2624665 International Affairs

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Poland, Germany and the EUAuthor(s): Roland FreudensteinReviewed work(s):Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 74, No. 1(Jan., 1998), pp. 41-54

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Poland,Germanynd theEU

ROLAND FREUDENSTEIN

The eastward nlargementf theEU seemsto constitutehegreatesthallengeto thatorganization ince the nceptionofEuropean integrationn the i95os.But theEU at the turnof thecenturywillhave to respond o other hallengesas well: those of economic globalization, f new security isks nd of newlyintensifiednternal roblems. incetheearly 99Os, whenthe firstf these hal-lenges clearly merged,thastendedto eclipsetheothers; ut n truth,hey redeeply nterconnected.Two countries n particular re likelyto play a central role in Europe'sresponseto thesechallenges:Germanyand Poland. So is theirbilateral ela-tionship.t would be an exaggeration o saythatEurope's future ingesuponPolish-Germanrelations. ut it is certainlyhe case that, irst,heway thingswork out betweenthesetwo states s highlyrelevant o everythinglse thathappens in Europe in the decades to come; and second, this relationshipencompassesmanyofthe east-west roblems hatEurope as a whole faces.

In order o analyse olish-German elationsn the context f European nte-gration,t is necessary irst o look at thestateof theintegration rojectgen-erally s itpresentstself tthe end of1997.Thenboth German and Polishpol-icyneed tobe examined, aking ntoaccountthebearing hat hedevelopmentof domesticpolitics s havingon their espective pproaches o the EU. Finally,the present nd future f theirbilateralrelationshipn the contextof EUreform nd enlargementan be assessed.EU eastward enlargement and globalization: two into oneThe state ftheUnionThings have gone awry n European integration.he EU has undoubtedlybecome the target fpopulardiscontentn an unprecedentedway.Nowherewas thismorevisiblethan n the ratification ebatesafter he signingof theMaastricht reaty.he narrowFrenchYes', theDanish No' and then imited'Yes',thenumerous otes n the British arliaments well as theominousdeci-

InternationalAffairs4, I (199 8) 4I-54 41

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Roland Freudensteinsion of the GermanConstitutional ourt (trying o stear coursebetweenfed-eralism nd intergovernmentalism),eemed to show that ntegrationmayhavereached ts imit. nternally,ising nemploymentn mostmember tates s rais-ing questions bout the EU's capacity o cope with economic globalization;internationally,he war in formerYugoslavia,nd theEU's reaction o it, eemtohave virtually nnihilated he credibilityf a Common Foreign nd SecurityPolicy (CFSP), originallyhailed as one of the major achievements f theMaastricht reaty.To make thingsworse, heAmsterdam reaty fJune 997 does not appear tohave fulfilledhe expectations f t expressed y some member tates n the astcouple of years. Originally planned to make up for the shortcomings fMaastricht hence the nitial abel as a 'review conference'),t quickly doptedthe function fpavingthewayfor nlargement hrough tructuraleform. utthere s now a consensus mong member tates hat, incethe decisivereformsin the decision-making rocess were not achievedin Amsterdam, herewillhave to be a third ntergovernmentalonferenceIGC) before he next groupof countriesoin the Union.Nevertheless, espite this somewhat discouraging ackground,n order toassess he problems nd look forsolutions,we should first ecall the successesachieved n theintegration rocess n recentyears. he decade since I986 hasseen the most dynamicdevelopment f European integration ince the treatyof Rome: two enlargement ounds (Spain and Portugal n I986; Sweden,Finland and Austria n I995), the Single European Act of I986, the Maastrichttreatyf 99I and theAmsterdamreatyf 997. Simultaneously,heEU suc-cessfullyoncludedthe negotiations eading up to the creationof theWorldTradeOrganization WTO). Moreover, t absorbed easternGermany n I990and embarked n a major effortfstabilizationf ts mmediate asternneigh-bours, henew democracies f central nd easternEurope (CEECs). Lookingback,these are no smallachievements.Even in assessing msterdam,ne can hardly scape thenotionof theglassbeing halfemptyor halffull,dependingon the perspective f the viewer.Looking at the mood in member tatesduringthe monthsbefore he IGC, itwas by no means clear thattherewould be a consensual conclusion at all.Moreover,even thoughthe intended reform f decision-making tructures(adapting hedistributionf votes n theEuropean Council, or introducing'double majority' hatprevents minority f citizens rom utvoting major-ity) and reductionn the number fmembers f theEuropean Commission norderto make room fornew member tates id not come about,progresswasachievedin other fields. o name ust two of the more successful spectsofAmsterdam, he control functions f the European Parliamentwere greatlyenhanced, nd at eastcooperation n usticeandhome affairsthe third illar')is to be phasedintotheframework f thefounding reaties. ut most mpor-tantly,he road is open forthebeginningof negotiationswiththe candidatecountriesn I998.42



