3D1 Onis Insight Turkey

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Vol. 10 No. 4 2008

Mark R. Parris Common Values and Common Interests? Te Bush Legacy in US-urkish Rela-

tions / Michael A. Reynolds urkey’s roubles in the Caucasus / Saltanat Berdikeeva Future o

Energy ransportation in Eurasia afer the Georgia Crisis / Ziya Öniş urkey-EU Relations: Be-

yond the Current Stalemate / Kıvanç Ulusoy urkey and the EU: Democratization, Civil-Military

Relations, and the Cyprus Issue / Ahmet Arabacı Explaining ransormation o urkish Civil So-

ciety in the EU Accession Process / Vamık Volkan rauma, Identity and Search or a Solution in

Cyprus / M. Ergün Olgun, Dirk Rochtus Cyprus: Te Belgian ‘ool Box’ Revisited / Mahmood

Monshipouri, Banasheh Keynoush Dealing with Iran: Conrontation or Negotiation?

I S S N 1

3 0 2 - 1 7 7 X

TURKEY AND THE EU: STILL COMMITTED?

A NEW COLD WAR IN THE CAUCASUS

CYPRUS: SOLUTION OR SEPARATION?

Published by SEA Foundation or Political, Economic and Social Research



35

urkey-EU relations historically move in terms o cycles. At the end

o each cycle, urkey moves closer to and be-comes more integrated with the EU. Te long-term pattern is thus clearly oriented in the di-

rection o urther integration. Te slower thepath and the greater the delays on the path tomembership also imply, however, that urkey is conronted with higher barriers to entry with each turning o the cycle. Te thresholdor membership clearly rises over time, a actwhich can be illustrated by some concrete ex-amples. When Greece became a member in

1981, the country’s democratic credentials con-stituted an important yardstick or member-ship. When urkey pushed or EU candidacy in the late 1980s and ‘90s, the EU had by thenbecome ar more integrated and the criterionor entry had become not only democracy per

se, but the quality o democracy. In the currentcontext, urkey’s membership aspirations areaced with additional hurdles. Te number o

ABSTRACT

Te prospects or urkey’sambitions or ull EU membershipdo not appear to be very brightin the current conjuncture.Te “grand coalition or special

partnership” appears to be rmly entrenched. With key chapters ornegotiation already suspendedwhat is likely to happen is that thegovernment in power is likely topursue a loose Europeanizationagenda o gradual reorms allingconsiderably short o deepcommitment or ull-membership.Te paper investigates theunderlying reasons or the decline

o enthusiasm or EU membershipollowing the golden age o Europeanization and reormsduring the early years o the AKParty government. Te article alsopoints to domestic and externaldevelopments which may help toreverse the current stalemate and,hence, ends with an optimistic noteconcerning the uture o urkey-EU relations.

urkey-EU Relations: Beyond

the Current Stalemate

ZİYA ÖNİŞ*

* Proessor o International Political Economy, Koç University,[email protected]

Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 4 / 2008pp. 35-50

Articles



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

36

EU members has dramatically increased

over time; ultimately all twenty-sevenpresent members will have to endorseull membership. Furthermore, the EUappears to have reached the limits o top-down, elite-driven projects. oday,public opinion and citizen participation

are crucial, and are likely to become increasingly more important over time. Tismeans that urkey needs to cultivate not only elite support, but also support at thelevel o the individual citizens o Europe in order to accomplish its long-term goal

o EU membership.1

Tis line o argument clearly suggests that there is a strong case or acceleratingurkey’s push or EU membership and the associated reorm process. Yet, in thecurrent context, urkey-EU relations have reached a certain stalemate. What weobserve now is the emergence o a kind o grand coalition or special partnershipwhich is strongly rooted both in urkey and in Europe. Tis grand coalition ap-pears to be rather insurmountable or the oreseeable uture. Te objective o thepresent paper is to explain the paradox o how urkey-EU relations ended up withthe current stalemate ollowing the golden age o Europeanization and reorm,particularly during the early years o the AK Party government, reaching a climaxwith the decision to open negotiations with urkey in December 2004. Te paperlooks to the uture and tries to single out a possible mix o external and domesticinuences which might help to revitalize urkey’s EU membership process.

