3. Case of Iljazi v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

8/13/2019 3. Case of Iljazi v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

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FIRST SECTION

CASE OF ILJAZI v. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF

MACEDONIA

(Application no. 56539/08)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

3 October 2013

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 2 of the

Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision


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ILJAZI v. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA JUDGMENT 1

In the case of Iljazi v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a

Chamber composed of:Isabelle Berro-Lefvre,President,

Elisabeth Steiner,

Khanlar Hajiyev,

Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,

Julia Laffranque,

Ksenija Turkovi,Dmitry Dedov,judges,

and Sren Nielsen, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 10 September 2013,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

PROCEDURE

1 The case originated in an application (no. 56539/08) against the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of

the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental

Freedoms (the Convention)by a Macedonian national, Mr Mensur Iljazi(the applicant), on 17 November 2008.

2. The applicant was represented by Mr D. Kadiev, a lawyer practising

in Skopje. The Macedonian Government (the Government) wererepresented by their Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov.

3. The applicant alleged that his right to due process had been infringed

on account of a refusal by the domestic courts to admit evidence he wished

to adduce.

4. On 8 June 2011 the application was communicated to the

Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of

the application at the same time (Article 29 1).

THE FACTS

I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE

5. The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Skopje.

6. On 14 May 2007 an investigating judge at the Koani Court of FirstInstance (the trial court) opened an investigation against the applicant onsuspicion of drug trafficking. His pre-trial detention was also ordered. The

decision stated inter alia:


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2 ILJAZI v. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA JUDGMENT

[O]n 10 May 2007 [the applicant] had bought, from an unidentified seller inIstanbul, 9.5 kg of heroin, which [the applicant] had packed in nineteen plastic bags ...

He had hidden the packed drugs in textile goods acquired in Turkey and had loaded

them in the cargo area of [a truck] owned by the company ... where he is employed in

a position of responsibility. On 13 May 2007 [the applicant] tried to bring the drugs

illegally [into the respondent State] ...

7. The decision also referred to a statement given by the applicant on

14 May 2007, which was not submitted to the Court. In their observations

the respondent Government referred to that statement, in which the

applicant had stated, inter alia, as follows:

... S.B. and T. were present in the car park. They loaded goods that belonged toseveral manufacturers into the truck and the trailer. During that time I was present in

the car park, but I was walking around the truck searching for parts to repair it. I did

not observe the loading. As I said, it was S. and T. (referring to S.B. and T.S.) who

observed and carried out the loading (of the truck).

8. The Government also referred to a statement given on the same day

by G.Z., a witness who was identified in the criminal proceedings as the

applicants partner. G.Z. stated:

... [A]t about 10 a.m. we arrived at the car park, where goods were starting to beloaded (into the truck). I was present when ten bags containing textile goods were

loaded. At about 3 p.m. I left for Skopje with another truck. While I was in the car

park, goods were loaded by S.B. and T.S, both from Pristine. After S.B. left, T.S.

continued the loading ...

9. The applicant did not dispute the above statements.

10. On 16 May 2007 the Kosovo1

Organised Crime Bureau in Pristineinterviewed S.B., a carrier from Pristine who transported goods from

Turkey to Kosovo, and T.S., who worked with S.B. The record of the

questioning was in English and contained the full names and addresses of

both S.B. and T.S., citizens of Kosovo. According to the record, S.B. stated,

inter alia:

... [A]ll goods of [non-regular clients] are checked in advance by me or [my]employees, whereas we dont check at all goods of [clients we have dealt with] for along time ... T.S. and I were present [while the goods were loaded]. I was present

while half of the trailer was loaded and then, at about 12 am. (on 10 May 2007), I left

for Pristine ... [They] (the clients who delivered the [last shipment of] goods) were

regular clients whom I know ... [A]t about 2-3 pm. (on 13 May 2007) G.Z. called totell me that his truck had been stopped and that some forbidden goods had been found

in two containers, to one of which the name tag of a certain B.S. had been affixed.

Inside, there had been another label with the letter S, whichreferred to the company[S.T.] that had loaded the goods in the truck. (Despite the fact that S.B. did not know

any B.S., he had not checked the containers) [since] [T]hey had been sent by the

company S.T.; we know these people and we have a verbal agreement to transport

goods ... My employee T.S. wrote in his notebook just the name B.S. in order to

1All reference to Kosovo, whether to the territory, institutions or population, in this text

shall be understood in full compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution

1244 and without prejudice to the status of Kosovo.


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know to whom the goods belonged. He registered these goods under the number

382-383. The label indicating that these goods were T-shirts was affixed in person by

an employee of the company S.T.

11. T.S. confirmed S.B.s statement regarding different practices indealing with goods sent for transportation by regular and non-regular

clients. He also acknowledged that he was responsible for registering the

goods being transported from Turkey to Kosovo. He stated, inter alia:

... On 11 May 2007 goods were loaded the whole day ... During that time, thedispatcher of the goods and I were present (in the car park). I was also in charge of the

goods that were loaded in the truck. As far as I noticed there was nothing suspicious.

They (the clients who delivered the goods) were regular clients ... the letter S(referring to the name tag inside the two containers where drugs were found) referred

to the company which loaded the goods in the truck. The letter S concerns goodsthat belong to the company S.T. or a person called S. (the co-owner of the company

S.T.) who had personally dispatched that day the goods that were stopped in

Macedonia ... I just wrote in my records the name B.S. in order to know to whom the

goods belonged. I registered these goods under the number 382-383. S. attached

personally the label [indicating] that the goods were T-shirts. I did not check the

goods because S.J. told me I vouch for the goods ... of the company S.T., especiallyfor goods with the letter S.

12. Both S.B. and T.S. denied having had any connection with the case.

13. According to an indictment filed with the trial court on 30 May

2007, on 10 and 11 May 2007 the applicant had loaded 9.079 kg of heroin,

which was already packed in nineteen plastic bags, together with some

textile goods, into a truck that belonged to the company D.B., which was

managed and owned by the applicant. On 13 May 2007 the applicant,driving the truck, had entered the respondent State at the Delevo border-crossing, where the drugs were found by customs.

14. The trial court held two hearings, on 28 June and 13 July 2007. On

the latter date it heard oral evidence from the two customs officers who had

discovered the drugs in the truck, and from Mr A.N., the authorised

representative of a carrier association. The latter produced evidence

regarding responsibility for the transportation of goods. He stated, inter

alia:

... The dispatcher and recipient are responsible for the goods being transported ...The driver, i.e. the carrier, is responsible for the quantity of goods and any damage.

The dispatcher is responsible for the contents of a shipment, together with the customs

officers on the shipping post ... The driver can monitor the number of packages. He or

she cannot check the contents of the shipment. The driver can act only if he or she

notices that undeclared goods have been loaded ... The checking of a shipment loaded

in a truck is carried out by the exporter or the customs officer. The quality of the

merchandise is checked by the exporter and the importer. The carrier, i.e. the driver,

does not check the quality of the merchandise ...

15. On the same date, the applicant, who was legally represented, asked

the trial court to admit the statements of S.B. and T.S. given before the

Kosovo Organised Crime Bureau in Pristine. The trial court rejected that


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request on the ground that there was already sufficient evidence to establish

the facts.

16. On 13 July 2007 the court rendered a judgment in which it found theapplicant, who had no previous criminal record, guilty, and sentenced him

to five years and three months imprisonment. The operative provisionsstated that the court found the applicant guilty of drug trafficking since on

10 and 11 May 2007 he had loaded and hidden drugs in a truck and

transported them from Turkey into the respondent State. The court

dismissed the applicants arguments that he had not known to whom thedrugs belonged, that he had used different border-crossing points on his

return to the respondent State for practical purposes, and that S.B. had been

present when the goods were loaded into the truck in Turkey. The following

items of evidence were listed in the judgment: oral evidence given by the

applicant, G.Z., two customs officers and Mr A.N.; search reports regardingthe truck and the applicant dated 13 May 2007; a TIR carnet and invoices;

certificates in respect of temporarily seized objects issued on 13 May 2007;

and an expert report drawn up on 15 May 2007 confirming that the drugs

found in the truck were heroin. The court also issued a forfeiture order in

respect of the truck.

