1. Chapter Eight: Countermeasures

2. New technologies and new procedures for executing effective countermeasures are diverse. Some are very cost effective and some are purely for psychological effect. The utility of a particular measure should be subject to appropriate risk assessment criteria. 3. Remote Controlled Aircraft 4. The government acknowledged immediately after 9/11 that the government would indeed consider all kinds of technology, including methods to enable air traffic controllers to take over control of distressed aircraft and to be able to land aircraft by remote control. Pilots, accurately pointing out a potential vulnerability, have expressed concern over potential terrorist ability to gain access to the controllers on the ground. This idea proposes to create a system that takes control of the aircraft away from its pilot remotely. The security measures to keep airplane-based hackers out would also keep the pilot from regaining control of his aircraft. This opens up an avenue for attack that does not currently exist. If someone could turn several jets into cruise missiles simultaneously and remotely, there would be a lot of money in finding a way to exploit it. The idea of a panic button is more realistic. Remote control would be a good thing if the pilot took a deliberate action to permanently (until replacement of components was completed) relinquish control of the aircraft. 5. Arming Cargo Pilots 6. Cargo pilots will now also be permitted to carry weapons under new legislation that closes a loophole in the Homeland Security Act. Cargo airlines generally oppose the idea of their pilots being armed. Steve Alterman, president of the Cargo Airline Association, said the 13 all-cargo airlines that comprise his group do not want their pilots to be allowed to participate in the armed pilots program. "We believe that programs for securing the aircraft and screening each and every person attempting to board the aircraft provide the best means of defense against hijackers," Alterman said 7. Container Hardening 8. As early as 1993, Congress asked the FAA to study and report on different types of technology designed to protect aircraft against certain explosives. Even prior to that, the aircraft hardening program had been started in 1991. The overall purpose of the project was to create systems, that would protect commercial aircraft from catastrophic structural damage or critical system failure due to in-flight explosions. Secondary objectives are to investigate vulnerability from some spurious electromagnetic or high-energy signal interfering with aircraft electronic systems and to assess the threat presented by manually operated highly mobile, surface-to-air missiles. 9. The program is designed to determine and identify: (1) the minimum amount of explosives that will result in aircraft loss; (2) the methods and techniques that can be applied to the current and future fleets of commercial aircraft to increase the level of vulnerability to explosive effects; and (3) the threat to aircraft from electromagnetic (EM), projected energy, and surface-to-air missiles and practical countermeasures. One estimate from the Air Transport Association projects that such containers would cost airlines $5 billion a year. Additionally, the containers are only available for wide-body aircraft, which includes only 25% of the aircraft in service. 10. Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening Systems (CAPPS II)/Secure Flight 11. in 1998, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) implemented the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) to enable air carriers to separate passengers into two categories: those who require additional security scrutiny (selectees) and those who do not. CAPPS used information from the passengers itinerary to search for certain behavioral characteristics determined by the FAA (and now by the Transportation Security Administration) to indicate a higher security risk. A passengers selectee status was transmitted to the check-in counter, where a code is printed on the boarding pass of any passenger determined to require additional screening. At the screening checkpoint, passengers who are selectees were subject to additional security measures. CAPPS II was the follow on system. 12. All of these systems rely on a Passenger Name Record. When a passenger books a plane ticket, certain identifying information is collected. This information is used to check against some data store (i.e., a TSA No-Fly list, the FBI ten most wanted fugitive list, etc.) and assign a terrorism "risk score" to that person. CAPPS II was cancelled by the TSA in the summer of 2004. Shortly thereafter, the TSA announced a successor program, called Secure Flight that would work much the same as CAPPS II. TSA hoped to test Secure Flight in August 2005 using two airlines. In February of 2006 Secure Flight was cancelled for being potentially insecure 13. Shoulder-Fired Missiles 14. Individual planes could be equipped with defense mechanisms against missile attacks. Many military aircraft and some commercial planes such as El Al, the Israeli airline, have the capacity to use flares and advanced technology to divert incoming missiles. Although current options for such defense are inordinately expensive given the level of the threat, submitting a request for such technology to the open market could yield less costly and more accessible defense options. The technology for such a defense already exists and effective diversion mechanisms for commercial planes need not be as robust as those for military aircraft (possibly costing as little as $200 per plane). A priority for such defense efforts should be high-threat, high-density airports. 15. Advanced technology to divert incoming missiles 16. After 9/11, the U.S. Department of Transportation chartered an industry team to make recommendations to improve aircraft security. One of those recommendations was to reinforce cockpit doors in order to deny access from intruders. Modifications have been completed on the door of all U.S. airliners and the doors on international carriers that serve the U.S. The Rapid Response Team has concluded that: Some appropriate flight deck barrier device must be approved and installed in the entire U.S. fleet and future design of flight deck doors must meet newly determined requirements. Procedural changes must be made at all airlines regarding identification and access of all personnel to the flight deck. 17. Airline industry, unions, and FAA should redesign security training with possible implementation of defensive capabilities to address newly identified threats, incorporate changes into the annual curriculum, and provide security training to all crew members. Each airline, in cooperation with the FAA or other government entities, must develop a delivery system to provide government security advisories to crew members in a timely manner. A task force should determine the necessary modifications to assure continuous transmission of a transponder signal. All airlines, pilots, and the FAA should jointly identify procedures in pilot training that could be adapted in an attempted hijacking. 18. Anti-sniper Measures 19. Wiretapping 20. It is simply important to remember that: It is very easy for a terrorist to access transportation facility phone wires Even an amateur can easily bug or tap a phone line An eavesdropper does not have to get close to the target to tap the line Managers have a serious false sense of security about the phone and related wiring Telephone lines are extremely vulnerable to eavesdropping It's very difficult to find a bug or wiretap on a phone line Detection requires an expert knowledge of telephones and electronics Communication is critical to all modes of transportation and some serious thought needs to be addressed towards the terrorists potential ability to tap into this huge source of information from unprotected systems. 21. Global Positioning Threats 22. The U.S. Department of Transportation has for years been investigating hackers intent on knocking out or distorting positioning data from the Global Positioning System. The Volpe National Transportation Center made an intensive study into the threats to systems that receive GPS signals from the Defense Departments 28-satellite constellation. The first portion of the study was completed in July 1999. They documented the threats from interference to GPS systems for railroad, maritime, aviation, and intelligent transportation system users. The second part of the study concentrated on how to protect the systems. 23. Ballistics 24. There is no such thing as bullet proof. A ballistic or bullet resistant material is designed to resist penetration from specific types, calibers, and velocities of ballistic threats. Variations of personal protection clothing can be purchased which suit the needs of law enforcement, the military, explosion disposal teams, and heads of security, as well as vulnerable transportation officials 25. The Federal Air Marshal Program currently has its training facility and airline security research facility located at the Williams J. Hughes Airport and now falls under the purview of the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA: 49 CFR Chapter XII Part 1544.223). Using a wall full of computer generated maps, the TSA tracks the flight path of each flight with an air marshal on board and supporting documents indicate the travel schedule of each marshal. They currently employ 45,000 people and are financed with a $4 billion supplemental spending bill from Congress. The agents receive special training and regularly travel on U.S. air carriers on high- risk routes. Additionally, as federal agents, they are permitted to make arrests without a warrant when certain felony offenses against the United States can be reasonably shown to have been or are being committed. The Federal Air Marshal Program is administered by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). 26. Federal Air Marshals 27. Describe the advantages and disadvantages of installing anti-terrorist technology on transportation assets.