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11206

Demian D. Schroeder14 Meadow StreetBrooklyn, NY

April 11, 2013

CHAil-18EHSL:FRICHARD M. BERMANU.S.D.J.

Honorable Richard M. BermanU.S. District JudgeU.S. District Court (SDNY)Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 12

(1,,, ~ . J.,1c.t J.SO ORDERED:____Iltt..8RICHARD M. BERMA.NU S D . J ~ - -'1/,t/'Jonc 4 -- - ___ _DArE F I L E D : ~ . I J L r ? "

New York, NY 10007SUbjectU.S. v. District Council ofNew York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood

of Carpenters & Joiners ofAmerica, et al; (Index No. 90 Civ. 5722) (RMB)(THK)Reference: February 13, 2013 Order, Doc. No. 1255MOU response of Review Officer & D.C. Attorney James M. MurphyDear Judge Berman:In TEAMSTERS LOCAL v. LABOR BOARD, 365 U.S. 667 (1961) th e court stated:The Board recognizes that the hiring hall came into being "to eliminate wasteful. timeconsuming. and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workmen and haphazard uneconomicalsearches by employers." Id . 896. n. 8. The hiring hall at times has been a useful adjunct to theclosed shop.J. But Congress may have thought that it need not serve that cause, that in fact it hasserved well both labor and management - particularly in the maritime field and in the buildingand construction n d u s t r y . ~ In th e latter th e contractor who frequently is a stranger to th earea where the work is done requires a "central source" fo r his employment needs;,S, and ama n [365 U.S. 667,673] looking for a jo b finds in the hiring hall "at least a minimumguarantee of continued employment."Congress has not outlawed the hiring hall. though it has outlawed the closed shop except withinthe limits prescribed in the provisos to 8 (a) (3).7 Senator Taft made clear his views that hiringhalls are useful, that they are not illegal per se, that unions should be able to operate them so longas they are not used to create a closed shop:"In order to make clear the real intention of Congress, it should be clearly stated that the hiringhall is not necessarily illegal. The employer should be able to make a contract with the union asan employment agency. The union frequently is the best employment agency. The employershould be able [365 U.S. 667, 674] to give notice of vacancies, and in the normal course ofevents to accept men sent to him by the hiring hall. He should not be able to bind himself,however, to reject nonunion men if they apply to him; nor should he be able to contract to acceptmen on a rotary-hiring basis. . . ."" . . . The National Labor Relations Board and the courts did not find hiring halls as such illegal,but merely certain practices under them. The Board and the court found that th e manner in

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which the hiring halls operated created in effect a closed shop in violation of the law.Neither the law nor these decisions forbid hiring halls. eyen hiring halls operated by the unionsas long as they are not so operated as to create a closed shop with all ofthe abuses possible undersuch an arrangement. including discrimination against employees. prospective employees.members of union minority groups, and operation ofa closed union." S. Rep. No. 1827, 81stCong., 2d Sess., pp. 13, 14.There being no express ban of hiring halls in any provisions of the Act, those who add one,whether it be the Board or the courts, engage in a legislative act.

*********************Please reference our prior letter dated February 27, 2013, Doc. No. 1231, 8-pages regardingthe NYCDCC August 5, 2011 by-laws, Section 5, 12, & 20. Section 4(A) of the By-lawsapproved by the Court vesting the Executive & Legislative power in the District Council. TheEST holds limited powers via the Executive branch ofthe District Council under the by-law

structure, Section 10 (A) to (N) as established by the United States Attorney, the Review Officerand as approved by the Court.The Council Delegate Body (CDB) holds the Legislative powers, without limitation under bylaws Sec. 4(A) and under Sec. 4(B), it holds the full plenary power and authority as a check(mandated by the RO . & U.S.A.O.) on an out of control and dictatorial EST such as was presentwithin the Forde administration. Accordingly and contrary to the UBCJA International dictates toEST Bilello, it is the legislative branch of the New York City & Vicinity District Council ofCarpenters (NYCDCC) who in the first instance must initiate any and all proposed changes to

the May 26, 2009 standing order of Judge Haight for the 67% Contractor to 33% HiringlReferralHall Out of Work (OWL) list register.The UBCJA International and it counsel of record, Latham & Watkins and/or the NYCDCCor the Wall, Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York and their associated counsel ofrecorddo not have or hold the vested legal power or rights under the representative form of democracy(which they have all jointly & severally pushed the court to accept) established and claimed by

UBC General President Douglas J. McCarron since the advent of the District Council structurenegated the right of rank & file members to secure via private secret ballot election, a vote forthe business agents and officers they choose; rather, McCarron and his counsel of record and theDistrict Council and their counsel of record intentionally went before the Department of Labor(DOL) via two lawsuits, Harrington v. Herman and Harrington v. Chao within the First CircuitCourt ofAppeals arguing for the representative form of democracy.At page 47-49 in the member response, July 1, 2011, to the UBCJAlnternational's RestructuringPlan, we stated:AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE:In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. UNITED STATES, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) at ChiefJustice Hughes stated:First. Two preliminary points are stressed by the government with respect to the appropriateapproach to the important questions presented. We are told that the provision ofthe statute

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authorizing the adoption of codes must be viewed in the light of the grave national crisis withwhich Congress was confronted. Undoubtedly, the conditions to which power is addressed arealways to be considered when the exercise of power is challenged. Extraordinary conditionsmay call for extraordinary remedies. But the argument necessarily stops short of anattempt to justify action which lies outside the sphere of constitutional authority.Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power. !! The Constitutionestablished a national government with powers deemed to be adequate, as they have provedto be both in war and peace, bu t these powers of the national government are limited by theconstitutional grants. Those who act under these grants are not at liberty to transcend the[295 U.S. 495, 529] imposed limits because they believe that more or different power isnecessary. Such assertions of extra-constitutional authority were anticipated and precludedby the explicit terms of the Tenth Amendment- 'The powers not delegated to the United Statesby the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or tothe people.'Douglas J. McCarron proffered a false dogma of extra-ordinary circumstances created by the"sophisticated regional Contractors working intra-state and inter-state, therein requiring theMobility of the Contractor workforce. This policy was presented in 1997 under the Consentdecree and was implemented nationally in 1999.Predecessor actions to this new policy were reflected in the UBCJA Internationals prior lawsuitswherein they convinced the 6th Circuit that Union By-Laws created the right to vote for BusinessRepresentatives, therein, that right could be taken away by another by-law rules change, per, 992F.2d. 1418 (1993) UBCJA Dresden Local No. 267 v. UBCJA International and Sigurd Lucassen(92-3746) at 42 .

. As a matter of law, the 6th Circuit erred in stating "looking at the actual mechanics of theloss of the right to elect a business representative, the district court reasoned it was theadoption of the Council by-laws, not the reorganization that eliminated the Local's rightto elect a business representative. Indeed, it was the Capital District Council by-laws thatcreated the right in the first place."

In Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992), Justice Thomas at II A stated "Section 7 ofthe NLRA provides in relevant part that" [e]mp loyees shall have the right to self-organization, toform, join, or assist labor organizations." 29 U.S.C. 157. Section 8(a) (1) of the Act, in turn,makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employeesin the exercise of rights guaranteed in [502 U.S. 527, 532] [7]." 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1). By itsplain terms. thus. the NLRA confers ri2hts only on employees. not on unions or theirnon employee or2anizers. "The District Courts reasons in Dresden are not in accordance with the text of the NLRA or itsLegislative history. No other Circuit Court has made such a similar ruling, nor could they as it isfactually and legally incorrect, and can therefore not stand. The Sixth Circuit's decision inDresden Local 267 issued on April 27, 1993, some 15-months after the Lechmere decision issuedon January 27, 1992.

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The UBCJA International under Sigurd Lucassen and subsequently under Douglas J. McCarronhas perpetuated this myth, this fallacy of so called law since the decision issued on April 27,1993. Given the vel)' plain meaning of the Act and noting Justice Thomas's ruling inLechmere.. ." By its plain terms, thus, the NLRA confers rights only on employees, not onunions or their nonemployee organizers." the right to vote being part & parcel to the corepredicate of the Act, the vel) ' premise of the NLRA; and that the right to vote is held sacrosanctto the employee, or the worker as defined in the NLRA Preamble and the Policy of the UnitedStates, NLRA Sec. 1, and as upheld in Lechmere, the 6th Circuit Court clearly erred in stating thatthe mechanical right of the loss of the right to elect a business representative .. was the adoptionof the Council By-Laws.The Council By-Laws did not create the rieht to vote, the United States Coneress did so.As a general matter oflaw, Union members via a coerced or forced vote cannot alter, change oramend what Congress and the Executive branch of government pass into law, via amendinginternal union bylaws on demand of the International Union representing them. Were that true,then we would have chaos, which is what we have in the UBCJA right now, an unfettered andout of control Dictatorship run amuck.

.:. The UBC International, as a labor organization cannot force their hidden agenda orposition to refuse members the right to vote in Union matters which have as theirpredicate Federal law. Furthermore, the UBCJA International cannot force this upon asubordinate Regional or District Council or Local Union under the auspice of a simpleinternal rules change when said rules change violates the Supremacy Clause of theUnited States Constitution, and the UBCJA International usurps the authority of theLegislative branch of government to initiate, pass, amend or alter Federal Laws.

In Payne v. Tennesse, 501 US 808, regarding stare decisis, at page 501 U. S. 828, th eSupreme Court stated:"Stare decisis is not an inexorable command; rather, it "is a principle of policy and not amechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106,309 U. S. 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional cases, because in such cases"correction through legislative action is practically impossible." Burnet v. Coronado Oil & GasCo., supra at 285 U. S. 407 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Considerations in favor of stare decisis areat their acme in cases involving property and contract rights. where reliance interests areinvolved, see Swift & Co. v. Wickham. 382 U. S. 111, 382 U. S. 116 (1965); Oregon ex reI. StateLandBd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U. S. 363 (1977); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & GasCo., supra at 285 U. S, 405-411 (Brandeis, J, dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust Co.,265 U. S. 472 (1924); @ 53 U. S. 458 (1852); the opposite is true in cases, such as the presentone, involving procedural and evidentiary rules".

Under the currently approved and court accepted by-laws dated August 5, 2011, theNYCDCC claimed the Executive & Legislative roles within our Federal system while theUBCJA International & the NYCDCC via a non-existent and unproven affiliation agreement ofthe illegally disbanded Local Unions, wherein all rights and tangible & intangible property andfunds and accounts were seized by the UBCJA International, and both the NYCDCC & UBCIAInternational jointly hold the rights to the judiciary under Section 52 & 53 of the UBCIA

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Constitution which the NLRB Board ruled was "facially unlawful" without qualification. TheUBCJA International and the NYCDCC cannot consume the Legislative branches inherent andbinding legal authority under the representative form of democracy card they have played in pastlegal decisions to initiate the legislation in the first instance, particularly given the ReviewOfficer's and the United States Attorney's Office (DOJ) written approval of, and assent to thisnew form of democratic engagement, to paraphrase ex Federal Judge Conboy's statements madein Your Honor's Courtroom in May of 2011.

Quite simply, it is one or the other. The UBCJA International & the NYCDCC and theirrespective counsel of record cannot have it both ways. You either have the representative form ofdemocracy as they bought through the Department of Labor via the UBC's lawsuits inHarrington v. Herman and its subsequent morphing into Harrington v. Chao and both partiesaccept and live by the full plenary power & authority vested in the NYCDCC Council DelegateBody to initiate all legislation in the first instance, including the decision to go to your court, anArticle III Federal Court wherein your honor holds exclusive jurisdiction to decide any & allmatters; to propose changing the standing order of a sitting Federal Judge (Charles Haight) datedMay 26, 2009 (Doc. No. 961) for the 67% - 33% HiringlReferral rule; or, the UBCJA and theNYCDCC open those decisions to review by this court for an opposing opinion via stare decisisand a sua-sponte order wherein this Court sustain the role of Congress to initiate, amend andalter Federal law in the first instance with respect to the worker & employees right to vote forrepresentatives of their choosing under both the preamble and NLRA Section 7. I f they Jive byHarrington v. Chao, they must also die by Harrington v. Chao; or, this Court mustoverturn the one, to save the other.

Without the Council Delegate Body's execution of its right to initiate the legislation and makeits own proposal for proper hiring ratios in the first instance, the UBCJA International, the DC &Wall-Ceiling's demand for 100% Full Mobility & reversion of all District Council control ofhiring to a notoriously corrupt Contractor Association via the Latham & Watkins May 26,2011Restructuring Plan letter at page 5, wherein Latham & Watkins lead counsel Judge KennethConboy issued a directed threat from Wall & Ceiling and stated: "and Wall & Ceiling andother employers' willingness to participate may well hinge on the elimination ofthe socalled 50-50 rule" cannot be sustained as a matter of law for the following reasons:

1) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties is an express violation of the ConsentDecree and is a Unilateral Change to both the Collective Bargaining Agreement and theConsent Decree, as per NLRB v. Katz, 369 US 736 (1962); is a refusal to bargain and, assuch is a prima-facie violation ofNLRA Sec. 8(a)(5).2) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties is an express violation of the standingOrder ofFederal District Court Judge Charles Haight dated May 26, 2009.

3) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties is an express violation of the NYCDCCBy-laws dated August 5, 2011, Section 10 (A) wherein the EST shall "(A) The ExecutiveSecretary-Treasurer shall cause to be kept a detailed record of each Council DelegateBody meeting and a record of all roll-call votes cast by Delegates in such meetings .. ."

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As EST Bilello failed to keep a roll call vote of Council Delegates who, by their illegalactions to force a vote for the Wall-Ceiling MOU, an unexecuted contract wherein theDistrict Council by-laws mandate that the EST make any/all referrals to aU jobs - saidfailure to record the names of the Council Delegates voting for reverting aU control of allhiring qualifies and every such member for charges of fraud, dereliction of duty,conspiracy and demand an investigation by the 10 & CCO with issuance of formalcharges and suspension and veto from office by the Court appointed Review Officer.

4) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties is an express violation ofNYCDCCBy-laws, Section 35 (A) to (C) as the Council Delegates who colluded with EST Bilelloto violate rank & file member rights and these By-laws failed to call for a SpecialConvention of the Council Delegates to amend the By-laws, per 35(A), failed to submitthe proposed amendment to the By-laws to at least 1I3 rd of the Local Union, the UBCJAConstitution per 35(B) and failed to first refer the proposed amendment to the By-laws tothe Executive Committee or the Review Officer for consideration per 35(C).5) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties and the offending council delegatesvoting to sustain their own illegal actions also violates By-law section 37(D) as the

offending Delegates failed to provide for the mandatory 30-day written notification to theprincipal office of each Local Union calling for such Special Convention to amend theby-laws.6) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties, in particular the EST and the 60 as yet,un-named Delegates willfully & wantonly violates NYCDCC By-law Section 38 whichmandate "the referral of all workers to jobs shall be performed by the ExecutiveSecretary-Treasurer" & "workers shall have the right to seek work and be employed .. ."via a non-exclusive hiring hall system which is known as "shaping" or "soliciting" yourown work within the construction industry. The illegal reversion of 100% control of all

hiring establishes an illegal closed shop as outlawed by Federal law (Taft-Hartley, LMRA1947) and by long settled board precedent in Argo Steel amongst other citationspreviously stated to this honorable Court; therein, illegally disenfranchising or lockingout 40% of the District Council's active/working Union Carpenters who rely upon theDistrict Council's non-exclusive Hiring/Referral Hall as their primary and only source ofemployment opportunity. The District Council cannot lock out its own dues payingmembers via such facially unlawful practices or procedures.7) The directed threat by the aforementioned parties violates Section 21 of the NYCDCCBy-laws, which state: "SECTION 21: TRUST FUNDS - All allocations fromnegotiated total wage amounts to annuity, health and welfare, pension, funds sponsoredby the International, apprenticeship, labor-management cooperation committees, vacation

savings, and holiday plans, shall be determined by the Council Delegate Body."Counselor Murphy misconstrues application of this section and its subordination to Bylaws Section 5 (B) (7); which is controlling and states "7. Review and revise all draftcontracts of the Council and approve or reject all such contracts prior to theirexecution, including, but not limited to .."

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8) The United States Court ofAppeals for the Second Circuit which decision issuedFebruary 20.2007 made it amply clear at 9. PC. 7 "The Consent Decree is clear andunambiguous. King. 65 F. 3d. at 1058. The Consent Decree addresses CBA's in twoplaces: Paragraph 4(f)(I)(b) and Job Referral Rule 5(B). However, neither empowersthe Union to circumvent the Consent Decree through a CBA." It is quite clear herethat the UBCJA International, the District Council, EST Bilello and their respectivecounsel of record all should be held in contempt of court for their willful and wantoncollusive and fraudulent actions in furtherance of continued racketeering which theConsent Decree by design, agreement & waiver considerations was purposed - and, thatthe United States Attorney's Office and the Review Officer by their direct standingshould have prevented from being enacted or considered, yet each failed to perfonn.

The Council Delegate Body never at any time received a full executed draft or final contract forthe Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries ofNew York, Inc. on or before the alleged sham MOUvote ofAugust 22,2012 or anytime thereafter up to and including the February 27, 2013 CourtConference held before Your Honor or between that date and the Counselor Murphy's belatedsubmission of an executed contract dated March 12,2013 wherein the D.C. Delegates & the rank& file members first received it via PACER on March 13,2013.

The alleged August 22,2012 vote on an incomplete Memorandum ofUnderstanding (MOU)must also fail as a matter of law as the UBCJA International and the Executive branch of theDistrict Council and the Contractor Association, none ofwhom sit in the Legislative Branchwere the parties who illegally initiated the legislation via a power not held, wherein they usurpedor aggrandized the powers of the respective branches. The United States Supreme Court stated:"The separation of powers can be violated in two basic ways. One involves theaggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other, Buckley v. Val eo, 424 US 1 (1976)....Another occurs when a law, despite no inter-branch aggrandizement "disrupts the properbalance between the coordinate branches" by preventing one of the branches from accomplishingits constitutionally assigned functions" Nixon v. Adm'r. ofGen. Servs. 433 US 425 (1977)." Inthe instant matter, items 1-7 above, the Executive Secretary-Treasurer has usurped the role theLegislative branch ofthe District Council delegates full plenary power & authority and itsunlimited authority to control all actions and matters of the District Council.

The United States Supreme Court stated: "Because consent decrees "have attributes bothof contracts and judicial decrees," they are treated differently for different purposes.United States v. ITTContinental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223,236, n. 10,95 S.Ct. 926, 934, n. 10,43 L.Ed.2d 148 (1975). See also Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S., at 519, 106 S.Ct., at 3074.For example, because the content of a consent decree is generally a product of negotiationsbetween the parties, decrees are construed for enforcement purposes as contracts. See ITTContinental Baking Co., supra, 420 U.S., at 238, 95 S.Ct., at 935; Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept.,679 F.2d 541,557 (CA6 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 561, 104 S.Ct. 2576, 81

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L.Ed.2d 483 (1984). Fo r purposes of determining whether an employer can be held liablefor intentional discrimination merely for complying with the terms of a consent decree,however, i t is appropriate to treat the consent decree as a judicial order. Unlike the typicalcontract, a consent decree, such as the ones at issue here, is developed in the context of adversarylitigation. Moreover, the court reviews the consent decree to determine whether it is lawful,reasonable, and equitable. In placing the judicial imprimatur on the decree, the court provides theparties with some assurance that the decree is legal and that they may rely on it. Mostsignificantly, violation of a consent decree is punishable as criminal contempt. See 18 U.S.C. 401,402; Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 42.

In F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure 12.15, p. 681 (3d ed.1985) (hereinafter James &Hazard). Since at least 1874, this Court has recognized that a third party may collaterally attack ajudgment if the original judgment was obtained through fraud or collusion. In a case brought byan assignee in bankruptcy seeking to recover property allegedly transferred in fraud of thebankrupt's debtors, the Court wrote:"Judgments of any court, it is sometimes said, may be impeached by strangers to them for fraudor collusion, but the proposition as stated is subject to certain limitations, as it is only thosestrangers who, if the judgment is given full credit and effect, would be prejudiced in regard tosome pre-existing right who are permitted to set up such a defense. Defenses of the kind may beset up by such strangers. Hence the rule that whenever a judgment or decree is procured throughthe fraud of either of the parties, or by the collusion of both, for the purpose of defrauding somethird person, such third person may escape from the injury thus attempted by showing, even in acollateral proceeding, the fraud or collusion by which the judgment was obtained." Michaels v.Post, 21 Wall. 398,426-427,22 L.Ed. 520 (1874) (footnote omitted).The United States Supreme Court stated: As we held in Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,529-530, 106 S.Ct. 3063,3079,92 L.Ed.2d 405 (1986): "Of course, parties who choose toresolve litigation through settlement may not dispose of the claims of a third party, and a fortiori,may not impose duties or obligations on a third party, without that party's agreement. A court'sapproval of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore cannot dispose of the validclaims of non-consenting [individuals]. . . . And, of course, a court may not enter a consentdecree that imposes obligations on a party that did not consent to the decree. See, e.g.,United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 84 S.Ct. 763, 11 L.Ed.2d 743 (1964); Hughes v.United States, 342 U.S. 353, 72 S.Ct. 306, 96 L.Ed. 394 (1952); Ashley v. City o fJackson, 464U.S., at 902, 104 S.Ct., at 257 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); IB Moore0.409[5], p. 326, n. 2.

First, the Department of Labor's Secretary of Labor, Herman and subsequently Chao were notnamed parties and neither Secretary of Labor, past or present consented to the terms &conditions of the Consent Decree.Second, in consideration of the aforementioned items and precedent case law (good law)noted herein, the District Council attorney Murphy's false claim that the MOU executed 100%Full Mobility can only be considered a sham pleading. The DC by its intentional with-holding ofthe proofof majority status via signed authorization cards, and by failing to hold the required9(a) representation election has engaged in the fraud or collusion specifically prohibited by the

Consent Decree.

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Third, since the Council Delegate Body (CDB) did not consent to the 100% ContractorAssociation control of all Hiring/Referrals for 100% Full Mobility, nor did they initiate thelegislation via their full, complete & entire (plenary) power and authority under Section 4 (A) &(B) of the District Council By-laws, nor were they allowed to see, read, review, debate or discussa fully executed draftJfmal copy of a proposed contract in final form or content the ExecutiveBranch which the EST Bilello occupies and which via the RO's own admission and design wassubordinated to the legislative branch of the District Council, herein, the CDB; then, the WallCeiling & NYCDCC proposed fmal March 12,2013 contract (CBA) proffering 100% reversionof all control of hiring/referrals to a corrupt Contractor Association cannot stand as a matter ofright or as a matter of settled law and we respectfully pray that the Court rule the MOU and the100% reversion of control of all hiring to the Wall-Ceiling Contractor Association void, ab-initio,and that the Court via its inherent exclusive jurisdiction approve the Movants Proposed Order,Document No. 1246, dated March 11, 2013 as stated therein.

In UNITED STATES TRUST CO. v. NEW JERSEY, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) the SupremeCourt STATED: "Yet private contracts are not subject to unlimited modification under thepolice power. The Cour t in Blaisdell recognized that laws intended to regulate existingcontractual relationships must serve a legitimate public purpose. 290 U.S., at 444-445. A Statecould not "adopt as its policy the repudiation of debts or the destruction of contracts or the denialof means to enforce them." Id., at 439. Legisla tion adjusting the rights and responsibilities ofcontracting parties must be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to thepublic purpose justifying its adoption. Id., at 445-447.19 As is customary in reviewing economicand social [431 U.S. 1,23] regulation, however, courts properly defer to legislative judgment asto the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure. East New York Savings Bank v.Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945).

In PLAUT v. SPENDTHRIFT FARM, INC., Us. _ (1995) ED PLAUT, ET UX, ETAL., PETITIONERS v. SPENDTHRIFT FARM, INC., ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITEDSTATES COURTOF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTHCIRCUIT No. 93-112, atC, the SupremeCourt stated "Apart from the statute we review today, we know of no instance in which Congresshas attempted to set aside the final judgment of an Article III court by retroactive legislation.".Yet, in the instant matter herein, whereby the UBCJA International & the NYCDCC viaapplication of Harrington v. Chao and their assumption of the exact same tripartite system ofgovernance for the D.C., counselor Murphy puts forth the untenable proposit ion of "nunc-protunc" to legitimize their desire to set aside Judge Charles Haight's May 26, 2009 standing ordervia retroactive legislation through a Carpenter Union successor contract negotiation under acollective bargaining agreement. There is simply no binding authority for any union to void astanding order of a Federal District Court Judge via a CBA negotiation Memorandum ofUnderstanding.I f there is such authority, we would like to see it and Counselor Murphy should produce it.Respectfully submitted,

[ J J / m ~ . / ; 1 1 K t ~ t vDemian D. Schroeder

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cc: BY E-MAILBenjamin H. TorranceAssistant United States AttorneyCivil DivisionOffice of the United States Attorneyfor the Southern District of New York86 Chambers StreetNew York, NY 10007Dennis M. Walsh, Esq.Review OfficerThe Law Office of Dennis M. Walsh415 Madison Avenue, 11th FloorNew York, NY 10017Bridget M. Rhode, Esq.Counsel to the Review OfficerMintz, Levitz, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.e.666 Third AvenueNew York, NY 10017New York City & Vicinity District Council of CarpentersExecutive Secretary-Treasurer Michael Bilello395 Hudson StreetNew York, NY 10014James M. Murphy, Esq.Counsel for the New York City & Vicinity District Council of CarpentersSpivak Lipton, LLP1700 BroadwayNew York, NY 10019John DeLollisExecutive DirectorAssociation of Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc.125 Jericho Turnpike, Suite 301Jericho, NY 11753-1022Mark A. Rosen, Esq.Counsel for the Association of Wall-Ceiling & Carpentry Industries of New York, Inc.McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney, & Carpenter, LLP1300 Mount Kemble AvenueMorristown, NJ 07962-2075

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ADDITIONAL SERVICE via E-Mail: Robert F. Makowski, Sterling Dadone, N orman Saul, Raynier Gamboa, Veronica Session

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[ATTACHMENT] SECTION 35: AMENDMENTS (A) Any amendments and changes to these Bylaws may be put into effect by the action of theDelegates at a Special Convention of the Council.(B) A proposed change must be submitted in writing by at least one third of the Local Unionsaffiliated with the District Council, with the seal affixed provided that the ResolutionsCommittee consisting of three (3) or more members has reviewed and approved the resolution asto its legality in accordance with the Constitution and Laws of the United Brotherhood and theapplicable Collective Bargaining Agreement, and State and Federal laws.(C) All changes or proposed changes to the Bylaws or Trade Rules of this Council or any of theLocal Unions shall be first referred to the Executive Committee for consideration andrecommendation, and then referred to a Bylaws committee for consideration and, if warranted,recommendation to the Delegate Body that a proposed change or changes be adopted. Ifapproved by the Council and in accordance with Section UB of the Constitution and Laws of theUnited Brotherhood (the "UBC Constitution"), the proposed change or changes must besubmitted to the General Vice President for approval after review of, among other things,whether such change or changes are in conformity with the UBC Constitution, are in the bestinterests of the District Council, and will further the objectives of the Consent Decree orStipulation and Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, nothing herein shall change or limit theauthority of the General Vice President pursuant to the UBC Constitution to approve ordisapprove changes to these Bylaws. All proposed changes to the Bylaws shall be subject to theapproval of the United States Attorney and, during the term of the Review Officer, the ReviewOfficer.

SECTION 37: MISCELLANEOUS(D) The Executive Committee of the Council shall have the authority to call a SpecialConvention. Written notice describing the purpose of a Special Convention must be given to allDelegates and the principal office of each Local Union at least thirty (30) days prior to suchConvention. The delegates of any Special Convention of this Council shall consist exclusively ofthe Delegates to this CounciLSECTION 38: HIRING HALLOR JOB REFERRAL SYSTEM (MOBILITY)The Executive Committee of the Council shall maintain, and all workers shall be governed by,uniform rules and/or procedures consistent with the Consent Decree, and any other Order enteredin United States v. District Council, et al., 90 Civ. 5722, for the registration and/or referral toemployment of unemployed workers. Workers shall have the right to seek work and be employedthroughout the territorial jurisdiction of the CounciL Representatives, organizers and agents ofthe District Council may not otherwise refer members to jobs or in any way inform an employerthat a member is available for employment. The Executive Secretary-Treasurer shall maintainrecords of all worker registration and referrals, which shall be reviewed regularly by theExecutive Committee and which may be reviewed by any member upon reasonable request.

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4-11-13 DDS (12pgs) to RMB Doc. 1307

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