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 DOI: 10.1177/1043986213485635

April 2013 2013 29: 296 originally published online 25Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice

Robert M. LombardoChicago

Fighting Organized Crime : A History of Law Enforcement Efforts in  

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Article

Fighting Organized Crime: A History of Law Enforcement Efforts in Chicago

Robert M. Lombardo1

AbstractThis article reviews the history of law enforcement efforts against traditional organized crime in Chicago. While the historical record is replete with examples of the relationship between corrupt police officials and Chicago’s underworld, little has been written about the often valiant efforts directed at the Capone Syndicate and the Chicago Outfit by the law enforcement community. This article seeks to fill this void. Reviewing mainly primary sources, this article argues that police corruption was the direct result of political direction and not the concerted acts of the Chicago Police Department or individual acts of law enforcement officers. These findings have important implications for the study of organized crime and further clarify the role of machine politics as a direct cause of organized crime in American society.

Keywordschicago syndicate, chicago outfit, black hand squad, scotland yard

A recent study of political corruption listed Chicago as America’s most corrupt city far exceeding New York and New Orleans, other cities with a long history of political scandal (Simpson, et al 2012). Chicago’s reputation for corruption also extends to its involvement in traditional organized crime. The term traditional organized crime refers to the alliance between vice entrepreneurs and elected public officials. In Chicago, traditional organized crime has been dominated by one group, the Chicago Outfit. Originally referred to as the Capone Syndicate, the Outfit can trace its roots to the late 1800s and Chicago’s Democratic machine. When asked about the 1957

1Loyola University Chicago, IL, USA

Corresponding Author:Robert M. Lombardo, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology Loyola University, Chicago, 820 N. Michigan Ave. Rm. 922, Chicago, Illinois 60611, USA. Email: RLOMBAR@luc.edu

485635 CCJ29210.1177/1043986213485635Journal of Contemporary Criminal JusticeLombardoresearch-article2013

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roundup of some 80-odd crime bosses meeting in Appalachian, New York, Chicago crime syndicate leader Sam Giancana (Russo, 2001) replied that the meeting should have been held in Chicago: “The cops don’t bother us here.” While there may have been some truth to Giancana’s statement, many police officers did bother the mob. This is their story. As this review will show, police made repeated efforts to control organized crime in Chicago but were often prevented from doing so by the established political structure. While it is impossible to document the exploits of every police officer who took a stand against organized crime, this article will concentrate on a number of important efforts including the activities of the Chicago Police Black Hand Squad, the Chicago Police Scotland Yard Detail, the Cook County Sheriff’s office under Richard Ogilvie, the Chicago Crime Commission, and the various law enforce-ment components of the federal government including the U.S. Treasury’s Prohibition Bureau, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Internal Revenue Service.

The Black Hand Squad

The Black Hand Squad was a group of Italian American police officers, organized in 1911, to fight Black Hand crime in Chicago. Although often equated with organized crime, the Black Hand was not a criminal organization. The Black Hand was simply a crude method of blackmail by which wealthy Italians and others were extorted for money. Intended victims were simply sent a letter stating that they would come to violence if they did not pay a particular sum of money. The term Black Hand came into use because the extortion letters usually contained a drawing of a black hand and other evil symbols such as a dagger and skull and crossbones. While academic research has largely discredited the association between Black Hand crime and American organized crime, popular literature ties the Black Hand to the evolution of organized crime in the United States. (Lombardo, 2010). In fact, the alien conspiracy theory argues that orga-nized crime evolved in a linear fashion beginning with the Mafia in Sicily, emerging in the form of the Black Hand in America’s immigrant colonies, and culminating in the development of the Cosa Nostra in America’s urban centers (Kefauver, 1951).

The idea for a squad of Italian American police officers to fight Black Hand extor-tion came from Chicago’s Italian community. In 1907, Joseph Mirabella, president of the Unione Siciliana, an Italian Fraternal organization, called for the organization of a “White Hand Society” to oppose the menace of Black Hand crime in Chicago (“For a White Hand Society,” 1907). The White Hand announced that it would secretly receive information about the activities of Black Hand criminals and that it would provide protection to all who were threatened with Black Hand extortion. The White Hand also sought the establishment of a squad of Italian American police officers to counter the Black Hand menace (“Need a Black Hand Squad,” 1908).

The call for the establishment of the Black Hand Squad was based on the White Hand Society’s belief that the foreign nature of the Italian community limited police protection. The police and public alike generally did not understand the language, customs, and traditions of the Italian immigrant (White Hand Society, 1908). For example, one custom that benefited Black Hand criminals was the cultural distrust of

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government and law enforcement exhibited by Southern Italians and Sicilians. The history of Southern Italy is a history of 1,000 years of political, social, and economic repression. Centuries of foreign domination and bad government gave rise to a culture of contempt for the police and the law. When a crime occurred, Italians refused to cooperate with the police, who were often viewed as representatives of an alien power.

Two Italian American police officers were assigned to Black Hand crime in Chicago as early as 1908 (“Police Seeking Black Hand,” 1908). Detectives Gabriel Longobardi and Julius Bernacchi arrested Vincenzo Capra for attempting to extort US$1,000 from grocer Benedetto Cairo in August of that year. Detective Longobardi, a native of Italy, had been a member of the department since 1906. He was originally assigned to the Maxwell Street district where his acquaintance with the residents of Chicago’s West Side allowed him to successfully conclude a number of important investigations and win promotion to detective. Detectives Longobardi and Bernacchi were eventually reassigned to Assistant Police Chief Herman Schuettler’s office where they worked as “Italian crimes specialists.”

Personnel records indicate that the Chicago Police Department assigned four new officers to work with Detectives Longobardi and Bernacchi in the spring of 1911 (“Chicago Police Department,” n.d.). Police officer Paul Riccio was transferred to Assistant Chief Schuettler’s office in May and officer George De Mar the following June. Officer Riccio, a native of Italy, had been on the force since 1906 and, like Longobardi, had gained experience investigating Black Hand crime while assigned to the Maxwell Street station. Officer De Mar had been a police officer since 1909. Michael De Vito joined the department in April of 1911 and was immediately assigned to Chief Schuettler. Officer Phillip Parodi transferred to the squad a short time later. This was apparently the beginning of the Chicago Police Black Hand Squad. Also referred to as the Italian Squad, Black Hand officers worked directly on cases of Black Hand extortion and assisted local detectives in solving murders and other crimes in the Italian community.

