3Smelser_1998_TheRationalAndTheAmbivalent

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The Rational and the Ambivalent in the Social Sciences: 1997 Presidential AddressAuthor(s): Neil J. SmelserSource: American Sociological Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Feb., 1998), pp. 1-16Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2657473 .

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THE RATIONALAND THE AMBIVALENTIN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES*1997 PresidentialAddress

Neil J. SmelserCenterfor Advanced Study in the Behavioral SciencesIn this essay I attempt to establish the centrality of a fundamental idea-ambivalence-as a psychological postulate that is essential for understand-ing individualbehavior,social institutions, and the human condition gener-ally. In this effort I examine the strengthsand limitations of an alternativepostulate-the rational-choice model of behavior-and argue for supple-menting it with a conception of ambivalence. The idea of ambivalence isessential for explaining phenomena such as reactions to death and separa-tion, but also is required n our understandingof love, social organizations,social movements,consumer attitudes, political practices and institutions,as well as thefundamentalvalues of the Westerndemocratic tradition.

he idea of "the rational"holds a nobleI place in the historyof philosophy.In thattradition t is closely linked to reason, a men-

tal faculty through which humans are able tothink logically, reflect on right reasons forconduct, and discover the rational life-which in its turn is connected with a virtuouslife. The idea of reason reached both a turn-ing point and an apex in the Age of Reason ineighteenth-centuryFrance, when it came todwell on the capacity of humankind o devisean orderly,rational society, free from the en-cumbrances of religion, aristocracy, and tra-dition (Taine 1881; Tocqueville 1856).

"Rational" has always been a positiveword. Sica (1988) observes that. . ." rationality" as attained otemic status,

having served more oftenduring he past twocenturiesas sloganor symbol hanas convinc-ing analytic oncept. t connotes ecularizationand the eclipse of mythologicalexplanation.(P. 4)An exception to this glorious history, ofcourse, is the idea of "psychological rational-ization," or creating phony good reasons forignoble motives.The rational survives in the contemporarysocial sciences, but except in psychology, thelink with reflective capacity has largely dis-solved and the idea of a virtuous life derivedfrom reason seems to have disappeared alto-gether.The majorcontemporarymeanings of"rational"are the following:

* Direct correspondence to Neil J. Smelser,Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sci-ences, 75 Alta Road, Stanford,CA 94305 ([email protected]).American Sociological Review, 1998, Vol. 63 (February: -16) 1


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2 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW(1) Rational choice derives from the Brit-ish utilitarian tradition, via neo-classical eco-nomics. It is the theoretical core of econom-ics, though it has been greatly qualified andelaborated through parametricmodificationsand other developments such as game theory.It has also spread, with varying success andopposition, into political science, sociology,anthropology, law, organization theory, man-agement science, and elsewhere. The centraltenet of rational choice is that individual andcorporate actors take into account their pref-erences and the relevant external conditionsand behave so as to maximize their utility oradvantage.(2) Rationality as an organizational or in-stitutional strategy is conveyed in Weber's([1922] 1968) concept of "rational bourgeoiscapitalism," which connotes the systematicorganization of ideas, people, and resourcesin the interests of instrumentalefficiency andeffectiveness. This idea is also found-though with less positive connotations-inHabermas's (1975) notion of instrumentalra-tionality embodied in the administrative-legal bureaucracy of the contemporary state.Weber's idea sometimes implies differentia-tion and elaboration, so that, in addition tothe economy, administrative structures, legalsystems, musical styles, and religious tradi-tions may become rationalized. In this con-notation "rationality" and "rationalization"are almost synonyms; both refer to system-atic social-structural and cultural develop-ment. Some postmodern and globalist writ-ers regard this meaning of the rational as a

distinctive feature of modern society, whichis giving way to postmodern forces (Albrow1996:34-37).(3) Scientific rationality refers to the as-sumptions, values, norms, and procedures ofscientific inquiry.It guides the conduct of re-search and the production of theory and em-pirical findings, keeping them in line withscientific logic and methods. Those commit-ted to sociology and other social sciences assciences accept some version of scientific ra-tionality, though its tenets have come underattack within our own fields.Rational choice and rationality as an insti-tutional strategy have become increasinglydominant in the second half of the twentiethcentury. I mentioned the march of rational-choice analysis. Consider also several other

examples: in psychology, the overwhelmingsuccess of the cognitive revolution, with off-shoots of cognitive science and informationscience; in organizational theory, the emer-gence of theories of rational management oforganizations, including management sci-ence in schools of business administration;in psychoanalysis, the shift from drive andinstinct psychology toward ego psychologyand object-relations theory, and the down-playing of the unconscious and the irrational;in the study of social movements, less em-phasis on affect and ideology and more em-phasis on the instrumental/rational perspec-tives of resource mobilization and social-movement organizations; in the revolutionmade possible by the computer-a rational-izing device par excellence; in the spectacu-lar expansion of global capitalism, accompa-nied by extended rationalization of world re-sources, organizations, and markets.Correspondingly, nonrationalist and irra-tionalist perspectives in the social scienceshave diminished. Nietzsche finds few adher-ents; Freud must be considered marginal(even in anthropology, where the Freudian-inspired "culture and personality" approachhas waned); Le Bon has been passe for de-cades; Mosca and Michels are rememberednot for their "irrationalism" but for theirtheories on the distribution of power; Paretois famous not for his residues and derivations(the ideological and emotional dimensions oflife) but for his "optimum,"a rational prin-ciple of welfare economics and social policy;and Simmel's sociology of emotion anderoticism remains unappreciated. We cur-rently see stirrings in the psychology and so-ciology of emotion, but these are flickers inrelation to the larger trends toward rational-ization.The main countertrend in the contempo-raryworld is a certain anti-rationality, whichis directed at all three identified forms of ra-tionality. I have in mind the cumulative im-pact of strands of thought such as neo-Marx-ism, critical theory, varieties of phenomenol-ogy, some parts of feminist and gender stud-ies, cultural studies, and postmodernism.Some neo-Marxist and critical thought hasrejected much social science as an apologyfor capitalism and the state; the phenomeno-logical impulse has sought to undermine thepositivistic and generalizing aspects of so-


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THE RATIONAL AND THE AMBIVALENT 3cial-science investigation; some feministwriters have attacked rational-choice theoryand other lines of social-science analysis asmale-dominated and male-biased; and post-modernism combines an alienation from "ra-tional" aspects of modern society with ananti-science impulse, an identification withthe oppressed, and a fascination with "differ-ence" and the uniqueness of "the other,"which rejects general principles and grandnarratives.At the same time, representativesof these approaches themselves appeal toreason and logic and occasionally marshalempirical data to press their perspectives.Thus we witness a polarization betweenvarious kinds of rationality and a reactiveanti-rationality that includes a curious right-left opposition, and serious analysis of thenonrational and irrationalsomehow has beenabandonedby the wayside. I suggest that therole of nonrational forces in individual,group, and institutional behavior can be re-suscitated by employing the idea of ambiva-lence. I hope that we can liberate ourselvesto a degree from the world-view implied inthe enduring distinctions among the rational,the nonrational, and the irrational.SOME NOTES ON RATIONALCHOICEI now turn to rational choice as theoreticalassumption and as psychological construct.Some of my observations are critical, but Iintend neither to applaud nor to bash the ra-tional-choice approach yet again. Rather, Iaim toward developing a supplement to it.The ingredients of rational choice, as re-fined in neoclassical economics, are: (1) in-dividual actors, uninfluenced by others and"unconstrained by norms" (Coleman 1990:503), are motivated to maximize their well-being (utility); (2) actors possess completeinformation about their tastes, their re-sources, and the availability, quality, andprices of products, as well as about job op-portunities and other market conditions; (3)actors calculate and behave rationally-theydo not make errors, they do not forget whatthey know, they do not act on impulse or oth-erwise irrationally; (4) tastes are "given"-that is, they are stable and not to be ex-plained-they are the starting-point and notthe object of analysis; and (5) the interaction

between two actors, the buyer and seller, pro-duces an equilibrium point at which ex-change occurs, and at this point supply anddemand and utility and cost converge.In the recent history of rational-choiceanalysis, economists and others have relaxedevery one of these five ingredients and nowanalyze situations with incomplete informa-tion, risk and uncertainty, unstable prefer-ences, power differentials among actors,satisficing ratherthan maximizing utility, andso on. Furthermore, rational-choice analystshave moved beyond market interchanges toanalyze contest situations (game theory), vot-ing and other political behavior (Downs1957), participation in social movements(Oberschall 1973; Olson 1965), racial dis-crimination,decisions to marry and have chil-dren (Becker 1976), and addiction (BeckerandMurphy 1988). Schelling (1996) has evendevised a model of coping rationally withlapses in rationality. These developmentshave meant-according to one's point ofview-a relaxationof original rational-choiceassumptions to extend and refine the ratio-nal-choice model, and an "imperialism" onthe part of economists and other rational-choice theorists. Above all, these develop-ments in rational-choice analysis involve aconceptual stretching of the idea of rationaland threaten a theoretical degeneration: Ev-erything becomes rational if you push hardenough, and "rational"becomes more or lesssynonymous with "adaptive."Despite these relaxations and extensions,rational-choice analysis retains a theoreticalcontinuity. Even if conditions of risk, uncer-tainty, lack of knowledge, third parties, andso forth, are incorporated,the rational-choiceanalyst's strategy is to convert them into pa-rameters and ask, given those parameters,how will individuals behave rationally? Thisquery is answered by building a model of ra-tional behavior under newly hypothesizedconditions, frequently expressed mathemati-cally and sometimes related to hypotheticalor real empirical data. This, then, is the ker-nel of continuity, the enduring "culture" ofrational-choice analysis (Smelser 1995).I note five additional points about rational-choice analysis:(1) "Rational"is a relative, not an absolutenotion. It varies according to framing per-spective and level of analysis. The same item


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4 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWof behavior (e.g., smoking) may be rationalin the short run (it gratifies) but not in thelong run (it increases the probability of pre-mature death). To sell in a panicking finan-cial market may be rational from theindividual's standpoint, but its aggregated ef-fects on markets may lead to irrational out-comes. To dump toxic waste in the river maybe rational for a firm (to minimize costs), butnot rational from the standpoint of preserv-ing the environment.(2) Rational choice is relative in a secondsense. For rational-choice behavior to be pos-sible, a number of conditions must be present.At the individual level, mutual trust and pre-dictability between exchanging partners is anecessary social-psychological condition. Atthe social level the necessary conditions in-clude a stable institutional setting and rulesfor exchange (a market), a stable medium(money or its equivalent), and a legal orderthat prevents theft, fraud, and coercion andenforces rules of property and contract.Theseconditions are neither rational nor non-rational in themselves. They are best regardedas contextual conditions under which behav-ior guided by rational choice can occur.(3) Ironically, as rational-choice analystsexecute their work, both formulaic wordslose their meaning. Explained behavior is notrational in the classical sense of the term(that is, it need not involve reflection or rea-soning). It need not even be consciously cal-culated. This is so because behavior con-ceived as the product of rational choice is, inthe end, determined by a given set of prefer-ences and by a number of objective factors(e.g., price and quantity). Furthermore,eventhough alternatives are available to the actor,the explanatory power of preferences andconditions is (or should be) complete, andthus there is no choice. So although the ideaof rational choice resonates rhetorically withvalued philosophical traditions of rationalityand valued cultural traditions of individual-ism, neither reason nor choice is necessaryfor what passes as rational-choice analysis.Regarded correctly, rational choice is an in-tervening psychological constant typicallyinvoked when assigning meaning to and ex-plaining links between marketand other con-ditions and rates of behavior.(4) Rational-choice analysis leaves littleplace for affect or emotional attachments

(England 1989; England and Kilbourne1990; Lawler 1997). In one sense this omis-sion is odd, because the chief principle ofutilitarianism is seeking pleasure and avoid-ing pain, and both pleasure and pain are af-fective states. Neither do anxiety, rage, love(especially blind love), neurotic conflict, orpsychosis figure in rational-choice analysis,despite some recent general efforts to relaterational action and affect (Collins 1993;Hirschleifer 1993; Jasso 1993) and some re-search on the feelings of regret that occurafter decisions are made in uncertain situa-tions (Lindenberg 1994; Loomes andSudgen 1982).(5) With respect to actors' motivations, ra-tional-choice theory relies almost exclusivelyon univalent orientations. The motivation ismaximizing utility or acting on the basis of ahierarchy of preferences. Yes, negative fac-tors are involved, as in the conception ofdisutility and costs, but these negative fac-tors are conceptualized separately from pref-erences and weighed alongside them. Equi-librium states are reached when positives andnegatives "balance out" in relation to one an-other. Rational-choice theory does not dealwith the possibility that we can actively loveand hate the same object simultaneously, orthat such affective orientations cannot comeinto an equilibrium with one another so as topermit optimizing choice and action based onthat choice.

THE NATURE OF AMBIVALENCEThe issues of affect and valence open the doorto another psychological foundation of be-havior-human ambivalence. I have treatedrational choice as a psychological postulate,not as a general psychological principle. As apostulate, rationalchoice has two advantages:(1) as a simplification, it permits the creationof formal models capable of mathematicalexpression and capable of generating predic-tions about behavior; (2) as an ingredient ofexplanations, it has value when applied tothose socially-structured situations (markets,competitive games, political contests, ar-ranged marriage systems) in which interestsare given a place and in which gain and ad-vantage are rewarded.Now I turn to another psychological pos-tulate that also has wide applicability. This


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THE RATIONAL AND THE AMBIVALENT 5is the postulate of ambivalence-the simul-taneous existence of attractionand repulsion,of love and hate. Ambivalence is inclusive inthat it can focus on people, objects, and sym-bols. Experience alone demonstrates the im-portance of this phenomenon. We may, forexample, divide the world into people welove and people we hate, but on close exami-nation thatdistinction fades. If we think onlyof those we love or like most, we almost al-ways discover this feeling accompanied bysomething we do not like; and even the mosthateful people turn out to hold out some mor-bid attractionor redeeming feature.In picking the topic of ambivalence, I amin good company. I call to your mind Mer-ton's superb essay on sociological ambiva-lence ([1963] 1976), in which he masterfullycrafted an account of how socially-structuredroles call on incumbents simultaneously toembrace and reject the same object or norm.My approachto ambivalence takes intrapsy-chic processes, not roles, as the starting point,but Merton's and my analyses greet one an-other in a friendly fashion, even though theyapproach ambivalence from different direc-tions. In another sense, though, I am in un-friendly territory.In reviewing Merton's "So-ciological Ambivalence," Levine (1977)pointed to American culture's tendency "toeschew dualistic or ambivalent constructs infavor of univalent statements."American so-ciologists, he added, are part of this culture;they like to search for "dominant patterns,univalent metrics, monochromatic path dia-grams, and unilineal logical derivations" (p.1278; also see Levine 1985, chap. 2).The postulate of ambivalence is meant todiffer from that of rational choice in at leasttwo senses: (1) Preferences are generally for-mulated in positive terms-as what peoplewant. Although preferences can be expressednegatively, as what people do not prefer, theytend to be univalent-either positive or nega-tive. The nature of ambivalence is to holdopposing affective orientations toward thesame person, object, or symbol. (2) Withsome exceptions, preferences areregardedasrelatively stable; ambivalence tends to be un-stable, expressing itself in different andsometimes contradictory ways as actors at-tempt to cope with it.Although the postulate of ambivalence dif-fers from that of rational choice, it is not a

theoretical competitor and is certainly notopposed to the postulate of rational choice.Both postulates are generated for purposes ofunderstanding, analysis, and explanation. Myargument is that the notion of ambivalenceleads us to understandand explain a range ofbehaviors and situations beyond the scope ofrational-choice explanations, however far thelatter may be stretched.The term "ambivalence" was first used bythe psychologist Bleuler in 1910, though theidea was not novel. He gave the term a num-ber of meanings, one of which was simulta-neously opposing affects-love and hate-toward the same object. This meaning caughtthe attention of Freud, the great theorist ofambivalence, and it pervaded all his works.Many elements of Freud's psychoanalytictheories have been discredited: eros andthanatos, universal dream language, the psy-chosexual stages of development, the primalhorde. The principle of ambivalence, how-ever, remains a cornerstone of psychoana-lytic thought.Freud applied the idea of ambivalencewidely. In his "Interpretationof Dreams," henoted that often one dreams of a dead per-son, who subsequently comes alive, and thenis again dead in the same dream. Freud ar-gued that this sequence helps[] the dreamerto repudiate his very intense and often con-tradictoryemotional attitudes" (Freud [1900]1953, vol. 5:431). Ambivalence may becomeeroticized, as in sadomasochism (Freud[1905] 1953, vol. 7:159). It is at the core ofthe oedipal relations between child and par-ent. Of Little Hans, for example, Freud re-marked:

We know that . .. Hans's anxiety had two con-stituents: here was fear of his fatherand fearfor his father.Theformerwasderived romhishostility towards his father [a competitor orhis mother],and thelatter rom the conflict be-tween his affection . . . and his hostility. (Freud[1909] 1955,vol. 10:45)Ambivalence is at the core of obsessive/compulsive disorders, in which the personcontinuously does and undoes the two sidesof "a conflict between two opposing im-pulses of approximately equal strength"(Freud [1909] 1955 vol. 10:192). Indeed, thedevelopment of conscience itself is rooted inambivalence-"one of the opposing feelings


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6 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWinvolved shall be unconscious and kept un-der repression by the compulsive dominationof the other one" (Freud [19 12-1913] 1955,vol. 13:68).Combing through Freud's writings, onediscovers that he establishes the followingcharacteristics of ambivalence:(1) Its origins lie in the intimate relationsbetween a child and his or her parents andsiblings. These relations, I might add, arethose from which the child cannot escape:This is a critical point.(2) The stronger the positive side of am-bivalence, the stronger the negative. Freudsaid,

[The] king or chief arousesenvy on accountofhis privileges:everyone,perhaps,would ike tobe a king. Dead men, new-born babies andwomenmenstruatingr in labour timulatede-siresby theirspecial helplessness;a man whohas just reachedmaturity timulatesthem bythepromiseof new enjoyment.Forthatreasonall of these personsandall of these statesaretaboo, since temptation must be resisted.(Freud 1912-1913] 1955, vol. 13:33)Elsewhere he wrote of the "law of ambiva-lence of feeling, which to this day governsour emotional relations with those whom welove most" (Freud [1915] 1957, vol. 14:293). (Incidentally, this premise contrastswith Homans's (1950) proposition that "themore frequently persons interact with oneanother, the stronger their sentiments offriendship for one another are apt to be" [p.133]. Homans's proposition is only half true;the "law of ambivalence" brings negativesentiments back in.)(3) Ambivalence becomes established inthe psyche. It cannot be resolved once andfor all. Speaking of the child's desire tomasturbate and its prohibition (both by par-ents and by the child's conscience), Freudnoted that "the prohibition does not succeedin abolishing the instinct. Its only result isto repress the instinct (the desire to touch)and banish it into the unconscious. Both theprohibition and the instinct persist, . . . thepsychological constellation becomes fixed. . . as the subject's ambivalentattitude to-ward a single object" (Freud [1909] 1955,vol. 10:29).(4) Although fixed mainly in childhood,ambivalences generalize readily to other realand symbolic situations. Freud's most dra-

matic evidence is the patient's positive andnegative transferences toward the psychoana-lyst, evoked in the absence of any stimulusthat might excite strong reactions. Ambiva-lence finds expression in religious systems.Says Freud,The contradictions n the original nature ofGod are . .. a reflection of the ambivalencewhich governsthe relationof the individual ohis personal ather.If the benevolentand righ-teous God is a substitute or his father, t is notto be wondered t thathis hostile attitude o hisfather,too, which is one of hating and fearinghim and of making complaints against him,shouldhavecome to expression n thecreationof Satan. Freud 1922] 1961, vol. 19:85)

E. Erikson (1962) repeatedly applied the ideaof splitting in explaining the psychology andtheology of Martin Luther's Protestantism.The psychology of ambivalence has one fi-nal ingredient. Because ambivalence is suchapowerful, persistent, unresolvable, volatile,generalizable, and anxiety-provoking featureof the human condition, people defendagainst experiencing it in many ways. Thosemechanisms of defense Freud mentioned in-clude: reversing one side of the ambivalentfeeling, usually by turning the negative sideinto a positive ("love thine enemy") (Freud[1912] 1958, vol. 12:299); repressing oneside and rigidifying the other side into a re-action-formation, for example, in the ideali-zation of a parent; displacing or substitutinga remote object or symbol for the real object;projecting, for example, resolving one's ownambivalent feelings toward a loved one whohas died by blaming evil spirits; splitting ortransferringthe positive side of the ambiva-lence into an unqualified love of one personor object, and the negative side into an un-qualified hatred of another (also see Klein,[1935] 1986:141-43).The sequence beginning with ambiva-lence, proceeding to defense, and then mov-ing to behavior does not fit comfortablywith the logic of rational choice. Many ofthe dynamics of ambivalence occur beyondthe range of consciousness and calculation.The psychological and behavioral reactionsinvolved in ambivalence are likely to be im-mediate responses to emotions-principallyanxiety-that escape personal reflection al-together. We might say that this kind of be-havior is adaptive-though with varying


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THE RATIONAL AND THE AMBIVALENT 7success-and reasonable in that it is under-standable within the logic of ambivalence.(We might even suggest that ambivalenceforces us to reason even more than prefer-ences do, because conflict may be a strongermotive for thinking than is desire.) It is alsopossible to develop models of behaviorbased on the dynamics of ambivalence. Butto subsume it under the logic of "rational"or "choice" or "rational choice" is not ana-lytically helpful. To do so involves seriousconceptual stretching and adds little excepta false sense of precision and the positivehortatory effect that invoking the idea of"rational"typically produces.

APPLICATIONS OF THE LOGIC OFAMBIVALENCEDeath and SeparationI begin a further consideration of ambiva-lence by addressing an obvious example. Theloss-especially the unanticipated loss-ofloved ones evokes the strongest of ambiva-lent reactions. The classic study of bereave-ment is that of Lindemann (1944), a psychia-trist who interviewed the survivors of theCocoanut Grove nightclub fire and panic inBoston during World War II. He observedamong survivors a "mourning syndrome"consisting of several affective and behavioralreactions, sometimes occurring in rough se-quence-numbing and denial, blaming thelost victim, blaming oneself and idealizingthe victim, blaming others, and then agradual "working through" the grief by re-suming routines andbuilding on old and newsocial relationships. All these reactions wereaccompanied by strong affects. Even thosenot suffering personal loss were shocked,and the tragedy was followed by episodes ofscapegoating-the bellboy (who presumablystarted the fire), the nightclub management,city inspectors, and others (Veltford and Lee1943).This mourning syndrome has been docu-mented in other settings, including the battle-field death of comrades in World WarII andthe Vietnam war (Grinker and Spiegel 1945;Lifton 1973), and the loss of loved ones,friends, and neighbors in natural disasters(K. Erikson 1976). It is also seen in the natu-ral deaths of parents, spouses, children, and

other loved ones, though in the case of long-expected deaths, anticipatory grief and its as-sociated reactions mitigate the bereavementprocess.Shock, anger, grief, and recovery fromgrief are also witnessed in the wake of deathsof political leaders and cultural idols. Thesefigures are often endowed with charisma, es-pecially in times of crisis, but beneath thisidealization lies a deep ambivalence, whichprobably accounts for "the fragility of cha-risma" (Aberbach 1996). Research has docu-mented ambivalent reactions to the death ofFranklinRoosevelt (Grazia 1948) and the as-sassinations of Abraham Lincoln, JohnKennedy, Robert Kennedy, and MartinLuther King, Jr. (Bonjean, Hill, and Martin1965; Sheatsley and Feldman 1965; Turner1982). The attempted assassination ofRonald Reagan in 1981 excited a similarrange of reactions, including expressions bysome that they wished the assassination hadsucceeded (Mortensen 1987). The idealiza-tion of RichardNixon-perhaps the target ofmore ambivalence than any other presidentin the twentieth century-in the days afterhis death is also notable. Leadership succes-sion-the loss of one leader and the arrivalof a new one-often produces instability andturbulence (Gouldner 1954; Weber [1922]1968). And if more evidence is needed, weneed only point to the charged and often ide-alized memories of figures such as MarilynMonroe and Elvis Presley, which sometimesinclude the belief that they are still alive(Fowles 1992). We are effectively bound toour leaders and secular gods and goddesses,both because of what they are and becausewe transfer to them powerful positive andnegative affects from childhood. So whenleaders are lost, we react with feelings of lossand bereavement.This mourning syndrome can occur in re-sponse to separations other than death. Di-vorce and separation, often voluntary andeven wished, can produce reactions of am-bivalence and "working-through"as complexand deep as death reactions. Typically onenever completely forgets or recovers from apast marriage or love attachment (Goode1965). The departureof children from home,though sometimes welcomed by parents andchildren alike, is also shrouded with continu-ing ambivalence.


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8 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWMilder though similar reactions occur af-ter other separations, such as retirement ormoving away from a community. In this con-nection, observe that at the end of the twen-tieth century the world is experiencing an ac-celeration of these kinds of separations-through continuing high rates of divorce, es-trangement, and break-ups; through sus-tained rates of geographical mobility and in-creased rates of international migration;through the tenuousness of neighborhoodand community resulting from that mobility;through the "temp revolution," which bringsworkers to and from the workplace withgreater frequency; and throughthe increased

mobility within the workplace associatedwith the phenomenon of flexible specializa-tion (Piore and Sabel 1984). Our time mightbe called the "age of temporariness,"or the"age of intermittency,"or perhaps the "ageof sequential bonding."The humanbeing hasan enormous capacity to adapt to these cir-cumstances, but we also must acknowledgethat we are not immune from the recurrentambivalent reactions that accompany suchcomings and goings.A single principle underlies all these ex-amples: When we bond with people deeply,or even superficially, we become to some de-gree less emotionally free as a result. Theserelations invariably become fused with someambivalence, and when we lose or separatefrom others, dealing with that ambivalencebecomes a necessity, even though the copingprocess is often mild and passing. This prin-ciple invites generalization, and I now turnto some less self-evident applications.Dependence, Limitations on Choice, andAmbivalenceLet us recall the kinds of situations to whichmodels of rational choice appear to applybest: situations in which both calculation andchoice are institutionalized and rewarded andin which standards for calculation areknown. Another ingredient of such situationsis that the actor may freely enter into andwithdraw from exchange relations. We callthis ingredient "choice," which is a type offreedom, and markets for consumer goodsand free labor are its prototypes. InHirschman's (1970) words, "some customersstop buying the firm's products or some

members leave the organization" (p. 4). Thisis Hirschman's exit option, to which I willreturn later.Of course, this freedom is relative, as de-ciding not to buy a product may involve apsychological cost. Furthermore,one usuallyhas to work somewhere, and it is often bothcostly and risky for an employee to quit onejob and search for another. Note, however,that rational-choice theorists (especiallygame theorists) also have analyzed situationsin which choice is limited, for example, rela-tions to authority, blackmail situations, andinternational relations.With this reference to freedom in mind, Inow call attention to a contrasting range ofsituations in which actors are dependent onone another. The form of dependence mayvary. A subordinate person in a power rela-tionship is politically dependent; a personwho is committed to a religious or socialmovement cause is ideologically dependent;a person in love is emotionally dependent.The common element, however, is that free-dom to leave-choice-is restricted becauseit is costly politically, ideologically, or emo-tionally. Thus, dependence entails a certainentrapment. Although the relation betweendependence and solidarity-the positive sideof ambivalence-is well articulated (Hechter1987), this negative side of dependence hasnot been given anything like equal time. Mygeneral proposition is that dependent situa-tions breed ambivalence, and correspond-ingly, models of behavior based on the pos-tulate of ambivalence are the most appli-cable. I illustrate this proposition in severalsituations:(1) Let us return to Freud. His prototypicalsetting for the development of ambivalenceis the young child, who is dependent on hisor her parents in many ways-dependent onthem for survival as an organism, dependenton them as authorities, and emotionally de-pendent on them because he or she lovesthem. Childhood entails a type of enslave-ment from which one cannot escape. Thechild's objects of ambivalence are those bywhom he or she is entrapped-parents andsiblings (and perhaps increasingly thesedays, day-care personnel). Adolescence isthe protracted experience of partial escape, aperiod in which ambivalence toward parentsand siblings is repeatedly "acted out," some-


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THE RATIONAL AND THE AMBIVALENT 9times in extreme ways. Once the escape toindependence has been more or less accom-plished, we often observe a return to thepositive side of the ambivalence because theentrapment is diminished. This process iscaptured in Mark Twain's remark that whenhe was 16 years old he thought his father thestupidest man in the world, but by the timehe reached 21 he was surprised at how muchthe old man had learned in 5 years. The es-cape is never complete, however. The en-slaved child inside us never totally sheds itsambivalence toward parents and siblings, andthis ambivalence finds expression in recur-rent "transference" o authorities, colleagues,subordinates, loved ones, friends, gods, de-mons, heroes, and scapegoats.(2) The most common adult relationshipsin which ambivalence is most evident arethose between lovers, partners, intimates,and friends-in a word, those on whom weare dependent. One might appropriatelytermthese relations "voluntary emotional depen-dence," or perhaps the dependence arisingfrom the half-voluntary, half-involuntary ac-tions of falling in love and becoming friends.These relationships often involve other kindsof dependence as well-for example, in mar-riage, the dependence deriving from the dif-ferential power of husband and wife, and infriendships among political and status un-equals. Emotional dependence, however, isalways a part of the picture.(3) Lawler's (1997) experimental and theo-retical work on group membership and affectsuggests that "positive emotion generated bychoice processes strengthens affective ties togroups credited with making choice oppor-tunities available; negative emotion weakensties to those blamed for constraining choice"(p. 393 ; also see Lawler 1992). The generalprinciple is that constraint generates ambiva-lence, and that, as a special case, the diffi-culty involved in withdrawing from a groupinto which one is "locked" increases ambiva-lence toward that group and its members.(4) Certain types of organization are seed-beds of ambivalence and its consequences -spite, petty wrangling, struggles for recogni-tion, and vicious politics-even though thepolitical stakes are often not very high. Theseare Goffman's (1962) "total institutions"-mental institutions, military camps, prisons,and private schools-and also include mon-

asteries, convents, psychoanalytic institutes,and academic departments. What these orga-nizations have in common is that their par-ticipants are "locked in" by personal or insti-tutional commitment or other situational cir-cumstances and can escape only at greatcost.In academic departmentspeople are "lockedin" by tenure or by the yearning and strugglefor tenure, and can escape only at great costunless a more attractive opportunity arises.People have to live with one another,but thisdoes not mean they have to love one another;it implies, rather,that they both love andhateone another.These organizational settings contrast withsituations in which people live temporarilybut from which they know they will with-draw or escape. I refer to these as "odyssey"situations, which have a known beginning,duration, and end. They include ocean voy-ages, summer camps, junior years abroad,and the college years. I would also includethe years in residence at my own Center forAdvanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.People, sometimes strangers, are thrown to-gether in physical proximity, but they knowthis close contact will end in time. They canthus afford to love one another and more orless bury the negative side of the ambiva-lence that is associated with intimacy. Thiscircumstance, I am certain, goes a long waytoward explaining why such odyssey experi-ences are typically lived and rememberedwith unalloyed sentimentality and nostalgia.(5) Another setting for ambivalence isthose groups, organizations, and socialmovements that demand commitment, adher-ence, and faithfulness from their believer-members.These include churches, ethnic andracial identity groups and movements, laborunions and other social-class movements,and social movements generally. Some ofthese settings have salience in contemporarytimes-namely in the apparent worldwidechallenge to the nation-state by identitygroups and identity movements. The depen-dence created in these settings comesthrough commitment to a belief, cause, orcommon goal and through membership in ademanding organization.Three observations are in order: (a) Thesegroups and organizations manifest the prin-ciple of in-group solidarity and out-grouphostility. This principle was enunciated


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10 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWforcefully in the sociology of Georg Simmel(Coser 1956; Wolff 1950:368-70)). Almostall groupings regard the world dichoto-mously-as friends or enemies, believers ornonbelievers, good or evil. We do not under-stand the full significance of this categoriza-tion, but one of its apparent functions is todiminish the internal ambivalence bred bycommitment by splitting it between insideand outside. I know of no mechanism thatbetter protects the fragile solidarity of theseintense groups. (b) Many social move-ments-those we classify as protest move-ments-act against political authorities oragainst social arrangements put in place andlegitimized by them. They express the nega-tive side of ambivalence that colors most ori-entations toward authority.At the same time,many such movements exhibit opposite ten-dencies within-the adoration of leaders andstrong demands for conformity and commit-ment. But in the end, movement leaders arethemselves subject to the vicissitudes of theirfollowers' ambivalence, and they stand inconstant danger of experiencing a negativeturn. (c) Just as the defiant child excites am-bivalence in his or her parents-generated bystruggles with their own inherited ambiva-lences-so political authorities almost in-variably assume an ambivalent attitude to-ward those who protest against them. Ac-cordingly, authorities are forever tempted topunish, ironically contributing to their ownvulnerability. The delicate relationship be-tween protesters and authorities is often adouble-dance of ambivalence, a game of last-tag in which each forever tries to avoid ille-gitimate expression of the negative side oftheir ambivalence and to push their antago-nists into it.(6) In consumer markets we see ambiva-lence toward some kinds of products such asjewelry, fine clothing, furs, and luxury auto-mobiles. This ambivalence finds expressionespecially among those who cannot affordextravagance or luxuries and sometimesamong those who can. Attitudes toward theseluxury products contrast with those towardprimarily utilitarian items such as hammers,nails, garden hoses, and toothpaste. The rea-son for the ambivalence and controversydoes not reside in material characteristics ofthe products themselves. It arises becausethey are symbols of the status systems in

community and society. People's places inthese systems are largely involuntary; theseare systems from which it is difficult to es-cape, and symbols of these systems arebound to draw ambivalent reactions.(7) Finally, in our search for applicationsof the idea of ambivalence, we would do wellto look in sociology's back yard. There is al-most no facet of our existence as sociologistsabout which we do not show ambivalenceand its derivative, dividing into groups orquasi-groups of advocacy and counter-advo-cacy. We are ambivalent toward one another;toward the competing notions of our disci-pline as science, as humanistic study, as po-litical enterprise, and as art; toward the dif-ferent methodologies we employ; toward theacademic departments that house us; towardthe administratorsand funding agencies thatsustain us; toward other disciplines; and lastbut not least, toward our subject matter it-self-the community as simultaneously em-bracing and suffocating, the deviant as si-multaneously troublemaker and innovator.You name it, we have mixed feelings aboutit. We do not think much about these ambiva-lences; we mainly voice and act on themwithout reflection. The sobering paradox isthat although we as sociologists are perhapsamong the best equipped to understand am-bivalences, we scarcely think about or studythem. Yet to understandthem would lead ustoward explaining our own sectarian andschismatic tendencies, as well as those inacademic life generally.Social Structure, Social Process, andPolitical AmbivalenceTo carrythis analysis of ambivalence further,I call attention to some social structures andprocesses that serve, among other things, asvehicles for the expression, play, and never-to-be-realized resolution of individual andgroup ambivalence. Let me begin by address-ing one possible misunderstanding.I have nointerest in the origins of these structuresandprocesses, and more important, I disown anyclaim that they are conscious or unconsciousinventions designed to deal with ambiva-lence. The special function these structuresand processes serve, however, may havesomething to do with the passion they exciteand their tendency to endure.


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THE RATIONAL AND THE AMBIVALENT 11Many if not all societies institutionalizerituals that reverse, at least temporarily,ambivalently regarded situations-for ex-ample, giving high-school students the op-portunity to run the city government for aday and the widespread practice of ritual re-bellion (Gluckman 1963). In our own andother societies, athletic contests, organizedaround institutional memberships (highschools, colleges, and universities) and com-munities or territories (professional sports),offer endless opportunitiesfor the splitting ofambivalence-solidarity with the one side,hostility toward the other. Because athleticcontests are usually carefully controlled and

defined as "only games" that do not matterin the serious business of life, the splitting isrelatively benign, except when it spills overinto barroom brawls, mob violence and loot-ing, and marauding of crowds of soccer fans.In the same light, one also could mention lo-cal and regional pride (which invariably in-cludes some hostility toward other localitiesand regions) as well as uneasily institution-alized urban gangs, known both for theirfierce solidarity and their potential for vio-lence.Familiar political institutions and pro-cesses also offer opportunities for convertingambivalent feelings into univalent prefer-ences, and in the meantime, delegitimizing ina certain way one side or the other of am-bivalence. Consider the following illustra-tions:The public opinion survey-a special in-vention of the social sciences-has, overtime, evolved into a full-scale political insti-tution. Its essence is this: A representativesample of citizens is asked a question abouta political official (approve or disapprove),a political candidate (how one intends tovote), or some issue of public concern(crime, drugs, abortion, affirmative action,race relations). Most research on publicopinion focuses on background social fac-tors (age, race, sex, religion, education) oron cognitive processes (complexity theory,balance theory, dissonance theory) (Milburn1991). From an affective point of view,however, the interesting fact is that mostsurvey questions are phrased univalently-approve or disapprove, favor or not favor,and how strongly. Introspection alone, how-ever, informs us that our feelings about pub-

lic figures and issues are ambivalent if notmultivalent. Consider only the following U.S. Presidents: Roosevelt, Truman, Eisen-hower, Kennedy, Nixon, Ford, Carter,Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. All of thesenames conjure in us mixed feelings, eventhough we may prefer some over others.Likewise, we are ambivalent on many of thesocial issues tapped by surveys, even thoughwe may sometimes confidently representour opinions to ourselves and others as ab-solute. This ambivalence is seldom tappedby most surveys. Indeed, it is typicallyshunted aside by offering forced-choice al-ternatives. Surveys often depict the world asthough it is divided into people who are forand against someone or something-a cleardistortion of the social-psychological realityof public feelings. This representation isthen reified into an imagined "public opin-ion," reported as reality in the press, read bymarket analysts and politicians, and actedupon. Following this reasoning, we must re-gard attitude surveys not as revealed prefer-ences but as a distorted structure of realitythat minimizes and-in the process-delegitimizes both ambiguity and ambiva-lence.This general diagnosis of public opinionsurveys must be qualified in one importantway. Some sociological colleagues (Schumanand Presser 1981; Smith 1984; Turner andMartin 1984) have attacked,with great imagi-nation, the issues of measuring non-attitudes,passion, intensity, subjectivity, and ambigu-ity, thus moving closer to the kind of method-ological sophistication requiredto taphumanambivalence.Other, more binding parts of the politicalprocess also redefine, defuse, and pacify-atleast temporarily-situations of more or lesspermanent and never-resolved public am-bivalence. In the electoral process, votingconverts individual ambivalence into abso-lute preference. (Votes, too, are not revealedpreferences but conversions of ambivalenceinto univalence.) The results are aggregatedand the winner takes all, at least for a time(Slater 1963). At the same time, public am-bivalence is temporarily delegitimized,which is why protests against election out-comes seldom occur, or if they do, they areineffectual unless they take the form of con-stitutional challenges. This either-or logic


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12 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEWapplies to a wide range of political acts-laws enacted, acceptable compromisesreached, court decisions made. All thesebinding political decisions partake of this ei-ther-or, winner-take-all character, and thuscan be regarded as "truce points" in the eter-nal process of temporarily resolving ambiva-lent and conflictual situations and renderingone side of public ambivalence temporarilyunacceptable and non-legitimate.Following this logic, I have found it en-lightening to re-read Hirschman's (1970) re-markable book, Exit, Voice,and Loyalty, as atreatise on ambivalence. Hirschman's viewconcerns the market mainly, but it also ap-plies to organizations and nation-states. Inwhat follows I will consider the political as-pects.Viewed from the perspectives of citizenand state:(1) Exit is the capacity of citizens to reactto the negative side of their ambivalence to-ward the nation. The nation is, of course, asocial entity on which we are dependent, be-cause we are locked into it by membershipfrom birth and live within its laws and power.The exit option is to leave the country.(2) Loyalty represses the negative side ofthe ambivalence and accentuates the positive.(3) Voice, finally, is intermediate;some de-gree of loyalty is presupposed, and some de-gree of alienation and opposition-a wish toexit, as it were-is acknowledged. Somearena is established for "working out"publicambivalence and conflict-with varying ef-fectiveness-and "working it into" institu-tional arrangements.Voice is, in Hirschman'swords, "any attempt at all to change, ratherthan to escape from, an objectionable stateof affairs" (1970:30). Voice is manifested indemocratic institutions. It is especially im-portantwhen exit is unavailable or too costly.As Hirschman noted, "[T]his is very nearlythe situation in such basic social organizationas the family, the state, or the church"(1970:33).Exit is costly for individuals, however,and Hirschman (1970) perceives ambiva-lence-as well as psychological splitting-involved in exiting:

In leaving his countrythe emigrantmakes adifficult decision andusuallypaysa high pricein severing many strongaffective ties. Addi-tionalpayments extractedas he is beinginiti-

ated into a new environment and adjusting toit. The result is a strong psychological compul-sion to like that for which so large a paymenthas been made. In retrospect, the "old country"will appear more abominable than ever whilethe new country will be declared to be thegreatest, "the last hope of mankind," and allmanner of other superlatives. (Pp. 112-13)Hirschman's "splitting" resolution may betypical, but a truer account would considerthe continuing ambivalence toward both oldand new, just as colonies that have "exited"an empire experience a continuing ambiva-lence toward the former colonial power.Many combinations of exit, voice, and

loyalty can function as resolutions of am-bivalence in binding organizations. In clas-sical Judaism, self-defined as tribal, exitwas impossible and extreme loyalty was de-manded. In classical Catholicism, exit wasvirtually impossible (except through excom-munication), and voice (heterodoxy) wasprohibited, except for Catholic "orders,"which did not fully exit and retained somevoice while proclaiming loyalty. In much ofProtestantism loyalty has been a matter ofindividual commitment; more voice is per-mitted, and exit (schism) is relatively easy.In its uneasy history, East Germany sup-pressed both exit and voice and demandedextreme loyalty. When at a critical momentexit became possible, exit became voice,and the regime, which commanded ambiva-lence at best and little true loyalty, collapsed(Joppke 1995).Finally, this line of reasoning adds to ourunderstanding of democracy and democraticinstitutions. To simplify, the French Revolu-tion provided the West (and the world, as itturns out) two great political legacies thatcrystallized as that revolution unfolded. Thefirst legacy is the values of a free demo-cratic community, which were expressed inthe first word of the Revolution's slogan-liberte'-implying that the state will not in-trude on citizens except in instances whenthey threaten to do harm to others. The sec-ond is the idea of the modern nation-state-la patrie-which has become the modernbasis of political integration. The nation-state is envisioned as the single seat of sov-ereignty and governance, a bounded terri-tory, the locus of economic self-sufficiency,the monopolistic wielder of legitimate force


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THE RATIONAL AND THE AMBIVALENT 13and violence, the focus of a common culture(including language), and the object of loy-alty and group identity. (Our own pledge ofallegiance to the flag, which refers to "onenation . . . indivisible, with liberty . . . forall" compresses both legacies into a singlephrase.)These two sets of ideals are evidently uto-pian-unrealizable in their pure form. More-over, they often pull in opposite directions,and as a result, create a range of politicalambivalences that have never been resolvedand that continue to dominate our politicallife (Wagner 1994). In this context, mostdemocratic institutions appear as "voices"-mechanisms available to work through theseambivalences continuously as a process ifnever entirely satisfactorily completed as atask.Here is my reasoning: Liberty can be re-garded as a principle of limited exit within acontext of loyalty-a way of minimizinggovernmental involvement in the lives of citi-zens. This principle, however, stands in per-manent tension with the political imperativesof the sovereign nation, which are to discour-age exit and to demand loyalty, both ofwhich impinge on liberty, absolutely defined.By institutionalizing a democratic prin-ciple-or fiction, if one prefers-that the rul-ers are ruled by the people they rule, limitedintrusions on liberty are defended as legiti-mate, particularly if rulers are policed by aquasi-independent agency, the courts.CONCLUDING REMARKIf we move toward the broader implicationsof the place of the rational and the ambiva-lent in the social sciences, it becomes clearthat we are dealing with a fundamental exis-tential dilemma in the human condition. It iscommunicated in various dichotomies-free-dom versus constraint, independence versusdependence, autonomy versus dependence,maturity versus infancy, and more-butwhatever the dichotomy, the dilemma ap-pears to be insoluble. Neither pole is a sepa-rate state or condition. Neither freedom nordependence can be realized in a full or ex-clusive form, because one is partof the other.Human beings long and strive for both, but,when they achieve a measure of either, theother reasserts itself. As in the nature of am-

bivalence itself, we want both sides at once,but cannot fully satisfy either side.We social scientists, in our brief history,have fashioned a certain "division of labor"that is understandable in the dilemma I havedescribed. Economics and part of politicalscience (democratic theory and the study ofdemocracy) have stressed the freedom side;parts of sociology, anthropology, and socialpsychology-which stress the interpersonalas well as normative and other constrainingforces-stress human interdependence. Ihave argued that the traditions of rationalchoice apply best to situations in which rela-tive freedom of choice reigns. Coleman(1990) appears to confirm my point in hisadvocacy of the rational-action model for so-cial theory. He argues that its principles are"groundedin a humanistically congenial im-age of man"(p. 4). By this he refers to a clas-sical liberal image-"the freedom of indi-viduals to act as they will" and a concernover "constraintsthat social interdependenceplaces on that freedom" (1990:4). To me thissays that rational-choice principles areappli-cable to situations in which choice is institu-tionalized.I also have arguedthat psychological mod-els based on ambivalence have special powerin social situations in which political, group,and emotional dependence is salient. We findboth sides of the dilemma-between free-dom and dependence-stressed in relativedegrees in our social arrangements.I argue, finally, that we must be driven tounderstand both sides-freedom and depen-dence-by employing different assumptionsand different explanatory strategies. In inves-tigating freedom and dependence as well asfreedom we reach toward a fuller under-standing of human action, social institutions,and the human condition itself.Neil J. Smelser received his Ph.D. from HarvardUniversity in 1958, and served on the faculty ofthe University of California Berkeley from 1958to 1994. He is now Director of the Centerfor Ad-vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Hismost recent book is Problematics of Sociology(University of California Press, 1997). His re-search interests include sociological theory, so-cial movements, sociology of education, and eco-nomic sociology. He recently became co-editor ofa new InternationalEncyclopediaof the Socialand Behavioral Sciences (Elsevier, forthcoming


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14 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW2001). His honors include election to the Na-tional Academy of Science, the American Acad-emy of Arts and Sciences, and the AmericanPhilosophical Society.REFERENCESAberbach, David. 1996. Charisma in Politics, Re-ligion and the Media: Private Trauma, PublicIdeals. London, England: Macmillan.Albrow, Martin. 1996. The Global Age: State andSociety Beyond Modernity. Cambridge, Cam-bridge, England: Polity.Becker, Gary S. 1976. The Economic Approachto Human Behavior. Chicago, IL: University ofChicago Press.Becker, Gary S. and Kevin M. Murphy. 1988. "ATheory of Rational Addiction." Journal of Po-litical Economy 96:675-700.Bonjean, Charles M., Richard J. Hill, and HarryW. Martin. 1965. "Reactions to the Assassina-tion in Dallas," Pp. 178-98 in The Kennedy As-sassination and the American Public: SocialCommunication in Crisis, edited by B. S.Greenberg and E. B. Parker. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press.Coleman, James S. 1990. Foundations of SocialTheory. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of

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