23rd Infantry Regiment - Historical Report - August 195023rd Infantry Regiment - Historical Report -...

Korean War

23rd Infantry Regiment - Historical Report - August 1950

2nd Infantry Division

Korean War Project Record: USA-42

Folder: 070013

Box: 07

File: 13

National Archives and Records Administration

College Park, Maryland

Records: United States Army

Unit Name: Second Infantry Division

Record Group: RG407

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project 2ID-00300017


REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

HEADQ.U AR'rBRS, 25D IHF.AH'i'RY Hill HiliJ>TT 2d Infantry Division

APO 248, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, Califo~~ia

(CSIUS - 5)

1 August 1950 TO: . 51 August 1950

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APPHOifli'..J) BY:

Infa..'1.try

S.ECRET

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DECLASSIFIED ; REPRODUCED ATTHE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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-- COHTb'IJTS --

Classification Announcement

Distribution

Table of Contents

List of Supporting Documents

Narrative Summary

Annex I (23d I~ On Sangju,- Taet~ Road)

Annex II (Opera ti o:r.s )

Forev1ard to iiar Diary

.Y/ar Diary - Record. of Daily Entries

Appendix 1 -- Supporting Documents

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2

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5-10

11-12

1,5-17

18

19 .. 28

(Hote: Appendix 11 1 11 is attached only to Copies 1 and 2, and to the copy retained at Headquarters Eighth U. S. Army)

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LIST OF IHCLOSU?..ES

Ap;.:>endix l. - SupportinG Docwnonts

DESCRIPTIOfJ

S.-1 Journal, Hq 23d Inf Regt, copy of daily entries -- l August - 31 August 1950

S-2 and S-3 Journal (combined)J Hq 23d Inf Regt, copy of daily entries -- 1 August - 31 August 1950

ncu 1·1iscel1oneous Docpments: I

Operations Orders

Operations Directive (from higher hq.)

Reports to higher hq.

Periodic Operations Reports

Intelligence Summary

Reports from . subordinate units

Letters frorn higher hq.

Hessages from higher ~1q.

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SE~ET HEADQUARTERS, ~ INFA.J.WRY

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF COMMAND

AND. UNIT HISTORICAL REPORT

PERIOD COVERED 1 August - 31 August ~950

0

(CSHIS - 5)

During the period 1 - 4 August 1950, the 23d Infantr-.r was nearing the close of its journey to Korea. In addition to normal housekeeping details, troop training continued and plans for the debarkation of troops were completed.

On 5 August 1950, both vessels docked at Pusan, Korea. Preparation for unloading was begun as soon as the vessels docked. When the troops came ashore, immediate preparations for movement to a forward assembly area were made.

On the evening of 6 August 1950, the 23d Infantry, minus a rear echelon which remained behind in Pusan, closed in at the forward assembly area at Wondong, Korea. Training activities were resumed and weapons were test fired. Vehicles, which came forward from the rear echelon at Pusan, were checked and serviced. There was very little indiscriminate firing by individuals, although there were constant rumors that the North Korean Guerillas would attempt to make harassing attacks upon the assembly area.

Coincident with the training of individuals, liaison with friendly units was established; communication facilities and equipment were checked;

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

' and detailed reconnaissance

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of the :oa\ net to the North was made.

Upon arrival in Korea, it became apparent taat many items of personal and organizational equipment ~hich had been transported to the Far East Col!ll!land were excess. \vb.en the troops disembarked they \'/ere required, uhile still on the docks, to separate their equipment into two bags, placing all items not essential to combat activity in a 11 B8 bag. Huch valuable equipment \'las lost during this procedure, and, of course, all the effort expended in dra'I'Ting, issuing and the transportation of this equipment 11as '1-Iasted. Hany items of personal property uhich '\'lere placed in these bags 11'ere permanently lost to the oimera.

The equipment and .vehicles of the 23d Infantry had been transported to the Far l!ast":oonm~and in seven ships. As these ships arrived at Pusan they -rrere unloaded quickly, and vehicles and equipment moved to the for\iard assembly area at V/ondong. Concu1·rently, units v1ere encouraged to nshakedo'l'm 11 their equipment and eliminate all items not essential to combat operation. Items of excess not turned in to technical services were stored at the rear command post of the division, under the supervision of the regi1uental personnel officer.

No unusual logistical problems arose during the period. Although the regiment moved frequently on short notice, supply personnel 'I'Tere able to assure that all needed supplies, if available in Korea, reached the regiment \1i thout undue delay. At one time, \'fhile the re::;iment '\'las operating a railhead at Kyongsan, units supported from the railheaq were nearly equivalent, in strength, to one infantry division.

Upon arrival in Korea the 23d Infantry, with its attaclLme11ts, consisting of the .?7th Field Artillery Battalion, Battery "B 11 , 82nd /!.AA Battalion, Company 11 B", 2d Engineer Battalion, and Traffic Platoon, 2d liilitary Police Company, became a part of the Eighth Army Reserve. il'aile at i'fondong, aerial and g!ound reconnaissance of road nets and possible areas of emploj~ent was made.

On 10 August 1950, orders \'Tere received directing the Combat Terun, 'l'lhile remaining in Eighth Army Reserve, to move to,an assembly area at Kyongsan. The 3d Battalion, 23d Infantry, with appropriate attachments, moved by ~otor to Kyongsan, departing iiondong at 2030 hours end closing in at Kyongsan at 0430 AOUrs, 11 August 1950. The remainder of the combat team noved by rail and motor on 11 August and closed in at K~ongsan by 1830 hours.

Upon arrival at Kyongsan, orders >'lere received directing that elements of the Combat Team be prepared to execute several counter-attack missions in the sector. II!ll!lediate reconnaissance and preparation for the execution of these missions \:Vas made.

On orders of 12 Ausust 1950, the 23d Regimental Combat Team, minus the 3d

1

·. Battalion, moved to I.firyane, Korea. The movement uas completed by 2030 hours .

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. At. this time the 1st Battalion \'las detached from the regiment and placed under the :· control of the Commanding General, 2l~th Infantry Division. The battalion remain

ed detached l.ljltil 28 August and during the period from 12 August, \'las employed ' .

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I. in a series of operations in; the vicinity of Hill 409, near riyons; Pung, Korea. Elements of Tank Company, 2;5d Infantry, Heavy Eortar Company, 2;5d Infantry, and Battery nB 11 , 82nd AAA Battalion, i·lcre attached to the 1st

\ Battalion during this period.

The Regimental Combat Team, minus the 1st and )d Battalions, remained in Eighth Army Resene at Hiryane;, until 1300 hours, 14 August 1950, at vrhich time the unit v1as ordered to return to Kyongsan. This uwvement vms initiated immediately, all elements closing in at Kyongsan at 2025 hours, 15 August. At 0945 hours, 16 August, the remainder of the 2;5d Regimental Combat 'l'eam,

I

minus the 1st and )d Battalions, \'las ordered to move to Kyongju. The 2d Battalion was directed to remain in position at lqongsan until relieved by the 27th Infantry Regiment. This relief was accomplished during the nights

~· of 16 - 17 August, and the 2d Battalion moved to Kyongju, closing in at 0500 hours, 17 August 1950. The period during which the 2;5d \•Tao at Kyoneju vias un-event.ful. At 2150 hours, the ,;57th Field Artillery Battalion, less 11A11 Battery, was relieved from attaclunent to the 23d Regimental Combat Team, and ordered to the Taegu front departing at 0_:500 hours. At 1500 hours, 18 August, the 2)d Regimental Combat.Team, minus the 1st Battalion and the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, Vias ordered to return to Kyongean. The move to Kyongsan \vas completed at 2045 hours, 18 August 1950.

During the period 5-18 August 1950, the 2;5d Regimental Combat Team sau no action but gained much valuable experience. Drivers of trucks and other vehicles became expert at cross-country travel over extremely difficult terrain. Communications, mess and maintenance crews received valuable training in field operations~ Officers and men alike became hardened and adjusted to the rigorous outdoor life. Perimeter security became habitual. The 19th of August found the 2,;5d Infantry in excellent fi5hting condition, and although ~~der stre1~th, ready for combat.

At 1400 hours, 19 August, the Nilitary Police Platoon, which had been attached to the 23d Regimental Combat Tea."ll, \·tas relieved from attachment and ordered to report to its parent organization. At 1800 hours, 19 August 1950,

·j the Combat Team, minus the first Battalion, \'las ordered to move to the vicinity of Taegu, Korea, with the mission of providing security for the 8th and 37th Field Artillery Battalions, and occupying a defensive position astride the mab1

I supply route, about eight miles north of Taegu. The 3d Battalion established '·j a p~rimeter for the Field Artillery units, and the 2d Battalion occupied the r defensive position astride the main supply route. _At this time, United nations ! troops in the sector, (~he 1st ROK Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the

27th Regimental Combat Team), uere heavpy er..gaged by a large enemy force 11hich was mru~ing an all-out effort to capture Taegu.

At 1300 hours, 22 August, the 2d Battalion, 23d Info.ntry, rlhich had replaced the 3d Battalion as a security force for the artillery units in the area, (8th and 37th Field Artillery Battalions) i'/as attacked by elements of an enemy regiment, reinforced, which had infiltrated the United Nations lines in the sector.

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S~ET · The attack was savage in nature, but was repulsed by 1600 hours. action several limited objective counter-S;ttacks uere made by 11 E11

companies in order.to improve their positions.

During the and uGu

The enemy attacked again at 1745 hours~ makill8 his main effort against the positions of Fox Company. This attack -vms repulsed 'lith the aid of several air strikes. Although this attack failed to dislodge the 2d Battalion from its posi tiona·, the enemy succeeded in bringing small arms and mortar fire to bear upon a five mile stretch of road, extending north of Taegu, v;hich i'iOS the l·1ain Supply Route for all Eighth Army Troops in that sector.

During this action the outstanding leadership of Corporal Kyoshi Masuda, Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 2)d Infantl~y, prevented the v;i thdrawal of a ROle unit, and materially qontributed to the success' of the action.

At this .time the Commanding~fficer,.2)d Infantry, Colonel Paul 1. Freeman, Jr., and an advance command group consisting of the Regimental S-), l.fu.jor Frank Heszar, the Communications Officer, Captain Benjamin \'ialker, and the Hec.;imental S-2, i'1ajor· John Callum, \'lent for-v~ard to control the action. (See Annex I --112)d Infantry On Sa.ngju- Taegu Road 11 )

Sporadic enemy artillery fire, \'lhich had begun to fall on the 2d Battalion positions at 2ll0 hours, 21 .August, continued throughout the day and during the nights of 21-22August and 22-23 August.

On the night of 22 August, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, directed the 25d Regimental Combat :rerun (minus the 1st Battalion) to clear the enemy from the J.l.1ain Supply Hout.e and the commanding ground overlooking the £,1ain Supply Route • . '.

At dawn, 25 August, the 2d Battalion attacked to ito flrurucs and front to clear out an estimated regiment of enemy (later found to be elements of the 1st and·l4th NKPA. Regiments, combined into a single task force) opposing it. Concurrently the )d Battalion made an all day attack on a three mile strip east of the Taegu road. All companies v1ere coll!!llitted in .the attack.

The 2d Battalion met vii th particularly stubborn resistfu'1ce, but mana[;ed· to seize the commanding terrain overlooking the l:~Iain Supply Route 'tith couparatively light losses. The entire attack VIas conducted over the most hazardous terrain, in which the enemy had the advantage of high ground and carefully concealed defennive positio~s·

Sporadic enemy counter-attacks against the 2d Battalion during the afternoon were unsuccessful. An all-out attack against the positions of Fox Company at 2100 hours \"las repulsed, ;dth heavy·casualties inflicted upon the enemy.

Enemy efforts to reassemble their troops in front of the 2)d Infantry positions during the night were frustrated by fire from the 4.2 Hortars of the 2;5d Infantry Heavy l"!ortar Company. The entire action. above Taegu vias marked by the

·careful coordination of all supporting fires.



The action of 23 August \'las highly successful. Although American casualties were comparatively light, more than 500 of the enemy v:ere killed in the immediate proximity of the 25d Infantry positions, and it wan estimated that several hundred more were killed by artillery, air, and other supporting a:rms. The complete success of the action can best be judged from the statement of an

i-- enemy lieutenant, captured by the 2d Battalion on 26 August. This prisoner [ stated that, follO\'Iing the 25d 1 s action of 2,5 August, his regiment existed 11 in { name only 11 •

The 25d Infantry did not again become involved in large scale fighting in the Taegu Area. ~ 25 August, the 25d Regimental Combat Team, (minus the 1st Battalion) \'las attached to the 24th Division, assigned the mission of relieving the 27th Infantry, and of continuing to provide artillery and infantry support to the 1st ROK Division.

On 28 August 1950, the 25d Regimental Combat Team reverted to 2d Division control. The 5d Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel R. G. Sherrard, '1as detached from the regiment and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division.

During the afternoon of 28 August, the 2)d Regimental Combat Team .(minus) was relieved by the 27th Infantry and moved to Hiryang, Korea, closing in the l~ryang assembly area at 2)40 hours. At this time the 1st Battalion, 25d Infantry, returned to the control of the Commanding Officer, 25d Infantry.

At first light of' 29 August 1950, those elements of the 25d Regimental Combat Team \'lhich rrere at ~liryang moved to a nei'l assembly area near Changnyong, Korea.

During the afternoon of 29 August, the lst Battalion, 25d Infantry, relieved t.he 3d Battalion, 38th Infantry, of its positions along the Hakto:ng River. At this time, the battalion was assigned a frontage of 16,000 yards, and it was necessart to place all of the rifle companies of the battalion on line. The 2d Battalion, 25d Infantry, was placed in a reserve position approximately eight miles to the rear of the let Battalion, and located in a position COllllllanding the road net. On 51 August, Easy Company uas r:JOved, by 2d Division order, to a reserve position in the 9th Ini'antry sector to act as a regimental resel"Ve for the 9th Infantry, •·:hile Easy Company, 9th Infantry, uas engaged in a river crossing knorm as 110peration :Me.nchu 11 •

During the afternoon of 31 August, it became apparent that the enemy '\"Tas building up a considerable force in the 25d Infantry sector. l'funy troop movements were observed, and the enemy uas seen building rafts, apparently in preparation for an attempt at crossing the Naktong.

I At 2050 hours, First Lieutenant \'/illiam M. Glasgo1:, Jr., platoon leader of

.. the 2d platoon of Baker Company, l·epo1·ted that groups of eneruy carrying lighted

torches \tere mal·ching toHard the river. Friendly artillery caused the torches

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SEt{ E T to-be extinguished, but they were later relighted and the marching torchbearers formed the letters 11 V11 and 110 11 • By 2045 hours it began to appear that approximately 1500 of the enemy had crossed the river.

' At 2240 hours Charlie Company, commanded by Captain Cyril S. Dartholdi,

~ms under heavy attack, and the entire battalion position vms under heavy fire. This initial attack vias driven back by the combined fires of the company v1eapons and supporting mortars, tanks, and I-f-19 and 1-1-16 anti-aircraft artillery vehicles.

While the attack on Charlie Company \IDS being driven off, four large groups of enemy crossed the river in front of Baker Company positions, heavily supported by artillery, machine guns, and other direct fire v;eapons. Each of these groups was equal in strength to approximately one battaliox1, and though they suffered heavy casualties, \'iere able to move through the gaps bet·.:een plato<?na, surround the platoon positions, and send a large force deep into the battalion sector to\'mrd the battalion command post. A portion of this force swung to the North to strike the left flo.nk of Able Company, 700 yards away.

By 2400 hours, 31 Au,s"Ust, all elements of the 1st Battalion i'rere under extremely heavy attack, and Baker Company, co:onnanded by Captain David Ha.lker, had, after heroic resistance, been forced to give up all of its forvlal·d positions. At this time the Regimental Commander, Colonel PaulL. Freeman, Jr., informed the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Claire E. Hutchin, Jr., that George Company, part of the regimental reserve, uas being attached to the lst Battalion, and \'las moving to the 1st l3attalion area immediately.

Concurrently, the Regimental Commander, having learned that the position of Charlie Company had been penetrated by large enemy forces~ ordered that Fox Company, reinforced by elements of 11H11 Cornpany, establish a blocking position on the high ground commanding the road leading f'ron the Naktong Hiver, ~ through Ponch 1o, to Changnyong. This force, commanded by VAjor Lloyd K. Jenson, Executive Officer, 2d Battalion, 25d Infantry, established the position, vrhich the 2,?d ·Infantry vlas to occupy through tv1c weeks of the heaviest fighting in its history.

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;6F.l!H.~ Lt Col Ir£antry Commanding



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.IU'll~EX I

T-i~TY-TE;riRD INFAIJTRY Oil SiuJGJU - TAEnU ROAD 19 - 23 August 1950

1. Although continually probing the perimeter of the Eighth Army's defense throughout the month of August, the enemy1 s main intention and effort. continued

l to be the capture of Taegu. l'.ccordingly, having cut off the 3d ROK Division at j Yongdok, and having captured the. toi'm of Pohang Dong, the enemy, on 14 Auggst; f renewed his effort to drive a ·o~edge betvreen the 1st ROK and 1st Cavalry Divi-f .sions, attacking southeast along the Viaeg11an - Taegu road, and south along the ! Sangju - Taegu high~tay. 'l'he latter high\'tay lay just Hithin the 1st ROK Divi-

sion zone, and it was along this boundary bet1·1een the lst Cavalry and lr::t ROK Divisions that contact and coordination uere most difficult.

r 1r 2. By 15 August, the enemy had succeeded in penetrating the 1st HOI\ Divi-1 sion 1 s left flan.lc and occupied con:mJanding terrain behind the right flank of the ' lst Cavalry Division; on 16 A1.1gust still further enemy gains forced the vli th-

\ drawal of left fla11k ROK and right flank lst Cavalry units to combat the penetration. The threat to Taegu \'Tas considered so great that o. large proportion

I of the civilian population evacuated the city. Hational Police and ROK Hili-) tary Academy cadets \'fere disposed for the defense of the city, and headquarters

personnel i'lere assigned defense posts within the headquartern compound •.

l 1

3· At this juncture, the 27th ROT of the 25th Division, plus Oomp~~y 0 of the 89th Tank Battalion, ru1.d the )7th Field Al·tillery Battalion of the 2d Infru1try Division, were ordered on 17 August to move to an assembly area north of Taegu and, \tith the lst ROK Division, to attack on 18 August to reduce this enemy penetration. On the morning of 18 A.ugunt, the attack began and the 27th ROT advanced about 2500 yards, but the 11th and 12th ROK Regiment,s, on either flank of the 27th, vi ere slov; to keep pace. Iii th both flanks of the 27th' eXl::JOsed, it wasd~asy for the enemy to infiltrate the area south of the 27th 1 s o.dvance elements, and the long na.rro\'f valley up uhich the advance vias being pushed, made it particularly easy to attack the supporting artillery and HSR from the surrounding hills.

4. Accordingly, on 19 August, the 23d ROT (-) of the 2d Division uas ordered to move from Kyongsan to assist the attack, the 2d Battalion being ordered to an· assembly area about three thousand yards north of the Kumho river bridge (northwest of Taegu), and the 5d Battalion being moved into the area occupied by the 8th and 57th FA Battalions to protect those units from enem;;r infiltration.

5• 'l'he 20th and 21st of August uere marked by heavy but unsuccessful att.acks against the 27th RCT. During the night of 21-22 August, however, the enemy infiltrated to positions behind·the 27th ROT and to the flanks of the 2d. Battalion, 23d Infantry, iihich had replaced the 3d Battalion in the fonrard position. This infiltration began at a point about seven miles north .of the Kumho river

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bridge, and continued north to the 27th RCT 1 s rear. By afternoon of the 22nd, \'lire and radio commm'lication bet•·men the 25d Infar1try and the- 27oth Infantry had gone out but, just prior to the break in corumunications, the CO of the 27th inf'ormed the 00 of the 25d that there uere several hundred ·enemy '.lOr king their uay around the east flank of the 27th tovtard the east :t'lank of the fon·iard battalion of the 25d Infantry. Later reports indicated that this enemy force \'las probably of regimental size, and the 00 of the 25d Infantry therefore Hent forward to make a personal reconnaissance of the situation. The last report of the day, from an air observer, stated that the 27th HOT appeared to be surrounded.

6. Although this report vms not true, th<? enemy inf.iltration south of' the 27th not only threatened that unit and its supporting artillery, but also endangered the MSR and the 2d Battalion, 25d Infantry. Furthermore, if the enemy

I ·could move in such numbers along the high ground overlooking the valley road, l there \'Jas every possibility that he could infiltrate sufficient forces to f threaten Taegu itself. ~\ccordingly, on the night of 22 Au[~Ust, orders v:ere I issued to the 1st ROK Division to come up on line uith the 27th HO'l', and the \ 2;5d ROT (-) \'las directed to clear the enemy i'l'on the lviSR and from the surround-" t ing high ground. !

7 •. At 0655 on 23 August, the ;5d '(rear) Battalion of the 25d Ini'antry attacked l'J.Orth to clear the I4SR, and the 2d Battalion attacked to its flanks and front to .clear out an estimated regiment \·Thich \'las opposing it. The attack of, both battalions of the 2;5d Ini'ant1-_y vias pal·ticularly difficult and hazardous, both because the enei!ly held the high ground overlooking the narrm·T valley, and · because the road through this valley Has the onl;>r means of vehicular approach. As the advance proceeded, long lines of vehicles >·lere held up by· the ener:r.f' s fire. The rocky hillsides and comanding terrain cave the enemy excellent cover from uhich it was extremely difficult to dislode;e him. In many cases, it took direct artillery and t~~k fire to eliminate the hidden enemy, ru1.d individual courage and fortitude to seek out the opposint infantry and deotroy them. It is a tribute to the courage and discipline of the individual ooldier, and a remarkable commentary on the training and efficiency of the 25d Ini'o.ntry

'\1. that, by mid-morning, part of the 2d Battalion \Tao on its objective, and by

mid-afternoon, the ;5d Battalion had cleared the ESR and had made contact ~lith \ the 2d Battalion. In nine hours, the road had been opened, the enemy dispersed, , and the threat to Taegu had been tem:Jorarily removed. <.

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HE.WQUARTJs, ~D INFANTRY

ANNEX II

OPERATIONAL A.!Ui!EX TO ,. COl-iM.UID AND UNIT HISTORICAL REPORT

PERIOD 1 AUGUST - 51 AUGUST 1950

1. TROOPS ASSIGNED:

(OSHIS -5)

, The 25d Regimental Combat Team was complete except for the fact that no tactical Air Control Party was assigned at the beginning of the period. The 60th Transportation Truck Company \'las attached in addition to the normal attachments.

2. PROBLEHS OF ORGANIZATION:

It \'las found that Headquarters and Headquarters Company, vtith all its attachments, was too large for proper movement and control by a company headquarlers staff. These attachments, \'lhich brought the company strength to· approximately 500 perso11nel and sixty vehicles, included attached liaison officers, division signal teams, VHF teams, and a CIC Detachment.

5· OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS:

Although tactical doctrine as presently taught in our schools is sound, ,pertain modifications \·Iere necessary. It was found that a closed perimeter, lias mandatory in the defense. It vtas necessary that command posts and service trains either be within the perimeter, or establish separate perimeters of' their O\m.. ~rtillery not Hi thin the perimeter required additional protection.

There \'Iere never sufficient troops to permit the designation of a definite. regimental reserve. Normally each coopany in the defense had the additional mission of beine prepared to leave its sector and co~mter-attack ·in another.

Upon arrival in Korea, the Regimental Combat Team moved to an assembly area at ii'ondong and \'/as able to reorg~nize, e.ssisn :replacements, and continue necessary maintenance while \'laiting for vehicles and equipment to arrive from port.

, During the period the Regimental Combat Team uas at '.1ondong (5-10 August) a training program in the form of conditioning marches, firing of weapo1~, and small unit tactics Has instituted and carried out. T he extreme heat proved to be a decided handicap, and it 1'fas readily apparent that the


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troops needed physical


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conditioning.\

It was found that the prescribed load the average soldier we.s to carry i'ial;l too heavy. V1'hen reduced to a practical minimv.m, the i teras carried were ammunition, weapon, entrenching tool, individual rations; limited toilet articles, and extra socks. No pack, raincoat, or extra clothing Vias ce.rried. The ration, individual, combat, >·las found to be too bulky for convenience but could not be omitted. '

During the fi1·st fei·l nights in Korea there v;us sorae promiscuous firing. However, .\'lith the application, of strict fire discipline, this problem was (!Uickly overcome. Sentries were not permitted to fire unless ordered to do so by the squad leader or other commander. (leapon chaLlbers Here kept erapty. Persons ui thin the perimeter ~<:ere not perni tted to fire under any circumstances.

In the event of attack, individuals VIi thin the perimeter 1;ere instructed to assemble at designated points for employment as needed. The preparation of fire plans tlas difficult. There i·Tere not enough suppo1·ting \'ieapons to cover all approaches afforded by the ruggea Korean terrain. Several alternate fire plans were required for each \'Ieapon.

4. COMMAl:ID:

. .. D\lring the Korean campaign units 11ere required to cover unusually >fide frontage~ (as wch l'l.S 161 000 yards for a battalion in some instances). Therefore ~t Was necessary to allow considerable latitude to subordinate unit com-manders in the execution of their missions. The extremely rugged terrain, and the fact that maps v1ere very inaccurate, made it desi1·able that final decisions in regard to disposition of troops and allocation of fires be left to the subordinate commander.

5• TERRAIN:

A proper appreciation of terrain is doubly important in a locale such as Ko1·ea •. Due to the unusually uide frontages assigned to units, control of the. commanding terrain features and the meager road net Vias imperative.

The difficult terrain required that all supplies be hand carried to troops on position, thereby causing an uddi tional strain on troops i'Ihose endurance was already taxed to the utmost. 1\. plastic, disposable 1ruter container uould have been of value during this operation.

6 • ifiATHER:

.·· . , ··.· Temperatures remained very high throughout the period and tr.opps ... suf'<'fered from ·heat prostration until they became· acclimated. Careful attention

''to s.alt and .water discipline, 1 including the supervision of the concw.aption of salt by all commanders v1as requil~ed.

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· 7. ·. SUPPORTn~G UNITS~ -r,' .... ,._ ... •''.


Field Artillery~ Artillery support durinc; the period \'las superior. Very close .cooperation and liaison betr1een artillery and infan'.:,ry comm2.nders \tas maintained at all times. Infantry protection fol· artillery positions is a must in tlarfare of this type.

During the battle no1·th of Taegu, the 2)d Regimental Combat Tem:; (minus one batt~lion) had the mission of providing perimeter defense for the 0th and 37th Field .Artillery Battalions rlhich i'lere in general support of the 27th Infantry.' Subsequently, vltlen a large enemy force Hhich had infiltrated the United Nations Forces lines attacked the 2)d Infantry perimeter, a large artillery concentration vras immediately available.

Anti-Aircraft Artillery: .Anti-Aircraft Artillery Has employed in close support of ground forces. 'I'he I:I-19, vli th its l!Omm guns, was found to be particularly effective in covering area targets and enga.c;in.::;point t2rgets at long ranges. The 11-19, if provided ui th heavier armor, uould be an ideal ground support rleapon. Its hir;h angle of elevation permitted direct fire to be placed on the crests of ridges- and peaks. '£he M-16 vras not too effective, since long fields of' grazing fire Here seldom possible in Korean terrain •

. The present organization of the 1-...AA Batter;;- into t;;o platoons Hi th four sections each should be modified to three platoons of three sections each to conform vfith the triangular emplo;<Iment of oti10r Ulli".:.s. 'I'he tHo-platoon organizat.ion vms seldom utilized. It is believed that, in any type of i·:arfare, three platoons \lould be effective, even if the AA.A reverted to a strictly antiaircraft role.

8. AHHOR:

. Due to the limited, road net and rugged terrain, armored units uere ·utilized .only' in establishing road blocks and in engaging point targets at long

• . ' • f ' •

ranges.

The tank doze1· \'las a nuisance. It blocked the road, moved very sloi'lly, and promptly bogged doim upon leaving the 1•oad.

' ·.~ " ' 'I '

.. .. .·.·· .. T~e first Tactical Air Control Party rfas assigned to the 25d Re;:;imental co'ombat Team on 8 Au&..Ust 1950. During the Taegu battle the officer in charge of t(lis group, First Lieutenant Nelson, USAF, had to compete uiti1 the Tactical Air Control parties assigned to the 27th Regimental Combat Team and the 1st J.i.OK Division for planes. The 27th Regimental Combat Team diverted some flir;hts to the 25d Regimental Combat Team "•then a m~tual benefit ilould result.

The Tactical Air Control Party ansigned to the 1st HOK Division Nas

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1 •


I useless. It was stationed at,the division command post because of the assump-

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t.ion that ~;~ince there \vas only one 'factical Air Control Party available to the division it should be centrally controlled. idrcraft so controlled uere \'Tasted since the Tactical Air Control Party could neither identify the target nor assure that the aircraft could identify it.

Since the Tactical Air Control Party \'lith the 2)d Hegh:~ental Combat 'I'eam 'lias assigned for only fifteen days duty, the Tactical Air Control Officer left the combat team on 25 August, uhile it i·:as being employed above '.;.'aegu, leaving the coli!bat team vlithout a Tactical Air Control Party for the rer:Jainder of the Taegu action. Later the 2)d Regimental Combat Team occupied its sector on the Naktong River i'l'ithout a Tactical Jdr Control Party. H.epeated requests for a 'facti cal Air Control Party rlere \'li thout avail since none Has availe,ble to the division for assignment to the combat team. The Division Commander, i11 turn, attempted to get a 'rACP for the combat team from Ei[;;hth Al~w.y but 'I'Ti thout result.

10. ENGINEER:

Engineer support consisted of establishing a water point and performing.li!inor road repair.

Every move brought up the problem carrier was not designed for Korean roads. ing bed would have been more practical.

11. ADJACENT U.NITS:

of moving the D-7 dozer. Its A light dozer on a smaller carry-

Ho problems in liaison or communication t'lith United States Forces arose during this per~od.

Coordination i'li th ROK forces \'las difficult. ROK troop disposi tiona were foundto be inaccurately reported. On no occasion ua.s a ROK attack launched at the time scheduled by the ROK Commander. Requests, to the ROK Comli!andera, for road clearance vrere granted but road clearance vms never r;iven. On one occasion the 2)d Hegimental Combat Team was I.r'!OVing South fu'ld the 21st Regimental Combat Team was moving IJorth. ROK sur)ply columns Nere novinc.; in both directions. A traffic jam, v;hich seriously delayed troop move1uents, vas the l'esul t.

:1-'Iuch ammunition v;s.s ·\'lasted in supplyin;; supporting fires for the 1st I ~ ROK Division. Unnecessary fires Here called for and fires delivered on the ! basis of a HOK attack order. v1ere vli thout effect due to the fact that HOK attacks are not launched as scheduled.

It is recommended that, i'lhen boundaries are established betHeen Allied and United States units, physical contact be maintained and that c.ny [_;aps v;hich may be necessary exist Vfithin the units. Visual contact is not sui'ficient •

•


DECLASSifiED REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

S E cf\E T 12. WEAPONS EYALUATION:

Flame thro-vrers we1·e not used during this period. It vras impl·actical to hand-ca.rry them up and do'l'tn a mountain and then ship them to the rear for recharging. Carryi:ng \later, rations, and ammunition over the very ru[:ged Korean terrain taxed the endurance of the troops to the utmost.

Hany persons do not accept the peep sight on the rifle and c8..rbine as being the best. Often, in the heat of combat, the peep sight is ir:;nored

·when an open sight rlOuld be used. In rainy vieather an open sight would certainly be more effective. Frequently, a target picked U) by eye is lost ;·rhen the rifleman attempts to relocate it through t!1e sight.

The 11J!lerican Army 1 s need for a smokeless po\tdcr, similar to trJ.o.t used by the enemy, has been clearly indicated in this vrar. All of the vlea~·ons curre~tly used by our forces can easily be located by their smoke after diccharge.

Lt Col., Inf Executive Officer 2;5d Infantr;;/ Hegiment

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-00300035

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1. \r!hen known, tho outhority for o~1y pcrticu~r,r action hes been indicated in the authority column.

2. Reference numbers :Listed l'ef•:::r to the corresponding supporting documents in Jl.ppendix 1. The S-1 Journal is listed as 11 Section Atr.

.3. S-2 and S-.3 Journal is listed under a section B11 •

4. .All other clocumm1ts are under general heEl ding "Ivliscellaneous Documents, Sectioh en' fli th apf)ropriate su.b.:..sectiC)ri nc.:..rto c.:..gn.

5. Appendix 1 is attached onl;:,r t~ co~-·ies 1 and 2 of the Coramand and Unit Historic;al Report, end to the copy lThich Hil.l be retained by Headquarters Eighth United States il.rrny.

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-00300036

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1300 to 1600 Hrs 2 Jlug 50

3 Aug 50

0730 Hrs 4 Aug 50

0600 Hrs 5 Aug 50

1530 I-Irs 5 Aug 50

0430 to 1800 Hrs 6 Aug 50

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HEADQUARTBH::3 ·23D I:JFJ:,;;TRY REGIEJE:JT :· ...

Tll•3 R3GORDED AUTHORITY

1 Aug 50 Unit Journal Entr;l //1 thru 7, 1 Aug 50

1300 to Unit Jovxnal 1600 Hrs Entries //6 &

2 Lug 50 7, 2 Aug 50

3 Aug 50 Unit Journal En try §1 thru 7, 3 .Aug 50

0730 Hrs Unit Journal 4 Aug 50 Entry 112, 4

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0600 Hrs Unit Jour·:]a1 5 Aug 50 Entri £11, 5

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1530 Hrs Unit Journal 5 Aug 50 Entry /15, 5

.Aug· 50

'Ji~?t Iii~~~RY

.. ~GTICN

'rhe usual training rmd shipbocrd duties.

A GPX Has held for training of the comr::.and post group ebo;:rd the US~G HHliam 0 Darby.

Training aboard shi;.J Hes conc~ucted, consisting of firing at targets from the fantsil, a?1d training films. 1Jeather continued clear and morale high.

Pr?paration was made for debarkation.

The General Darby docked at Pusan, tying up at the port pier at 1000 Hrs.

All troops debarked and unloading \<las completed at 1300 Hrs • The General l"reeman tied up at the pier at 1400 Hrs •

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Troops left the Pusan dock area for the railroad A 1$00 Hrs Entry #2 to 6 .llug 50 8, 6 Aug 50

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station end moved by train to the for1-1ard assembly area at ilondong. The Cormnand Post ,,,as opened at 1000 Hrs, and security Hes arTanged by H~QO Hrs • r.iaison Hith friendly units \·Jas established. ·

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-00300037

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1000 Hrs 7 Aug 50

1000 Hrs to 2115, 7 Aug 50

8 .Aug 50

1310 Hrs 9:·'Ap.g;.50. "''(;:,;:r,. -.

TUB ~\ECORDID

2300 Hrs 6 Aug 50

1000 Hrs 7 ltug 50

1000 Hrs to 2115, 7 Lug 50

8 1;ug 50

lJlO Hrs 9 f;ug 50

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tUTHORITY

Unit Journal Entry :112, 6 Aug 50

Unit Journal J<::!ntr-.r #5, 7 Aug 50

Unit Journal Entr-y: #6 . to 28, 7 bug 50

--- --

Unit Journal Entr-.r · #13,

.9 Aug 50

g DTi~li.Y

R.T~, • .;CTION ~

Training nctivities '"ere reswned km1cdiatel7 alY1 .!• Hea:·ons ;;>ere test fired. A detail reconnaissance of the rosd net to the north 1-1es mecle.

The Executive Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Van 71iet A i·!as notified of the shootin:? of an enlisted man of Compei1Y· 11. on duty ilith the security .!Jl::ttoon at the ';Iondong Railroad Station. The Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, Has notified of this event by Hajor J.:eszar, Regimental 3-J. (Unit Journal Entry /114, 6 Aug 50)

The Jd Battalion Has alerted for future move. A

This period Has spent in receiving and checking sup- A & plies and in establishing communications betHeen ele- B ments of the regiment.and between the Regimental Com-mend Post and the 2d JJiv~sion Command l'ost. Lt. True and the I & R Section departed on a reconnaissa!1Ce of the 2/+th Division Sector.

T'ne ·;1enther continued ext,~·emely hot and morale remained A high. Range firing <-7as conducted ·c~uring the day and a . radio net to Ivahhoe was set up. Contact 1!ElS made at 2l00 Hrs.

A:muster report Has taken at 1200 Hrs. and the follm-ling ·A streni':;th figu:i:'es 1-Jere prepared: Hqs 37th FA Bn - 42 Officer, 5 \Tarrant. Officers, 506 Enlisted 1'-1en; Btry B, S2Q. A~\A - 7 Officers, 1J6 Enlisted 1':en; -_Company B, 2d Engrs - 5 Officers, 1 U arrant Officer, J 70 Enlisted Hen .. All of these units with.the 23d. RQor:.,J;e~~:i:l}~d ~1."!-Jf~~~~-lj""~':lii;;,~~*'

Korean W

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-00300038

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TTI<rE OF LCTICN

1330 to 1311.0 Hrs, 9 Lug 50

9 Aug 50

1245 Hrs, 10 Aug 50

1350 Hrs 10 Aug 50

1945-Hrs 10 P.ug 50

11 Aug 50

1924 to 2018 Hrs, 11 Aug 50

TD\1E RECOIIDED

1330 to

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LU1'HORITY

Unit Jom1 nal

:1&"7 • /;CTION TTO.

1340 Hrs, Entri·3s ;n 9 The operation of unloadine jeeps, trailers, and oth8r .l'>. -vehicles from the ~reH Horld, Hhich ',·Tas docked in

9 Lug 50 & 20, 9 Jlug }\lSan, Has begun. 50

9 Lug 50 ----- Training exercises and range firing Here conducted. · A

124.5 Hrs, Unit Journal The unlo3ding of the l.Jev-1 Forld '.Jes completed. 11 10 Lug 50

1350 Hrs 10 .Aug 50

191+5 Ers 10 Aug 50

11 Jmg 50

1924 ~toe-: 201g Hrs, 11 l~ug 50

}~ntry !l6, 10 .Aug 50

Unit. Journal EntrY' ·;¥10, 10 .Aug 1950

Unit Journal Entr.r #15, 10 Lug 50 -

The 2.3d RCT received a vJarning order from 2d Division to be prepared for movement.

.lt quarte.ring party consisting of officers and men from each unit in the regiment deported for Division uith Captain L0His in chc·rge.

The day \vas spent in moving from 'rJondorig to Kyongsan. The 3d Battalion moved by motor, closing in at Kyongsan at 0430 Hrs., Hhile mdst of the remainder of the combat team moved by rail and motor, closing in at the nevi command post by 1830 Hrs. l-Teather continued extremely hot.

Unit Journal Elements of the 23d RCT \-rere directed to be prepared Entry #14 to to execute several counterattackmissions. Innnediate 20, 11 Aug 50 reconnaissance and preparation for the execution of

-F"\_6-•-ssion Has made •

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-00300039

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~he 23d ~GT ml~us t~e 3a Jattalion des orfGr~d to ~ove es sc·o·1 2:; lXJssibl·3 to 1 iryr::n:; tc perforn! t11t:~ F.issio:1 of i;.rJr;y"" ·.·:·::-l·:>T-.'c. 2?f;[: "\"Trs: t'1r:.~ c,(·.tnr~F:-1·~~ I=-~o:s-f.:, .rr.s o·~'C.Yl·:: d 0t ~ ir ,..rt: ·:1g.

The lst :Sattelion •.,;es c.eteched from the 230 RCT and phced 1.F.:der t)le cc'1trol of the 24tJ:1 Division.

13 Lu£; 50 13 Au.g 50 This p3riod vas spe1t i:1 recon"',eissa ce r::issions end cht:~·c1dng of cormnunications. The Regimental Combat T8am L:inus the 1st and 3d Batta:Lio:·1s re1T!ained in :::<:ighth .t.1rmy Reserve.

14 to 17 .August l95D In.c1usive

1500 Hrs 18 .hug 50

16.30 to 1730 Hrs

1.'1 Jmg 50

1500 Hrs 18 Aug·50

1630 to ·1730 Hrs 18 Aug 50

Unit Journal Entry /!41, 18 Aug 50

Unit Journal ..., t . .!/.44 l!.D rJ.es 1r ,

45 & 46, 18 Aug 50

Durine this p8r~od the c:rr.1.'ot team moved to Kyongsan o·:1 15 August. The 2d 3E:ttdion r•":ln.ained in position i:1 l~;yongs~m until relieYed l:Jy the 27th I~1f'ant17 RegiLEmt. !~eentir.:e t:1e .'23d ROT l1ad n1ove_d to Kyoneju Hithout c:ny of Hs three battalions. The 2d 'Bettalion rejoiried the regime:'lt at Kyongju on the norning of 17 .;ugust 1950.

The 23c1 ROT ~Jas alerted for movement to Kyongs an.

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The quartering party, the I & R S,ecticin, and the command group t:eparted for Kyongsan•

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28

29

30

31

32

33

34

TD\1~-3 C:B, ICTIO~J

2045 Hrs 18 J~ug 50

1009 Hrs 19 1\ug 50

1800 Hrs 19 l.ug 50

2000 I-Irs 19 Aug 50

19 Aug 50

m-,..~ .... ., ll.l'".J..:J

RECORDED

201~5 Hrs 18 l~Ug 50

1009 Hrs 19 Aug 50

1800 Hrs 11 Aug 50

2000 Hrs 19 Aug 50

19 Lug 50

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AUTHORITY

Unit Journal :8ntry ://:)0, 18 Aug 50

Unit Journal Entry ;%, 19 J.~ug 50

Unit Journal J!.:ntr'.f /}21, 19 l:ug 50

Unit Journal Entry ~129,

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ACTI0 1J

The ?.3d I:CT (minus) clos(:'ld :1t Kyongsan. The Cor:1lllcnding Officer arriv,,d fror;; Taeg11 at 2000 ::Irs.

A message from :Sighth /c,rr.& 1Ieadquarters relieved the 73d Tank Battaliol1 fro1r1 thr'J 23d RGT.

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Oro<::rs '.Jere receive::~ .for the 23d ROT to move to Taet:;u A and the Cornmanding Officer and his staff departed 1:326 Hrs.

The command group arriYed at the Taegu Area a:J<1 the 11. command post Has estabJ.ished.

The ::_:)urpose of the move to Taes,JU ue:3 to enable the 23d B RCT minus the 1st Battalion to provide security for the 8th and 37th FA Battalions <J'1c1 to occupy a defensive - -position astride the HSR about 8 miles north of Taegu.

20 Aug 50 20 Aug 50 This poriorJ Has spent in reconnaissance and preparation fo:c possi:)le combat action.

B

21 .Lug 50

.1731 & 1732 Hrs

22 Aug 50

21 J .. ug 50

1731 & Unit Journal 1732 Hrs ·Entries #34 &

22 Aug, 50 35, 22,Aug 50

During this period Uni"t:ied 7Tations Troops in the Taegu .4.rea Here heavily eneaged by a large enemy force uhich Has making an all out effort to capture Taegu. The 2d Battalion o.f the 23d RCT 1..ras in position as a security force fqr artillerf units in the area.

The 2d Battalion Has attacked by elements of an enemyregiment, but managed to repulse the attack~ During this action an air strike was effective and tlie enemy

· withdrew.

B

A & B

Korean W

ar Project 2ID

-00300041

ENTRY N~

35

36

37

38

39

40

~ET HE.:ID:;,jUARTBRS 23D INFANTRY REGINENT . .

TI>IE OF TINE ACTIOli RECORDED AUTHORITY

2400 Hrs 2400 Hrs Unit Journal 22 Aug 50 22 Aug 50 Entr.r :l!:43,

22 Aug 50

22 lmg 50 22 Aue 50 - - - - -

1930 Hrs 1930 IIrs Unit Journsl 22 ~:me 50 22 Aug 50 Entry il?9,

22 ~~us 50

0655 ::Irs 2..3 Lug 50

0720-Hrs

0655 !Irs 23 Aut; 50

Unit Journal Zntr;r //2, .Aug 50

23

0720 Hrs Un.it Jom·nal ?~ l·t' 0 r:n 2-=l ··t10· .:::o :~,1+-r•r J!?q 1-,,../ • •L<..:) /- ··_.r _.. .=:> ./ -O.-<- 'V t.l ,i f.,. .1 '

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23 i'ug 50 23 ~~ug 50 Unit Journal 311+.1-.i ·~~~r.~

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2.3 Aug 50

vl.AR DIARY

.1\CTIOl~

Some replacements uere received during this :period, A and were broken do\m as follo\vS: Hq & Hq Co - 5, S0rvice Co - 1, Nortar Co - 92, }iedical Co - 26, A Co - 1"3, B Co - 1~0, C Co - 29, D Co - 71, Hq 2c1 En - 3, E Co- 27, F Co- 27, G Co- 25, H·Co- 71, Hq 3d Bn - 4, I Co - 18, K Co - 20, L Co - 20, and N Co - 60.

The enemy attacked a,'5ain at 1745 Hrs. and again the B attack 1..ras repulsed b)'" several air strikes. At t~.1is time, th~ Com."D.anding Officer of the 23d ROT uent forivard to control the actio!'l. The enemy succeeded in bringing small arms and mortar fire to bear u~;on a 5 :mile stretch of road north of Taegu Hhich Has the BSR for-the troops in the sector.

Prisoner reports ic1C1iccted 2'1 onen17 build up for a A he-"V:f Clttack, r~nd the South Koreaa Forces in th:) area re9orted hGc'V'J pressure to their front.

Th3 2d and 3d B<~ttalicns :;ttf1ckx1 to cJ.ear out e:1e1:1y A & ~)ockets op:-::;osin2: the::l. The 2d Battali:)C'l met ·:xr·C.icu- B lerly henv:y resistance_, but seizoc! connnarid~ng :terrain overlooking the 1S3R 'lith cor,!parati,re GE:se.

Inform~;tio!'l rGceivod fran 1st ROK Division incli.cnted thct r:tain forces ''goinst the 3d B[ltte:lion h::::d Hithc~ra:J~1: 1.oe-tinE ol1l;y ~!.is·i1t forces de:Le.·Jd:Lns·.

T11G Cor:J.rnc1ndin.g Cffico::."' of t1.e 23d I~:1f~-·ntr~t Regir:1ent 11DS inforraod that s11 elements of the 2d Da".:. · a1:.8::

co~1tact 1--lit/1 the enemy.

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Tll-1E OF .ACTION

1530 Hrs 23 .Aug 50

0240 Hrs 24 Aug 50

1000 Hrs 21+ .Aus 50

TIHE, RECORDED

1530 Hrs 23 J,ug 50

0240 Hra 24 .Aug 50

1000 Hrs 2/+ .Aug 50

.AUTHORITY

Unit Journal Entr.r #85, 23 Aug 50

Unit Journal ~ . ,,,... '"'/ ;~;Acrr,ry r.=o, ~<+

.:.:\.ug 50

Unit Jotu1 nal l~n try ;il9, 2l;. ~~ug 50

2102 Hrs 2102 ~-Irs Unit Journal 25 Au;:s 50 25 .~~ug 50 I~ntry §39,

25 .Aug' 50

2257 Hrs 2257 Hrs U:1i t Journal 25 Lu~g 50 25 l:.l1~.; 50 ~~:1try {f.68,

25 Luc 50

'lAR DLt:IRY

ACTION REF. 119..:_

By this time all elements·were on their objective. The 3d Battalion had met little resistance. Enenv casualties >·Tere ver-f heavy and total friend1y casualties Here about 20.

.A

1:esse.ge from Commanding Offir:er, 2d Batt<:> lion, to the A Gom.'nanding Officer, 23d RCT; stated thd F Company had been attacked at 1930 Hrs. 23 .August by enemy forces estimated to be '100. The attack Has repelled by coordinated small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. .Another smaller attack H2S repelled at about 2130 Hrs., and t!1ere had b0e·,1 no firing on any battalion position since 2200 Hrs.

Commac1din;; Officer, 23c1 RC'l' notified Eishth Ar:my that .A the rood a:1d the friendly nrtiJlery tnits hod boe;1 secured for 36 hours, ::1'~r] t~1et there h:;.d 'osen no ene1.1y fire on the '1·l.3R. for 12 hours •

The Co;~'71an.di?1:~· Officer of the 23d :2CT informed J.1is A subordinete co:m.r.~snder.s t~l:Jt t':1o ;~iss irm of the combat tsam ~n:s to holr1 -~hs positio'ls then hGld by th-:; 27t.'1 In~f:.::ntr:v t~-:1d. the 23c1 's 2d B.·:ttelion; :JY1(1 to b3c~c ll~ t/:.e ROXs ·Jith supportbz fire.

An. op·-c:r·otionctl cUr2ctivo •r s received from :GUS.b.K out- A & linin::; th3 ni.ssbn of tho: ?3(:, I1fe 1tr/ os follo·1s: To C-2 r:;lieve th?. 27th RCT, to block ene:n;r peDGtretion, ond to rebfo:'ce of the:; 1st Koroan Dhrisio:1 •rith fire of the 37th FA Battalion.

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IL:':D~UXB.T:ZR3 23D DF.;?iTRY REGIEE:IT'

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LUT;I RI'rY .',CTICH rr:::;F. r:o .

2:) Lug 50 ?..5 .:;ug 50 - - - - - On th:i.s date the regiment carried out its assigned mission of relieving the 27th Ini'antry Regiment and of continuing to provide crtillr:,ry and infantr-1 support to the 1st ROK Division.

A

26 .Aug 50

1454 Hrs 27 Lug 50

2337 Hrs 27 Aug 50

0945 Hrs 28 Aug 50

102.0 Hrs 2.8 Aug 50

26 Aug 50

145/J. Hrs 27 Aug 50

2337 Hrs 27 L.ug 50

0945 Hrs 28 Aug 50

102.0 Hrs 2.8 Aug 50

(

Unit Jom•nal Entry 1/72, 27 Aug 50

Unit Journal Entr-1 #138, 2.7 .?.ug 50

Unit Journal Entry #49, 28 .Aug 50

Unit Journal Entry /154, 28 J.ug 50

Unit Journal Ent~ #71·.· . ., - ' 28 Au~ 50

Situation reports from battalions indicated some enemy A automatic ueapons an'' artillGry fire, 'Jut. the p.:-;riod ;-:r:s ge:1erally quiet.

The 2Jd RCT Has alerted for movement to I,1irynng, and A the 3d Bt:ttDJ.ic·n 11ss alerted to mocre to the lst Gava~ry Division Area.

1-:essage from the 2d Diviaion Ho.sdquc.rters stated that A the enemy uas build ins up in the DiYis ion Secto1·, and the Divisio~1 mieht be attock on the 27th. Throu;:;hout the c:ay, numerous re:;,orts Hers received of enelY'if activity, but although some elements of the RCT Here under fire, the }Y:riod Hes s;enerelly c~uiet.

'rhe Lt 3attalion of the 27th Infant17 prepared -to re- A lieve the 2d Battalion, 2Jd, plus its artillery, at 0950 Hrs. The 2d Battalion HE<S alerted to expect re-: lief.

The Comrnanding_Officer, 2Jd Infantry, discussed Hith A the Comrn!F'ding GeneJ;"al, 2d Infantr-.r Division, the proposed move of the .3d BattaJ.ion, 2..3d, to relieve a battalion in the 1st Cavalry Division Sector.

The message from Commanding General, 2d Division, re- A lieved the 2.3d RCT from attachment to the 24th DiYision, and the combat team reverted to the control of the 2d Division.

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ENTRY ];fa.

53

54

55 /

56

57

58

59

HEliDQU.mTERS 23D

TINE OF .ACTIOn

TIME RECORDED

1315 Hrs · 1315 Hrs 28 Aug 50 28 Aug 50

2345 Hrs 2345 Hrs 28 .Aug 50 28 -"ug 50

28 Aug 50 28 Aug 50

0500 f:os 0500 to; 1150 Hrs 1150 Hrs

29 .;\ug 50 29 .Aug 50

·AUTHORITY

Unit Journal Entry #74, 28 Aug 50

Unit Journal Entry #98, 28 Aug 50

Unit Journal Entry /l4 to 12, 29 Aug 50

0020 Hrs 0020 Hrs Un_it Jom~nsl 30 .Aug 50 30 J\ug 50 E:1try #2, 30

Luzu.~: ·t, 50

0235 Hrs 0235 Hrs 30 Au~ 50 30 Png 50

u~1i t Jm:trnal :~ntry 0f6, 30 .:\ug 50

HAR'DIARY

ACTION

.All subordinate units of the combat team \Jere issued movement orders.

The 23d RCT (minus) closed l1!iryang .il.rea at 2340 Hrs. A and reported to 2d Divis ion Headquc:rters.

On this date, the 1st Battalion, 23d, reverted to the A control of the CoB.rMmding Officer, 23d Infantry Hegiment.

The combat team \ES ordered to move to a net./ 1:1rea necr A Changnyong, Korea, and de1x1rted liiryang at OSOO Hrs. The comnwnd grou~;J closed at the ne• . .J corrrrc1BUd post at 1150 Hrs., en-::1 tl:le combot tee.m closed at the ne~.l r:ree at 11,30 Hrs.

The 1st Battslion, 23d IYlfantry, relieYed the 3d A Battalio11, 38th Infontry of its positions c.J.ong the Hektong :Riv•.:T. The 2d Battalio··1, 23d Inf'e,1try, Has placed ln a reserv-e position a~)r;roxim:,tely 8 niles to the rear of the 1st Battalio~.

The 1st Battalion reported e;1emy ac·tivity alone; the beach of th:;, :'Jektong Riv;::;r held by that battalion. l~rtor fire W88 plcced on the area.

A

3everc:l boat 1oods of enem:r attempted to cross the it river. The 1st Battalion report,ec1 half o.f th? e:1emy bGrges destroyed a·1d Company l1 Has belie7ed to ht,ve destroyed th~ other half.

Signatm·e: 1( ~1 'W.L J.:ti~ [,,~' q B ~

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TIME o:B' THJL "~CTION RECORDED

'T''i'"'l ,s ~ ... J.:J

Iill~lDQU LR.T~RS 23D DJ.F ANTR:t REG H:TENi'

;JLR DD.RY

l!UTHORITY liCTION 11'SF. IlD.

30 Aug 50 30 Aug 50 - - - - - 7Ene.'1If patrols 'JJere observed throu.:;hout thG ,'ey and several enelTl.y atte:n:1ts to r:rosa t 11e river in smaJ.l stree1gth \.Jere thi·lsrtec1. The period 'las generally quiet but enemy activity •·n-os increasing end oll in-

'· .H

1510 ;-rrs 31 Aug 50

Jl Aug 50

1510 Hrs 31 ~~ug 50

31 Aug 50

UnH Journal J'::ntry (}62,

· 31 Aug 50

dications uere that thA enemy 1:1es ebout to stage an all out attack.

Durine the efternoon of 31 J:ugust it bec.?.me apparent that the enemy •n;s building up a considera'l:Jle force ie1 the combat team area. .!i comr1a~1y of ener:~y infentry Has located in the 1st Batta.lion 3cctor and an air strike was requested.

Oi1 the nit:;ht of 31 .4ugnst, Baker Coompany reported a group of enemy carr;"ring lighted torches toward the river. Under friendly artiJlery fire, torches ,.Jere ex·~inguished but '.·Jere later relighted, and the torch bearers formed the letters 11 711 and non. By 2100 Hrs.

A

A, B, C-4, C-5, C-6

a force of ener:ij estimated to be a ~Jattalion had -crossed the river. By 2300 Hrs. the entire 1st Battalion ' . .Jas under hea•r.r attack. By midnight, four separate. battalions of enem:r had crossed tho river and although they suffered heavy casualties, ',Jere able to drive a large force deep into the 1st Battalion Sector.

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