Probably the most important Black Hand case to come to the attention of the Chicago police was the kidnapping of 6-year-old Angelo Mareno (“Futile Search for Kidnappers,” 1911).This case was important because it provided a firsthand account of how official corruption worked to protect Black Hand criminals. Angelo Mareno was kidnapped in Chicago’s Little Sicily neighborhood on August 6, 1911. Detectives learned from a playmate that the boy was last seen in the company of a man going West on Oak Street shortly after 10:00 a.m. Police and neighbors alike searched every house, barn, and shed in the area for the missing boy. Apparently undeterred by the searchers, and despite the fact that the whole community was involved in the effort, a neighbor spotted one of the kidnappers the next day. He was seen leisurely walking through the neighborhood right past the location where the kidnappers had taken the boy. Detectives Longobardi, Riccio, and Parodi of the Black Hand Squad were assigned to the investigation.

After having been missing for nearly 5 days, Angelo Mareno was returned to his family on August 11, 1911. He was found walking on Gault Court at 10 o’clock at night by detectives assigned to the kidnapping case (“Police Find Kidnapped Boy,”

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1911). The boy told the officers that he had been held in a house on West Division Street. The next day, police had four people in custody in connection with the kidnap-ping of Angelo Mareno: Carmelo Nicolosi, his wife Paulina, his brother Joseph, and mother-in-law Biagia Cutrona (“Mareno Exposes Bold Kidnapers,” 1911). In spite of Joseph Nicolosi’s claims of innocence, indictments were returned against him, his brother Carmelo, Paulina Nicolosi, and Biagia Cutrona (“Indict 5 in Moreno Case,” 1911). Indictments were also returned against two new defendants, Calogero Costandino and Leoluca Macaluso, who were with the actual kidnappers of the boy. Angelo Mareno would later testify that Macaluso came to the street in front of his house with a big red wagon and took him for a ride around the block and then to a big black house on Division Street.

Just 1 month after their indictment, Joseph and Carmello Nicolosi were found guilty and sentenced to life in prison for their crimes. Paulina Nicolosi was sentenced to 7 years for her part in the blackmailing scheme. The severe sentences were meant to carry a strong message to Black Hand criminals, especially those operating in the Little Sicily area. The sentences, however, were never carried out. Judge Lockwood Honore granted the Nicolosis a new trial on February 19, 1912 arguing that newspaper coverage of the case had influenced the jury (“Kidnappers Free, Victims Suffer,” 1914). On February 24, the case was taken off the court call. It was put back on, post-poned, and taken off again at least a half dozen times. It would be 2 years before the new trial began. The Marenos were mystified! The mystery, however, was solved when court records revealed that Chicago Alderman John Powers posted bail for both men after having arranged to reduce the defendants’ bonds in the new trial from US$25,000 to US$10,000. John Powers was the alderman of the Nineteenth Ward, which was located in the Near West Side of Chicago. He ran two saloons and a gam-bling house, and was known as the “Prince of Boodlers” because of his ability to push corrupt measures through the city council (Baker, 1969).

The involvement of Alderman Powers led to a public outcry. The Reverend Elmer L. Williams, pastor of the Grace Methodist Church, attacked the activities of Powers in the case, stating that Alderman Powers was a saloonkeeper who misrepresented the people of the Nineteenth Ward and “recognized the political value of a neat little orga-nization like a Black Hand society” (“Kidnappers’ Trial Reopens Today,” 1914). He concluded that the “blackest hands” were not found in Little Italy but were those put out to sign bail bonds for such characters as the Nicolosis and to write continuance on the judge’s call sheet.

Public sentiment and pressure from the Chicago Tribune forced the court to set a new date for the retrial of the Nicolosi clan (“Kidnappers Trial Reopens Today,” 1914). Frederick Burnham, the prosecuting attorney, told the press that he had tried many times to have the case called, but there seemed to be a “hidden power” that balked at his efforts. The case finally was set for trial on May 5, 1914, the day after the Chicago Tribune article disclosing Alderman Powers’ involvement in the case. Jury selection began the same day. On May 7, Antonio Mareno took the witness stand and told how he had been victimized by the blackmailing scheme. He also explained the “system” of blackmailing that existed in Little Sicily and challenged prosecutors to do

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something about what he described as the “saloonkeeper bosses” who held power there (“Kidnapped Boy’s Father,” 1914).

Whatever the system of Black Hand crime, and whatever the connection to saloon-keeper bosses, Black Hand crime in Little Sicily, and throughout Chicago, plummeted in 1912. Black Hand criminals may have been down, but they were not out. Detective Anthony Gentile, who had headed the Mareno guard detail, was transferred to Hegewisch, and ordered into uniform allegedly because he watched Mareno “too dili-gently” (“Free Italians in Kidnapping Case,” 1914). Gentile, while assigned to the East Chicago Avenue Station, had also played a prominent role in a number of other Black Hand investigations. Being transferred to Hegewisch in the Chicago Police Department was the equivalent of being transferred to Siberia. The transfer of Gentile was not the end of the story. The new trial only lasted 3 days. Much to the astonishment of every-one involved, Judge Michael McKinley acquitted the Nicolosis of all charges.

Although direct evidence that Alderman Powers had a hand in dismissing the charges against the Nicolosis has not come to light, the fact that he was involved at all signaled that Black Hand criminals had some tie to elected officials. Powers’ involve-ment also demonstrated the often-felt futility of testifying against Black Hand crimi-nals. On the other hand, the Mareno case also demonstrated the heroic efforts made by members of the Italian community and Chicago Police against Black Hand criminals. Former White Hand Society members, in spite of the demise of the organization, had provided financial support to the Nicolosi investigation, and any number of police officers risked their lives and careers to fight Black Hand extortion, as demonstrated by the action taken against Officer Gentile.

The Black Hand Squad was under the direct supervision of deputy chief of police Herman Schuettler. Schuettler’s dogged determination to stamp out Black Hand crime led to his appointment as chief of police (“Schuettler Picked as Police Chief,” 1916). City officials had considered him for the position before, but he had always refused it. When he finally accepted the office, it was with the understanding that he would close his police career when he relinquished his badge as chief. His appointment was described as one of the few good things that could be credited to the scandal-ridden administration of Mayor William Hale Thompson. Thompson was known for his “wide-open town” policy when it came to enforcing liquor and gambling laws. Schuettler enjoyed the rare distinction of having risen through the ranks on merit alone, never having involved himself with the corrupt inner ring that controlled police promotions. Mayor Thompson’s first assignment for his new police chief was to attack what the mayor described as the “crooked hand of whiskey,” referring to the relation-ship between Chicago saloons and vice activity (“Brand Saloons,” 1918).

Herman F. Schuettler, the patron of the Black Hand Squad, died in August 1918 after 35 years of police service (“Chief of Police H. F. Schuettler,” 1918). The press described him as the greatest police chief that Chicago had ever known. Both his fel-low officers and even the criminal elements respected and admired him because of his fairness and courage. The department held Schuettler up as a model for every rookie police officer coming on the force. At a time when police corruption was the norm, his integrity and honesty as a public official were never assailed. Schuettler was born in

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1861 in the Near North Side of Chicago, where he spent much of his police career. He was described as a giant of a man, who was as kindly and thoughtful as a woman. The death of Chief Schuettler signaled the end of the Black Hand Squad. The officers were soon transferred to the detective division. Although they continued to investigate crime in the Italian community, they began to move about the police department as their careers progressed. Were the officers transferred because they lost their patron or was it because the Black Hand scourge had ended? Whatever the reason, the 1920s brought a new law-enforcement problem, Prohibition.

Prohibition

The National Prohibition Enforcement Act ended the sale of alcoholic beverages in the United States. Although the federal government had created the Prohibition Bureau within the Treasury Department to enforce the liquor ban, no similar unit was created at the local level. Police were generally tolerant of drinkers and minor speakeasies but were forced to deal with the bootleggers who were growing in wealth and power and contemptuous of authority. In Chicago, the responsibility to fight the often violent bootlegging gangs fell on the city’s detective force. Among the most famous of the city’s crime fighters were detective bureau chief John Stege and his deputy captain William “Shoes” Shoemaker.

Stege, who was described by the Chicago Tribune as the “gangster’s terror,” led a bureau of 1,000 detectives who not only investigated major crimes, but rode hard on Chicago’s gangster community (Doherty, 1952). At the first sign of trouble, it was Stege’s policy to conduct wholesale raids rounding up gangsters in their strongholds. He would hold them as long as he legally could or until they were willing to provide information about recent crimes. Stege had a strict rule against brutality and the third degree. He gained the respect of the criminal underworld because he couldn’t be bluffed, bribed, or scared. Criminals knew that he could be trusted to “make a deal” if they provided information. Stege was a product of the reform-minded mayoral admin-istration of William Dever. In 1929, working with the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Stege and Shoemaker led more than 100 federal agents and Chicago police into Chicago Heights, a Capone stronghold, where they seized bootleg stills, more than 423 slot machines, 10 double-barreled shotguns, 16 revolvers, and 500 rounds of ammunition (“Chicago Heights Raided by U.S.,” 1929).

As Dever’s cleanup man, Stege became the target of William “Big Bill” Thompson, who was running against Dever in the 1927 mayoral elections. If elected, Thompson promised that he would fire Stege for his “overzealous” efforts. Campaigning on the promise that he was as “wet as the Atlantic Ocean,” Thompson was returned to the mayor’s office for a third term (Wendt & Kogan, 1953). Immediately on taking office, Thompson fired Stege claiming that Stege had been arrested for manslaughter before becoming a police officer under the name John Stede (“Captain Stege on Trial,” 1927). Stege responded that his only arrest had been for a minor offense as a juvenile (“Chief Suspends John Stege,” 1927). After fighting his dismissal in court, Stege was returned to the police department and the detective bureau, but without responsibility for vice

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enforcement (“Stege Rewins Police Captaincy,” 1928). Once more the raids and line-ups of gangsters began. It wasn’t long before Thompson responded demoting Stege and assigning him to an abandoned police station on North Halsted Street where he remained for the next 6 months.

When Anton Cermak won the mayor’s office in 1931, he assigned Stege to the Wabash Avenue station with orders to enforce the gambling laws against the Negro policy wheels (“Stege Battles to Save Dupes,” 1931). Policy was important to the Black community and Black elected officials. Graft from policy funded Black south side political campaigns. Although Stege was only enforcing the law, Cermak’s real motive was “to make Democrats out of the Negroes of the 2d and 3d wards” (Doherty, 1952). Blacks until this time were staunch supporters of Big Bill Thompson and the Republican Party. The story of John Stege is not only one of courage and integrity but it also demonstrates the perverse way that the established political structure was able to use honest police officers for political purposes; in this case forcing the Black com-munity into the Democratic fold in Chicago through the enforcement of misdemeanor gambling laws.

Cermak was not involved with the Capone mob. In fact, Cermak personally directed the organization of a vice and gambling unit within the police department in an effort to increase police efforts (“Cermak and Courtney Join Forces,” 1932). While antimob, Cermak was not antivice. Recognizing the financial importance of gambling to the political structure in Chicago, he moved to rationalize the city’s gambling enterprises under his own control. He recognized the importance of gambling for the Democratic political machine. Cermak attempted to reorganize gambling under the supervision of his own political followers including gamblers Ted Newberry and Martin Guilfoyle.

The Kelly Years

On February 15, 1933 Cermak was shot and killed while speaking with then president-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt in Miami, Florida (Gottfried, 1962). Alderman Frank Corr was chosen as Cermak’s temporary successor. He was soon succeeded by former funeral director and sanitary district engineer Edward J. Kelly. Kelly served as mayor of Chicago from 1933 to 1947 (Flynn, 1940). Kelly was the choice of Cook County Democratic Party chairman Pat Nash. Nash had made a fortune building sewers in Chicago, including US$14,000,000 in work from Kelly’s sanitary district (Doherty, 1943). Kelly was an advocate of the “liberal-town policy,” a more refined version of the “wide-open town” policy advocated by Big Bill Thompson. While official pro-nouncements informed the public that the Capone Syndicate did not exist, the streets of Chicago were lined with handbooks and policy gambling flourished in Chicago’s South Side. The Kelly–Nash combination had turned to the Outfit for revenue to fund their political organization (Biles, 1984). Tribute paid to the Democratic Party by the vice lords was a vital source of political funding. The supervision of gambling revenue was entrusted to each ward committeeman. A portion of the money collected went to Democratic offices downtown, while the rest stayed in the ward to defray campaign expenses.

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The Kelly–Nash machine had a more ruthless and efficient alliance with the under-world than any previous Chicago administration. Under it 7,500 protected gambling establishments were said to operate openly. Financial records obtained by the Chicago Tribune in 1943 showed that the Syndicate was paying US$300,000 a year to politi-cians, police, fixers, and public officials in Cook County and its country towns (“Courtney Only Rival,” 1943). The Tribune obtained the records after gangster Jake Guzik left them in the oven of his apartment when he moved out of a fashionable North Side hotel.

Although frequently overlooked, Kelly’s contribution to organized crime in Chicago rivaled that of Big Bill Thompson. A 1946 investigation of the police depart-ment by the Chicago Crime Commission found that the department was ruled by Kelly’s city hall machine (“Chicagoans Pay,” 1946). Gambling was controlled in each police district by the “captain’s men,” plain clothes officers who worked directly for the district captain. Their job was to collect tribute from gamblers, bawdy houses, and cheating night clubs and taverns. Other officers were not allowed to interfere. Any officer brash enough to set out against these activities was quickly disciplined and transferred to some undesirable assignment. Even if a case did make it to court, they were often “fixed” by Kelly’s precinct captains who were employed as court clerks (“They Are Just,” 1946). While there were honest police officers in the department, Kelly’s absolute control of promotions and assignment prevented men like John Stege and William Shoemaker from rising to command positions during his administration.

After 14 years as mayor, Edward Kelly was asked to step down in 1946. Kelly’s administration had been tied to organized crime, which along with the deterioration of the public schools and his efforts to bring Blacks in to the Democratic Party had alien-ated many voters (Hirsch, 1987). In Kelly’s place, Democratic leaders chose Martin Kennelly, whose integrity and respectability were unquestioned (“Kennelly Life Story,” 1951). Kennelly was a self-made man. He had built Allied Van Lines and chaired the American Red Cross in Chicago during World War II. Under Mayor Kennelly, flagrant gambling disappeared. Bookmaking continued on a “sneak” basis, but visible, commercial gambling establishments were closed down. Although Kennelly was generally viewed as an honest man, some charged that the city was man-aged poorly under his leadership (“Chicago’s Cops More Honest,” 1953).

Chicago Crime Commission

The complete domination of law enforcement by the Kelly–Nash Machine left much of the fight against organized crime in the 1940s to the Chicago Crime Commission. While not a government agency, the Chicago Crime Commission played a major role in society’s efforts against organized crime in Chicago. The Chicago Crime Commission was created in 1919, as a committee of the Chicago Association of Commerce, to act as an independent investigative body representing the public interest in matters relating to the administration of criminal justice (Hoffman, 1987). Much of the Crime Commission’s reputation stems from its activities against organized crime and the Capone Syndicate in Chicago during the Prohibition years. One of the Crime Commission’s earliest efforts

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was the creation of a “public enemy’s” list containing the names of Chicago’s most notorious gangsters. The list provided by the Crime Commission contained 28 names (Lyle, 1960). Heading the list was Al Capone, “Public Enemy No. 1.” The name caught the public’s attention as books, radio shows, and moving pictures adopted the phrase bringing additional attention to the gangster problem.

The Chicago Crime Commission was also directly responsible for bringing Prohibition agent Elliot Ness to Chicago. In 1929, Crime Commission Director Frank Loesch traveled, with a group of prominent businessmen, to Washington, D.C., to meet with President Herbert Hoover regarding crime conditions in Chicago (Hoffman, 1989). As a result of this meeting, the president ordered a full-scale attack on the Capone Syndicate by the Prohibition Bureau and the Internal Revenue Service. Under the supervision of 28-year-old Elliot Ness, Prohibition agents battered down the doors of 19 Capone distilleries and six breweries and seized or destroyed more than US$1,000,000 worth of whiskey, beer, delivery trucks, and other equipment. While the “Untouchables,” as Ness’ men became known, were busy dismantling Capone’s boot-legging empire, agents of the Internal Revenue Service were also busy assembling tax cases against Capone and many of his leading hoodlums.

The Chicago Crime Commission also worked with a group of prominent business-men to establish the Citizen’s Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of Crime (Hoffman, 1989). The Secret Six, as they came to be known, were so named by the press because their chairman, Colonel Robert Isham Randolph, refused to name his five colleagues lest he endanger their lives. Working in cooperation with the Crime Commission and the Internal Revenue Service, the Secret Six donated US$1,000,000 to fight organized crime. This money was used to hire private investigators who devel-oped informants, tapped telephones, paid witnesses, and generally collected informa-tion on mob activity that was passed on to federal authorities. It was the Secret Six who spent US$10,000 sending star witness Fred Ries to South America until he was needed to testify against Capone in federal court on charges of income tax evasion.

Scotland Yard

In May 1950, U.S. Senator Estes Kefauver began a series of legislative hearings into organized crime (Trohan, 1951). The “Kefauver Hearings,” as they were called, were unique in that they were the first congressional hearings to be seen on television. Some believe that Kefauver began the hearings to position himself to run for president, which he did in 1952 when he sought the Democratic Party’s nomination. The Kefauver Hearings led to a renewed effort by the Chicago police. The Scotland Yard unit that had been set up by Mayor Cermak in 1931 under the direction of Captain William Shoemaker, to investigate important murders and major crimes, was expanded to include the investigation of organized crime (“Alcock Upsets Station,” 1931). Charles Gross, a Republican ward committeeman, had been shotgunned to death and Chicago hoodlums had begun a bombing campaign against the Teamsters Union. Headed by Lieutenant Joseph Morris, Scotland Yard would now concentrate its efforts on the Outfit’s attempts at labor racketeering, gambling, and extortion.

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Scotland Yard’s efforts against organized crime began in 1952. Its activities were so successful that by 1953 it was rumored that Tony Accardo was moving to California to avoid the surveillance of the Scotland Yard detail (“Hear Accardo Hopes,” 1953). Morris had ordered his men to arrest Accardo any time he was seen inside the city of Chicago. The unit also began to intensely watch the members of Chicago’s crime syn-dicate, particularly those on their “top 20” list (“Name Top 20,” 1953). Police believed that this intelligence gathering effort would help to “neutralize” (prevent) the mobs criminal activities. So aggressive were Scotland Yard officers that Sergeant William Duffy, disguised as an ice cream peddler, pushed his ice cream wagon into a Fourth of July party at Accardo’s River Forest mansion and sold ice cream to the gangsters’ children while eavesdropping on their parents’ conversations (“Accardo, Guzik Run Gantlet,” 1953).

The crime syndicate responded to the success of Scotland Yard by filing a number of nuisance suits against the unit. Slot machine boss Edward Vogel sued Lieutenant Morris and several members of Scotland Yard for false arrest after being charged with disorderly conduct in 1952 (“Vogel Demands US$100,000,” 1952). The following year, thief Anthony De Rosa claimed that Morris and his men had beaten him during an interrogation following his arrest for possession of stolen property (“Police Beating Denied,” 1952). The officers were subsequently indicted by a Cook County grand jury, but found innocent at trial (“Jury Selection Begun,” 1953). Police Commissioner Timothy O’Connor refused to suspend the officers and branded the charges as an attempt to intimidate the police department disclosing that three overtures had been made from “hoodlum elements” indicating their willingness to withdraw the charges if Scotland Yard would “lay off” of certain investigations (“Trial of 5 Cops,” 1953).

In spite of its success, the Scotland Yard organized crime unit was disbanded in 1956 after only 4 years of operation. Virgil Peterson of the Chicago Crime Commission charged that the unit had been “knifed” by its political enemies, but police commis-sioner Timothy O’Connor said that the unit was broken up as part of a detective divi-sion decentralization plan (“Scotland Yard End,” 1956). Not only was the unit broken up, but its extensive files had vanished. More than six filing cabinets listing more than 10,000 criminals, 600 hoodlums, and 150 businesses taken over by gangsters had dis-appeared (“Seek Scotland Yard Gang Data,” 1958).

The real reason for ending Scotland Yard may have been the election of Richard J. Daley to the mayor’s office (“Illinois: Daley Life,” 1956). The Cook County Democratic Party had dropped its support of reform-minded mayor Martin Kennelly. During the campaign, Lieutenant Joe Morris had been investigating a bookmaker, Michael Farr, who had powerful connections to the Cook County Democratic Central Committee, and word got to Daley that the Scotland Yard detail was working against him (“Disclose Rice Probed,” 1955). Farr was known as the private bookie of the top brass of the Democratic machine. In spite of Morris’ denials, the unit was disbanded when Daley came into office. Morris had also testified in the 1954 federal prosecution of nine men charged with vote fraud in the First Ward. The First Ward was the center of the Outfit’s political power (“Convict 5 in Vote Frauds,” 1956). After the trial, U.S. Attorney Robert Tieken wrote Chicago Police Commissioner Timothy J. O’Connor

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that after asking six police officers to testify, including one police captain, only Lieutenant Joseph Morris was willing to appear in the vote fraud case. The Chicago Tribune condemned the whole episode arguing that it underscored the relationship between local law enforcement and the worst elements of the criminal community (“The Election Fraud Conviction,” 1956).

Richard Ogilvie

In 1954, Richard B. Ogilvie, a member of the Young Republican Club of Cook County, joined the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago (“Ogilvie’s Record,” 1961). In 1958, he was appointed to the Attorney General’s Task Force on Organized Crime. Ogilvie was assigned to the Chicago office, one of four set up by the government in response to the 1957 underworld conclave in which 67 gangsters were found meeting in Appalachian, New York. For the next 2 years, he directed a special grand jury investigating the Chicago Outfit (“Call Special U.S. Jury,” 1959). Ogilvie’s work, however, seemed to be blocked at every turn. Although promised a staff of lawyers and investigators, he was given one assistant—Bill Carey. In spite of these obstacles, Ogilvie and Carey were able to convict mob boss Tony Accardo on charges of income tax evasion, but the case was later overturned by an appellate court.

On leaving the U.S. Attorney’s office, Ogilvie again became active in Republican politics. Addressing the Cook County Republican Veteran’s League in 1961, Ogilvie charged that the federal government was failing in its responsibility to stop organized crime (“Assails Crime Fighting,” 1961). He also charged that FBI director Hoover had not kept up with the times. Ogilvie argued that Hoover, and other policy makers, viewed the fight against organized crime as a local law enforcement problem but that local agencies were hopelessly inadequate to cope with this menace. While the federal government may not have had the jurisdiction to fight organized crime, the FBI did begin the “Top Hoodlum Program” in 1953 to collect information on America’s gang-sters. Proving to be the one political leader who stood firm against the mob, Ogilvie ran for Cook County Sheriff in 1962 arguing that organized crime was the biggest business in Chicago and that law enforcement had done nothing to suppress crime syndicate leaders.

Ogilvie was right about the organized crime problem in Chicago. Local law enforce-ment was helpless largely because of the political power of the mob. The Outfit sold narcotics, muscled labor unions, and forced saloon keepers and restaurant owners to install their juke boxes and pinball machines. They also ran handbooks, dice games, gambling casinos, and brothels. The Chicago Tribune estimated that the Outfit con-trolled 1,000 places in Chicago and suburban Cook County where a person could gamble in one form or another (Leonard & Smith, 1959); all made possible by a pow-erful alliance between elected officials and crooked politicians. The Outfit was so powerful that virtually every organized illegal activity came under their control. When they heard of an independent gambling operation or a tavern where “strippers” and “bar girls” solicited drinks, the Outfit demanded a percentage of the profit to ensure police protection and peace with the Outfit.

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Ogilvie’s run for sheriff so troubled the Outfit that word came down from mob leader Sam Giancana that Ogilvie’s candidacy had to be stopped (Tagge, 1962). The Outfit had a substantial investment in suburban Cook County that would be threatened by an unfriendly sheriff. In south suburban Calumet City, for example, Gambling and strip clubs ran all night (“Find Gambling, Vice,” 1953). According to the Chicago Crime Commission, wide-open gambling also flourished in the suburbs of Forest Park, Melrose Park, and Lyons.

Mounting public disapproval of crime conditions led to a Republican victory in the sheriff’s race. Ogilvie defeated the Democratic candidate Roswell Spencer, chief investigator for the Cook County State’s Attorney (“Ogilvie Beats Spencer,” 1962). Once in office, Ogilvie declared war on organized crime. One of his first official acts was to appoint Arthur Bilek chief of the sheriff’s police (“Ogilvie to Give,” 1962). Bilek was the director of training for the Chicago Police Department and had earlier gained a squeaky-clean reputation while assigned to organized crime investigations under Republican State’s Attorney Benjamin Adamowski.

Within a month of taking office, Ogilvie’s police, working with the Chicago Police Department, arrested 250 people in gambling raids throughout Chicago and suburban Cook County (“250 Arrested,” 1962). Ogilvie’s police even raided mob-infested Cicero, Illinois clamping down on gambling and vice activity in the suburb (“Cicero’s Night Life,” 1964). Cicero was especially famous for its striptease shows. Clubs such as the Dream Bar featured women who stripped down to their “G” strings. The Sheriff’s police department established 16-hr-a-day uniform patrols in Cicero to ensure that vice activity did not reopen. Ogilvie also presented Cicero Police Chief Erwin Konovsky with a 10-point plan to clamp down on criminal activity and threat-ened to ask the state’s attorney to charge Konovsky with malfeasance if he did not implement the plan. So aggressive were Ogilvie’s efforts that his men arrested future mob boss Joey Auippa for the attempted bribery of police officer Donald Shaw stem-ming from a Cicero gambling investigation (“Trap Auippa,” 1965).

Ogilvie also clamped down on vice activity in the unincorporated areas of Cook County, where vice often ran openly (“County Vice, Gambling,” 1955). Unincorporated areas are those that are not governed by any village or municipality. Administratively, their control falls under the Cook County Board and they are under the law enforce-ment jurisdiction of the Cook County Sheriff. The vast size of the county, weak town-ship government, and lax enforcement by the sheriff made these areas prime locations for crime syndicate activities. Gambling houses such as Vic’s Tavern and the Ballard Inn in Main Township, the Sunrise Inn in Leyden Township, the Forest Lounge in Niles Township, and the Wagon Wheel and Norwood House in Norwood Park Township flourished in the unincorporated areas (“Gambling Hums,” 1953). Vice activity in these areas became particularly important prior to a Chicago mayoral elec-tion because the Outfit provided the financial support without which the ward and precinct organizations could not function.

His success and popularity as sheriff propelled Ogilvie to the presidency of the Cook County Board of Commissioners in 1966 and 2 years later to the office of gov-ernor of the State of Illinois (“Heads County Board,” 1966; “Nixon, Ogilvie Stars,”

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1968). Within a year of taking the governor’s office, Ogilvie created the Illinois Bureau of Investigation to flight organized crime and drug trafficking in the state (“House OKs Ogilvie Law,” 1968). The IBI, as it came to be known, was intended to be state’s version of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In spite of the need for heightened enforcement against the crime syndicate in Chicago, liberal reformers and Chicago mayor Richard J. Daley fought the creation of the IBI fearing a “super police” state. Richard Ogilvie was ultimately a one-term governor losing to Democrat Daniel Walker in 1972. Ogilvie’s loss was blamed on his support for a state income tax. Like Ogilvie, Walker was also a one-term governor losing to former United States Attorney James R. Thompson in 1976 (“For Unified Law Enforcement,” 1977). Thompson, who is generally viewed as a reformer, disbanded the IBI, forever ending the state’s efforts against organized crime.

An Illinois bureau of investigation modeled after the FBI was proposed as early as 1940 by the Illinois State Bar Association (Kinsley, 1940). The intent of the proposal was to create a nonpolitical bureau to assist state’s attorneys and sheriffs with major investigations, establish a state crime lab, and to fight organized gangs throughout the state (“Barrett Tells Plan,” 1941). The effort to create such a bureau languished for 30 years until resurrected by Governor Ogilvie in 1969. In 1971, 1 year after the IBI began operations, there was already a bill pending in the Illinois legislature, sponsored by Chicago Democrats, to place the IBI under the jurisdiction of the Illinois State Police (“Elrod, Carey Tangle,” 1970). A similar measure was introduced again in 1971with some success (Seslar, 1971). All duties of the IBI’s general criminal investi-gation division were turned over to the state police (“State Cops Get Duties,” 1971). A series of investigative and management blunders finally gave state politicians the ammunition needed to end the IBI. The Walker administration had brought in a num-ber of outsiders to run the organization, who some believed had mismanaged the agency (Elmer & Locin, 1974). Placing the IBI under the jurisdiction of the Illinois State Police may have made management sense, but the fact of the matter is that the state police never pursued on organized crime enforcement agenda.

The CPD Intelligence Division

In November 1959, an inmate in the Cook County Jail sent word to state’s attorney Benjamin Adamowski that he had information to trade for a reduction in charges. The inmate, Richard Morrison, told state’s attorneys’ investigators that he had been involved in a burglary ring with eight Chicago police officers assigned to the Summerdale Police District (“Summerdale Scandal,” 1965). The scandal rocked the police department and forced the retirement of police commissioner O’Connor. Seeking to reestablish the integrity of the department, Mayor Daley appointed a com-mittee to find a nationally recognized expert to lead the Chicago Police Department. After weeks of searching, the committee chose its own chairman, Orlando W. Wilson, to lead the department. Known as “O. W.”, Wilson, a former police officer and college professor, was a student of police organization and management. His book Police Administration was viewed as the bible by progressive police managers across the

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nation. Recognizing that Chicago had an organized crime problem, Wilson appointed Joseph Morris to lead the newly formed Bureau of Inspectional Services to fight police corruption, vice, and organized crime. Morris, in turn, appointed his former protégé William Duffy to command the newly created Intelligence Division and lead the fight against organized crime.

Morris and Duffy lost no time in reorganizing Chicago’s efforts against the under-world. Housed in a secret location at Chicago’s Navy Pier, the Intelligence Division attacked gambling, narcotics, pornography, and policy gambling. Intelligence Division detectives even cracked a major juice loan operation (“Detectives Crack Mob,” 1964). The constant surveillance of syndicate hoodlums by Duffy’s officers also prevented the infiltration of legitimate businesses (Wiedrich, 1963). Duffy also assisted the McClellan Committee in its investigation of organized crime in Chicago (“Chicago Mafia Chiefs Named,” 1965). Following the lead of the federal government, Wilson attempted to have a wiretap law passed in Illinois; however, the bill was killed by the West Side Bloc (Tagge, 1963). The West Side Bloc was a group of Chicago Aldermen, Illinois State legislators, and U.S. Congressmen who supported the Chicago Outfit. When Wilson left the department, Duffy was demoted by Wilson’s successor James B. Conlisk for “failing to bend to political pressure.” Captain Joseph Morris retired (Knott, 1980). This was the second time that Duffy had been demoted for his efforts against organized crime.

When Jane Byrne became Chicago’s mayor in 1979, she forced James E. O’Grady, the superintendent of police, to resign. O’Grady had openly supported incumbent mayor Michael Bilandic in the mayoral primary. In O’Grady’s place, Byrne appointed former homicide commander Joseph Di Leonardi as acting superintendent of police. Di Leonardi immediately appointed William Duffy to lead the Bureau of Inspectional Services and the department’s Intelligence Division. At the time of his appointment, Duffy told Di Leonardi that the Outfit would have him removed as superintendent within 90 days if he returned him to lead the department’s fight against organized crime (J. Di Leonardi, personal communication, September 22, 2011). Duffy’s appoint-ment signaled a crackdown on organized crime. Almost immediately, police stepped up gambling enforcement in the First Ward.

Before long, Di Leonardi was called to city hall by mayoral aides William Griffin and Michael Brady, who informed him that John D’Arco, the First Ward Democratic Committeeman, wanted Duffy demoted (Mount, 1980). Di Leonardi refused and withdrew his application to become Chicago’s permanent police superintendent. Government informant and mob insider Robert Cooley wrote in his book When Corruption Was King that First Ward Alderman Fred Roti had explained to him that Jane Byrne had been told that either she got rid of Di Leonardi or that municipal unions would shut down the city during upcoming contract negotiations (Cooley & Levin, 2004). Such was the power of the Chicago Outfit, of which Roti was a “made member.” Soon Di Leonardi, Duffy, and James Zurowski, who had run the police garage for Di Leonardi, were demoted to meaningless jobs and banished from police headquarters. It was the third time that Duffy had been demoted for his stand against organized crime. What was even worse, this time the department tried

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to justify the demotion by labeling Duffy a stumble bum and a fraud, questioning his reputation as a crime fighter. Then police superintendent Richard Brzeczek, who had been appointed by Byrne to succeed Di Leonardi, went so far as to claim that the charges made by Di Leonardi and Duffy were baseless and that the men were “shooting their mouths off because they were demoted” (“Mob Influence Reports,” 1980). Byrne’s concern for the wishes of D’Arco may have stemmed from the fact that D’Arco had arranged reconciliation between Byrne and her two political enemies, Aldermen Victor Vrdolyak and Edward Burke (Petacque & Hough, 1979).

Although Byrne had succumbed to pressure from D’Arco and the First Ward, the police department actually stepped up its enforcement efforts against the Outfit. Veteran gambling investigator Donald Herion was placed in charge of a special squad to attack syndicated gambling and Captain Julian Gallet was placed in command of the Intelligence Division. Gallet had a vision of police and federal agents working together to build cases against organized crime. Under his command, Chicago police continu-ally raided the Outfit’s dice and barbooth games and worked with the FBI on the “Operation Chisel” chop shop investigation (Crawford, 1984). Intelligence officers were also instrumental in arresting members of the FALN terrorist group who had planted explosives in downtown Chicago (Kennedy, 1984).

The Feds Step Up to the Plate

The election of Ronald Reagan in 1981 brought new pressure on the mob. Reagan appointed a national commission to study organized crime (Reagan, 1983). Headed by former New York judge Irving R. Kaufman, hearings were held throughout the coun-try to develop new remedies to cripple America’s crime syndicates. Reagan had first-hand experience with organized crime when as a member of the Screen Actors Guild, he watched as the Chicago Outfit tried to muscle in on the motion picture industry. The commission recommended that an aggressive effort be launched to root out organized crime concluding that previous efforts have been disorganized and largely ineffective. The commission also recommended that steps be taken to rid labor unions of mob influence through the extended use of electronic surveillance, aggressive enforcement of federal antiracketeering laws, and the decertification of unions that were found to be mob controlled (Koziol, 1986).

Things began to happen. In 1986, mob boss Joseph Auippa and three other Chicago gangsters were convicted in a Kansas City trial of skimming profits from the Stardust casino in Las Vegas (Koziol, 1986). Skimming is the practice of removing money from a casino counting room before income taxes are determined. Gambling has been legal in Las Vegas since 1931. In 1946, the Chicago Outfit invested money to build the Flamingo Hotel, one of the earliest on the Las Vegas strip. Through their influence with the Teamsters Central States’ Pension Fund, the Outfit arranged financing for San Diego businessman Allen Glick to purchase the Stardust Hotel and Casino 1974. Over the next 10 years, Auippa and company skimmed two million dollars in profits from the casino. Chicago gangster Anthony Spilotoro was Chicago’s man in Vegas. He not

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only watched over their investment in the Stardust Hotel but also collected gambling debts and ran a juice loan operation (Koziol, 1979).

In 1990, the federal government brought a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prosecution against members of the Chicago Outfit. There had been prosecutions of Chicago gangsters before, but never a RICO case. After years of prosecuting individual gangsters, the government announced a three-pronged racketeering attack against organized crime in Chicago (Baquet & O’Brien, 1990). The first case, known within the government as the “Commission” investigation, was expected to bring indictments against the bosses of Chicago’s five street crews. Street Crews were geographically based subdivisions of the Chicago Outfit. The second, an attack on the mob’s political influence in Chicago, was directed at First Ward Alderman Fred Roti (the same Roti who had earlier demanded the demotion of deputy police superintendent William Duffy) and First Ward Democratic Committeeman John D’Arco. The third was a racketeering prosecution of the Joseph Ferriola Street Crew.

The first case to be announced was the indictment of mob chieftain Rocco Infelise and 19 other members of the Ferriola Street Crew. Infelise commanded the crew after Ferriola’s death. The indictment charged the crew with using murder, intimidation, and payoffs to protect their illegal operations (“U.S. v. Rocco Ernest Infelise,” 1990). A key factor in obtaining the indictments was the cooperation of William Jahoda, a member of the Ferriola Street Crew, who had turned to the government for protection fearing that he was on the outs with fellow mobsters. After a week of deliberation, the jury returned a combination of convictions, acquittals, and indecisions (O’Brien & Gorman, 1990). Although all those prosecuted were not convicted, the case was the beginning of a series of federal prosecutions that would help to bring the Chicago’s Outfit to its knees.

Six months after the Ferriola indictment, veteran gangster Lenny Patrick and four others were indicted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for extorting substantial sums of money from the owners of various restaurants, car dealerships, and illegal gambling operations (“U.S. v. Mario Rainone,” 1991). Although not among the three cases announced earlier, it was a significant step against organized crime. The victims were apparently chosen because they had some familiarity with the Chicago Outfit. All total, the defendants collected US$376,000 from their victims. The victims included Billy and Company, the Hole in the Wall, and Myron and Phil’s restaurants; Father and Son Pizza; and King Nissan and the Motor Werks of Barrington. The group also sought to collect an illegal gambling debt from contractor Alex Tapper and impose street tax on two illegal gambling businesses. They were also charged with trying to set fire to the Lake Theatre to settle “union problems.” In a surprising turn of events, Patrick agreed to cooperate with the government and testified against his boss, Gus Alex, making him the highest ranking mobster ever to become a government witness (O’Brien. 1991).

The attack on the mob’s political influence was dubbed “Operation Gambat,” a code name for “gambling attorney” referring to FBI informant Robert Cooley (“5 Indicted in ‘Corruption Feast,’” 1990). First Ward Alderman Fred Roti, First Ward Democratic Party Secretary Pat Marcy, Illinois State Senator John D’Arco Jr., and

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former Cook County Chancery Judge David Shields were all indicted by the federal government for what was described by the Chicago Tribune as a “Corruption Feast.” The importance of the investigation was that it finally broke the connection between organized crime and politicians in Chicago. Roti was charged with accepting money to “fix” a Chinatown murder trial and Marcy was charged with bribing Judge Frank Wilson in the murder trial of syndicate killer Harry Aleman. Senator D’Arco Jr. was charged with accepting money to introduce a bill, in the Illinois General Assembly, to expand the kinds of insurance sold by travel agents.

The Justice Department announced another racketeering prosecution in 1992 when 11 members of the Outfit’s “Carlisi” Street Crew were indicted (“U.S. v. Anthony C. Zizzo,” 1992). The indictment charged that Carlisi and his codefendants ran an exten-sive sports bookmaking operation and had engaged in loan sharking, extortion, attempt arson, and income tax evasion in furtherance of their criminal enterprise. The Crew also financed Lenny Patrick’s juice loan operation. They operated in West Suburban Cook County and Du Page County, Illinois. All but one was convicted in federal court.

In 1997, the Chicago Crime Commission reported that in spite of this impressive string of prosecutions, the federal government did not kill off the mob (Kendall & Mills, 1997). Down but not out, the Outfit reorganized into three street crews, rather than five, and renounced the indiscriminate use of violence. The mob now had fewer members and made less money. RICO had made street crew bosses just as guilty of mob murders as the guys who pulled the trigger. The mob had also found a new source of revenue, video poker machines (Warmbir, 2002). Video poker was a perfect source of revenue for the Outfit. The machines were growing in popularity and were legal, but could be used in an illegal fashion. They could be used to gamble.

In spite of the convictions of Roti and D’Arco, the influence of the Outfit was still felt in Chicago’s city hall. Rather than purchase its own trucks, the city of Chicago often leased them through the “Hired Truck Program.” A 2004 exposé by the Chicago Sun Times found that one out of every 10 trucking firms in the city’s program was owned by alleged mobsters, Outfit associates, and family members (Warmbir & Novak, 2004). Trucking companies wanting to work in the program had to deal with city employee Nick “The Stick” Coco, a reputed mob loan shark. The trucking compa-nies doing business with the city were owned by such Outfit luminaries as loan shark Jimmy Inendino, bookmaker Gregory Paloian, and Fred Roti’s nephew Fred Barbara, who had earlier tried to collect a US$20,000 juice loan from an undercover FBI agent. City government had become one of the Outfit’s most lucrative rackets!

On April 25, 2005, the Justice Department finally announced the commission case indicting the Chicago Outfit as a “criminal enterprise” (“U.S. v. Nicholas Calabrese,” 2002). Dubbed “Operation Family Secrets,” 14 gangsters were arrested on charges stemming from murder to bookmaking and tax fraud. Described by U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, as a “hit on the mob,” the case was a milestone event in the battle against organized crime. What made this case particularly important was that it charged the defendants with committing 17 murders in furtherance of crime syndicate activi-ties. The murders occurred between 1970 and 1986 and read like a history of organized crime in Chicago. One man, Frank Calabrese was charged with participating in 13 of

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the alleged killings. Calabrese was so feared that his own brother and son testified against him in the Family Secrets trial. Frank Calabrese, Joseph Lombardo, and James Marcello were found guilty of participating in 10 murders (Huffstutter, 2007). Three others were convicted on racketeering charges. The jury remained deadlocked, how-ever, on the remaining eight cases.

In spite of the far-reaching effect of the Family Secret’s prosecution, West Suburban racket’s boss, Mike “the Large Guy” Sarno, was indicted in May 2009 by the federal government and accused of leading an illegal gambling ring and playing a key role in the 2003 pipe bombing of a competitor’s video poker business (Markoff & Goodie, 2010). Six others including Outlaw motorcycle gang members Anthony and Samuel Volpendesto, and Mark Polchan were also charged with racketeering conspiracy. The ring reportedly committed jewelry heists, auto theft, arson, and witness intimidation. Sarno allegedly oversaw nine robberies and thefts that yielded more than US$1.8 mil-lion. The 6-week trial proved that Sarno had carved out an alliance between the Chicago Outfit and the Outlaws motorcycle gang.

Conclusion

This article has reviewed the history of law enforcement efforts against traditional organized crime in Chicago. While finally destroyed by the federal government at the turn of the century, law enforcement efforts against the Capone Syndicate and the Chicago Outfit were the responsibility of local law enforcement for nearly 100 years. The thesis of this article is that police inefficiency was the direct result of political cor-ruption and not the concerted acts of individual law enforcement officers. This argu-ment is supported by the fact that every successful attempt by the Chicago Police Department, Cook County Sheriff, and the State of Illinois to fight organized crime was thwarted by the established political structure. The story of organized crime in Chicago is not one of a transplanted Sicilian Mafia, but of the failure of government. Political corruption and a slow response by the national government are the true his-tory of organized crime.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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Author Biography

Robert M. Lombardo, PhD, is an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Loyola University, Chicago. Professor Lombardo is a 33 year police veteran having served with both the Chicago Police Department and the Cook County Sheriff’s Police Department where he worked in various capacities including the investigation of organized crime and drug trafficking.

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