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PROFESSIONAL PAPER 401 / January 1984"%q

THE BERLIN-BAGHDAD

Ott RAILWAY AS A CAUSE

OF WORLD WAR I

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2 ~PROFESSIONAL PAPER 41 / January 1984

P THE BERLIN-BAGHDADRAILWAY AS A CAUSEOF WORLD WAR I

Arthur P. Maloney

Prepared at New York University, 1959

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. Railroads and "The New Imperialism" .............. 1

1I. German-Turkish Background to the Baghdad Railway ..... 2

IIIo The First Phase: A Comercial Venture, 1888-1899 ....... 6

IV. The Second Phase: Drang Nach Osten, 1899-1908 ........... 7

V. The Third Phase: The Germans Compromise, 1908-1914 .... 9

t ~VI. The Baghdad Railway as a Cause of World War I ........ 10

1.* Affirmative Arguments ..... . .. . .. *...... 10

2. Negative Arguments * .... *... .. **......... 11

Afterword ........................ .... 16

Bibliography .............................. .* 17

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I. Railways and "The New Imperialism".

Shortly after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the European Powers,Japan, and the United States entered upon an era of unprecedentedindustrial and commercial expansion. One feature of this expansion wasthe rapid development of rail transportation to unite widely separatedand, frequently, sparsely settled areas. A second aspect was theaggressive scramble for colonies, protectorates, naval bases and spheresof influence. It was discovered that railroads, in addition to openingmarkets and securing sources of supply, served to politically unify newterritories and vastly simplified the problem of military defense andcontrol of the region. Equally important, the railroads became thedominant business interest in the new mines and industries on eitherside of the railway, in the towns along the right of way, and in thefarming areas for miles around the railroad. This was true both ofrailways in "colonial areas" and in home areas: for example, the majorrailways of Germany, Russia, and the United States.

Railways having become so important, it was soon merely sufficientfor one nation to announce the preliminary plans for a new railway toengender suspicion, hostility, and jealousy in other powers. Such wasthe effect on the French of England's projected Capetown-to-CairoRailway, which would conflict with the French-planned East-West Railwayacross the bulge of Africa. Similarly, the Russo-Japanese War of 1905grew out of a struggle for control of railways in Manchuria and wasprecipitated, in part, by the Japanese determination to strike beforethe Trans-Siberian Railroad--which would considerably strengthenRussia's hold in the Far East--could be completed.

rhe Baghdad Railway was a projectae grand in conception and assweeping in scope as--any-of-therailways already sent ioned. At first amodest effort in north-eastern Anatolia, it soon captured the enthusiasmof important men in German and Austrian financial, industrial, andpolitical circles. This growing interest of Germany, by a sort ofpolitical third law of motion, engendered an equal and opposite reactionin Russia, France, and England.

In this paper I trace the history of the Baghdad Railway from itsconception in 1888 to the beginning of World War I. I will show howimportant the Railway was in the political, economic, and diplomaticevents which led up to the First World War.

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11. German-Turkish Background to the Baghdad Railway

There are far too many facets to the Baghdad Railway project to beconsidered adequately in a short paper. Many will only be mentioned inpassing. However, two factors seem of crucial importance as backgroundto the Railway throughout the course of its development. These were:(1) the swelling flood of German economic power and her emergence as amajor world trader; and (2) the disintegration of Turkish politics.

The growth of Germany as a world power is best summarized by meansof a few tables of comparative statistics. These data were taken from alittle book by Dr. Karl Helferich which was published on the eve ofWorld War I [l].*

PopulationDate Germany (p. 14) Europe**

1816 25,000,000 200,000,0001871 41,000,000 300,000,0001888 48,000,000 360,000,0001913 66,000,000 460,000,000

In population growth, Germany's rate of increase was about that ofEurope as a whole (but much greater than France's).

Steel Production, Thousands of Tons (Helferich, p. 72)

1886 1910 Increase ()United States 2,600 26,000 900Germany 950 13,000 1,300Great Britain 2,400 6,100 150France 430 3,400 700Russia 240 2,300 900Belgium 164 1,400 800

By 1910, Germany had far surpassed Great Britain in steelproduction; in fact, her production was greater than that of Great

* Dr. Helferich was appointed Assistant General Manager of the Anatolian

Railway in 1906 at the age of 34. He was the son-in-law of Dr.Siemens-who was then head of the Deutsche Bank, the bank behind theBagdad Railway. Helferich became director of the bank and was laterGermany's Finance Minister during part of World War I. The book hewrote in 1914 was part of a nation-wide celebration at every level-social, political, economic--of the 25th anniversary of Kaiser WilhelmII's accession to power. It provides a glimpse of how Germans viewedthemselves and the world in 1914.

** Encyclopaedia Britannica.

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Britain, Russia, and France combined. Yet Germany's population was

still (in 1910) only one eighth that of Europe.

Total Import-Export Trade, Millions of Harks (Helferich, p. 73)

1887 1912 Increase (percent)

Germany 6,200 20,000 220England 11,000 22,000 100United States 5,800 16,000 170France 5,900 12,000 100

By 1912, Germany's visible trade had increased from one half thatof England's in 1887 to almost equal that of England in 1912--despite adoubling of English trade in this period.

Shipping (Helferich, p. 77)(Steam Ships)

1,000Date Number registered tons

Germany 1885 700 4001911 2,000 2,500

England 1885 7,000 4,0001911 12,000 11,000

United States 1885 5,000 1,4001911 10,000 2,500

Norway 1885 700 2001911 1,800 900

* France 1885 900 5001911 1,800 800

Here, the increase in German economic wealth again is marked.Despite lack of extensive coastal trade, by 1910, she had reached paritywith the United States in registered tonnage of steam ships and had onefourth the tonnage of Britain--versus one tenth in 1887. By 1910,Germany had three times the carrying capacity of France or Norway--whereas in 1887, she was only equal to these countries.

The table also shows that the German ships were larger on theaverage than those of her competitors. This reflects the relativelygreater importance to the Germans of world versus local trade.

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Hoffman [141 documents the British reaction to the German tradeincrease by citations of the despairing cries of innumerable Britishconsular reports. German traders were more energetic and were muchbetter supported by their home government and by their home banks thanwere the British. Taylor [5], writing during World War II, sees in allthis an unholy alliance of government, industry, and labor, artificiallymaintained, aggressive, selfish, ruthless. Helferich, in his preface tohis little book, sees the 25 years in Germany prior to World War I as abursting forward of a whole people unparalleled since the Reformationand the Renaissance [11, p. 4]. Certainly, a new colossus had arisen inthe middle of Europe and certainly this new colossus would be expectedto press for expanded world trade and world power. Helferich himself,writing in Die Deutsche Turken Politik (p. 8), said; "it was neitheraccident nor deliberate purpose, as much as it was the course of Germaneconomic development which led Germany to take an active interest inTurkey." (As quoted in Earle [7, p. 52]).

In contrast to Germany's growth in power and unity, Turkey duringthis period became weaker, and her sovereignty was steadilycompromised. In 1875, Turkey was forced to repudiate her debts to theEuropean powers. In 1876, the liberal group in Turkey was able to forcea constitution on its own carefully chosen Sultan, Murad V. However,Murad went insane within the year, and Abdul Hamid II came to power.Abdul pretended to accept the constitution, but the 1877-1878 War withRussia gave him an excuse to dissolve the newly formed NationalAssembly. This step was followed by the arrest or exiling of theliberals and the de facto suspension of the constitution. At the end ofthe War with Russia Britain supported Turkey at the Congress of Berlinand picked up Cyprus as a reward. Abdul Hamid then embarked on a seriesof economic and military reforms. These paid off In the defeat ofGreece in an 1897 War. However, they were of no avail in protectingfar-off Tripoli, which fell to Italy in 1911.

In 1912, the first Balkan War stripped Turkey of territory closerto home--including the important city of Adrianople. But Adrianople wasregained in the second Balkan War of 1913, directed against Bulgaria bythe other Balkan powers and by Turkey (a last-minute entry).

Domestically, Abdul Hamid's rule was characterized by extensivegraft and corruption, a vast political police organization, a huge andslow-moving bureaucracy, and a series of insurrections of minoritygroups. Yalman [29] who grew up in the Salonika which sheltered MustafaKemal and other Young Turks, describes the long stream of exiles thatpassed through Salonika on their way to the capitals of Europe, the

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unrest, the ferment of excitement*, the clandestine newspapers (of oneof which he was the editor). In 1908, the Young Turks were strongenough to force a constitutional government on Abdul Hamid. TheSultan's attempted counter-revolution of April, 1909 failed, and AbdulHamid was deposed. Mohammed V, Abdul's brother, became the Sultan.

Although the Young Turks were fired with the liberal ideas ofEurope, they had no better solution to the nationalities problem than tocontinue to hold down the subject peoples by force. This policy was togive way to the idea of a nation-state only in the 1920s under MustafaKemal.

In economic affairs, the repudiation of the Turkish public debt in1875 led to an ineffective consortium of European Powers in 1876 whichlasted until 1881. In that year, the Ottoman Public Debt Administration(P.D.A.) was set up. By assigning to the P.D.A. certain Turkish staterevenues, it was possible to begin to pay Turkey's creditors in asystematic fashion. This restored Turkish credit, and a series of loanswere made to Turkey under the protecting aegis of the P.D.A. Asexpenses mounted, so did the role of the P.D.A. Turkey was slowly beingmortgaged to the European Powers (Earle, [7]).

* By the twentieth century, the P.D.A. had assigned to it one fourthof the state revenues (Blaisdell, [211, p. 150). These assignedrevenues were the most readily expandable and the easiest to collect--for example, customs duties (Blaisdell, [21], p. 151). By the controlof the tax rates in these areas, the P.D.A. could, and did, controlTurkish capital expenditures. For example, French-British delegates tothe P.D.A. blocked an increase in customs revenues in 1911 to preventTurkey from acquiring the capital needed to build certain sections ofthe Baghdad Railway (Blaisdell, [21], p. 224). Finally, the P.D.A.,because of the interlocking directorships with the Ottoman Bank (French-dominated) and the Deutsche Bank (backers of the Baghdad Railway) andthe various European-controlled railways, harbor facilities, andindustries, assumed a dominating role in the Turkish economy--as is welldocumented by Blaisdell (21]. The P.D.A. thus became extremelyimportant in the history of the Baghdad Railway.

* Innumerable writers sprang up to criticize the regime. One of the

most popular, Teufik Fikret, wrote a poem titled "What's The Use" inwhich he recounted an imaginary dialogue with a political favorite."What is the use," said the favorite, "of having schools, books,hospitals, and factories which have only an impermanent existence in atemporal world?" To which the poet answered, "And what is the use ofhaving your state and all its worldly riches as long as they mean onlydarkness, slavery, misery, and humiliation for us?"

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III. The First Phase: A Commercial Venture, 1888-1899

As early as 1835, Molke, who had served as military advisor inTurkey, suggested German development of the area. Subsequently, in1871, von Pressel made certain surveys which impressed the TurkishGovernment, and a short railway was built. It was not, however, until1888 that the Baghdad project can be said to have begun. In that year,Dr. Siemens' Deutsche Bank founded the Anatolian Railway Company. Thenew company took over an existing British line and began to extend itinto southern Anatolia. Included in the concession was an agreement bythe Anatolian Railway to consider extension to Baghdad at somesubsequent date. Bismarck opposed this extension provision but wasoverruled.

There was virtually no opposition to the railway on the part ofother European powers at this time. Wolf [9, p. 171, reports a small

skirmish in December, 1892, when Sir Clare Ford, British Ambassador toConstantinople, raised objections to the German concession. Marschallvon Biederstein, then German Foreign Minister, countered by having theGerman Consul General in Egypt withhold his consent to further Britishadvances in Egypt. Lord Cormmer, the British chief in Egypt, protestedvigorously and urged the British Foreign Office to reconsider theRailway project. Two days later, Lord Rosebury withdrew the Britishobjections.

With a few exceptions like this, the Railway was a quiet commercialventure during these years. The Germans ran their railways effectivelyand honestly, and the Turkish Government was very favorably impressed.

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IV. The Second Phase: Drang Nach Osten, 1899-1908.

In 1897, the Turks had won a war with Greece in which the Germanrailways had been a material factor in their success. This, more thanthe much publicized second visit of the Kaiser to Constantinople,induced the Sultan to push for continuation of the railway project.This facet of the railway is carefully documented by Wolf [9, p. 19 etseq.] and is his most important contribution to the history of theRailway, as Chapman [6] correctly points out in her bibliography.

On November 27, 1899, the Germans were given a definite concessionto extend the railway to Baghdad. Included in the concession wereguarantees of a certain revenue per kilometer of track laid--the so-called Kilometer Guarantees--and carefully worded provisions spellingout German rights to establish and operate irrigation projects, harbors,and various in4.-qtries along the right of way. To back up the KilometerGuarantees, certain state revenues in certain districts of Turkey wereassigned to the railway.

The proposed route was from Haidar Pasha (the Asiatic side ofConstantinople) through Angora, Adana, Mosul, Aleppo, Baghdad, and on toBasra and the Persian Gulf. There were two immediate reactions to thisproposal. First, the Russians objected to the line going through Angoraas being a potential threat to her interests in eastern Anatolia. Bythe Black Sea Basin Agreement of 1899, the route was shifted westward sothat it would pass through Konia instead of Angora, and Russia withdrewher objections. Second, the British, fearing the possibility of aGerman naval base on the Persian Gulf, made a protectorate out of Kuwaitby agreement with the Sheik of Kuwait (1899). This effectively barredthe Railway from a southern terminus on the Gulf. The result was thatBasra, on the Shatt-al-Arab (the confluence of the Tigris and theEuphrates Rivers) 60 miles north of the Gulf, became the proposedterminus. The line as projected, therefore, ran from Constaninople toBasra--a distance of 2,500 miles. This was a project of greatermagnitude than the Santa Fe from Chicago to Los Angeles, or the UnionPacific from Omaha to San Francisco (Earle, [7], p. 75).

The Railway offered the Turks definite advantages over linesproposed by other European Powers. The main factor was that the linewould tie together Turkey's scattered provinces. This was not true oflines ending at the Mediterranean below Anatolia. Such lines tended todetach Turkish territory. A second advantage was that the line wentthrough the Tauras Mountains of western Anatolia rather than along thesea coast. This meant the Railway was safe from interdiction byEuropean naval guns in time of war. A third advantage was that theGermans, unlike the other European powers, were not likely to attemptannexation of territory served by the Railway.

Despite the bellicose tone of the Pan-Germanic League and theKaiser himself, despite the slogans of "mittel Europa" and "Drang nach

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osten," the Railway project was received rather calmly by the Britishand French press. In fact, on November 30, 1889, the London Timessaid: "There is no Power into whose hands Englishmen would more gladly

*,.- 4 see the enterprise fall than Germany's." (As quoted in the Edinburgreview of 1907, [31]). At the same time, "less cordial sentiments were

- *expressed toward Russia and France" (Earle, [7], p. 67).

From 1899 to 1902, nothing much happened. The British wereexercised over the 1900 German naval expansion, but the Railway was not

~part of this clamor. In the meanwhile, the Germans were quietlysurveying the route and trying to estimate its cost. After a period ofrenegotiation with the Sultan over financial terms, a "final" concessionto the German company was announced on March 18, 1902. Shortage ofmoney led the Germans to offer shares in the Railway to France andBritain as a means of helping to float loans in these countries. Sir

-9 Nicolas O'Conor, British Ambassador to Constantinople, was in favor of4, this "internationalization" (Gwinner, [36]), as were the British Foreign

Minister and the Prime Minister.

However, a tremendous outcry was raised against the project in theBritish press. Chapman [6, p. 208] agrees with Hoffman [14] that thisoutcry was led by special interests--such as the Lynch Brothers'shipping concession on the Euphrates-which capitalized on the wave ofanti-German feeling then sweeping the country. In any event, allauthorities agree that public pressure helped the British Government torepudiate internationalization. Hoffman [14, p. 147] feels that Britishbanking interests had changed their minds about the finances of theconcession, while Chapman [6, p. 208] points out that the Germanguarantee of equity in freight rates was never clearly brought beforethe British public.

Though the press uproar subsided and was never again as violent on.A the Railway issue, the British and French Governments continued to

, .obstruct the Railway. In addition to blocking Germany from access tothe British or French securities market, Britain put pressure on theTurks to slow down the Railway. In cooperation with the French, Englandworked through the Ottoman Public Debt Administration to block Turkishincreases in tariffs which would be used to finance the Railway

". . (Blaisdell, [211, op. cit.). Finally, when Germany asked for aconference with Britain, the English countered by requiring French andRussian participation. The Germans, fearing to be outvoted, refused.England then made prior agreements of Germany with France and Russia asine qua non for negotiations with England (Chapman, [6), p. 208).

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Taken all together, these policies of France and England (and, to acertain extent, Russia) constituted a most determined and consistentopposition. Yet, Sarolea [15, p. 249] and Fraser [34], writing in 1912,derided German talk of Entente opposition to the Railwayl This type ofjournalism could not and did not contribute to a better internationalatmosphere.

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V. The Third Phase: The Germans Compromise, 1908-1914

The British had warned the Russians during the Reval negotiationsthat they could not permanently obstruct the Railway (Brandenburg,(121). In 1908, the Germans compromised, and turned the Baghdad-to-Basra section of the Railway concession back to Turkey. ("The dream ofthe German Baghdad Railway is dreamed away" wrote one of the directors--Benns, [1, p. 77]). This concession removed the grounds for the chief

S"British objection, yet it was with Russia, at Potsdam in 1910, that thefirst agreement with an Entente power was made. Russia's Persian sphereof influence was recognized. More delays followed. Despite Britishfears of a German-Russian rapprochement (Hosely, [30], makes it clear

that even after 1910 the Germans still had room for maneuvers againstthe solidarity of the Entente.), it was not Britain, but France who madethe next agreement, in February, 1914. (France got northern Anatoliaand Syria as spheres of influence, the Deutsche Bank and the French-dominated Ottoman Bank came to terms, and the German sphere of influencearound her railway in Anatolia was recognized.)

Finally, on June 15, 1914, the British initialed an agreement whichhinged on still further agreements of the British and the Germans withTurkey. The agreement involved recognition of the German railwaymonopoly in most parts of Turkey, a stoppage of the railway at Basra,British control south of Basra, the allowance of an increase in Turkishcustoms, German monopoly around Adana, British monopoly in Mesopotamia,and making the Shatt-al-Arab an open body of water (Chapman, [61,p. 206-7). There is no doubt (Earle, [7]) that Britain got the best ofthis arrangement. In addition, she had so delayed construction of theRailway as to seriously hinder Turkish troop movements during the war.In return for these "tactical" advantages, Britain had contributed toGerman fears of encirclement and had strengthened the system ofalliances which helped make World War I a terribly costly and protractedstruggle.

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~VI. The Baghdad Railway as a Cause of World War I

-'" Affirmative Arguments

The strongest case for the Baghdad Railway as a cause of World WarI is put by Benns [1, p. 781: "Although before the outbreak of the Warin 1914, understandings were thus eventually reached regarding theBaghdad Railway by Germany, Russia, France, and Great Britain, theproject had already done much to poison the international atmosphere.Germany had come to believe that the opposition of the Entente Powerswas only part of their general policy of encirclementoo...Russia, GreatBritain, and France had become deeply suspicious of Germany's plans inthe Near Easto....Russia's realization that the Austro-Getraan advanceinto the Balkans and Turkey must be checked if her own plans forsecuring control of the Straits at Constantinople were not to bethwarted had much to do with the course of events during the fatefuldays of July, 1914."

This statement by Benns seems rather strong. It is not backed upby the references he cites* specific to the Baghdad Railway, butapparently is based on a general appraisal of the diplomatic chess gameprior to World War 1.

A more moderate argument is presented by Hoffman [14] who views theRailway from the standpoint of its influence on British trade in theOttoman Empire and in Persia. He makes a convincing case for theRailway as an integral part of an all-out German assault on Englishtrade in the area. He cites (p. 159-161) a very early Britishreaction--the September 21, 1899 "Curzon Dispatch." In this dispatch,the Indian Government voiced its alarm over German penetration intoPersia and urged conciliation over the Persian issue with Russia so thatthe two powers could jointly repel the Germans. This line of reasoningled, according to Hoffman, to the Reval Agreement with Russia of 1907.For 1909, Hoffman (p. 166) cites Sir Charles Hardwage's message to theBritish Ambassador in Berlin: "If we and the Russians present a solidfront and cooperate very closely in Persia, I think we shall in the enddefeat the Germans as we are the two poeswho aein a oiinto

o exert the most pressure."

~British fears of discriminatory rates on the Baghdad Railway are

~cited many times by Hoffman. For example (p. 153), Sir Edward Grey toi the German Ambassador in London in 1908: "It is impossible to agree to

• an increase in customs duties unless we have additional safeguards~against the use of these additional revenues for the purpose of

displacing British trade in Mesopotamia. We feel that we must either

* Earle himself [71 does not argue much one way or the other on the linkbetween the Railway and World War I. He is more interested in it as acase history of imperialism.

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VI h aha ala saCueo ol a

have a par- in the Baghdad Railway itself, or else we must have aconcession by which we could trade in Mesopotamia on equal terms" (Brit.Doc. VI, 373-378). And again on May 26, 1911, Sir Edward Grey to theImperial Defense Committee (Hoffman, p. 155) "We cannot agree to atariff increase that will be used to build a railway which will be usedto discriminate against our goods. We cannot, either, permit compromisewith our strategic position on the Persian Gulf."

The strategic menace to Britain was the theme of the 1903 hue andcry in the British press against the Baghdad Railway. This is also thetheme of Fraser's 1911 and 1912 articles [33, and 34] and Geraud's 1914article [35]. Most of these writers were concerned with the idea of aPersian Gulf naval base being athwart England's life line to India, orof a Turkish attack on Egypt. Fraser [33] also saw, as early as 1911,that the Railway from Germany to Turkey would enable Germany to blockthe Dardanelles and cut British-Russian communications in wartime. Thiswas a rare reaction. The fear of Germany's military domination ofTurkey was fairly general, however, especially in 1903 when Dr. Paul vonRohrback published in his Die Baghdadbahn:

"A direct attack upon England across the North Sea is out ofthe question .... The prospect of a German invasion of England is afantastic dream .... England can be attacked in only one place:Egypt .... Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egyptuntil she is mistress of a developed railway system through AsiaMinor and Syria, and until through the progress of the AnatolianRailway to Baghdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack byEngland upon Mesopotamia .... The policy of protecting Turkey, whichis now pursued by Germany, has no other object but the desire toeffect an insurance against the danger of a war with England.(Rohrback's italics; cited in Lynch, [38], p. 380).

The counter reactions of the British press were violent. Thesestatements are supposed by some writers to have aggravated Anglo-Germanmisunderstanding and so helped bring on the War.

A final argument is that of Wolf [9]. He sees the Baghdad Railwayas an important source of friction between Germany and the Entente(p. 102) but believes the Railway was mainly "Germany's pawn in theEntente-making game which failed to stave off the war" (Preface). He isnot too impressed with the trade arguments--such as those developed by

0 Hoffman and Earle. As he points out (p. 103), although Earle's figuresshow a vast percentage increase in German trade with Turkey, Earle doesnot mention that this trade was only a small fraction of Germany's totaltrade.

Negative Arguments

Mrs. Chapman's book [6] is the most recent study devoted to theBaghdad Railway. She is a most forthright disbeliever in the Railway as

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a cause of World War I. Whereas Benns emphasizes Great Power squabblesover the Railway going on right up to the war, Mrs. Chapman sees theRailway as "one of the few subjects on which Anglo-German agreement wasobtained." The fact that the conflict was being settled in the veryyears when international tensions were so great and that "the agreementswere initialed when the War broke out is probably the best proof thatthe Baghdad Railway was at most a minor contributing irritant in Anglo-German relations prior to 1914" (p. 210-211). She does not believe thatthe war could have been advanced or stopped a single day by any Britishaction with regard to the Railway. As to the press reaction, shebelieves the 1903 outcries of the British press to be the only importantinstances, and there they were more part of a general anti-Germansentiment than a direct result of the German railway plans.

A more fundamental objection is that of S.B. Fay in his "Origins ofthe World War" [25]. Professor Fay (p. 32) sees these five mainunderlying causes of World War I:

1. The system of secret alliances2. Militarism3. Nationalism4. Economic imperialism5. The newspaper press

In a brief discussion of these underlying causes, Fay says that railwayconcessions "are one of the most important forms of economic imperialism

4because they involve political as well as economic interests." However,Fay disclaims further effort to trace underlying causes as being beyondthe scope of any one book. Yet on page 46, at the beginning of hisstudy, he writes: "Generally speaking, however, this economicimperialism is usually exaggerated as one of the underlying causes ofthe War.... If one reads the diplomatic correspondance of the yearsbefore the War, one is struck by the relatively slight emphasis which isgiven to these economic rivalries, which haunt so largely the mind ofthe agitated business man and newspaper editor. It is not so muchquestions of economic rivalry as those of prestige, boundaries, armiesand navies, the balance of power, and possible shiftings in the systemof alliances which provide reams of diplomatic correspondence and raisethe temperature in the Foreign Offices to the danger point." Afterwhich, Professor Fay plunges into a marvelously vivid account of thediplomatic exchanges prior to the war. At the end of his study he

returns to the attack. On page 558 he says: "Economic rivalry,national ambitions and antagonisms, and newspaper incitements [played arole in bringing on the Great War]. But it is doubtful if all these[together] could have led to war if it had not been for theassassination of Franz Ferdinand. This was the flame which caused...therapid and complex succession of events which culminated in a world war,and for this Serbian nationalism was ultimately responsible."

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The essence of Professor Fay's objection to the Railway (oreconomic factors in general) as a cause of the war is quite clear fromthese extracts. Diplomacy turns out to be the all-in-all, or virtuallythe all-in-all, for Fay. I will discuss this line of argument and thepoints of view brought out earlier, in the concluding section of thispaper.

Conclusion

Professor Fay's line of reasoning strikes at the very roots of theidea of the Baghdad Railway, or any other economic problem for thatmatter, as being a cause of war. Therefore, I will deal with ProfessorFay first before tackling the other arguments.

What does Fay do? He cuts the statesman off from the wholematerial world. The world becomes a stage on which intrigues are spunout, bluffs are made or called, and shouts and strange silences becomethe weapons in a shadow game of conflict. And in the end, whathappens? An assassin's bullet rings down the curtain. But can thisreally be the case? Do diplomats argue in a void? Or is it morereasonable to say that the real world is somehow the substructure of theidea world in which wars are hatched? Even a Descartes cannot trace theexact transformation from the thing-in-itself to the thing-in-the-mind. But psychology has shown us that the most horrible nightmares arederived from certain distinct physical and psychical realities. Withless irrational behavior, the underlying causes are more easily found.So it is with World War I. One of these realities behind the war is theBaghdad Railway. I shall now do my best to prove this.

In the early sections of this paper I have emphasized the economicdevelopment of Germany prior to the war. The incredible increase inGermany's industrial might became a factor in the thinking of allEuropeans. Non-Germans were jealous and frightened of this power;Germans were filled with exaltation at their own deeds (see Helferich,[11]). With this might behind her, Germany became a world power for thefirst time in history. She sought colonies, fought trade wars,threatened Britain's naval supremacy. And in the Near East she beganthe economic penetration of Turkey--spearheaded by the BaghdadRailway. These are facts; these are facts only because of Germany'sincrease in economic power; diplomacy has nothing to do with this.Diplomacy does not create a Krupp or an I.G. Farben, but a Krupp or a

g Farben gives a new edge to diplomacy.

Now, was the Railway important to European diplomacy or was itnot? Was it just a footnote (Fay, [25]), a pawn (Wolf, [9]), a minor

4. irritant (Chapman, [6])? The answer is no. Those who have studied the'Railway, including Wolf and Chapman, fill their theses with details of

disputes, deadlocks, arguments. As early as 1899, England was forming aprotectorate over Kuwait to block the Railway's access to the PersianGulf. Refusal to let the Turks raise customs duties to pay for the

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elI.4

Railway, refusal to join in the Railway management, refusal to allowRailway shares to be traded on their exchanges--these were the actions

4of France and England. Does this make the Railway a minor matter? Ithink not.

What about the Germans themselves? Brandenburg, in his "Bismarckto World War" [121, has a reference to the Railway in 42 out of 520

*. pages. Admittedly, some of the references are to agreements into which* the Railway entered only as a bargaining point. But what a persistent

bargaining pointl Why was this? It was because Turkey and the Railwayhad become to Germany what Morocco was to France and what Egypt was toEngland. No colony of Germany had this status. The visits of theKaiser to the Sultan were momentous occasions to Europeanchancelleries. Writers like Rohrback made trip after trip to Turkey toreport back on the more and more wonderful possibilities for mining,irrigation, markets, military usefulness. Marschall von Biederstein,probably the best diplomat of the German Foreign Service, choseConstantinople for his Ambassadorship when he stepped down from theoffice of Foreign Secretary in 1897--and he stayed there as long as hecould. Turkey was Germany's white hope. Was Germany reasonable inthis? Was she not paying too high a price for a problematical future?Perhaps. But the same can be said of Britain's obsession with the routeto India and the French fanaticism about North Africa-which persistedinto the post-World War II period. The important facts are that Turkeyexisted, the Baghdad Railway was in progress, and the Germans haddefinite and strong ideas on the importance of these facts to them as anation. To argue that the trade with Turkey was only a small fractionof Germany's world trade (Wolf) is to miss the essential connectionbetween facts and national hopes based on these facts.

So far I have attempted to show that the Railway was:

1. A continued source of conflict between Germany and otherworld powers

2. A key facet of German's national hopes and ambitions.

There is remaining, however, the most important aspect of all: the roleof the Railway in promoting the alliance system which had so much to dowith the stupendous scale of World War I. In 1875, Bismarck had statedin the Reichstag that Germany's interests in the Turkish-Balkan area..were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier." Bismarckwas determined not to be involved in an area where Austria and Russiawere at odds. As he said in 1886, since Germany could not appease oneof these nations in this area without offending the other--bothextremely dangerous as enemies--it was not at all worthwhile to becomeinvolved.

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,. . .. . .... ... . .. . .

q. q

This was not a difficult policy to follow in these early days.*But the world was changing. Not by accident, not by design (asHelferich puts it 1111), Germany's economic power began to flow intosoutheastern Europe and into the Ottoman Empire. What was the result?Germany became involved in the Balkans as she had not been in Bismarck'stime. England was able to let Germany guard Constantinople and began tocut loose from Turkey (Brandenburg, [12]). The French and English beganworking together against Germany in the Public Debt Administration ofTurkey (Blaisdell, [21]). Faced with the new German threat to Persia,Russia and England were able to settle their differences in 1907 atReval--to make the "unmakable entente" (Hoffman, [141). All the othersources of conflict-Alsace-Lorraine, Bosnia, Herzegovina, the GermanNavy--affected only one of the Entente powers. Only the Baghdad Railwayhad the unenviable distinction of developing hostility in all threeEntente powers simultaneously. The result was to make Germany feel evermore encircled and to move her closer to a dangerous alliance withAustria.

In summing up: the Railway was a manifestation of a dramatic andalarming growth of German economic power. It played a role in theBritish-German trade rivalry, in their strategic maneuverings, and inthe German-English press controversies. The Railway helped unite theEntente powers against Germany and this led Germany into a fear ofencirclement, her increasing involvement in the Balkans, and herdangerous alliance with Austria. German hopes for the Railwayundoubtedly were exaggerated, but failure to recognize these hopes onthe part of the Entente powers helped bring on World War I. As Millssays in his "The Causes of World War I1" [26], allowing sources ofnational conflicts to grow without attending to them is to courtdisaster. The Railway involved a major conflict of national interests;failure to estimate these sources of this conflict correctly on bothGerman and Entente sides definitely helped bring on World War I.

g * Austrian, British, French, and Italian ships dominated the easternMediterranean trade. It was not until 1889 that the first Germanpassenger ship reached the Near East (Rosen, [28], p. 39). Contrastthis with Morgenthau's description of the first train to make it all theway from Berlin to Constantinople on January 17, 1916. (Morgenthau wasAmerican Ambassador to Turkey [27, p. 273]. "There was great rejoicingin Constantinople.... The railroad station was decorated with flags andflowers and the whole German and Austrian population, including theEmbassy's staffs, turned out to welcome the incoming train."

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N. .1 1 - .' ,.. -.", '. . ... . -

AFTERWORD

This paper was prepared in the spring of 1959 for a New YorkUniversity Graduate History Seminar in 20th Century European History. Ibelieve it has value for a CNA audience in two important respects:

First, it documents a complex web of interests and rivalries in theMiddle East. Today some of the players have changed, but theinteraction of strategies and economic interests, of shifting alliances,and of interventions by the great powers continues.

Second, the paper illustrates how difficult it is to ascribe cause-and-effect relations in human affairs--even after the event. How muchmore difficult, then, to predict the consequences of what we do today onwhat tomorrow holds--for ourselves and for those who dwell in thiscrossroads of the world.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS

General

1. Benns, F. Lee. European History Since 1870. 4th ed. New York,1955.

2. Brandenburg, Erich, and Anon. The German Empire: 1870-1914.Encyclopaedia Britannica. Vol. 10, pp. 293-304. 1952

3. Florinsky, Michael T. Russia: A History and an Interpretation.2 vols. New York, 1955.

4. Sherrington, Charles Ely Rose. Baghdad Railway. EncyclopaediaBritannica. Vol. 2, pp. 924-925. 1952.

5. Taylor, A.J.P. The Course of German History: A Survey of theDevelopment of Germany since 1815. New York, 1946. (Writtenduring World War II, this is an incredibly bitter book. Thescholarship behind it makes it much more dangerous than Sarolea'sbook. At times, however, Professor Taylor very much overreacheshimself. Perhaps the most fantastic example occurs on page 19:"In the rest of Europe, religious reform meant going forward;with Luther, it meant going back, repudiating everything that was

carrying civilized life beyond barbarism....Even the technicaloccasion of his breach with Rome was symbolic: he objected tothe sale of indulgences in order to raise money for the buildingof St. Peter's--if it had been for the purpose of massacringGerman peasants, Luther might never have become a Protestant.")

The Berlin-Baghdad Railway

6. Chapman, Maybelle K. Great Britain and the Baghdad Railway,1888-1914. Smith College Studies in History, XXXI, Mass.,1948. (Mrs. Chapman is a thoroughly refreshing writer. Shesimply does not believe in the Baghdad Railway as a major causeof World War I. For Mrs. Chapman, and her readers, the Railwayis interesting for its own sake.)

* 7. Earle, Edward M. Turkey, The Great Powers, and the BaghdadRailway-A Study in Imperialism. New York, 1923. (Earle is thegrand old man of the Baghdad Railway. Everyone tips his hat toEarle before commencing his own account. This includesBlaisdell, Yalman, Wolf, etc. Excellent on British pressreaction. Has numerous hazy spots.)

8. Stratton, Morton Brown. British Communications in the MiddleEast, 1885-1939. University of Pennsylvania Doctoral

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Dissertation. Philadelphia, 1943. (Only Chapters VI and VII areavailable in N.Y.U. library. Chapters I and II, which are themost important ones for this paper, are available only onmicrofilm from the University of Pennsylvania.)

9. Wolf, John B. The Diplomatic History of the Baghdad Railroad.University of Missouri Studies, XI, 1936.

German Economic Development

10. Clapman, J.H. The Economic Development of France and Germany:1815-1914. 4th ed. Cambridge (Eng.), 1951. (I found this ratherdisappointing. His economic history of Britain is muchsuperior. Nevertheless, it is a valuable comparative account andI am glad I skimmed it.)

11. Helferich, Dr. Karl. Germany's Economic Progress and NationalWealth, 1888-1913. New York, 1914. (Helferich was first son-in-law to the director of the Deutsche Bank, later director andGermany's finance minister. The essence of this little book isthe irresistible growth of German economic power: the world mustgive way!)

German Foreign Policy and Trade Rivalry

12. Brandenburg, Erich. From Bismarck to the World War: A Historyof German Foreign Policy, 1870-1914. London, 1927. (Brandenburgbriefly discusses the Railway but does not give it the slightestmention in his concluding chapter on the causes of World War I.He sees the War as being caused by the expansionist aims ofRussia and the revanche movement in France. Germany had theleast to gain from the War. Her chief mistakes were abandonmentof Bismarck's policies for the misguided aggressiveness of theKaiser and letting herself be involved in the intrigues of theAustrian foreign office.)

13. Hammann, Otto. The World Policy of Germany, 1890-1912. London,1927. (Hammann was chief of the press division, German foreignoffice, 1893-1917.)

14. Hoffman, Ross. Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914. Philadelphia, 1933. (Gives a very effective breakdown oftrade and shipping statistics during the period of England'seconomic decline vis-a-vis Germany. For the purposes of thispaper, more useful than Clapman.)

15. Sarolea, Charles. The Anglo-German Problem. New York, 1912.(Sarolea, a naturalized British citizen (originally fromBelgium), is the opposite side of the coin from Brandenburg.Sarolea sees the Germans as deliberately building up anti-British

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feeling among the German people for one purpose only: war. Ifthe Germans would only recognize that England just must have thebiggest navy, and that only a few countries came to power at theright time to win coloniest)

16. Sontag, Raymond James. European Diplomatic History, 1871-1932.New York and London, 1932.

,, 17. Sontag, Raymond James. Germany and England: Background of.Conflict, 1848-1894. London and New York, 1938.

18. Treitschke, Heinrich von. Germany, France, Russia, and Islam.New York and London, 1915. (Trietschke is the German counterpartof Taylor. His rabid jingoism knows no bounds.)

VBiography

19. Eyck, Erich. Bismarck and the German Empire. London, 1950. (Achilling picture of Bismarck and his Germany. Nothing on therailway but invaluable for the German background.)

20. Kurenberg, Joachim von. The Kaiser: A Life of Wilhelm II, LastEmperor of Germany. New York, 1955. (Kurenberg makes it prettyclear that Wilhelm II had to get rid of Bismarck if he wished tobe master in his own house. Unfortunately, despite every effortto show the Kaiser in a favorable light, Wilhelm II emerges as abadly informed and headstrong ruler.)

Turkey

21. Blaisdell, Donald C. European Financial Control in the OttomanEmpire. New York, 1929. (This is an extremely detailedanalysis. It includes a certain amount of data on the Railwaybut is most valuable for its picture of a complex interlockingtangle of high finance and low intrigue among the European statesand Turkey.)

A 22. Lengyel, Emil. Turkey. New York, 1941. (With the exception ofBlaisdell, neither this nor the other Turkish books are much good

on Turkey and the Baghdad Railway. (In comparison, no Germanhistory can escape at least a page or two on the Railway.) Thepertinent chapters in Lengyel, Luke, and Price give a picture ofthe corruption of Abdul Hamid's court, the web of intrigue andpolice spying throughout Turkey, and the explosive currents ofthe Young Turk movement.)

23. Luke, Sir Harry. The Old Turkey and the New-from Byzantium toAnkara. London, 1955.

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l' , . ' '

'e; ). , "S ' 'Seb* '. ,. , e-.,e.e eE... .A .. ,

4

24. Price, M. Phillips. A History of Turkey from Empire toRepublic. London, 1956.

* The Causes of War

25. Fay, Sidney Bradshaw. The Origins of the World War. 2nd. ed,revised. 2 vols. in one. New York, 1930. (A thorough study, onthe political level, of documentary and autobiographical materialavailable up to the date of publication. The German documentsavailable were substantially complete by 1930; the English andAustrian, fairly complete; the French were just beginning topublish. Many Russian documents had been published by theBolsheviks. No official collections were available from Serbia,though numerous unofficial collections, memoirs, and the like hadbeen published.

The tone of the work is admirably moderate. The style isslightly old-fashioned. My chief criticism is that Fay slightsthe economic and social causes of the war in his concentration onpersonalities and diplomacy. All in all, however, it is anastounding piece of research. It is a shame a more recentedition was not possible-but even so it has been and willcontinue to be an extremely valuable book.)

26. Mills, C. Wright. The Cause of World War III. New York, 1958.(A doctrinaire crusading pamphlet rather than a clearly reasonedstudy. Very provocative, however, and also very disquieting.)

Memoirs

27. Morgenthau, Henry. Ambassador Morgenthau's Story. New York,1919. (Morgenthau was American Ambassador to Turkey, 1913-1916. He reminds me very much of the old-fashioned figure of thecontemporary U.S. ambassador to Russia, Mr. Francis. He is thesame sort of fussy, well-intentioned, simple old fellow. Hegives a certain amount of naively-expressed local color to theTurkish scene just prior to World War I.)

28. Rosen, Friedrich. Oriental Memoirs of a German Diplomatist. NewYork, 1930. (Herr Rosen's diplomatic career was spent mostly inor about the Near East, including Turkey, in the last 40 years ofthe 19th century. He gives several interesting side-lights onthe Baghdad Railway.)

29. Yalman, Abdul Emin. Turkey in May Time. Norman, Okla., 1956.(Yalman has been a Turkish journalist since before 1914. In 1959he was editor and publisher of the anti-communist, pro-AmericanIstambul daily, Vataan.)

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-o *'P %

PERIODICALS

Russia, Turkey, and the Great Powers

30. Mosely, Phillip E. "Russian Policy in 1911-12". Journal ofModern History, 71-7, vol. 12, 1940. (Mr. Mosely's article,which is based on Czarist archives just then released by theSoviets, paints a convincing picture of confusion andcontradiction in Russia's foreign policy. Policy was made inConstantinople, cancelled in Moscow, reaffirmed inParis...instead of a single policy, Russian diplomacy was a hodgepodge of diverse schemes.)

.Contemporary British Opinion

With the exception of the Article by Dr. .,inner of theDeutsche Bank, all the articles which follow were written byEnglishmen between 1900 and 1917. These articles, which are onlya small sample of the total, cover a number of writers, journals,and dates. The reactions to the Baghdad Railway are varied.They range from opposition to it as a dangerous German plan todominate the Near East or belief that it is a foolish orinconsequential enterprise, to support for the Railway as apromoter of trade and a civilizing influence.

31. Anon. "The Baghdad Railway." Edinburg Review, 371-398,vol. 206, 1907. (A review article covering six articles or bookspublished in France and England. Author sees the Railway as ameans of uniting Turkey and helping her to progress, but he viewsfear of German annexation of Turkey as a chimera. BelievesFrance and England should cheer Germany on as a fellow Europeanpower helping to civilize the world.)

32. Dicey, Edward. "England and Germany." The Empire Review, 368-375, vol. 18, 1910. (Takes a very sanguine view of theprobability of Anglo-German cooperation in general matters and inparticular in regard to the Baghdad Railway.)

33. Fraser, Lovat. "Why Help the Baghdad Railway?". The NationalReview 314-322, vol. 57, 1911. (The same general line ofargument as in his 1912 article or in Geraud's 1914 article....Heurges Britain not to let Turkey raise her duties-which would helpsubsidize railway building at the expense of British trade. Sees"internationalization" as much a blunder in 1911 as it was in1903 in the days of Mr. Balfour and Lord Lansdowne. UnlikeHogarth, believes the Germans will make Basra, on the Shatt-al-Arab (the confluence of the Tigris and the Euphrates) a first-class port which will not threaten the British on the PersianGulf. But if the British were to let the line extend to Kuwait

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v.t- .. *.L. e... .. ... . .% - - %.- - '. % -.l

"

and build a naval base there, England would be "giving hostagesto fortune".)

34. Fraser, Lovat. "The Baron [Marschall von Biederstein] and hisBaghdad Railway." The National Review 606-619, vol. 59, 1912.(Believes that German cries of "English opposition" are phoney.Sees no advantage to British participation in a railway entirely

4' in Turkish territories. Urges that the British do not demeanthemselves by trying to please the Germans but that they stick tothe policy of maintaining British supremacy in the Persian Gulfas "emphatically proclaimed by Lord Lansdowne and reiterated bySir Edward-Grey".)

35. Geraud, A. "A New German Empire: The Story of the BaghdadRailway." The Nineteenth Century, 958-972, 1312-1326, vol. 75,1914. (Sees "Modern Turkey, weakened and dismembered" as being"crushed under the overwhelming weight of the Baghdad Railwayenterprise and everything connected with it." English and Frenchopposition has been too hesitant. The attempts to deny theGermans the help of French funds has been futile. England'sagreement with Russia on Persia has been circumvented byGermany's convention in Baghdad with Russia (Potsdam, 1910).Only the March 9, 1911 program of Sir Edward Grey as announced inCommons offers much help: (1) acknowledgement of the British

*J protectorate at Kuwait; (2) opposition to an increase of Turkishcustoms duties; (3) construction of British railways wheneverpossible to offset the leverage of the Baghdad Railway project.)

36. Owinner, Arthur von. "The Baghdad Railway and the Question ofBritish Cooperation." The Nineteenth Century: 1083-1094,vol. 65, 1909. (Dr. Gwinner succeeded Dr. Siemens at theDeutsche Bank in 1901. He claims that the completed sections ofthe Railway could only have been built with the financial support

*of the Turkish government. He also claims that once opened totraffic, the railways have opened up new sources of revenue toTurkey, have bound Turkey together, and are on their way topaying for themselves. He deplores the press campaign of 1903which dissuaded Lord Lansdowne from support of Britishparticipation in the Railway: if the British had come in theRailway would be built by now and Britain would be sharing in theprofits.)

37. Hogarth, D.G.. "The Baghdad Railway." The National Review, 462-473, vol. 39, 1902. (Sees the projected Railway as the successorto a series of futile English attempts to lay rails in Turkey andin the Euphrates Valley. Doubts if the line will pay; doubts ifthe Baghdad to Gulf section can be built unless the Englishdominate that section of the line; discounts the idea of the

4Railway as a strategic menace to British India, Egypt, or the* revenues of the Suez Canal.)

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38. Lynch, H.F.B. "The Baghdad Railway." Fortnightly Review, 375-387, N.S. 89, 1911. (Lynch I believe to be related to the LynchBrothers who operated the Euphrates River Boat Line parallel tothe southern section of the proposed route of the Railway.)(Lynch dismisses the idea of a dramatic increase in German tradewith Turkey or of extensive German colonization as fanciful. Butthe strategic threat to Egypt, Persia, and the Suez Canal heconsiders to be very real. He is also alarmed at the idea of thecustom increase needed to pay for the extension of the Railway.)

39. Pears, Edwin. "The Baghdad Railway." Contemporary Review, 570-591, vol. 94, 1908. (Sees the Railway as being completed withina few years. Believes Germans are too cautious to make analliance with Turkey lest this antagonize Russia. However,Russia's fears are real. Therefore, it is in the interest ofpeace that Mr. Balfour's original suggestion forinternationalization of the Railway should be followed up.)

40. Woods, H. Charles. "The Baghdad Railway in the War." Thei,5. Fortnightly Review, 235-246, N.S. 102, 1917. (Woods believes a

lasting peace can only be based on splitting Turkey away fromGermany. Unless this is done, "either on the field of battle orin the arena of diplomacy...the advent of peace itself wi)l stillleave us face to face with the danger of a renewed con' .Lct overGerman domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf".)

41. Woods, H. Charles. "The Baghdad Rat vel and irs Tributaries."The Geographical Journal, 32-57, vol.. 50, 1917. (Mostlygeographical material. Filled with maps and photographs.)

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PP 211 PP 222Mlizrahl. Murice N., "On ApproKliing the Circular Coverage Mlzraili, Muric N., "Correspondence Rules and PathFunction," 14 pp.. Feb 1978, AD A054 429 Integrals," 30 pp.. Jun 1978 (invited paper presented at the

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1111 249 PP 262Simpson, William ft., "The Acelernrter Mwthods of Otaining Peterson, Charles C., "Tird Wrld Military Elite In SovietAircraft Panlormence from Flight Test Date (Dynamic Per- Perapective." 30 pp., Now 1979, AD A077 83Sloreance lesting)," 403 pp., Jun 1979, AD AD7S 226

PP 263PP 246 liableon. Kathy I., "Using Comclal Teniters and Container-

Dodiling, frame, "Layof s and Ihmpiopment Ineirence," U5 ships for Navy Underway Reoplenishment," 23 pp., Nov 1979.pp*, Feb 1979 (Preented at the Wear onferenoe an "Low AD A077 636leI mosLabor ftrefts, 0 hIlcage. Jun 1979), P A 06289

Tune, Jaime A., Jr.. "The Transpont III ertI Is of D lofteSeams I* Applied Fields." 163 pp.. Nor 1979, 0AD P06 44

.P

J-_%%--

7. -1 -t -" *1_ . I - --73.71777 7. .7 a-- -

PP 264 PP 27711el8l06d, Robert 6.. 'The U.S. Havy In the Pacific: Post. Mengel, Marc, -Smll Fluctuations in Systems with RuitiplePresent, and Glimpses of the Future.* 31 pp., Nov 1979 Limit CYCles." 19 Pp., Nor 1911 (Published In SIM J. Appi.(DelIveae at the International Symposium on the Sea. n"t.. Vol. 38. O. 1. Feb 19601 AD P066 229Sponsored by the International Institute for StrategicStudies. The Brookings Institution end te Yasluri Sulebun, PP 278Tokyo, 16-20 Oct 1978) AD A066 037 Mlzrehl, Maurice, -A Targeting Probim: Empet vs. Expected-

pp 265 Value Approaches.- 23 pp., Ap 1960, AD A065 096

0 Wainlad, Robert G.., 'Maer sod Pesos In te North: Som pp 279Political Implications of the Chenging military Situation In Wait, Stephen N.. OMuSOO Inferences and the Use .t Forces ANorthern Europe," i8 pp., Nov 1979 (Prepared for Critique of farce Without Nr,' 50 pp.. by 1900,presentation to the Conference of the Nordic Bilance In AD AO65 097perspective: The Changing littary sand Political Situation,-Center for Strategic end International Studies, Georgetown pp 260University, Jun 15-16, 1976) AO A077 838 Goldberg. Larence, 'Eatimstion of the Effects of A Ship's

Steaming On the Failure Note of Its Equipmnt: An Applie-PP 266 tin of Econometric Analysis.' 25 pp., Apr 1960, AD A09 0M

Utgoff. Kathy, Clessan, end Ilrech Iling. Franh, 'Taeas andInflation,- 25 pp., Nov 1979, AD AOI 194 PP 291

Nigzrall burice N., w~mmnt on 'Discretizatlon Problems ofPP 267 Functional Integrals in Phse Space'.' 2 pp., bay 1960,

Trost, Roert P., end Vogel, Robert C., 'Me Raspone of published In 'Physical Reviaw D%, Vol. 22 (iW11).State Governmnt Receipts to Economic Fluctuations and the AD A094 994Al locetion of Counter-Cyclical Revenue Sharing Grants,'12 pp., Dec 1979 (Rleprinted from the Review of Economics end PP 283Statistics, Vol. LXI, No. 3, August 1979) Dismukes, Bradfard. 'Ewpeted Deamnd far the U.S. bevy to

Serve as An Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: ThinkingPP 268 About Pol itical and VII tary Environmentai Factors,- 30 pp.,

"CThomson, James S., 'Seaport Dependec e nd Inter-State Ap 1960, AD A065 099Cooperation: The Case of Sub-Sahoan Afr ica.' 161 pp.,Jan 1990, AD AOSi 193 PP 264

J. Kel son,* V. Nunn, end U. Sumi ta." 'Th Laguarre Trans-PP 269 form,' i19 PP. byV 19610. AD A0111 100

Weiss, Kenneth G., 'The Sovieat Involvement In the Ogaden *lTe Graduate School of managemnt, University of RochesterMor.' 42 pp., Jan 1960 (Presented at the Southern Conference and the center for Navel Amalyes

on Slavic Studies In October, 1979)., A 062 219 *aMe Gradutle School of Managemant, University of Rochester

pp 270 PP 265Nsenek. Richard, 'Soviet Policy In the Hon of Africa: The Romaal, Richard B. 'Superpower Sencurity Inhmters In the

~ Decision to Intervene,' 52 pp., Jan 1960 (To be published In ladlan Ocean Area,' 26 Pp., Jun 1990, AD ADS? 113MTe Soviet Union In the Third World: Success or Failure,'

ad. by Roert N. Donaldson, Wastyimw Press. Boulder. Co., PP 286Suer 1960). AD A06i 195 sirshi, Weurie ".. aOn the we Approuixation to toe

Propagator tor Arbitrary Holaitonlons.' 25 pp.. Aug 1960PP 271 (Published In Journal of Moth. Phys.. 220i) Jan 111411,

*Nonnmil, James. 'Soviet end Americen Stretegic Doctrines: AD A091 307.4'On Deebra Ties,' 43 pp., Jan 1960 AD A06I 192

PP 287PP 272 Cope, Davis. 'Limit Cycle Solutions of Rmation-Olffualon

Wiss, Kenneth G., 'Te Azores In Diplomacy and Strategy, Equtions,' 35 pp., Jun 1960, AD A067 114"I 1940-1945. 46 pp., Par 110110 AD A085 094

PP 273 GOOmn. Waiter. 'Don't Let Your Slides Flip You: A PainleseNtafte Nichael K.. 'Labor Supply of Wives of"h Husbands Ouide to ViSUais That Resily Aid.' 26 pp.. (revisedEmployed Either Full Tim or Pert Tim,' 39 pp., Nor 1960, Aug 11112), AD A092 732AD A0112 220

pp 209pp 274 Robinson. Jack. 'Adequate Classification guidance - A

*An. Walter R.. *A Result in the Theory of Spiral Sesrch.' Solution and a Problem,' 7 pp., Aug I96, AD A091 2129 pp., Nor 1960

pp 275 "ao, orgory Yi.. 'Eveluetlon of omputer Soile.. In enoldberg, Lawrence. alboruitars Advertising end Navy Enlist- Operational Environemnt.' 17 pp., Aug 11110, AD AM9 213

merts,' 34 pp., Nor IMS. AD A0612 221 P

pp o MOdla. 0. 8.' and Troat, It. P., 'Sonse Extensions of theGeldberg, Lwence. Delaying d erhaui and Shlp$s Equip- Norove Press Nodal,' 17 pp., Oat 1960. AD P09i 946k met,' 46 pp.eb 1960. AD A065 09 'UIaversity of Florida

PP 292 PP 30Thmas, Joes A.. Jr..* "The Transport Properties of Blinary Nuann. Laura H.. -An Introduction to tile Literature of SearchGan Mixtues In Applied Maegnetic Fields,: 10 pp., Sep 1980 Theory," 32 pp., Jim 1961, AD Al00 420

* .(PubiIshed In Journal of howlal Physics 72(10)6is My 1960) pp 306

Anger. ThOrns E., "Meat Good Are Mortars, Models?" 7 pp.,g.PP 293 May ONO1, AD AlSO 421

'CThmas. Jms A.. Jr., OEveluetion of Kinetic Theor Coli-sion interals Using tile Generalized Phone Shift Approach," pp 30712 pp., Sep 1960 (Printed In Journal of Chemial Physics Thomases. Jinm, 0epndonce, Risk, aod Vloraibility,"72(10), is may 1960) 43 pp.. Jail 1961, AD A102 60

PP 294 PP 306Roberts, Stephen S.. 'French Ravel Policy outside of Nisrahl, MN., n"Gospondance Amles end Pathi laterals. 1?Europe., 30 PP., Sep 1960 (Presented at til Conference of pp., Jul 1901. (Published In 014uovo Climanto 9", Vol. 61.thle Section an Military Studies, International Studies 96) AD A102 OffAssociation, Kisesh Islend, S.C.), AD A09I 300

PP 299 lelnland. Robert 6. "An (The?) Explanation of tile SovietRoberts, Stephen S., 'An Indicator of Informal Espire: Inveelon of Afghanistan," 44 pp., Ray 1961, AD Al00 422Patterns at U.S. Nevy Cruising on Oversees Stations, 1669-1697." 40 pp., Sep 1960 (Presented at Fourt" Ravel History PP 310Symposlum, US Naval Academy, 26 Oct 1979). AD A091 316 Stenford. Janette M.. end low, Tel To,* -A Preictive Method

for Osereinlong Possible Three-diinnlonel Foidlagls afpp 29 immunogllobullsm bchbonas Iround Antibody Colaoing Sites,"

01aaahes. Bradford, and Petersen, Charles C., 9101oritles 19 pp., Jun ONO1 (Publishted In J. Themr. 61o.. 1981). 66,Factors Affecting Iberian Security," (Factores Mritie qua AD AlSO 423Mafctan Is Segeridad lborlca) 14 pp., Oct 1960, AD A062 733 olorthuetern University

PP 297 - ClassIfled PP 311W ue, brae Bachilag; Frenk P. Rt.; end Utgoff,

PP 290 Kahleen P. Ciasomn, "As Eveluation of Ui Funds." 13 pp.,Nisrahi, Moabec N., CA Morhov, Approach to Large Missile bay 1961 (Publshed In Rational Cornisslen am UnamloymentAttacks." 31 pp., Jan 1961,0 A 096.1"9 GOOepeAItionts "URMeepoyne 0090e~ 1t0o: Stu 1111e4 and

Research," Volum 2, Jul 1900), 00 AlSO 424PP 299

Jondrin, Jesse M., end Levy, Robert A., "iege Leadeship In pp 312Construction, 19 pp., Jan 1961. AD *094 797 Jondroa, Jiase; Bunn&, Rarlene; end Levy, Robert, wTha

Optom Speed Limit." 23 pp.. Jul 1963 (Rovlsed),PP 300 AD Alg0 429

Jondiw, Jeane, end Schmidt. Pter,a -ft tile Estiation of4 Technical inefficiency In tile MtWiltic frontier Production PP 313

functien Model,- 11 pp., Je 1961, AD AD%0 160 Roberts. Step0e S., "Thes U.S. Navy In the lUOu," 36 pp.,411ichigen" State University Jul 1961, AD Al02 090

PP 301 PP 314Jendrow, Jens N.; Levy. Robert A.; end Huighes. Claire, Jeohn, Christpilers ibirowltz. Stenley A.; end Loche."Tadhnical Chap and Employment In Steel, Autos, Aluminum, Robert F., "f ling tile Draft Debae.-, 20 pp.. Jul 1961,and Iran Oe.- 17 pp., Mar 1281.AD All" 394 AD AlSO 192

pp 3 PP 315Jandron, Jaws N., sod Levy. Robert A., "The Effect of suck, Ralph V. (Capt.. UM), "La Cotasroil byaoteleorts on Eoasyit Under Rationael lEpeota!toss," to pp., "am ....," 4 pp., Jul 1961, AD A102 097Apr ONO61, A11119392

PP 316pp 303 Roberts, Stephen S.. mdeste Eurpopes and MTO Navies,

Thompsen. Jae, "The Rarest Coinodity In the Coming 190," 20 pp., Aug 1961, AD A104 2W.1/ ~A- Reeu e ra," 3 pp., Avg logo (Published In tile Washington

Star, 13 Apr 191), AD A104 221 PP 317Roberta, Stephena S.. Superpowm Raveal &lsi5 Mnagmnt In

pp 304 the Mediterranen," 35 pp., Aug 1961, ADl A104 22Daffy, MRaOile K.; Orasuood. Michael J.;O and Mcowell.Johns M.,69 "A Oeee.Soctienel Model of Annual Interragional PP 316Migretien end blpsmnt baothr lstorteepoel Evidence of Vago. Miles N., "Vugoslle and tile Soviet Policy oarStrutuls engaoo, 1956-I97.0 31 pp., Apr 1961, AD *096 393 In tile Mditerranan Since 1961." 167 pp., Aug 1961elblveresy at Colorado

* ,eArlim Stt Voiversity

-4-

pp 319 pp 3Smith. Michael W.. "Antlair Warfare Defensa of Ships at Lea. LungV-Fat,' and Trost. Robart P., "Eatietion of SomSaa," 46 pp.. Sap 1901 (This talk was delivared at the Naval Limited Dependent Variable Medals with Application toWarfare System and Technology Conference of the Amrican Housing Damend," 26 pp.. Jan 1902. (Publishedl In Journal ofInstitute of Aronautics and Astronautlcs In Washington on Econometrics S (1976), AD A 112 53612 Dac 1960, In Boston on 20 Jan 1981, and in Los Angales on *University of Minneaota12 Jun i981.), AD A106 191 P

PP 320 Kenny, Lawrence W.;' La, Lung-Fol;aa Haddel a, G. S.;4 andTroat, ft. P.. Lurie. Philip, and Bargar, Edward, *A Mote on Trost Rt. P., -Returns to DOlago Education: An InvestigationEstimating Continuous Tew Dacision Obdls," 15 pp., of Salf-S. lection Bias Based on the Project Toalant Data." isSap 1901. AD A106 193 Pp., Jan 1962. (Published in insnt~ iEconomic Review,

Vol. 20, No. 3, Oct 1979), AD A112 480PP 321 a*,Ileslty of Florida

fluffy, Michael K., and Ledown, Jerry R,.,' uThe Similtaneous *"l~nIverslty of MinnesotaDetermination of Income and Eepla o~t In United States~-Mexico Sorder Region Economies." 34 pp..* Sap 1961, pp 331AD A106 540 Lee, Lung-Pl;' Maddala, G. S.;** and Trost, R.P. -AVmptat-'Associate Professor of Economics, Arizona State Unoivers ity Ic Coveriance Matrices of Two-Staga ProbIt and TwoStaga

TObW Methods for Simulteneous Equations Models wifth Salec-PP 322 tivlty," 13 pp., Jan 102. (Published In Econometrics. Vol.

Warner, John T., -Issues In Navy Manpower Research and 48, No. 2. Nor 1980), AD Al 12 463Policy: An Economst's Perspective," 66 pp.. De 1961, 'tIversIty of Minnesota

AD AIIO 221 vers~ty of Florida

PP 323 PP 336Bowne, Fredorldi N,, 'Generation of Correlated Log-Norwal O'Neill. Thorns, "Noblity Fuels for the Navy," 13 pp.,Sbeuences for the Simlation of Clutter Echoes.- 33 pp.. Dec Jan 1902. lAcceptedl for publication In Navel institute,i981 Proceedings), AD At 12 511

PP 324 PP 337Hforowitz, Stanley A., -"untifying Saspooer Roadiness," Warner, John T., and Goldberg. Natthm, S., "The Influence of6 PP.. Dec 1901 (Publishe In Defense Managment Journal, Non-Pecuniary Factors on Labor Supply: The Coe of Navy

4Vol. i8, No. 2), AD AIIO 220 Endilsimant Personnel." 23 pp.. Dec 1981, AD Al 13 094

pp 326 PP 339Roberts, Stephen S., "Western Eurqosan and NATO movies, Ison, Demond P.. * The Persian Gulf and the National1961," 27 pp., Jul 1982. AD AIlSI 703 Interest," It pp., Feb 1962. AD A112 105

PP 327 PP 340.. n. Colin (Capt., USN). and Graham, David At., Lurie, Philip; Trost. Rt. P.; and Serger, Edward, "A MethodOEstimetion and Anlysis of Navy Shipbuilding Program for Analyzing Multiple Spell Duration Date," 34 pp., FabDisruption Costs." 12 pp.. Mar 1900. AD A112 114 1962, AD At 12 504

PP 326 PP 341Wlniand, Robert G., "Northern Waters: Their Strategic Trost, Robert P., and Vogel, Robert C.,* "Prediction withSignificance." 27 pp., De 1900. AD A112 109 Pooled Oross-Saction end litme-Series Data: Two Coa

Studies." 0 pp., Feb 1962, AD A112 103pp 329 *Southern Illinois University

Mengel, Marc, "Appliled Mathematician And Navel Operators,"40 pp.. Poor 19112 (RvIsed), AD A1lS 998 PP 342

Las, Lung-Fe);' Meddele, 6, S,;** and Trost, It. P., "Testingpp 330 for Structural Change by 0-Mehods In Switching Slomeltafeous

Lockman, Robert F.. "Alternative Appoaches to Attrition Equations Nodels,- 1 pp.. Feb 1962. AD At 12 462Naemt"30 pp., Jan 1962, AD A112 110 awIiverlty of Minnesota

*Ginivorsity of Floridapp 331

Roberts, Stephen S., -The Turkish Straits and the Soviet pp 343Navy In th e Ndterraneen,- 15 pp., Mar 1992 (Published In Goldberg. Matthew S.. "Projecting the Navy Enlisted ForceNavy International) Level1," 9 pp., Feb 1962. AD At 12 464

PP 332 pp 344Jehn, Chriatepher, "The UO and Aphibious Wart ere" 36 pp., Fletcher, Joan. W.. "Navy Quality of Life and Aeanliment."tNor 1902, AD Ail 19 2 13 pp., Nov 1901. AD A113 093

346ff Kahy Zod balr ik*-TeEooisofMli A .Gorge,. "Evaluating Tactical Comand And Control

Annall Mme , ofth PoblChe Tracciores, ppo, Sapnio AD62 A22 A 30Tpows,"- No4 pp6. AD92 A i 601

PP 362PP 347 Morit , SDanled ., "Isthe foiry Geradige Aitcraf

JMcdonel Jmes, and TrAt Pobart "AuntEr rca Std fof h lTajectoi, 1 pp. Sp 1962, AD A122 386

Var~b, 24 pp.. Fob 192. AD A16 601 P 6

PP ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ P 34 aias,62p. Ot16.ADA2 2

Jonrid, ese. anTs," Rnd berti, 0.n Emiicam, ud ~olaofalcl"10p. e 98.A 12Pnrductine IneficincytIn ofe Prespnce bf Alrr-na PP 36

Hydrocarbons," 7 pp., Jul 1981. (Publishidin journal of Quester. Alnew nod akas Michael, "Tha Military'sChemical Physics, 7604). 15 Feb 1902). AD A13 093 WNopIe"nV Poear., 29 pp., Oct 19112. AD A123 657"Uivarsity, of Utah. Dept. of Chamistry

pp 369pp 390 ora-, WIIiss Le ., and gartholoeme, Js C., 4Cdr.USM),

Levine Warct "A Method for Increasing the Firspowar of Pacychological Aspects of Mtna Warfare." 19 pp., Oct 19112*Virginia Class Crulsera," 10 pp., Apr 1962. (To be polsitahed AD A126 244

In U.S. Naval Institute Procoadlogs). AD AIN6 602PP 366

PP 391 Spruill, Me"c L.. and gastlirth Jaoeph L.6 n0n teCoutre, . .* a Stanford J. It.. Newtsa, J. 0.;O Stevens, Eaftleft of the COr.alati0n Coefficient From GroupeP. 10.0 and Vu, T. T..* -Possible lhrae"Imslaeomal Socidsone Data," 9 Pp., Oct 1962, (Published In the Journal of theFolding Around Antibody Combining Site of linanolobln Amrlssan Statistical Anociation, Sep 1962, Vol. 71, No.WORD 167.- i* pp., Apr 1962 (Published fin Journal of 379, Thaory and Methods Sectlon), AD A122 362Thaoretical G1010g.) eorge sahington Iiveralty, Dept. of Statistics

SI "Northuastarn univeaety, Dapt%, of Biochemistry a MolecularBiology and Engineering Sciances & AppIlaed Wathintlcs, pp 36

wo inland, Robert G., "hke Evolution of Soviet Reaquirementspp352* for Movel Forcas-Solving the Probi m ot the Early 1960s"

Barfoot, C. Bernard. "Aggregation of Conditional Absorbing 41 pp., Dec 19112, AD A123 699Warksov Chalns," 7 pp., Jun 1962 1Presented to the SixthEuropean Maeting on CyberneIcs and Systems faseercho held PP 369at the lhvesity of Vienna, Apr 1982), AD Ail6 603 Quester, Allea, and Lockman, Robart, "The All-Volunteer

Forces A Positive PerspectIve," 29 pp, v Ny 1962,pp 393 AD A12S 279

Berfoot, C. Bernerd. -Som Heathtiea$ Methos for Modelingthe performnce Of a Distributed Data soe System," IS pp., pp 370Jun 11162. (Proatad to the international Woring Conferenc Heatier, Barnard D.. "IHaan Resource Models: An Overvien,"on Modal baolia. held at Bad Wank Ost Germny, Apr 17 pp., Way 1962. AD A123 6961962), AD At 16 604

PP 372pp 554 murley, Wili11m J., "An Overview of Acoustic Analysis."

Hall, John V.. "Why the Short-ibr Scenaro Is Wong for 46 pp., Jon 1963. AD Ai28 316NMIa Plannlng." 6 pp., Jun 1962., AD AilS 702

pp 373pp 396 jecoloson, Louis. Moaseerdu to Quantify the Effect ot

Cylhe, Steven; Goldberg, Natha S.; en Paull and Metro, earamnent Cha of Station lWaves on UlySS' NMs and LaborLes Esatiton of the Personal Diaoount Notes Evidenc Supply,"1 39 pp., Jan 1963. AD Alas 300from Militaory Noaelmant Decisions," 19 pp., Apr IM.2AD A122 419 PP 374

Clay-monder, Deborah. sod Sialls, Ellenms "alacig AccessionPP357 and floWttons The Olsaggrepate Modal." 27 pp., Aug 1"62

Goldberg, Metla S., pOarenin asotas, and Long.Rosn We Oifferentials," 13 pp., Sap 1962 (Published In PP 379Quarterly Journal of Econonice, Noy 19412) Feldman. Paul. "Privetizing Airports tn Washington. D.C.."

17 pp., Feb. 1963. AD Ai28 236

4N,%

. . ... ...._..,._ - -- .---u--v-w- .-- v rr.* r . -r r r' .= - .' P -'- 4'. ., . .. a -- . .nr . " i s ,-' -to --.o-.,

"... -. .--. ."-.. . .. - . . . .- " "

PP 376 PP 9leiss. Kenneth G., "Power Grows Out of the Barrel of a M:GOlmy, Doald; Ceweiil, Ugo; Roberts, Arthur; end

Gunboat: The U.S. In Sln-Soviet Crises," 136 pp., Dec I2 Winston, boland, "Devolopment of -n Underwater HighSensitivity Cherenkow Detector: See Urchin.' 20 p.,

PP 379 Aug 1913Jondrow. Jame N.; Chase. David E.; and Gle. ChristopherL., "The Price Otterentill between Domestic and Imported Pp 36Steel." 17 pp., May 1963 Jondrow, James N; Brechilag. Frak; and Marcus, Alan;

"Older Wotkers In te Market for Part-Tim Emplom et

P936 34 p.. Aug i903Balls, Ellen, M"alanclig Accession and Rtentlion: Cost andProductivity Tradooffts 38 pp.. Nor 1963 Pp 396

Levy, Robert A.; twes, Marianne; and Jondrow, Jamn N.;

PP 381 "Technical Change and Employmt In the Stol, Auto,Reeves, John N. L.. "CtA's Conceptual Delign an Cost Models Alumin, Coal, and Iron Ore industrias.- 2- P.. Se IN"3

for Hlgl-Speed Surface Craft.- 23 pp., Apr 1963, A Al 245pp 400

pP 962 Laird, Roln F.. "French Nuclear Forces In thie 19s and

Levy, Robert A., end Jondrow, James N, "The Adjustment of 1990s," 37 pp., Aug ISEmploymet to Technical Change In the Steel end Autoindustries," 40 pp., May 1963 PP 401

Maloney, Arthur P., "The SeriIgi R0 Ivey an a CausePP 383 (Revised) of orld Her 1, 27 Pa., Jan 1964

Th ws, James A., Jr, and Mngel, More, "Properties of QulckLook Passve Lo lzto, 9 pp. Jul 19

PP 364Goldberg Mathe S.. and Heer Michal F.. -A Corisoof thlO Pr'ophelt an ACO Force Pr'ojection Models I - 5 pp.,Jun 1981

PP 385

Angler, Bruce; Driscoll, Kurt; and GeCy, pat. KathyRequiremts Dervation for the Nav Comprhesive owti1n and Suply Study.- 22 pp., Se 1V

PP386Angler, Bruce M., Driscoll, Kurt A.; Capeter. Kathly

A., "Construction of 'Training Cost Per Graduate' for timeNavy Comprehensive Compensation and Supply Stu," 67 pp.,Now 1962

pp9387Balls, Elln, end Clay-Mendez, Deborah, "Dalnclng Accessionend Retention: The Aggregate Model," 20 pp.. Jul 1962

pp9386Clay-finde Deborah. "Models of Accession and RetentIon,"11 pp., Oct 1962

PP389lay-landez, Deborah, "A Ulnimm Recruiting Cost FunctIon

for Male High School Graduates," 31 pp.. Jan 1912

PP 390CIlay-Nondez, Deborah, "Documentation for the Recruiting Cost

Estiates Utilized In the Navy Comprehensive Compensationend Supply Study," 30 pp., Sep 1962

Goldberg, Larry, "Summery of Navy Enlisted Supply Study,"

11 pp., Jul 1961

PP 392-ern.r John T., end Sion, Bruce, "An Empirical Analysis of

Pay and Navy Enlisted Retention In the AVF: Preliminary

Results," I1 pp.. Doc 1979

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