28.full

7/23/2019 28.full

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/28full 1/11

http://iqq.sagepub.com/ International Affairs

India Quarterly: A Journal of

http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28The online version of this article can be found at:

DOI: 10.1177/097492848504100105

1985 41: 28India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs R. Rama Rao

India and Pakistan: Differing Security Perceptions

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Indian Council of World Affairs

can be found at:India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs Additional services and information for

http://iqq.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

http://iqq.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:

http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28.refs.htmlCitations:

What is This?

- Jan 1, 1985Version of Record>>

by Syed Ali Hassan Shah on October 25, 2012iqq.sagepub.comDownloaded from

http://iqq.sagepub.com/



http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28



http://www.sagepublications.com/

http://www.icwa.in/

http://iqq.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts


http://iqq.sagepub.com/subscriptions

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav


http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28.refs.html


http://online.sagepub.com/site/sphelp/vorhelp.xhtml


http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28.full.pdf





http://iqq.sagepub.com/content/41/1/28.full.pdf


http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav


http://iqq.sagepub.com/subscriptions


http://www.icwa.in/

http://www.sagepublications.com/



7/23/2019 28.full


INDIA

A N D

PAKISTAN

:

DIFFERING SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

The two fragments into Ivhiclz Britain, before its ivitJidrawalf,.om the sub-

continent, had split

the

Iiidian Empire, carried witli thenz

a

legacy

of ~ i i u r i~ a l

distrust. This could not but irzfliience

the

coiirse

of

sirbseqirent events in

the

sub-continent.

So have the attitudes

of

the erstwliile coloiiial a i d

other

powers towards the new states

iri

the light

of

their respective regional intere-

sts. i the conp ara tirely short period of thirty-seveii j'cars,

short

in

th

life

of

nations, the tw o s ta tes have been involved in hostilitie s on tliree occa-

sions, iiot coiriitiiig Pakistan's attack

on

Iiirlia in tlihKutcli sector in April

196s.

Ttnie no

doubt

is a great healer but

it

takes

s i i ie

tiiire f o r deep

wourids

to

Ileal.

Th e Iiealiiig process

~vorrld

e aided mid succeed

only

if the govern-

nicnts

of

both coirritries are conviriced

t ha t

not

miitiial hostility but at least

co-existence,

if not ntuttrrll

amity , is good for both countries and strive to

create conditioiis f o r peacefiil co-existence. I f only o m side is anxioirs to

niaintairi peace

arid the

otlier wislres to iiiaiiitain teiisioii,

t i e

latter w ill pre-

vaiL Ptrblic opiiiioii iit the f w o

corrrrtries,

if ntobilised

for

proniotiiig co-

exislerice rather than coifroiitatioii,

~rotrlrl

he@.

In

rieiiiocrotic court tr ie s, at

least

iri

theory, public opinion i s aforce t o reckoii with and 110 goveriiiiiciii

con for

long afford

to disregard publ ic opiriion. Tltc itiedia, agairt in theo ry,

reflects piiblic opinioii and serves t o consolidate aitd strenptlieii i t in the

process coiiipelliiig thc

goreriiirient

of tlie day to consider careJrIIy th issues

raised.

I I I

practice, hoivever, goveriiriients, eveit

rt

6cIiberal" democracies

call

influence promimiit segments of the iiiedia to project issues in

the

iiiaiiiier

desired by the foririer, i.e., the niedia can atid regrettably are being irsed t o

misirfornr tlic public at

horiie

arid abroad. Everi so, in de~iiocracios, irltinia-

tely,

goveriiiiiental efforts ot withstandii1g, at least s oi~ ie ections of

the

niedia discover. fa c ts and fi ar le ss ly expose gowrririieiits' earlier efforts to

niisiilforn: the pirblic. Th is is the inhereiit strength

of

democracies.

l i t dictatorships this is diffcirlt. Rut there are dictatorships and dictator-

ships In Pakistan, f o r

esanlple,

b y all accoirnts the goreriimcnt of Genera

Zia ul Hag, in i ts

own

way,

has

managed t o seciire tolerance i f i i o t

tlic en-

thusiastic support of a inajority of urban nt idle and lower niiddle classes

for

the

niartial

law

reginre.

A

sec ion-even a large section-of politically

cons-

cious urban and rirral gtotcps

are

totally urlreconciled to rule by generals f o r

a number of reasoiis. Aiiotlier section of the sa me sira tn

of

Pakistani society

again for

i ts

o wn

reasons, supports the reginie. Tlius General Zia

is

secure,

Col Rama Rao

Retd)

is at

the

Birla

Institute

of

Scientific Research, New Del hi.





7/23/2019 28.full


INDIA AN D PAKISTAN

29

provided

h e

continires,

with

the

dexter i ty he has

so

a n p ly denioiistrated

dliririg

eight

tseritjitl

years,

to

steer

his country 11 a

“least

r isIi”

coiirse,

arid there is

a

good

chance

of

prescrvirtg peace,

p r e c n ~ o i r s

lrotigh

i f

rray be,

iri the sirb-contirterit.

FOUNDATIONS

OF

PAKISTAN’S SECURITY POLICY

E R T A I N

other factors too have to be taken into account in understand-

C

ng Pakistan’s att i tude towards world events an d towards India more

particularly. Firs t, to P akistanis, their coun try was carv ed o ut of undivided

India in or der t o provide M uslims

of

the sub-continent

a

homeland where

they could practice their religion without hindrance. This however has

its qualifications, since Mu slims were by

no

means a persecuted min ority

in India. O n th e contrary they were the favoured group

in

the country,

where tradition ally th e majority c om mun ity ha s been t he silent sufferer. Th e

creato r of Pakistan, Jinnah, wanted his people t o shake themselves free

from earlier prejudices. H e m ad e this clear in his opening ad dress as

President of th e C onsti tutent Assembly of Pakistan when he called o n his

people “to bu ry the hatchet, let bygones be bygones” and to l ive a s free

citizens, con tribu ting their mite for the well being of Pakistan.’ He also

pointed out

that

“you ’are free; you ar e free

to go

to your temples, you

are f ree to go to your mosques’ or to any other place of worship in this

St ate of Pak istan ...y ou may belong to any religion or caste-that has

nothing to d o with the business of the S tate We ar e s tart ing in the

days when there is no discrimination, no d istinction between one commu -

nity an d anoth er. We are start ing with this fun dam ental principle that

we are all citizens and equal citizens of on e State.”

Noble principles, well enunciated and not surprising either, since even

in 1946, before the final shap e-of Pakistan was decided upon, Jinnali

in

an interview with Reuter’s cor res pon den t

a t

New Delhi

h ad

categorically

declared that, the “new state Pakistan) would be

a

modern democrat ic

state

w i t h

sovereignty resting with the p eop le and th e nienibers of th e new

nation having equ al rights regardless of their religion, caste or creed.”‘

However, shortly after Pakistan came into being its architect passed away.

Soo n thereafter, Liaqat Ali K han too dep arted from the scene, having

fallen

to an assassin’s bullet. However pun y Liaqat Ali’s stat ure may

Seem to some Pakistanis,

i n

comparison with that of the founder

of

Pakistan, the fact remains tha t those who succeeded hini proved to be

shorter in s tature and far less competent tha n Liaqat Ali. Shortly there-

after an other respected leader K ha n Sah ib was also assassinated. Mean-

while,

n

nexus was established between “the burcaucracy, arm y an d feud al

and r eac ti ona ry e lements o f t he M us l im L e a g ~ e , ” ~hich grew strong er after

Lia qat Ali’s de ath , and this oligarchy, except for brief intervals, ha s been

running the country since then.





7/23/2019 28.full


30

R.

RAhIA

R.4O

Fo;br.irrnlhfi l i tory

Agreetirent

with ilic

Utiiierl

States

After an uneasy three-year period of uncertainty an d m ismanagement of

the cou ntry by its politicians, the directions alo ng which Pakistan might

move becanie evident. In 1955, President Eisenhower’s Adm inistration pro-

posed

a

formal military alliance with Pakistan in terms

of

which the latter

could receive American military equipm ent, training an d othe r form s of

supp ort. Pakistan for its part was to offer bases for the United States and

sup por t i t in th e latter’s crusade against Com mu nism -i.e. , the Soviet

Union and a t t ha t t ime Ch ina as well. On this, however, Pakistan had

its own views an d plans. It wanted American military assistance and poli-

tical su ppo rt *for dealing with India, n ot for enabling it t o fight th e

Chinese

or

even the Soviet Union. China’s Prim e Minister, C ho u En-L ai

received an d accepted Pakistan’s secret assurances to this effect a n d en-

sured th at th e understanding arrived

at

between C hin a and Pak istan would

be kept secret from India and the U nited S ta te s4 Thus the basis of build-

ing u p Pakistan’s military might with Un ited States’ assistance, supple-

mented by tha t from others, was for dealing with India and India alone,

f rom a position o f streng th, no t for fighting others. This has been the foun-

datio n of Pakistan’s foreign an d security policy almost fro m the day it

emerged a s an independent country.

Predictably, Pakistan’s first military ruler at tac ke d India once he receiv-

ed American military equipment and his troops gained confidence in hand-

ling them.

He

was

wrongly advised by his ebullient Foreign Minister

Zulfiqar A li Bhutto, and he himself had ma de several errors of judgement.

These erro rs eventually caused his dow nfall.

The

Cliitin Fnc to r

After the

1965

debacle, Pakistan once again starte d building its armed

forces an d its second military ruler, G en era l Yahya K han , having achieved

a

diplomatic t r iump h by arranging

a

secret meeting between his American

friends Presiden t Nixon and Henry Kissinger an d the Chinese Ch?’rninii

Mao

an d Prime M inister Cliou En-Lai in 1971, failed

to

display states-

m ans hip in dea ling with the lawfully elected representatives of the then

Eastern Wing of Pakistan. Nor was he well served by his military and

oth er advisers. He, or in his name, Pakistan’s’Arm y let loose

a

reign of

terror in Bangladesh, murdering hundreds of thousands of people

Muslims as well as Hindus-and driving o ut mor e tha n ten mi]lion

Bangladeshis into India.

As

if this d em ogr aph ic aggression against Ind ia

was not enoug h, Pakistani troops began t o car ry ou t forays violating

Indian territory and attacked Indian bord er posts. N or were such attacks

confined to India’s eastern borders. After

all

India had to protect i ts

bor-

ders and In dian t roop s had no opt ion but to resist aggression and support

Bangladeshis in their

struggle

for

national l iberation. W hat was cIear,thea,





7/23/2019 28.full


INDIA

AND PAKISTAN

31

and even more

so now, is tha t liad Pakistan’s friends-America an d

China-cau tioned General Yahya Khan , tha t i t would be h w i s e as well as

counter productive t o resort to genocide an d wholesale destruction of

houses and oth er properties of people of his own country

i n

answer to

tlieir legitimate dem and s for provincial au ton om y, Pak istan might hav e

remained intact . T he United States was anxious not

to

displease General

Yahya Klian in any way since he had been ent rus ted with the delicate

mission of opening the pa;h t o China. T he Chinese for their part , realised

the Pakistani Army’s wrong approa ch in dealing with the people of Bang-

ladesh but diplo~natically tayed quiet. A Pakistani analyst notes that this

was because China’s commitment was not to undivided _Pakistan b’ut t o

the area consti tuting th e W estern Wi0g.j

Rhirtto’s

Contribirtion to

Pokistaii’s Eincrgeiice as a

h’ttck~wr

ower

After the events of 1971, and restoration of civilian authority in Pakis-

tan, i t was not unreasonable

to

expect tha t the new Pakistan, a more com -

pact and cohe rent state blessed with hard working and talented men an d

women, would devote i ts energies to develop i ts econom ic potential in

order to enable i t s people to live in com fort and create a base for further

orderly growth

Bhutto himself, having bcen an .impo rtant mem ber of t w o martial law re-

gimes

\\ as

well aw ar e of the pow er exercised by the civil-military bure au-

cracy- f ueda l elite complex-in Pak istan. His

first

s tep

on

assuming office

was

to

restorc

the self.confidence of the arm ed forces. Nevertheless so me

steps werc taken t o tninimise the c hanc es of the revival of BoriupnrtisiiiG by

creating

a

Dcfence Council, presided

over

by the Defence hlioister, and the

appointment of a Cha irma n and Chiefs of Staff, who would be the senio r

most military adviser to the Defence Minister and the Cabinet but

would

have

no

direct control

over

the forces. Likewise th e Chiefs of Army, Navy

and A ir Force woiild not have direct control over troo ps but only

t h e res-

ponsibility for coo rdina tion. Th e objective, as men tioned earlier, was to

raise the odds against individual senior

commanders

staging a

coup.

Bh utto had served his country

well

by securing the return

of

over

90,000

prisoners of war as well as

5000

square miles of territory

t h a t

Pakistan

liad lost during 1971. Rut his statement’ that he

h a d

secured at

t h e

confe-

rence table what the armed forces had lost on thc battlefield, thoug h cor-

rect, caused resentm ent against him am ong sections of thc latter who even

otherwise were per hap s not ue ll disposed tow ard s him. But Dhutte’s ser-

vice

to

his country in this respect cannot be ignored by historians. So was

his work in laying the foundat ion and providing the impetus for Pakis-

tan’s emergence as

a

nuclear pow er, a s h e h ad rightly declared in his

testament shortly before moun ting the gallows? His outspokenness an d





7/23/2019 28.full


32

R.

RAhlA

R A O

his persistence in proceeding with the nuclear program me in defiance of

the warnings of US statesmens eventually cost h im his life.

Rcgiorinl De~eloprrreri~siilmrtce

Pnk

Util i ty

for

the U S

After eliminating Bh utto, General Zia-ul-H aq steadily consolidated his

hold on t he cou ntry by removing senior generals who i n his opin ion might

have s taged a

coiip

against him. T h e first tw o years in office were his mo st

difficult. Th ere afte r several regional events served to enha nce Pakistan’s

utility fo r the United S tates; first, the Revolu tion in Iran and th e flight of

the Sha h fro m his country, ironically brou ght abo ut by the United States

itself and the rise

of

fundaiiientalism in tha t country. Th e Shah was

America’s dep enda ble ally in the Gu lf region , whose role was to keep the

Gulf safe for the United States. The successor government cou ld hardly

be considered a friend of the Un ited States, not certainly after the cap-

ture of the American Embassy in T eheran by Iranian s tudents and the

abort ive at tempt by U S forces

to

stage a commando opera t ion to recap-

tur e tkc embassy and secure release of American personnel. T h e continu-

ing Iran-Iraq War, which in the opinion of some Iranians

was

started by

Iraq if not

o n

American instigation, a t least in the hope tha t Iraq would

receive s uppo rt not only from conservat ive Ar ab States but .from USA

as

well, is ano ther cause for Iran’s resen tmen t against America.

A

consequence of the abort ive American operat ion in Iran was that

Pentagon realised the need for building secure bases for i ts

RDF

Rapid

Dep loym ent Forces) at several po ints close to th e Gulf for instant and

effective action in the neighbouring r egion in furtheran ce of its interests.

Second was the presence of Soviet troop s in Afghanistan. Th e only safe

means of entry into Afghanistan for U S agents to organise covert and

other resistance operations is through Pakistan. Pakistan could and has

provided facilities to Afghan resistance pers onne l and their

US

instructors.

As

qiiiri

p r o

giro

Pakistan has sought and received assurance of total

Am erican supp ort in regional matte rs, military assistance to the extent

considered ade qua te by Pakistan’s arm ed forces, economic assistance and

acceptance, at least tacitly, of Pakistan’s nuc lear weapons

This

is because the U nited States needs Pakista n for i ts bases close to th e

Gu lf area and Pakistani tro ops for protecting Gulf Ar ab regimes. Equally

important, with Pakistan firmly tied

to

the United States, the freedom of

ma noeu vre by the Soviet Un ion would be

considerably

restricted not-

withstanding any actions that the United States o r U nited States-aided

local gro up s may take in .Iran. This is the significance of the assurance

given by Vice Pres ident Bush to Pak istani leaders durin g his visit to th at

count ry in May

1984,

to the effect tha t American interest and co mnlit-

ment to Pakistan transcended Afghan istan. M ore recently, US diplo-

mats have assured Pakistan tha t any improvem ent in US-Ind ia relations





7/23/2019 28.full


INDIA

AND PAKISTAN 33

will not be a t Paki,stan’s expense.” India’s concern is tha t an add ition al

objective of Am erica arm ing Pak istan heavily, is to utilise the latte r as

a

lever against Ind ia.

PAKISTAN’S

SECURITY

CONCERNS

Every co unt ry has certain basic security con cern s arising from its geo-

st rategic locat ion, the character, s t rength an da t t i tu de s at any given t ime

of neighbouring countries, and equally on the country’s own internal poli-

t ical dynamics and att i tudes of the ruling elite or party. In the case of

Pakistan, threats fro m external sources have been minimal if not altogc-

ther absent. Soviet troops have been in Afghanistan since December 1979

but judging from Pakistani troo p disposit ions which are not close t o the

Afghan borders but to those of India, it is difficult to maintain that

Pakistan fears aggression fr om across its Western borders. N or

does

i t

have any concerns regarding i ts borders with China since the two coun-

tries havd repeatedly affirmed that maintenanc e of close friendship w ith

each other is,one

of

their principal foreign policy objectives.

This leaves Ira n and India. Ira n und er the Shah was closely allied to

Pakistan both as a non- Ara b Muslim country a s well as a partne r in th e old

Central Treaty O rganisation formed under

U S

auspices. T he new Ira nia n

regime is fund am entalist, based o n Shiite principles. Pakistan is an Islamic

StateI2 and Genera l Zia-ul-Haq ha s been extremely careful in adopting an d

declaring, whenever necessary, Pakistan’s neutrality in the Ira n-I raq co n-

flict. Hence Iran has no c a w fo r com pla in t. Fur the rm ore, I ran has its

hand s full with several problems an d has n o reason

to

confront Pakistan,

despite the latter’s alliances with th e U nited Sta tes an d A ra b States. It

could, in fact, be argued that sllould Iran so much as consider confronting

Pakistan, America using that

as

a n excuse might land i ts

RDF

on the

coast of Iranian Baluchistan and establish positions inland as well. Hence

Pakistan has nothin g to worry abo ut i ts Iranian frontier also except tha t

in the event of Am erican overt o r covert intervention in Iran, the Shiite

minority of Pa kist an may feel extremely insecure an d niay react, He nce

the only -frontie r from which, for the sake of argu me nt, Pakistan could

feel threatened is tha t with India. Here a t the risk

of

stating the obvious,

i t must be said tha t Ind ia has not in the past an d is no t going to, now or

in the future, attack any country. It has been the victim of aggression all

along. At best it reacts and tries to repel aggression.

General Zia-ul-Haq is not unaware of this but given th e different pulls

within his c oun try, the India bogey,

as

in the past, could be, resurrected,

and once resurrected could make Pakistan’s ruler

a

prisoner of his own

actions.





7/23/2019 28.full


34

INDIA’S SEARCH FOR PEACE

R R A h l A R A O

There is increasing conc ern in India o n this coun t. Several factors tend

to reinforce this concern. First , P akistan has already secured extremely

powerful air, naval and land attack weapons in the form of aircraft , des-

troyers, o the r surface craft an d sub marines an d heavy guns that have dual

atom ic a s well as conventional) capabili ty.

A

section

of

opinion, largely

based on information fi ltering through from abr oad, consider t h a t Pakis-

tan is relatively weak in lan d atta ck wea pon s i.e., tanks). This, however,

is no t the case

;

Pakis tan has secured large numbers of tanks from China

as well as West Euro pe an d elsewhere and must have methodically “u p

gunn ed” them . Second, Pakistan’s electronic surveillance systems, sup -

plemented by information provided by those established by America

aro und th is country, would enable Pakistani forces

to

destroy any Indian

forces air, na val and land) found, thu s dealing a crippling blow o n India.

Subsequently, Pakistani forces could also mo unt attacks on India’s key

political, defence and indus trial centres, f ur the r crippling the cou’ntry.

Third, an d most serious, Pakistan is already a nuclear p o ~ v e r ’ ~nd its

capabili ty

may

be approaching that of Israel i n this regard.

A s

early as

April

1979,

Genera l Zia-ul-Haq had frankly indicated to

U S

Deputy

Secretary of S tate, Warren.Cliristoplier, tha t Pakistan intended t o develop

nucle ar w eapo ns because Ind ia alread y possessed nuclear capability an d

the situation in neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan was unstablc and

hence it was essential for Pakistan to have the weapon. Similar statements,

directly as well as

off

the record, have been m ade by Pakistani spokesmen

on several occasions since then.

Th e posi tion

now is

that P akis tan

is

set to make not a few but

a

size-

able number of nuclcar weapons. Senator Crauston, after a visit to

Pakistan, had pointed out in the Senate that , that country was producing

enriched uran ium on an “assembly line” basis.14 The senator’s obse rvation s

have been confirmed by the crea tor of K aliuta and the architect of

Pakistan’s bo mb , Dr. Abdul Qad eer himself.15 I t

is

difficult to resist the

conclusion that Pakistan has already pilcd up a modest-sized nuclear arse-

nal based o n the design provided by Ch ina in. its

1964

test and is now

fabricating some hydrogen bomb s as ~ ~ 1 1

All these a re relevant in the context of Indian sfcurity. India n defence

plan‘ners will no t be wrong in assuming th at Genera l Zia ul Ha q is an

extremely careful comm ander. He may be expected

to

follow the principles

of

Mao

Ts e Tung , namely, to attack when victory is certain, to avoid

attacking when victory is uncertain and absolutely refuse to consider

arm zd conflict if such a conflict has any cha nce of adversely affecting the

country’s integr ity and safety.

Even

a

minor engagement or a local

war as Ayub Kha n had

wanted his

1965

at tack on Ind ia to be, o r

a

punitive action for





7/23/2019 28.full


INDIA

AND

PAKISTAN

35

quelling a l o k rebellion,

as

Yahya Khan wanted his operation in Bangla-

desh to be, could ultimately get ou t of co ntrol. Gen eral Zia is not going

to make similar mistakes. However,

his

advisers may argue that with

the formidable conventional strength that they have built up with A merican

and Chinese assistance and the nuclear might tha t i t has acquired

in

a

decade of intelligent and hard work, Pakistan ca n indeed deal I ndi a a

crippling blow an d furthe r, th at if Ind ia is allowed time the prospective

victim too might build some nuclear weapons and a preemptive strike

may become difficult. These arguments are,

no

doubt, reminiscent of

those used by Ayub Khan’s advisers two decades ago. Hopefully, G eneral

Zia ul Haq will not allow himself to be pushed

to

the point

of no

return.

The reasons for hope are that given Pakistan’s internal dynamics, unless

Zia secures

a

victory over India in the man ner tha t Israel demon strated

in Egypt in

1967,

by destroying th e latter’s a iran d grou nd forces before

they could move, Zia’s posit ion a t home may become untenable, Furth er,

if Ind ia is no t wiped ou t in the first wave of atta ck , India may suffer, bu t

the shock waves that would arise in the w ake of the first phase

of

Pakistan’s att ac k would no t only have their impact o n India but far more

perhaps on Pakis tan. Here comes the uncertainty of victory. In a dictator-

ship-although Pakistan is set to transform itself into a state with a

civil ian head-the main source of concern for the ruler are the disgruntled

members of th e arm ed forces. Several of these have been rounded up from

time to t ime in Pakistan. This dang er will arise again at the first sign

of

trouble at the fro nt. Additionally, there is th e problem of minority pro-

vinces and this problem added to the others could consti tute the proverbial

last straw o n th e camel’s back.

India’s interests as well as the true interests of all

i n

the subcont inen t

are clear-namely

to

prevent

a

war, conventional a nd even more earnestly,

a nuclear war. Furtherniorc, India is eager to promote posit ive coopera-

t ion am ong the countr ies of the subc ont inen t , big and smal l, in mat ters

of trade, exchange of scholars and generally to bring about condi t ions

unde r which fanlilies in onc coun try could visit their relatives in an ot he r

without irksom e restrictions, newspapers and literature published in on e

country may be available

in

another and at least over a period

to

ensure

tha t mutual suspicious are replaced by inutual trust .

Lest impetuous elements on the other side may be tempted with

prospects of easy victory, I ndi a would need to buiId up its defence-

conven tional a n d n ucl ear --while persevering in its efforts

to

establish

cordial relations with Pakistan as well as other neighbours.

March

1985.





7/23/2019 28.full


36

REFERENCES

R

RAh4A

RAO-

1

Mo hamm ad Ali Jinnah‘s Address to Pakistan’s Co nsti tuen t Assembly, August

1937 at Karachi, reproduced in Speeches of

Quaid-i-Arant Muoliaiitmad

AIi

Ji/rnah.

Gove rnor Gene ral of Pak istan, p. 10. Karachi, 1948. See also Stanley W olpert ,

Jinnah

of

Pakistan London, 1984 . and Chief Justice M ohamm ad M unir,

From

Jiniiafi

t o Zia

New Dellii, 1981 .

2 See Moham mad Munir ,

Front Jiniiah

t o Zia n .

1,

p. 29.

3

“Pakistan

:

ub-Continent,” South London), February 1985, pp. 8-9.

4

On

23 April 1955 at Bandung, China’s Prim e Minister Cho u En-Lai state d that h e

had received assurances fro m the Prime M inister

of

Pakis tan , Mohammad Ali

Bogra, tha t although Pakistan was a member of a military treaty i t was no t against

China and f urth er that if th e United Sta tes too); aggressive action under th e

military trea ty o r if i t launched global war. Pakistan would not be involved in

i t

just as i t was not involved

in

t h e Ko r e a n Wa r , Ch i n a

and

Pakistan also agreed

to keep th is unders tanding seere t f rom both th e Uni ted Sta tes and India .

From

“Documents on nternational Affairs for 1955” pp. 421-2, cited in Sangat

Singh,

akistan’s

Fore /?Policy Bombay 1970 , pp. 105-106.‘

5 Naveed Ahm ed, “Sino-Pakistan Relations, 1971-1981,” in Pakistarr Horisott

Karachi), Vol. XXXlV, o. 3, 1981, p. 59.

“White Paper” o n Kash mir issued by th e Pakistan Government reproduced in

Pakistait Tiiires Lahore), 16 January, 1977.

7 Ibid.

8 Prem Chopra Ed.) : f

I

iir

Assasci/ratt‘rf

Delhi, 1979).

9 He nry Kissinger warned Pakistan, at a m eeting in Paris \ \ i t11 Pakistan’s then

Minis ter fo r F oreign Affa i rs,

Aziz

Ahm ed tha t, should Pakistan proceed with i ts

nuclear weap ons programme, th e U nited Sta tes mould, make “a horrible example”

of th at co un try i.e., Pakistan). See JWIS Karachi) and news report in

Sfatesnmrr,

New Delhi), 10November, 1977.

1 The

Suirduy

Telegraph London), as early as January 1980, had suggested that

Pakistan ha s probably received tacit approval from USA and C hina fo r going

ahead with i ts nuclear programme. See news report in

Patriot

New Delhi),

14 January, 1980.

Vice President George Bush’s statem ent reported in Statesriran New Delhi).

9

May, 1984 an d Armacost’s interview at Islamabad in

Tiriles

of I d i u New Delhi),

3 March, 1985.

12 As Chief Justice Moham mad Munir has noted,

i t

is difficult

to

define precisely

what Islam is since no wo schools of Islamic theology agree on the subject. There

a r e

73

sects in Islam. According t o Sheikh Abdul Q adir J i lani there are as many

as

150

sects an d according to th e followers of on e sect those of

all

other sects are

heretics. H enc e the difficulty in prescribing Islamic laws in a country where

members

of

m ore t han on e Islamic sect may be living. See n. 2,p.

140.

13 I n t h e Hindus fan Times New Delhi), 8 April 1979, Gene ral Zia’s stand was rein-

forced by th e Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affa irs C ommit tee, Sena tor Zab-

b lock when hepoin ted ou t to the Sec re ta ry o f S ta te th a t secur ity conce rns w r e

a

factor in Pakistan’s drive for acquiring nuclear weapons.

14 Senator Craoston’s address in the Senate on 21 J u n e 1984 eproduced in Strutegic

D i g e s t New Delhi), August 1984, p. 827 833.

15 Dr. Qadeer has c lear ly pointed out that Pakistan is among the top f ive or s ix

countries which have uranium enrichm ent facilit ies on

a

large scale. In this respect

Pakistan is on par with Britain an d West Germany , he said, adding that the capa-

.





7/23/2019 28.full


:NDIA A N D PAKISTAN

37

cities available

in

Japan and India. for example, are quite small.

Hc

also added

significantly that

Pakistan

has the

capacity

to enrich

uranium beyond 9 per cent

which

s

needed for

the bomb-A

or

H.

Tiriles

of

Indiu,

14

March,

1985.





28.full

Documents

Transcript of 28.full