4th Amendment Satisfaction Other Search and Seizure ... 5-10 4th Amendment... · consent to a...
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Transcript of 4th Amendment Satisfaction Other Search and Seizure ... 5-10 4th Amendment... · consent to a...
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1. Characteristics of Suspect:Age, education level, gender and race of the subject are all factors to be considered in the voluntariness equation. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, ( ) ( g226 ( 1973)).
Knowledge of a right to refuse to consent to a search is not necessary in order for the search to be deemed voluntary; however it is a factor that may be considered.Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234.
2. Acts of Government Agent:F h h ’ l i f d f d ’ h i h b li i dFor the most part, the courts’ analysis of defendants’ character traits has been limited to an acknowledgment that they are a factor in the determination of voluntariness. By and large, courts are willing to find that, at least in the absence of egregious police misconduct or coercion, consent by a suspect was voluntarily given.Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 211, 222‐25 (2002).
It is a well settled principle that where there is coercion, there cannot be consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973).
Consent given after officer falsely states that he has a search warrant is not valid, as it is tantamount to telling the subject that he has no choice but to consent. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549‐50 (1968).
Police may not use a threat to obtain a warrant when there are no grounds to do so in order to induce submission.United States v Evans 27 F 3d 1219 1231 (7th Cir 1994)United States v. Evans, 27 F.3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir. 1994).
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The fact that an officer engaged in trickery or subterfuge to gain consent does not necessarily render defendant’s consent involuntary, as it is just one of the factors the court may consider in analyzing validity of consent.People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. 2009).
Agents went to the home of a child pornography suspect and, knowing that their statement was untrue, informed the suspect that he may be a victim of identity theft. The court concluded the d l d b h h b l h fdeceptive language was used by the agents to cause the suspect to believe he was a victim of crime, and it was based on this assumption that he allowed the officers to come in to his home. Agents requested permission to look at suspect’s computer. Believing the agents were attempting to help him, suspect turned on his computer and provided the agent with necessary passwords. A resulting search uncovered images of child pornography.
Court stated that when agents’ tactics involve misrepresentations (at least those which do not rise t th l l f f l l l i i th t h h t) th t h ld l th t tto the level of falsely claiming the agent has a search warrant), the court should analyze the extent to which the deceit directly served to overcome a citizen’s reticence or resistance to the search.United States v. Parson, 599 F. Supp. 2d 592, 603 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
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Agents sought consent to search residence for explosives and evidence relating to explosives and bomb‐making. A reasonable person assessing exchange between agent and person granting consent would conclude that consent extended to the computer.p
Request that the computer be returned after the FBI made a copy of the hard drive may serve as an indication that search was within scope of consent; defendant did not express an objection to the removal or the copying of the hard drive.
Furthermore, the court held that the revocation of consent, which occurred two months after consent was granted, did not operate retroactively to invalidate the agent’s actions. In effect, the court held that there was no expectation of privacy in the mirror image copy that the FBI hadcourt held that there was no expectation of privacy in the mirror image copy that the FBI had consent to obtain, and that the agent could continue to search this mirror image even after consent was revoked .
United States v. Megahed, 2009 WL 722481 (M.D. Fla. 2009 ).
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United States v. Stierhoff, 477 F. Supp 2d 423 (D. R.I. 2007).United States v. Stierhoff, 477 F. Supp 2d 423 (D. R.I. 2007).
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Computer science grad student gave law enforcement consent to search computerComputer science grad student gave law enforcement consent to search computer.He agreed to let officers take computer to FBI office for exam. Reasonable to assume he knew it would involve more than a cursory look.United States v. Al‐Marri, 230 F. Supp. 2d 423 (2007).
Agent asked appellant if he could search his cell phone; appellant was nonverbal but handed agent his phone. Appellant’s surrender to agent of his cell phone in response to agent’s open‐ended request implied grant of equally unbridled consent for agent to examine the phone and the information contained therein. L St t 298 SW 3d 658 (T 2009)Lemons v. State, 298 S.W. 3d 658 (Tx. 2009).
In Prinzing, court found that police did not engage in trickery to obtain consent; rather, he had a two‐fold purpose in his visit. However, police chose to indicate that he wanted to search for illegal credit card activity, chose to impart to defendant that he was a victim, not a suspect, and thus, police chose to limit the scope of the search.People v. Prinzing, 907 N.E.2d 87 (Ill. App. 2009).See also, United States v. Richardson, 583 F.Supp.2d 694 , 716 (W.D. Pa. 2008).
In Parsons agents had no objective evidence regarding identity theft the misrepresentation used toIn Parsons, agents had no objective evidence regarding identity theft, the misrepresentation used to gain suspect’s consent. Evidence of child pornography was suppressed: scope of consent limited to information re: ID theft.United States v. Parson, 599 F. Supp. 2d 592 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
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It is well‐settled that consent to search, in the absence of a search warrant may, in some circumstances be given by a person other than the target of the search.1
United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 1978).
The theories that allow searches based on third party consent are closely related: commonThe theories that allow searches based on third party consent are closely related: common authority and assumption of risk.
“Common authority is ... not to be implied from mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies third‐party consent does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements, but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co‐inhabitants has the right to permit the inspectionis reasonable to recognize that any of the co inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.”
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7. (1974).
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People who might have actual authority to consent:People who might have actual authority to consent:
•Parents
•Spouses
•Employers (maybe; not always)
•Room‐mates and co‐tenants
Montana is the only state that categorically rejects the theory that a youth can provide legal consent to a search. The court in State v. Schwarz concluded that due to Montana’s enhanced right to privacy under Article II, Section 10, consent, as an exception to the warrant requirement must be narrowly construed, and as such, a youth under the age of sixteen does not have the authority to waive her parents’ privacy rights.
Allan v State 2009 WL 1164980 (Ala Crim App ) (citing State v Schwarz 136 P3d 989 992Allan v. State, 2009 WL 1164980 (Ala. Crim. App.) (citing State v. Schwarz, 136 P.3d 989, 992 (Mont. 2006).
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An officer may rely on the consent of a person who seems authorized to consent, regardless of whether or not the person is actually authorized to give consent. The Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez set forth an objective standard: would all of the facts available to the officer at the moment warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises?”
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).g , ( )
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Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188‐89 (1990).
See also United States v Kimoana 383 F 3d 1215 (10th Cir 2004)See also, United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
Even if accompanied by young children, a third party’s mere presence on the premises to be searched is not sufficient to establish that a man of reasonable caution would believe the person had mutual use of the property by virtue of joint access or control over it for most purposes. Instead, government must offer some additional evidence to support a claim of apparent authority.
Officers who encountered woman at front door of defendant’s apartment did not know who she wasOfficers who encountered woman at front door of defendant s apartment did not know who she was or her relationship to defendant or the premises. One who answers door of an apartment at three o’clock in the afternoon could be a “repairman, a visitor, or a neighbor watering the plants or feeding the pets.” In this case, officers were presented with an ambiguous situation and were under a duty to make a further inquiry as to the woman’s authority.
United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1130‐31 (10th Cir. 2007).
Officers did not blindly accept girlfriend’s claim of authority over premises to create apparent authority to search. Officers questioned girlfriend and discovered:• she had key to apartment•She kept possessions in the apartment•She lived off‐and‐on at apartment• she frequently cleaned and did household chores at the apartment.United States v Goines 437 F 3d 644 649 (7th Cir 2006)United States v. Goines, 437 F.3d 644, 649 (7 Cir. 2006).
Officers did not rely on “unsubstantiated hunch” that defendant’s girlfriend had joint access to the apartment; before they entered the apartment, she told officers she kept several possessions there and could enter apartment in defendant’s absence.
United States v. Meada, 408 F.3d 14, 21 (1st Cir. 2005).
General Principle:
In a 5‐3 decision, the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Randolphheld that a co‐tenant’s consent does not suffice for a reasonable search if a potential defendant with self‐interest in objecting is in fact physically present and objects.
G i R d l h 547 U S 103 122 23 (2006)Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122‐23 (2006).
The Majority admitted it was drawing a fine line but reasoned that as long as there was no evidence that police removed the potentially objecting tenant from the premises to avoid a possible objection there is practical value in the clarity of complementary rules, one recognizing a co‐tenant’s authority to grant permission when there is no fellow co‐tenant on hand, and the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupants contraryon hand, and the other according dispositive weight to the fellow occupants contrary indication when he expresses it.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 136‐37.
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United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2008).
Police uncovered child pornography while executing valid warrant on defendant’s business computer. Police asked defendant for consent to search his home computer which he refused. The defendant was arrested and taken to jail. In the meantime, other officers went to the defendant’s home and asked defendant’s wife for permission to search the home computer, which she eventually granted.
The Eighth Circuit noted that Randolph’s narrow holding referenced a defendant who was physically present, and therefore was not applicable. As such, defendant’s refusal to give consent did not invalidate the later consent granted by his wife ‐ a cotenant possessing joint access or control over the computer for most purposes ‐ and therefore authorized under Matlock.
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The court found no problem with the fact that officers did not inform the authorized third party (Mrs. Hudspeth) of the prior refusal of her co‐tenant (Mr. Hudspeth), opining that, “the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement did not demand that the officers inform Mrs. Hudspeth of her husband’s refusal. This conclusion is supported by Matlock and Rodriguez, where law enforcement officers bypassed the defendants against whom the evidence was sought, although the defendants were present and available to participate in the consent colloquy. The officers instead sought the consent of an authorized cotenant.” United States v Hudspeth 518 F 3d 954 960 (8th Cir 2007)United States v. Hudspeth, 518 F.3d 954, 960 (8 Cir. 2007).
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Effect of defendant’s removal by police:
In many instances the defendant will not be physically present and voicing an objection to the search because police have removed him from the scene.
In its holding that an officer’s knowledge of prior express refusal does not invalidate subsequent consent by an authorized third party, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hudspeth focused onconsent by an authorized third party, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hudspeth focused on the officer’s knowledge, not on his actions. In Hudspeth, the Eighth Circuit strictly construed Randolph stating that “Hudspeth was not present because he had been lawfully arrested and jailed based on evidence obtained wholly apart from the evidence sought on the home computer. Thus, this rationale for the narrow holding of Randolph, which repeatedly referenced the defendant’s physical presence and immediate objection, is inapplicable here.”
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In Wilburn, police received tip that defendant Wilburn was a felon in possession of h d h h d k d d i li d h li d i h lhandguns, he had a revoked drivers license, and he lived with Taylor.
Police staked out his apartment. “They soon got lucky,” and saw D. exit his apartment and get in his car which was parked in the rear of the complex.
When he drove around the block to the front of the apartment to pick up Taylor, he was arrested for driving with revoked license.
After a search of D. And his car turned up no weapons, he was handcuffed and placed in back of carback of car.
Unites States v. Wilburn, 473 F. 3d 742, 744 (7th Cir. 2007).
The court noted the facts established that police, did not deliberately remove Wilburn from the area to avoid hearing an objection to the search.
United States v. Wilburn, 473 F. 3d at 745.
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Police arrested defendant of suspicion of drug activity, handcuffed him and placed him in the back of the squad car which was parked next to his home. Police then asked defendant’s co‐tenant‐girlfriend for consent to search the home, which she granted.
Noting there was no evidence presented that officers removed the defendant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding possible objection, which under Randolph would invalidate the co‐tenant’s consent, the court opined “the subjective interest of the officer seems less important than the effect upon the potential defendant.”
Since defendant was removed involuntarily from the place from which he could have made his “threshold refusal,” the court held that he was “physically present.”
The court also found that the defendant, by his actions refused to grant consent. The girlfriend did not have keys to the home; police had to ask the defendant for his keys which were in his pocket. Defendant did not voluntarily hand over his keys, and he tried to prevent the officer from obtaining possession of the keys.
State v. Jackson, 931 A.2d 452, 455 (Del.Super.Ct. 2007).
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The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Murphymeans that a one‐time objection by one can permanently disable the other from ever validly consenting to a search of shared premises /permanently disable the other from ever validly consenting to a search of shared premises / property.
The Ninth Circuit interpreted Randolph’s holding that third party consent to a search is valid “[s]o long as there is no evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a possible objection” to mean that police can not prevent a co‐tenant from objecting to a search through arrest, arguably, even a valid arrest. The court builds on this premise and holds “[i]f the police cannot prevent a co‐tenant from objecting to a search through arrest surely they cannot arrest a co tenant and thenfrom objecting to a search through arrest, surely they cannot arrest a co‐tenant and then seek to ignore an objection he has already made.”
United States v. Murphy, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124‐25 (9th Cir. 2008).
When an objection has been made by either tenant prior to the officer’s entry, the officer must, in the absence of exigent circumstances, obtain a search warrant.
United States v. Jackson, 516 F.3d 1117, 1124‐25 ( 9th Cir. 2008)., , ( )
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The Seventh Circuit rejected Ninth Circuit’s holding in Murphy, finding that it extended Randolph too far.
• Objection loses its force when defendant is validly arrested and taken to jail. • An objector does not have an absolute veto.• Both presence and objection by tenant are required to render co‐tenant’s consent unreasonable.
United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776 , 783‐84 (7th Cir. 2008).
The court took note of Randolph’s underlying societal expectation theory: A warrantless search of a home based on a co‐tenant’s consent is unreasonable in the face of a present tenants express objection. However, once the tenant leaves, societal expectations shift and the tenant assumes the risk that a co‐tenant may allow officers to enter , even knowing that the other tenant would object (or continue to object) if presenttenant would object (or continue to object) if present. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d at 785.
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United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978).
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Locks are critical in determining who is authorized to consent.
“If one wants to ensure his possessions will be subject to consent search based only due to his own consent, he is free to place these items in an area over which others do not share access or control, be it a private room or a locked suitcase under a bed.”United States v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
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Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2001).
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In Trulock v. Freeh, the Fourth Circuit analyzed whether the search of Trulock’s password‐protected computer files, authorized by his housemate, was valid under the Fourth Amendment.
The court found that Trulock’s use of a computer password was analogous to the use of the lock on a footlocker, and as in Block, it shows he affirmatively intended to exclude his housemateon a footlocker, and as in Block, it shows he affirmatively intended to exclude his housemate from these files. The steps Trulock took to insure his files were inaccessible to his housemate (the creation of a password which he did not reveal) are evidence that he did not assume the risk that the files could be subjected to a search authorized by another.
The court in Trulock was not faced with the issue of apparent authority, in that the housemate informed police she did not know Trulock’s computer password.
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001).Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4 Cir. 2001).
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Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 403 (4th Cir. 2001).
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Wife told officers she used the computer only occasionally to play solitaire. After shutting down computer, officers mirrored the hard drive and conducted a forensic analysis of the copy using software that did not reveal the husband’s files were password‐protected.
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2007).
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The court took into consideration the following facts in holding that the officers were reasonable in assuming that the wife had authority to consent to a search of the computer:
• Computer was located in a common area• Computer was located in a common area.
• Computer was on and screen was lit even though husband was not at home.
• Fraudulent acts committed came from the home computer using accounts established in the wife’s name.
• Computer leased solely in the wife’s name.
• Officers had no indication that files were password protected.p p
United States v. Buckner, 473 F.3d 551 (4th Cir. 2001).
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The court noted that an officer presented with ambiguous facts relating to authority has a duty to i i f h b f l i i l i h li f iinvestigate further before relying on consent. However, in analyzing the totality of circumstances available to the officers, the court found they could have reasonably believed that the defendant’s father possessed mutual use and control over the computer and therefore authority to consent to its search. As a result, the officers were under no duty to ask clarifying questions. The court considered the following factors:
• door to defendant’s bedroom was open, giving the officers a clear view of the computer• father said he was free to enter the defendant’s room, although he knocked if the door was , gclosed
• father owned the house and lived there• father paid the ISP bill• father did not say or do anything to indicate his lack of control over the computer at the time he was asked for his consent
United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 713‐14 (10th Cir. 2007).
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Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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