17. The court found that on 10 May 2007 textile goods had been loaded,

in the presence of the applicant, G.Z. and S.B., in the truck in the car park in

Istanbul. After ten to fifteen containers had been loaded, G.Z. had left the

car park, just after S.B. had done so. The next day, textile goods had

continued to be loaded. The applicant had been present in the car park while

the goods were loaded into the trailer and the truck. The applicant had

hidden the drugs, already packed in nineteen plastic bags, in two containers

with other textile goods. B.S.s name tag had been affixed to the containers.The court stated, inter alia:

That the applicant loaded the drugs into the truck was confirmed by G.Z., who saidthat S.B. and he had left (the car park) and that the applicant had remained on the

scene while the textile goods were loaded into the truck. That [the applicant] knew

that he was transporting drugs was confirmed by the fact that he changed border-

crossing points on his return, that is, he used border-crossing points where customscontrol was less strict. Transportation through those border-crossing points was longer

and more expensive ... That S.B. was not present when the truck was loaded is

established on the basis of G.Z.s statement. That the applicant loaded the drugs intothe truck is based on the fact that he was obliged to observe what was loaded. G.Z.confirmed that in his statement. That the drugs were stored in the central part of the

truck, which was only accessible with difficulty, implies that the applicant loaded the

drugs and knew that he was transporting them.

On the basis of the evidence admitted and the facts established, the court considers

that the accused [was engaged in drug trafficking] since it is proven that he was aware

that he was transporting drugs, previously packed and hidden in textile goods, which

he loaded into the truck and brought illegally into [the respondent State]. He was thus

engaged in drug trafficking.


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18. The applicant appealed, alleging substantive procedural flaws and

errors on the facts and law. He complained that the trial court had not

established the truth regarding, inter alia, the person who had loaded thegoods at the critical time. In this connection he referred to the statements of

S.B. and T.S. (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above), in which they had stated

that he had neither been personally involved nor observed the loading of the

goods into the truck. After S.B. and G.Z. had left the scene, the goods had

continued to be loaded by T.S., assisted by another employeea dispatcher.The applicant referred to the trial courts refusal to admit the statements ofS.B. and T.S. in evidence (see paragraph 15 above), arguing that the

Customs Bureau, which had filed the criminal complaint against him, had

been in possession of those statements but had failed to submit them to the

public prosecutor. That fact had been brought to the attention of the trial

court, which could have obtained them easily. By refusing to request thosestatements proprio motu, the trial court had established the facts, and

convicted him, erroneously. In the applicants view, those statementsprovided clear evidence that he had not had anything to do with the drugs.

He further submitted a copy of the statements, translated into Macedonian.

19. The applicant further complained that the judgment contained

unclear and conflicting reasoning on the question whether he had loaded the

drugs into the truck or he had simply been present in the car park when the

drugs were loaded by other persons. He argued that loading drugs into his

truck and failing to observe that drugs had been loaded into his truck were

not the same thing. The applicant contended that factual gaps had been

filled in by speculation.

20. At a hearing held on 28 November 2007 in the presence of the

applicants representatives and the public prosecutor, the tip Court ofAppeal dismissed the applicants appeal and upheld the trial courts

judgment. As to the applicants complaint regarding the evidence producedby S.B. and T.S., the court stated:

...in refusing to admit the statements of S.B. and T.S., the trial court did not violate[the applicants] right to defence ... since the statements ... (were) given before theKosovo police authorities, and the fact that [S.B. and T.S.] were not examined is of no

relevance ... since the trial court correctly established, on the basis of G.Z.sstatement, that S.B. had not been present while (the goods were being loaded) into the

truck where the drugs were found.

21. On 21 January 2008 the applicant lodged a request with the Supreme

Court for an extraordinary review of a final judgment (

), in which he complained, inter

alia, that his defence rights had been violated because the trial court had

refused to admit the statements of S.B. and T.S. and had failed to secure

their attendance at the trial despite the fact that it had known their names

and whereabouts. The examination of these witnesses by the Kosovo Police


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Service had been requested by the national authorities after the drugs had

been found.

22. In supplementary submissions received by the Supreme Court on10 April 2008, the applicant complained that his conviction had been based

on the fact that he had used the Delevo border-crossing, where customscontrol had been, as established by the trial court, less strict. In this

connection he submitted a copy of his passport, which had earlier been

deposited with the trial court, according to which he had used that

border-crossing on many occasions before the critical day.

23. The applicants appeal was forwarded to the public prosecutor forcomments. As indicated in the Supreme Courts judgment (see paragraph 24

below), together with submissions Ovp.br.64/08 (a copy of which was not

submitted to the Court), the public prosecutor stated that the applicantsrequest should be accepted.

24. On 10 April 2008 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicantsrequest and confirmed the lower courts judgments. It held as follows:

... (The court) considers that all the relevant facts are supported by the admittedevidence, and the (established) facts are beyond any reasonable doubt (

) ... [T]he lower courts, after

having made a complete analysis of all the evidence, documentary and verbal,

correctly and completely established all the relevant facts, especially regarding the

actions that [the applicant] took at the critical time and place ... On the basis of all the

admitted evidence, in particular [search records, certificates for temporarily seized

objects, an expert report], statements given by witnesses, (namely) [the customs

officers] and G.Z., the lower courts correctly and completely established the sequence

and chronology of the events prior to and after the offence was committed.

The above-cited evidence, as well as other verbal and documentary evidence ...

confirms that [the applicant] ... transported drugs heroin, which he had earlier, inIstanbul,Turkey, hidden, together with other textile goods, and loaded into the central

cargo area of [his truck] ...

The Supreme Court underlines that [the lower courts] refusal to admit evidenceproposed by the defence ... cannot be regarded as a violation of the defence rights of

the convicted person. [S.B.], as confirmed by [G.Z.], was not present when the goods

were loaded in Turkey ...

25. This judgment was served on the applicant on 29 May 2008.

II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW

Criminal Proceedings Act of 2005, consolidated version (Official

Gazette no. 15/2005)

26. Section 308 2 of the Criminal Proceedings Act 2005 (the Act)provides that the president of the adjudicating panel of a trial court is

obliged to ensure the complete examination of a case, to establish the truth

and to remove any procedural delays and superfluous issues.


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27. Under section 340 2 and 6 of the Act, the establishment of the

truth concerns all facts that a court considers relevant for a correct

judgment. The adjudicating panel can decide to request evidence that hasnot been proposed or evidence that was withdrawn.

28. According to section 351 1 of the Act, if a fact is to be established

on the basis of a personal observation by an individual, the latter should be

examined at a hearing. The examination cannot be replaced by the reading

of a statement by that person.

29. Section 365 1 of the Act provides that the court is to decide on the

basis of the facts and evidence admitted at the trial.

30. According to section 389 1, the second-instance court is to decide

on the basis of a session or a hearing.

31. Under section 390, the second-instance court will hold a hearing

only if it is necessary, because of errors of fact, for new evidence to beadmitted, or previously admitted evidence to be re-presented and if there are

no justified reasons for the case to be remitted for a retrial.

32. Under section 398 1, the second-instance court can reject the

appeal as belated or inadmissible; it can dismiss the appeal and confirm the

lower courts judgment; it can quash the lower courts judgment and remitthe case for fresh examination by the trial court; or it can overturn the trial

courts judgment.33. Under section 418 1 (7) of the Act, a case may be reopened if the

European Court of Human Rights has given a final judgment finding a

violation of the human rights or freedoms. The same provision is provided

for in section 449 (6) of the new Criminal Proceedings Act, which entered

into force in 2010 and would become applicable after 1 December 2013.

THE LAW

I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION

34. The applicant complained under Article 6 3 (d) of the Convention

about the domestic courts refusal to admit the written statements ofwitnesses S.B. and T.S. and to secure their attendance and examination atthe trial. The Court considers that these complaints should be analysed

under Article 6 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, which read as follows:

In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to afair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

...


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(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance

and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses

against him.

A. Admissibility

35. The Government did not raise any objection as regards the

admissibility of the application.

36. The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 35 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes

that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be

declared admissible.

B. Merits

1. The partiessubmissions

37. The applicant maintained his complaint. He submitted that the trial

court had been made aware, at the earliest stage of the proceedings, of the

written statements of S.B. and T.S. Consequently, it was obliged, under

sections 308 and 340 of the Act (see paragraphs 26 and 27 above), to admit

them and, subsequently, to examine S.B. and T.S. That the impugned

proceedings had been unfair was supported by the fact that the Customs

Bureau, which had lodged the criminal complaint against the applicant and

had been in possession of those statements, had failed to communicate themto the public prosecutor and the court. That evidence had accordingly not

been examined.

38. The Government submitted that the applicant had had a fair trial.

The courts had admitted all the relevant evidence, which the applicant had

had the opportunity to challenge. He had requested only once that the

statements in question be admitted in evidence. He had not sought, although

he had been legally represented, the examination of S.B. and T.S. by the

trial court. Copies of their statements, translated into Macedonian, had been

submitted for the first time with the applicants appeal. Apart from theirnames, they had not contained any information as to the witnessescapacity,

or the purpose for which they had been examined. The records of theirquestioning had not been signed, nor had any seal been affixed to them.

Consequently, the trial court had not been obliged to admit those statements

since they were not valid evidence under section 365 of the Act

(see paragraph 29 above) on which a judgment could be based.


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statements of S.B. and T.S. given on 16 May 2007. It is evident from the

records of their questioning that both S.B. and T.S. witnessed the loading of

the goods into the applicants truck in the car park in Turkey. S.B. left thescene at noon on 10 May 2007, but T.S. remained until the loading was

completed on 11 May 2007. Neither of them stated that the applicant had

loaded any goods into the truck. On the contrary, they both stated that

workers from the company S.T., which was apparently the dispatcher of the

goods, had loaded the goods into the truck. T.S. was even more specific: he

stated that S., who was the co-owner of the company S.T., had personally

delivered the goods in which the drugs were found. Moreover, they both

confirmed that S. had personally affixed a label to the goods stored in the

containers where the drugs were subsequently found stating that they were

T-shirts (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). It has not been claimed that the

applicant was in possession of those statements at that time. The trial courtrefused to admit them in evidence on the ground that there was already

sufficient evidence to establish the facts. It appears that the applicant did not

make an explicit request for the trial court to examine S.B. and T.S.

However, in the Courts view, that did not prevent the trial court fromcalling these witnesses if it considered their evidence relevant for the

establishment of the truth. The Court observes in this context that pursuant

to sections 308 and 340 of the Criminal Proceedings Act the trial court was

required to extend the taking of evidenceproprio motuto all relevant facts

and means of proof, including those which had not been adduced, with a

view to establishing the truth and the actual circumstances of the case

(see paragraphs 26 and 27 above).

43. On 13 July 2007 the trial court convicted the applicant. The

operative provisions stated that he had loaded and hidden the drugs in the

central cargo area of the truck and had transported them from Turkey to the

respondent State (see paragraph 16 above). His conviction was based on

G.Z.s testimony, which stated that the applicant had been present in the carpark at the critical time; on the fact that he had used border-crossing points

where customs control had been less strict; and the fact that the drugs had

been hidden in a part of the truck that was difficult to access. Consequently,

there was no direct evidence that the applicant had loaded and hidden the

drugs in the truck. The trial court did not explain how the facts describedabove corroborated the actions imputed to the applicant. Even G.Z., who

had left the car park earlier, stated that the goods had been loaded by S.B.

and T.S., and that the latter had continued loading the goods after G.Z. had

left the car park (see paragraph 8 above).

44. In such circumstances, there is no doubt that the applicants requestthat the courts admit the evidence of S.B. and T.S. was sufficiently

reasoned, relevant to the subject matter of the accusation, and could

arguably have strengthened the defence position (see Polyakov v. Russia,

no. 77018/01, 34, 29 January 2009, and Guilloury v. France,


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no. 62236/00, 55, 22 June 2006). The trial court relied on G.Z.stestimony in concluding that S.B. had not been present when drugs were

loaded into the truck (see paragraph 17 above). The Court notes, however,that no explanation was given as regards the evidence of T.S., who was

responsible for the loading and was present at the critical place up to the

time when the applicant left the car park with the truck (see paragraph 11

above).

45. The applicant appealed before the tip Court of Appeal. In supportof his appeal he submitted a copy of the witnesses statements, which hehad apparently obtained in the meantime. The Court of Appeal did not make

its own assessment of the facts, but relied entirely on the facts established

by the trial court. It neither admitted the statements of S.B. and T.S., which

were allegedly in the possession of the Customs Bureau, a State body, nor

considered the possibility of examining these witnesses, despite the fact thatthe records of the questioning contained their full names and addresses

(see paragraph 10 above). In this connection, the Court notes that that court

had full jurisdiction to review the case on questions of both fact and law

(see paragraphs 31 and 32 above).

46. In his request for an extraordinary review of the final judgment

before the Supreme Court, the applicant raised his grievances about the

lower courtsrefusal to examine S.B. and T.S. or to admit their statements.That the public prosecutor supported that request (see paragraph 23 above)

shows that it was not unreasonable (see Polyakov, cited above, 34). The

Supreme Court, however, upheld the lower courts judgments and thereasons given regarding S.B. Again, no explanation was given as regards

T.S.s evidence. Moreover, it did not explain how the evidence listed in itsjudgment (see paragraph 24 above), which post-dated the events in the car

park in Istanbul, corroborated the finding that the applicant had loaded and

hidden the drugs in the truck.

47. In view of the foregoing, the Court considers that, in the absence of

any direct evidence, the applicant should have been afforded a reasonable

opportunity to challenge the assumption that he had loaded and hidden the

drugs in the truck. The refusal to examine the defence witnesses, at least

T.S., led to a limitation of the defence rights incompatible with the

guarantees of a fair trial enshrined in Article 6 (see Popov,cited above, 188).

48. The Court considers that there has accordingly been a violation of

Article 6 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention.


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II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

49. Article 41 of the Convention provides:If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols

thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only

partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to

the injured party.

A. Damage

50. The applicant claimed 27,010 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary

damage, of which EUR 7,500 corresponded to the value of the truck that

had been confiscated in the impugned proceedings and EUR 19,510 to loss

of income during his imprisonment. He also claimed EUR 85,000 in respectof non-pecuniary damage due to the alleged violation of his right to a fair

trial and the refusal of the national authorities to order his temporary release

from custody in order for him to attend the funeral of his mother.

51. The Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated. They

stated that there was no causal link between the alleged violation and the

pecuniary damage claimed.

52. The Court considers that the basis for an award of just satisfaction in

the present case must be the violation of the applicants defence rights underArticle 6 of the Convention. It further observes that the applicant s claimsfor pecuniary damage are related to the outcome of the criminal proceedings

against him and the alleged consequences of his conviction. In thisconnection, the Court notes that it cannot speculate as to what the outcome

of the impugned criminal proceedings against the applicant would have

been had there been no violation on the above-mentioned ground

(see, mutatis mutandis, Schmautzer v. Austria, 23 October 1995, 44,

Series A no. 328-A, and Demerdieva and Others v. the former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, no. 19315/06, 33, 10 June 2010). It therefore

finds no causal link between the pecuniary damage claimed and its finding

of a violation of Article 6. Accordingly, the Court makes no award under

this head.

53. On the other hand, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered non-

pecuniary damage on account of the failure of the domestic courts to admit

the evidence he wished to adduce. Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court

awards him EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax

that may be chargeable. It rejects the remainder of his claim under this head

as unrelated to the violation found.


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B. Costs and expenses

54. The applicant did not make any claim in respect of costs andexpenses.

55. Accordingly, the Court does not award any sum under this head.

C. Default interest

56. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate

should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank,

to which should be added three percentage points.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY

1. Declaresthe application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 1 and 3 (d) of the

Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months

from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with

Article 44 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,400 (two thousand and fourhundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in

respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of

the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until

settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate

equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during

the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismissesthe remainder of the applicants claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 October 2013, pursuant toRule 77 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Sren Nielsen Isabelle Berro-Lefvre

Registrar President

3. Case of Iljazi v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Documents

Transcript of 3. Case of Iljazi v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia