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Research Note: Public and Private Managers' Perceptions of Red TapeAuthor(s): Hal G. Rainey, Sanjay Pandey and Barry BozemanSource: Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1995), pp. 567-574Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public AdministrationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3110348 .Accessed: 20/10/2013 00:22

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Researchote:Publicndfivareanagers'Percepdonsf edapeHalG.Rainey,he niversityf eorgiaSanjayandey,yracuseniversityBarryozeman,eorgiaech

Do managersngovernmenterceive igherevelsf ed ape ntheir rganizations hanmanagersn ndustry? ost eoplewould hink o,but rganizational esearchersave ften oundthat overnment rganizationsonot ecessarilyave igherev-els f ule ntensityhan usinessirms. f there rehigherevelsingovernment, hat xplains heir xistence?al Rainey, an-jay Pandey, ndBarry ozemaneportn surveyfpublic ndprivatemanagersperceptionsf ed ape hat upports ome om-mon ssertionsbout ed apengovernmentut hat ontrasts

sharply ith ther ssertions. hepublic ndprivate anagersdifferedittle n general uestionsbout ule nforcement. etthe ublicmanagers eremuchmore ikely han rivateman-agers oreport hat ules onstrain he elation etween anagers'performancend their ay ndpromotion. he uthors ssessseveralxplanationsfwhetherndwhy ublic managers aycreate ed ape, ncluding goal mbiguity ypothesis,n insecu-rity ypothesis,nd n expectancyypothesis.he esultshowsome upportfor he atter wo ypotheses.he esultslso up-port he oal mbiguity ypothesis,ut mong oth he ublic

andprivatemanagers. he uthors ltimatelyoncludehatexternal ulesnd aws oncerninguch unctionsspersonneland rocurementre hemostmportantourcesf ed apengovernment. he uthors allformore ystematicnalysisf edtape, ncluding he se fmethodsuch sthose eportedere,nsupport f urrent eformffortsimed t reducinged ape.

Red ape s an mportantopic n administration.orexample,he itle f he Report f theNational erfor-mance eviewNPR), rom edTape oResults,mpha-sizes he bjectivef reducing ed ape n government(Gore, 993). n pite f ts rominence,owever,chol-arly nalysesf ed ape ave een elativelyare. dmin-istrativenalystsaveonducted uch esearch ertinentto the opic, ut ften mploy concept ther han edtape.

Inthis rticle, ediscusshe esultsf survey f ub-lic and private anagershat xploredheir erceptionsof red apen their rganizations.hesurveyncludedquestionsepresentingifferent imensionsf red apeanddifferent ays f measuringt. Weanalyzediffer-ences etweenhe ublic ndprivate anagersn thesemeasuresecauseheoreticalnd ase-descriptivenalysesof red ape ften ssert hat ublic rganizationsavemore ed ape han rivate nes. We also nalyzedhe

consistencyf the uestionnaireesponsesith everaldifferent ypothesesboutwhy ed ape ccurs. Thehypothesesncluded goal mbiguity ypothesishatclaims hat mbiguousoals n thepublic ector ausemanagerso reate ed ape;n nsecurityypothesishatargueshat ublicmanagersnitiate ed ape ecauseheyfeel isk-aversend nsecurebout heir uthority;nd nexpectancyypothesishat epicts ed ape s the esultof weak inkages etween erformancend extrinsicrewardsuch s pay nd romotionn he ublicector.

Theresultshowedome harp ifferencesetweenpublic ndprivate anagers' erceptionsbout ertainaspects f red ape.Thepublicmanagers eremuchmoreikelyoperceiveheir ersonnelulessmakingthard o base manager'say ndpromotionn perfor-mance.We lso ound ome upport or he oal mbi-guity ypothesis, utfor oth ectors. imilar osomepreviousurveys,efound o differencesetweenublicandprivate anagersn perceivedrganizationaloalambiguity. ealsofound hat he managers'uestion-naire esponseshowedome onsistencyith he nsecu-

rity nd xpectancyypotheses.Red ape: efinitionndResearchssues

Redtape anbe defined s rules, egulations,ndprocedureshat emainn force nd ntail complianceburden or he rganizationuthave o efficacyor herules' unctionalbject Bozeman,993; 83).Red apecanoriginatenside he rganizationr from xternalsources. t can have n internal mpact r an externalimpact.

Public dministration eview November/December995, ol. 55, No.6 567

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This efinitionmplieshat ed ape suselessnd ndulyur-densome. hat imensionf ed ape anbe difficulto ssess,because hat nepersonees s rritatinged ape, nother er-sonmay ee sessentialulesndprocedures.ecauseewereconductingmail urvey, etook he pproachf sking an-agersbout heir erceptionsf ed apend elated atters. sdescribednAppendix, he urveyncludeduestionsbout hegeneralevelf ed apen he rganizationnd bout hentensi-ty f ule nforcement.he urvey lso sked bout onstraintsand elays nder ersonnelulesnd rocedures,ecausef heirprominencen discussionsf red ape n governmentGore,1993;National cademy f PublicAdministration,986;Thompson,994).These uestionseflectworkingefinitionofred ape hat olds hat t exists henmanagersay t does,when hey erceiventensiveule nforcement,ndwhen heyperceiveonstraintsnddelaysromulesnd roceduresn uchareasspersonnel. efeel hat hiss valuablepproachor hepresent.f heNationalerformanceeviewnd thernitiativesaim oreduce onstrainingulesn government,e need odevelopayso ssesshe xistingevelsf uch ulesnd hangesinthoseevels.We lsoneedmore nderstandingfhow heseperceptionselateoother esponsesfmanagersnd o test hesorts fhypotheseseexamineere.Comparingublicman-agers'esponseso hose f rivate anagersivessfurtherom-parativeurchaseor nalyzingheseerceptions.

Comparisonsfpublic ndprivate anagersre lso mpor-tant ecauseopularnd cademicpinionften epictsovern-ment s more idden ith ed ape han usiness. n strikingcontrast,ocialcientistsho tudy rganizationshereafteralledorganizationheorists)ave endedo find o such ifference.Therule nforcementuestionsn our urvey,hat edescribelater, ere rawn rom easuresf formalizationevelopedyorganizationheorists. ormalizationeferso the ntensityfformalulesnd roceduresnorganizations.rganizationheo-rists' easuresf ormalizationave layedpart n longstand-ing ontroversyver hetherublicnd rivaterganizationsif-fer n such dimensions, ithmany rganization heoristsconcludinghat hey onot McKelvey,982).Researchimedat developingypologiesf organizationsave ften ound oevidencef differenceetweenublicnd rivaterganizations,even n ome f he tereotypicalistinctionsuch sgreateror-malizationr rule ntensityn governmentrganizationse.g.,Haas,Hall, nd ohnson,966; ugh tal., 969).

Meanwhile,conomistsndpoliticalcientistsritingbout

the ublic ureaucracy ave ot eenisteningo hese essagesfrom rganizationheorists. hey ave virtual raditionfassertinghat overnmentashigherevelsf ed ape han ri-vate ector rganizations,nd hat ublic dministratorsnten-sively isseminateed ape Dahl ndLindblom,953, .4;Downs, 967;Niskanen, 971;Barton, 980;Meyer, 979;Warwick,975).

Empiricalesearchypoliticalcientistsndpublicdminis-trationistsas eported ixedindings.ometudiesave ddedto the rganization heorists' indingsf ittle ifference etweenpublic nd private rganizationsn extensivenessf rules ndprocedures, r havefound ven ower evelsn public rganiza-

tionsBuchanan,975).Others ave ound igherevelsf ulesandproceduralonstraintsngovernmentrganizationsBald-win, 990;Bozeman,eed, ndScott, 992;Bretschneider,1990; oldaway,ewberry,ickson,ndHeron, 975; an ndRainey,992; ainey,983).Thedifferencesnresearchindingsappearoresult rom ifferencesnthe ypesnddimensionsfrules nd ed ape hat he esearchersnalyzed. heresults ereport ere elp o xplainheseonflictsmong revioustudies.

SomeModelsxplaininged apeAs mportantsthe uestionfwhetherublic rganizations

have istinctivelyighevelsf ed ape s the ssue fwhere edtape omes rom. ome f he uthors ited bove ssert hatpublicmanagersggressivelyreate ed ape.Weanalyzedhesurveyesultso ssessheironsistencyith everal xplanatorymodelsfwhymanagersreateed ape SeeAppendixfor hequestionnairetems sed or he ariables entionedere.)AGoalAmbiguity ypothesis

Onefrequentxplanationfwhy ublicmanagersnitiateedtape mphasizesoal mbiguityn public rganizationse.g.,Mainzer,973;Allison,983; ynn, 981;Blumenthal,983).Public rganizations,ccordingothis ypothesis,avembigu-ousgoals.Theoutputs fpublic rganizationsonot ell neconomic arketshat rovideuch performancendicatorsssalesndprofits. ublic rganizationsroduce ublic ervicesand utputs ith public ood haracter. valuationsf heseoutputsre aden ith alue uestionsnd oliticalontroversies.Becauseublicmanagersannot eviewoncise,alid erfor-mancendicators,heytriveo ontrolheirubordinatesy ssu-ing xtensiveulesndproceduralpecifications,nd mphasiz-ing dherenceo them. Managersn private rganizations,accordingo hismodel,onot ollowhis attern.

Weexaminedhe vidence or his ypothesisyregressingvarious easuresf ed ape n measuref he managers'er-ceptionsf rganizationaloalmbiguity. eused variableorsectorpublicersusrivate),ariablesepresentingegreesf ov-ernmentalnfluence-that erefer o s publicnesss nd on-trol ariablesor rganizationalize nd dministrativentensity.An nsecurity ypothesis

An xplanationloselyelatedogoal mbiguityuggestshatpublic anagersrequentlyssue nd mphasizeed ape ecausethey eelnsecurebout heir uthoritynd ontrol ver heir

subordinatesnd bout heirbilityorely ntheir ubordinates.Accordingo his ypothesis,ublic anagerseelhat heir ier-archicaluthoritys weakenedy ivil ervice ules nd otheradministrativeonstraints,ypoliticalnterventionsndover-sight, y nions,nd y oliticalllianceshat ubordinatesayhavewith egislatorsnd nterest roups. hey ssue ules ndproceduralequirementsn the suallyain ffort o ncreasetheir ontrolverubordinatese.g.,Warwick,975).

We ooked or videncef his attern y egressinged apemeasuresn a measure f he managers'ense f ecure uthorityandtrust, s representedy uestions bout rust n subordinates,risk-aversion,nd heir ense f he dequacy f heir uthority.

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AnExpectancyypothesisLess amiliarnthe iterature npublic ureaucracys an

explanationnvolvinghemanagers'ewardxpectancies.heconceptf xpectanciesomesromhe xpectancyheoriesfwork otivationPerrynd orter, 982; vans,986), hereexpectancyeferso a person'sxpectationhat n action rbehavior,uch sperformingell n one's ork, illead orewards. ccordingo his xplanationf ed ape,ngovern-

mentgencieseakxpectanciesboutxtrinsicewardsuchspay nd romotionerves n mportantausef ed ape.This ypothesisrawsn conomicheoriesuchsproperty

rightsheoryDemsetz,967)nd ther conomicnalysesfbureaucracyNiskanen,971).Propertyightsheoristsssertthat key istinctionetweenusinessirmsnd overnmentagenciess hat irmwnersaveightso he rofits.his ivesthem he ncentiveo conomizenmanagement,n ncentiveabsentnmost ublicgencies.heseconomistsrguehatn

publicgencies,n he bsencef he ncentiveormonetaryrewardsor erformancend fficiency,sideaymentselatedtopoliticalower,udgetxpansion,nd ncrementsnperson-nel ecome oremportantBozeman,987;2-53).Govern-ment anagersan se ed ape s politicalnd trategicool;for xample,heyan se t o esistudgetnd taffingutbacks.In dditiono uchncentiveso llow r ncreaseed ape,heincentives ess or fficientanagementngeneralnd or heeliminationf nefficientdministrativerocedures.e ookedfor videncehat ightupporthis odely egressingedapevariablesn scalemeasuringhemanagers'xpectanciesboutpay nd romotion,swell s the ther ariablesentionednthe escriptionsf he reviousodels.

ResultsOur xaminationf hemean ifferencesetweenhe ublic

and rivateamplesndicatedo ignificantifferencesetween

I'

Thedata sed n his tudy re subset f he ata eing ollectedy heNational dministrativetudies roject NASP)n 1993. TheNational dministrativetudies rojectsa joint ffort f research onsortiumith articipatingesearcherst Florida tate niversity,Ohio tate niversity, yracuseniversity,heUniversityfDenver,nd heUniversityfGeorgia.hepurposefNASP s to ollect atafor mpirical tudiesf ureaucratization,ormalization,ed ape,nd ersonnelystemsnboth ublic nd rivate rganizations.

The study opulation as made p of public nd private rganizationsavingmore han 0 full-time mployeesn the yracuseMetropolitanrea nd n he lbany etropolitan rea.

Thepublicample rame as made p ofNewYork tate overnmentgenciesnAlbanynd yracusend ity nd ounty overnmentsinSyracuse. e used he tate irectory1990-1991)ublishedy heNewYork tate ffice fGeneralervicesogeneratehe ist f tateagenciesnAlbanynd n Syracuse. eused he ity f yracuse overnmentelephoneirectory1992) ogeneratehe ist f ity ndcounty fficials. privateamplef omparableize o he ublicample as rawn, sing two-stageandomamplingrocedure.n thefirst tage,he hief xecutivef he rganization as ncludedn he amplerame. or ery arge rganizations,he mmediateubordinatesof the hief xecutivefficer ere lso ncludednthe ample rame. n the econdtage,middlemanagers ere dded o the ample.Dependingnthe ize f he rganizationpto fourmiddle anagersere ampledor very opmanagerncludedn the irst tage. hesubset f he ata eportedn his rticlesmade pof he opmanagersampledn tage .

These ampling roceduresieldedsample f566 top managers-269rom ublic rganizationsnd 97 from rivate rganizations.The amplingriterionfmore han 0 mployeesxcluded ost f he ity nd ounty overnmentrganizations.f the ublic ample f269, 40weremembersf tate rganizations.pproximatelyweeksfter he irst ave f urveys, embersf he esearch eam alled on-respondentso sk hem oreply nd/or ailed hem letter nd nother lankurvey,equestingreply. f the 69 public managers,09respondedor response ate f pproximately1percent. ighty-threerivate anagers ut f 97respondedor responseate f 8 per-cent. he ggregate esponseate as 4 percent192 ut f 66).

Weusedwavenalysiso assess onresponseias. In mail urveys,onrespondentsend o be similaro the ate espondentsFowler,1988).Wave nalysisauges onresponseias y omparingespondentsho espondeadilyo hose ho espondfter he ollow-uptepsare aken.Wave nalysisndicatedo tatisticallyignificantifferencesetweenhesewo roups n the ariablesnvestigatedn the tudyand ther mportantharacteristicsuch s gendernd ocation. his rovidesome videncegainst onresponseias.

One reviewerf his rticle xpressedoncernbout epresentativenessf he ample ecausehe wo ectors rehighly ariednd om-plex.Appendix providesresponseothis oncern. t hows categorizationf he rganizationsnwhich he urveyespondentsork.

Thedispersioncrossypesf rganizationadet nappropriateouse hese rganizationalroupingsnour egressionnalysis.nspectionof he ata, owever,ndicated otendencyf he esultseportedere oreflect particularnfluencef ne ormore f he ubcategorieswithin ne f he ectors. he amplencludeddiverseet f rganizationsrom oth ectors,ndnot. noverrepresentationf ny articu-lar ype. nclusionf he rivate onprofitnd ervice roupsnthe rivateectorample ight ave een redictedoweight he ampleagainsthe esults ereport ere. hismakeshe esults oreonvincinghan, or xample,omparing anufacturingirmsogovernmenthumanervicegencies.

Another eviewerbservedhat ur ampleoncentratednNewYork, ne f he most ormalizedtate overnments,ith trong tategovernmentontrolsver ocal overnmentsswell. n response,e rguen he iscussion ection hat trong imilaritiesetweenome fourfindingsndother tudiesnother tates nd evelsfgovernmentrovidevidencehat heNewYork ocation oesnot enderurresultsnapplicableoother ettings.

Wecreatedcalesor he ariables eportedere hroughactornalysisnd tem nalysisnthe uestionnairetems. ppendix describesthe cales nd eports ronbach'slpha or he cales. henwe xaminedhemean ifferencesor he wo amplesn the ariables n thestudy, nd an he egressionnalysesescribedarliernd nTables -3.

Publicnd rivate anagers'erceptionsfRed ape 569


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the amplesn numberf ariablesherenemight avere-dictedifferences.or xample,here as odifferencen hescale or erceivedrganizationaloalmbiguity.his indingcontradictshe idelyepeatedbservationhathe oalsf ub-lic rganizationsremore ague, ultiple,nd onflictinghanthe oals f rivaterganizations.e lso ound o ignificantdifferencen he cale f ule nforcement.he bsencef if-ferencesn hesecalesupportshe enericerspectiven rga-nizationsescribedarlier,hat ownplayshe ignificancefpublic-privateistinction.

Ineach f he egressionquations,eused rdinaryeastsquares. imited ependentariableechniquesere otrequiredecauseach f he ependentariablesereitherintervalr rdinaln calend heir istributionsere ot eavi-ly kewed.heregressionseportednTables-3 re hosenwhich efoundtatisticallyignificantesultsor he ariablesrepresentinghe hree odelsescribedarlier,r or variablerepresentinghe ublicersusrivateector istinction.urregressionsndicatedomeailureso upportime-honoredsser-tions bout he istinctivenessfpublic ureaucracies.heyalso, owever,ndicatedomeeryharpistinctionsetweenhepublicnd rivateamples.

Inparticular,he egressionshowedhat ublic anagersweremuch oreikelyoreport igherevelsf ed ape nresponseo generaluestionboutt. Public anagerslso if-ferederyharplynperceptionsbout ersonnelroceduresndconstraints,howingmuch igherendencyoperceivehatpersonnelulesonstrainhe bilityotie ewardsoperfor-mance,hat ersonnelctionsre ubjectoong elays,nd hatmoreeoplerenvolvedn ersonnelecisions.

TheGoalAmbiguityypothesisThe egressionsorhe oalmbiguityypothesisre eported

inTable . Accordingothis ypothesisublicrganizationshave igherevelsf oalmbiguityhan rivaterganizations,and hisausesublic anagerso reateulesnd onstraintsnpublicrganizations.s ustmentioned,owever,e oundosignificantifferenceetweenhe ublicnd rivate anagersnperceivedoalmbiguity,findingonsistentithomereviousstudiesLannd ainey,992; ainey,983).

Ourmeasurefgoal mbiguityas ignificantlyelatedoseveraled apemeasuresTable).Table containshe esultsof ive egressionnalyses.he irstwoolumnseportegres-sionsnvariablesepresentingeneraldministrativeed ape-the eneral ed ape ariablend he ule nforcementariable(describednAppendix).The hreeegressionsn he ightrefor hreeariablesepresentinged apenpersonnelrocedures,(describednAppendix). In the egressionsor eneraledTape, ule nforcement,nd ersonnelule onstraints,oalAmbiguityhowssignificantelationo he ed apemeasures,evenakingnto onsiderationhe ther ariables.et, smen-tionedbove,he ublicnd rivate anagersid ot iffer nthe goal ambiguity easure.Thus, the results or hese hreeregressionsreconsistent ith goalambiguity ypothesis, utnot ne ased n public-privateistinction.hese esultsre on-

sistent ith n nterpretationhatmanagersho erceiveoalambiguitylso erceiveigherevelsf ed ape. Obviouslyheseresultsonot irmlystablishhe ausal irection, ut hey realso onsistentith he nterpretation hatmanagershoper-ceive oal mbiguitylay role n nitiating nddisseminatingred ape. heresultso not upporthenterpretationhat ub-licmanagersre articularlyikelyocreate ed ape n responsetogoalmbiguity.

Size ndRedTapeIn three f he egressionsnTable , the rganizationalize

measurehows significantelationo the ed apemeasure,resulthat houldurpriseoone.The ignificancef ther ari-ablesven fter akingizento ccountstherefore ore ote-worthy.

Sector ifferencesTable also howshat he ector ariablehat epresentshe

publicersusrivateichotomyiguresaryignificantlyn ever-alof he egressions,articularlyhosen General edTape ndPersonnelule onstraints.his attern eflectshe ifferencesbetween ublic ndprivate anagersn perceptionsboutadministrativeed apentheir rganizations.t also eflectshesharp ifferencesn the ersonneluleConstrainttems ventakingnto ccounthe ther ariables.imilar ifferences,smarkedsthese, ave een eportedn these uestionsboutpersonnelulesnprevioustudiesCourseyndRainey,990;Rainey,983).These epeatedindingsith ifferent amplesndifferentrganizations,evelsfgovernment,ndparts f heUnited tates, swell ssimilar indingsrom ther ountries(e.g.,oloman,986),uggesthat heseifferencesnperceptionon the part f public nd privatemanagers re tronglyentrenchedn theUnited tates ndpossiblyther ountries.Thedifferencesre ery trong,y he tandardsf he ocial ci-ences. nsome f he temsn his cale,0percentf he ub-licmanagersouldgree, hile 0 percent f he rivate an-agers ould isagree-theesponsepproachednanimityithinthe ifferentectors.

Interesting,lso,sthe bsencef significantelationf hePublicnessnd ector ariableso he ule nforcementariable.Theres significantifferencen hemean cores or he ublicand rivateamplesnthis ariable, hen oother ariablesretaken nto ccount.When he ther ariables re aken nto

account, owever,his ifferencettenuatesTable ).Aswith

other indings entionedbove, his netends osupportgenericerspectivehat ownplayshe mportancef publicversusrivateistinction.

The nsecurity ypothesisThe egressionsor hensecurityypothesisre iven nTable

2. The nsecuritycaleoncernshemanager'serceptionsf opmanagement'srustn mployees,he isk ropensityf opman-agers, nd the manager'sense f dequate uthority. n thesequestions,he ublicmanagerseported igherevels f nsecuri-ty han he rivate anagerst= 2.63,P > .009).

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TableRegressionesultsor heGoalAmbiguityypothesisor ed ape t tatisticsppearnparentheses)

General dministrativeedTape Personnel ed TapeGeneral ed Tape Rule nforcement ersonnel uleConstraints ersonnel elays Number f DecisionMakers

Intercept 0.678 (1.228) 2.399* (6.408) 5.68 * (7.036) 3.288 (0.355) -0.684 (-0.660)Goal mbiguity 0.192*** (3.002) 0.105****2.421) 0.399* (4.302) -0.038 (-0.033) -0.002 (-0.019)Size 0.456* (5.003) 0.084 (1.363) 0.431*** 3.285) -0.347 (-0.214) 0.831* (4.557)Administrativentensity0.676 (-0.746) 0.293 (0.477) -0.873 (-0.661) 9.011 (0.593) 2.621 (1.521)Resourceublicness 0.019*** (2.729) -0.002 (-0.516) -0.001 (-0.097) -0.024 (-0.187) -0.012 (-0.879)Influenceublicness 0.066****1.972) 0.029 (1.273) 0.163** (3.384) 0.459 (0.738) 0.065 (0.985)Sector 1.507** (3.547) 0.077 (0.266) 4.907* (7.951) 16.156****2.143) 1.468*****1.810)Adjusted 2 0.4026 0.0656 0.6247 0.0825 0.3527Flevel 18.525 2.838 43.444 2.634 13.806n 156 157 153 109 141*Significantt the .0001 evel; *significantt the .001 evel; **ignificantt he .01 evel; ***significantt the .05 evel;*****significantt the .10 evel; ****significantt the .10 evel.

The data n Table show significantelationetweenheinsecurityariablend ll he ed apemeasures.herelationsparticularlytrong orGeneral ed Tape nd PersonneluleConstraints. gain, ector lso howstrong elationso thesetwo ariables, ith he ublic managers oreikelyoperceivehigherevelsfGeneral edTape, nd muchmoreikelyoper-ceive igherevelsfPersonnelule onstraint. ere gain resome mportantssuesbout roof f ausationnddirectionfcausation. hese results, owever,re onsistent ith hehypothesishat ublicmanagers'oncernsver he dequacy ftheir uthoritynd heir bility o rely n their mployeesrerelatedo heir erceptionsf ed ape. Theresultsre lso en-erallyonsistentith he ossibility hat his ense f nsecuritycauses anagersoproliferateed ape.

The Expectancy ypothesisTheresults or he egressionsertainingo the xpectancy

hypothesisredisplayednTable . The Expectancycores,describednAppendix,show trong elationsoGeneral edTape,Rule nforcement,ndPersonneluleConstraints.lowercore eans weakerxpectancyhat erformanceilleadto extrinsic ewards. hese results re onsistent ith heexpectancyypothesisescribedarlier,hat eld hat weakerexpectanciesill e related ohigherevelsfred ape.Again,SectorhowsstrongelationoGeneraled ape nd ersonnelRule onstraints,ith ublic anagersighern hese ariables.

Discussionnd onclusionsTheresultsllustratehe alue f he urveytemsndmeth-

odsweused o nalyzeed ape.Clearlyther ethods uch sinterviewsndparticipantbservationavedvantages,ut hissurveydds o a growinget f responsesromarge roups fdiversendwidespreadespondentshat rehard o reachthroughntensiventerviews.his ffort an ontributeo oor-dinated fforts mongmanagersndresearchersnterestednanalysisf red ape ndother dministrativessues.Managersinvolvednred ape eductionnitiatives,nd nalystsupportingthem,hould ind urmethodsnd esultsnformative.

Managersnd esearchershould indnterestingur videnceagainstsomeommonssertionsbout ed ape. Wefind o up-port or he oal mbiguityypothesiss unique o public rga-nizations. ur videnceoes ot ndicate hat ublicmanagersshow greaterendencyo ssue nd nforce ulesnresponseogoal mbiguity,nd his esult sconsistent ith ther tudies(Buchanan,975; an nd Rainey,992;Rainey,983). Also,wefind o differenceetweenublic nd private anagersntheir erceptionsbout ule nforcementn their rganizations.This indingsconsistentith he tudies y rganizationheo-rists escribedarlier. ublic anagers ho ave een ur esultsfound hisnteresting,ut easonable,s an ndicationhat rga-nizationalunction,echnology,nd ther actorsan utweighpublic-privateistinctionndetermininghe eneralevelf uleenforcement.

The trikingifferenceetweenublicndprivate anagersonpersonnelules nd onstraintssconsistent ith esponsesfrom ther tatesnd evelsfgovernmentCourseyndRainey,1990;Lan and Rainey, 992; National cademyf PublicAdministration,986;Rainey, 983;Thompson, 994;U.S.OfficefPersonnelanagement,979), ndwith he bserva-tions bout uch onditions ntheNPR. TheNPR roposesochange hese onditionst the federalevel, nd mplicitlyassumeshat overnmentanbemademoreike he rivateec-tor n this egard. heWinter ommissioneport roposesdecentralizationndderegulationf merit ystemsThompson,1994).Such hangesanbe assessedhroughurtherompar-isons f hisort.

Theprospectf educinged apenturn aisesuestionsfwhetherndhow t canbereduced. ur results rovideomesupport or he nsecuritynd xpectancyypotheses.his anbe nterpretedssuggestinghat ublicmanagerslay part ncreatinged ape ecausehey eelnsecuren heiruthorityndrelations ith ubordinates,ndbecausehey ave o materialincentiveoreduceed ape.This uggestsomemportanthal-lengesobeconfrontednreducinged apen he ublicector.TheNPR nd heWinter ommissioneportmphasizeecen-tralizinguthorityver ersonnelulesndpoliciesoagencies.Yet he uccessf uch nitiativesill ependnwhetherublic

Publicnd rivate anagers'erceptionsfRed ape 571


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TableRegressionesultsor he nsecurityypothesisor ed ape t tatisticsppearnparentheses)

General dministrativeed ape Personneled apeGeneral ed ape Rule nforcement ersonnelule onstraintsersonnelelaysNumberfDecision akers

