1

Midterm

Constitutional Law

1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PREAMBLE

We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and

establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop

our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule

of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.

ARTICLE I

NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all

other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial

domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters

around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part

of the internal waters of the Philippines.

ARTICLE II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all

government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,

justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Section 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the

protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity

of the national territory.

Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon

the people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under

conditions provided by law, to render personal, military or civil service.

Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and promotion of the

general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

STATE POLICIES

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount

consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-

determination.

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Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from

nuclear weapons in its territory.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and

independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate

social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for

all.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic

autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn

from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic

efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their

physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and

nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality

before the law of women and men.

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness

among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord

with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster

patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and

development.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and

promote their welfare.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by

Filipinos.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and

provides incentives to needed investments.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework

of national unity and development.

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote

the welfare of the nation.

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties

as may be defined by law.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective

measures against graft and corruption.

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full

public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

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ARTICLE IV

CITIZENSHIP

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching

the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform

any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in

accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission

they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

ARTICLE V

SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at

least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the

place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No

literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a

system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the

assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules

as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

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THE STATE: JURISTIC CONCEPT AND POLITICAL UNIT

ARTICLE XVI

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. The State may not be sued without its consent.

State Immunity from suit; In General

U.S. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990)

Held: The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one ofthe generally accepted principles of

international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we

would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of

incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed

incorporated in the law of every civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society

of nations. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to

complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their

duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative

act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state although it has not been formally

impleaded.

When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have descended to the level of the other

contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied consent. In the case o US, the

customary law of international law on state immunity is expressed with more specificity in the RP-US Bases

Treaty. There is no question that the US, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-

suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. It is only when the contract

involves its sovereign or governmental capacity that no such waiver may be implied.

It is clear from a study of the records of GR No. 80018 that the petitioners therein were acting in the exercise of

their official functions when they conducted the buy-bust operations against the complainant and thereafter

testified against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the US, they cannot be

directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued.

As for GR No. 80018, the record is too meager to indicate what really happened. The needed inquiry first be

made by the lower court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties on the basis of

evidence that has yet to be presented at the trial.

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Department of Agriculture v. National Labor Relations Commission 227 SCRA 693 (1993)

Held: The States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general

law or a special law. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in

Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims

involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between

private parties." Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,

thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the government is

deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its sovereign

immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification.

Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still

be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done in

its proprietary capacity.

When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution

against it. Tersely put, when the State waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an

opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties either by general or

special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of

execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and

properties may not be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on

obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the correspondent

appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to

be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as

appropriated by law.

United States of America vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state

without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principles of independence and

equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and

evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them —

between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietary acts. The result is that state

immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial

transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. A state may be said to have

descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only

when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the exercise of its sovereign

function. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both

the US and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized

for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

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Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124 (1993)

Held: This is not a suit against the State with its consent. Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission

regarding indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident by the government does

not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11

expressly states that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will conduct an

"investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took place." Secondly, whatever acts or utterances

that then President Aquino may have done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its

immunity from suit. Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State. Some instances when a suit

against the State is proper are:

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will

belong not to the officer but to the government.

While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does not pertain to the government.

Although the military officers and personnel, then party defendants, were discharging their official functions

when the incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they exceeded their authority as

stated in B.P. Blg. 880.

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the

incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of

this court in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have acted beyond the

scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages.

Doctrine of Immunity from suit of a foreign state

Sanders v. Veridiano 162 SCRA 88 (1988)

Held: Under the law of public officers, acts done in the performance of official duty are protected by the

presumption of good faith, and that even mistakes committed by such public officers are not actionable as long

as it is not shown that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

Shauf v. Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 713 (1990)

Held: While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable

to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their

duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative

act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against

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them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must

be noted, however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.

Public officials having been found to have acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for

damages. The doctrine will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his

private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen; it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may

be liable in his personal capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his acts done with malice and in

bad faith or beyond the scope if his authority or jurisdiction.

Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon 405 SCRA 126 (2003)

Held: The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State with a private party cannot be construed as the

ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure imperii or jure gestionis. Such act is only the start of the inquiry.

Is the foreign State engaged in the regular conduct of a business? If the foreign State is not engaged regularly in

a business or commercial activity, and in this case it has not been shown to be so engaged, the particular act or

transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident

thereof, then it is an act jure imperii.

The existence alone of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall

be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines is not necessarily a

waiver of sovereign immunity from suit. The aforesaid provision contains language not necessarily inconsistent

with sovereign immunity. On the other hand, such provision may also be meant to apply where the sovereign

party elects to sue in the local courts, or otherwise waives its immunity by any subsequent act. The applicability

of Philippine laws must be deemed to include Philippine laws in its totality, including the principle recognizing

sovereign immunity. Hence, the proper court may have no proper action, by way of settling the case, except to

dismiss it.

Immunity under International Law; Diplomatic Immunity of State Agents

M.H. Wylie v. Rarang 209 SCRA 357 (1992)

Held: The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been

performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is showing of bad

faith.

Minucher vs. Court of Appeals 214 SCRA 242 (1993)

Held: The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of

customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit

and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his

representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are

those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but

acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit

without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The

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proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the

maxim - par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction

over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the

state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed

to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it

has not been formally impleaded. This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. It is a different matter

where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the

rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of

Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33 SCRA 368):

“Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or

officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been

invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of

immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against

a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he

violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an

assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional

provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of

state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.”

The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued

in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and

agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation

usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a

well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever

damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority

and jurisdiction.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be

established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an

indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns.

The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government of the two countries,

certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy,

as well as the participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation"

conducted at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic

status" of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if

not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement

Agency.

United States v. Reyes 219 SCRA 192 (1993)

Held: The doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being

sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and

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agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation

usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him.

In the latter, even on the claim of diplomatic immunity — which Bradford does not in fact pretend to have in the

instant case as she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Article 16(b) of the 1953 Military

Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG 52 — this Court ruled:

Even Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations admits of exceptions. It reads:

1. A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall

also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in the case of:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the

receiving State outside his official functions (Emphasis supplied).

Since Bradford did not file her Answer within the reglementary period, the trial court correctly declared her in

default upon motion of the private respondent. The judgment then rendered against her on 10 September 1987

after the ex parte reception of the evidence for the private respondent and before this Court issued the

Temporary Restraining Order on 7 December 1987 cannot be impugned. The filing of the instant petition and

the knowledge thereof by the trial court did not prevent the latter from proceeding with Civil Case No. 224-87.

"It is elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case

pending before a lower Court, does not interrupt the course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction

restraining it."

Immunity under International Law; Diplomatic Immunity of International Organizations

World Health Organization v. Aquino 48 SCRA 242 (1972)

Held: The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that petitioner Verstuyft is

entitled to diplomatic immunity, prusuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised

respondent judge of the Philippine Government’s official position. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer

of the Government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner’s right to diplomatic immunity and asked for the

quashal of the search warrant.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic

immunity is essentlualy a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the

executive branch of government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized by the executive

branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity

upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the Government, the Solicitor-General in this case, or

other officer acting under his discretion. Courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of

property, as to embarass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign relations.

The Court, therefore, holds that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion

in not ordering the quashal of the search warrant issued by him in disregard of the diplomatic immunity of

petitioner Verstuyft.

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Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC) v. National Labor Relations Commission 241 SCRA 580 (1995)

Held: Petitioner SEAFDEC-AQD is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

Being an inter-governmental organization, SEAFDEC including its departments (AQD) enjoys functional

independence and freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

Holy See v. Rosario 238 SCRA 524 (1994)

Held: The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status if a foreign sovereign, the Holy See,

through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine Government

since 1957.

The privilege of sovereign immunity in this case was sufficiently established by the memorandum and

certification of the Department of Foreign Affairs. The DFA has formally intervened in this case and officially

certified that the Embassy of the Holy See is a duly accredited diplomatic mission to the Republic of the

Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of a diplomatic

mission or embassy in this country. The determination of the executive arm of government that a state or

instrumentality is entitled to sovereign or diplomatic immunity is a political question that is conclusive upon the

courts.

Where the plea of immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch, it is the duty of the courts to

accept this claim so as not to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting the country’s

foreign relations.

ELEMENTS OF A STATE

1. TERRITORY

ARTICLE I

NATIONAL TERRITORY

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all

other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial

domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters

around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part

of the internal waters of the Philippines.

INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE

1. POLICE POWER

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Bautista v. Juinio 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Held: In the interplay between such a fundamental right and police power, especially so where the assailed

governmental action deals with the use of one's property, the latter is accorded much leeway. That is settled

law. What is more, it is good law. Due process, therefore, cannot be validly invoked. As stressed in the cited

Ermita-Malate Hotel decision: "To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police

power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,

extending as it does 'to all the great public needs.' It would be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to

destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its competence to

promote public health, public morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is 'that

inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety, and

welfare of society.' "

Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals 195 SCRA 112 (1991)

Held: The Pollution Adjudication Board is the very agency of the government with the task of determining

whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution

statutory and regulatory provisions. We also recognized its power to issue, ex parte, cease and desist orders.

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented

precisely because stopping continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other

inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness

or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which

Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and

implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to

protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and

animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary

requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those

here involved, through the exercise of police power.

2. TAXATION; cf. CONST., Art. VI, §28 & Art. X, §5

ARTICLE VI

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1.

1. The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of

taxation.

2. The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such

limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and

wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program

of the Government.

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3. Charitable institutions, churches and personages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit

cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for

religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

4. No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the

Members of the Congress.

ARTICLE X

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Section 2. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes,

fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with

the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local

governments.

Collector of Internal Revenue v. Pineda 2 SCRA 401 (1961)

Atanasio Pineda died on May 23, 1945. He was survived by his widow, Felicisima Bagtas, hereafter referred to as

Mrs. Pineda, and fifteen (15) children, one of whom is herein respondents, Manuel B. Pineda. On August 30,

1945, proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased were commenced in the Court of First

Instance of Manila as Case No. 71129 thereof, in which Mrs. Pineda was appointed administratrix of the estate.

Mrs. Pineda performed her duties as such administratrix until June 8, 1948, when said case was closed and she

was relieved of her aforementioned duties. Over two (2) years and a half later, Internal Revenue Examiner

Espinosa investigated the income tax liability of some heirs of the deceased. In the course of her investigation,

she allegedly found that no income tax return for the years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948 had been filed on behalf

of his estate. When Mrs. Pineda and her children, some of whom were minors, were contacted by examiner

Espinosa, the latter was referred to respondent Manuel B. Pineda. Inasmuch, however, as Pineda could not be

found in his residence and did not come to see her, although examiner Espinosa had left word for him to do so,

she examined the records of said Case No. 71129 and pertinent records of other offices of the Government, and

on the basis of the data thus gathered, she filed on January 29, 1951, income tax returns for the estate of the

deceased corresponding to the aforementioned years 1945, 1946, 1947 and 1948. On August 1, 1951, income

tax assessment notices Exhibits 3-A and 5-A (pp. 6 and 32, BIR rec.), for the years 1945 and 1946, were sent to

said estate "c/o Manuel B. Pineda", respondent herein, who received said notices on September 8, 1951. Four

(4) days later, he submitted to petitioner herein a "statement" contesting the accuracy of said assessment

notices and alleging that the income of the estate had been included in income tax returns filed by Mrs. Pineda

(pp. 25-28, BIR rec.).

Obillos, Jr. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 139 SCRA 436 (1985)

Held: It is error to consider the petitioners as having formed a partnership under article 1767 of the Civil Code

simply because they allegedly contributed P178,708.12 to buy the two lots, resold the same and divided the

profit among themselves.

13

To regard the petitioners as having formed a taxable unregistered partnership would result in oppressive

taxation and confirm the dictum that the power to tax involves the power to destroy. That eventuality should be

obviated.

As testified by Jose Obillos, Jr., they had no such intention. They were co-owners pure and simple. To consider

them as partners would obliterate the distinction between a co-ownership and a partnership. The petitioners

were not engaged in any joint venture by reason of that isolated transaction.

Their original purpose was to divide the lots for residential purposes. If later on they found it not feasible to

build their residences on the lots because of the high cost of construction, then they had no choice but to resell

the same to dissolve the co-ownership. The division of the profit was merely incidental to the dissolution of the

co-ownership which was in the nature of things a temporary state. It had to be terminated sooner or later.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue 158 SCRA 9 (1988)

Held: Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.

However, such collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason

for government itself It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the authorities

and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxations, which is the promotion of the common good, may be

achieved.

But even as we concede the inevitability and indispensability of taxation, it is a requirement in all democratic

regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in accordance with the prescribed procedure. If it is not, then the

taxpayer has a right to complain and the courts will then come to his succor. For all the awesome power of the

tax collector, he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate, as it has here, that the law

has not been observed.

Commissioner of Customs v. Makasiar 177 SCRA 27 (1989)

Held: Tariff and customs duties are taxes constituting a significant portion of the public revenue which are the

lifeblood that enables the government to carry out functions it has been instituted to perform.

3. POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; cf. CONST., Art. III, §9

ARTICLE III

BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Dulay

93 SCRA 305 (1987) Held: Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full

equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its

improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

14

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive

department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the

guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for pubhc use without just compensation,

no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's

findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980)

Held: There is no question as to the right of the Republic of the Philippines to take private property for public

use upon the payment of just compensation. Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution of the Philippines provides:

'Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.

It is recognized, however, that the government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose what private property

should be taken.

Republic v. De Knecht 182 SCRA 142 (1990)

Held: While it is true that said final judgment of this Court on the subject becomes the law of the case between

the parties, it is equally true that the right of the petitioner to take private properties for public use upon the

payment of the just compensation is so provided in the Constitution and our laws. Such expropriation

proceedings may be undertaken by the petitioner not only by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but

also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

When on February 17, 1983 the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 expropriating the very properties

subject of the present proceedings, and for the same purpose, it appears that it was based on supervening

events that occurred after the decision of this Court was rendered in De Knecht in 1980 justifying the

expropriation through the Fernando Rein-Del Pan Streets.

B.P. Blg. 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of this Court. And the

trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case pending before it on the ground of the

enactment of B.P. Blg. 340.

Moreover, the said decision, is no obstacle to the legislative arm of the Government in thereafter (over two

years later in this case) making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the

propriety of undertaking the expropriation of the properties in question and thereafter by enacting the

corresponding legislation as it did in this case. The Court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting B.P. Blg.

340. Thus the anterior decision of this Court must yield to this subsequent legislative flat.

Manotok v. National Housing Authority 150 SCRA 89 (1987)

Held: The power of eminent domain is inherent in every state and the provisions in the Constitution pertaining

to such power only serve to limit its exercise in order to protect the individual against whose property the power

is sought to be enforced.

15

The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific decree or law orders the

expropriation of somebody's property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the same. Neither should

the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been ordained as existing by the decree or

the just compensation has been fixed and determined beforehand by a statute.

In other words, although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a

court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard

are given to the owner to protect his property rights. We agree with the public respondents that there are

exceptional situations when, in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the requirement of due process

may not necessarily entail judicial process. But where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's property, his

right to due process of law has been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged

violation.

Republic v. Lim 462 SCRA 289 (2005)

Held: When the state wields its power of eminent domain, there arises a correlative obligation on its part to pay

the owner of the expropriated property a just compensation. If it fails, there is a clear case of injustice that must

be redressed.

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private

property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that

there must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use.

Just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the

land, but also the payment for the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,

compensation cannot be considered ‘just.’ In jurisdictions similar to ours, where an entry to the expropriated

property precedes the payment of compensation, it has been held that if the compensation is not paid in a

reasonable time, the party may be treated as a trespasser ab initio.

SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION: JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CHECK ON

THE ABUSE OF POWER BY THE POLITICAL BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

Cf. CONST., Art. VIII, §1(2)

ARTICLE VIII

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established

by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights

which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or

instrumentality of the Government.

16

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various

courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5

hereof.

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803)

Held:

1) Yes. Marbury has a right to the commission.

The order granting the commission takes effect when president’s constitutional power of appointment has been

exercised, and the power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power

has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.

2) Yes. The law grants Marbury a remedy.

The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the

laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.

Where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, the

individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the law for a remedy.

The President of the United States, by signing the commission, appointed Mr. Marbury a justice of the peace in

the District of Columbia. The seal of the United States, affixed thereto by the Secretary of State, is conclusive

testimony of the verity of the signature, and of the completion of the appointment. Having this legal right to the

office, he has a consequent right to the commission, a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation of that right for

which the laws of the country afford him a remedy.

3) Yes. The Supreme Court has the authority to review acts of Congress and determine whether they are

unconstitutional and therefore void.

It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to

particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret the rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the

Court must decide on the operation of each. If courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is

superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case

to which they both apply.

4) No. Congress cannot expand the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction beyond what is specified in

Article III of the Constitution.

The Constitution states that “the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases,

the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction.”If it had been intended to leave it in the discretion of the

Legislature to apportion the judicial power between the Supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that

body, this section is mere surplusage and is entirely without meaning. If Congress remains at liberty to give this

court appellate jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original, and original

17

jurisdiction where the Constitution has declared it shall be appellate, the distribution of jurisdiction made in the

Constitution, is form without substance.

5) No. The Supreme Court does not have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.

To enable this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or

to be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.

It is the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause already

instituted, and does not create that case. Although, therefore, a mandamus may be directed to courts, yet to

issue such a writ to an officer for the delivery of a paper is, in effect, the same as to sustain an original action for

that paper, and is therefore a matter of original jurisdiction.

Disposition: Marbury doesn’t get the commission.

Marshall:

“It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department [the judicial branch] to say what the law is.

Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws

conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.

So, if a law [e.g., a statute or treaty] be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution

apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding

the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of

these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty. If, then, the Courts are to

regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution,

and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.

Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law

are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only

the law [e.g., the statute or treaty].

This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written constitutions.”

Requisites of Judicial Review

A. There must be an actual case or controversy; the question before it must be ripe for adjudication. The governmental

act being challenged must have had an adverse effect on the person challenging it.

Mootness and Ripeness

Mootness and Ripeness both deal with the existence of an actual controversy; mootness with whether the controversy

has terminated, and ripeness with whether it is ready for adjudication. A case will be declared moot if the defendant

18

dies during a criminal trial, if the plaintiff dies during a civil action and the action does not survive the death (usually by

statute), and if the parties settle between themselves before a final judgment is entered. In these situations the issues

are no longer redressable. Exceptions do exist to the mootness doctrine which allow a case to be heard: where

secondary injuries exist that may be addressed by the court; cases which involve a wrong that is capable of repetition

and likely to evade review; where an illegal practice has been terminated but it could be resumed at any time; and in a

properly certified class action suit.

Cases are declared not ripe because the injuries are either too speculative or they may never occur. The rationale behind

the ripeness doctrine is that a court should not issue premature judgments based on abstract disagreements. Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). Ripeness typically arises when preenforcement review of a statute is

sought, at which point to considerations are examined, and both must be present in order for an issue to be ripe. First,

the plaintiff must show that a hardship is likely to be suffered in the absence of a judgment. This hardship could be

caused by the law as it will eventually be applied, by collateral injuries, or because compliance with the law causes the

hardship, and the only other choice is to break the law with the resulting consequences of being prosecuted. The second

consideration is whether the issues are fit for a judicial decision. An issue that specific facts would assist in the judicial

consideration will be found not ripe, while an issue is ripe when it is mostly a question of law, one which does not

depend on context.

Ripeness:

Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497 (1961)

Held: The appeals are dismissed, because the records in these cases do not present controversies justifying the

adjudication of a constitutional issue.

Tan v. Macapagal 43 SCRA 677 (1972)

Held: As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by it, there is no room for the interposition of

judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the appropriate

case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.

U.S. v. Richardson 418 U.S. 166 (1974)

Held: Respondent lacks standing to maintain this suit.

(a) Flast, which stressed the need for meeting the requirements of Art. III, did not

"undermine the salutary principle . . . established by Frothingham [v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447] . . . that a

taxpayer may not 'employ a federal court as a forum in which to air his generalized grievances about the

conduct of government or the allocation of power in the Federal System.'"

(b) Respondent's challenge, not being addressed to the taxing or spending power, but to the statutes regulating

the CIA's accounting and reporting procedures, provides no "logical nexus" between his status as "taxpayer" and

the asserted failure of Congress to require more detailed reports of expenditures of the CIA.

19

(c) Respondent's claim that, without detailed information on the CIA's expenditures, he cannot properly follow

legislative or executive action, and thereby fulfill his obligations as a voter, is a generalized grievance insufficient

under Frothingham or Flast to show that "he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury

as the result" of such action. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634.

Mootness

Defunis v. Odegaard 416 U.S. 312 (1974)

Held: Because petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he has registered regardless

of any decision this Court might reach on the merits, the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art. III

of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues, and the case is moot.

(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of the school's admissions practices, but upon

the simple fact that petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit him to complete the

term.

(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet evading review," since petitioner will never

again have to go through the school's admissions process, and since it does not follow that the issue petitioner

raises will in the future evade review merely because this case did not reach the Court until the eve of

petitioner's graduation

Brennan, J.,dissenting

I respectfully dissent. Many weeks of the school term remain, and petitioner may not receive his degree despite

respondents' assurances that petitioner will be allowed to complete this term's schooling regardless of our

decision. Any number of unexpected events -- illness, economic necessity, even academic failure -- might

prevent his graduation at the end of the term. Were that misfortune to befall, and were petitioner required to

register for yet another term, the prospect that he would again face the hurdle of the admissions policy is real,

not fanciful; for respondents warn that

"Mr. DeFunis would have to take some appropriate action to request continued admission for the remainder of

his law school education, and some discretionary action by the University on such request would have to be

taken."

Respondents' Memorandum on the Question of Mootness 3-4 (emphasis supplied). Thus, respondents'

assurances have not dissipated the possibility that petitioner might once again have to run the gauntlet of the

University's allegedly unlawful admissions policy. The Court therefore proceeds on an erroneous premise in

resting its mootness holding on a supposed inability to render any judgment that may affect one way or the

20

other petitioner's completion of his law studies. For surely if we were to reverse the Washington Supreme Court,

we could insure that, if for some reason petitioner did not graduate this spring, he would be entitled to

reenrollment at a later time on the same basis as others who have not faced the hurdle of the University's

allegedly unlawful admissions policy.

In these circumstances, and because the University's position implies no concession that its admissions policy is

unlawful, this controversy falls squarely within the Court's long line of decisions holding that the "[m]ere

voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case." United States v. Phosphate Export Assn.,

393 U. S. 199, 393 U. S. 203 (1968); see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368 (1963); United States v. W. T. Grant Co.,

345 U. S. 629 (1953); Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U. S. 37 (1944); FTC v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,

304 U. S. 257 (1938); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U. S. 290 (1897). Since respondents'

voluntary representation to this Court is only that they will permit petitioner to complete this term's studies,

respondents have not borne the "heavy burden," United States v. Phosphate Export Assn., supra, at 393 U. S.

203, of demonstrating that there was not even a "mere possibility" that petitioner would once again be subject

to the challenged admissions policy. United States v. W. T. Grant Co., supra, at 345 U. S. 633. On the contrary,

respondents have positioned themselves so as to be "free to return to [their] old ways." Id. at 345 U. S. 632.

I can thus find no justification for the Court's straining to rid itself of this dispute. While we must be vigilant to

require that litigants maintain a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy to assure that

"the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary

adverseness, and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the constitutional

challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution,"

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 392 U. S. 106 (1968), there is no want of an adversary contest in this case. Indeed,

the Court concedes that, if petitioner has lost his stake in this controversy, he did so only when he registered for

the spring term. But petitioner took that action only after the case had been fully litigated in the state courts,

briefs had been filed in this Court, and oral argument had been heard. The case is thus ripe for decision on a fully

developed factual record with sharply defined and fully canvassed legal issues. Cf. Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S.

40, 392 U. S. 57 (1968).

Moreover, in endeavoring to dispose of this case as moot, the Court clearly disserves the public interest. The

constitutional issues which are avoided today concern vast numbers of people, organizations, and colleges and

universities, as evidenced by the filing of twenty-six amicus curiae briefs. Few constitutional questions in recent

history have stirred as much debate, and they will not disappear. They must inevitably return to the federal

courts, and ultimately again to this Court. Cf. Richardson v. Wright, 405 U. S. 208, 405 U. S. 212 (1972)

(dissenting opinion). Because avoidance of repetitious litigation serves the public interest, that inevitability

21

counsels against mootness determinations, as here, not compelled by the record. Cf. United States v. W. T.

Grant Co., supra, at 345 U. S. 632; Parker v. Ellis, 362 U. S. 574, 362 U. S. 594 (1960) (dissenting opinion).

Although the Court should, of course, avoid unnecessary decisions of constitutional questions, we should not

transform principles of avoidance of constitutional decisions into devices for sidestepping resolution of difficult

cases. @Cf. 19 U. S. 404-405 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).

On what appears in this case, I would find that there is an extant controversy and decide the merits of the very

important constitutional questions presented.

B. The constitutional question must be raised by the proper party. The person challenging the act must have

"standing" to challenge, i.e., he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained,

or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement.

Locus standi

People v. Vera 65 Phil. 56 (1937)

Held: The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a

proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a

statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained,

direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the constitution,

the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it

set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal

wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule

that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws.

Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S. 83 (1968)

Held:

1. The three-judge court was properly convened, as the constitutional attack, even though focused on the

program's operations in New York City, would, if successful, affect the entire regulatory scheme of the statute,

and the complaint alleged a constitutional ground for relief, albeit one coupled with an alternative

nonconstitutional ground.

2. There is no absolute bar in Art. III of the Constitution to suits by federal taxpayers challenging allegedly

unconstitutional federal taxing and spending programs, since the taxpayers may or may not have the requisite

personal stake in the outcome.

3. To maintain an action challenging the constitutionality of a federal spending program, individuals must

demonstrate the necessary stake as taxpayers in the outcome of the litigation to satisfy Art. III requirements.

22

(a) Taxpayers must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked, as

it will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially

regulatory statute.

(b) Taxpayers must also establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional

infringement alleged. They must show that the statute exceeds specific constitutional limitations on the exercise

of the taxing and spending power, and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated

to Congress by Art. I, § 8.

4. The taxpayer appellants here have standing consistent with Art. III to invoke federal judicial power, since they

have alleged that tax money is being spent in violation of a specific constitutional protection against the abuse

of legislative power, i.e., the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Frothingham v. Mellon, supra,

distinguished.

Real party in interest

Fernando Poe, Jr. v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo 454 SCRA 142 (2005)

Held: A public office is personal to the public officer and not a property transmissible to the heirs upon death.

Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow or the heirs in election contests where the protestant

dies during the pendency of the protest.

While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely

personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court

of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, we have allowed substitution and intervention but

only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the

judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit.

C. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. If not raised by the pleadings,

ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.

By way of exception, courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a question affecting

constitutionality of a statute should be presented.

People v. Vera, supra

D. The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself. In other words, the court will

not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is unavoidable. The constitutional issue must be the very lis mota

of the case.

Sotto v. Commission on Elections 76 Phil. 516 (1946)

Held: A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,

unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other

ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional will be

left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable.

23

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

STATE POLICIES

ARTICLE II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all

government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted

principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,

justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

Doctrine of Incorporation

Kuroda v. Jalandoni 83 Phil. 171 (1949)

Held: Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional because Article II, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution

explicitly provides that “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the

generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of nation.”

In promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President of the Philippine exercised his power as

commander-in-chief of all armed forces. Moreover, it was in adherence with the generally accepted principles

and policies of international law which form part of our Constitution.

With regards to the contention about the participation of two American lawyers, the Philippines was under the

sovereignty of the United States and thus, we were equally bound together with the US and Japan, to the rights

and obligations contained in the treaties. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full

sovereignty.

Mejoff v. Director of Prisons 90 Phil. 70 (1951)

Held: Considering that in the United States (where transportation facilities are much greater and diplomatic

arrangements are easier to make) a delay of twenty months in carrying out an order of deportation has not been

held sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, this petition must be, and it is hereby denied.

Borovsky v. Commissioner on Immigration G.R. No. L-4352, September 28, 1951

Held: In the United States there were at least two instances in which courts fixed a time limit within which the

imprisoned aliens should be deported5 otherwise their release would be ordered by writ of habeas corpus.

Nevertheless, supposing such precedents apply in this jurisdiction, still we have no sufficient data fairly to fix a

definite deadline

24

In re Garcia 2 SCRA 984 (1961)

Held: The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise

of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the

applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in Spain, and

the citizens of Spain desiring to practice their professions in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring

to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is

not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges

provided in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the

contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state could not

have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the

Philippines, for the reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative

of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the Philippines, the power

to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only to the Congress of the Philippines.

Agustin v. Edu 88 SCRA 195 (1979)

Held: The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this

consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter of Instruction:

"[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies

concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations

Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government

under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and

devices; * * * " It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses

relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law

of the land * * *." The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It

is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt

servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international

morality.

J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553 (1983)

Held: The Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the

land. ..." To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of

international law, it should be a part of the law of the land.

In the absence of a clear and present danger of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest. There was no

justification then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. These

rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, 129 SCRA 373 (1984)

25

Doctrine of Transformation

CONST., Art. VII, §20-21, Art. XII, §2(4) & Art. XVIII

ARTICLE VII

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 21. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with

the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit

to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or

guaranteed by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have

the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.

Section 22. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-

thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

ARTICLE XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of

potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are

owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be

alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full

control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter

into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or

corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such

agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-

five years, and under such terms and conditions as may provided by law. In cases of water rights for

irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of waterpower,

beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive

economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as

cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays,

and lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or

financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and

other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real

contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State

shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

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The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,

within thirty days from its execution.

STATE POLICIES

ARTICLE II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES

Section 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with other states, the paramount

consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-

determination.

Section 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from

nuclear weapons in its territory.

Section 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the prosperity and

independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate

social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for

all.

Section 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development.

Section 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic

autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn

from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic

efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Section 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their

physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and

nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.

Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality

before the law of women and men.

Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

Held:

1. The State's interest in universal education is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on

other fundamental rights, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children.

2. Respondents have amply supported their claim that enforcement of the compulsory formal education

requirement after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of their religious

beliefs.

3. Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-

sufficient segment of American society, the Amish have demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the

interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the

continuing survival of Old Order Amish communities, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a

27

statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the difficult burden of demonstrating the

adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of the overall interest

that the State relies on in support of its program of compulsory high school education. In light of this showing,

and weighing the minimal difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept,

it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory

education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.

4. The State's claim that it is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to

children regardless of the wishes of their parents cannot be sustained against a free exercise claim of the nature

revealed by this record, for the Amish have introduced convincing evidence that accommodating their religious

objections by forgoing one or two additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or

mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and

responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society.

Ginsberg v. New York 390 U.S. 629 (1968)

Held:

1. The magazines here involved are not obscene for adults, and appellant is not barred from selling them to

persons 17 years of age or older.

2. Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press, Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 354 U. S.

485, and there is no issue here of the obscenity of the material involved, as appellant does not argue that the

magazines are not "harmful to minors."

3. It is not constitutionally impermissible for New York, under this statute, to accord minors under 17 years of

age a more restricted right than that assured to adults to judge and determine for themselves what sex material

they may read and see.

(a) The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for even where there

is an invasion of protected freedoms, "the power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches

beyond the scope of its authority over adults." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 321 U. S. 170.

(b) Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in the

rearing of their children is basic in our society, and the legislature could properly conclude that those

primarily responsible for children's wellbeing are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid

discharge of that responsibility.

(c) The State has an independent interest in protecting the welfare of children and safeguarding them

from abuses.

(d) This Court cannot say that the statute, in defining obscenity on the basis of its appeal to minors

under 17, has no rational relation to the objective of safeguarding such minors from harm.

4. Subsections (f) and (g) of § 484-h are not void for vagueness.

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(a) The New York Court of Appeals, in Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 76, 218 N.E.2d 668, 671,

construed the definition of obscenity "harmful to minors" in subsection (f) "as virtually identical to" this

Court's most recent statement of the elements of obscenity in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U. S. 413,

383 U. S. 418, and accordingly the definition gives adequate notice of what is prohibited, and does not

offend due process requirements.

(b) Since the New York Legislature's attention was drawn to People v. Finkelstein, 9 N.Y.2d 342, 174

N.E.2d 470, which defined the nature of scienter for New York's general obscenity statute, when it

considered § 484-h, it may be inferred that the reference in provision (i) of subsection (g) to knowledge

of the "character and content" of the material incorporates the gloss given the term "character" in

People v. Finkelstein.

(c) Provision (ii) of subsection (g) states expressly that a defendant must be acquitted on the ground of

"honest mistake" if he proves that he made "a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of

such minor."

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness

among them.

Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord

with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

Sierra Club v. Morton 405 U.S. 727 (1972)

Held: A person has standing to seek judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act only if he can show

that he himself has suffered or will suffer injury, whether economic or otherwise. In this case, where petitioner

asserted no individualized harm to itself or its members, it lacked standing to maintain the action.

Oposa v. Factoran 224 SCRA 792 (1993)

Held: While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and

State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and

political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it

concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the

petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a

matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from

the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the

well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are

mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and

imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day

would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come

— generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

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Laguna Lake Development Authority v. Court of Appeals

231 SCRA 292 (1994)

Held: The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public interests" gives

vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies or the 1987

Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord

with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-impairment. This is

but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and promote the right to health of the

people and instill health consciousness among them." It is to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as

a fundamental human right.

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of procedure under the

circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and authority under its charter and its amendatory

laws.

MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2007

Held: One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of

2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the

protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides

that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention,

control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote

environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the

protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that

recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and

ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive

management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real

or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must

reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must

perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’

hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are

required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It

implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and

advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of

nature.

30

Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports to foster

patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and

development.

Section 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and

promote their welfare.

Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by

Filipinos.

Garcia v. Board of Investments 191 SCRA 288 (1990)

Held: The provision in the Investments Code requiring publication of the investor's application for registration in

the BOI is implicit recognition that the proposed investment or new industry is a matter of public concern on

which the public has a right to be heard. And, when the BOI approved BPC's application to establish its

petrochemical plant in Limay, Bataan, the inhabitants of that province, particularly the affected community in

Limay, and the petitioner herein as the duly elected representative of the Second District of Bataan acquired an

interest in the project which they have a right to protect. Their interest in the establishment of the

petrochemical plant in their midst is actual, real, and vital because it win affect not only their economic life but

even the air they will breathe.

Hence, they have a right to be heard or "be consulted" on the proposal to transfer it to another site for the

Investments Code does require that the "affected communities" should be consulted. While this Court may not

require BOI to decide that controversy in a particular way, we may require the Board to comply with the law and

its own rules and regulations prescribing such notice and hearing.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

Held: In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks

of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could

have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an

American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino, Formerly a concourse

for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine

history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of the festivities during the inauguration of

the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government. it plays host

to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine hospitality.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not merely

to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as

the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance, the duty of

upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the

intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from

it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for

31

Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter

could have not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its judgment for that of

the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the

Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress

and development . . . in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division

against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were

published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal

system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to intervene in

contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it

is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not

adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It

will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.

Section 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector, encourages private enterprise, and

provides incentives to needed investments.

Section 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and agrarian reform.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework

of national unity and development.

Section 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote

the welfare of the nation.

cf. Art. XIV, §17

Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128 (2000)

Section 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information in nation-building.

Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties

as may be defined by law.

Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective

measures against graft and corruption.

Section 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full

public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

CITIZENSHIP

ARTICLE IV

CITIZENSHIP

32

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine Citizenship upon reaching

the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in the accordance with law.

Who are citizens of the Philippines

Aznar v. Commission on Elections 185 SCRA 703 (1990)

Held: In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private

respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided under Commonwealth Act No. 63.

Among others, there are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country, (2) by express renunciation of citizenship,

and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the

evidence, it is clear that private respondent did not lose his Filipino citizenship by any of the three mentioned or

by any other mode of losing citizenship.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains.

it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. The

petitioner failed to positively establish this fact.

Tecson v. Commission on Elections 424 SCRA 277 (2004)

Held: Whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the

father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or

not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative

father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that

having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the

Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in

1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that

Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in

1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of

respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers

citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or

illegitimate.

Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita, G.R. No. 177721, July 3, 2007

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform

any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in

accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.

33

Co v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal 199 SCRA 692 (1991)

Held: The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine

citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected

citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino

women. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino

father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a

Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not,

under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien

father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. Hence, the

bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result

in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members. It is for this reason that the

amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all

those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the

effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct

the inequitable and absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have

been nil at the time had it not been for the curative provisions.

Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.

Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration 41 SCRA 292 (1971)

Held: The prevailing rule is that under section 15 an alien woman marrying a Philippine citizen, native-born or

naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Philippine citizen provided that she is not disqualified under section 4 of the

same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien, who subsequently becomes a naturalized Filipino

citizen, acquires Philippine citizenship the moment her husband takes his oath as a Philippine citizen provided

that she does not have any of the disqualifications under said section 4.

In order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough that she

possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in

its Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization

apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her

marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband;

she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she

desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for

naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or

Spanish and one of the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real

property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of

intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of

34

her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which,

she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will

she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino

citizen only by judicial declaration.

Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 174 SCRA 245 (1989)

Held: Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other

qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V,

Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of

automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of

appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the

Province of Sorsogon.

Labo Jr. vs. Comelec 176 SCRA 1 (1989)

Held: There is no claim or finding that petitioner automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of his marriage to

an Australian national in 1976. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a

formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen.

The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of Australia, or at

least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over the people of

Baguio as mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be

restored only after the returning renegade makes a formal act of rededication to the country he had abjured

and he solemnly affirms once again his total and exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not

be accomplished by election to the public office.

In re Willie Yu v. Defensor-Santiago 169 SCRA 364 (1989)

Held: Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not

left to inference or implication.

Aznar v. Commission on Elections, supra

35

Republic v. Li Yao 214 SCRA 748 (1992)

Held: Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced in favor of the Government and against the applicant.

Admission to citizenship is one of the highest privileges that the Republic of the Philippines can confer upon an

alien. It is a privilege that should not be conferred except upon persons fully qualified for it, and upon strict

compliance with the law." Philippine citizenship is a pearl of great price which should be cherished and not

taken for granted. Once acquired, its sheen must be burnished and not stained by any wrongdoing which could

constitute ample ground for divesting one of said citizenship. Hence, compliance with all the requirements of

the law must be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

Republic v. Hon. Judge Tandayag, G.R. No. 32999, October 15, 1992

Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections 257 SCRA 727 (1996)

Held: Frivaldo had reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of his repatriation under P.D. 725 and was qualified

to hold the position of governor of Sorsogon.

Mercado v. Manzano 307 SCRA 630 (1999)

Held: By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other

country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from

the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign

citizenship.

Valles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 137000, August 9, 2000

Bengzon v. Cruz 357 SCRA 543 (2001)

Held: Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of

the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed

Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political

economic necessity.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his

citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was

originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status

as a natural-born Filipino.

Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission

they are deemed, under the law to have renounced it.

Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law.

36

Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections 497 SCRA 649 (2006)

Held: Those who retain or re‑acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship

Retention and Re‑Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in

Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

SUFFRAGE

ARTICLE V

SUFFRAGE

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at

least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the

place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No

literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.

Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a

system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates to vote without the

assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed to vote under existing laws and such rules

as the Commission on Elections may promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

The Right to Vote in Elections; Residence v. Domicile; Qualifications and Disqualifications of Voters

Faypon v. Quirino 96 Phil. 294

Held: Mere absence from one’s residence of origin – domicile – to pursue studies, engage in business, or

practice his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment, or loss of such residence. The determination

of a person’s legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be from his acts, activities,

and utterances. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin must show and

prove preponderantly such abandonement or loss. The registration of a voter in a place other than his residence

of origin is not sufficient to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence. The respondent has not lost

his residence of origin.

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, x x x When all election is to be held, the

citizen who left his birth place to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot; but

for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from the place of his

professional or business activities; so then he registers as a voter as he has the qualification to be one and is not

willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in

national elections, Despite such registration, the "animus Revertendi" to his home, to his domicile or residence

of origin, has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than

his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of much residence. It

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finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to the place of his birth. The same

feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for

another".

Gonzales v. Comelec 21 SCRA 774 (1967)

Held: The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto is not included in the general

grant of legislative powers to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the people — as the repository of

sovereignty in a republican state, such as ours — to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.

Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power.

Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not

as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the

members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the

same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution — they are the very source of all

powers of government, including the Constitution itself .

The fact that Congress is under legal obligation to make said apportionment does not justify, however, the

conclusion that failure to comply with such obligation rendered Congress illegal or unconstitutional, or that its

Members have become de facto officers. The effect of this omission has been envisioned in the Constitution,

pursuant to which:

. . . Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number

of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from

the present Assembly districts. . . . .

The provision does not support the view that, upon the expiration of the period to make the apportionment, a

Congress which fails to make it is dissolved or becomes illegal. On the contrary, it implies necessarily that

Congress shall continue to function with the representative districts existing at the time of the expiration of said

period.

Even if the present Members of Congress are merely de facto officers, it would not follow that the contested

resolutions and Republic Act No. 4913 are null and void. In fact, the main reasons for the existence of the de

facto doctrine is that public interest demands that acts of persons holding, under color of title, an office created

by a valid statute be, likewise, deemed valid insofar as the public — as distinguished from the officer in question

— is concerned. Indeed, otherwise, those dealing with officers and employees of the Government would be

entitled to demand from them satisfactory proof of their title to the positions they hold, before dealing with

them, or before recognizing their authority or obeying their commands, even if they should act within the limits

of the authority vested in their respective offices, positions or employments. One can imagine this great

inconvenience, hardships and evils that would result in the absence of the de facto doctrine.

The sufficiency or insufficiency, from a constitutional angle, of the submission thereof for ratification to the

people on November 14, 1967, depends — in the view of those who concur in this opinion, and who, insofar as

this phase of the case, constitute the minority — upon whether the provisions of Republic Act No. 4913 are such

as to fairly apprise the people of the gist, the main idea or the substance of said proposals, which is — under R.

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B. H. No. 1 — the increase of the maximum number of seats in the House of Representatives, from 120 to 180,

and — under R. B. H. No. 3 — the authority given to the members of Congress to run for delegates to the

Constitutional Convention and, if elected thereto, to discharge the duties of such delegates, without forfeiting

their seats in Congress. We — who constitute the minority — believe that Republic Act No. 4913 satisfies such

requirement and that said Act is, accordingly, constitutional.

The provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3

permits Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for and assume the functions of

delegates to the Convention.

Ceniza v. COMELEC 95 SCRA 763

Held: The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying the same

privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates neither the

Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage.

The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable classification.

If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be

treated and regulated differently from another.

The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges granted

by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute

prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to

another individual or groups of voters in the same city.

Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage since the Constitution

confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where the city is located.

Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the questioned statues

neither withdraw nor restrict.

The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular annual

income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of

existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show

whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province

where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial

government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election of provincial officials in some

instances. The provincial government has no governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities

are independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the case, it is but just and

proper to limit the selection and election of the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests

are vitally affected and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.

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Romualdez v. Regional Trial Court 226 SCRA 408 (1993)

Held: The term ‘residence’ as used in the election law is synonymous with ‘domicile,’ which imports not only an

intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of

such intention. ‘Domicile’ denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure,

or for like reasons, one intends to return. Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another

choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or

bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old

domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The

purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of

residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The political situation brought about by the "People's Power Revolution" must have truly caused great

apprehension to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious concern over the safety and welfare of the members of

their families. Their going into self-exile until conditions favorable to them would have somehow stabilized is

understandable. Certainly, their sudden departure from the country cannot be described as "voluntary," or as

"abandonment of residence" at least in the context that these terms are used in applying the concept of

"domicile by choice."

Akbayan v. COMELEC 355 SCRA 318 (2001)

Held: It is an accepted doctrine in administrative law that the determination of administrative agency as to the

operation, implementation and application of a law would be accorded great weight considering that these

specialized government bodies are, by their nature and functions, in the best position to know what they can

possible do or not do, under prevailing circumstances.

The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In

other words, there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligato est. Hence, a statute

may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally,

coincidentally, it must be presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a

law which is far removed from the realm of the possible. Truly, in the interpretation of statutes, the

interpretation to be given must be such that it is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and

practicality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the “stand-by power” of the respondent COMELEC under

Section 28 of R.A. 8436, presupposes the possibility of its being exercised or availed of, and not otherwise.

Further, petitioners' bare allegation that they were disfranchised when respondent COMELEC pegged the

registration deadline on December 27, 2000 instead of the day before the prohibitive period before the May 14,

2001 regular elections commences - is, to our mind, not sufficient. On this matter, there is no allegation in the

two consolidated petitions and the records are bereft of any showing that anyone of herein petitioners has filed

an application to be registered as a voter which was denied by the COMELEC nor filed a complaint before the

respondent COMELEC alleging that he or she proceeded to the Office of the Election Officer to register between

the period starting from December 28, 2000 to January 13, 2001, and that he or she was disallowed or barred by

respondent COMELEC from filing his application for registration. While it may be true that respondent COMELEC

set the registration deadline on December 27, 2000, this Court is of the firm view that petitioners were not

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totally denied the opportunity to avail of the continuing registration under R.A. 8189. Stated in a different

manner, the petitioners in the instant case are not without fault or blame. They admit in their petition that they

failed to register, for whatever reason, within the period of registration and came to this Court and invoked its

protective mantle not realizing, so to speak, the speck in their eyes. Impuris minibus nemo accedat curiam. Let

no one come to court with unclean hands.

In a similar vein, well-entrenched is the rule in our jurisdiction that the law aids the vigilant and not those who

slumber on their rights. Vigilanties sed non dormientibus jura in re subveniunt.

The COMELEC in denying the request of petitioners to hold a special registration, acted within the bounds and

confines of the applicable law on the matter - Section 8 of R.A. 8189. In issuing the assailed Resolution,

respondent COMELEC simply performed its constitutional task to enforce and administer all laws and regulations

relative to the conduct of an election, inter alia, questions relating to the registration of voters; evidently,

respondent COMELEC merely exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to it and one which squarely falls

within the proper sphere of its constitutionally mandated powers. Hence, whatever action respondent takes in

the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, specifically on matters involving voters' registration, pertains to

the wisdom rather than the legality of the act. Accordingly, in the absence of clear showing of grave abuse of

power or discretion on the part of respondent COMELEC, this Court may not validly conduct an incursion and

meddle with affairs exclusively within the province of respondent COMELEC - a body accorded by no less than

the fundamental law with independence.

As to the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of the writ of mandamus, The court held that it cannot, in view of

the very nature of such extraordinary writ, issue the same without transgressing the time-honored principles in

this jurisdiction. For the determination of whether or not the conduct of a special registration of voters is

feasible, possible or practical within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the

exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.

THE CONSTITUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY: AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS TO THE

FUNDAMENTAL LAW

CONST., Art. XVII, §§1 & 3; Amendments or Revisions by Congress acting as a constituent assembly or by a constitutional

convention

ARTICLE XVII

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:

1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or

2. A constitutional convention.

Section 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a

majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

Legal Article:

On Amending the Constitution, Lecture delivered by Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza as Holder of the 2005

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Metrobank Foundation Professorial Chair in Constitutional Law at the Court of Appeals Auditorium, July 7, 2006.

See Sinco, supra at 55-98 (Chapter IV on Constitutional Conventions)

Gonzales v. COMELEC, supra Doctrine of Proper Submission

Held: We take the view that the words "submitted to the people for their ratification", if construed in the light

of the nature of the Constitution — a fundamental charter that is legislation direct from the people, an —

expression of their sovereign will — is that it can only be amended by the people expressing themselves

according to the procedure ordained by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the

people for their blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote blindly.

They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions compare them with the proposed

amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of

extraneous or possibly in insidious influences. We believe, the word "submitted" can only mean that the

government, within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform very citizen of the provisions

to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and effects thereof.

In Re Subido 35 SCRA 1 (1970)

Held: Government officials and employees are not absolutely barred from becoming candidates for the office of

Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, the only condition being that when they do so they should relinquish

their positions; that this condition is imposed for reasons of public interest, among the most important of which

are, first, that there are certain government offices which afford their occupants many built-in advantages not

available to others and which may be used or abused to enhance their own candidacies, contrary to the very

spirit of the equal protection clause invoked by the petitioners; and second, that to allow government officials

and employees to campaign for the Convention and, if elected, to sit as Delegates therein without vacating their

positions would be clearly detrimental to the government and to the public at large, which would thereby be

deprived of their services for the unpredictable length of time that the Convention may last, without such

positions being filled through new appointments, resulting in disruption of public service.

Imbong v. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28 G.R. No. L-32432 September 11, 1970

Del Rosario v. COMELEC 35 SCRA 367 (1970)

Held: The power to propose amendments to the Constitution is implicit in the call for the convention itself,

whose raison d'etre is to revise the present Constitution. Consequently, there is no fraud or surprise that is

perpetrated by the questioned title on the legislature and the public, which is sought to be avoided by the

constitutional requirement that only one subject shall be embraced in the bill which shall be expressed in the

title thereof.

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Furthermore, it is not required that the title of the bill be an index to the body of the act or be comprehensive in

matters of detail. It is enough that it fairly indicates the general subject and reasonably covers all the provisions

of the act so as not to mislead Congress or the people

Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702 (1971); November 4, 1971 (Motion for Reconsideration)

Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333 (1976)

Id. at §2; Amendment through a people’s initiative

Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every

legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No

amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this

Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.

Defensor-Santiago v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Held: It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which

only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or

resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities,

municipalities, and barangays can pass.

PIRMA v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 129745, September 23, 1997

Lambino v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 174153 & G.R. No. 174299, October 25, 2006

Held: The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that

the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.

First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their

behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the

people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment is

"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that

contains the full text of the proposed amendments.

The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If

so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the

several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of the millions of

signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.

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Id. at §4; Valid ratification of amendments or revisions under §1 by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not

earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision; Valid ratification of

amendments under §2 by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety

days after the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified

by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later

than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a

plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification

by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.

Planas v. Commission on Elections G.R. No. L-35925 January 22, 1973

Held: The Convention was legally free to postulate any amendment it may deem fit to propose — save perhaps

what is or may be inconsistent with what is now known, particularly in international law, as Jus Cogens — not

only because the Convention exercised sovereign powers delegated thereto by the people — although insofar

only as the determination of the proposals to be made and formulated by said body is concerned — but, also,

because said proposals cannot be valid as part of our Fundamental Law unless and until "approved by the

majority of the votes cast at an election at which" " said proposals "are submitted to the people for their

ratification," as provided in Section 1 of Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution.

Mitra, Jr. v. Commission on Elections 104 SCRA 59 (1981)

Held: Once the fact of acceptance by the people of a new fundamental law is made evident, the judiciary is left

with no choice but to accord it recognition. The obligation to render obeisance falls on the courts as well." 17

Even petitioners must be aware that aside from the referendum that led to the ratification of the present

Constitution, there was a second one held on July 27 and 28 in 1973, 18 and another on February 27 and 28 in

1975. 19 The 1976 amendments to the Constitution were adopted in the referendum held on October 16 and

17 of the year. 20 Then on December 17, 1977, there was again held a referendum. 21 The fact that the people

went to the polls would be indicative of their acquiescence in the present Constitution. Nor could petitioners be

unaware that two elections have been held under the present Constitution, one for members of the Interim

Batasang Pambansa on April 7, 1978 and the other for local government officials on January 30, 1980.

cf. CONST., Art. XVIII, §27; Effectivity Date of the 1987 Constitution

ARTICLE XVIII

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Section 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a

plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.

44

The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was approved by the

Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six, and

accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of October, Nineteen hundred and eighty-six at the Plenary Hall,

National Government Center, Quezon City, by the Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder

affixed.

De Leon v. Esguerra 153 SCRA 602 (1987)

Held: The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date, therefore, the

Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded.