4 Spinoza on the Ideality of Time

2014. Idealistic Studies, Volume 43, Issues 1 & 2. ISSN 0046-8541. pp. 2740DOI: 10.5840/idstudies20145133

SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME

Geoffrey Gorham

Abstract: When McTaggart puts Spinoza on his short list of philoso-phers who considered time unreal, he is falling in line with a reading of Spinozas philosophy of time advanced by contemporaneous British Idealists and by Hegel. The idealists understood that there is much at stake concerning the ontological status of Spinozistic time. If time is essential to motion then temporal idealism entails that nearly every-thingapart from God conceived sub specie aeternitatisis imaginary. I argue that although time is indeed imaginaryin a sense no one doubts as Spinoza saysthere is no good reason to infer that bodies, the infinite modes, and conatus are imaginary in the same sense. To avoid this conflation, we need to follow Spinoza (who follows Descartes) in carefully distinguishing between tempus and duratio. Duration is not only real; it has all the structure needed to ground Spinozistic motion, bodies and conatus.

I. IntroductionIn the introduction to his groundbreaking 1908 article The Unreality of Time, the British Idealist J. M. E. McTaggart includes Spinoza on his short list of philosophers who have treated time as unreal.1 Without defending this interpretation, McTaggart acknowledges that he is falling in line with the idealist reading of Spinozas philosophy of time earlier advanced by Hegel and others.2 In Faith and Knowledge, for example, Hegel comments that ev-ery line of Spinozas system makes the proposition that time and succession are mere appearances so utterly trivial that not the slightest trace of novelty and paradox is to be seen in it.3 This reading of Spinoza is also common among McTaggarts contemporaries within the school of British Idealism. Thus, Joachim characterizes limited temporal duration as our mutilation of eternal actuality.4 And the idealist reading has persisted among influential twentieth-century scholars like Hallett and Wolfson, and even in recent, very circumspect, commentators like Schliesser, who asserts about Spinozistic time and duration: these imaginings should not be thought to belong to the fundamental ontology of the world.5

Notwithstanding the strong measure of opportunism in Hegels Eleatic reconstruction of Spinozas metaphysics, there is no shortage of texts, early

IDEALISTIC STUDIES28

and late, that prima facie support the ideality of Spinozistic time.6 In the Metaphysical Thoughts (1663) Spinoza emphasizes that time is not an af-fection of things but a mere mode of thinking (G I, 24; C 105). A private letter from the same year underscores and broadens this doctrine: measure, time and number are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of the imagination (Letter 12; G IV, 56; C 203). And the imaginary origin of time is confirmed in the Ethics: no one doubts that we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or with the same speed (1P44schol: C 480).

As the idealists understood, there is a good deal at stake concerning the ontological status of Spinozistic time. If, as Spinoza himself asserts,7 time is an essential component of motion, then temporal idealism entails that nearly everythingapart from God conceived sub specie aeternitatasis imaginary. For motion and rest (including the scalar speed) account for both the individuation (2L1; C 458459) and the identity of bodies (2def7; C 447).8 Motion, and hence time, are further implicated above the level of finite modes. When Spinoza is asked for an example of an eternal and infinite mode that follows immediately from the absolute nature of God (1P21; C 429) he offers motion and rest (Letter 64; G IV, 278). Time is also involved in the key notion of conatus, by which each thing perseveres in its being. Spinoza explains that conatus involves an indefinite time since a thing will always continue to exist by the same power by which it now exists unless it is destroyed by an external cause (3P8dem: C 499). Consequently, timeat least indeterminate timeis connected to the actual essences of things since the striving by which things persevere is nothing but the actual essence of the thing (3P7; C 499).

This temporal saturation of the created realm will be welcomed by the idealist as reinforcing their wholesale acosmism: things in time, and time itself are nothing.9 I would like to argue, to the contrary, that although time is indeed imaginary in a certain sensea sense no one doubts as Spinoza saysthere is no good reason to infer that such fundamental features of the world as bodies, the infinite modes, and conatus are imaginary in this same sense. To avoid this conflation, we need to follow Spinoza (who follows Descartes) in carefully distinguishing between time (tempus) and duration (duratio). Duration, I will argue, is not only real; it has all the structure needed to ground Spinozistic motion, infinite modes and conatus. In particular, it is inherently successive. This restores the mundane reality of modes while highlighting the unique and timeless being of God. For Spinozas version of divine eternity excludes both time and duration and thereby eliminates any analogy between the limited and successive existence of created things and the limitless and necessary existence of God. But, contrary to Hegel, this does not reduce created things to nothing; rather, it reinforces the Cartesian doctrine that their distinctive way of being is successive duration.

29SPINOZA ON THE IDEALITY OF TIME

II. Time as Modus Cogitandi: The 1663 TextsSpinozas earliest discussion of time is presented in the metaphysical thoughts (Cogitata Metaphysica [CM]) which he appended to his 1663 synthetic exposition of Descartess Principles of Philosophy (Descartes Principiorum Philosophiae [DPP]).10 An early chapter of Part One, On Time and Duration, follows directly upon treatments of the kinds of being, the distinction between essence and existence, and the modal categories. Clearly, Spinoza considers it important to clarify the ontology of time, as one of the principal questions that arise in the general part of metaphysics (S 94; G I, 233). He first defines eternity as the attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of God, but postpones discussion until later. Next, he defines duration [duratio] as the attribute under which we conceive the existence of created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality [rerum creatarum existentiam prout in sua actualitate perseverant existantiam] (S 104; G I, 244). So conceived, he notes, duration is distinct only in reason from the total existence of a thing since as much as you take away from the thing so much necessarily you take away from its existence (S 104105; G I, 244). As for time, in order that duration my be determined, we compare it with other things that have a fixed and determinate motion, and this comparison is called time [tempus] (S 105; G I, 244). Such clock time, he emphasizes, is not an affection of things [rerum] ... but rather a mode of thinking [modus cogitatndi] that we use to explicate duration (ibid.).

Spinozas treatment clearly derives from Descartess. In the Principles of Philosophy, Descartes too holds that duration is an attribute under which we conceive a thing insofar as it perseveres in existence [sub quo concipimus rem istam, quantenus esse perseverat] (AT 8A 26; CSM 1 211). And as such, he holds that a thing is distinguished only in reason from its duration since if a substance ceases to endure then it ceases to be (AT 8A 34; CSM 1 214). Descartes characterizes tempus in nearly the same terms as Spinoza later will: in order to measure the duration of all things, we compare their duration with the greatest and most regular motions ... and this duration we call time (AT 8A 27; CSM 1 212). This comparison adds nothing real to duration except a mode of thought (ibid).

Both models emphasize an ontological divide between duration and time: the former is intrinsic to things and not really different from their existence; the latter is a convenient measure or comparison and not really distinct from human thought. Descartes flags this divide in his heading for the relevant section of the Principles: Some attributes are in things and others in our thought; what duration and time are (AT 8A 27: CSM 1 212). And he con-cludes the section emphasizing that time adds nothing to duration except a mode of thought (ibid.). Likewise, in the opening chapter of CM, Spinoza lists tempus among the modes of thinking for explicating a thing by de-termining it in comparison with another thing (S 95; G I, 234). Later, he


makes it even clearer that while time depends on human thought duration depends only on created things:

Time is the measure of duration, or rather, is nothing but a mode of thinking. Consequently it presupposes not just any created thing whatever, but par-ticularly thinking men. As for duration, it ceases when created things cease to exist and begins when created things begin to exist. (S 129; G I, 169)

Duration may also be compared with the third temporal notion, the eternity of God. Neither duration nor eternity are mere modes of thinking but rather attributes under which we conceive existence (created and uncreated things re-spectively).11 Yet, unlike eternity, duration is conceived as longer and shorter (major & minor) and as if (quasi) composed of parts. Moreover, duration is an attribute of existence only, not of essence (S 105; G I, 244), Later in CM Spinoza repeats these contrasts between duration and eternity, but drops the qualification that we conceive of duration merely as if composed of parts. Rather, he says it is precisely because in eternity there are no parts, nor any before and after (nihil prius nec posterius), that we can never attribute duration to God without destroying the true conception we have of him (S 111; G I, 251). So in CM duration occupies an ontological middle-ground between time and eternity: it is has a successive structure, with parts before and after, like time, but is a real attribute, like eternity.

Since the aims of DPP, and to a much lesser extent CM, are expository, it is not always clear when Spinozas agreements with Descartes are sincere. When it comes to time, we fortunately have a detailed independent and con-temporaneous discussion which confirms the Cartesian philosophy of time set out in CM. In the 1663 Letter on the Infinite to Ludwig Meyer (who composed the preface to the DPP), Spinoza uses his triad eternity, duration and time to explain the different ways in which things can be infinite. Sub-stances are infinite by nature or definition, which means that they cannot be conceived as not existing and their existence cannot be divided into parts or conceived as greater or lesser. This is eternity. In contrast, the existence of modes can be so conceived without destroying at the same time the concept we have of them (G IV, 55, 5-12; C 202). This is duration. There are two ways the duration of modes can be infinite: (i) by the force of the cause in which they inhere and (ii) because they cannot be equated with any number though they can be conceived to be greater or lesser (G IV 61, 1-7; C 205). By (i) he seems to mean that the duration of modes is infinite insofar as it flows from things eternal (G IV 56, 16-17; C 203). By (ii), which he also labels indefinite, he seems to mean that duration is infinite insofar as it can be assigned no specific number, either because it is continuous or because it is infinite in extent.12 Finally, Spinoza maintains that time arises by abstracting from substance quantity, which itself is conceived in two ways: superficially with the imagination (which is easy) vs. as it is in itself with the intellect (which is difficult). The easy way of abstracting produces time:


From the fact that when we conceive quantity abstracted from substance, and separate duration from the way it flows from eternal things, we can determine them as we please, there arise time and measureTime to determine Duration and Measure to determine Quantity, in such a way that, so far as possible, we imagine them easily. Again, from the fact that we separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself and reduce them to classes so that as far as possible we imagine them easily, arises Number by which we determine these affections. (G IV, 56, 15-19; C 203)

Spinoza emphasizes that time, so conceived, cannot be infinite. For it makes duration easily quantifiable by dividing it into parts and assigning them a definite, i.e., finite, number: neither number nor measure not time (since they are only aids of the imagination) can be infinite. For otherwise Number would not be number, nor Measure measure nor Time time (G IV, 58, 16-18; C 204).

Those who forget number, measure, and time are merely finite products of the imagination inevitably entangle themselves in the most absurd absur-dities (G IV, 57, 12; C 203).13 For example, when someone has conceived Duration abstractly, and by confusing it with time begun to divide it into parts, he will never be able to understand how an hour can pass. The abstracter runs into a Zeno problemif an hour is to pass, it will be necessary for half of it to pass first, and then half of the remainder... (G IV 58, 4-8; C 203). The source of the difficulty is not taking duration to have parts for, as already noted, it is the very nature of duration that we conceive it as greater or less and divide it into parts. Rather, it is the attempt to numerically quantify these parts. The abstracter either continues to subtract half the remaining time, and in this way never reach the end of the hour or misguidedly assumes that duration is composed of discrete moments: but composing duration of moments is the same as composing number merely by adding noughts (G IV 58, 9-5; C 204). Either way, the problem is not that duration has parts but that we imaginatively quantify and count them. The true Mathematicians, on the contrary, do not assume that such things exceed every number because of the multiplicity of their parts, but because the nature of the thing cannot admit number without a manifest contradiction (G IV 59, 14; C 204). So, as in CM, duration has a rich structure that is infinite both in in relation to its cause, and inherently in extent and division; the trouble begins when we conflate this structure with discrete numerical abstractions, confusing the duration of things with marks on a clock.14

III. Time and Duration in the EthicsWe come to the account of time and duration in the Ethics by way of the analogous notion of extension, which is treated in much more detail. Gueroult has noted how in Letter 12 the infinity of duration is presented under a double aspect: insofar as it flows from absolutely partless eternity and insofar as


its has parts that are numberless.15 A corresponding ambivalence about exten-sion is prominent in the Ethics. In the famous scholium to proposition 15, where Spinoza attempts to reconcile the extendedness and indivisibility of God, he repeats nearly verbatim the Letter 12 distinction between quantity as conceived in the imagination (divisible) vs. the intellect (indivisible). But he adds an additional point, at most only implicit in Letter 12, that since matter is everywhere the same its parts are distinguished only by its affections i.e., modally but not really (1P15s, V; C 423424). As Spinoza explains in CM, two (non-substances) are modally distinct when although either mode may be conceived without the help of the other, nevertheless neither mode may be conceived without the help of the substance whose modes they are (G I, 257; S 118), Since Spinoza, like nearly all seventeenth-century philosophers, treats space and time symmetrically it is worth formulating the corresponding doctrine for duration. This would be that although my duration or continu-ance in existence today can be conceived apart from my duration tomorrow, neither can be conceived apart from me. This fits well with another indirect point Spinoza makes against the real divisibility of extension in 1P15, which is that opponents of the vacuum (plenists) cannot admit such division: for if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts were really distinct, then why could not one part be annihilated, the rest remaining connected with one another as before? (1P15s, IV; C 423). The temporal analogue would presumably be that although we can think of the different parts of duration independently there can never be a real gap in duration itself. In any event, both points suggest that extension and duration can have intrinsic parts but not parts that are really distinct or discrete.

The treatment of duration and time themselves in the Ethics is essentially the same as in earlier texts although Spinoza more thoroughly explains why we impose the latter upon the former. Duration is the existence of something conceived as a certain species of quantity (2P45s; C 482) and specifically defined as an indefinite continuation of existing (2Def5; C 447). The quantity of a things continued existence is indefinite in itself because it cannot at all be determined through the very nature of the existing thing (ibid. See also 1P24c; C 431). Nor is the extent of a finite things duration determined by its efficient cause which necessarily posits the existence of the thing, and does not take it away(2Def5; C 447). Rather our duration depends on our place in the infinite common order of nature of which we have are mostly ignorant. So we have only an entirely inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body (2P30; C 471) much less other finite things (2P31; C 472). In the face of such inadequacy, time is the means by which the imagination represents the past and future durations of things. It is a conventional measure of dura-tion derived by comparing the regular motions of bodies: we imagine time, from the fact that we imagine some bodies to move more slowly than others, or more quickly, or with the same speed (2P44schol; C 480). So time takes


indeterminate duration and reduces it to determinate, measurable parts.16 For example, the actual existence of the human body, i.e., a lifespan, is explained by duration and can be defined by time (5P23dem). In this way the Letter 12 parallel between duration/time and extension/measure is retained. For in his 1P15s diatribe against those who fear attributing extension to God, he insists that figure and measure are superficial means by which the imagination attempts to limit the quantity of extension (1P15s: II 57, 9-11; II 58, 25-26; II 59 20-25; C 420424).17 Nevertheless, imaginary time fails to represent real durations adequately. Unlike in Letter 12, however, the problem is not so much that time relies on numerical abstraction as that the imagination is unreliable in itself. Thus, since the imagination depends on sense experience, it will represent the durations of things only uncertainly, i.e., contingently (2P44s; C 481) and represent present things as disproportionately good or evil in comparison with past or future things (4P62s; C 582).

As noted above, duration is crucial to Spinozas mature doctrine of cona-tus or the striving by which things persevere in their being, which he says constitutes the actual essence of any finite thing (3P7; C 499). As we have seen, Spinozas original definition of duration is in fact perseverance in ex-istence (S 104; G I, 244). Furthermore, the striving of conatus must involve indefinite rather than finite time (tempus indefinitum) (3P8; C 499). Such indefinite existence is just what constitutes duration in the Ethics (2Def5; C 447) and distinguishes it from measured time (G IV, 58; C 203). Indeed he goes on to specify that the human mind strives to persevere for an indefinite duration (indefinata quadam duratione) (3P9; C 499). Spinoza derives the conatus doctrine from the proposition that no thing can be destroyed except by an external cause (3P4; C 498). There is a corresponding perseverance or inertia in motion and rest: a body in motion moves until it has been determined by another body to rest; and a body at rest also remains at rest until it is determined to motion by another (2L3; C 459). So the definite time and speed of a motion is not determined by its nature, but only from external causes, just as the definite duration of a thing is not known simply from its essence (2def5; C 447; see also 1P24c; C 431), but only from the common order of Nature (2P30; C 471). What is known is simply that minds and bodies successively endure, whether in motion or rest.