Intercept 3.915* (4.640) 3.978* (6.829) 9.707* (7.588) 3.701****2.367) 2.733 (1.612)Insecurity 0.152* (4.728) 0.080**3.627) 0.199* (4.097) 1.678***2.727) 0.174***2.699)Size 0.407* (4.649) 0.064 (1.052) 0.350***2.641) -0.356 (-0.228) 0.828* (4.639)Administrativeintensity0.415 (-0.467) 0.544 (0.885) -0.199 (-0.146) 10.731 (0.717) 2.922*****1.702)Resourceublicness .020*** 2.951) -0.002 (-0.397) -0.0004 (-0.042) 0.025 (0.201) -0.009 (-0.691)Influenceublicness 0.046 (1.413) 0.019 (0.855) 0.140***2.840) 0.178 (0.290) 0.041 (0.635)Sector 1.370** (3.337) 0.026 (0.092) 4.824* (7.699) 14.431*****1.967) 1.179 (1.470)Adjusted2 0.4563 0.1109 0.6302 0.1415 0.4150F level 20.697 4.221 41.186 3.967 15.725n 154 155 151 108 139*Significantt he .0001evel; *significantt he .001 evel; **ignificantt he .01 evel; ***significantt he .05evel;*****significantt he .10 evel; ****significantt he .10evel.

managersctually ave, r can be provided, he ncentive oreduceed ape.Economicheoriesndergirdingur nsecurityand xpectancyypothesesontendhatmany ublicgenciesytheir atureonot rovide uch ncentives. lthough edo notfully cceptuch ssumptions-weften eevery igh evelsfefficiencyotivationngovernmentgencies-ouresultsug-gest hat eformseed o ddresshe oncretencentivesor edtape eduction. s one xample f uch n ssue, mplementingofficialshouldonsiderncludinguccesst red ape eductionin performancevaluationsnd nbonus r award rograms.Ourresultslso uggesthat eformers ill ace he hallengeftrying oprovide ore ecurity ormanagersnd xecutives,nthe ense eflectedn our ecurity uestionsbout isk aking,trust, nd uthority. ecentralizationf uthorityver ersonnelpolicymay elpwith his hallenge,ut ough racticalssueswill emain. s one xample,mplementingfficialshouldare-fully xamine hetherndwhen oliticalppointeeshould ereplacedith ore ermanentnd xperiencedareerists.

Asmentionedarlier,ur egressionnalysesannot rovehedirectionf ausationmong he ariables.heresultsupportthe nterpretationhat ublic anagers lay rolen reatingedtape n heir rganizations.heresultsould lso e nterpreted,

however,sreflectinghe ffectfgeneraled ape nd ersonnelrules n managers'esponseso the nsecuritynd xpectancyquestions.or xample,lthoughublicmanagers ay issemi-nate ersonnelules ecausefweak ewardxpectancies,heymay lso eport eak ewardxpectanciesecausef xternallyimposedersonnelulesnd onstraints-inffect,he ausationcan un oth ays.

Our ltimate eneralonclusionctuallymphasizeshisatterdirectionn he elationship.his tudynd ther esearchndi-cates ous that he xternallymposedules nd aws overingsuch unctionsspersonnelndpurchasingre hemorempor-tant ourcesf ed ape.Our esultsre imilaroother tudiesthat uggesthat eneralormalizationndrule ntensityreinfluencedore y ize, unction, echnology,nd ther actorsthan ypublic r privatetatus, ut hat ublic rganizations

show harply igherevelsf formalizationf ertain unctionssuch spersonnelndpurchasingPugh t l, 1969;BozemanandBretschneider,994). These nd ertain ther imensionsand unctionsre eavilynfluencedy xternallymposedodiesof aws, ules,nd versightctivitieshat re mposednmanygovernmentalgencies.his nterpretationsconsistentith hecurrenteformffortshat ttemptoreduceed ape y ecen-

TableRegressionesultsor he xpectancyypothesisor ed ape t tatisticsppearnparentheses)

General dministrativeedTape Personnel edTapeGeneral edTape Rule nforcement ersonnel uleConstraints ersonnel elays Number fDecisionMakers

Intercept -0.991 (-1.446) 1.916** (3.840) 1.863*****1.958) 8.153 (0.394) 2.248 (1.639)Expectancy 0.217* (5.542) -0.067****-2.332) -0.414* (-7.659) -0.721 (-0.584) -0.123 (-1.533)Size 0.386* (4.304) 0.056 (0.863) 0.345*** (2.785) -1.373 (-0.496) 0.863* (4.377)Administrativeintensity0.286 (-0.313) 0.419 (0.631) 0.154 (0.122) 1.574 (0.062) 3.164*****1.685)Resourceublicness 0.013*****1.876) -0.005 (-0.867) -0.012 (-1.251) -0.066 (-0.303) -0.012 (-0.863)Influenceublicness 0.048 (1.394) 0.026 (1.036) 0.146*** (3.057) 1.149 (1.023) 0.046 (0.624)Sector 0.807*****1.809) -0.218 (-0.672) 3.471* (5.626) 22.341 (1.636) 1.231 (1.344)Adjusted 2 0.4412 0.0436 0.6853 0.0758 0.3901F level 19.290 2.036 51.088 2.162 12.688n 139 140 138 85 125tstatisticsppearnparentheses.*Significantt the .0001 evel; *significantt the .001 evel; ** ignificantt the .01 evel; ***significantt the .05 evel;*****significantt the .10 evel; ****significantt the .10 evel.

572 Publicdministrationeview November/December995, ol. 5,No.


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tralizingndreducinghesexternalonstraints.uch emainstobedetermined,owever,bout hether ndhow eformsanchange odies f aw, egal recedent, itigation,ndotherdimensionsf he laborate ontexthat ave hapedxistingadministrativetructuresndprocedures.hatmakesllthemore mportantontinuedffortst systematicnalysisf redtape.

HalG. Raineys professorf oliticalciencet he niver-sity f Georgia.isrecent esearchas ocusednorganizationalchangendredesign,ndon ncentiveystemsndpersonnelrulesn public gencies,speciallys comparedoprivateirms.He s ervingschairpersonf he ublic dministrationectionof heAmericanoliticalcience ssociation.isbook, nder-

standingndManagingublic rganizations,on he 992BestBookAward f the Public nd Nonprofit ector ivision f theAcademyfManagement.

Sanjay andey s a Ph.D.candidate n the nterdisciplinarySocial cience rogram,nd a researchssociate ith heCenterfor echnologynd nformation olicy t theMaxwellchool fCitizenship nd PublicAffairs, yracuse niversity. is recentresearch as focused n science nd technology olicy, ublic

managementnformationystems,ndred ape.Barry ozeman s director f the chool f Public olicy nd

ProfessorfPublic olicy t Georgia ech. Hespecializesnorga-nization heory nddesign, pecificallyithin he ontext f ci-entific nd echnicalnstitutions.

ReferencesAllison, raham ., Jr., 983. Public ndPrivate anagement: re hey

FundamentallylikenAllUnimportantespects? n James . PerryandKenneth raemer,ds., ublic anagement.aloAlto, A: May-field, 2-92.

Baldwin,.Norman, 990. PerceptionsfPublic ersus rivateector er-sonnelnd nformal ed ape: Theirmpact nMotivation. mericanReviewfPublic dministration,ol. 0 March),-28.

Barton, llen ., 1980. A Diagnosis fBureaucraticaladies. n CarolWeiss nd AllenH. Barton, ds.,Making ureaucracies ork. everlyHills, A:Sage, 7-36.

Blumenthal, ichaelW., 1983. Candid eflections f BusinessmannWashington. n James . Perry ndKenneth . Kraemer,ds., ublicManagement.aloAlto, A:Mayfield,2-33.

Bozeman,arry, 987.AllOrganizationsre ublic. an Francisco:ossey-Bass.

, 1993. ATheory fGovernmentRed ape.' ournalf ublicAdministrationesearchndTheory,ol. July),73-303.

Bozeman,arry, nd tuart retschneider,994. ThePublicnessuzzle'nOrganizationheory: Test f Alternativexplanationsf DifferencesbetweenublicndPrivate rganizations. ournalf ublic dministra-tion esearchndTheory,ol. (April),97-224.

Bozeman,arry, amela eed, ndPatrickcott, 992. The resencendPredictabilityfRedTape nPublicndPrivate rganizations. dmin-istrationnd ociety,ol. 4 November),90-322.

Bretschneider,tuart, 990. Managementnformationystemsn Publicand Private rganizations: nEmpiricalest. Public dministrationReview,ol. 0 Sept./Oct.),36-545.

Buchanan,ruce, 975. Red ape nd he ervice thic: ome nexpectedDifferencesetween ublic nd Private anagers. dministrationndSociety,ol. (February),23-438.

Coursey,avid, ndHal G.Rainey,990. PerceptionsfPersonnelystemConstraintsn Public, rivate, ndHybrid rganizations. eviewfPublic ersonnelAdministration,ol. 0 Spring),4-71.

Dahl,Robert

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Lindblom,953. Politics,conomics,nd

Welfare.hicago: niversityfChicagoress.Demsetz, ., 1967. Toward Theory fProperty ights. mericanco-

nomic eview,ol. 7, 47-359.Downs, nthony, 967. nside ureaucracy.oston: ittle, rown.Evans, .G.,1986. Organizationehavior: heCentral ole f Motiva-

tion. YearlyeviewfManagementf he ournalfManagement,ol. 2,203-223.

Fowler,.J., 988. Survey esearchethods. ewburyark, A:Sage ub-lications.

Gore, lbert, 993.From edTape oResults: reating GovernmenthatWorks etter Costs ess.Reportf heNational erformanceeview.Washington.C: U.S.Governmentrinting ffice.

Haas, .Eugene, ichard . Hall, ndNorman .Johnson, 966. Toward

anEmpiricallyerived axonomyf Organizations.n R.V. Bowers,ed.,StudiesfBehaviorn Organizations.thens, A: UniversityfGeorgiaress, 57-180.

Hage, erald,ndMichael iken, 969. Routineechnology,ocial truc-

ture, ndOrganizationaloals. Administrativecienceuarterly,ol. 4(September),66-376.Holdaway,dward .,John . Newberry,avidJ. Hickson,ndR.Peter

Heron, 975. DimensionsfOrganizationsnComplexocieties: heEducationalector. dministrativecience uarterly,ol.20 (March),37-58.

Lan, hiyong,ndHalG.Rainey, 992. Goals, ules, ndEffectivenessnPublic, rivate,ndHybrid rganizations: ore videncen FrequentAssertionsbout ifferences. ournalf ublic dministrationesearchandTheory,ol. January),-28.

Lynn, aurence., 1981. Managinghe ublic'susiness. ewYork:BasicBooks.

Mainzer,ewis ., 1973. Politicalureaucracy.lenview,L: Scott-Fores-man.

McKelvey,ill, 982. Organizationalystematics.erkeley: niversityfCaliforniaress.

Meyer, arshall ., 1979. ChangenPublic ureaucracies.ondon:Cam-bridge niversityress.

National cademyf ublic dministration,986.Revitalizingederal an-agement. ashington,C: National cademyf ublic dministration.

Niskanen, illiam ., 1971. BureaucracyndRepresentativeovernment.Hawthorne,Y: Aldine.

Perry, ames., nd yman . Porter, 982. Factors ffectinghe ontextforMotivationnPublic rganizations.cademyfManagementeview,vol. (January),9-98.

Pugh, erek .,David .Hickson, . Robin inings,ndC.Turner, 969.The ontext fOrganizationtructures. dministrativecienceuarter-

ly, 4:1March):1-114.Rainey, alG., 1983. Public genciesndPrivate irms:ncentivetruc-

tures, oals nd ndividualoles. AdministrationndSociety,ol.15(August),07-242.

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Soloman,sther ., 1986. Private nd PublicManagers: n EmpiricalInvestigationfJob haracteristicsndOrganizationallimate. ournalofAppliedsychology,ol. 1 May), 47-259.

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Public nd Private anagers' erceptionsf RedTape 573


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AppendixA: ariables

Dependentariables:Generaldministrativeed ape:ForGeneraled ape,he espondentsatedhefollowingtem n 10point cale, ith 0 ndi-catinghe ighestevelf ed ape:

If ed apesdefinedsburdensomedminis-trativeulesnd rocedureshat ave ega-

tive ffectsn he rganization'sffectiveness,howwould ou ssesshe evel f ed ape nyour rganization?

ForRule nforcemented ape, he ndex asmade p f sum f he atings n he ollowingtwotems,atedn 1 to scale, ith ndicat-ing trong greementHage nd iken,969):

Theemployeesere re onstantlyeingwatchedo heckor ule iolations.Peopleere eels houghheyre onstantlybeing atchedo ee hey beyll he ules

Personneled ape:The ndex or ersonnel ule onstraintsasmade p f sum f he ollowingtems. ll heitems ere ated n 4-pointcale, ith ndi-catingtronggreement.heCronbachoeffi-cientlpha orhecale as .91.

Evenf managers poor erformer,ormalrules akethard o emoveim rher romthe rganization.The ulesoverningromotionakethardfor goodmanageromove pfasterhanpoor ne.Due to rules, ay aisesormanagersrebasedmore n ongevityhan n perfor-mance.Theformalay tructuresnd ules akethard o rewardgoodmanagerith igherpay ere.The ersonnelulesnd rocedureshat ov-ernmy rganization aket asy oruperi-ors o rewardubordinatesor ood erfor-mance.Reversedcoring).

The wo ther ersonneled apemeasureserebasednmeasuresfdelaynd nthe umberofpersonsnvolvednthe ollowingersonneldecisions.

For he ersonnel elays easure,he espon-dentswere sked o ndicate n weeks heamount f time aken etween he nitiationof the requestmadeby unit within heorganizationnd the ctual pproval f therequest , or wo ctions: iring ull-timeemployeesndFiring ull-timemployeesFor he Numberf ecision akers easure,respondentsere sked o ndicate the um-ber f personsn the rganization homusttypicallypprove ach ctivity efore ctioncanbe taken or iring ull-timemployeesand or iring ull-timemployees

Independentariables:GoalAmbiguity:Thegoal mbiguitycalewasmade pof he ol-lowinghreetems:

Thisorganization's issions clear o mosteveryonehoworks ere.This rganizationas learly efinedoals.It s easy o give precise xplanationf hegoals f his rganization.

The first tem as rated n 10-point ikert caleand the emaining wo n a four oint ikertscale.The Cronbach oefficientlpha or hescale fter tandardizinghe ariables as0.78.To create goal mbiguity easure,he coreson the hree tems ere dded pafter tandard-izing o mean f0 and standard eviationf1.Insecurity:Themanagerialnsecuritycalewas omprisedfthe ollowinghreetems:

Top management isplays high evel ftrust n his rganization'smployees.Top managementn this rganizationsnotafraid o ake isks.I do not have nough uthorityo determinehow ogetmy obdone.

The Cronbach oefficientlpha or his calewas0.63.Expectancy:The Expectancyndex as scale ased n thefollowingitems:

My uperiors' hims etermine hether yideas r recommendationsre used by theorganization.Producing ow quality work leads todecreasedob ecurity.If produce high uality fwork utput, twill ead o higher ay.

Thequality nd technical erit f my deasor recommendationsetermine hetherheywill e used.Producinglow uality fwork ecreases ychancesor romotion.

The Cronbach coefficient lpha for theExpectancyeasureas .74.Control ariables:Administrativentensity:Administrativentensity as he atio f he oga-rithm f he umberf dministrativemployeesto the ogarithmf he otal umber f mploy-ees.

Publicness:Two measuresfpublicnessere sed. ResourcePublicnesssa measuref the percentagef heorganization'sudget btained hrough ithercontracts rom overnment rganizations rthrough ales to government rganizations.Influenceublicnesss a measure f he xtent owhich ublic rganizations nd public fficialsinfluencenorganization.he nfluence ublic-ness core as btained y dding he coresona 1to 10 cale)f he ollowingtems:

This organization s subject o extensiveexternalontrol y ublic rganizations.Elected overnmentfficials outinelyxert

strongnfluencenthis rganization.Size:Logarithmf he ull ime quivalentmployeesworkingor he rganization.Sector:Sector ascoded y dummy ariable ithsignifyingpublic rganizationnd0 signifyingaprivaterganization.

Appendix: A Categorizationf he Organizationsn he ample

Private rganizationsPrivate onprofitHospital, ealth ervices, entalHealth N= 5)Elderly ervices, ursing omes N= 4)Charitable ocial ervice, conomic evelopment(N= 10)PublicHealth, isaster esponse N= 3)Private or rofit: ervice irmsNewspaper, ublishingN= 2)Optical ervices N= 1)Informational, esearch, onsulting e.g., inan-cial nd engineering ervices)N= 10)

TelecommunicationservicesN= 1)Repair,Material andling N= 3)Sales, easing, upply N= 4)Private or rofit: anufacturing nd rocessingFirmsManufacturersnd abricatorsN= 35)ProcessorsOil,Chemical,everage)N=6)Public rganizationsHuman ervicesWelfare,outh, ubstanceAbuse, ob raining,amilyndChildren, en-talHealthndRetardation)N= 16)Governmental anagement, dministration,

Employee elations Personnel, aborRelations,General ervices, orkers' ompensation)N=18)Finance, udgeting, axation, uditor,ComptrollerN= 10)SciencendTechnology, nergy, nvironmental(N= 5)Economic evelopment, usiness egulation(N= 5)Lottery N= 1)Department f State N= 2)Transportation, ublicWorks N= 6)

574 Public dministrationeview November/December995, ol. 5, No.6

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