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HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Human Rights Quarterly35 (2013) 132 2013 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

To see Themselves as Others seeThem: The Five Permanent Memersof the Security Council an the HumanRights Councils Universal Perioic

Revie

Rhona Smith*

AbSTRACT

The ve permanent members o the United Nations Security Council (indeedall UN member states) have completed the rst cycle o the United NationsHuman Rights Councils universal periodic review o their compliance withhuman rights. While they were treated the same rom a procedural pointo view, this new mechanism represented a unique opportunity or otherUN member states to examine the permanent ves human rights records,commenting thereon. Thus the interactive dialogue and resulting recom-mendations presented a unique opportunity to see themselves as others seethem. Will they have liked what they saw?

I. INTROdUCTION

France, the Peoples Republic o China, the Russian Federation, the UnitedKingdom o Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States1exercise unique power and infuence within the United Nations organiza-tion by virtue o their status as permanent members o the United Nations

* Rhona Smith is Proessor o Human Rights at Northumbria University. She has held previ-ous permanent or part-time appointments at various universities include Beijing University,Robert Gordon University, Strathclyde University, and the University o Western Ontario.1. Hereinater France, China, Russian Federation, UK, and US.

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Vol. 352 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Security Council.2 Their right to veto3 within the Security Council means thatmany major decisions, including membership applications4 and any enorce-ment action authorized by the United Nations, must be agreed upon by all

ve or at least not objected to by one or more.5

The adoption o SecurityCouncil Resolution 1973 on Libya in 2011 demonstrates the considerablediplomatic negotiations that precede the tabling o many resolutions.6 Inthat instance, the Russian Federation and China abstained thereby allowingthe resolution to pass.

Inevitably there are periodic calls or changes to the permanent mem-bership o the Security Council in order to refect more accurately the UNregional groupings, or to represent a broader range o power, wealth, or similaractors.7 Proactivity in protecting and promoting human rights has not been

identied as a salient actor in that particular debate, but the perormanceo the current permanent members therein is checkered. Today each perma-nent member accepts international human rights albeit to a greater or lesserdegree than other states. Their perormance is rarely compared, but since2008, along with every other UN member state, the ve permanent memberstates have engaged with an innovative new mechanism or considering statecompliance with norms o international human rights: universal periodicreview (UPR). By virtue o this mechanism, every state has the opportunityto review the human rights perormance o every other UN member state.

2. U.N. Charter art. 23, signed26 June 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153(entered into orce24 Oct. 1945).

3. Id. art. 27.4. Id. art. 4, 1. Admission is decided by the General Assembly on the recommendation

o the Security Council. On membership o the UN and human rights criteria, see, orexample, Alison Duxbury, The PArTiciPATionof sTATesin inTernATionAl orgAnisATions: The roleof humAn righTsAnD DemocrAcy 89 passim(2011).

5. One or more permanent members may elect to abstain, thus acilitating the adoptiono the measure i the requisite majority o the ull membership o the Security Council

so votes (concurrence is inerred rom a non-negative vote). U.N. Charter, supra note2, art. 27.6. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. SCOR, 6498th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (17 Mar. 2011).7. SeeuniTeD nATions, A more secure WorlD: our shAreD resPonsibiliTy 80, 248 (2004),

available athttp://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pd (with models or expansion opermanent membership proposed). See also David M. Malone, Security Council, inThe oxforD hAnDbook on The uniTeD nATions (Thomas Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007);Edward C. Luck, Principal Organs, in supra; Christopher Hill, The European Dimensiono the Debate on UN Security Council Membership, 4 inTl sPecTATor 31 (2005); ThomasG. Weiss, The Illusion o UN Security Council Reorm, 26 WAsh. Q. 147, 155 (2003);Thomas G. Weiss & Karen E. Young, Compromise and Credibility: Security Council Re-orm?, 36 sec. DiAlogue 131 (2005); Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposals or UN Security Council

Reorm, 99 Am. J. inTl l. 632 (2005); Ian Hurd, Myths o Membership: The Politics oLegitimation in UN Security Council Reorm, 14 globAl governAnce 199 (2008); AlbertVenter, Reorm o the United Nations Security Council: A Comment on the South A-rican Position, 20 inTl J. WorlD PeAce 29 (2003); Mussarat Jabeen, Indian Aspiration oPermanent Membership in the UN Security Council and American Stance, 25 s. AsiAnsTuD. 237 (2010).

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2013 To see Themselves as Others see Them 3

For the ve permanent members o the Security Council, this proved to bea unique and not necessarily an entirely positive experience.

To acilitate an examination o the review experience, this article will

begin by briefy charting the involvement o each permanent member statein the evolution o contemporary international human rights. Thereater, theUPR process will be outlined, identiying the standards which states arebeing measured against therein. The extent to which the ve permanentmembers meet objective standards o international human rights will thenbe discussed beore a brie analysis o the more subjective comments andrecommendations made during the UPR. Responses to these comments willalso be considered. Finally, some thoughts on the experiences o the vestates seeing themselves as others see them as regards to compliance with

human rights; the permanent ve are not regarded as beacons o humanrights compliance.

II. THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMbER STATES OF THE UNITEdNATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL ANd HUMAN RIGHTS:A HISTORICAL REVIEw

Contemporary international human rights discussed in this article date rom

the oundation o the United Nations and the drating o the Universal Dec-laration o Human Rights (UDHR). The Economic and Social Council estab-lished a Commission on Human Rights with the express task o tabulatingundamental rights and reedoms and writing an international bill o rightsor the new world order.8 Each o the ve permanent member states o theSecurity Council participated in this process through their representativesin the working group drating the declaration: Peng Chun rom China, RenCassin rom France, Georey Wilson rom the United Kingdom, EleanorRoosevelt rom the United States, and Vladimir Korestsky rom the then

Union o Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).9 Achieving agreement betweenall participating states proved a challenging task.10 Dierent ideological viewsexpressed by members on socioeconomic rights and civil and political rightsdivided the Commission and tore apart the work o the Commission andthe United Nations or decades thereater.11 In 1948, the division becameapparent when the USSR and a number o states, primarily rom the Soviet

8. Report o the Committee on the Organization o the Economic and Social Council, U.N.

ESCOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/20 (1946).9. The Russian Federation replaced the USSR as permanent member on the Security Council

ollowing the dissolution o the USSR.10. On the drating process, seeJohAnnes morsink, The universAl DeclArATionof humAn righTs:

origins, DrAfTing, AnD inTenT 5 (1999).11. Id.

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bloc, abstained rom voting in avor o the UDHR, which was adopted bythe General Assembly at that time.12

In human rights terms, the adoption o the UDHR proved to be the pin-

nacle o progress or some twenty years. While apartheid in South Arica,decolonization, and the United States civil rights movement combined toprompt the comparatively swit adoption o the Convention on the Elimina-tion o all orms o Racial Discrimination, it took until 1966 or the text othe two international covenants drawn rom the UDHR to be adopted, and aurther ten years or these instruments to attract sucient ratications to enterinto orce.13 Even then, there was a marked dierence in ratications o thetwo instruments, a dierence which has been eroded over the interveningyears. To date neither China nor the United States have accepted both these

core treaties. The United States declared position became that human rightswere adequately entrenched in their constitution, thus the international provi-sions were superfuous.14 The USSR, at the time, accepted the undamentalnature o socioeconomic rights but rejected civil and political rights as beingideologically grounded in principles o democracy, thus contrary to com-munism.15 The other states overtly embraced human rights treaties but addedcaveats in the orm o reservations and declarations, thereby underminingthe ecacy o their purported commitment to the rhetoric o the treaty.16

To an extent, the permanent ve member states seemed to be o much

the same opinion, that other states needed international human rights, butnot them. France boldly declared there were no minorities in France; the

12. Universal Declaration o Human Rights, adopted10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III),U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948) [hereinater UDHR]. Byelorus-sian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Union o SouthArica, and Yugoslavia abstained.

13. International Convention on the Elimination o All Forms o Racial Discrimination, ad-opted21 Dec. 1965, G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 660 U.N.T.S. 195

(entered into orce4 Jan. 1969), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Covenanton Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI),U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., art. 2(2), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (enteredinto orce3 Jan. 1976); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted16Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into orce23 Mar. 1976).

14. For discussions on this, see Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human RightsTreaties: Race Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 chinese J. inTl l. 321,32122 (2010).

15. The Russian Federation took a dierent position and has since ratied the Covenant onCivil and Political Rights. Additionally, it is a member o the Council o Europe and ac-cepts its civil and political rights-based Convention on the Protection o Human Rights

and Fundamental Freedoms.16. The existence o such reservations remains controversial. See, e.g., General Comment

No. 24, General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon Ratifcationor Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to theDeclarations Under Article 41 o the Covenant, adopted2 Nov. 1994, U.N. GAOR,Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994).

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Soviet Union did likewise.17 Despite the growing number o complaintsagainst the United Kingdom beore the European Court o Human Rights,which supervises state compliance with civil and political rights enshrined

in the European Convention or the Protection o Human Rights, the UnitedKingdom considered its national legal situation suciently robust to protectrights. Thereore, the United Kingdom continued to reject individual com-munications beore the UN treaty monitoring bodies.18 The United Statesadopted a decidedly ambivalent approach, ailing to ratiy internationalhuman rights treaties while insisting that other states, or example, its tradepartners, improve their human rights records. In a broader context, however,during the decades ater the adoption o the UDHR, Chinas population wasacing the challenges o the Cultural Revolution, France and the United

Kingdom were regularly testing nuclear weapons in the South Pacic region,and the USSR and United States were engaged in an arms race and periodicindirect conrontationsnot activities conducive to promotion and protec-tion o universal human rights.

Universal human rights attracted wider interest again only ater the 1993Vienna World Conerence Declaration and Plan o Action,19 the UnitedNations Millennium Declaration,20 and the dissolution o the Soviet bloc(thereby ending the divisive Cold War period). However, this change wasarguably more at the behest o the decolonized states and newly independent

territories, rather than a positive concerted endorsement o the permanentve Security Council member states.

In the twenty-rst century, the permanent member states have elected toenter into periods o dialogue on human rights inter se, as well as engaging

17. Decision o the Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the Inter-national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Thirty-Seventh Session ConcerningCommunication No. 220/1987, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., U.N. Doc.

CCPR/C/37/D/220/1987 (1989). Declaration in respect o Article 27 International Cov-enant on Civil and Political Rights: In the light o article 2 o the Constitution o theFrench Republic, the French Government declares that article 27 is not applicable soar as the Republic is concerned. Id. app. 2. The government o the Union o SovietSocialist Republics stated that in the Soviet Union, there are no population groupswhich could be regarded as ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities whose rights re-quire special protection in the sense indicated in the plan or the study prepared bythe Special Rapporteur. frAncesco cAPoTorTi, sTuDyonThe righTsof Persons belongingToeThnic, religiousAnD linguisTic minoriTies 8 (1991).

18. European Convention or the Protection o Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,opened or signature4 Nov. 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 (entered intoorce3 Sept. 1953).

19. Vienna Convention on the Law o Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969), 1155U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into orce27 Jan. 1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). Seealso, Susan Marks, Nightmare and Noble Dream: The 1993 World Conerence on Hu-man Rights, 53 cAmbriDge l. J. 54, 5455 (1994).

20. United Nations Millennium Declaration, adopted18 Sept. 2000, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N.GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (2000) [hereinater: Millennium Declaration].

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in human rights perormance reviews and dialogues elsewhere. The UnitedStates annually publishes human rights reports on states around the worldto which China responds with its own, inevitably rather damning, review o

human rights in the United States.

21

The United States, the United Kingdom,and France have dialogues with China on, inter alia, human rights. Franceand the United Kingdom, as members o the Council o Europe regionalhuman rights system (o which the Russian Federation is also a member)and the European Union, regularly exchange views on human rights interse and in dialogues with third parties.22

In recent years, terrorism has proven a challenge to human rights orall ve states. The United States remains entangled in a web o allegationso human rights violations concerning Guantanamo Bays Camp Delta and

the use o military orce in Iraq and Aghanistan.23

China is regularly criti-cized or alleged inringements o reedoms o assembly and expression, aswell as or actions taken to quell claimed unrest among Uyghurs o Xizangprovince and Tibetans in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.24 The UnitedKingdom swapped the perceived threat o terrorism associated with Irishrepublicanism last century or a perceived broader threat rom extremistgroups with consequential changes in detention and trial provisions.25 TheRussian Federation was enmeshed in military action in Chechnya and re-cently in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. On the ace o it, this group o ve

states aces a growing number o challenges, and human rights, while usu-

21. Human Rights Record o United States in 2010, xinhuA (Mu Xuequan ed., 10 Apr. 2011),available athttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/10/c_13822287.htm.

22. The Russian Federation is also a member o the Council o Europe but is not a membero the European Union. It does not have the same level o human rights dialogue as theUnited Kingdom and France.

23. Press Release, Oce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights, UN ExpertsExpress Concern over Guantanamo Bay Detainees, U.N. Press Release (23 June

2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=6508&LangID=E; Press Release, Oce o the High Commissioner orHuman Rights, Pillay Deeply Disturbed by US Failure to Close Guantanamo Prison,U.N. Press Release (23 Jan. 2012), available athttp://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11772&LangID=E; Promotion and Protection o AllHuman Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including theRight to Development: Report o the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summaryor Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, H.R.C., 11th Sess., Agenda Item 3, U.N. Doc.A/HRC/11/2/Add.5 ( 2009); US Should Articulate Womens Rights Strategy, hum. rTs.WATch (19 Oct. 2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/10/19/aghanistan-us-should-articulate-women-s-rights-strategy.

24. See, e.g., Press Release, Oce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights, UN

Rights Chie Voices Concern over Tensions in Tibet Autonomous Region, U.N.Press Release (14 Mar. 2008), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25980&Cr=arbour&Cr1.

25. For historic perspective, see Clare Feikert, Pre-Charge Detention or Terrorist Suspects:United Kingdom,l. librAryof congress (Oct. 2008), available athttp://www.loc.gov/law/help/uk-pre-charge-detention.php#summary.

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ally present in their rhetoric, is not so evident in reality. There is, o course,some evidence to the contrary.

As noted above, the Russian Federation and China abstained rom the

Security Council resolution authorizing action against Libya in 2011 to en-able the measure to be passed,26 a resolution arguably refecting the Re-sponsibility to Protect doctrine.27 Furthermore, the resolution on sanctionsagainst the Democratic Peoples Republic o Korea 1874 (2009)28 ollowingup on resolution 1718 (2006)29 clearly excludes humanitarian aid romthe sanctions being imposed, illustrating recognition within the SecurityCouncil o the need to consider the eect sanctions may have on the rightso the population.30 These examples indicate the growing tendency o theSecurity Council to be drawn into human rights concerns as inringement

o human rights are increasingly viewed as threatening international peaceand security.31 Accordingly, the Security Council nds itsel engaged withhuman rights on a regular basis.32

At the regional level, France, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Fed-eration are all party to the European Convention on Human Rights, acceptingautomatic jurisdiction or aggrieved individuals beore the European Courto Human Rights in Strasbourg, France. Each has a number o outstand-ing cases pending consideration and several judgments awaiting nationalimplementation. Moreover, the United Kingdom has negotiated opt-outs to

the European Unions Charter on Fundamental Rights. The United States is amember o the Organization o American States (OAS) but, to date, has notaccepted the terms o its Convention on Human Rights. Thereore, complaintscan only be brought against it in terms o the OAS Charter itselthus tothe Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rather than through theregional Convention to the Court.33 When presenting their candidatureor the Human Rights Council, the United States o America commented[i]n particular recognition o its human rights commitments within the

26. S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 6, 3.27. Rebecca J. Hamilton, The Responsibility to Protect: From Documents to Doctrine But

What o Implementation?19 hArv. hum. rTs. J. 289, 28991 (2006).28. S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. SCOR, 6141st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (12 June 2009).29. S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. SCOR, 5551st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (14 Oct. 2006).30. Lessons have thus been learned rom the rat o sanctions imposed on Iraq beore the

US military action in 2003 (ater which sanctions were undamentally changed).31. U.N. Charter, supra note 2, art. 24.32. SeeJulie A. merTus, The uniTeD nATionsAnD humAn righTs: A guiDeforA neW erA 98123

(2d ed., 2009); syDney D. bAiley, The un securiTy councilAnD humAn righTs (1994); Mariano

J. Aznar-Gomez, A Decade o Human Rights Protection by the United Nations SecurityCouncil: A Sketch o Deregulation?, 13 eur. J. inTl l. 223 (2002); Jan Klabbers, TheSecurity Council and Human Rights, in inTernATionAl moniToring mechAnisms: essAys inhonourof JAkob Th. moller 241 (Gudmundur Alredsson et al. eds., 2d ed., 2009).

33. See, e.g., Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States o America, Case 11.140, Inter-Am.C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002).

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Inter-American system, the United States strongly supports the work o theInter-American Commission on Human Rights.34

This brie historical overview indicates the number o challenges the

permanent member states o the Security Council ace with regard to humanrights compliance and preeminence. However, the purpose o this articleis to consider the views o other UN member states, as expressed in theUPR process, the sole mechanism by which every UN member state has itscompliance with human rights and international humanitarian law reviewed.

III. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCILS UNIVERSAL PERIOdIC REVIEwPROCESS

General Assembly Resolution 60/251 sealed the ate o the Commission onHuman Rights, establishing in its place the Human Rights Council.35 Thatresolution also introduced UPR to improve promotion and protection ouniversal human rights in an organization still characterized by disparitiesin approach to human rights and, consequently, in a world where humanrights standards vary dramatically.36 The rhetoric o human rights treatiesand declarations remains ar rom being a reality.37 The basic premiseunderpinning UPR is that all UN member states will be reviewed in the

same manner and by approximately the same criteria.38 Given the claimso bias in the Commission o Human Rights and claims o selectivity by itin electing which states to examine, this universal approach is a welcomedevelopment.39 In the current context it means that the permanent memberstates cannot avoid being subjected to the same process as other states, therenow being parity o treatment.

34. U.S. Human Rights Commitments and Pledges: Fact Sheet, u.s. DePTof sTATe (16 Apr.2009), available athttp://www.state.gov/documents/organization/121976.pd.

35. Resolution on the Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (2006) [hereinater GA Resolution 60/251].

36. Id. 5(e).37. See, e.g., Mary Robinson, From Rhetoric to Reality: Making Human Rights Work, 1 eur.

hum. rTs. l. rev. 1 (2003).38. Institution-building o the United Nations Human Rights Council, H.R.C. Res 5/1 U.N.

GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 5th Sess., 9th mtg., 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/5/1 (2007)[hereinater HRC Resolution 5/1].

39. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights or All, Reporto the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., Agenda Items 45, 55, 182, U.N.Doc. A/59/2005 (2005); Paul Gordon Lauren, To Preserve and Build on its Achieve-ments and to Redress its Shortcomings: The Journey rom the Commission on HumanRights to the Human Rights Council, 29 hum. rTs. Q. 307, 309 (2007).

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The basis or review is stated as being the Charter o the United Nationsand the UDHR, which all members accept,40 along with any human rightsinstruments to which the state is a party and voluntary commitments given

by the state in international oramost notably the statements made bythose states proclaiming their candidacy to the Human Rights Council.41 Thepurpose o this review is an assessment o the human rights situation in eachstate, conducted in an objective, transparent, non-selective, constructive,non-conrontational and non-politicized manner.42 Sharing good practicesamong peers, as well as oering constructive technical assistance and otherorms o capacity building, are cornerstones o the process, which is perhapsto be expected given its structure as an intergovernmental process.

In urtherance o parity, each states review is based on three docu-

ments: a written national report by the state or, i the state elects not to orails to submit one, an oral report; a compilation prepared by the Oce othe High Commissioner or Human Rights o existing treaty body reports,special procedures reports, and similar on the state under review; all materi-als currently in the public domain; and a summary o credible and reliableinormation received by the Oce o the High Commissioner on HumanRights rom other stakeholders.43 A troika, three states selected by lotteryto head up the working group, considers these reports and reviews eachstate. Once the process is complete, the troika reports its ndings to the ull

Human Rights Council.44 The crux o the review process is an interactivedialogue. This is undertaken within the working group and convened by thetroika in accordance with the published schedule. During the dialogue, the

40. This includes the Russian Federation and those states abstaining in the 1948 GeneralAssembly vote.

41. To view voluntary commitments rom the 2006 Human Rights Council applicationsession, see Voluntary Pledges and Commitments on Human Rights, United Kingdom(2006), available at http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/uk.pd; Aide Memoire, China(2006), available at http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/china.pd. For 2008 and 2009,see Letter dated 29 February 2008 rom the Permanent Representative o the UnitedKingdom o Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations Addressed to thePresident o the General Assembly, 62d Sess., Agenda Item 113(d), U.N. Doc. A/62/730(2008); Letter dated 25 March 2008 rom the Permanent Representative o France to theUnited Nations Addressed to the President o the General Assembly, 62d Sess., AgendaItem 113(d), U.N. Doc. A/62/775 (2008); Letter dated 22 April 2009 rom the PermanentRepresentative o the United States o America to the United Nations Addressed to thePresident o the General Assembly, 63rd Sess., Agenda Item 104(c), U.N. Doc. A/63/831(2009); Letter dated 24 March 2009 rom the Permanent Representative o the RussianFederation to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, 63rd Sess., Agenda

Item 104(c), U.N. Doc. A/63/797 (2009); Note verbale dated 27 April 2009 rom thePermanent Mission o China to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretariat, 63rdSess., Agenda Item 104(c), U.N. Doc. A/63/840 (2009).

42. HRC Res. 5/1, supra note 38, 3(g).43. Id. 15.44. Id. 18(d).

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state presents its report then other states are able to comment thereon, makerecommendations, or ask questions. Three hours are allocated or the reviewwith each state commenting or two minutes ollowed by time or the state

under review to respond appropriately. A strictly applied time limit meansthat, on occasion, not all states wishing to comment or ask questions canparticipate in the dialogue.45 At the conclusion o the session, the workinggroup prepares a report on the dialogue and any immediate response theretoo the state. A urther document (usually an addendum to the working groupsreport) contains responses o the state to the recommendations delivered aterconsideration thereo. These documents are orwarded to the ull HumanRights Council, which invariably adopts the outcome o the review as con-stituting the working groups report together with any comments, voluntary

pledges, or similar made by the state in light thereo. The outcome o thereview is a ormulistic, bland statement, virtually identical or each state.46

France, the United Kingdom, China, and the Russian Federation werein avor o the Human Rights Council and sought initial election as mem-bers, thereby holding themselves out to be world leaders in human rights.47Having voted against the enabling General Assembly Resolution 60/251,the United States nally engaged in the process when it sought candidatureor the Council in 2009. Accordingly, when considering UPR, it must beborne in mind that the United States did not participate during the initial

stages.48 In 2011, all ve permanent members o the Security Council heldmembership o the United Nations Human Rights Council. The second andnal terms o oce or France and the United Kingdom expired in 2011; thesecond terms or China and the Russian Federation expire in 2012.49 Thus,the United States will soon be the sole permanent member o the SecurityCouncil also sitting on the Human Rights Council.50

45. This limitation even applies to the ve permanent members o the Security Council. Itis now the practice that states timed out o the interactive dialogue can lodge com-ments on the extranet or the state under review to respond to beore the Human RightsCouncil adopts the outcome o the review.

46. berTrAnD g. rAmchArAn, The un humAn righTs council 122 (2011).47. Membership criteria and procedures or the Human Rights Council are detailed inGA

Resolution 60/251, supra note 35, 89.48. For the views o the Chair o the US House Foreign Aairs Committee on whether the

US should withdraw rom the Council, see, or example, Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Op-Ed,

Money Talks or UN Reorms to Happen, miAmi herAlD, 21 Mar. 2011, available athttp://oreignaairs.house.gov/press_display.asp?id=1765.

49. A staggered system o initial terms was instituted to ensure perpetuity and that therewould be a rolling system o appointments to the Council.

50. States can serve only two consecutive terms o oce. GA Resolution 60/251, supra note35, 7.

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IV. THE FIVE PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMbER STATES ANdTHEIR COMPLIANCE wITH HUMAN RIGHTS GOALS

While the remit o UPR is the ullment by each state o its human rightsobligations and commitments,51 suggesting a comprehensive review ocompliance with core human rights, a number o indicators o progress haveemerged rom the review process. These measures are typically examinedthrough paper documents and statistics available in the public domain, andthus, are easily identiable and relatively objective.

The rst o these indicators is the ratication o core treaties. Universalhuman rights are obviously predicated on global ratication o, and con-sequential respect or, proclaimed universal human rights. Core treaties

are deemed as being the nine identied core human rights treaties o theUnited Nations, the Statute o the International Criminal Court, the GenevaConventions, and the Reugee and Statelessness Conventions.52 There issome evidence o the eight undamental International Labor Organizationconventions also being cited during the review process, though not especiallyin respect o the permanent ve member states. However, or states with astrong indigenous population, mention is usually made o International LaborOrganization Convention No. 16953 and the United Nations Declarationon the Rights o Indigenous Peoples.54 Figure 1 provides inormation on the

permanent member states relevant ratications and accessions regarding thecore treaties. France exhibits the best history o accepting international hu-man rights treaties, ollowed by the United Kingdom, with the United Statesdemonstrating a very low level o acceptance. All ve states retain reserva-tions and declarations, which limit the impact o their treaty acceptances.55

51. Id. 5(e).52. A list o core human rights instruments is provided by the Oce o the United Nations

High Commissioner or Human Rights, available athttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/.

53. Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILONo. 169), adopted27 June 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into orce5 Sept. 1991).

54. Declaration on the Rights o Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. GAOR, 61stSess., U.N. Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007).

55. See liesbeTh liJnzAAD, reservATions To un-humAn righTs TreATies: rATify AnD ruin? (1995);Ryan Goodman Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96Am. J. inTl l. 531 (2002); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (reserva-tions), adopted16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. DocA/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. For commentary on the USposition, see Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratifcation o Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost oSenator Bricker, 89 Am. J. inTl. l. 341 (1995); William A. Schabas, Invalid Reservations

to the International Covenant on Civil andPolitical Rights: Is the United States Still aParty?21 brook J. inTl. l. 277 (1995). For specic inormation on the French Declara-tion (tantamount to a reservation) regarding Article 27 o the ICCPR, see Views o theHuman Rights Committee Under Article 5, Paragraph 4, o the Optional Protocol to theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Communication No. 219/1986,U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ 39/D/219/1986 (23Aug. 1990).

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Second, compliance with the United Nations voluntary human rightsgoals proclaimed by the United Nations Human Rights Council.56 Thesegoals include:

(a) universal ratication o the core international human rights instruments. . . ; (b) strengthening o the legal, institutional and policy ramework at thenational level . . . to ensure the promotion and protection o all human rights;(c) establishment o human rights national institutions . . . ; (d) elaboration onational human rights programmes and plans o action to strengthen the capacityo States to promote and protect human rights; (e) . . . national programmes oaction that . . . [seek to] eliminate discrimination o any kind . . . and all ormso violence against, inter alia, women, children, indigenous populations, migrantsand persons with disabilities; () adoption and implementation o programmes ohuman rights education . . . ; (g) increasing cooperation with all mechanisms othe United Nations human rights system, including special procedures and treatybodies; (h) strengthening o mechanisms to acilitate international cooperationin the eld o human rights.57

The General Assembly suggested that states could report on these during theUPR process. Several states have accepted this suggestion and reerence tothe voluntary goals is a eature o many interactive dialogues. Additionally,General Assembly Resolution 62/149 calls or a moratorium on the deathpenalty as a step towards abolition thereo.58 China and the US unsurprisingly

voted against this sensitive and contentious political issue. Both countries areresolute in adherence to the death penalty in accordance with internationalhuman rights law. To this end, China has now restricted the oenses attract-ing the death penalty to bring their penal code in line with internationallaw, albeit corruption still appears as a capital oense.59 Figure 2 capturesthe position o the ve states in respect o the voluntary goals at the end othe rst cycle o review.

The third consideration is the states progress toward meeting the mil-lennium development goals, which were adopted by the United Nations

General Assembly.60 While axiomatically the goals aim at the less developednations, they remain relevant or all states as they lay down a common stan-dard o achievement to better lives everywhere, and there is hope or moredeveloped states to support less developed states in securing the goals. Inthis respect, the millennium development goals link to one o the voluntary

56. Voluntary human rights goals, H.R.C. Res. 9/12, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 9thSess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/9/12 (2008) [hereinater HRC Resolution 9/12].

57. Id. at 1(a)-(h).58. Moratorium on the use o the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 62/149, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess.,

U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/149 (2008).59. Laney Zhang, China: Death Penalty Crimes to Be Reduced, l. librAryof congress, 31 Aug.

2010, available athttp://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/lloc_news?disp3_l205402201_text.60. Millennium Declaration, supra note 20.

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goals mentioned above, namely international development aid.61 The UnitedNations has a target o 0.7 percent o a states gross national product atmarket prices as an ocial development aid target.62 It must be noted that

China is in a slightly anomalous positionit is a recipient o donor aidwhile simultaneously investing heavily itsel in less developed Arican states.China is the only one o the permanent ve states that is deemed to be ina developing region; the other our are in developed regions. Nevertheless,as the statistics demonstrate, some replicated in Figure 3, recent economicprogress made by China has aected heavily the East Asian statistics ondevelopment, rendering evidence o signicant improvements. The UnitedStates, the United Kingdom, and France are classed as states o very highhuman development by the United Nations Development Programme. The

Russian Federation has high human development, and China has mediumhuman development.During the review process, contributing states regularly reerence rati-

cations, millennium goals, and voluntary goals. However, the time restraintso politics and diplomacy combine to mean that no review is thoroughlycomprehensive in analyzing compliance with all salient human rights obli-gations. Inevitably the snapshot presented is merely indicative o humanrights perormance as perceived by other states and interested parties. Forthe purposes o this article, it does, however, permit some understanding o

how other interested states view the human rights records o the permanentve members o the Security Council.

V. THE VIEwS OF OTHERS: STATE COMMENTS ANdRECOMMENdATIONS

When considered in comparison to other states, it appears that France, theRussian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States attracted

many negative comments, while China attracted primarily positive com-ments.63 Obviously, there are a number o possible reasons or this, not leastthose grounded in international politics and diplomacy. Moreover, the samestates did not necessarily seek to comment on all ve permanent memberso the Security Councilonly Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, Germany, India, Indo-nesia, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland

61. HRC Resolution 9/12, supra note 56, goals 1(h), (j).62. International Development Strategy or the Second United Nations Development Decade,

G.A. Res. 2626 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 42, 43, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2626 (1970).

63. This is based on scoring all comments as positive, neutral, or negative across all reviewsin the rst cycle.

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were successully selected to comment on each o the ve states during theinteractive dialogue reported on by the relevant working groups.64 China,France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom participated in the

interactive dialogue o each others review and that o the United States.

65

The ollowing sections provide an overview o these interactive dialogues,surveying the statements made by delegations and considering the comments(i any) made by other permanent member states.

A. France

The working group on the UPR o France, chaired by the troika o Malay-

sia, Zambia, and Italy, reported to the eighth session o the Human RightsCouncil.66 A total o orty delegations made statements during the interactivedialogue held in preparation o that report.67 These statements oten werequestioning or critical o selected areas o practice in France. Indeed, therewere no resolute positive endorsements o Frances human rights record byany state, although several states were, in eect, neutral, simply asking orclarication or urther inormation68 or balancing positive with negative com-ments.69 Obviously, the categorization o positive versus negative is subjec-tive and predicated on the essence o the comments made by contributing

states, almost all o whose delegates inevitably couch their interventions indiplomatic language.

Interventions made during the review revealed that use had beenmade not only o the national report tendered by France,70 but also o thecompilation prepared by the Oce o the High Commissioner o HumanRights regarding pre-existing international human rights documents on

64. Due to time constraints, Canada was unable to participate in the interactive dialogueor the Russian Federations review, but contributed to all others.65. As noted above, the US initially was not supportive o the Council and its review process.66. Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: France, U.N. GAOR,

Hum. Rts. Council, 8th Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/47 (2008) [hereinaterWorking Group Report France].

67. Id. 9.68. Qatar requested urther inormation on equality provisions and on the balance France

strikes between reedom o expression and protection o religions against deamation.Working Group Report France, supra note 66, 36.

69. Mexico commended Frances promulgated progress on migrants, reiterated concerns oa Special Rapporteur concerning the denition o terrorism and periods o detention o

suspects, and recommended the withdrawal o Frances declaration under Article 124o the Rome Statute o the International Criminal Court. Working Group Report France,supra note 66, 16.

70. National Report Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(A) o the Annex to HumanRights Council Resolution 5/1: France, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 2d Sess., U.N.Doc A/HRC/WG.6/2/FRA/1 (2008).

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France71 and the compilation summarizing the views o contributing stake-holders.72 For example, China commented on a 2008 recommendation madeby the Committee on the Elimination o Discrimination Against Women to

France regarding equal pay or equal work and employment or disabledwomen;73 India raised issues pertaining to religious reedom noted by theSpecial Rapporteur on Freedom o Religion or Belie;74 Germany picked upon comments made by the Committee Against Torture;75 and South Aricainquired o Frances response to comments o the Committee on the Elimi-nation o Racial Discrimination on the position o immigrants, particularlyimmigrant women.76 Given the extensive media attention accorded to Franceslaws prohibiting religious symbols rom being worn in schools, at work, andin other venues, it was inevitable that this issue was commented on exten-

sively, with comments being generally negative.77

This is a prime examplethat reviews sometimes ocus on issues which have achieved a relativelyhigh media coverage. Such a populist approach is arguably problematic,highlighting headline issues rather than less obvious, but nevertheless, un-damental inringements o human rights.