IV. Duration and EternityThe nature of Spinozistic duration can be further clarified by comparison with eternity. As already noted CM strongly separated divine eternity from the duration of created things. Because Gods existence is his essence, and duration cannot in any way pertain to the essences of things,18 it follows that duration is not attributed to God:

Since duration is conceived as being greater or less, or as composed of parts, it follows clearly that no duration can be ascribed to God. For since


his being is eternal, i.e., in it there can be nothing which is before or after, we can never ascribe duration to him without at the same time destroying the true concept we have of God. (G I, 250, 31-251,3; S 111. See also G I, 269 13-15; S 129)

In radically separating eternity from duration, Spinoza deviates from the traditional conception of eternity as a non-successive species of duration. On this conception, God persists or endures but not with parts of his duration arranged before and after; rather his duration is permanent, simultane-ously whole, or all at once.19 Spinoza is adamant that to avoid attributing any duration to God, we say that he is eternal (G I, 250 10-12; S 111). He seems to have Descartes in mind in saying that those who attribute duration to God assume that he is as it were continuously created by himself (ibid.), for Descartes ventures this doctrine in the First Replies to the Meditations (AT 7 109; CSM 2, 7879). Spinozas insistence on an absolutely duration-less model of divine eternitywhich is to be attributed to God alone, not to any created thing even thought its duration is without beginning or end (G I, 252, 18-9; S 112113)underscores his commitment to the inherent structure of duration itself: greater or less, composed of parts, and successive (before and after).

Spinozas concern to avoid attributing duration to God is evident in his exposition of Descartess philosophy in the DPP. For instance, although he otherwise faithfully represents Descartess several proofs of Gods existence, he conspicuously omits the premise of the second causal proof that even if I had always existed I still could not preserve myself given the nature of time is such that its parts are not mutually dependent (AT 8A 13; CSM I 200; cf. AT 7 49; CSM 2 33). Spinozas critical exposition of the proof makes it instead depend entirely on the assumption that if I was self-created I would have given myself every perfection. Apparently, he did want the proof to depend on Gods relation to temporal parts. Similarly, Descartess own proof of the law of rectilinear motion turns crucially, though somewhat obscurely, on the assumption that God preserves motion in the precise form in which it is occurring at the very moment he preserves it, without taking account of the motion which was occurring a little earlier (AT 8A64; CSM I 242). But Spinozas even more puzzling reconstruction proceeds entirely from the nature of motion which supposedly excludes from consideration any duration that can be conceived as greater than another duration (G I, 204; S 65). Spinoza himself concedes that it may be difficult to see why this does not exclude curvilinear motion as much as rectilinear. So he contents himself with the assurance that motion in a straight line, since it is simplest, is contained in the essence or definition of motion. (G I, 205; S 65)20 These amendments to Descartess official proofs illustrate Spinozas reluctance to associate God in any way with the successive duration of created things.

In the Ethics, eternity is again conceived as the sort of existence which


follows simply from a things definition or essence, and which cannot be explained by duration or time, even if the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end (1def8; C 409).21 This seems to be true with respect to the notorious doctrine of the eternity of the human mind after the destruction of the body: We do not attribute to the human mind any duration that can be defined by time except insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, . . . however since whatever is conceived, with a certain necessity, through Gods essence itself, is nevertheless something, this something that pertains to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal (5P23; C 607). In the scholium to this same proposition Spinoza reminds us that eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time (ibid.; cf. 5P29dem; C 609).22 The reason for this is straightforward in the case of God, from whose definition it follows he exists and therefore he is eternal (1P19dem; C 428), which means that for God there is neither when, nor before nor after (1P33s2; C 437).

The durationless nature of divine eternity thus confirms the inherently suc-cessive structure of the duration from which God is removed. Nevertheless, in spite of his eternity, God produces the successive duration of singular things , i.e., their beginnings and subsequent finite perseverance in existence, via the infinite chain of finite causes (1P24c; C 431; 1P28; C 432433). While these finite modes have a determinate existence, and hence duration, Spi-noza also mentions things which follow from the absolute nature of any of Gods attributesthe so-called infinite modesand he labels these eternal (1P21; C 429; 1P28dem; C 432). This might seem problematic given I have suggested that the infinite mode (of extension) endures. However, it is clear that Spinoza does not conceive of the infinite modes as eternal in the strictly durationless way of God. For his specific claim is that these things have always (semper) had to exist (1P21; C 429) which suggests that they are sempiternal, i.e., endlessly enduring.23 Indeed, Spinoza sometimes stipulates that he intends ab aeterno with just this sense: here we mean nothing other than duration without any beginning (G I, 270; S 130). Furthermore his spe-cific demonstration against the determinate existence or duration of infinite modes proceeds by reductio on the assumption that at some time it does not exist or will not exist (1P21; C 430). Such a reductio can establish only that infinite modes are sempiternal, not the much stronger view that they are durationless.24 Most importantly, and as noted above, when Spinoza is pushed in correspondence for an example of an infinite mode, he offers motion and rest (G IV, 278). But while motion/rest might well be from eternity in the sense of having endured forever, it is hard to see how they could be absolutely removed from duration and succession. The same is true of Spinozas example of the other sort of infinite modes, the so-called mediate ones, which fol-low from an attribute of God as it is modified by a modification (2P22: C 430). Spinoza cites the whole face of the universe (G IV, 278) and refers


his correspondent to 2P13L7 for details. But that lemma defends the identity of bodies of arbitrary size, despite moving or resting as a whole, so long as they maintain the same mutual communication of motion among its parts. In this way, the whole of nature is one individual whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in infinite ways without any change in the whole individual (2P13L7; C 462). While this infinite mode of extension is unchanging in a sense, it is hard see how to exempt it from duration and succession.25

V. ConclusionWeve established that Spinoza consistently embraces an ontological distinc-tion (derived from Descartes)26 between duration, which is a real attribute of created things, and time, which is a merely imaginary, quantitative measure of duration. Bodies and organisms, conceived under the attribute of extension, persist by maintaining various motion/rest connections among their parts, interact according to deterministic laws of motion and collision, and gener-ally persevere in their being, though only for a fixed time given their place in the common order of nature.27 While our measures and estimations of these processes depend on temporal conventions imposed by us, and hence can never attain the degreee of adequacy in our knowledge of things conceived sub specie aeternitatis (5P29; C 609610), what they measure is a consequence of the successive persistence of things themselves not our imagination. So Spinozas insistence on the inherently successive duration of the finite and infinite modes allows him to sustain a realistic and mechanistic conception of the natural world essentially in line with the new philosophy of his timecontrary to the main idealist versions of Spinozismdespite his monistic conception of substance and his general suspicion of mathematical abstraction.

Macalester College

Notes

Thanks to my colleague Martin Gunderson and my student Samuel Eklund for very helpful discussion and criticism. And thanks to Macalester College for supporting my collabora-tion with Sam through a Student-Faculty Summer Research grant.

1. McTaggart 1908: 457. Originally published in Mind 17 (1908): 457473.

2. McTaggart notes that the two most important movements (excluding those which are as yet merely critical) are those which look to Hegel and to Mr. Bradley. And both these schools deny the reality of time (ibid.). See Parkinson 1977 and Franks 2005 on Spinozism in German Idealism.

3. Hegel 1977: 106.

4. Joachim 1901: 121. See also Caird 1888: 219; Joachim 1901: 120122; Alexander 1921: 21.

5. Schliesser 2012: 441. Cf. Hallett 1930: 714; Wolfson 1934: 352.


6. On this, see Parkinson 1977 and, more recently, Melamed 2010.

7. There can be no motion from one place to another that does not require a time than which there could always be an even shorter time (S, 60; G I, 197).

8. Cf. 2L3def; C 460.

9. Hegel 1977: 106.

10. Although CM shows the strong influence of Descartes, they clearly represent Spinozas own considered views. See the introduction to CM by S. Barone and L. Rice (S xxvii-xxx).

11. G I, 244. S, 104. On the intimate relation between duration and existence for Spinoza, see Wolfson 1934: 343354. Contrary to Wolfson, however, duration is not a mode of existence (354) but an attribute, as Descartes, and Spinoza himself, says (G IV, 278).

12. To illustrate continuous infinity, he invokes a geometrical example involving inscribed, non-concentric circles. The upshot is that different parts of the non-overlapping area contain numerous unequal spaces each of which contain variations that exceed every number (G IV, 60, 2; C 204). To illustrate uncountably infinite extent he notes the absurdity of someone who wishes to determine all the motions there have been by reducing them and their duration to a definite number and time (G IV, 60, 12; C 204).

13. For a critical discussion of Spinozas negative attitude to number, see Bennett 1984: 46. For a more sympathetic treatment, see Gueroult 1973.

14. Recently, Schmaltz has provided a detailed discussion of temporality in CM and Letter 12, consistent in most respects with the analysis offered here. Schmaltz, however, is primarily concerned with the nature of eternity rather than the distinction between time and duration. See also Schliesser, forthcoming.

15. Gueroult 1973: 186.

16. Cf. Bennett 1984: 47; Hallett 1930: 5; Wolfson (1934: 358) and Bennett are among the few commentators to have given serious attention to the duration/time distinc-tion in Spinoza.

17. See also 4d6, where Spinoza observes that we are in the same way limited in our ability to distinctly imagine large spatial and temporal intervals, and 5P29s, where he notes that we conceive things as actual in relation to time and place (5P29s: C 610).

18. Spinoza is here conceiving of essences as independent of existing things: for no one will ever say that the essence of a circle or a triangle, insofar as it is an eternal truth, has endured (G I 250, 28-30; C 316). In terms he will later employ, the formal essences of things do not endure even if the actual essences do. Thus, there are formal essences even for non-existent things which exist only as comprehended in Gods attributes and not as insofar as they are said to have duration (2P8c; C 452). On the other hand, conatus itself, which is a form of duration, is nothing but the actual essence of the thing (3P8; C 499).

19. See, for example, Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1, 10, 1-4 ; Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae 50, sec. 3.

20. For an illuminating discussion of Spinozas treatment of this law, see Gabbey 2006.

21. Despite such direct assertions, a number of prominent scholars have maintained that Spinozistic eternity is merely endless duration or time (i.e., sempiternity) at least in


the Ethics. See Kneale 1973, Donagan 1973, Bennett 1984: 48. For the (more common) view that eternity is strictly opposed to duration and time see Joachim 1901: 295298, Hallett 1930, Wolfson 1934: 369, Alexander 1921: 22, Hardin 1977, Steinberg 1981, and Schmaltz Forthcoming. The last two commentators argue forcefully that Spinozas conception of eternity is unchanged from the earlier works through the Ethics.

22. Since this doctrine is only indirectly related to the duration/time distinction I will not enter the long and complex discussion of its meaning and coherence. Good recent contributions to this discussion are Kneale 1973, Donagan 1973, Hardin 1977, Steinberg 1981, Bennett 1984, Parchment 2000, Garber 2005, Garrett 2009, and Schmaltz Forthcoming.

23. See also 1P17s; C 426. Donagan 1973: 245, Bennett 1984: 205. Both Gueroult (1973: 184185) and Schmaltz (Forthcoming: 12) suggest, plausibly, that the infinite modes of the Ethics correspond to the things which have no bounds, not by the force of its es-sence, but by the force of its cause (G IV 53, 2-3; C 201). For the historical background of sempiternal vs. timeless eternity, in relation to Spinoza, see Wolfson 1934: 358369 and Kneale 1973.

24. This point is emphasized by Schmaltz in his recent, compelling case for the mere sempiternality of the infinite modes (Forthcoming: 16-17).

25. Alexander 1921: 33; Donagan 1973: 245246; Schmaltz Forthcoming: 1218. For opposing views, see Hallett 1930: 8388 and Hardin 1977: 130132.

26. Wolfson (1934: 353) is one of the few scholars to have noted the Cartesian origin of Spinozas philosophy of time. Surprisingly, he goes on to assert: Essentially, thus, time and duration, according to Spinoza, are the same (ibid.).

27. A parallel project would be pursued under the attribute of thought: minds would persevere in their being by sustaining psychological and causal relations like memory and desire, for a fixed time insofar as it expresses the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and defined by time (5P23d; C 607).

Primary Source Abbreviations

AT = Oeuvres De Descartes, 11 vols., ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. Paris: J. Vrin, 1983.

C = The Collected Works of Spinoza, vol. 1, ed. and trans. E. Curley. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.

CSM = The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 2 vols., trans. John Cotting-ham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511805059

G = Baruch Spinoza, Opera, vols. IIV, ed. C. Gebhardt. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925. Cited by volume, page, and, in some cases, line number.

S = Baruch Spinoza, The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy and Metaphysical Thoughts, trans. S. Shirley, Introduction and Notes by S. Barone and L. Rice. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 1998.


Secondary Sources

Alexander, S. 1921. Spinoza and Time. London: Allen and Unwin.

Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinozas Ethics. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Caird, J. 1888. Spinoza. Edinburgh: Blackwood and Sons.

Curley, E. 1988. Behind the Geometrical Method. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Donagan, Alan. 1973. Spinozas Proof of Immortality, in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. M. Grene, 241258. New York: Anchor Books.

Franks, P. W. 2005. All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism in German Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gabbey, A. 2006. Spinozas Natural Science and Methodology, in The Cam-bridge Companion to Spinoza, ed. D. Garrett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Garber, Daniel. 2005. A Free Man Thinks of Nothing Less Than Death: Spi-noza on the Eternity of the Mind, in Early Modern Philosophy: Mind, Matter and Metaphysics, ed. Ch. Mercer and E. ONeill. New York: Oxford University Press.

Garrett, Don. 2009. The Essence of the Body and the Part of the Mind That Is Eternal, in A Companion to Spinozas Ethics, ed. O. Koistinen, 284302. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gorham, G. 2007. Descartes on Time and Duration, Early Science and Medicine 12: 2854. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157338207X166380

Grene, M., ed. 1973. Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays. New York: An-chor Books.

Gueroult, M. 1973. Spinozas Letter on the Infinite, in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. M. Grene, 182212. New York: Anchor Books.

Hallett, H. F. 1928. Spinozas Concept of Eternity, Mind 37: 283303.http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XXXVII.147.283

. 1930. Aeternitas: A Spinozistic Study. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hardin, C. L. 1977. Spinoza on Immortality and Time, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 8: 129138. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swjphil19778358

Hegel, G. 1977. Faith and Knowledge. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Joachim, H. H. 1901. A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kneale, M. 1973. Eternity and Sempiternity, in Spinoza: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. M. Grene, 227240. New York: Anchor Books.

Lachterman, David. 1978. The Physics of Spinozas Ethics, in Spinoza: New Perspectives, ed. R. Shahan and J. Biro, 71111. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.


McTaggart, J. M. E. 1908. The Unreality of Time, Mind 17: 457473.http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/XVII.4.457

Melamed, Y. 2010. Acosmism or Weak Individuality: Hegel, Spinoza and the Reality of the Finite, Journal of the History of Philosophy 48: 4782.

Parchment, S. 2000. The Minds Eternity in Spinozas Ethics, Journal of the History of Philosophy 38: 349382.http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2005.0062

Parkinson, G. H. R. 1977. Hegel, Pantheism and Spinoza, Journal of the History of Ideas 38: 449459. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2708674

Schliesser, E. 2012. Newton and Spinoza: On Matter and Motion (and God, of Course), Southern Journal of Philosophy 50: 436458.http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2012.00132.x

. Forthcoming. Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science: Mathemat-ics, Motion and Being, The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza, ed. M. Della Rocca. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schmaltz, T. 1997. Spinozas Mediate Infinite Mode, Journal of the History of Philosophy 35: 174205. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.1997.0024

. Forthcoming. Spinoza on Eternity and Duration: The 1663 Con-nection, in The Young Spinoza: A Philosopher in the Making, ed. Y. Melamed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Steinberg, D. 1981. Spinozas Theory of the Eternity of the Mind, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11: 3568.

Wolfson, H. A. 1934. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of His Reasoning, 2 vols. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

4 Spinoza on the Ideality of Time

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