Tere is no doubt that urkey will continue to be an important regional powereven without attaining EU membership. Failure to achieve EU membership will

not mean a collapse o the urkish economy or o urkish democracy. A centralpremise o the present essay, however, is that membership in the EU holds very signicant benets or urkey and represents the rst-best solution. Tereore,it is an objective that cannot be easily dismissed in avor o alternative scenariosbased on notions o privileged partnership. EU membership is important to ur-key or three interrelated reasons. First, the urkish economy will be in a muchstronger position in the presence o a strong, long-term EU anchor. Indeed, it isimportant to emphasize that the principal benets o membership, such as accessto redistributive unds and related EU programs, as well as the gains that are likely

to accrue rom participation in the internal EU market, actually materialize aerthe country’s accession as a ull member. It would be interesting to reer to theexperience o Eastern Europe where Euro-skepticism grew during the transition

Membership in the EU is an

objective that cannot be easily dismissed in avor o alternativescenarios based on notions o privileged partnership



Turkey-EU Relations: Beyond the Current Stalemate

37

period, but actually declined aer ull accession in the post-2004 era. Secondly,

the process leading to ull membership will have quite dramatic consequences orthe quality o urkey’s democratic regime. urkish democracy, in spite o the im-portant reorms that have been implemented in recent years, still alls short – by a considerable margin – o being a ully-consolidated liberal democracy. Tirdly,urkey’s oreign policy strengths based on so power will be signicantly en-hanced i urkey is able to act collectively with the EU, as opposed to developinga series o bilateral relations with its neighboring countries.

From a Vicious to a Virtuous Cycle: Te Golden Age of Europe-

anization in urkey Arguably the process o “Europeanization” in urkey in the ormal sense o

the term, meaning a process o interrelated economic and political reorms in linewith EU conditionality, dates back to the process leading up to the inception o the Customs Union by the end o mid-1995. Te Customs Union was importantin terms o accelerating the process o trade liberalization in urkey which hadstarted back in 1980, and was also instrumental in promoting an important seto regulatory and democratization reorms.2 Yet, in retrospect, it is air to argue

that urkey-EU relations during much o the 1990s were aced with what MehmetUğur has aptly described as “the anchor-credibility dilemma.”3 In the absence o the ull membership signal, the EU was not powerul enough to generate a deepcommitment or macroeconomic stabilization and reorms on the part o ur-key’s political elites. Similarly, the ailure o the urkish political elites to deal withendemic political and economic instability, in turn, raised undamental questionmarks rom the EU perspective concerning urkey’s commitment to the goal o Europeanization. Te outcome was a vicious circle.

Given this background, the Helsinki Decision o the European Council in De-cember 1999 was critical in the sense that, or the rst time, urkey was recog-nized as a candidate country or ull membership. Te decision provided a pow-erul incentive or reorm. Coupled with the impact o the deep economic crisisthat urkey experienced in February 2001, the EU process became particularly important in creating the mix o conditions and incentives necessary or large-scale economic reorms. Especially in the post-crisis era, urkey experienced akind o virtuous cycle o mutually reinorcing democratization processes andeconomic reorms rather similar in nature to the kind o transormations that

the EU’s Southern European members, such as Spain, Portugal and Greece, hadexperienced during the 1980s, and that the Eastern European members like Po-land, Hungary, and the Czech Republic had gone through during the prior wave



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

38

o Eastern enlargement in the course o

the 1990s and the early 2000s. Althoughwe have identied a series o importantturning points in urkey’s recent, ormalEuropeanization process, such as 1995,1999 and 2001, most analysts wouldagree that perhaps the golden age wasthe period extending rom the summer

o 2002 – marked by the parliamentary passage o a dramatic reorm packageduring the period o the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government – to October

2005, when accession negotiations were ormally opened. Te golden age period,by and large, corresponded to the early years o the AK Party government. Inspite o initial ears concerning the party’s Islamist origins and credentials, theAK Party proved to be both moderate and reormist in orientation. Indeed, theAK Party government during this period displayed a vigorous commitment toimplementing the Copenhagen criteria both in the economic and political realms.As a result, the European Council at its December 2004 Summit in Brussels de-cided to open the negotiation process without delay. Tis is something that ew

people, even close observers o urkey-EU relations, would have expected back in December 1999 when urkey was announced as a candidate country but theprospect o membership appeared quite distant. Te Brussels decision o 2004clearly underlined the rapid pace o transormation and reorm that urkey hadexperienced during the golden age period.

Te EU membership process in urkey during this period had a proound im-pact in three interrelated areas. Te rst key area was the economy. Te urkisheconomy in the post-crisis era experienced one o its most successul phases o

growth. Fiscal and monetary discipline was established and ination was reducedto single digit levels or the rst time or several decades. Important institutionalreorms helped to create a relatively autonomous central bank and a more ro-bust banking and nancial system which created stability conducive to long-termgrowth. Moreover, urkey, or the rst time in its recent economic history, startedto attract considerable amounts o oreign direct investment. Te prospect o EUmembership was critical in terms o providing the kind o longer-term anchorwhich the IMF program alone could not accomplish.4 Moreover, the EU processplayed a central role in providing a ocus or a program o reorms and the mo-

tivation needed or diferent groups in society to rally around the reorm pro-gram. Te act that urkey’s oreign direct investment boom efectively started in2005, ollowing the decision to initiate the ormal negotiation process, constitutes

Negative and ambiguous signals

originating rom the EU and“the West” in general were o critical importance in swingingthe pendulum away romurkey’s Europeanization drive




39

urther testimony to the importance o

the kind o powerul signals that rapidprogress in meeting the ormal EU cri-teria helped to provide to key economicactors.

Te second important maniestationo the golden age period came in therealm o democratization. Here urkey made important strides, progressing

rom a ormal representative democra-cy toward a consolidated or substantive democracy during this period. Criticalreorm packages introduced by the Parliament represented important advances,dramatically extending the boundaries o civil and human rights as well as therule o law in urkish politics. Te abolition o the death penalty and the stepstaken towards the recognition o Kurdish identity are particularly striking ele-ments o reorm in this context. Te reorm process initiated steps in the directiono a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem by ofering a set o cultural rightswhich involved the use o the Kurdish language or education and broadcastingpurposes. Tis rights-based discourse represented a undamental break with whathad been the dominant approach o the urkish state elites: a tendency to view the Kurdish problem primarily in economic and security terms. Tere is no doubtthat the kind o democratization reorms that passed through the Parliament dur-ing this period would have been inconceivable in the absence o powerul in-centives and pressures rom the EU, particularly given the strong resistance romnationalist circles which tended to view such reorms as an existentialist threat tothe unity o the urkish state.5

Te third broad realm in which the ormal Europeanization process appears tohave made a proound impact is urkey’s oreign policy behavior. Te emphasis o urkish oreign policy during this period shied quite dramatically towards theuse o “so power” resources.6 Whilst the EU process constituted a centerpieceo urkish oreign policy, there was also an explicit attempt to develop a multi-dimensional oreign policy, popularized by the slogan o “zero problems” with allneighboring countries.7 Indeed, there was an attempt to improve relations with allneighbors during this period, and urkey made signicant progress toward im-

proving relations with countries such as Greece and Syria with whom urkey hadhad problematic relations in the past. Similarly, signicant eforts were made todevelop relations with Russia and the Black Sea neighbors. Tis is also the period

Te ailure o the EU to ulll

its promises to the urkishCypriots in return or theircooperative attitude toward

resolving the Cyprus conictalong the lines o the UN planor reuniying the island came

as yet another major blow



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

40

in which urkey undertook important

initiatives to improve relations with theArab Middle East and to increase urkishpresence in the Islamic world by actively participating in the Islamic ConerenceOrganization. Yet another striking ea-ture o urkey’s oreign policy behaviorduring this period, and a central eatureo the AK Party era in general, involved

the push to nd an internationally acceptable solution to the Cyprus dispute along

the lines o the Annan Plan. Tis represented quite a dramatic departure romthe established policy stance o the urkish state. What is also remarkable duringthis period is the democratization o oreign policy itsel. urkish oreign policy is no longer monopolized by a limited number o state actors. New actors such asbusiness associations and civil society groups have emerged as active participantsin the oreign policymaking process. Furthermore, oreign policy issues are now open to public debate, and previously xed positions on a number o issues, in-cluding Cyprus, relations with Armenia, and Kurds in Northern Iraq, are being

challenged in the process. Hence, in a nutshell, all these elements put togethersigniy a very signicant shi in the direction o urkey’s emergence as a benignregional power which would not have been possible – at least over such a limitedperiod – in the absence o an ongoing, deep Europeanization and democratizationprocess.8

What Went Wrong? Explaining the Loss of Momentum

In analyzing urkey-EU relations during the AK Party era we may identiy two

distinct sub-phases. Te rst phase, rom the end o 2002 to roughly the end o 2005, corresponds to the Golden Age o Europeanization in urkey. During thisperiod, the AK Party government built on the oundations laid by the previouscoalition government and pushed single-mindedly or urkey’s ull membershipand the associated set o economic and democratization reorms. Although thereappears to be a signicant degree o continuity with respect to oreign policy ac-tivism during the post-2005 era, the second sub-phase corresponds to a certainloss o enthusiasm and commitment on the part o the government to what hadpreviously been the ocal point o urkish oreign policy eforts, namely joining

the EU as a ull member. Indeed, one may go urther and argue that the oreignpolicy stance o the AK Party government in the post-2005 era deviated rom anall-out Europeanization drive, to a possible retreat, to what could be described as

Te “urkey question”

is a reection o deeperuncertainties and ears inEuropean societies and theproblems that they ace inadapting themselves to thepressures o globalization




41

a kind o “loose Europeanization” or “so Euro-Asianism” strategy.9

o an outside observer, the loss o enthusiasm or the EU membership projectin urkey both on the part o the government and the public at large within ashort space o time represents quite a paradox and deserves an explanation. In-deed, there was no single turning point, but several interrelated turning points: anumber o actors were at work to bring about this dramatic change o mood bothon the part o the AK Party elite as well as the public at large. Te intense debategenerated in the aermath o the Brussels Summit o 2004 concerning urkey’sEuropean credentials, particularly in core EU countries such as France and Ger-

many, helped to initiate a serious nationalist backlash in urkey, and strengthenedthe standing o anti-EU, anti-reorm groups both within the state and in society at large. urkish media representations o Europe as a monolithic bloc also con-tributed to this change o mood. Te increasing questioning o the very basis o urkish membership and urkey’s European credentials by inuential politicalgures at the very core o Europe such as Sarkozy in France and Merkel in Ger-many at a time when the decision to open up accession negotiations had already been taken made a deep impact in terms o inuencing this change o mood inurkish domestic politics. Indeed, public support or EU membership dropped

strikingly rom a peak o 74% in 2002 to around 50% by 2006 and 2007.10 Te actthat Europe was also going through an international constitutional stalemate, asevidenced by the rejection o the proposed Constitutional reaty in the Frenchand Dutch reerenda, injected an additional dose o pessimism. Again, media rep-resentations or misrepresentations o the constitutional crisis in urkey contrib-uted to growing Euro-skepticism by helping to project the EU as an unattractive,crisis-ridden project.

Some o the key decisions o the EU concerning urkish accession also exer-

cised a proound impact in terms o undermining enthusiasm at the elite level andamong the public at large. Te rst o these was the clause on the possibility o per-

manent saeguards on ull labor mobility ollowing urkey’s accession to the EU as a

ull member.11 Tis clause immediately generated criticism even among the most vocal supporters o urkey’s EU membership as a clear case o unair treatment.12 Whilst a temporary saeguard on labor mobility, such as the seven year transi-tion period on the new Eastern European members, was quite understandable,the imposition o a permanent saeguard efectively meant that urkey would be

relegated to second division status and a special partner position even i it were tobecome a ull member.

On top o the labor mobility issue, the ailure o the EU to ulll its promises to



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

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the urkish Cypriots in return or their

cooperative attitude toward resolvingthe Cyprus conict along the lines o theUN plan or reuniying the island cameas yet another major blow. Te EU’s ail-ure to deal with the Cyprus problem onan equitable basis was increasingly in-terpreted, even among key members o

the pro-EU, pro-reorm coalition in urkey, as yet another case o unair treat-ment. Te act that the negotiations process was partially suspended due to the

Cyprus dispute and specically to Cyprus’s ailure to open its ports to vessels romthe Republic o Cyprus proved to be the ultimate blow in this context. Te EU’sunbalanced approach to the Cyprus dispute appeared to conrm widely-held per-ceptions among the urkish elites and the general public that Cyprus was beingused to place yet another obstacle in the path o urkey’s ull membership, theimportant point being that the Cyprus issue was in itsel not critical and was beingused as an instrument o exclusion.

Te negative external environment originating rom the EU ront was ampli-ed by a process o steady deterioration in relations with the United States, whosestrategic partnership had traditionally been a key element in urkey’s relationswith the EU.13 Te growing instability in Iraq and the human costs o the IraqWar were interpreted as a direct consequence o American unilateralism and ag-gression; this perception contributed to a major increase in anti-American andanti-West sentiments, given the act that culturally there is no strong demarcationbetween “Europe” and the United States as distinct entities in the urkish context.Te mutually reinorcing tendency is to view the EU and the US as part o the

same, mutually interlocking “West” or Western civilization.

While the negative and ambiguous signals originating rom the EU and “theWest” in general were o critical importance in swinging the pendulum away romurkey’s Europeanization drive, important domestic actors were also at work. Akey element in this context was the weakening commitment o the AK Party lead-ership to the goal o ull EU membership. We should take into account here theIslamist roots o the AKP. Tere is no doubt that the party has signicantly trans-ormed itsel as it has progressively moved to the very “center” o urkish poli-

tics; this became even more evident in the context o the 2007 general electionswhereby liberal representation within the AK Party increased markedly. Yet oneshould not orget the act that one o the core issues on the party’s political agenda

Euro-skeptics in urkey eel

that European integration andits associated conditions willtend to undermine the unity and the secular nature o theurkish state




43

is that o “religious reedoms.” It can be argued that the party leadership real-

ized, through encounters with some o the key decisions o the European Courto Human Rights, that the domain o action or a religion-based party within theEU is clearly circumscribed.14 Tis insight might also have been instrumental inreshaping the attitudes o the party leadership to the question o EU membership.Whatever the case may be, evidence o a loss o enthusiasm is evident in the actthat the AK Party government has not actively pushed or some o the key reormsemphasized by the EU.

Te elections o July 2007 represented a major opportunity or the AK Party to

revitalize urkey’s Europeanization and reorm agenda. Te party emerged romthe election with an even larger coalition o support and this broad-based publicsupport could have been utilized to reactivate a large-scale reorm agenda. rue,certain steps have been undertaken to modiy the notorious article 301 o the pe-nal code and new legislation has been introduced to protect the rights o urkey’snon-Muslim minorities. However, these measures have been implemented in arather deensive and lukewarm manner. Given its broad mandate, the governmentcould have taken more radical steps such as abolishing article 301 o the penal

code altogether. Likewise, opening the Halki Seminary could have represented amajor move in terms o recognizing the rights o Christian minorities. Instead,with an exaggerated sense o its own power and a diminished sense o the impor-tance o the EU anchor, the party leadership clearly missed an opportunity dur-ing the all o 2007. Te proposal involving a new constitution was an importantreorm initiative very much in line with the spirit o EU conditionality. Yet insteado pushing or a new constitution in a vigorous manner and trying to orge thekind o societal consensus needed to render such a radical project workable, theparty’s ocus increasingly shied towards the promotion o undamental religious

reedoms such as allowing emale students to wear the headscar in the universi-ties. Arguably, the crucial mistake here was to present these issues in an isolatedashion in the orm o a constitutional amendment and not as part o a broaderreorm package. Te party’s narrow ocus, in turn, helped to create a very seriousbacklash and even alienated liberal opinion which had hitherto been quite sup-portive o the AK Party’s reormist and moderate credentials.

Ironically, the optimistic mood o the immediate post-election era was re-placed by a serious re-polarization o urkish society, culminating in the court

case against the AK Party in the early part o 2008 on the grounds that it had violated the very basis o urkey’s secular constitutional order. Te consequenceso these developments or urkey-EU relations have been rather negative. From a



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

44

European perspective, this set o events

appeared to raise undamental questionsabout urkey’s democratic credentialsand has clearly empowered those mem-bers o European society committed toexcluding urkey on the grounds o cul-ture and identity, whilst leaving Europe’spro-urkey actions in a highly deen-sive position. Te eventual verdict o theConstitutional Court in the summer o

2008 did not involve the closure o theAK Party, although the party did receive

a serious warning and aced monetary penalties. Ultimately, the Court’s decisionhelped to reverse the high degree o uncertainty which the case had generated,and brought an air o stability back into urkish economic and political lie, creat-ing the potential or a new opening in urkey-EU relations.

Back to a Vicious Cycle? Te Emergence of a Grand Coalitionfor a Special Partnership

Tere is no doubt that the EU membership process has enjoyed considerablesupport among diferent groups both in urkey and in Europe. Otherwise, theprocess would not have reached the stage o accession negotiations. In Europe,whilst public support or urkish membership has been weak, there has neverthe-less been strong support among certain sections o the elite depending on their visions o the uture o the EU integration process. Tose elements which havebeen particularly avorable to urkish membership are those that see the uture o the EU moving in a more intergovernmental direction and at the same time envis-age a strong role or the EU as a security actor. Te same elements tend to place a very high premium on the transatlantic alliance and the role o the United States.Hence, not surprisingly, Britain, the new member states and the Scandinaviancountries have emerged as important supporters o urkish membership aspi-rations in recent years. Similarly, urkish membership appears to enjoy across-the-board political support in all major Mediterranean countries with the notableexception o France. With that said, divisions also exist across the political spec-trum in individual countries. Unlike France, or example, both German elite and

German public opinion are divided on the issue o urkish membership. Socialdemocrats, with their more exible and culturally open visions o Europe, tendto be more receptive to urkish membership. It was, aer all, Germany under the

With key chapters or

negotiation already suspended,the government in poweris likely to pursue a looseEuropeanization agendao gradual reorms thatall considerably short o deep commitment to ull

membership




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leadership o Schröder that provided the strongest support or urkish member-

ship in the process leading up to the crucial Helsinki decision o the EU Councilin December 1999.15

Te critical point, thereore, is that the EU is not a monolithic entity and thereis sizeable actual and potential support at the elite level or urkish membershipwhich can be cultivated by urkey’ political elites. Te problem in the currentcontext, however, is that the EU’s pro-urkey coalition has become rather sub-dued and deensive. Similarly, the various elements which have been supporterso EU membership within urkey appeared to have lost much o their enthusiasm

and commitment. In contrast, the opponents o urkey’s EU membership havebecome much stronger and more vocal, and have efectively ormed a grand coali-tion in avor o urkey’s exclusion rom the EU.

On the surace, urkey-skeptics in Europe and Euro-skeptics in urkey tend tobe quite diferent. urkey-skeptics in Europe, strongly embodied in the personali-ties o leaders like Sarkozy and Merkel, hold that urkey is not a natural insiderin a culturally-bounded vision o Europe and the associated deep integration pro-cess. Euro-skeptics in urkey, on the other hand, eel that European integration

and its associated conditions will tend to undermine the unity and the secularnature o the urkish state.16 Looking beneath the surace, however, one can iden-tiy common elements. In both cases, a politics o ear, specically the ear o ragmentation, appears to be a central actor. In the European context, these earsare based on the expectation that urkish accession will serve to ragment Europeand jeopardize its urther cohesion and governability. Te negative outcomes areexpected to maniest themselves both in the cultural realm, by undermining thecultural homogeneity o Europe, as well as in the economic realm, with massivemigration rom urkey resulting in a loss o jobs on a grand scale or established

European citizens. Te second common element is that those who support a spe-cial partnership or urkey are those who stand to lose the most rom the global-ization process.

Crucial developments in the internal politics o Europe over the past ew yearshave undoubtedly made a deep, negative impact on urkish membership pros-pects. One o the striking developments in Europe in recent years has been thedevelopment o right-wing populism based on the ears o immigration and losso jobs uelled by the rise o Islamophobia.17 Tere is no doubt that the events o

9/11 have le a deep imprint on the European landscape and have clearly helpedto uel anti-Muslim sentiments at the level o the general public. Te clear swing o the pendulum toward right o center, Christian Democratic parties in recent years



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

46

has also generated an unattractive environment or urkish membership and has

helped to corner supporters o urkish membership both at home and abroad ina heavily deensive position. What is important to recognize, however, is that the“urkey question” is a reection o deeper uncertainties and ears in Europeansocieties and the problems that they ace in adapting themselves to the pressureso globalization.

Looking to the Future: Grounds for Optimism

Te prospects o urkey’s ambitions or ull EU membership do not appear tobe very bright in the current conjuncture. Te “grand coalition or special part-nership” appears to be rmly entrenched. Perhaps even most worrisome, on thetop o the dramatic decline in public support or EU membership in urkey, is theloss o enthusiasm on the part o the liberal, pro-European elites or the EU mem-bership process. With key chapters or negotiation already suspended, the gov-ernment in power is likely to pursue a loose Europeanization agenda o gradualreorms that all considerably short o deep commitment to ull membership. Tepursuit o a loose Europeanization agenda, needless to say, is perectly consistentwith the vision o a privileged partnership.

Tere is no doubt that the EU membership process or urkey has lost much o its early momentum. Yet there are important developments that could make onemore optimistic about the uture. First, the act that the Constitutional Court caseagainst the governing party did not end in a decision to ban the party constitutes,rom a short-term perspective, a avorable development. Te outcome o the courtcase against the AK Party could have had very serious destabilizing consequenc-es or domestic politics and the economy, as well as or the uture trajectory o urkey-EU relations. In European circles, a decision to close the party could have

been interpreted as a major breakdown o democratic order in urkey with thenatural consequence o suspending the negotiation process altogether. It wouldthen have been very dicult to revitalize the negotiation process. Second, thechange o government in Southern Cyprus, and more recently, the re-initiation o ormal negotiations or the reunication o the island have helped to create a new climate o hope or an equitable settlement o the Cyprus dispute. Although it istoo early to predict the nal outcome, there is at least a possibility that it will bepositive, a result that would then help to eliminate a major hurdle on the path o

urkey’s progress towards EU accession.European integration and urkey-EU relations are both long-term historical

processes. In spite o serious ups and downs and periodic crises along the way, the




47

long-term trend has clearly been in the

direction o deepening both the EU’s in-ternal integration process and urkey’sintegration process with the EU. Long-term historical processes are dicult toreverse, and reversal becomes particu-larly dicult once the critical decisionis taken to initiate EU negotiations witha candidate country. Indeed, no country has reached the point o negotiations and then ailed to qualiy as a ull member.

Having set the target o ull membership as a long-term goal and having investedso much in one another, ending up with anything less than ull integration willrepresent a sense o ailure and a certain loss o credibility on both sides. Hence,a sense o historical perspective tends to inject an air o optimism regarding theuture course o the integration process as well as the possibility o urkish acces-sion to the EU as a ull member.

Te current constitutional crisis in the EU may ironically create an opportu-nity or urkey. Clearly what is at stake in the constitutional debate is the uturedirection o the European project. I the outcome o the constitutional crisis is thedevelopment o the EU more in the direction o what Jan Zielonka calls a loosely structured “medieval empire” (which is broadly consistent with the British visionrather than the kind o deep integration project avored by the French), this willnaturally embody very signicant implications or the uture place o urkey inthe European context.18 I the uture path o the EU does involve a British-styleintegration process o a relatively loose, intergovernmental Europe with relatively exible boundaries that allow signicant scope or national autonomy, the pros-

pects or urkish accession will be considerably improved. In contrast, i the pre- vailing style o integration is based on the French project o deep integration – theidea o Europe as a “place” with xed boundaries as opposed to a exible “space” –the natural inclination will be to include urkey as an “important outsider” ratherthan a “natural insider” in a special partnership arrangement. Our interpretationo the current constitutional impasse in Europe that reached a peak with the nega-tive vote in the Irish reerendum o June 2008 is that the dominant tendency in theoreseeable uture is likely to conorm to the rst scenario, i.e. exible integration,

which clearly constitutes a development in urkey’s avor.In the current conjuncture, the EU is clearly sufering rom enlargement atigue

having absorbed ten new members in 2004 and two additional members in 2007.

Long-term historical processes

are dicult to reverse, andreversal becomes particularly

dicult once the criticaldecision is taken to initiate EU

negotiations with a candidatecountry



ZİYA ÖNİŞ

48

Furthermore, this was the most complex

wave o enlargement to date, involvingthe incorporation o countries with deeplegacies o communist regimes. Again, asense o historical perspective suggests,however, that the current enlargementatigue is unlikely to be a permanentphenomenon. Within the course o the

next ve to ten years, the EU may again nd itsel in the midst o a new wave o enlargement that would involve expansion towards the Balkans and Eastern Eu-

rope at the same time. Tere is already strong support or urther enlargement o the EU towards the East among the new member states. Te Poles, or example,have emerged as vocal supporters o Ukrainian membership. In a world o Rus-sian assertion, given the solid base o support or urther eastward enlargementamong the new member states, both or cultural and security reasons, it is highly probable that a new wave o enlargement will take place in the medium-term.Once this process gathers momentum, it might be dicult to exclude urkey romthe ongoing dynamic.

A avorable external environment or enlargement is quite crucial or revital-izing urkish membership aspirations in the medium term. A avorable externalcontext per se, however, is insucient and needs to be accompanied by a paral-lel process: the emergence o a strong political movement at home that is deeply committed to the reorm process and to EU membership. Clearly, a crucial ele-ment in this context will be the position o the secular middle classes in urkey. I these groups in urkish society eel that ull membership in the EU is a necessary anchor or preserving a liberal constitutional order and preventing their margin-

alization in an increasingly conservative urkish society, they may create the im-petus or the emergence o a political movement which, in turn, could capitalizeon a possible wave o urther enlargement to successully press or urkey’s inclu-sion in the EU as a ull member.

Endnotes1. See, in this context, Loukas soukalis, What Kind o Europe? ( New York: Oxord University

Press, 2003).2. For the details o this process see, Ziya Öniş and Caner Bakır, “urkey’s Political Economy in

the Age o Financial Globalization: Te Signicance o the EU Anchor,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 147-164; and Kemal Derviş, Michel Emerson, Daniel Gros

urkey needs to cultivate not

only elite support, but alsosupport at the level o theindividual citizens o Europein order to accomplish its long-term goal o EU membership




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and Sinan Ülgen, Te European ransormation o Modern urkey (Brussels: Center or EuropeanPolicy Reorm, 2004).

3. Mehmet Uğur, Te European Union and urkey: An Anchor/Credibility Dilemma (Aldershot:Ashgate, 1999).

4. See Öniş and Bakır, “urkey’s Political Economy in the Age o Financial Globalization: TeSignicance o the EU Anchor” or urther details.

5. For detailed treatment o the democratization reorms see Ergun Özbudun and Serap Yazıcı,Democratization Reorms in urkey (Istanbul: ESEV Yayınları, 2004); Senem Aydın and E. FuatKeyman, “Europeanization and the ransormation o urkish Democracy”, CEPS Working Paper,No. 6072 (Brussels: Center or European Policy Reorm, 2004); and Meltem Müüler-Baç, “urkey’sPolitical Reorms: Te Impact o the European Union,” South European Society and Politics, Vol. 10,No. 1 (April, 2005), pp. 16-30.

6. For a detailed treatment see Kemal Kirişçi, “urkish Foreign Policy in urbulent imes,”Chaillot Paper, No: 92 (Paris: EU Institute or Security Studies, 2006). See also the special issue o Insight urkey (urkey’s Rising So Power) Vol. 10, No. 2 (2008).

7. Tis slogan provided the inspiration or the AK Party’s oreign policy. For the intellectual ba-sis o urkey’s changing oreign policy during this period see Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik.

ürkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).

8. On the distinction between benign and coercive regional power see Ziya Öniş and ŞuhnazYılmaz, “Te urkish-EU-US riangle in Perspective: ransormation or Continuity?,” Te Middle

East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 2 ( Spring, 2005), pp. 265-284.

9. For a detailed elaboration see Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, “Between Europeanization andEuro-asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in urkey during the AKP Era,” orthcoming in urkish

Studies (Spring, 2009).

10. Euro-barometer results indicate public support or EU membership o slightly over 50% orJuly 2007. Te results are available at http://ec.europe.eu/public-opinion/index_en.htm.

11. For a good discussion o the negotiating ramework and its limitations rom a urkish pointo view, see Kemal Kirişçi, “Te December 2004 European Council Decision on urkey: Is it anHistoric urning Point?,” Te Middle East Review o International Afairs, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December2004).

12. See E. Fuat Keyman and Senem Aydın, “Te Principle o Fairness in urkey-EU Relations,”urkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 3 (Fall, 2004), pp. 83-85.

13. See Öniş and Yılmaz, “Te urkish-EU-US riangle in Perspective: ransormation or Con-tinuity?,” pp. 265-284 or urther elaboration.

14. In the case o Leyla Şahin versus urkey o June 2004, the European Court o Human Rightsdecided in avor o urkey. Te banning o headscarves at the University o Istanbul did not violateArticle 9 o the European Convention on Human Rights.

15. For a detailed treatment o the components o the pro-urkey coalition within the EU seeZiya Öniş, “urkey’s Encounters with the New Europe: Multiple transormations, Inherent Dilem-mas and the Challenges Ahead,” Journal o Southern Europe and the Balkans, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Decem-ber, 2006), pp. 279-298.

16. See Hakan Yılmaz, “urkish Populism and the Anti-EU Rhetoric,” Perceptions and Misper-ceptions in the EU and urkey: Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession (Leiden, Holland: Centreor European Security Studies (CESS) and urkey Institute, June 2008.)

17. For a good analysis with special reerence to the Dutch context, see Rene Cuperus, “Europe’s



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Revolt o Populism and the urkish Question,” Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and urkey:Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession (Leiden, Holland: Centre or European Security Studies(CESS) and urkey Institute, June 2008.)

18. Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire. Te Nature o the Enlarged European Union (New York:

Oxord University Press, 2006).

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