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TranscrtptMilitaryAnalystCallTopic: aDR

Host: Eric RuffOA5DPAON BACKGROUNDTranscriber. MurphyMr. Ruff: Hello?Folks this is EricRuffandwith me is, amongothers, are_ andand they'll be talking toyou for a second- in a secondor two.I justwantedto openup bytalking a little bit about sort of whatwearedoing here. Obviously, aswe are getting closerand closerto releasing the aDR, in about- what is it now, probablyabout12 days or something like that- a week from this Monday, Information is already startingto comeout moreandmore.YouprobablysawMarkMazzetti's piece in the LATimes (Jan. 24), sowe kindofmade adecision to start talking about this a little bit. 50 we are talkingon background nowabout theaDR. And I think the frameworkweareworking in- andwe havea documentthat's calledapreface. It's a prefacethat's going t go In the front of the aOR whenwe send it up. And wecanmakethis availableto you guys. I don't knowif wehavethe electronson it yet - butwe havea it's abouta three-pagedocument, andTara (Jones)or somebodywill get it out toyou either byfax or email, ifwe can email it OK? So, Il h inkwe've got all,that information for everybodywho'son the call. 'Importantto rememberhere is that this QDR isnot a new beginning. In essence, we've beenWorking lessons learned since wecame in In 2001 . And it's beena processbywhich overthe lastyearor soa numberof assumptionshavebeenlookedat and testedand testedand the thinkinghasbeen throughout thiswhat havewe IeamedfromIraq?What have learnedfrom AfghanIStan?Andwhatdowe knowgoing into the futureaboutwhat our force structureIsgoing to be?This thing has beena very high collaboration with civilian - I haven't been h e ~ e than twoyears, but the civilian and militarycollaboration in termsof this document,and_ andtheadmearcan certainly speak to this - has beenreallysomethingtowatch over the last year-plus.So withthat inmind, I'll just - we'll turn it over to . andthen" you and. can justtake it fromhere. Yeah, hi, this is _ First of ali i wantto say hi to Ken and Tim froma formerlife. I amgoing to walkyou through somehigh points onthe aDR. My rolewasas I guessbasically the traffIC cop, themanager, andthen I was supportedby Martywho is the J-8 here, andalso the folks in PA&E, and thethreeof us prettymuchrepresented themanagementcell.One thing uniqueabout this aOR as Ericwas aUuding to is that it wasnot a staffproduct It is thework of the four stars, and their Senate-contsmed civilian equivalentsIn the building.Theydroveit; theymadeall the decisions; theydirectedthe workon it; and they're the guys that putthousandsand thousandsof hoursinto it..It i s awartimeaOR. That's one thing that'sdifferentfrom in the past.We think thatwe're in thefourth yearof a very longwar. It's a war with a differentsortof enemythanwefaced in the past,anddifferentsort of neededcapabilities that we have to develop.The QDR itself is supposedto be a 2D-year look into the futureof what thedepartmentneeds.We're supposedto developa strategyandthen resource thatstrategy.Another thing thatwe diddifferent this time is beforestarting the QORwedid thestrategy. That waspublishedin Marchof