International, regional, and national measures can be considered duringthe review. Indonesia demonstrated the breadth o the process by inquiringabout progress on recommendations made by the Commissioner or Hu-man Rights o the Council o Europe78 while the United States expressed an

interest in Frances response to a particular ruling o the European Court oHuman Rights.79 As the review includes all o a states human rights obliga-tions and commitments, reerence to the European system is permissible. Itdoes, however, raise interesting questions as to the interrelationship betweenthe European and international systems, albeit both arguably have the sameend goal o promoting and protecting international human rights.

With respect to the geographical ocus o the review, Frances overseasterritories and departments were almost omitted rom the process as theRussian Federation and Guatemala were the only states that raised the issue,

71. Compilation prepared by the Ofce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights , inaccordance with paragraph 15(B) o the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution5/1: France, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc A/HRC/WG.6/2/FRA/2(2008).

72. Summary Prepared by the Ofce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights, in ac-cordance with Paragraph 15(C) o the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1:France, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Council, 2d Sess., U.N. Doc A/HRC/WG.6/2/FRA/3(2008).

73. Working Group Report France,supra note 66, 19.

74. Id. 37.75. Id. 30.76. Id. 56.77. Id. 37 (India quoting concerns o UN Special Rapporteur on reedom o religion).

See alsoid. 21 (Canada), 38 (Bangladesh), 47 (Iran), 21.78. Id. 40.79. Id. 32.

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and indeed, inormation thereon is also lacking beore the treaty monitoringbodies.80 This is especially important in the case o France, given that manyormer colonial territories are now included within metropolitan France and

thus only accessible to international comment through the review o France.As with all state reviews, the interactive dialogue did not systematicallycover all core rights and all human rights treaties accepted by France. Nei-ther did it ocus on the same issues as were raised in respect o the otherstates considered herein.

b. The Peoples Repulic of China

The Peoples Republic o China experienced one o the highest numbers ostates wishing to participate in the interactive dialogue115. O these, sixtyparticipated in the interactive dialogue; the remaining ty-ve states wereoered the opportunity to contribute questions and comments through theextranet.81 The strict time limit or each review osters the sense o equalitybetween states by ensuring a degree o parity but inevitably, aects the rigoro the process should only a raction o the states wishing to comment beaorded the direct opportunity to so do.

China noted at the start o proceedings that it is the worlds largest de-

veloping country,82 thereby distinguishing itsel rom the other permanentstates o the Security Council.83 While not necessarily a consequence thereo,the comments made to China were essentially positive, recognizing prog-ress made. Nevertheless, various issues gave rise to concern including thecontinuation o the death penalty, 84 restrictions on reedom o expression85

80. Id. 54 (Russian Federation), 49 (Guatemala). Contrast this with China in whosereport and presentations Hong Kong and Macao were specically represented, albeitthey are in a slightly dierent position.

81. China would subsequently be able to respond to such postings beore the review docu-mentation was considered by the Human Rights Council.

82. Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: China, U.N. GAOR,Hum. Rts. Council, 11th Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/25 (2009) [herein-ater: Working Group Report China]. For the other relevant documentation, see NationalReport Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(A) o the Annex to Human RightsCouncil Resolution 5/1: China, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, Working Group onUniversal Periodic Rev., 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1 (2008); SummaryPrepared by the Ofce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights, in Accordancewith Paragraph 15(C) o the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: PeoplesRepublic o China, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, Working Group on Universal

Periodic Rev., 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/3 (2009).83. See Figure 3 on the UNDP Human Development Index or each permanent member othe Security Council.

84. Working Group Report China, supra note 82, 31 (Switzerland), 42 (UK), 83(New Zealand). Contraid. 36 (Egypt).

85. Id. 82 (Czech Republic), 92 (Sweden).

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and reedom o religion,86 and treatment o minorities within the state.87France drew on the stakeholders reports to query various connementpractices as well as making recommendations on media practices and the

death penalty,

88

while the United Kingdom expressed concern over the useo the death penalty, issues related to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, andmedia reedom.89 In contrast, the Russian Federation was resolutely positivecommending Chinas work in the Human Rights Council, its progress onsocioeconomic rights, its interaction with civil society, its investment in Tibet,and on its progress with the judiciary, penitentiary systems.90

Several states noted perceived politicization o the review processorexample, Algeria regretted the politicization o the human rights situationin China during the review.91 It is perhaps due to this perceived politiciza-

tion that the delegates commenting on China almost invariably couchedtheir statements in positive terms. Economic progress and accompanyingdevelopmental progress proved high on the agenda o delegates. Indeedeconomic and social rights proved the center o discussion, perhaps refectingChinas status as a developing country. Another reason may be simply thatChina has not yet ratied the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, thus reerence to these rights are extracted rom the general humanrights obligations indicated by the UDHR and enshrined in other instrumentsChina has accepted. Perhaps unsurprisingly, European states, Canada, and

New Zealand presented the strongest critiques o Chinas progress in real-izing human rights.92

As was noted with the French review, only selected aspects o Chinasperormance were considered during the dialogue and, not least in light othe claims o politicization, the views expressed were subjectively evaluated.

C. The Unite Kingom of Great britain an Northern Irelan

The United Kingdom was the rst o the permanent ve to undergo the reviewprocess. In stark contrast to what China would experience a ew monthslater, only thirty-eight states sought to participate in the interactive dialogueor the United Kingdom, which is the least number o contributions o the

86. Id. 43 (Germany), 82 (Czech Republic).87. Id. 27 (Australia), 28 (Canada).

88. Id. 56.89. Id. 42.90. Id. 34.91. Id. 33.92. Id. 28 (Canada), 31 (Switzerland ), 42 (UK), 43 (Germany), 56 (France),

82 (Czech Republic), 83 (New Zealand), 92 (Sweden).

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permanent members.93 Issues attracting several comments and recommenda-tions include the relationship between human rights and measures taken inprevention o terrorism,94 policies on discrimination,95 and the ratication

and eect given in national law to international human rights treaties.

96

Therelationship between human rights and preventing terrorism was identiedas a major issue in the United Kingdom, not least with the series o legalchallenges brought beore the national courts and the European court con-cerning the application o UK laws and their compatibility with norms ohuman rights regarding detention.97 It was not only the United Kingdom andEurope which was discussed: Nigeria sought inormation on the extent towhich the United Kingdom protects the rights o Commonwealth nationals.98

Delegates rom the Russian Federation noted that the United Kingdom

should be understanding o the human rights situation in recently decolo-nized countries.99 China, in contrast, restricted itsel to noting the breadtho legislation and measures already in place in the United Kingdom andrequesting urther inormation on the participation o national minorities inpublic lie.100 France queried childrens rights, ocusing on corporal punish-ment, especially in overseas territories, which highlights the United Kingdomas a ormer colonial power.101 France also emphasized poverty reduction,as well as asking or dates on accepting the terms o the Convention onEnorced Disappearances.102

Argentina made extensive comments on the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands,South Georgia and the Sandwich Islands as well as the designation o BritishAntarctic Territory.103 Arguably, this is urther evidence o politicization o thereview process, as occurred with China. Sri Lankas delegation proposed areerendum be held on the desirability or otherwise o a written Constitu-tion preerably republican, which includes a bill o rights, which is a clearpolitical statement on the constitutional monarchy o the United Kingdom104and the act that the United Kingdom remains one o the only states withouta ormal written constitution.

93. Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United Kingdom oGreat Britain and Northern Ireland, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 5th Sess., AgendaItem 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/25 (2008) [hereinater Working Group Report UK].

94. Id. 19 (Cuba), 30 (the Netherlands), 33 (Switzerland), 38 (Sweden), 41(Algeria).

95. Id. 20 (India), 35 (Germany), 39 (Republic o Korea), 43 (China).96. Id. 40 (Azerbaijan), 48 (Egypt), 53 (Indonesia).97. Working group Report UK, supra note 93.98. Id. 44.99. Id. 16.

100. Id. 43.101. This is particularly interesting because as noted above, France did not reerence its

overseas territories in its report.102. Working Group Report UK, supra note 93, 29.103. Id. 51.104. Id. 17.

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The dialogue included a range o additional rights, but inevitably, manyrights and reedoms were omitted and the review was ar rom comprehensive.

d. The Unite States

The United States was last o the permanent members to be reviewed.105 Per-haps unsurprisingly, given the high prole o the United States on the worldstage and its checkered history on engagement with international humanrights treaties and systems, states proved keen to comment on the UnitedStates and its perormance on human rightsover 200 recommendationswere made during the dialogue.106 Nevertheless, the United States opened

proceedings by noting President Obamas and Secretary Clintons deep com-mitment to multilateral engagement, human rights, and the rule o law.107The Russian Federation positively assessed the progress made to rem-

edy human rights violations occasioned by the ght against terrorism.108China also noted the improvements made in recent years.109 Nevertheless,France,110 Venezuela,111 Egypt, Ireland, China, Vietnam, and Switzerlandcalled or the urgent closure o Guantanamo Bay detention center,112 some-thing promised, yet not delivered on by the date o review (or the presenttime). The treatment o civilians by the US military and others in Iraq and

elsewhere was also raised as a matter o concern, which the United Statesrecognized.113 Torture and its use in detention centers was raised by a num-ber o delegates.114 Other issues raised include climate change,115 the rights

105. Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United States o America,U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 16th Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/11(2011) [hereinater Working Group Report US]. For the other relevant documentation,see National Report Submitted in accordance with Paragraph 15(A) o the Annex toHuman Rights Council Resolution 5/1: United States o America, U.N. GAOR, Hum.Rts. Council, Working Group on Universal Periodic Rev., 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/

WG.6/9/USA/1 (2010); Compilation Prepared by the Ofce o the High Commissioneror Human Rights, in accordance with Paragraph 15(B) o the Annex to Human RightsCouncil Resolution 5/1: United States o America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council,Working Group on Universal Periodic Rev., 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/2(2010); Summary Prepared by the Ofce o the High Commissioner or Human Rights,in Accordance with Paragraph 15(C) o the Annex to Human Rights Council Resolu-tion 5/1: United States o America, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, Working Groupon Universal Periodic Rev., 9th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/3/Rev.1 (2010).

106. Working Group Report US, supra note 105, 92.107. Id. 6.108. Id. 11.109. Id. 21.110. Id. 41.111. Id. 92.155.112. Id. 92.15657, 92.5960.113. Id. 92.13640.114. Id. 92.14452.115. Id. 92.22122 (Nicaragua and Bolivia).

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o indigenous peoples,116 and the continuation o the death penalty in theadministration o justice in many US states.117

Issues relating to terrorism and the United States use o military orce

overseas inevitably may be considered at least partially politicized. Callswere also made or the United States to end the blockade o Cuba and sanc-tions against Sudan and other countries.118 Such sanctions and blockadesare oten unilateral and thus comments thereon may indicate politicizationo the review process.

Finally, and unsurprisingly, despite the identied progress made in real-izing human rights, the United States reluctance to ratiy all core treaties wasa major issue.119 Many delegates criticized and queried its stance, not leastin respect o the Convention on the Rights o the Child,120 the United States

being one o the only UN member states not to have ratied this instrument.Again, not all applicable rights and reedoms were raised during thereview.

E. The Russian Feeration

Over seventy states sought to comment on the Russian Federations UPRreport.121 Many comments related to human rights institutional issues, such

as extending invitations to special procedures122 and submitting all reports

116. Id. 92.199206.117. Id. 92.11835.118. Id. 92.7578 (Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Sudan, and the Democratic Peoples Re-

public o Korea).119. Id. 11 (Russia), 21 (China), 82 (Germany).120. Convention on the Rights o the Child, adopted20 Nov. 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.

GAOR, 44th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into orce2

Sept. 1990).121. Fity-ve states made statements during the interactive dialogue. A urther twenty-threewere time-barred, and thus, commented on the extranet. Report o the Working Groupon the Universal Periodic Review: Russian Federation, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Coun-cil, 11th Sess., Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/19 (2009) [hereinater WorkingGroup Report Russian Federation]. For the other relevant documentation, see NationalReport Submitted in Accordance with Paragraph 15(A) o the Annex to Human RightsCouncil Resolution 5/1: Russian Federation, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, WorkingGroup on Universal Periodic Rev., 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/RUS/1 (2008)[hereinater National Report Russian Federation]; Compilation Prepared by the Ofce othe High Commissioner or Human Rights, in Accordance with Paragraph 15(B) o theAnnex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: Russian Federation, U.N. GAOR. Hum.

Rts. Council, Working Group on Universal Periodic Rev., 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/RUS/2 (2008); and Summary prepared by the Ofce o the High Commissioneror Human Rights, in accordance with paragraph 15(C) o the Annex to Human RightsCouncil Resolution 5/1: Russian Federation, U.N. GAOR., Hum. Rts. Council, WorkingGroup on Universal Periodic Rev., 4th Sess., U.N. Doc A/HRC/WG.6/4/RUS/3 (2009).

122. Working Group Report Russian Federation, supra note 121, 24 (Switzerland), 80(Slovenia).

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to UN treaty bodies in a timely manner.123 However, a number addressedsubstantive human rights issues within the state: internally displaced per-sons,124 minorities,125 prisons and administration o justice,126 and poverty,

economic, and social rights.

127

France raised issues related to core civil and political rights includingdetention, administration o justice, as well as reedom o assembly and as-sociation or homosexuals.128 Picking up on the ormer, some progress on

justice was recognized by the United Kingdom, which nevertheless expressedconcern over media reedom, racism, and threats to human rights deend-ers.129 The United Kingdom also drew attention to extra-judicial killingsand torture in the Northern Caucasus.130 China noted appreciation o theRussian Federations approach to the review, particularly its consultations

with civil society and the media, and inquired about the social rights omilitary personnel.131

Concern was expressed over specic situations o alleged problems, suchas the Northern Caucasus,132 Ingushetia,133 and the Chechen Republic.134The Russian Federation viewed these comments as political and generallyunacceptable.135

In general, interventions by non-European states were positive.136 Eu-ropean states raised issues that are more contentious. Several states tookthe opportunity aorded by the review process to raise issues related to the

Council o Europes regional human rights mechanism (o which the RussianFederation is a member).137 The comments urged the Russian Federation tocontinue taking positive action in light o judgments o the European Courto Human Rights138 and pushed or ratication o Protocol Fourteen to the

123. Id. 48 (Montenegro), 19 (Germany).124. Id. 31 (Turkey) (positive comments), 28 (Nicaragua).125. Id. 17 (Finland), 28 (Nicaragua), 30 (Brazil), 34 (Ukraine), 52 (Republic o

Korea), 56 (New Zealand), 62 (Sweden).126. Id. 18 (France), 20 (the Netherlands), 36 (UK), 84 (United Arab Emirates).127. Id. 29 (Cuba).128. Id. 18 (France).129. Id. 36 (UK).130. Id.131. Id. 26 (China).132. Id. 55 (Australia), 59 (Denmark).133. Id. 61 (Norway).134. Id. 16 (the Czech Republic).135. Working Group Russian Federation Addendum, inra note 142 (Recommendation 13

not accepted by Russian Federation). The Russian Federations national report noted the

positive progress in Chechnya. SeeNational Report Russian Federation, supra note 121, 3841.

136. European is dened as members o the Council o Europe. Australia and New Zealandwere notably more negative than other non-European states.

137. Id. 54 (Georgia), 74 (the delegation o the Russian Federation).138. Working Group Report Russian Federation, supra note 121, 20 (the Netherlands).

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European Convention on Human Rights, a protocol which sought to signi-cantly reorm the European human rights mechanism and had long-awaitedthe Russian Federations ratication.139

As with the other states, the review process lacked any rigor in the senseo a systematic discussion o all applicable rights.

VI. THE RESPONSE OF THE FIVE PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCILMEMbER STATES

Perhaps it was inevitable that the ve states did not ully embrace what theyoten perceived as criticisms levied at them during the interactive dialogue,

especially as some o those criticisms were viewed as being politicallymotivated rather than objective comments on human rights compliance.However, as the process is tantamount to peer review, it is inevitable thatobjective and subjective views will be aired. At present, no single system omeasuring human rights perormance exists.140 A variety o indicators andmeasures can be used, resulting in a wide range o outcomes.141 Pertinently,in the UPR process, the states have the right to reply to all comments andstatements, thus errors can be corrected and explanations provided. Eachstate discussed above addressed the third state comments and recommen-

dations during the dialogue, or in responses urnished to the Human RightsCouncil.142 The Council thereater considered both the working groups

139. All states were required to consent beore Protocol 14 to the Convention or the Pro-tection o Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system othe Convention (ETS 194) entered into orce. A temporary solutionProtocol 14bis tothe Convention or the Protection o Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ETS204)was enacted to bridge the period pending ratication o the main protocol bythe Russian Federation. Protocol No. 14 to the Convention or the Protection o Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system o the Convention,European Union o Hum. Rts. Protocol 14, 13.V.2004 (2004).

140. Examples discussed in Todd Landman & Edzia Carvalho, meAsuring humAn righTs 17.246(2010); Maria Green, What We Talk about When We Talk about Indicators: CurrentApproaches to Human Rights Measurement, 23 hum. rTs. Q. 1062, 1096 (2001).

141. See, e.g., Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights: Principle, Practice, and Policy, 26hum. rTs. Q. 906 (2004).

142. Responses rom the reviewed states are contained in the Working Groups Reports andthe addenda to the Working Group Reports, as submitted to the Human Rights Coun-cil session, which adopted the UPR o the state. Report o the Working Group on theUniversal Periodic Review: France, Add., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 8th Sess.,Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/47/ Add.1 (2008) [hereinater Working Group ReportFrance Addendum]; Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review:Russian Federation, Add.,U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/19/Add.1/Rev.1 (2009) [hereinater Working Group Report Russian Federation Addendum];Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: United Kingdom oGreat Britain and Northern Ireland, Add.,U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 8th Sess.,Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/25/ Add.1 (2008) [hereinater Working Group Re-port UK Addendum]; Report o the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review:

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report on the interactive dialogue and the responses thereto beore ormallyadopting the review outcome.

One o the potential successes o UPR could prove to be substantial

progress towards universal ratication o core human rights treaties. The vestates considered herein certainly indicated urther progress on raticationwould be orthcoming. O particular note is the proposed increase o USengagement with international human rights treatiesthe state acceptedrecommendations to consider ratiying the Convention on the Rights othe Child,143 the Convention on the Elimination o Discrimination AgainstWomen,144 the Convention on the Rights o Persons with Disabilities, andsome ILO conventions.145 However, the United States rejected calls to ratiythe International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,146 albeit

with the caveat that it accepted recommendations phrased in the conditionaluture, and thus agreed to consider ratiying other treaties.147 China, France,the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom have also proven responsiveto calls to extend their ratications o core treaties. China indicated supportor recommendations that it should consider and begin national legisla-tive and policy changes, as appropriate, in preparation or acceding to theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.148 France accepted anumber o the recommendations and made several voluntary commitments.Thus, France undertook to submit to Parliament or early ratication the

Convention on the Rights o Persons with Disabilities, the Convention onEnorced Disappearances, and the Optional Protocol to the Torture conven-tion.149 France proceeded to do so and is now party to those treaties. Some

United States o America, Add., U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Council, 16th Sess., AgendaItem 6, U.N. Doc A/HRC/16/11/ Add.1. (2011) [hereinater Working Group Report USAddendum]; Report o the Human Rights Council on its Eleventh Session, U.N. GAOR,Hum. Rts. Council, 11th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/37, 520 (2009).

143. For earlier debate, see Don Browning, The United Nations Convention on the Rightso the Child: Should it be Ratifed and Why?20 emory inTl. l. rev. 157 (2006); Eliza-beth Bartholet, Ratifcation by the United States o the Convention on the Rights o theChild: Pros and Cons rom a Childs Rights Perspective, 633 AnnAls Am. AcADemy Pol. &soc. sci.80 (2011); Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suer the Children?: A Call orUnited States Ratifcation o the United Nations Convention on the Rights o the Child,19 hArv. hum. rTs. J. 161 (2006); Susan Kilbourne, Opposition to U.S. Ratifcation othe United Nations Convention on the Rights o the Child: Responses to Parental RightsArguments, 4 loy. PoverTy l. J. 55 (1998); Meg Gardinier, Why the US should ratiy theConvention on the Rights o the Child, 89 chilD WelfAre J. 7 (2010).

144. Working Group Report US Addendum, supra note 142, 28.145. Id. 28.

146. Id. 19.147. Id. 28 (deliberative treaty actions).148. Working Group Report China, supra note 82 (rst recommendation enjoying support).

See alsoShiyan Sun, The Understanding and Interpretation o the ICCPR in the Contexto Chinas Possible Ratifcation, 6 chinese J. inTl l. 17 (2007).

149. Working Group Report France, supra note 66, 7 (voluntary commitment).

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reservations and declarations made by France with respect to the Conven-tion on Elimination o Discrimination Against Women and the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights will also be reconsidered,150 though

not those concerning minorities.

151

It also committed to modiying nationallaws as necessary or the Statute o the International Criminal Court.152 TheUK agreed to consider signing the International Convention on the Protectiono all Persons rom Enorced Disappearances,153 though was not receptive tocalls or its accession to the Convention on Migrant Workers.154 Finally, theRussian Federation agreed to think about ratiying various treaties includingthe Convention on the Rights o Persons with Disabilities,155 and agreed toconsider acceding to the Rome Statute o the International Criminal Court,156the Convention on the Elimination o Enorced Disappearances,157 and the

Migrant Workers Convention.158

While a higher level o human rights protection does not necessarily ol-low rom ratication o human rights instruments,159 universal ratication bythe ve permanent member states o the Security Council would undoubtedlysend a positive message to other states. It is, however, unlikely that all vestates will accept individual communications concerning alleged inringe-ments o these treaties beore all the relevant treaty bodies.160 France and theRussian Federation are likely to be the exceptions. Nevertheless, increasedratication o core treaties will be a substantial step towards enhancing the

role o human rights in each o them.For the permanent members, action plans are comparatively easy ways

o demonstrating commitment to human rights, rather than ratiying everyhuman rights treaty. The positive comments made by states to China duringUPR when the imminent Chinese national action plan or human rights

150. Id. 910.151. Id. 29 (Russia, Austria), 30 (Canada, India), 42. See alsoWorking Group Report

Addendum France, supra note 142, at 3, 9.

152. Working Group Report France, supra note 66, 8 (voluntary commitments).153. Working Group Report UKAddendum,supra note 142, 12, (accepting Recommenda-

tion 22 rom France).154. Id. 20 (Rejecting recommendation 21).155. Working Group Report Russian FederationAddendum,supra note 142 (accepting the

relevant part o Recommendation 7).156. Id. at 23, Recommendation 5 (rejected).157. Id. at 3, Recommendation 7 (rejected in part).158. Id. at 3, Recommendation 6 (rejected or the present time).159. Anne f. bAyefsky, The un humAn righTs TreATy sysTem: universAliTyATThe crossroADs (2001),

available athttp://www.bayesky.com/report/nalreport.pd. Ratication or a very largenumber o participants in the treaty system has become an end in itsel. Id. at 7. But

seeOona A. Hathaway, Why Do Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?, 51 J.conflicT res. 588 (2007); Eric Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties ImproveRespect or Human Rights?49J. conflicT res. 925 (2005).

160. The UK experimented with a temporary accession to the optional protocol o theConvention on Elimination o Discrimination Against Women and has continued thiscommitment.

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was announced,161 is evidence o the impact such a plan can have. Chinaitsel considered the plan a success,162 and buoyed with enthusiasm or thismethod o enhancing human rights credibility.163 The state is now completing

a second national human rights action plan which will run between 2012and 2015. France also adopted relevant plansit has a national human rightseducation action plan164 and, during the interactive dialogue, Switzerlandeven requested a copy o Frances manual on detecting signs o torture.165

When addressing recommendations concerning Guantanamo Bay andsimilar detention centers, one interesting issue arose between the UnitedStates and China. China recommended quickly closing the Guantanamo Baydetention center and expatriating the terrorist suspect to their country oorigin [sic].166 Given the sensitivity o ongoing discussions regarding the ate

o the Uyghurs (Chinese nationals) in Guantanamo, with the United Statesreluctant to return them to ace likely arrest and prosecution in China, it isperhaps unsurprising that the United States responded diplomatically thattransers o detainees to their home countries will only be conducted inaccordance with our humane treatment policies.167

All ve states appeared relatively amenable to other recommendationsmade insoar as they all accepted a number o the recommendations oragreed to review issues raised. It should be noted that not all o the statesexamined herein have a monist approach to treaty law which would ac-

cord legal supremacy to international human rights treaties. China,168 theUnited Kingdom, the Russian Federation,169 and the United States170 gener-ally require national measures to transorm a treaty into something that canbe cited in national courts. Although technically monist, France requires acomprehensive national process beore ratiying any treaty and thereby ac-cording it orce within France.171

161. Examples include, Working Group Report China,supra note 82, 30 (Netherlands), 33 (Algeria), 44 (Uzbekistan). But see 76 (Benin enquired why China thought

an action plan necessary).162. info. officeofThe sT. council, AssessmenT rePorTonThe nATionAl humAn righTs AcTion PlAnof chinA: 20092010 (2011), available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-07/14/content_22989895.htm.

163. The ecacy o such a method is open to debate as indeed in Chinas claim to havesucceeded against the action plan on all counts.

164. Oce o the United Nations High Commissioner or Human Rights, First phase (20052009) o the World Programme or Human Rights Education, available athttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/education/training/national-actions-plans.htm.

165. Working Group Report France,supra note 66, 17.166. Working Group Report US,supra note 105, 92.157.167. Working Group Report US Addendum,supra note 142, 14 (bullet point on Recom-

mendation 157).168. Sanzhuan Guo, Implementation o Human Rights Treaties by Chinese Courts: Problems

and Prospects, 8 chinese J. inTl l. 161 (2009).169. consT. russ. feD., art. 15(4). See alsoW. e. buTler, The lAW of TreATies in russiA AnD The

commonWeAlThof inDePenDenT sTATes: TexTAnD commenTAry 116 (2002).170. u.s. consT. art. II, 2, cl. 2.171. George A. Bermann, French Treaties and French Courts: Two Problems in Supremacy,

28 inTl comP. l.Q. 458 (1979).

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While naturally these positive responses rom the ve states are pleasingevidence o support or promoting and protecting human rights, inevitablythe true test will be whether action and change ollows.

VII. SEEING THEMSELVES AS OTHERS SEE THEM: LOOKING TO THEFUTURE

There is little doubt that the ve permanent member states o the SecurityCouncil have not acquitted themselves especially well in the eld o inter-national human rights. As noted at the beginning o this article, there is agrowing body o literature suggesting that the current permanent members

o the Security Council represent an anachronistic snapshot o internationalrelations and power, dating to the conclusion o World War II. Certainly,advocacy o international human rights was not a consideration when de-termining permanent membership at Dumbarton Oaks. The United Nationsand its permanent ve states were established beore international humanrights developed and assumed their current prole. However, it would bereasonable to assume that, given the political and economic position o theve states generally and, particularly in the case o France and the UnitedKingdom, their ormer colonial history, protection o human rights should

be a key concern. That this concern should maniest itsel within the UnitedNations rather than, as the United States seems to wish, solely at the nationallevel, is axiomatic. Human rights have undoubtedly grown in importanceover the years since the United Nations was ounded, and thus there is anargument to be put orward that the permanent ve should recognize thisand take the necessary steps to ensure that they conorm to basic interna-tional human rights standards.

Unortunately, the ve states are not leading by example in respect ohuman rights, with none having achieved the proclaimed voluntary human

rights goals. This is all the more worrying when each o the ve states haspresented its candidacy or, and secured election to, the Human RightsCouncil. Membership o the Human Rights Council indicates that each notonly considers itsel a perect exponent o human rights but also that eachis willing to undergo the most thorough international scrutiny o its humanrights perormance. Such a high standard is necessary when the Councilsits in judgment o other states perormance on human rights (generally, aswell as through the UPR process). Ideally, albeit not in practice, the humanrights record o the members o the Council should be beyond reproach.

In spite o the oregoing, there is some (perhaps eclectic) evidence thatthe ve permanent member states do exhibit some good practices that haveachieved peer recognition. Egypt recommended the United Kingdoms leg-islation dealing with incitement to racial and religious hatred be emulated

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as a good practice in countries which have not done so,172 or example.However, it is interesting to note that China is identied most requently asembodying good practices that should be publicized and emulated. Sri Lanka

provided a political history o China then called or the state to publicizeits experience in combining a strong State with ethnic regional autonomyand urged China to make available in international languages to the resto the world its experience in economic revolution, modernization and insatisying the material needs o an enormous rural population.173 Povertyreduction programs and strategies implemented in China were deemed bestpractices by the Philippines and thus, to be shared,174 while Algeria suggestedsharing o the concept o Scientic Development perspectives to ensurecomprehensive, coordinated and lasting development and to continue build-

ing a harmonious society marked by democracy, primacy o the law, equityand justice.175 Given the nature o UPR, the balance o positive commentsin respect o China cannot be construed in itsel as suggesting that Chinahas the best human rights practices o the ve states discussed herein. Thereare a number o other imperatives that inevitably shape the review: trade,diplomacy, politics and international relations, and geography, to name a ew.

Proered technical assistance and international aid has yet to emergerom the interventions in reviews o less developed and least developedstates, although Djibouti thanked France or technical cooperation to date.176

It is encouraging to note that the United Kingdom and France are on targetto meet the 0.7 target or international aid,177 thereby meeting United Na-tions expectations, and contributing towards the advancement o humanrights ideals.

Looking at the national context, the ve states unortunately do notappear to be at the oreront advocating UPR. The publicity accorded tothe review outcome in each state was generally muted (i indeed evidentat all) and refected the positive, rather than negative, comments.178 There

172. Working Group Report UK,supra note 93, 48. Unsurprisingly the UK supported this.Working Group Report UK Addendum, supra note 142, 24.

173. Working Group Report China,supra note 82, 39. Obviously several other contribut-ing states take a dierent and dimmer view o Chinas actions in these areas. Id. at 27 (Australia).

174. Id. at 32 (Philippines).175. Id. at 33(a-b) (Algeria).176. Working Group Report France,supra note 66, 50.177. uniTeD nATions, monTerey consensuson finAncingfor DeveloPmenT 42 (2002), available

athttp://www.un.org/esa/d/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pd (target set at the Inter-

national Conerence on Financing or Development), ollowing Brussels Declaration othe Third United Nations Conerence on Least Developed Countries, U.N. GAOR, 8,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.191/12, 2 July 2001.

178. For linguistic reasons, the position in Russia cannot be veried herewith, but there waslimited news coverage in the UK, France, US, and China. The government oreign a-airs department issued a comment on the completion o the process in each instance.Some bloggers and others were very negative about the US opening itsel to criticismon the world stage.

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was comparatively little public interest considering the requirements o5/1 publicity. That said, all ve states did involve elements o civil societyin the review process. Moreover, there is some evidence o the ve states,

or media therein, noticing elements o the review process o the others.

179

Publicity or human rights, a goal rst enunciated in the General Assemblyresolution adopting the UDHR, remains underachieved worldwide.180 Theseve states are no exception.

As or uture improvement, the lack o overt incorporation o existinghuman rights treaties within the national laws and constitutions o the statescould be ameliorated by clear comprehensive human rights action plans.Notwithstanding the potential window dressing aorded by such plans,an ocial statement holds some weight, and at a minimum, gives ocial

cognizance to the ideal o international human rights treaties.181

China hasdemonstrated an approach to this that is comparatively light in positiveobligations but heavy in international impact. As the other our states areat a urther stage o development, surely they should be able to drat, pub-lish, update, and maintain national action plans. This could send a strongsignal o the seriousness with which international human rights are viewed.Moreover, based on Chinas experience, such plans are viewed positivelyby other states.

Although it is too early to assess the impact o UPR on human rights

globally, it appears evident that the process contributes something new anddierent to human rights monitoring. The ve permanent member states othe Security Council have not acquitted themselves especially well in theeld, tending to consider international human rights as something applicableto other states. However, they have demonstrated engagement in the reviewprocess, both as reviewers and reviewees. Such engagement demonstratesconsiderable willingness to accept human rights and this new and sometimeschallenging peer review process. It will be interesting to see whether thestates elect to more openly embrace international human rights beore the

next cycle o review. Ater all, part o the ocus o the second cycle is toconsider progress made on issues identied in the rst cycle.182 Given the

179. Full Text o Human Rights Record o United States in 2010, available athttp://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-04/10/c_13822287.htm. Chinese governmentnotes the negative view o US human rights in light o the UPR in its 2010 annual reporto the state o human rights in the country (see the last paragraphs).

180. UDHR, supra note 12.

181. It is acknowledged that the Chinese approach accords very minimal cognizance toactual treaties. Nevertheless, it does take aspects o treaties and creates goals or theirrealization within China.

182. Decision adopted by the Human Rights Council 17/119, Follow-up to the Human RightsCouncil Resolution 16/21 with regard to the Universal Periodic Review, U.N. GAOR,Hum. Rts. Council, 17th Sess., Agenda Item 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/DEC/17/119 (2011).

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Figure 1. The Permanent Five an the Core International Human Rights Treaties

KEY: X notes treaty ratication or accession completed at time o UPR. Ater UPRdenotes ratication or accession ater completion o the states UPR. (ICESCR OP (none ove have ratied it as o November 2011) and CRC OP3 were not open or signature at thetime o review o all ve states, thus are excluded.) Data taken rom http://treaties.un.org (15Nov. 2011).

China France Russian United UnitedFederation Kingdom States

ICESCR X X X XICCPR X X X X- ICCPR OP1 X X- ICCPR OP2 X X

CERD X X X X X- Art 14 X X

CEDAW X X X X- CEDAW OP X X X

CAT X X X X X- CAT OP Ater UPR X

CRC X X X X- CRC OP1 X X X X X

- CRC OP2 X X Ater UPR XICMWCRPD X Ater UPR Ater UPR

- CRPD OP X XCED Ater UPRStatute ICCt X X

comparatively poor perormance o the ve states in the view o their el-low member states, evidence o improvement in many aspects is obviouslydesirable beore the second cycle i the ve permanent member states wish

to better like the refection o how others see them.

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