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Poland,Germanynd theEUWhat is more,with economic and monetary nion (EMU) now firmlyntrack, he EU can look forward o the singlemost momentous tep n its his-tory. he introduction f the euro will have greatpsychological ffects, igh-

lighting ntegration o every ingle itizen n those countries hatparticipateand thatwill be most member states. conomically, reparation or ts ntro-ductionhasalready ausedconvergencen fiscal ndbudgetary olicies amongEMU candidate ountries o an extentno one would have dreamedofin theig80s.Thiscannotpersistwithoutpolitical ffects or he medium-term utureof ntegration,ivingnew impulses o both citizens nd political lites o thinkin more global terms.Of course, ll structuraleforms f ntegration,nd evenEMU, amount to little fthe question of unemployments not tackled suc-cessfullyn the coming years,fglobal competitivenesshroughower labourcosts nd greater lexibilityn the abour marketss not dramaticallynhanced.But this s preciselywhat is beginning o happen n mostmember tates, ithBritain, weden and the Netherlands lready aken s examples.Thecosts ndbenefitsf nlargementThere is no doubt thatnew markets nd new investment pportunities,ncountrieswith a much more favourable emographic tructure han currentmember tates,reamongtheobvious positive spectsofenlargemento cen-tralEurope.But the most mportant ositive ong-term spectof thechallengeofenlargements its role as a motorforchangewhich has to come aboutany-way,for the benefitof the future f integration t large.The perspective fenlargement ill forcethe EU to restructuren ways n which itwould haveto do so eventually,ven withthe current umberofonly S member tates.Examinedmore closely, his s only the other ide of the coin of the modern-ization argument orEU accession n the candidate ountries see below). Thereform f decision-making tructures,he overhaulof the regionalfunds ys-tem, hedownsizing f the Conmmon gricultural olicy (CAP), theupgrad-ing of cooperation n justice and home affairs nd other aspectsof what theCommissionhas namedAgenda 000-all these areurgently ecessary o copewith nternal hallenges Eurosceptic ttitudes) s well as external nes (glob-alization).EU enlargements adding onlytheurgency equired. ut ust as inthe candidatecountries, he enlargement/accessionrgument or reform ndtransformationhould not be used as the only one. If thatwere the case,thelobbies concerned (farmers,orexample)would get the impression fbeingsingledout to payforenlargement'.To a certain xtent, his spreciselywhat hasalreadyhappened n the case oftheCAP,which is why tmaybe considered good exampleof thecomplexinterdependenceof eastwardenlargement nd the necessities of internalreform. he CAP mustbe radically eformed orfourreasons:

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Roland Freudenstein* first,n its present orm t is in contradiction f the spirit,f not the etter,ofcommitments lreadymade by the EU under the treaty n theWTO;* second,through hevirtually omplete absence of marketmechanisms t is

arguably,n the ong run, ncompatiblewith the nterests f consumers swell as taxpayers;* third, hroughout C history,t has actively revented evelopment ncountries fthe South (e.g. LatinAmerica);* fourth,nd only fourth,n unreformed AP would lead to financial ol-lapse if ust Poland and Hungary oined the EU-through thevast ubsi-dies to which thesetwo countrieswould be entitled.The troublewiththe current ebate on CAP reform s that hefourth rgu-

mentseemsto be the prevalent ne in public debates,when really here arethreeother good reasonsto start hinking freform,ne of them even con-taining time factor: he EU will run into trouble n theWTO process fitdoes not substantiallyeduce subsidiesbefore 000. This needs to be pointedout in all effortso ustify AP reform. bove all,the EU will have to reminditself hat ostsand benefitsre nseparablyntertwined.The next tepsThe December 1997 European Council meetingin Luxembourg tried tobridgethegap between two competing pproaches o themethodofenlarge-ment: either to begin negotiatingwith a group of fiveCEEC candidates(Poland, he Czech Republic,Hungary, stonia and Slovenia) as wellas Cyprus,as recommendedby the Commission nJuly 997, or to begin talkswith alleleven simultaneously, his approach being favoured by the EuropeanParliament. he compromiseworkedout in the run-upto the Luxembourgmeeting ntails hebeginning fnegotiationswithonlyfiveCEECs byMarchI998, butwitha clearsignalto the others hattheymay oin thenegotiationprocess t any ime nthefuture,f ndwhenthe assessmentf their re-accessioneffortsllows. n orderto ensureregular eassessment f their bility o enternegotiations,nd to advise them on concrete tepsto improve heir tanding,theEU proposes conferencemechanism hat nvolves ll candidate ountries,regardlessfwhether heyare in negotiation r not. In thismanner, hefirstcandidates mightoncludenegotiationsn 2000 or soon thereafterthough hisis optimistic).With ratificationrobably protractednd arduousprocess, hefirst roupofCEEC entrantsmostprobablydenticalwiththe nitialgroupoffive)might oin around 003 /4. Despite the obvious mid- and long-term en-efits f enlargement,herewill be painfuldebates about cost and feasibilitynall currentmemberstates, speciallyn thepoorerones thatfearcompetitionforfunds nd subsidieswhen evenpoorercountriesoin theUnion. But thiswould notbe the first ifficultebate n thehistory f ntegration here com-promise s theanswer.

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Poland,Germanynd the UGerman Ostpolitik: in Europe's name?Germany's otivationforU enlargementThe argument hatGermany ather fficientlysesEuropean means to furtherits national nterests s not new.' It has been made in the context of WestGerman unificationpolicy,and recently,mplicitly r explicitly, as beenapplied to Germany's rivefor astward nlargementfthe EU, particularlytsinsistence hatPoland, s well as Hungary nd theCzech Republic, be includ-ed in the first ound.If there s a German nationalmotivation or EU enlargement, hat are itselements?Four aspectscome to mind, concerningall ten centralEuropeanapplicants orEU membership. he first s economic: with I00 million con-sumers nd annual consumption rowth ates f I0 percentandmore, entralEurope represents formidablemarket orexports-largelyfrom he EU, and,withinthatgroup, argely romGermany.Moreover, entral urope is turningout to be a moreand moreprofitableite for nvestment; ithcomparativelycheap and comparatively ighly skilled abour, t will providean excellentopportunity o intensifyhe divisionof abour n industrial roduction hat srequiredby economic globalization.

Second is thepolitical spect: U and NATO enlargementffer heonce-in-a-century hance of doing away with a marginalization f the easternhalfofEurope thathas lastedformuch longer than the period of the Cold War.Thisdivision nto modernityn the west and backwardnessn the east (withthearguable xceptionofBohemia) beganwith theindustrial evolution,nd wasonly deepened,notstarted, ythe ron Curtain. his division fEurope,with abelt ofreduced overeigntynd limited elf-determinationetweenTallinn ndTirana,was partand parcelof the modernEuropeanstate ystem ightup toI989-with all the potentials or nternationalonflictt contained. he otherelementof that system, alance of power politicsof the nineteenth-centurytype, ad been abolished hrough uropean ntegrationnly n the western alfafter he ig5os, butthreatenedo reappearn central urope after989, and infactdid rear tsuglyhead in the Balkans n ii9I-5. Only theprospect fEUmembershipor entral urope, nd ntheend,for heBalkans, oo,wouldguar-antee asting eace.On this iew, herejection fpowerpoliticswhichhadbeena constituent lementof the westEuropean integration rocessfrom heverybeginningwould have to be extended o Europe'seasternhalf.The third spect, he moraldimension,mayseem atfirstight obe the mostGermanofmotivations. aturally,here s a feeling f ndebtednesso the newdemocracies f central urope forhavingbrought bout thepeacefulunifica-tion of Germany n I989-90. This gratitude xtends to Poland's Solidaritymovementsince I980, Hungary'sopening of the barbedwire in I989, theI The most widely known expressionof this argument-made implicitly,nd very carefully-can be

found n TimothyGartonAsh,In Europe'sname, London: Cape, I993).

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Roland Freudensteincooperation of the Polish and Czech governmentsn the crisis nvolving heEast German embassy efugees aterthatyear, nd also the united rejection fa neutralization f Germany hatmarkedthe beginningof the laterVisegradcooperation n the springof I990. This element of gratefulnesss not onlyprevalent n the German political class but is widespread mong the popula-tion,and it givesrise to a commitment o help Germany's entralEuropeanneighboursn their spirations o EU and NATO membership.Finally, here s a geopoliticalaspect.EU enlargement as, n the Germandomestic ontext, ften een considered wayofbringingGermany rom heperiphery ftheWestcloser n towards he centre.Obviously,Germanymusthave an interestn its eastern orderceasingto be the frontier etween stabil-ity and potential instability; nd the only way to ensure that is to takeGermany's asternneighboursnto NATO and theEU.The first hree fthesemotivationsan,to a certain xtent, e extendedfromtheGermanto the overall U level-even the third ne: for houghthe otherwest European nationsmightnot need to feel indebtedto Poland and itsneighbours orthe fallof the BerlinWall, t is arguable hatonlytheabolitionofEurope'stwo-class ystem, ith twodifferentevelsofsecuritynddevelop-ment,will ensure lasting peace. And that should be in the interest f allEuropeans provided, f course, heyfeelanythingn commonwith theirfel-low Europeans at all; but thatwould pertain o solidaritymong the currentEU member states, oo). In conclusion, t is highlyquestionablewhetherGermany's trong onimitmentoNATO andEU enlargementan be consid-eredanother xampleofGermany assing ff ts own interest ndertheguiseofgeneralEuropeaninterests.What,then, f the geopolitical' rgument?t will have tobe incorporatednthe German domesticdebate on thebenefits f enlargement,ut it is not aswidelyused today s it was in theearly 99Os. Besides, t a closer ook,itrep-resents nly another,morenational, spectofthesecond argumentwhichcon-cerns tabilityn the continent s a whole.TheGerman omesticontextLooking at Germany tthe turnofthiscentury,ne cannotavoidthe mpres-sionofa society n despair, ithunemploymenteachingevels ast eenin the1930s.Almost veryGermantodayhas at east one unemployed erson n theirfamily r circle of friends. ompetitiveness hrough ophistication,ong thetrademarkf the Wirtschaftswunder,eems a distantmemory.Yet hile the feel-ing ofgeneralmalaise s reaching nexpectedheights,nd issues uch as glob-alization reaired nbookstoresnd on talk hows, oliticstself eemsparalysed.Germany's omesticpoliticalscene reflects he two overallEuropean chal-lenges comingto termswith theend ofEurope's partitionwhile respondingto economic globalization)probablymore sharply han thatof anyotherEUmember tate, opingas it mustwith theeconomic,political ndpsychological46



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Poland,Germanynd the Uaftermathf unification,ndrestructuringhe economy n the face ofgrowingunemployment n a rapidlyageing society.For the national elections inSeptember 998, two blocs arefacing ach other.On the one side is HelmutKohl'sChristian emocraticUnion (with tsBavarian ister arty,heChristianSocial Union), which has held power for 5 yearstogetherwith the centristFree Democrats (FDP). Althoughthis coalition s showing signs of strain,tswill to stay n poweris unbroken, nd periods of internal trife lternatewithdemonstrationsf closingranks.On the other ide,the opposition-made upof the Social Democrats SPD), theGreens and, possibly,hepost-communistParty fDemocratic Socialism PDS, withvirtually llof ts upportn the east-ern Ldnder)-stand ready to take over if they can break the narrowCDU-CSU-FDP majorityn the owerhouse,theBundestag.Chancellor Kohl's coalitiongot into serioustrouble n thepolls inJanuary1997, when anotherdramatic ise n unemployment ighlightedheneed forradicalreform:making abourmarketsmore flexible, nd reforming ermany'spensionfunds chemeas well as itsoverloaded ax system,o name only threeof the mosturgent rojects. urbulence roundGermanparticipationnEMUaddedto theuncertainty.one of themajor reform rojects ow seemsto haveanychance ofbeing putintopracticebefore he I998 elections, hanks o theSPD's blocking acticsn theBundesrat,heupperhouse.Media commentatorsjudged ChancellorKohl's coalition to be incapable of achieving henecessaryreforms. ut in thesecond half f1997 the picture egan to change again.Withthesinglecurrency rojectfirmlyn track, nd regional lectoral uccesses, orexample,nHamburg,n September, ohl quickly osthis mageof a sure oser,while the SPD still has an unsolvedleadershipproblem-will SchroderorLafontaine e its candidatefor the chancellorshipn i998? And will Germanvoterssee the eventualSPD candidate as anotherTony Blair-or, at secondglance, s ust a riskfactorn a crisis ituation? he race for 998 is stillwideopen. Suffice tto saythat hegovernment'sosition n thepolls n early 994was evenmoreprecarious han t is today, ut it stillregained nough groundto win the elections hat utumn.On keyforeign olicy ssues, here reonlynuancesbetween he twopoliticalblocs.What is more, oreign olicyhasbeen pushedfar nto thebackgroundnpublicdebates,ehind heburning omesticssues ftheday.n contrasto thefirsthalf f the 99Os, whenGermany eemed obe slowly pening p to its ncreasedinternationalesponsibility,tspublicdebates re now clearly urningnward. tseemsunlikelyhat heSPD or theGreens regoing omake theeuro an electionissue-especially n view of the fact hat he astdecisionon thesingle urrencytimetable illhaveto be takenn spring998, well before he election ampaign;NATO enlargementswidely ccepted, t leastwithin heSPD; andEU reformandenlargementeem toprovoke o major riticismrom he currentpposition.But thenextgovernment'sapacity or tructuraleform ill have obvious mpli-cations orGermany'sxternal oleaswell.A Germanynpermanentrisiswouldbe likely o lose much of ts determinationo speed up EU enlargement.

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Roland FreudensteinThree outcomes eem possiblefor he I998 poll. First, ohl wins again,mostprobablywith a narrowmajority the coalition'smajority t the last electionwas 140,000 votes, translatingnto fiveseatsin the Bundestag).This would

mean continuityn all fields, utwithnew impulsesforreformn the areaswhere theopposition s currentlylockingmeasuresn the Bundesrat:twouldbe politically mpossible ortheSPD to continue thatpolicyunder the shad-ow ofelectoraldefeat. he contradictions ithinthe coalition on EU reformand enlargement hat are visible today would be largelydiminished. his, byimplication,would mean a strengtheningf Germany's ole in the EU. Theweakened domesticpositionthatmade Kohl waveron theextension fmajor-ityvoting nAmsterdam ould disappear fter renewedelectionvictory.heprobable successionof Wolfgang chauble to the chancellorshipn mid-termwould not alter hisdevelopment.Alternatively,he oppositionmaytakeover.A coalitionbetweenthe SPD andthe Greens would probablynot mirror he success ofTony Blair in GreatBritain, ecause thehesitant rocess f renewalbegunin theSPD in 1997 doesnotcomparewith the development f'new Labour'sincetheBritish lectionsin 1992. The basics of EU and enlargement olicy would remain largelyuntouched;but theemphasis n and personal nvolvementn these ssuesthatHelmut Kohl represents ould be lacking. German advocacyof progressnintegration, s well as speedy eastward nlargement, ould lose some of itsclout.The third ossibleoutcome-and theleast ikely-would be a grandcoali-tion between theCDU and theSPD. Some reform rojectsmightfarebetterunder such an administration,ut strong nternalconflictsn the coalitioncould hamper Germany's xternalrole.Wolfgang Schauble would becomeChancellor mmediatelyinstead f nmid-term), rovided he CDU werethestronger artnern the coalition.Accordingto German practice, he foreignministrywould then come into the hands of the SPD, but the Chancellorwould retain strong nfluence, articularlyn European issues-as indeed isthe case atpresent.In any event, ven in Germanythe political partieswill have to do muchmore thantheyhave done up to now iftheywantto raisepublic supportforEU enlargement,ointing ut thebenefitsn a wide-rangingndfar-reachingcampaign, imilar o theone now in progress ortheeuro and in factbuildingupon theexperiencegained throught.Another nescapable aspect of German enlargement olicy after he elec-tion is the need to eliminate the current contradiction between threedeclaredgoals: leavingthe CAP basically untouched; reducingthe Germanshare n theEU budget; nd speedyeastward nlargement ftheEU. Each oftheseelements s incompatiblewith the two others.But anyretreat rom hefirstwo positions eems hardly ossible n the run-up to an electionas dif-ficultfor the incumbent government s that of I998 will be. Most impor-tantly,astward nlargementwill only sell if the economic situationcan be48



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Poland,Germanynd theEUimproved hrough he structural eforms o urgently eeded now.Thisappliesto Germany s well as to the EU as a whole.Poland's Western aspirations: continuity or change?PolishmotivationsforU accessionThe question why Poland wants to oin the EU is not as easy to answer s itseems;but t s,forobvious reasons, ighly elevant o pre-accession nd acces-sionpolicy. hree aspects ome to mind: considerationsfeconomics,politicsandmodernization.The easy answerwould be to saythatPoland wants o share hewealth ccu-mulated n the integration rocess, hrough ohesion funds, ubsidies,marketaccess,etc.Of course, hisaspect s there;but no one who has observed thePolish debate on EU accessionover a period of years ould failto be aware ofpolitical overtoneswhich are at least as important s the economic ones.Clearly, here s a deep-rooteddesire n Poland to belong to a larger ntity-theEuro-Atlantic ommunity,s it were.This is largely xplicable n terms fPoland's specifichistory,nd the widespread feelingof havingsuffered orEurope in 920, 1939-45, 1980-81) whilenever aving ot nythingnreturn.EU and NATO memberships seen as the ultimate and,most mportantly,heformal) cknowledgement f a historical ebttheWesthas towards oland,aswell as ofPoland'sbelongingto theWestern ommunity. ecurity spects rerelevant, ut maybe not prevalent,n this context.The classical elementsofnational ecurity re, n the Polish mind-set, overedby NATO membership,which it is hoped will come about in April I999-nowhere in the formerWarsaw Pact countries s NATO membership s popular as in Poland today,with approvalratesof over 8o per cent of the population.But among manypoliticians, emainders f economic dependence upon easternneighbours,above all Russia, continues o cause concern, nd the appropriate emedy nthisspecific ontext s seen more in EU membership han n anything lse.Consequently,heEU is considered o have a security imension, oo-if onlythrough hesinglemarket nd economic solidarity.There is, however, thirdmotivation, hich thoughconnected to the firsttwo, tands n its own right: U memberships seen as a chance to catchupwithEuropean modernity,nd thus o re-establish contactwhich was lost notjust at thebeginning f theSecond WorldWar, utasfarback as thebeginningof thepartition f Polandat theend of theeighteenth entury.The eryprepa-ration orEU membership,uns heargument,ntails hosesteps n restructur-ing, ransformationnd institutionaleformwhich would be necessary nywayto modernizePoland,but would lack coherence ndurgencyf t were not forthe carrot' fmembership.2 ogically,his pproachbringswith t the riskof2 This s themain rgumentsed n theNational trategyf ntegrationublishednFebruary997: seeNavodowatrategiantegracjiThe Committee or uropeanntegration: arsaw,997).

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Roland Freudensteinpoliticaltrouble f and when restructuringecomes painful, nd discontentsthen turned gainst ccession tself.n that ense, he implications f Poland'sultimatemotivation or ccessionmirror hoseofthe EU forenlarging tself.This blend of views s largely epresentativef the Polish elite n general, ut tmustbe emphasized irsthatNATO memberships for he moment he moreimportant lement, nd second that considerable cepticism emains mongPolish conservativesbout theEuropean Union as such.Poland'snew overnmentIn September 1997 Poland elected a new parliament Sejm) with a vastlychanged constellation f forces. he parties f the right,mostlynot presentnthe Sejm of the pastfouryearsbecause theyfailedto pass the 5 per cent bar-rier n 1993, became the strongest arliamentary roupwith 201 out of 460MPs. Their grouping, Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS, with MarianKrzaklewski t thehelm),comprises 9 parties,radeunions and otherorgani-zations, nd itspoliticalviews rangefrom ocial democraticvia centrist ndconservative o Catholic-nationalist.t is held together y a strong eeling fanti-communism,nd also a sense of competition,fnot disdain, or the cen-trist Freedom Union (UW, chaired by the new finance ministerLeszekBalcerowicz), he uniorpartnern thecoalition nd the one Polishpartywhichmostclearly ombinesa modernistic iew of societywith liberal economicsand which comes closest to federalist ttitudes n European integration.Tensions n thiscoalitionwill be inevitable and thepainful rocessofnego-tiationswhich led to the formation f the new government nder PrimeMinister uzek in earlyNovember1997 hasalready ivenample proofof that.But there s no alternative o this coalition,which once more combinesthepoliticalforces hat nitiated he PolishAugust'of I980: thepost-communistSocialDemocratsSLD), npower rom993 to 1997, virtuallyost heir oten-tialcoalitionpartnersn theSeptember 997 elections,nd are ikely o remainin oppositionuntil 001, or until break-upof the current oalition which sstillpossible)forcesnew elections.The AWS-UW coalitionhas set tselfn ambitious gendaofreform,ryingto recapture he speed and decisivenesswhich had been lost in thepreviousfouryears.Most of theaspectsof thisprogramme re, t least mplicitly,on-nected withPoland's effortso prepareforEU accession, nd the outcome ofthisreform ffort ill have a strong earingupon Poland'sability o oin.Themost mportant ointson theagendaare as follows:* Decentralization.nitialattempts o strengthenocal self-administrationndintroduce ounties, ndertaken y governments p to 1993, weresubsequent-ly stopped n their racks ythepost-communistsnd especially ytheir oali-tionpartner,he peasantparty. ow this tem s theareaofstrongestonsensusbetween theAWS and the UW. Even a reduction n number (and thus a50



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Poland,Germanynd theEUstrengthening)fthe49 voivodshipslocaladministrativenits) urrentlyn exis-tence s a distinct ossibility.n a country s centralized s Poland the creationof regions n theproper ense forthe first ime n historywould be no smallachievement.t would also greatly nhance the capacity o absorbpre-acces-sion assistancefrom the EU throughthe PHARE programmeand theEuroregions3whose potentialhasnot been fully xploited o farbecause therewas simply oo littledecision-making owerin the lower echelons ofadmin-istration.* Acceleratedrivatization/demonopolization.Thiss another ectorwhere ittlehasbeen done duringrecentyearsbutwhich has a directmpact upon the medi-um-termnternationalompetitivenessf Poland'seconomy and thuson ful-filling he Copenhagen criteria orEU membership). owever, his ssuemightstill turn out to be a source of conflict etween the UW and theAWS, orbetween thegovernmentnd the strong radeunion wing of theAWS. Sincea greatnumberof obs in Poland's moribundheavy ndustries re at stake, hisis a particularlyensitivessue.On demonopolization, oland is already ehindschedule n thepre-accession rocess greedwith theEU.* Social and health nsuranceeform.ere there re fewdisagreementsetweenthe coalitionpartners,ut thechangefrom astlynefficientmployer-financedsystemnow in place to a mixedsystemmight tillprovoke nitialfrustrationamong workers.Reform is neverthelessnevitable,f only to reduce labourcostsand thuscreate mployment.* Agriculturaleform.his is probably ne of the most painful spectsof trans-formationn the Polish context. he backwardness f theagriculturalector,nwhich over 5 per cent of theworkingpopulationare employed,will have tobe addressed oon. Only a well-planned tructuralolicyholds out thepossi-bility f new ob opportunitiesor he vastnumber f smallholdershroughhecreationof agribusinessnd industries uch as food processingn rural reas.The success of these effortswill determine the lengthand nature of theinevitable ransitioneriod in agriculturehatPoland faces when oining theEU. This sectorof reformwill not be a major source of conflictwithinthecoalitionbecause thepeasant obbywithin heAWS isweak,butfrustrationsnrural reasmight till ost the coalitionvotes n theforthcominglections.* Educationaleform.his is crucial to the long-term ustainabilityf growth.Poland's crisis-riddenchools and universities ill have to be based in partonprivate financing,with vastly ncreasedopportunities or scholarships. hismightnotonlycause frustrationsn the short erm, ut also come into conflictwith the new constitution hich stipulates heright o free ducation.But itis inevitablefthequality f education s to be improved-another mportantif ndirect lementofpre-accession olicy.

3 Cross-border ooperationin specifically esignated reas such as,forexample, Saxony-Silesia,northernBohemia or Pomerania, .e. on both sidesoftheGerman-Polish bordernear Berlin.

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Roland FreudensteinAll of theseare areas n which the astcoalitioncould not or would not takedecisive tepsforward. uccess or failure n thesereform rojectswill, o a largeextent, etermine he speed and intensity f Poland's move towards U mem-

bership.The rgument hat cceleration f reformnthese reas s indispensableto thoroughpreparation or oining the EU has rarely een made in publicdebate so far-but it is certainlyn the back of the mindsof most of the ead-ing politicians f thisnew coalition.Accessiontrategynder henew overnmentBefore the election, twas by no meansclear that coalition of thekindnowin officewould continuethe specific pproach to theEU of itspredecessors.The AWS had raised fearsabout its European orientation, specially n itsoppositionto the new constitutionn the referendum fMay 1997, when itbranded the articleconcerning he transferf statecompetencesto suprana-tional organizations s somethingclose to high treason. n the event,thatturned out to be probably he last openly anti-EU reflexby theAWS. EUaccession hasbecome a declaredgoal of the new government,fonly throughthe pressure f the UW and,of course, ubordinate o the desire o oin NATO.Nevertheless, sizeable factionof about 50 out of 20I AWS membersof theSejm can stillbe considered nherently istrustfulf integrations such;andwith the coalition n possessionof a parliamentary ajority f only30 votes,thiscan be considered crucial group.Most of thembelongto one of severalgroupings f a Christian-nationalistendency,nd theymight till ause trou-ble in parliamentwhen the government eeds supportfor ts EU policy.Buteven here change maybe underway.Poland'sCatholic clergy s now in theprocess fchanging tsviews on integration.he new tendencywashighlight-ed duringthe visit of a high-ranking elegationof Polish bishops to theEuropeanCommission n earlyNovember1997.The head ofthePolishepis-copate,CardinalGlemphimself, ho had in I995 publiclydenounced theEUas partof an anti-Polish onspiracy,ow openlyembracesEuropean integra-tion.The trickle-down ffect fpro-EU statementsy bishopson thesepoliti-ciansof theright an hardly e overrated.Nevertheless,veniftherightwing of the AWS now accepts ntegrationssuch,therewill stillbe conflictwithin hecoalitionabout the ndividual ssuesofpre-accession trategynd accessionnegotiations.Theseensionsmight rys-tallize aroundForeignMinisterBronislawGeremek UW) on the one hand,and the head of the Ministerial ommitteeforEuropean Integration, yszardCzarnecki (AWS), on the other.The largely nexperiencedCzarnecki hasannounced a tougheningof Polish attitudes n trade in the pre-accessionprocess, specially n agriculturend some industrial roducts.On the otherhand,he has taken more realistic tance hanmostof his coalitionpartnersntheprobable yearof accession, peakingof 2004 or 2005 rather han2000. Ifthistendency o dampdown exaggerated xpectations an be coupledwith a52



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Poland,Germanynd theEUthorough nd decisivefurtherevelopment fpre-accession trategy,produc-tive consensus n the details fPoland's EU policy may still ome about.Polish-German relations and EU enlargementThere have been almost as many events hailed as breakthroughs nPolish-German relations ince I989 as there were years. But the decisivemomentwas arguably heTreaty n Friendship nd NeighbourlyRelations ofJune ggI (which, n turn,waspossibleonlythroughGermany's ecognition ftheOder-Neisse border n December Iggo).While itwas beingnegotiated,nearly 99I, thethen Polishforeignminister,rzysztofkubiszewski,oined aterm: he new Polish-GermanCommunityof Interest.Warmlywelcomed inGermany,t itscore was Poland's EU membership NATO enlargementwasnot on the cards at this stage).With this ssue enshrined lready n the I99Itreaty,othcountries ad taken heir elationshiparbeyondthebilateral ssuesof reconciliationwhich had dominated t for so long.The German defenceminister olkerRiihe began talking bout NATO enlargementnApril 1993and thus took another mportant tep in the same direction.Meanwhile, nboth enlargement rocesses,Germanyhas become a front-runner ithin theEuro-Atlantic rganizations-not without internalcontradictions,s shownabove.Germany's ole as Poland's advocate withinNATO and theEU has hadprofound ositive ffects n its magein Poland.In Germany, owever,while bringingPoland into the EU is not a contro-versial ssue amongthepoliticalelite,Poland'sratingsn public opinion havefallen harply ince 989. Poles arewidelyassociatedwithpetty rime and ille-gal labour.An exampleofeven thegovernmenthowingprotectionisteflexesin this ontextwas the smallPolish-German risisn thesummer f 1997, overPolish migrantworkershave been legallyemployed by Polish constructionfirms nder n intergovernmentalgreement f theearly 990s. Germany,ear-ing repercussionsromEU partners, uspendedthe preferentialreatment fPolish companieswhilethe case waspending n theEuropeanCourt ofJustice.The official rgument eferrednlyto theLuxembourgcase,but therewas astrong omestic omponentas well: the eventhighlightshepopularGermanfears fmassivemigration hatwill accompanyPoland'sEU accession.Muchwork will haveto be done,dramatizinghestrategic ecessity fenlargementto convincethedoubters.One crucial, f largelysymbolic, ttemptto go beyond bilateralismnPolish-German elationss the nclusion f France n order o form heWeimarTriangle, irst nnouncedin I99I by foreignministers enscher, umas andSkubiszewski. esides the individualmotivations f France and Poland in thisdevelopment,tsmost nterestingspect s probablyGermany'sttempto mul-tilateralizetsOstpolitik.The low butperceptiblehange n French ttitudes oEU eastwardnlargement ay uggest hat hispolicyhas had a roletoplay.Thearchitectsf both the Polish-GermanCommunity f Interest nd theWeimar

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Roland FreudensteinTrianglewill have to answer hequestionof what theseconstructs illstand orafter oland oins theEU.The answer an onlybe a convergencen strategiesfintegration-in other words, n enlargement f the Franco-Germanpairingwhichhas been thedriving owerbehindmany fnot mostof theachievementsof ntegrationo date. t ishard o imagine nyresonant isionof the EU in thetwenty-firstentury hat s not shared y central ountries.It is time to view the challenge of EU enlargementn a new context.Domestic politicswillplaya larger ole, speciallyn a timeof crisisn the nte-gration rocess nd of structuralhangedemandedbyeconomicglobalization.Issues such as the reform fpensionfunds nd social security,f labour costsand flexibilityf markets, ow have a directbearingon the overalldirectionEuropean integrations taking. ossibly he moststriking ffect f I989 (fromtheperspective fEU enlargementsthat his s now truefor ountries n bothsidesofthe former ronCurtain.Aboveall,political litesmustbeginto see thelogical connections etweenthe Union's eastward nlargementnd thestruc-turalreforms fEU institutions,s well as of the economies of the memberstates. n the near future,Germanyand Poland will play key roles in thisprocess. he change ofgovernmentn Poland in 1997 means, n thewhole,astepforward. changein Germany n I998 will not reverse heprocess, utmay signal slowingdown.

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2624665 International Affairs

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