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'05. It's availableon DefenseUnk. It'sanunclassdocument. That strategytookaboutsixmonthsof the senior leadership's time. Andwhenwe referto the seniorleadership, we're talkingthesecretary and the deputy, the chairmanandthe vicechairmanof the Joint C h i e f ~ , three.Servicesecretaries, five - four servicechiefs, and five undersecretaries. And that compnses theheadquarter's senior leadership, andthenon a periodic basiswe bringIn the nine combatantcommanders to get their inputs.That groupwassupportedby thevice chiefs of the S e r v i ~ andsomeof the other direct reports to the secretary Who, at their tcur-sterlevel, ended up dOing anawtul lot ofthe staffworkto push it forwardto the senior leadership.Whatwe cameout with were two 'twin imperatives. And the bottomlineof the QDR report itselfsays thatwe needto shift our balanceand the capabilitieswehad, that the Sept. 11, 2001represented 8 changeand anoff-balancing ofwhat thestrategiccontext thatwe thoughtwe hadup until that poin t And sowe are shiftingour balanceandweare shiftingour capabilities. AndI'lltalk to someof the areaswe are doing that in.We see four setsof challenges thatwehave In the futureto be able to address. And historicalywe've lookedat a traditional set of challenges whichbasicallyinvolvedmajor combatops, andstate-versus-stateconflicts. Andwe looked at everything else asa IessElr-lncluded caseto beable to meetthat.As we look to the futurewe see'a setof irregularchallenges which are represented by both IraqandAfghanistan, butalso the operationsthatwe saw in Haiti and Liberia, and this iswhereusuallythe enemyill within a state, but not partof 8 state.We arenot fightinganothernationstate, but somesort ofmovement. and it requires'a differentset of capabilities, sometimesthoughtas lower level butstill anareawherewe need to developmoreexpertise.The secondsetis a catastrophic setof challenges. And thoseareone time of eventsthatcouldoccurto the U.S. Theyarejust unacceptable for us to acceptthat blow. PeartHarborwouldbe anexampleof that; g.11 is an exampleof that; gettinghit bya nuclear lED inone of our. Cities wouldbe an exampleof that. And so defensehas a role in protecting thenationagainstthat in thefuture. .And then the final set of the four Isdisruptive. And that is a challengeor a threatwhichmightcomeagainstus that wouldbasicallyneutralize theAmericanmilitaryas.a key Instrument ofnationalpower. ' .And youkind of think of if anothercountrywouldhavegottenstealthratherthanus,what wouldhave that meant?If somebodycomesupwith a blo-warfare agentthat cangeneticallytargetoursoldiers or something, than thoseare the type of challenges thatwewant to be ableto meet-.So we lookat the future; we lookat aboutgettingcapabilities acrossall four of thosesets ofchallenges.The secondbig partof theODRwas a recognition that aswechange the capability of the forcesin the fieldwe haveto changethe headquarters. That the headquarters and theway that we'recurrentlyand operatedis not suffIC ientlyagile to beable to support the fighting forcesthatwehave over there. So we haveto do thingsto bettersupportthemand to be ab1e to accelerateourability to reorientthe force. So there is an intemar lookhere, too.There's a recognition that this ODR, as Ericwassaying, is a point In timeacrossa continuumoftransfonnation. So it represents a snapshot in time. It Is something that startedworkingonbasically two yearsagostartedthe Initialeffort, andwe'll stili be workingon It twoyearsJromnow.There isa point in timeon the 6'" of Februarywherewe sendup a reportto the Hill, but it is anevolving process.

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Erictalkeda littlebit aboutthe lessonsIeamed andwhatwentIn here. Itwasmorethan"just IraqandAfghanistan. It Isthe- the otherareas in theglobalwaron terror- thePhilippines, theHomofAfrica, Georgiaand thePan-Sahel (inAfrica). Theseareareaswherewe aretrying to fighttheglobalwar on terrorism.Weareworkingwith partner nations; sometimes they lack the capability,sometimes they lack thewill to beableto effectively prosecute this, andwe needto do thingstobuildup their capabilities.Anotherbig areais humanitarian. Ourbiggestvictories to datein theglobalwar on terrorismwhich involves impacting theheartsandmindsof themoderateMuslimshavebeenInour .responses to humanitarian disasters. Specifically, theearthquake aroundChristmas of '04 andthen the tsunam i from theearthquake, andthenPakistani earthquake (October '05). Andthepollingthat theagencydoesandthe shiftof opinionsbecauseof thosetowardtheUnitedStatesandawayfrom radical Islamhas beenvery,very significant.

, .So that speaksto anotherproblem thatwe face In thefutureand that'sone of unpredictability anduncertainty. We cannotpredictwithanycertainty whatsoever howour forcesmightbe ableto beusedIn theMure.Wecansaywith a veryhighprobability thatwithinthe next 10yearsU.S.forceswill be employed somewhere in thewor1d wherethey arenot today. But as far 88 whenthatwill be, wherethatwill be, or howthatwill be. there is just nowayto determine that.So wehaveto havean agilityof forcesandwe haveto build capabilitieS, ratherthan focusing on a5pecificthreat.And then the final areathat has informed thework is our response in supportof eMI authorities,specifically, the military'sresponse to 9-11 , andnowmorerecently Hurricane Katrina andRita.And that in providingtheAmerican peope security, wehavea roleto playon the domesticfront,too. 'SotheODRthenwill speakto- the document will speakto four keyfocusareasthatwe areconcerned with building morecapabilitiesat the beginningof the21 century.Howdowe provide defense in-depth to thehomeand?Howdo wehastenthe demiseof terroristnetworks? Howdowe preclude hostile powers or rogueelementsfrom acquiringor usingWMD?Andthen finally, howdowe influence and ImpaCt countries thatareat strategc crossroads?Andthey'rewearethinkingof threecountries specifically. Weare thinking of Russia' andtotemperitsmovetowardauthoritarianism. WearethinkingofChinaand successfully managng Itsrise in thecommunity of nations asa constructive force, and if thatdidn't prove successful, howdowedissuade themfromhostileambitions?Howdowedeterthemfrom (inaUdible - cursor?CUfS

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Nowthat partnershIp and capabilitycapacityhappensdomestically, as far asworkingwith stateand localgovernments, Departmentof Homeland Security; it happensinteragency on the nationalsecurity front,wOl1t ingwithStateDepartment, the NSC, CIA in an interagency p ~ andtheninternationally, how dowe build thecapabilityof the partnernationsthat we w o . w i t h ? Becausethis Is very clear to the Departmentof Defensethatwe haveto have lots of humility as.weapproachthe problemsetbeforeus.We are not going to be able to predictwhat is going to be able tohappen, an.dweare not going tobe ableto solve it on our own, eitherasa departmentor a nation.We are gOing to be dependenton partners. Most times for suretheyare going to be able to for sureaddress the problem .cheaper thanwecan,and manytimes theyare goingt9 be ableto do It moreeffectivelybecausethey are familiarwith the local culturalterrain, they know the language. and they canoperatemore effectively in theenvironmentwe are In.Along those 12 areas thatwe talkedabout beingableto makechanges, we talk about leadingedge investments that we canmake and decisionsthat we can makein the fiscal year '07 budget,that arriveson the Hill the sametime thattheQDRdoes. Butthoseare only leading-edgeInvestments. The major shifts thedepartment needsto makewll bemade88 wedo the program- Mure-yeardefense programin the coming year,whichwill lookat the years '08 through '13. Sothat's wherea lot of the significant vectors.thatthe QDRhas setwill find their way Intoprogrammaticchange,althoughthere are somethat are handledin the QDRItself.Andwith that, at a top level - I guessone of thethings- two otherPoInts real qutck, One iswedid do a force-plannng construct. We have retined the force-planningconstructfrom2001.Wemaintain thatwe will still beableto do twomajor conflictsnearlysimultaneously, takeone of themto the level of whatwe call a wln-decisive, sometimes categorizedas something that mightresultin a regime change.We'lI,beableto do those. In the past, we had thoughtof bothof t,hose asconventionalcampaigns. Going forward, wewant to havethe capability to haveoneof thembe aprolonged, irregularcampaign.Theanalysis thatwedid in theQDRclearlyprovedthat themost stressing thing on the force isnotthe high-intensity majorcombatoperations, but it is the prolonged. irregular campaign thatgoeson for a numberof yearsand requires a rotationalbaseto support it. And the multipliereffect there is whatputs the stresson the force.Someof the other thingswe Ieamedis thatwetalkabout the force somepeople think of anactive-reservecomponent We also needto think about anoperational and an institutionalcomponent And the usabilityand the force thatwe emploY.forward is only the operationalcomponent And so as we look atwhat the sizeof the force Is. ratherthan looking at total endstrength, where there is many thingson the institutional forcewecan do to transferto eMlianJobsor contractorjobs, we really - what the numberwe're really interestedin iswhatdowe have in theoperatIonal force,andwhat are thecapabilitiesof thoseforces versusthe problemsetwe areconfrontedwith?And so the QDRdoesa lot tomove morecapabilityandmore numbersinto theoperationalforce.Italso doesa lot to movemorecapability Into the irregularspecial operations arena,malOOgsome sizable Increases there -and taking thegeneral purposeforcesandstart to give them (softlight?) capabilities.Also in the force-planning construct werecognize theneed to havea deterrence, but not a onesize-tits-all deterrence, whichwe've had in the pastof massiveretaliation, but one thatwill alsowork against roguepowerswhomight be in a state of collapseor would seemingly appearto beundeterrabe and also terroristsand their networ1

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_ Right, right And as you areprobablyaware, there's a lot.of flagsaround right nowtowhich therearen't necessariywholeunits togowith. The numberof flagswill remain the same.The percentage of flags that have real, viableforcesassociated with themwill go up. But that isnot to say that theremightnot bea handful aroundthat are in the current statusthat they arenowthat there's not necessarily a fully associated unitwith them. But no flags - to my knowledge - tomy knowledge noflagswill go away.So they'll still have the same bragging rights.Q: Exactly .Q: Hello. Jed Babbin, AmericanSpectator. Haveyouguysgottena sign off fromNegroponteandGoss (PorterGoss?)on this? Because what I am e a r i Isyou guysaregoing to beputting anawful lotmoreintoestablishingdefense-related intelligencecapability andtherecouldbea littlebit of a turf war brewing, no?_ The QDRhas been staffedthroughtheNSC. up to the highest levels, In (and?)components thatcomprise the NSC- the intelligencecommunity, the StateDepartment, theDepartment of Homeland Security, JusticeDepartment,It has alsobeenstaffedthroughthoseorganizatonsalso. .I - we have not solved the problem of the iron major andthe titanium colonel, either In ourorganization or otherones. Youwill beable to findsomebody burledIn anorganizationwhosomehowfeelsthat his particuar parochialInterest was not servedas fully as hethought Youwillnot find anybodyat the senior levels of the defenseestablishment - and that's the four starsthat don't believe in this document That's -I mean, someof us that have particlpatedIn it thinkthat the document itself is just an artifact of the QDR. But really what the QDRwas it was aprocessthat brought the departmentin, looked ata commonset of problems, and came upwith acohesive approachto it that everyone bUys in.There - oneof the thingsweget hit for Is that therewerenomajor weapon cuts. We didn't kill anymajor weaponsystems in theQDR.Because we had such a collaboratve effort, wewereable tomakelarge investments In the areasweneedto do, without having to dothat And it couldn'thavebeen done If it weren't theservices that werecoming forward andsaying this is how I candomypart to contribute to beableto shiftthe balanceandwherewe rieed to go.So. I've only been in the Pentagon for threeyears, but guys that havebeen through here andsatthrough all the QDRssaythat this was fundamentally differentIn kind as far asnot just theapproach at the senior leadership, but as it developed. the collaborative effort. the fact.that- andthevices - andmaybe gota better count than I do - but Iwould say the vices put in 500hoursof their time over the last 15; 16months, insilting downand collaboratlvelyworidngwiththe undersecretariesandthe deputyand thevice chairman In trying to come up andworkthroughthese solutions. .Andwecouldn't got toWhere wedid if this wouldn't have represented - the spirit wouldn't havebeenone of that weare all in this togetherandwehaveto come up with commonsolutions.Wealso, as far as Inclusivlty, broughtin on many ofour meetingsmembers of theDepartment ofHomelandSecurity, theCIA ;weactually had someof ourkeyallies participate inour Internaldiscussions. And so this wasmuchmore inclusive than it's beenin the past, too.So, you know, there might be somepeoplewho feel that theywere Injured butwe are not awareof anybodyat a leadership level anywhere In thegovernment that feelsuncomfortable with thisreport

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_And just to put an asteriskto thequestion on Ambassador Negroponte, OffIceofthe Secretaryof Defensefolksthat are the intel sideof the house Isworking very closelycontinuousprocessworkingwith tnedirectorof national Intelligence and theCIA. So there's beenan awful lot of crosstalkduring thedevelopmentof thisQDR andcontinuingonwardwithbalancingthe capabilitiesthat are represented Inall those threeorganizations.Mr. Ruff: More questions?Q: If nobodyelse Is'going tojump in, it's JedBabblnfor one more. You'vementioneda term andyou just scaredthe liver out ofme, guys. NuclearlED?_ Yeah, I mean if -let's face it, we've got somebadguys out there that are trying todevelopa full nuclearfull cycle, and have the ability to producefissile m a t ~ r i a l . This is all aboutwhat the (7 Response) to theglobalwar on terrorism. It is weaponsof massdestruction. It is aglobalization mechanismwhichallows themovementof materialsand ideas in a networkworld,and it Is the emergenceof terrorist organizations that have no limitto the amountof terrorthattheyarewilling to put on any nationor anygroupof people to get to their politicalends.And thenexusof those three things iswhat keepsusup at nightQ: Forgiveme for interruptlng but I thinkone of,things thatI am hearingis that if it Isa new term,it's got to be an identifiablethreat Is this nearor longerterm?

We havecountries that are producingnuclearmaterials that are not underthe nonproliferation treaty right now, So it isa possibilityof whichwe cennotignore. And I mean it is thehigh end, worse case. It doesnt necessarily- a nuclearlED Isnot necessarily something thatwould haveto go critical, and it couldjust havea radiological dispersionaspectof It - knownasan ROD- radiological dispersiondevice.And the otherthing'is is the QDR is givena responsibility to lookout in the next20 years.Whenwe go to the intelligence community and ask themto look Into the future, and to give us all'assessmentof wherewe are going to be, theycan do it with a certaindegree of accuracyout tofIVe years.The world we live in right now though,going out 10years is an extremetyiffy exercise, one thatthey feel uncomfortable with. And theywill not ventureout to the 2o-yearmarkbecausetheworld's just too uncertain; we cannotpredict whichway thingsare going to go. Theenemy is 'evolving too fast to beable to do any sortof linear extrapolation.And sowe havea responsibility in looking out atthat 20 yearsto beable to addressall feasiblethreats and to try to anchorwhat the high-endone Is, And a terroristwith a - with a - withfissilematerial, and with a little bit of know-how; Is theworst-case scenario.That coupledthough - I would say that's on a parwith 8 terroristwith bio-warfareknowledge, too,or access to bio-warfarematerials. Bothof thoseare the high endone.Q: Thank you.Q: This is JeffMacCauslandagain. There's beena lot of leaks, and I emphasizethewords leaks,soyou can say that's not necessarily true, that one of the things this report Is going to say to theshiftingof a partiCUlar numberof forces- partlcular1y air and naval - from , frankly, theAtlantic tothe Pacific. Can you talk about that for a second?And also, howdo you see balancing the effortto. IfyouWill, find a good relationshipwith theChineseas opposedto creatinga forcestructurethat they find threatening and thenwe end up,youknow, fulfilling ourown propheces? '

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_ Right I mean that's a - let medeal with the latter one, thePacificandstuff like that Imean, stabilityis thecoin of the realm in thePacific. It's not sUbject to an alliancestructurelikethe Atlantic Is.The U.S. is a force for stabilityin the region. I think it's recognized by all.We don'tuse our forcesout there in anaggressve nature.Bythe sametoken, for operational responsiveness , the timelines due to the distanceinvolvedaresignificantly different In the Pacific, soweneedto havethings forward.Ourability to respondwith17,000 troopswithin one week of theBandaAceh tsunami, to beableto be delivering relief, wecould not havedone if we didn't haveour forward basing and forwardpresence structurethatwe .havethere.Inorder to dothat, therewill be a shiftof maritimetowardthe Pacific.We talkedabout that InQDR '01;we continueto talk about that in QDR '06. Andyou'll probablyseesomespecificmemesin the report that will very discretelydealwith that.IntheAtlantic- the Atlanticis a - tomaintain our traditional relationship with NATO, toencouragethe transformationof NATOfrom a ColdWar structureto one that can makeadifferenceto theworld we liveIn. Obviouslyyou're aware thatwe're dolngISAF (Int8l'natio.nalSecurityAssistanceForce)out-of-areaops therein Afghanistan, and we'reworkingwith themonthe NATOresponseforce, andwe:rehaVingdiscussions onotherareasas we'll go toWerkunde(Germany) andthe ministeria Iscoming up hereIncouple ofmonthson areas'that NATOcancontinueto grow there. But it probablydoesn't requirethe sameforce structurethat did duringtheColdWar. .Q: Thank you.Mr. Ruff: OK,we'll just recap here.We'll get this meterlal out to you, end I know one or twofolks asked If ttiey could get e transcrtpt of this just for your own personsl use and theanlwer I I y.., we'll give you that. I f . on background.And I wouldjust add one last thingand that is, youknow, there's been 8 lotof discussionisbuilding and aDR isCetta inly part of this umbrellain the long war. Andjust for your SA(situational awareness), you're going to beseeingInthe daysandweeks ahead the &8Ctetaryand leadership in this building talkingmore aboutthis longwar andwhat the componentsare.And I would just giveyou thatas something to be watchingout for aswe go forwardwithspeechesand ~ i n g s like that. .OK?Thankseverybody.(end of call).