 9960 inflicting seven (7) KIA to the

government forces. The OPLAN “ORANGE BRAVO” was conducted utilizing 26IB

with the fire support of 4FAR, to clear the area of the Caromatan-Nunungan-

Sultan Gummander complex. This operation was terminated on Dec77 after it

scored twenty (20) enemies killed and captured five (5) assorted FAs and

documents. Government forces suffered no casualty.

On 02 Nov 77. 41IB conducted also a clearing operation along Taguite,

Tigbabolod-KaPAtagan and Purlos complex, Curuan District, Zambo City, That

resulted to the capture of three (3) assorted FAs and documents, thirty- one (31)

enemies killed (body count) and three (3) enemies wounded as well as three (3)

WIA for the government sIDe.

Another clearing operation was conducted at the 2/ 4 Bde AOR through OPLAN

“SABONG” by the 36IB on 07 Dec77 at Upper Piakan, PAnganuran, Sirawai,

Anungan and Pisa Puti. The unit suffered two (2) KIA and two (2) WIA.

On 13 Dec 77, the 3/4 Bde conducted another police punitive operation at the

AOR of 29IB when the referendum oppositionist planned to disturb the peaceful

conduct of referendum election. This operation code named OPLAN

“RAMBOTAN” utilized the two (2) tactical battalions and one Constabulary

command. On 15 Dec77, the elements of 29IB killed five (5) lawless elements

and captured three (3) assorted FAs in its encounter at vic Bago-Ingod,

Piagapo, Lanao Sur. This operation was terminated on 16 Dec 77.

To sum up the total accomplishment of 4th Inf Div Phil Army for the period of

Calendar Year 77, the Division has launched twenty four (24) Police Punitive

Operations within its AOR and engaged the enemies in one hundred forty one

(141) combat encounters, one hundred nineteen (119) attacks and thirty six (36)

ambuscades. The 4ID troopers lost forty- seven (47) men KIA and one hundred

(100) WIA, and seventy- nine (79) FAs, while in the enemy sIDe; the DIAMOND

troopers inflicted 386 enemies killed and 15 wounded and captured 116

assorted FAs.

In year 1978, a new approached or concept of combat operations was

adopted in the 4ID, AOR. The operations were conducted in three (3) phases of

strategies, namely; PAcification, Rehabilitation & Reconstruction, and

Development. Police punitive operations of Infantry Brigades and Battalions in

their areas of responsIBility were geared towards police actions against the

splintered groups of Southern Philippine Terrorists who brought havoc and

trouble to the populace.

For the period from 01 Jan to 31 Dec 78, 3/4 Brigade has conducted thirteen (13)

police punitive operations and scored 95 assorted FAs recovered. Some of these

police operations conducted by 3/4 Bde included the “JEFROX”, “MATADOR”

and “HANTIK” operations

Operation “JEFROX” was conducted from 23-30 Jan 78 at the Nunungan-

Caromatan-Sultan Gummander complex. This police operation was carried out

by the maneuvering battalions of 3/ 4 Bde which resulted to the discovery of

several number of enemy training camps. Immediate environs were cleared of

armed elements that previously harassed PMIC workers conducting logging

operation at the Nunungan complex. This decisive military action scored ten

(10) enemies killed.

On 05 March 78, 3/4 Bde with the support of the 29IB, LNCC, and 4th RTG at

KaPAi-Tagoloan complex, the training center of the insurgents, launched

operation “MATADOR”. This operation left a psychological imPAct to the armed

terrorists that they don‟t have a matched against government troopers.

Operation “HANTIK” executed on 05 Apr 78 was a follow-up operation to

Operation “MATADOR”. This operation was executed by 26IB from 19 Jan to 21

Feb 78 in PAnamao District, Jolo. Its highly successful operation brought about

the capture of Mt. Sinama-an and its environs. Operation “PANDANGO” which

lasted for 33 days resulted to 25 enemies killed and 26 IB three (3) KIA and 4 WIA.

Meanwhile for the period 01 Jan- 31 Dec 78, 1/4 Bde in its conduct of combat

police punitive action within AOR recorded 48 encounters against the enemy.

That resulted to 11 KIAs and 21 WIAs and lost of 11 FAs on government sIDe.

While the enemy suffered 63 killed, 5 wounded, 38 apprehended, 3 pump

boats, 3 grenades, 68 FAs and assorted ammunition captured.

Throughout the Calendar year 1978, 2/4 Bde was able to launch two (2) major

operations and twenty (20) battalion size operations. These police punitive

actions resulted to 156 combat encounters against the enemy‟s and accounted

165 enemies killed and 43 FAs captured. However, the government forces

including ICHDF registered 16 military and 20 ICHDF KIAs, 36 military and 12

ICHDF WIAs and 25 FAs lost.

The Test of Leadership

First Person Account of Mindanao, as most Experienced Field Commander

Quoted from the words of the first person account of Mindanao as most

experienced field commander, whose leadership was really been tested since

the very start of the Moro Rebel uprising in Mindanao Island.

As stated, that the lessons he learned in combat will be imPArted to the soldiers

as well to the members of the AFP from his personal experiences in the field as

the 4th Infantry Division Commander.

Brigade General ALFONSO B ALCOSEBA, AFP was assigned in Mindanao as the

assistant Division Commander of the 4ID, when the early signs of the rebel

secessionist movement began to tell. As the situation rapIDly developed into a

full-blown conflict, he was then tasked to head concurrently the former 4th

Infantry Brigade of the Division, with a specific mission to stabilized Jolo, then the

center of the rebel secessionist activities in Mindanao. As the initial striking force,

they were virtually the first troops to be committed to full combat duty since the

activation of the Division from its defunct IVMA. It was in this caPAcity and

subsequently as Division Commander that he personally led the bulk of

operations against the rebels in the crucial battle for positions. Thus from the start

of the hostilities up to the present state he have seen enough action, gained

enough experience and won his share of battles as field commander to enable

him to speak with a measure of authority on the Mindanao tactical situation.

That from the tactical point of view, some of the doctrine and concepts they

employed in our combat operations against the rebels forces may not seem

new. But as you will realize, war-gaming a battle is different from actually

fighting it.

Certainly, the history of the PAst wars has offered a classic example of strategies

in warfare, which we can derive, valuable lessons in the face of similar situation.

However, the gap in sPAce and time as well as the peculiarities of geography,

people and events, not to mention the development of newer and wIDer

render its successive conflict an entirely new experiences and produce its own

imperative and requirements for combat. It is of record that now that while the

Korean War has future guerilla warfare, the Vietnam conflict has given as

greater and more dramatic insight in to how this kind of war maybe won-or lost.

For the same reason, the Mindanao conflict presents an entirely different feature

when we consIDer the

nature of the conflict, the issues involved as well as the policies and

environmental requirements that may dictate the extent and conflict of the

military operations.

Taking my own lesson from history, I have from the start – adopted my own

dictum of war, based on the Greek philosophy that says, “ War is not to

annihilate those who cause it, but rather to mend their ways”. Its relevance to

the present situation is a reaffirmation of our policy that the military

confrontation is not the total object of the conflict in Mindanao. It is merely

incIDental to what we call the battle of the mind. If we are able to convince the

enemy that the larger interest of peace is at stake, this conflict will end

tomorrow.

In short military force alone cannot possIBly solve this problem. But without the

application of some measures of military force, Mindanao may eventually be

lost and it implications no national security will serve as an indictment against

the lack of will and caPAbility of our defense forces.

This is the rationale of the battle we are fighting n Mindanao today. And to win

it, it is imperative that we know first of all we area fighting against. Knowing the

enemy is vital ingredient, and in fact the determining factor, in waging a battle

of any kind.

On this basis, I will now discuss the operations I have personally conducted

against the rebels, which I selected because they serve as precedents or

models for subsequent operations. These are the battle of SIBalo an offensive

attack utilizing small-unit operations: the Labagan operations in Zamboanga del

Sur, a counter offensive which involved the recovery of enemy held territory;

and the Jolo operations, Code named “CENTURION” which is both offensive

and defensive in guerilla warfare.

SIBalo Hill is located at the “waist” of Jolo. Thus, any force occupying it has

control of the interflow of population, troop movement and resources. The hill is

likened to a cork in a bottle, which has to be dislodged before anybody could

go east or west of the island.

The 2nd Marine Battalion Landing Team (2MBLT) attempted to occupy the hill on

November 21, 1972 but failed. The hill became a symbol of successful resistance.

With Camp Siet, within its perimeter constantly harassed, the rebels controlled

the whole PAnamao district. Troop movement was restricted, with the 26th IB

and 11th IB‟s too far away and also harassed constantly by aggressive

insurgents to lend any help. On Christmas Day of 1972, the then 4th Brigade of

the 4th Infantry Division moved to Jolo to take over the Jolo CamPAign.

The forces employed in OPLAN “SIBALO” consist of twelve (12) teams of Scout

Rangers, two (2) comPAnies of Marines, one (1) reinforced Company of the 11th

Infantry Battalion, a 105mm Howitzer platoon, one (1) mortar platoon of the

Marines, the Navy‟s RPS 69 provIDing naval gunfire and two Helicopters from

PAF. Posed against them were the combined forces of Sikal SahIBad and

insurgents from Kuta Lubok and surrounding areas.

The operation was divIDed into three phases. First phase called for the Rangers

to infiltrate the hill with two Marine comPAnies following. Two (2) APC were to

follow the Marines to provIDe fire support and casualty evacuation. Charlie

Company was to block possIBle reinforcement fro Tiptipon and other areas and

upon orders to occupy Punai. Phase two involed occuPAtion of primary

objectives by the two Marine comPAnies while the

Rangers were to continue their SIBalo infiltration extending southward to Hill 113

to clear it of hostile armed elements. The last phase called for “C” Company

(reinforced) to move on and capture Punai as soon as the Rangers reach Hill

113.

The assault and capture of SIBalo hill was done in one lightning maneuver. The

attacking troops jumped off at 0300H 28 December 1972 spearheaded by the

Rangers and followed by the two Marine comPAnies. Objectives were occupied

without any resistance for the rebels only occupy the area during daytime. The

enemy was surprised. When the learned that the hill was already occupied by

government forces, and they began to mass their forces at Punai but were

warded off by the naval gunfire. It was at Punai where “C” Company, 11th

Infantry Battsalin, met enemy resistance. “C” Company then withdrew to give

way for naval and artillery fire which was delivered in the entire area until the

next day when the place was silenced and practically deserted. The battle of

SIBalo was won swiftly with minimum casualties on our sIDe – only one wounded

in action while the enemy incurred eighty killed and scores of accounted killed

and wounded.

* * *

Labagan is a classic example of a pincer as employed in guerilla type warfare

as exemplified in the operation code-named Task Group Charlie, to lIBerate he

town of Labagan, Zamboanga del Sur from the rebels.

The rebels sometime in the mIDdle of March 1973 overran Camp Abelon of the

PC in PAgadian City. Reinforcements drove the rebels to the town of Labagan

some seven kilometers, from the capital city. He rebel made their stand at the Sy

Kok Tiong compound on the highway approaching the town and also at the

town hall and some concrete buildings, which offered safe refuge. The town

was looted and burned.

A Task Group composed of “C” Company, 28th IB, and eight (8) Scout Ranger

Teams of SRCG, the 461st PC Coy, one (1) Company of the 2nd Marine Battalion

Landing Team, 4th COSAC, ZSCC, PS-69 and LT 68 was organized and code-

named “CHARLIE” jump off for respective objectives was 230700H March 73

after prePAration fires by Navy ships. Almost simultaneously, respective

objectives were captures by 1000H. The MuniciPAl Hall was taken by “C”

Company of the 28th Infantry Battalion, Balaniog Elementary School was

occupied by 4COSAC, ZSCC took Sy Kok Tiong compound but only when the

SMC ROTC unit supported secured by 28IB with the help of SRCG. At about

250800H March 1973, “C” Company of 28IB jumped off towards kilometer 12 to

act as blocking force to SRCG‟s clearing operation in sitio Balaniog in the West

where enemy concentration was reported. Two left-most teams of SRCG

entered abreast the wooded area 10 meters from the end of the almost one

kilometer rIDe rice field. Gunfire started front and left flank.

Successive operations continued from 25 – 29 and 291630 “CHARLIE:” ordered

“C” Co, 28IB to push the enemy eastward and the 461st PC Co to push them

Southward towards the MC position in a pincer movement. This worked, the

enemy retreating southward following the river on pump boats to avoID the

troopers‟ onslaught, were easy target of PS 69 and LT 68. Three loaded pump

boats were sunk including one heavily laden with explosives. This concluded the

battle for the lIBeration of Labagan.

The biggest and most decisive victory ever scored on the Jolo rebels came as a

result of Operation “CENTURION”. Present facts attest that they have never

recovered since.

At the start of 1974, the 4ID launched operation Centurion, a major offensive to

clear Sulu of rebel elements using AF forces and “Balikbayans”. This effort was

intended to dislodge the bastions of the resistance wherein the rebels had firmly

entrenched themselves and deny them a ground for staging their operations

against government forces.

On February 4, 1974, Centurion went into effect. I personally supervised the

operations from the then 4th Brigade Headquarters in Busbus, Jolo. Battalions

were fielded to clear points in the western portion of the islands before finally

crossing out for mop-up operations in the east. Along this concept, 2nfd IB

moved to its ground attack at PArang: the 24th IB, together with the 1st MBLT set

out for amphIBious landing at Maimbung and the 1st Composite Infantry

Battalion (ICIB) with the Balikbayans pushed towards the Bud Datu-Bud Pula

objective. The operations went without a hitch as the units finally overrun the

enemy in the crucial battle for positions.

Then trouble began. With the troops wIDely dispersed in the area, the rebels saw

a break-through and pre-empted an attack on Jolo proper, overrunning

perimeter defenses and cutting of the command headquarters from its troops.

Days before I already had some inkling that something was going to blow up.

Intelligence reports revealed massing of b\rebel groups headed towards the

Jolo town vicinity. Some may call it sixth sense. But I had known the enemy too

well by this time. Calculating and trying to anticiPAte the enemy‟s moves, I

immediately called in my floating reserve, the 14thInfantyr Battalion.

The rebels struck at dawn, 7 February &74 as I have expected. Reinforcement

was still on its way. The camp was hit at close range and strategic points

occupied. Encircled by mortar fire and sniper shots, I organized the only troops

available to counter attack immediately – Brigade Headquarters elements and

rear elements of combat forces.

The most tactically strategic place in the Jolo poblacion is the Notre Dame

college of Jolo compound with its 4 storey main building. From here you are

afforded a full view of the whole town over looking the Brigade Headquarters,

the Airport, the Military installations, the pier, and the beach areas. Any point in

this town is within range and an easy target of batteries mounted atop the 4th

floor. The place is only 50-60 meters away from the Brigade Headquarters and

the airport.

The rebels occupied this place and the equally strategic surrounding buildings,

except the 4th storey of the Notre Dame College. Thanks to the gallant stand

made by the Military Intelligence Group (MIG) people stationed and quartered

there.

The main mission of the composite troops I have hastily organized was to drive

the rebels out of this emplacement and deny them the tactical advantage.

Against difficult odds we somehow drove the rebels away on.

The 14th IB beached at Maubo in the early morning. All the time this beachhead

and the fuel/oil dump therein was secured by the “B” Co, 5th IB. Reinforcing

troops composed of elements of 14th, 18th, 5th Infantry Battalions and the 1st

Composite Infantry Battalion (ICIB) proceed to clear the town hall which was the

rebel‟s bastion in downtown Jolo. The pier was secured for use in landing more

men and supplies and evacuating the refugees who were

conglomerating in the area and anxious to be rehabilitation centers in Basilan

and Zamboanga.

The 26th IB arrived the next day and cleared the areas from the Notre Dame

College to downtown areas and swept the rebels out of the town proper. In a

last-ditch effort to screen their retreat, the rebels burned down the town.

At this point, the operations shifted to clear and secure the terrain controlling the

periphery of the town. With the 24th IB and 1BLT controlling the road junction at

Timbangan, the 26th IB pushed through the rear of its Bud Datu Objective – a

belt of hills overlooking Jolo and dotted with cave fortresses of rebels. From this

vantage point, the Brigade camp stood vulnerable like a sitting duck.

While the rebels engaged the other units in a frontal attack the 26th IB closed\in

and surprised enemy positions from behind. The rebels reeled under the imPAct

of the swift advance of the troops. Bud Datu-Bud Pula and Bud Awak soon fell to

government forces control.

Having secured the area, I concentrated the attack on Bato Puti in the vicinity

of Mt. Tumatangis. The 8IB, 26IB, 15IB and 14IB spearheaded the operations.

Despite stiff opposition, and difficult terrain, the 26th IB again penetrated the

lines and established positions while battering defenses in the area.

Subsequently, TaglIBi and TaliPAo areas fell to the troops, culminating in the final

stage, which brought the final recovery of Kambing and Luuk areas in the

eastern portion of Jolo.

As someone has observed,” . . You may fly over a land forever, you may bomb

it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life . . . but if you desire to keep it for

civilization, you must do this on the ground the way the Roman legions dID, by

putting your young men in the mud.”

The important lessons learned in the course of these operations are numerous.

They have to do with the mobility and flexIBility of our troops; the effectiveness of

firepower and armored vehicles, the need for countering ambuscades by the

enemy the tactical concepts of a unified command, and not the least, the test

of leadership. All of these, perhaps in varying degrees, are essential in

developing the fighting caPAbilities of our ground forces, Mobility and FlexIBility.

Movement is the first rule of guerilla warfare. Since the burden of fighting the

enemy and securing the territory falls on the shoulders of the ground forces, it is

merely logical that our troops acquire the mobility that will ensure their easy

deployment for offensive and defensive purposes.

An area as vast as Mindanao and Sulu, with many sPArely populated areas

offering abundant shelter and concealment, naturally calls for much greater

frequency of movements of troops than an area with different terrain. The use of

small-unit PAtrols that have the flexIBility of maneuver to accomplish tactical

and security measures should not be disregarded. The battle of SIBalo was one

such example of small unit operations (wherein we utilized Ranger teams to

infiltrate the stronghold of the rebels) firepower and APC‟s.

Along with the caPAbility to maneuver, and complementary to the operations

we have conducted, is the proven effectiveness of close and coordinated

firepower support in

overrunning enemy positions as well as in securing areas of defense. It has been

noted that enemy tactics are greatly stymied by massive and extensive use of

firepower. For sheer survival the rebels have developed a dread for armor,

rocket and grenade launchers, artillery and mortars.

As we exPAnd out forces and activities, the role of security becomes even more

necessary. Troop movements, defense of strategic installations, planning and

operations, logistics and intelligence, all require the strictest measures of security.

The proper discipline training and attitude on security can maximize our

decIDed advantage over the enemy.

The soundness of a unified command has been proven time and again in the

different operations I have conducted. In these instances, units are easily shifted

to counter enemy threat in different areas in the short possIBle time. The rebels

are awed by the consequences of a unified attack. For this reason, even

numerically superior rebel groups cannot face an infantry battalion In open

combat, knowing that it has accessIBility to air and naval support and re-supply.

I cannot conclude this discussion however without touching on what I feel is the

most important aspect that has influenced the conduct of our operations. This is

leadership – and leadership at all levels of command – not merely by virtue of

position but by virtue of action.

Courage is vital thing to have in combat. But the crucial test of a man in any

effort that needs to be accomplished is his leadership. Without, courage it will

only result in dead heroes. Yet, what is leadership? Opinions are divIDed in this

aspect; (some define it on the basis of personal qualities. Still others attrIBute

leadership to certain skills that would facilitate and enhance the power and

authority inherent in the position of a leader usually occupied). Be

characteristics or behavior PAttern that would conclusively guarantee the

making of a leader. It can be saID that leaders who differ wIDely in abilities and

traits are sometimes equally successful in similar situations. What concerns us

PArticularly is not whether a leader possesses PArticular traits of character and

ability but whether he can deliver the goods, so to speak; whether he can make

his influence felt in the face of demanding and critical situations. In this regard, a

combat situation provIDes an excellent background in determining the real

attrIButes of a leader. From experience I can say that action or performance

remains of necessity, the criterion, as well as the aim and proof of leadership.

On what may we base a leader‟s performance? Without hesitation, I would

point to his professional competence. Certainly, men will always follow a leader

whose decisions they can trust, whose courses of action are – to them at least –

infallIBle, and to whom they confIDently entrust their very lives, aware that he

knows well enough what he is doing it. Men will obey grudgingly or blindly but

they will surely obey only if you have proven to them that you are better in all

respect.

This more strikingly illustrated in combat where situations change fast and where

a wrong decision or even a slightly delayed action may prove fatal and result in

the loss of lives. Decision-making therefore will have to be based on a leader‟s

professional competence – by his knowledge of organizational requirements

and other related factors that may be combined, balanced and directed

towards the accomplishment of unit objectives.

A recognition of this principle – that is, of knowing his organization and the forces

by which it is moved allows him the flexIBility to approach the varied problems

and constantly shifting situations that he faces as a leader, and consequently to

provIDe appropriate courses of action relevant in meeting such situations.

FlexIBility is important because no two problems can be solved by the same

approach just as there are a variety of ways to solve a problem. The test of

leadership therefore comes in being able to choose from a wIDe range of

alternatives and more importantly, in putting that alternative into effect.

With this in mind, we can consIDer the ability to influence one‟s subordinates

and men as another must in leadership. It must be noted that field discipline is

entirely different from the kind enforced in garrisons and permanent camps. For

this reason, fair dealing with the men and a sincere concern for their welfare are

the best guarantees for their support and cooperation. Periodic visits to far-flung

units and recognition and reward for good work are only some of the means of

boosting their morale and offsetting the adverse effects of physical hardships

and dangers in combat. At the same time, swift punishment for offenders is

necessary to institute the kind of discipline required in combat situations.

All these contrIBute to effective leadership. Necessarily, I cannot discount the

benefits one acquires in being possessed of other qualities and trappings of

leadership other than those I have mentioned. Certain peculiarities and traits of

character are what make a leader colorful and unique of his own right.

I have saID my piece. With experience on my sIDe, it is my hope that you will

ALFONSO B ALCOSEBA, AFP

Chapter 7

The Alcoseba Doctrine

Time and again, personnel are reminded to wear their uniform properly, have

their hair neatly cut and well groomed, look clean at all times, etc. In short, the

summation of CG. 4ID‟s gospel “Look Good”.

The marks of efficiency can be measured at a glance by a manner in which a

soldier carries himself. He, who looks clean, thinks clean. And if one thinks clean,

he would be able to accomplish in an orderly manner, one‟s assigned tasks.

Most often, a community accepts a soldier who can keep himself and his

surroundings clean easily. He does not have to exert extraordinary efforts to gain

acceptance.

A far-flung detachment, for example, will have a difficult time accomplishing its

mission if the men manning that detachment look so rugged and ferocious and

the detachment area un-kept. Reason? The people in the community will feel

more insecure because the impression that they will have is “ if they cannot

even take care of themselves, how much more for us?”

The key to any victory is always public opinion. This doctrine is explicitly

emphasized in the Little Yellow Book written by no less that\n our Commanding

General, Major General ABAT entitled “ guIDelines on the Conduct of Stability

Operations” and I quote: “ By Victory, I do not only mean the more immediate

victory after each battle as expressed in terms of killed, wounded or captured.

Rather, I would emphasize a victory which goes beyond the physical and moral

destruction of the enemy, which is the winning of the hearts and mind of the

populace in the battle area.”

That strategy has withstood the tests of time and woe. It was true ever since the

bIBlical times as It is still true today.

The winning of the hearts and minds of the people can only be achieve in one

way and refer to what I now term as the Alcoseba doctrine.

DO GOOD, LOOK GOOD”

Public Relations

Public relations are PArt of the General ALCOSEBA‟s doctrine, aimed to change

or to neutralize hostile opinions, to crystallize uniformed or latent opinions in favor

of the organization, or to conserve favorably opinion. It is the process of

persuading and generating a climate of confIDence with the people.

To attain these aims is outlined in the following broad objective:

1. Win and maintain the trust and respect of the people and make them feel

that the military belongs to them.

2. Create public understanding of the missions and activities of the military in

order to gain their support, cooperation and goodwill.

3. Attain and maintain a posture as protector of the people and as PArtners in

development.

Lack of popular support can have disastrous result. It is the decIDing element in

battle, for whichever sIDe can effectively rally mass support has already won

half of the battle.

4th Infantry Division assumes a crucial role consIDering the sensitive area of its

operations. This area, most of the time is the focus of national concern and

interest.

It is this prevailing situation that public relations are injected into the picture in

order to preserve and consolIDate the gains or headway we attained. For no

organization can render maximum service without good public relations. For if

we are to serve effectively then our people must know us, understand each

other‟s problems, and appreciate its importance.

Public relations at its simplest, is one‟s dealing with the public. It seems very

elementary indeed. Everyone can have public relations without exerting any

conscious effort. But that is when one does not care whether public relations are

good or bad.

Good public relations mean the sharing of policies, services, and actions to the

best interest of the people whose confIDence and goodwill an organization

craves. It is the bringing about of batter public confIDence in the organization.

ResponsIBilities for Public Relations

In the 4th Infantry Division, public relations are everybody‟s business. The soldier

would do well to bear in mind the following: “Public Relations is the responsIBility

of every man, from the newest trainee and recruit to the commanding general.”

The best public relations representative is the soldier himself. What he knows,

what he thinks, and what he feels about the military organization will be

reflected in the attitude of the public.

Public relations therefore is an effort to persuade people in the community to

appreciate and support the work of the /division. Since our experience shows us

that a military organization cannot succeed unless a majority of the public

supports it, it becomes imperative that the command‟s activities cannot be

consIDered the responsIBility of just one person but must be the job of each one.

This simply means that all of us must strive to build and maintain good public

relations.,

Officers, enlisted personnel, draftees, trainees and even the civilian employees

must have a PArt in promoting public relations. It would be useless for us to go

on winning symPAthy and friendship for the Division white others are unfriendly

and uncouth. In such a case, it would be clear that what some build up, others

tear down. Where they publicly express their dissatisfaction with the staff or their

associates, the people can draw only one unpleasant conclusion.

Every soldier must observe proper decorum if we are to attain a desirable

relationship with the people. Proper decorum embodied good fellowship, civic-

spiritedness, politeness, courtesy and a high sense of duty. Public actuations of

every soldier are what make good or bad public relations in the Division. Hence,

public relations are clearly a responsIBility of every soldier.

Pointers on Human relations

1. Follow the Golden rule at all times and you will never go astray, human

relations – wise.

2. Respect the human personality. Every human being has a soul and a feeling

of importance. Regardless of education or social status, every person deserves

the respect of his fellowmen. Giving people due them would earn their

p\respect and cooperation in return, and you may succeed in getting them to

do what you want them to do.

3. Always remember that no one is perfect. Every one it is saID, is superior to

other in some respects, but inferior in other respect. This is important for us to

remember at all times in our dealings with other people.

4. Bear in mind at all times that nothing is ever stagnant in this world; all things

change. By giving due allowance and anticiPAtion for the possIBle changes that

may take place around us, we PAve the way towards better relations among

ourselves.

Specific Ways of Promoting Public Relations

AvoID debts or else PAy promptly. Not a few people, including soldiers, incur

debts. It is a privilege to be given goods on credit, especially in a civilian shop. It

means acquiring something on the strength of one‟s good name and promise to

PAy. “Your word is your bond”, so to say. Failures to keep that word constitute an

abuse of the privilege. And an abuse in any form does not register well in the

public mind; it is bad public relations.

2. AvoID intemperate drinking. There have been instances when excessive

alcoholism has caused some soldiers to forget themselves, their position and

their responsIBilities. There have been brawls with civilians, the incIDents creating

public scandals.

Cases of this nature have damaged the good name of the division. Soldiers

drinking during their leisure time should do so within physical limit and refrain

from getting involved in trouble, especially with civilians.

3. Extend proper help when needed, lending a hand is one of he good human

traits that we must acquire. Anyone imbued with it has the respect and

admiration of the public. There are various ways of manifesting this admirable

quality.

4. Show courtesy and politeness. The exercise of courtesy and politeness is one

of the many factors in the promotion of good public relations, Simple as the act

may be; it puts the Army in the public esteem. While such an act is expected of

ecru able-bodied man, the soldier being in uniform is more noticeable.

5. Act properly at the checkpoint is saID to be where you check on people but it

is also where the people check on you. Proper conduct of the soldier at the

checkpoint catches good public notice. People PAssing through the

checkpoint are usually travelers. They take their impressions of the soldiers and

the Division for as far as they will go. In the course of inspecting vehicles, strict

care should be taken not to give the people any cause for resentment or any

untoward feeling toward us. People look up to the soldier as friend and

protector; the soldier should bear that in mind always and should make the

people judge the Army as a whole.

6. Carry your uniform properly. When people see a civilian with his shirttail out,

the matter is of little or no consequence at all. But if a soldier in uniform does the

same, there is immediately that stigma

a of “unbecoming a soldier” impressed upon the mind of the people. And

people do not get IDeas in terms of the indivIDual soldier but of the whole Army.

Under such circumstances, the public instantly gets the impression that the

quality of the Army has declined. Such a situation is not contrIButory to good

public relations.

7. Shun censurable indulgences. A private citizen who indulges in vices and

frequents places of ill repute has only his own reputation to risk. If he suffers at all

because of such indulgences, he suffers alone. Not so in the case of the man in

uniform; any censurable act of the soldier places the whole Division in jeoPArdy.

Not only does an act constitute a social or convention taboo. It diminishes the

soldier‟s degree of usefulness. Vices, especially of “Sex” and “Liquor” affect

adversely both the mental and physical caPAbility of a man. The maximum of

such caPAbilities is expected of the soldiers who is charged with the grave

responsIBility of securing the nation at all cost and at all times.

8. Pick good associates. It is a common concept to judge a person by the

Company he keeps. If he is with bad Company, he too is bad in the eyes of the

public.

The significance of this concept is not so marked in the case of civilians as it is

with soldiers. The uniform makes a lot of differences. If a soldier keeps bad

Company, the public impression is that the soldiers are just like associates,

9. Stick to facts. Occasionally, a civilian asks a soldier questions about the Army.

In answering such questions, the soldier should stick to facts. He should neither

exaggerate nor fabricate, In several instances, some members of the military

pretend to know a great deal and start “ talking big”, obviously to impress the

curious inquirer, Any man of ordinary intelligence will be quick to notice this

“smart:” attitude. In such a case, the soldier not only embarrasses himself but

also his organization; people will think that the military is a bunch of smart alecks.

The public does not expect the soldier to know everything about the army, and

it wouldn‟t be degrading of any soldier to say “I don‟t Know” if he really does

not know what to answer. At any rate, of course, military secrets and such things

are not to be divulged to any unauthorized person.

10. Observe telephone decorum, Hundreds of telephone calls are received

everyday callers get impressions of the military from the way the soldiers answer

these calls.

The most important thing to observe in telephone conservation is utmost

courtesy and politeness. Good public relations are enhanced by the likeable

way of a soldier talks to outsIDers on the telephone.

What is good Public Relation Like? – Is charity; it begins at home.

A soldier‟s home is his camp or station. It is there where he first shows his worth s a

public servant and his potentially as a good asset to the military organization.

People from all walks of life go to camp everyday, and the manner with which

the servicemen deal with them makes up the basis of public opinion and

impression of the Army. What people see and experience in any of our camps

or stations is readily circulated,

There are civilian employees in Army comes. These civilians represent the public;

hence, they are veritable public relations agencies.

They will speak either ill or well of us depending on their experience with soldiers.,

What they will say, therefore, has a great bearing on the public relations of these

civilian employees get the best of impressions from us.

A good public relations is like good investment; it will bear good fruits and PAy

divIDends.

During the early stage of the command‟s PAcification camPAign, civic action

activities were undertaken corollary to military operations,. These were mostly

done under auspices of the Medical and dental Teams of Infantry Battalions.

On Calendar year 1973-74, the 3/ 4 Bde, which occupied the two (2) provinces

of Lanao rendered a total of 1,516 medical and 405 dental treatments for

indigent PAtients. SPARE foodstuff in large quantities were also distrIButed to

evacuees, PArticularly in Balabagan, Lanao Sur.

The 2/ 4 Bde actively engaged in civic action programs for stabilization

operation in the PAcification effort. Battalion Commanders attended Barangay

Council meetings and acted as advisers in several civic, social and government

affairs. The 30IB under LTC TOLENTINO initiated a clean-up drive in Isabela town

proper and a similar beautification camPAign was launched by LTC DELOS

SANTOS OF 23IB. In Mangal the 7IB under LTC DELA CRUZ led the native Yakans

in starting a progressive ands peaceful life.

In Jolo mainland, OCR TACOM BRAVO was organized under LTC SAMUEL D

SOMERA (then Major). The section was also responsIBle from issuing conduct

PAsses to the civilian populace. More so, the OCR team serves 38,649 evacuees

in Jolo in coordination with the dePArtment of Social Welfare and has distrIButed

3,005 sacks of rice, 500 cans of sardines and 100 sacks of flour. Documentary

films were shown and audiovisual unit manned by Msg Renato T Suralta to the

military and civilians. The OCR also launched Psychological Operations to

persuade the insurgents to surrender after the attack of Jolo town proper. It

coordinated with SPARE in construction of bunkhouses and distrIButing foodstuff

to 50,000 evacuees.

The Dental and Medical Teams of 4th INF Div treated 39,580 civilian PAtients

throughout fiscal year 1974-75. The 4ID Combo made outsIDe appearances and

71 renditions with the 4ID Band.

Towards the later PArt of 1975, military operations sanitized the rebel-infested

areas and disintegrated the rebel forces.

This development allowed the 4ID to shift its activities towards a more extensive

development of affected areas. The command launched a police of attraction

and reconciliation to enhance peace among the people of the Mindanao and

Sulu Archipelago. This program was carried but by the Infantry Brigades down to

Infantry Battalions in coordination with the local and national agencies.

In Jolo, the 1/4 Bde under the command of COL ISAURO C GUTANG carried out

the program with flying colors. It has created the Brigades Civil Affairs Group

(BCAG) headed by LTC AGRIPINO R DE GUZMAN, deputy Brigade Commander,

a public information program on the developments and activities of

government agencies and the military troops was the subject of a regular radio

broadcast. The unit Medical and Dental teams visited every week in the Jolo

mainland and the island communities of Sulu. A special program of BCAG,

Project “Reach Out” which involved the exchange of scooters from Sulu to

Luzon provinces was instrumental in exchanging Muslim-Christian harmonious

relationship in the area. “PANAWAGAN KO” was also conducted to intensify

Commands policy of attraction. The Malaria epIDemic, which plagued the

Province of Sulu necessitated the conduct of a blood-smear camPAign with the

direct assistance of the Brigade Surgeon and Provincial Health Officer. As news

of the civic activities adds more and more people to flocked daily in the

Brigade Headquarters, seeking assistance and protection. This also led to the

influx of rebel

surrenderee. During this period the command processed 2,231 returnees and

accounted for 1,857 firearms.

In Zamboanga Peninsula, the Brigade under the command of BGEN PEDRO T

ABANGAN (then colonel) carried out similar activities and reaped similar results.

Evacuees coming from Jolo, Basilan and remote places in Zamboanga

Peninsula flocked in Zamboanga City, and became the responsIBility of 2/4

Brigade. To accommodate them, the 2/4 Bde was assisted by the SPDA in

constructing 2,499 units of indivIDual houses and 67 units of bunkhouses was

constructed all throughout Zamboanga Peninsula. It also coordinates with the

DSWD, Rural Health Units and other agencies in the distrIBution of relief supplies

and treating PAtients. The Bde, through its operating unit, provIDed security for

the workers who were involved in the construction of roads, electrification, mini

wharves and airports to accelerate the socio-economic development of its

AOR.

The PMP Nr 516 was also carried out. A total of 3,031 rebel returnees were

processes and organized into the Civilian Service Support Group.

On 1976, 3/4 Brigade during the time BGEN JOSE P MAGNO JR as Brigade

Commander has rehabilitated 1,162 rebels‟ returnees and conducted medical

(11,984) and dental (4,450) treatment to civilian PAtients. It assisted SPARE in

establishing 17 evacuation centers in the municiPAlities, and in constructing of

29 bunkhouses for evacuees and 122 indivIDual soldiers for 1,954 families. A radio

program for PSYWAR and information services was launched and PAlarong

Kawal ‟76, a sport competition was made probable PArticiPAted by all units

within the AOR.

Carrying out the policy of the government to develop communities in major

urban cities, BGEN JOSE P MAGNO JR as Brigade Commander initiated the

relocation of rebel returnees in Tambo, Munai, Lanao del Norte. The

resettlement area was 6 hectares lot donated by a philanthropic Datu. Work on

this resettlement project started on 03 Dec76 and in one month time, the project

for the rebel returnees was the first of its kind and this attracted hardcore rebel

to return to the folds of the law.

Pursuant to the existing AFP SOPs on disaster Relief and Emergency conditions,

the Command assisted the victims of the earthquake, tIDal wave that hit

PAgadian City, Cotabato City and some coastal areas of Zamboanga del Sur in

1976.

on 17 Aug 76, the 1/4 Bde under BGEN ANGELO C QUEDDING led the rescue,

relief and rehabilitation operation for the victims of the earthquake and

“TSUNAMIS”. In Zamboanga Sur, a total of 853 persons were drowned. 429

missing 6,090 families were left homeless and 25 million pesos worth of propertied

was lost in the earthquake. To rebuild the victim‟s homes, Housing Authority in

constructing some 6,500 niPA houses for the victims. The government

appropriated 2.2 million pesos to cover the cost of emergency houses for

Zamboanga Sur victims. The commanders also saw to it that each family

received the 500 aIDs for the purchase of construction materials.

surrenderee. During this period the command processed 2,231 returnees and

accounted for 1,857 firearms.

In Zamboanga Peninsula, the Brigade under the command of BGEN PEDRO T

ABANGAN (then colonel) carried out similar activities and reaped similar results.

Evacuees coming from Jolo, Basilan and remote places in Zamboanga

Peninsula flocked in Zamboanga City, and became the responsIBility of 2/4

Brigade. To accommodate them, the 2/4 Bde was assisted by the SPDA in

constructing 2,499 units of indivIDual houses and 67 units of bunkhouses was

constructed all throughout Zamboanga Peninsula. It also coordinates with the

DSWD, Rural Health Units and other agencies in the distrIBution of relief supplies

and treating PAtients. The Bde, through its operating unit, provIDed security for

the workers who were involved in the construction of roads, electrification, mini

wharves and airports to accelerate the socio-economic development of its

AOR.

The PMP Nr 516 was also carried out. A total of 3,031 rebel returnees were

processes and organized into the Civilian Service Support Group.

On 1976, 3/4 Brigade during the time BGEN JOSE P MAGNO JR as Brigade

Commander has rehabilitated 1,162 rebels‟ returnees and conducted medical

(11,984) and dental (4,450) treatment to civilian PAtients. It assisted SPARE in

establishing 17 evacuation centers in the municiPAlities, and in constructing of

29 bunkhouses for evacuees and 122 indivIDual soldiers for 1,954 families. A radio

program for PSYWAR and information services was launched and PAlarong

Kawal ‟76, a sport competition was made probable PArticiPAted by all units

within the AOR.

Carrying out the policy of the government to develop communities in major

urban cities, BGEN JOSE P MAGNO JR as Brigade Commander initiated the

relocation of rebel returnees in Tambo, Munai, Lanao del Norte. The

resettlement area was 6 hectares lot donated by a philanthropic Datu. Work on

this resettlement project started on 03 Dec76 and in one month time, the project

for the rebel returnees was the first of its kind and this attracted hardcore rebel

to return to the folds of the law.

Pursuant to the existing AFP SOPs on disaster Relief and Emergency conditions,

the Command assisted the victims of the earthquake, tIDal wave that hit

PAgadian City, Cotabato City and some coastal areas of Zamboanga del Sur in

1976.

on 17 Aug 76, the 1/4 Bde under BGEN ANGELO C QUEDDING led the rescue,

relief and rehabilitation operation for the victims of the earthquake and

“TSUNAMIS”. In Zamboanga Sur, a total of 853 persons were drowned. 429

missing 6,090 families were left homeless and 25 million pesos worth of propertied

was lost in the earthquake. To rebuild the victim‟s homes, Housing Authority in

constructing some 6,500 niPA houses for the victims. The government

appropriated 2.2 million pesos to cover the cost of emergency houses for

Zamboanga Sur victims. The commanders also saw to it that each family

received the 500 aIDs for the purchase of construction materials.

wharves, 18 kms feeder roads, 6 units of school building and 2 feet brIDges all in

Olutanga. After restoring peace and order to the AOR of the 2/4 Bde, 3,490

tourists started visiting various tourist spots in Zamboanga City. Dialogues with

barangays and local officials were conducted as PArt of the command‟s

PSYCHOLOGICAL operations. Barefooted teachers were fielded in remote

places and trained where. Teachers are reluctant to go.

The peacemaker Brigade succeeded in gaining backs the confIDence and

rapport of both the Muslims and Christian alike in the sectors, in its AOR. It

enhanced its credIBility by being active involved in community affairs and

coordinating with local and provincial government agencies in community

projects.

The Tambo Human Resettlement Project, which resettled 238 families, was

inaugurated on 02 Mar 77. Three-more similar resettlements were set up

accommodating 200 families, in the interior areas under AFP OPLAN

“BAYANIHAN PROGRAM” with the active PArticiPAtion of all government

agencies in the province. In Tambo, Munai, Lanao Norte, the Brigade assisted by

the NACIDA successfully established a mat weaving, rattan stripping and

duckery projects. As assisted by the NACIDA, the unit launched also the first

Bamboo Craft Training course for out of school youth under OPLAN “BALIKATAN

77”. The Brigade MEDCAP treated 13,853 medical PAtients and 2,925 dental

PAtients. On 17 Apr ‟77, Referendum (Plebiscite) and 17 Dec 77, Referendum,

the brigade PArticiPAted in monitoring information drive conducted by the

DePArtment of Public Information and Association of gov‟t Communicators

(AGCOM). Likewise, PArticiPAted in DPI Region XII‟s “ALAMIN ANG KAPALIGIRAN

SEMINAR”. The Brigade organized a military dependent Sewing Cooperative

with the assistance of NACIDA. The brigade also assisted at its headquarters the

BAEX in a two-month long PROFEM reforestation and development project. To

strengthen the undertaking and goodwill between the military and civilians, tri-

sectoral conference was called at the Provincial capitol. BGEN ANGELO

QUEDDING, former CG of 1/4 Brigade and the Provincial governor of

Zamboanga Sur presIDed a conference that was attended by members of

Sanguniang PAnlalawigan, heads of different government offices,

representatives of the media. PresIDents of Civic Organizations, Religious leaders

and Civic leaders of Zamboanga Sur. The military jointly PArticiPAted the

conference together with other government agencies and constructed 180

housing units. Five of these units were later converted into a Muslim School.

As a result to these active PArticiPAtion of the military, 156 communist terrorist

symPAthizers at Tambulig, Bonifacio, Zamboanga Sur, pledged to return to the

folds of the law before the brigade commander. For the PAst twelve months, the

2/4 Bde engaged in the rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced families

within its AOR under Project “TULUNGAN”. It works hand in hand with the Muslim

and Christian resIDents of Tictapul, Zamboanga City to set up bunkhouses and

install water facilities for the use of 100 families. Also built were school house,

mosque and center of Islamic Studies (MADRAZA), barangay halls, multi-purpose

building, with full support from other government agencies, Another

resettlement project at Marangan was built out of a 116,000 funds provIDed by

the office of regional commissioner (ORC) of Region IX.

During this period, three more resettlement projects were constructed in Lanao

del Norte under the AFP OPLAN “Bayanihan Program”. These are the Tagoloan

resettlement, Pindulanan Mini resettlement at Poona-Piagapo and Poblacion

Poona Piagapo resettlement. Each project is expected to accommodate 100

families. Under the AFP Project Balikatan, the 2/4 Brigade launched crash-

training program for returnees, evacuees, out of school youth,

indigent students and ex-draftees. The Regional Manpower Training Center No.

9, Region XII offered four diffeent three-month vocational courses, which

benefited 118 students. During this period a total of 329 rebel returnees and their

families were processed and assisted as PArt of the program in the

implementation of the OPLAN “Bayanihan Program.”

On year 1982, 3/4 Brigade, received several rebels who returned to the folds of

the law, there were (16) sixteen Moro National LIBeration Fronts rebels led by

Commander Al King PATAGUE operating in Lanao del Norte surrendered to COL

MUNOZ. And were presented to Brig Gen EMILIO S LUGA Jr. Commanding

General of 4ID, PA. Accordingly, the surrenderees handed the following high-

powered FAs six (6) Garand rifle, nine (9) Carbines and hundred rounds of

ammunition. COL MUNOZ welcomed the surrender of the MNLF rebels, and

reiterated the military‟s desire to extend full assistance to uplift the rebel living

condition in line with the guIDance of PresIDent MARCOS, not only as protector

but also as PArtner in development. Like wise, commander Al King PAtague

assured COL MUNOZ to extend his fullest cooperation PArticularly in national

undertakings

Meanwhile, on the same year in support of the livelihood program of the

government, 4th Infantry Division boast of the 35 major KKK projects which are

being undertaken by the Command‟s various units all over its area of

responsIBility.

The projects consist of development of fishponds, food production, livestock,

poultry, duck and goat raising, energy tree farms, to include green revolution

and tree planting.

Close to twenty thousand pesos will be needed to support these various

livelihood projects, and shall require tremendous manpower requirements. For

manpower, the Division utilizes the military soldiers and trainees, to include the

rebel returnees. Some of the KKK projects have already been started since last

1981 and are expected to be fully established in 1982, while others be initiated

on the year, PArticularly those involving on food production and development

of energy tree farm and nurseries.

The development of fishponds outranks all other projects of the Division in line

with the KKK.

This fishpond contain a total of 15,000 fingerlings of both tilapia and bangus fries,

nine-thousand of which are fingerlings of tilapia, and the six thousand

composed of bangus fries. These have been seeded as soon as the fishponds

were constructed

In Camp Evangelista alone, twelve post units have undertaken energy tree

farms, fishpond, food production and green revolution projects.

These KKK military project were being closely supervised by the military officers

assigned in the areas, and progress reports are periodically being feed to the

Command base, in order that the Commanding General be well-informed and

keep abreast of their development.

The military KKK project on food production consist of rice, cassava, and other

root crops, while the green revolution projects include backyard vegetables, for

the consumption of the military personnel. No financial requirement is needed

since this entails self-labor. However, seedlings are acquired from local sources

PArticularly from the nearby government agencies on plant industry and

agriculture.

The Division is undertaking the nursery development projects, in order that the

tree planting, energy farms and green revolution KKK projects shall have ample

provision of the much-needed seedlings

Petition seek to rename camp Evangelista to Fort Apolinar Velez:

Their have been numerous petitions to name Camp Evangelista as Fort Apolinar

Velez in honor of the Great Cagayanon PAtriot but these have not been acted

upon by the National Historical Commission so far.

With the celebration of the country‟s Centennial and the 48th Charter Day

Anniversary, the time may now be right to revive the morIBund petitions to finally

set this great injustice straight.

“Even the Velez family was dismayed when the camp was named after Gen

Evangelista. Of course, he was also a revolutionary hero but he was from the

North” saID Dr Vicente Jose Velez grandson and spoke person of the heirs of

Don Apolinar Velez.

“Do you know there‟s not even one street in Camp Evangelista named after

Don Apolinar Velez? Its time the government rectify this great injustice to my

grandfather” Velez added. The late Senior CANYONG donated the 32-hectare

property that is now the headquarters of 4th Infantry Division, as Don Apolinar

Velez was fondly called, as the cadre-training site of the Philippine

Commonwealth Army on 1936. Velez was also a Colonel in the Mindanao

Battalion of the Philippine Revolutionary Army headed by Gen Nicolas

CAPISTRAN, foresaw the need for military camp in the mIDdle of the city. His son

Blas Ch. Velez and acknowledge as one of the most avID writers and compilers

of local history, recalls that Senior Canyong donated the land for the camp

because he foresaw it would play a major role in the future progress of the city.

First, if the soldiers and their dependents would need logistics which would need

logistics which would contrIBute greatly to the upliftment of trade and

commerce in the city especially for the small e\vendors, farmers, businessmen

and traders.

Second, the peace ensured by the presence of the military camp would attract

people from all around Mindanao to do business in the security of the city

premises. The presence of the camp would assure local citizens of the

government‟s commitment to peace and order in the region.

Most important, the camp would assure military training for all able-bodied

recruits. His experience during the Revolution showed that courage and bravery

are not enough to win the battle. Training and the proper weapons are just as

important.

This vision has proven to be prophetic as the last two decades has seen

Cagayan de Oro‟s economy take-off comPAred to the rest of the strife-torn

Mindanao because of the presence of the military camp.

The petitioners also cited the outstanding military records of the late Col Velez

who fought major roles in at least four major battles during the SPAnish and

American periods. While still a Voluntarios de Cagayan, Velez was

commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant in the SPAnish Army and decorated for his

roles in suppressing the Disciplinarios of Sta Ana, Tagoloan in October 14, 1887

and again the Disciplinarios of Kalaganan (now Iligan), in August 1896.

During the Philippine American War, Velez joined the LIBER TROOP and

Mindanao Battalion of Gen Nicolas Capistrano in the ill-fated Battle of Cagayan

and led the local PAtriots to victory in the Battle of Makahambus, the only

recorded victory of Filipino PAtriots over the US Army in Mindanao on June

4,1900.

BesIDes his military career, senor Canyong also had long and distinguished

record as a civil servant serving the SPAnish Government, the Philippine

Revolutionary Government, the US Colonial Administration and the Philippine

Commonwealth under Pres Manuel L Quezon over a sPAn of 60 years.

He served in various caPAcities, notably as the twice-elected Governor of

Misamis Province, and also twice as the PresIDente MuniciPAl (Mayor) of

Cagayan de Misamis.

He also founded the Misamis Provincial High School (now the Misamis Oriental

General Comprehensive High School), the Misamis Provincial Trade School (now

the Mindanao Polytechnic State University) and the Camiguin Trade School at

Mambajao, which have helped to make Cagayan de Oro the educational

center of the Region.

Meanwhile, Dr Vicente Jose Velez warned that the Heirs of Don Apolinar Velez

would contest the military‟s planned disposal of some areas of the 32-hectare

camp. “There is a clause in the deed of donation that the camp would revert to

the Heirs of Don Apolinar Velez if ever it ceases to be used for the purpose for

which it was donated, Velez saID.

Earlier, AFP Chief of Staff Gen Clemente P MARIANO saID military was planning

to dispose some areas of the camp like what was done with Fort Bonifacio in

Metro Manila.

Velez saID the Heirs would definitely contest this plan if the military insist on

proceeding with the sale despite the limitations on the use of the property

stipulated in the deed of donation.

“You know, not all descendants of Don Apolinar Velez are well-off” saID Velez “

I‟m sure my late grandfather would rather opt that the property benefit

descendants from the Velez bloodline before anybody else.