21734172 Who Saved Pakistan in 1965

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THE REAL HERO OF

BATTLE OF CHAWINDACONTROVERSY

In March 2001 my book Pakistan Army till 1965's chapter on Battle of

Chawinda was published in Defence Journal Karachi.This started a

controversy about the eal hero of Battle of Chawinda as far as the most

decisive day 8th September was concerned.Below are the series of

letters then exhanged.The controversy has raged on from March 2001

till September 2008.

Agha H Amin



Major Agha Humayun Amin (Retired) The Author

EX MAJOR FAROUK ADAMS LETTER TO DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY REBUTTAL OF 2001:---

Farouk Adams Letter to Editor Defence Journal and A.H Amin's Reply Defence Journal August2001

The Battle of Chawinda

I refer to Agha Humayun Amins article on the Battle of Chawinda, and also being direct

participant, would like to share with your readers, some of my knowledge on the subject. Since

I am writing from memory, I will touch only upon those incidents and aspects of the battle, of

which I am certain.



About a week before the war started, an A. K officer from the Gibraltar Force, exfiltrated, and

brought to HQ 24 Brigade, certain Indian Army documents. These purported to show the

presence of the 1st Indian Armoured Division opposite us. Brig Abdul Ali Malik accordingly

informed the higher HQ, and GHQ detailed Maj. Mahmud of the Army Aviation to physically

carry these documents to GHQ for evaluation. GHQs assessment was that these documentswere part of an Indian deception plan. Brig Malik disagreed with this assessment. So it is

incorrect to say that he had no idea what he had against him, though it is correct that when the

attack came, he had no way of knowing that this was the main effort of the enemy. But neither

did anyone else.

When the Jassar fiasco took place, Brig Malik advised 15 Div. not to move him, because he

expected a strong attack against his positions. HQ 15 Div. did not agree.

HQ 15 Div. ordered 24 Brigade to clear the imaginary enemy bridgehead at Jassar. Brig Malik

tasked 2 Punjab Regiment (my unit) to do the needful. The Commanding Officer, Lt Col Jamshed

MC Bar, SJ, suggested an attack at first light, instead of a night attack, because we had no idea

about the enemy location, terrain etc etc. But 15 Div. orders were clear and inflexible, and so

Col Jamshed, decided to lead the attack in person. But before this could be done, the actual

situation in Jassar became clear, and the attack was called off.

At about first light on 08 September, an NCO of the Engineers came into our positions. He told

of a heavy Indian attack that had severely mauled 3 F.F Regiment which was deployed as

screen. He was immediately taken to the Brigade HQ, where Brig Malik questioned him in the

presence of Col Jamshed and Major Aslam Shah, who was the B.M.

If Brig Malik had any doubt about a serious enemy thrust in his sector, that was now removed.It took him about a minute to take, what many consider, the most important decision of the

war i.e. to advance on a broad front and engage the attacking enemy forces. This decision was

entirely Brig Maliks, and it saved Pakistan. Had it gone wrong, he would have been court

martialled. Since he suspected that HQ 15 Div. was prone to panic, he ordered Maj. Aslam Shah

to break wireless contact with the Div. HQ (which was re-established when the enemy had been

engaged, and Tikka Khan had taken over 15 Div). Brig Malik then gave the operation orders to

his unit commanders, including Lt Col Nisar, CO 25 Cavalry. It is, therefore, absolutely incorrect

to say that Brig Malik abdicated his command to a unit commander. Indeed, after that first

day, 25 Cavalry was not involved in operations as regiment, because the situation warranted

squadron actions in support of infantry. And this support these squadrons unstintingly andheroically provided. But this by no stretch of the imagination can be taken to mean the de facto

command of the Chawinda Battle was at any time exercised by Co 25 Cavalry. This remained

firmly in Brig Maliks hands who remained unswerving and steadfast and central to the battle,

right till the very end.

After the first three days of almost continuous battle we had suffered serious depletion in

numbers, and had suffered extreme exhaustion both physically and mentally. And so we were



withdrawn from the FDLs to recover, but that same evening the situation at the front became

so alarming that we were thrust right back into the battle. It is a fair comment on the morale of

24 Brigade group that despite our bedraggled state and the mauling we had received, there was

no hesitation on the part of anyone to rejoin battle. From then, to the end of the war, 24

Brigade held its position and survived but barely. It is difficult to explain what extreme

weariness really is.

There is mention in the article under reference, of Brig Maliks request to be moved to the

rear, which was refused by Gen Abrar. If a Brigade Commander is to make such a suggestion,

he cannot just say rear. He has to give an alternate plan of operations which he must work

out with his staff. Gen Aslam Shah (then B.M) denies that any such suggestion was ever made,

and this fits into the experience of people like me, who were quite clearly told that for 24

Brigade, this was to be a last man last round battle. Therefore, if such a suggestion is

recorded, either its context is missing, or it is the result of a misunderstanding. When we were

suddenly pulled out of recuperation and sent back into battle (refer sub-para above) we were

told that we will be pulled back for refitment at the first possible opportunity. Perhaps this

could be the context.

2. And now I would like to make few general comments as under:-

Anyone reading the article under reference is bound to come away with the impression that the

Battle of Chawinda was fought exclusively by Brig Amjad Chaudhry, Lt Col Nisar, Maj.

Muhammad Ahmed, and the direct participant Maj. Shamshad. The infantry, it seems was

just not there. As authentic history, therefore, this article will be seen as trifle lop-sided. The

truth is that by sheer coincidence some very brave and steadfast men got thrown into what was

24 Brigade. With the courage of these men, came a good deal of luck by providence and the

combination made for quite a number of gallant actions by all arms, and all ranks.

Brig Muhammad Ahmed was heroic, and so was Lt Col Nisar, but how can the rest of 25 Cavalry

be put into the dustbin of anonymity? Indeed I cant think of one officer or tank commander

who did not perform.

Yes, General Abrar was a good commander. He was calm and poised and did not foist needless

interference on 24 Brigade. Brig Amjad Chaudhry too had a reputation of a good artillery

officer, though I would have to be a very brave man to declare him the best gunner officer in

the sub-continent. These officers held their nerve, and did not panic. And nor did they need to.

They were never within the sights of the enemy. But people like Lt Col Shinwari, Lt Col Jamshedand Maj. Aslam Shah constantly were, and yet they kept their calm. And last but not the least

the composure of Brig Abdul Ali Malik deserves to be saluted. Throughout the battle his HQ was

either in the FDLs or not more than 400 yds in the rear. He kept his cool in the face of direct

enemy fire for days at end comparison between him and the others is like comparing a

fighter in the ring with the audience. When Lt Gen (Retd) Tariq, S. J came on PTV two years ago

on the occasion of Defence Day, he talked of his experiences of the Battle of Chawinda. He was

generous in his praise of many gallant actions. But he singled out Brig Malik beyond all the rest



as the man whose battle it really was, while all the rest of us revolved around him. Having seen

him at close quarters, I cannot disagree with this assessment.

3. Lastly, to call a respected senior officer a VCO type General, was not in very good taste.

Farouk Adam Khan S. J27 June 001

REPLY OF A.H AMIN TO EX MAJOUR FAROUK ADAM PUBLISHED ALONG SIDE FAROUK ADAMS

LETTER IN DEFENCE JOURNAL :---

I refer to Ex Major Farouk Adam Khans S.J letter on my article Battle of Chawinda .

I have only touched incidents and aspects of the battle about which I could be certain

based on the authority of tangible concrete and precise records in the form of official

sources of the Pakistan Army like Major General Shaukat Rizas The Pakistan Army-War 1965

sponsored and published by the Pakistan Army and printed by the Pakistan Army Press in 1984 ,

The Pakistan Army Green Book-1992 the official yearbook of the Pakistan Army published by

the Pakistan Armys General Headquarters and accounts of direct participants like Major

Shamshad. I had the opportunity of meeting other participants like Brigadier Ahmad in 1982 ,

Lieutenant Colonel Raza in 1993 and Major Shamshad in 2000. In addition, I met a large number

of participants while serving in 11 Cavalry from 27th March 1983 till 9th April 1985.

l Firstly the assertion by the worthy critic that the Indian mailbag was captured by an

exfiltrating element of Gibraltar Force. The Gibraltar Force was a fiasco of magnanimous

proportions and very few exfiltrated in good shape what to talk of capturing a mail bag. The

mail bag was captured by a deliberate ambush launched under the direction of Headquarter 15

Division under direction of Col S.G Mehdi. The official account on this episode is clear. ThusShaukat Riza states Lt Col Sher Zaman (MI Directorate) ordered Col S.G Mehdi (15 Division) to

lay an ambush on the road (Samba-Kathua), and get some prisoners. At 0100 hours night

3rd/4th September, Zaman had a call from an excited Mehdi. An Indian despatch rider had

been captured. His message bag contained mail for HQ Squadron 1 Indian Armoured Division.

The bag was immediately flown to Rawalpindi. (Refers-Pages-133 & 134-The Pakistan

Army-War 1965-Shaukat Riza-Army Education Press-1984).

l What happened after this at least on paper was a mystery till Gen N.U.K Babar cleared this

point on paper in an interview conducted by this scribe and published in DJ April 2000 issue by

stating that the mail box was dismissed as an Indian deception by the then DMI BrigadierIrshad.

l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states about Brigadier Malik i.e It took him about a minute to

take the most important decision of the war i.e to advance on a broad front and engage the

attacking enemy forces. Now this is a figment of the worthy critics imagination. In Summer

1997 issue of Pakistan Army Journal Brigadier Nisar the Commanding Officer of 25 Cavalry

gave his version of the Battle of Gadgor-Chawinda. Nowhere in the article did Nisar state that



Brigadier Malik gave him any order on the decisive 8th of September to advance on a broad

front and engage the enemy. On the other hand this point has been treated very clearly by

Shaukat Riza in the Pakistani GHQs officially sponsored account. Shaukat describes the initial

situation on the crucial morning of 8th September 1965 in the following words At about 0600

hours 24 Brigade received the news that 3 FF had been overrun. Brigadier Ali Malik got on to

Col Nisar and ordered 25 Cavalry to do something. (Refers Page - 148-Shaukat Riza-Op Cit)That was the only order Malik gave. All the subsequent deployment was done by Nisar and the

brunt of the Indian attack was borne by Bravo Squadron of 25 Cavalry commanded by Major

Ahmad. It was Col Nisar and Nisar alone who did the broad front deployment without any

orders to resort to any broad front deployment from Brigadier Malik.

l In paragraph 1 the worthy critic states that Brigadier Malik never made a request for a

withdrawal on 16th September. My source for stating that Brigadier Malik made a request for

withdrawing from Chawinda position is none other than a major direct participant staff officer

of the battle i.e Major K.M Arif the then GSO-2 (Operations) 6th Armoured Division at

Chawinda. It was 6th Armoured Division Headquarters which controlled the battle after 9th

September. It is very strange that the critic finds my narration odd rather than contesting the

authority which I quoted to support my assertion. In an article published in Pakistan Army

Green Book-1992-Year of the Senior Field Commanders, General K.M Arif (Retired) made the

following assertion i.e The battle raged with considerable intensity on September 16. After its

failure to capture Chawinda the enemy failed to envelop it by a two pronged attack. In the

process the villages of Sodreke fell and Buttur Dograndi came under attack. The severe fighting

resulted in many casualties. The situation was confused and the outcome uncertain .So fluid the

situation became that at 1630 hours 24 Brigade Commander requested permission to take up a

position in the rear.Abrar told the brigade commander on telephone, You know what is there

in the kitty. There is no question of falling back.We shall fight till the bitter end from our

present positions. His words proved a timely tonic. 24 Brigade fought gallantly. Soon thedanger subsided. (Refers -Page -6- Abrars Battlefield Decisions-Pakistan Army Green Book-

Year of Senior Commanders-Pakistan Army-General Headquarters-Rawalpindi-1992). This

assertion was made by one of the principal staff officers of the 6th Armoured Division who was

present on the scene and not a figment of my imagination.

l Even 6th Armoured Divisions War Diary contains a record of the above mentioned telephone

call.

l As to the worthy critics assertion in paragraph 1 about de facto command of Chawinda Battle

remaining in Brigadier Malik till the end. All that I stated was that during the most decisiveencounter of the whole battle at Gadgor on 8th September it was Nisar and Nisar alone who

exercised coup d oeil deploying his regiment entirely on his own without any orders from 24

Brigade about any broad front deployment or any specific orders to deploy in any particular

disposition. After this decisive encounter at Gadgor the Indians did not do anything till 11th

September. From 10th September 6th Armoured Division entered the scene and controlled the

Chawinda battle, 24 Brigade being one of the many brigades that it commanded.



l Refers the criticism in paragraph 2 that the battle was fought exclusively by Amjad Chaudhry,

Lt Col Nisar, Major Mohammad Ahmad and the direct participant Major Shamshad all I can say

is that the critic did not read my article but only scanned through it.On map opposite Page-40 it

is written that C squadron i.e Shamshads squadron arrived opposite Gadgor area at 1130 hours

after the situation had been stabilised. On various pages I have stated eg 25 Cavalry was toPakistan Armys good luck, a newly raised but extremely fine tank regiment (Refers-Page-43).

The same point is repeated on various pages.

l About Abdul Ali Maliks command qualities Gen Fazal Muqeem notes in his Pakistans Crisis in

Leadership The few counterattacks which 8 Division tried during the war were most

noticeable by their lack of planning.The units were hurled into battle without having been given

enough time for planning and preparations .The worst example of this attack was on December

17 when against all protestations of its very gallant commanding officer , 35 FF was sent into

battle for almost certain massacre (Refers-Page-215 and 216-Pakistans Crisis in Leadership-

Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan (Retired)-National Book Foundation-Lahore-1973).

l Chawinda was an armour battle and this is proved by casualties suffered by tank and infantry

units. How many infantry units except 3 FF could match the casualties of 11 Cavalry in 1965 i.e

34 killed. As a matter of fact the direct participant Major Shamshad has referred to one counter

attack in which an infantry company of 2 Punjab had Nil killed and two officers got the SJ. Even

in Chamb during Grand Slam 11 Cavalry lost 19 killed on 1st September 1965 alone while 14

Punjab lost a total of 3 killed in the entire Grand Slam. (Refers-Page-108 1 & 109-Pak

Bharat Jang-Colonel Mukhtar Gillani -Rawalpindi-April -1998). As a matter of fact 11 Cavalry

suffered more casualties in Grand Slam than all ten infantry units except one i.e 13 Punjab

which had lost 24 killed as against 11 Cavalrys 19 killed.But then the strength of an armoured

regiment is around 400 vis-a-vis 800 of infantry.

l Lastly the reference to VCO. This was purely symbolic and had nothing to do with rank or

status in the literal sense. Sher Bahadurs efforts to divide and distribute the 4 Corps Artillery

Headquarter before the 1965 War have been discussed by an authority no less eminent than

Pakistan Armys last C in C, Gul Hassan.This if done would have seriously compromised chances

of Pakistani success in Grand Slam and Chawinda.Without concentrated artillery at Grand Slam

or in Chawinda none including Abrar or Malik could have defeated the Indians.

Kind Regards

A.H Amin ([email protected])

-------------------------------------------------------------

BRIGADIER KAMAL ALAMS AND COLONEL ANWARS LETTERS TO DEFENCE JOURNAL AND MY

REBUTTAL AS ASSISTANT EDITOR DEFENCE JOURNAL OF JANUARY 2002:---



Brig Kamal Alam and Colonel Anwars Criticism of Chawinda and A.H Amin's Reply Defence

Journal January 2002

Dear Major Sehgal,

In his letter in Defence Journal of Aug 2001, Mr . Amin says that in the Pak Army Journal(Summer 97) Brig Nisar does not mention any order coming his way from his Brigade Comd on 8

Sept 1965. I am no historian but some questions immediately come to mind viz. Does Col Nisar

also mention that the Brigade Commander told him to do something? If not who is to be

believed, Brig Nisar or Gen Riza. And if he was not told to do something, what major event

galvanized him into taking this unilateral action against the enemy advance? Did he get

information about the enemy advance himself, or did someone give it to him, and if so who?

When he got his information, was he in the presence of the Brigade Commander , or was in

wireless contact with him? And when he decided to strike out on his own, did he at least inform

the Brigade? And if so what transpired; or did the rest of the Brigade merely follow 25 Cav

through guess-work?

The point I want to make is that in order to be classified as history we have to first establish

whether 25 Cav was a part of a larger formation, or was acting in a vacuum. And if it was

subordinate to

24 Brigade, did it take itself out of the Brigade ORBAT on its own, or did if take the Brigade

under its own command. This relationship can only be settled by the communication between

the two. So far it has been considered a settled fact beyond any controversy, that this Brigade

and all its components fought an outstanding action. After all there have been M Ds and

presentation on the subject for the last 36 years and most officers have had a chance to take

part in one or another of these. And no adverse comment has come to tarnish the reputation of any officer of the brigade.

It is only recently that through one sentence of Maj Gen Shaukat Riza s Book almost all infantry

actions of this battle seem to have been nullified, and the brave conduct of the Bridge

Commander has been found fit to be relegated to those who functioned below par.

I am afraid that Gen Rizas Book is primarily the amalgam of various war diaries, with very little

original research , officially sponsored to give the official view. A very good insight into its

historical value and credibility lies in what it has to say regarding the change of command in

Chamb, which is a scandal that has refused to be hushed up despite the best official efforts. Onpage 121 of the book Gen Riza blatantly states that change of Command in Chamb was pre-

planned. And then he goes on to brazenly assert that this was confirmed by most officers in

GHQ and 12 Div. He forgot that this was a deliberate, set-piece attack, the operation orders for

which per force would have to be attended by GOC 7 Div, if the command was to change, and

all the lower formations would have known about it, and at least some shred of documentary

evidence of this effect would have survived, at least in GHQ. But there is not a word extant to

corroborate this cover-up. And what is worst is that immediately after the war in Staff College



under, Gen Riza was serving a 12 Div officer who was the GOC of this Division. He was Gen

Akhtar Malik. At a time when even subalterns like me could question Gen Malik on this subject

and get a candid reply, it is impossible to believe that Gen Riza did not know all details of this

change from the horses mouth. And knowing this and then wilfully distorting history is

deserving of the strongest opprobrium. And then DJ takes one line of this history and knocks

out all infantry actions, and goes further to malign the commander of Chawinda Brigade! Andnow this is to pass for history?

Brig (Retd) Kamal Alam, TJ

14 Dec 2001

To : The Editor Defence Journal

Karachi

Sir,

I refer to letter by Mr. Farouk Adam and Mr. Amin on the Battle of Chawinda (Defence Journal

Aug 2001). In 1972, in company of some regimental at officers I met Gen A .A Malik in Mangla.

The question of 3 F F came up. He said the heaviest attacks seemed to come wherever this unit

was deployed. As such at one point he had to ask the Div HQ if there was any possibility for this

unit to be relieved and rested. The Div HQ said this was not possible. War diaries are often not

written immediately . There are often inaccuracies in them. Is it possible that this event is being

referred to by both writers? At any rate 24 Brigade War Diary should also be consulted.

Mr. Amin quotes Gen Rizas Book i.e. Brig Malik got on to ............... From this it is obvious that

it means the communication was by wireless or telephone. But I have attended an M D on this

battle and also heard its narration from Brig Shinwari. Both were nearer to Farouk Adams

explanation of events of

8 Sept. Mr. Amin says he has referred to official sources and officially sponsored GHQ

account of this Battle. This is its weak point. Our officially sponsored accounts unfortunately

have been cover-ups. Gen Riza wrote about such an important battle without interviewing any

infantry CO, or any officer of the Brigade HQ, when they were all alivel! What sort of history is

this?

I heard the talk by Lt Gen Tariq S. J to which Farouk Adam has referred. I have also heard him

on the subject in person. He said that all units gave their very best but also that the Brigade

Commanders conduct, whose HQ was often in line of direct fire, was most inspiring.

After reading the original article one gets the impression that the whole battle was fought by

Col Nisar and Maj Ahmed ably supported by Brig Amjad Chowdhrys guns. It seems infantry was

non-existant! Granted it was a tank battle and very well done by 25 Cav. But I cant recall any

DEFENSIVE tank battle over two weeks duration without an infantry firm base. And if Chawinda

base did not hold, that would be the end of the tank battle also. But the infantry did hold,

better than any infantry brigade on either side. And the Brigade Commander showed more



pluck than any officer of his rank, also on either side. I am willing to stand corrected on this.

And if not corrected, will not this make these units and Brig Malik deserving of credit?

Lt Col Mohammad Anwar

5 Dec 2001

REPLY TO CRITICISM OF BRIG ALAM AND COL ANWAR ON ARTICLE BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

AND SUBSEQUENT LETTERS PUBLISHED IN DJ MARCH 2001 ISSUES AND AUGUST AND

SEPTEMBER 2001 ISSUES

It is amusing as well as encouraging to note that this scribes article on Chawinda Battle of 1965

published in Defence Journal March 2001 issue continues to attract flak from critics!

The latest in the series are two letters , both written by retired officers . First of all I must clarify

that my sole motivation in all writing has been to endeavour to write what men did rather

than what they ought ideally to have done or what someone later with the benefit of

hindsight tried to portray , what they had done. Thus the analysis of Chawinda Battle done

with pure loyalty to service without any inter arm rivalry or nationalistic motivation. Pure and

unadulterated military history filtered dispassionately separating fact from fiction and myth

from reality. How far I succeeded is for readers to judge.

History as Frederick the Great once said can be well written only in a free country and ours has

been continuously under civil or military dictators since 1958. Enters Defence Journal which in

its resurrected form from 1997 picked up the gauntlet of serving as a medium of intellectual

honesty and forthright criticism and published facts which were unpalatable for some and

welcomed by the vast multitude. A breath of fresh air in a country reduced to intellectualstagnation because of years of censorship and intellectual persecution! I had written for the

Pakistan Army Journal and Citadel but had left military history writing when in 1998 through a

dear friend I discovered that there is a new Defence Journal in Karachi which is open to some

critical writing!

I maintain as one great master of English prose said that all history so far as it is not supported

by contemporary evidence is romance! Battle of Chawinda published in DJ March 2001 was

thus not romance! What many in this country wrote and was outwardly military history was

essentially Romance! Inspiring, superhuman but a myth promiscuously mixed with reality!

Chance plays a key role in battle and at Chawinda chance played a very important role! Nisar,

when he deployed 25 Cavalry did not know what was in front of him ! KK Singh Commander 1st

Indian Brigade also did not know what was in front of him! This mutual ignorance saved

Pakistan on that crucial day ! Later heroes were created! I repeat Heroes were created ! This

was what the article was all about !



What were the key facts? Most important tangible fact was casualties ! These were

deliberately hidden since these would have let the cat out of the bag! Everyone would have

discovered who really fought and who got gallantry awards on parochial,regimental or old boy

links !How many were killed in the biggest military blunder Operation Gibraltar! This is Top

Secret ! How many infantry men died at Chawinda? Again no mention of any figures! The real

motivation here is not national interest but to preserve or more important to guard

reputations



INDIAN CENTURION TANK OF INDIAN FIRST TANK DIVISION CAPTURED BY 25 CAVALRY

Brigadier Kamal Alams Letter

a. I stick to the assertion that the broad front deployment was done by Nisar and Nisar alone

and Brigadier Abdul Ali Malik had no role in it. It is another matter that Nisar also did not know

what was in front of him. It was like Jutland when both contending fleets were running towardseach other at express train speed. Why Nisar behaved as he did and what actually happened

even today is hard to understand, whatever anyone may claim now with the benefit of

hindsight! Brigadier Alam offers no tangible proof that the actions of 25 Cavalry had anything to

do with what Brig A.A Malik told Nisar. Nisar was told to do something and Nisar did

something without the least clue of what was in front of him. The important thing is that Nisar

did something rather than getting paralysed into inertia and inaction! I may add a personal note

here. I understand that Alams elder brother Brig Mujahid Alam COS 31 Corps while this scribe

was commanding 5 Independent Armoured Squadron was a fine soldier.

b. Alam raises the question about the controversial Do Something order by Brig A.A Malik to

Lt Col Nisar CO 25 Cavalry. The same words were repeated by Nisar in his article published in

Pakistan Army Journal in 1997. Then Alam raises the question about 25 Cavalry functioning in a

vacuum. 24 Brigade had two infantry units, one which had been overrun and dispersed on 8th

September i.e 3 FF and 2 Punjab which was at Chawinda. The crucial action took place at

Gadgor few miles north of Chawinda in which 25 Cavalry faced the entire Indian 1st Armoured

Division. This was an extraordinary situation and Nisar acted on his own best judgement since

Malik had abdicated to Nisar by stating that he should do something. It is another thing that



Nisar also did not know what was in front of him and acted boldly and unconventionally. Had he

known what was in front of him he may have been paralysed by inertia and inaction! But this is

speculation and some part of history always remains unfathomed and hidden! Nisar acted

through sheer reflex and deployed his unit in an impromptu manner. The fire fight which took

place at Gadgor between 0900 hours and 1200 hours was a pure tank versus tank affair. 25

Cavalry versus two leading tank regiments of Indian 1st Armoured Division! Thus the IndianArmoured Corps historian stated The Armoured Brigade had been blocked by two squadrons

of Pattons and in the first encounter had lost more tanks than the enemy had...the worst

consequence of the days battle was its paralysing effect on the minds of the higher

commanders. It took them another 48 hours to contemplate the next move. This interval gave

Pakistanis time to deploy their 6th Armoured Division...in fact the golden opportunity that fate

had offered to the 1st Armoured Division to make worthwhile gains had been irretrievably lost

(Refers-Pages-393 & 394-History of Indian Armoured Corps-Gurcharan Singh Sandhu-

Vision Books-Delhi-1990). Thus the Indians acknowledged This regiments (25 Cavalry)

performance was certainly creditable because it alone stood between the 1st Indian Armoured

division and its objective, the MRL canal.

(Refers-Page-395-Ibid).

c. At Gadgor on 8th September it was 25 Cavalry and 25 Cavalry alone which saved the day.

Major Shamshad a direct participant has already stated on record that SJs were awarded to

some officers for an attack in which not a single man was killed on both sides!

d. 25 Cavalry was part of 24 Brigade but all that Nisar its CO did on the crucial 8th September at

Gadgor was based on his own judgement. On 9th and 10th September no fighting took place as

Indians had withdrawn their armoured division to the crossroads. On 10th September, 6

Armoured Division took over and 24 Brigade was a part of 6 Armoured Division. On 8thSeptember there was a vacuum and Nisar acted in a sitaution which can be classified as one

characterised by absence of clear and precise orders!



INDIAN CENTURION CAPTURED BY 25 CAVALRY AT ITS QUARTER GUARD

e. Shaukat Rizas book is basically a compilation of existing facts. It has historical value since

Riza was allowed access to official records.

f. The change of command aspect about which Alam asserts is correct and was officially hushed

up but why should Shaukat Riza have any sympathy for the armoured corps of 1960s which was

arrogant and looked down on artillery as I personally witnessed right till 1980s as a young

officer in Kharian and Multan? Artillery officers were never welcomed in armoured corps unitmesses unless real exceptions based on personal ties and armour officers rarely visited artillery

messes.

g. Chawinda was a tank battle, thus armour suffered more casualties. On the other hand Lahore

was an infantry battle where the indomitable 1st Baluch lost something like around 30 killed in

battle , more casualties than most infantry units in the much trumpeted Grand Slam.

h. Now I offer some figures for the readers to form their own conclusions:--

UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES IN OPERATION GRAND

SLAM

REMARKS

6 PUNJAB 99 PUNJAB 15

13 PUNJAB 24

14 PUNJAB 3 WHAT KIND OF FIGHTING THIS UNIT DID IF IT

SUFFERED 3 KILLED ?

15 PUNJAB 8

8 BALOCH 10

11 CAVALRY 19

13 LANCERS 14



REFERS-PAGE-109-PAKISTAN BHARAT JANG-1965-COL MUKHTAR GILLANI-RAWALPINDI-JULY

1998 AND UNIT SOURCES 13 LANCERS AND 11 CAVALRY

The above casualties prove that Grand Slam was both an infantry and armour battle yet armour

suffered proportionately more casualties since the effective battle strength of a tank unit is half that of an infantry unit. 14 Punjab lost just 3 killed while 10 Guides Cavalry at Chawinda lost 3

killed in officers alone apart from 12 OR/JCOs killed! 11 Cavalry lost more in killed casualties in

1965 War than any of the above units of the Grand Slam i.e 34 killed. No fault of infantry since

Chawinda was an essentially a tank battle.

i. Brigadier Alam does not give any figures which prove that infantry suffered more casualties at

Chawinda. I have already admitted in my letter that the only infantry unit which bore the brunt

of Indian assault was 3 FF on the 8th September. 3 FF aside the brunt of the attack at Chawinda

was borne by armour units since Chawinda was a tank battle. At Lahore, the brunt of the attack

was faced by infantry since Lahore i.e 10 Division battle was an essentially infantry battle. Thus,

there were units like 1st Baloch and 16 Punjab which suffered tremendous casualties.1st Baloch

suffering casualties of 31 killed in 10 Division Area (Refers-Page-139-Col Gillani-Op Cit). 16

Punjab suffering casualties of 106 killed and 70 missing most of whom were killed (more than

total of all regular infantry units in Grand Slam) (Refers-Page-138-Col Gillani). On the other

hand there were formations which in words of Colonel Mukhtar Gillani exaggerated the fighting

and suffered nominal casualties like the 103 Brigade in 10 Division area (Refers Page-143-Col

Gillani).

j. Even at formation level Chawinda was not a big battle in terms of casualties since the Indian 1

Corps suffered less casualties than 11 Indian Corps in Ravi Sutlej Corridor.

k. Brigadier Alam has mixed inter arm rivalry with operational leadership and personalities.

Infantry had a role in Chawinda. Every arm and service had a role. If I have not discussed

infantry actions in detail it is not because infantry did nothing at Chawinda but simply because

Chawinda was a tank dominated battle with artillery playing a crucial role. Had I been biased I

would not have stated in various articles that the greatest tank commander of Pakistan Army at

operational level was Maj Gen Iftikhar who was an infantry man. Similarly Ibrar whose conduct I

pointed out as most decisive was again an infantry man .

l. If Brigadier Alam wants to highlight the infantry side of the battle he is free to write an article

on the Role of Infantry at Chawinda.



m. I have also compiled some casualty figures of armour units in 1965 which will give the reader

a fair idea of who did what and who suffered more or less:

UNIT KILLED CASUALTIES

4 CAVALRY 17

5 HORSE 5

6 LANCERS 20

GUIDES 15

11 CAVALRY 34

12 CAVALRY 8

13 LANCERS 14

15 LANCERS 8

19 LANCERS 18

20 LANCERS NIL

22 CAVALRY 1

23 CAVALRY 18

24 CAVALRY 14

25 CAVALRY 16

30 TDU 3

31 TDU 7

32 TDU 7

33 TDU 9 JASSAR 9

Note:These casualties were compiled personally and may not be wholly or totally accurate.

n. Lastly, Alams assertion that DJ is distorting history. A bit naive since articles published in journals are opinions of individual writers and not of the management. This is true for all

journals whether it is Pakistan Army Journal or Command and Staff College Citadel.

o. Finally, Brigadier Alams letter was crude and lacked common courtesy that one would

associate or expect from one holding the rank of a brigadier.

Lt Col M. Anwars Letter:

a. I was not referring to 3 FF when I discussed Brig A.A Maliks withdrawal request of 16

September. Hence, Col Anwar has misunderstood the point. Brig A.A Malik had requestedpermission to withdraw when Indian tanks had crossed the railway line on 16th September and

occupied Buttur Dograndi and Sodreke. This fact was brought to light not by the much criticised

Shaukat Riza but by the then GSO-2 of 6 Armoured Division Major (later General K.M Arif), first

more bluntly in Pakistan Army Green Book-1993 and again a little tactfully in his recently

published book Khaki Shadows. Thus no connection with 3 FF, an infantry unit which as far as I

know suffered more casualties than any other infantry unit at Chawinda. 3 FF fought admirably

but was launched thoughtlessly as brought out by Major Shamshad in his letter published in



Sept 2001 DJ and consequently suffered enormous casualties at Sodreke-Buttur Dograndi area.

Shamshad was the tank troop leader in support of 3 FF when it disastrously attacked Buttur

Dograndi. In opinion of Shamshad, the attack had failed not due to any fault of 3 FF but because

of poor planning by Commander 24 Brigade.

b. About the assertion of Col Anwar that official sources are cover ups, all that one can state isthat if these are cover ups why dont experts like Brigadier Alam and Farouk Adam or Col Anwar

or Lt Gen Tariq devote some time to writing serious military history.

c. In my writings I have relied on official, unofficial and personal as well as Indian accounts. If

someone has better knowledge of facts he is most welcome to apply his intellect and come out

with a better account.

d. Anwar has a point that infantry was holding a firm base. I have not denied this anywhere. My

emphasis, however, was on the real battle, the armour battle which was fought at Chawinda. It

is up to a reader to form subjective conclusions.

e. Anwar states that infantry has been ignored, I contend that the real fact which has not been

favourably received by some is that Brig A.A Malik has not been projected as much in my article

as he had been before. Infantry, is an arm and I have great respect for it , A.A Malik was an

individual who did well and rose to three star rank despite launching poorly planned counter

attacks as brought out by

Gen Fazal i Muqeem in 1971 War as a GOC .

Lastly I want to quote a great captain of war :

I am not publishing my memoirs, not theirs and we all know that no three honest witnesses of

a brawl can agree on all the details. How much more likely will be the differences in a great

battle covering a vast space of broken ground, when each division, brigade, regiment and even

company naturally and honestly believes that it was the focus of the whole affair! Each of them

won the battle. None ever lost. That was the fate of the old man who unhappily commanded.

Memoirs of General Sherman

Lastly my humble submission; Chawinda was about operational leadership, not small unit

actions or projecting individuals or maligning them. If someone feels otherwise it is hissubjective opinion.

Kind regards

A.H Amin



--------------------

MAJOR SHAMSADS SEPTEMBER 2001 LETTER PUBLISHED IN DEFENCE JOURNAL REBUTTING

FAROUK ADAM AND KAMAL ALAM AND COLONEL ANWAR:---

Major Shamshads Rebuttal of Farouk Adams Account of Chawinda-Defence Journal September2001

The Editor

Defence Journal

Karachi.

Dear Sir,

Brig (Retd) Muhammad Ahmed

The May 2001 edition of your esteemed magazine carries a letter by Brig (Retd) Mohammed

Ahmed which mentions as under,

Major Shamshad is right, in a way, when he says only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur. The

little difference being that only Charlie Squadron went up to Pasrur the others were turned

back half way when the Jassar fiasco was discovered.

I would like to correct the record here.

The entire action of night 7/8 and 08 Sept has been covered in a single article appeared in Oct

1997 edition of DJ. I have nowhere stated or recorded what Brig Ahmed has ascribed to me. An

editing error has appeared in the March 2001 edition of DJ which the Brig should have

corrected rather than confirming it.

The fact is that entire regiment moved to Pasrur on its way to Jassar. The regiment wasdetained at Pasrur while Charlie Squadron was despatched to Jassar which reached Narowal at

0300 hours and turned about to reach Pasrur at 0500 hours.

BATTLE OF CHAWINDA

The August issue of DJ carries a letter by Farooq Adam SJ on the subject and another by Mr A H

Amin who is on the panel of D J. Both the gentlemen have made reference to me. I, therefore,

feel obliged to put in my word to keep the record straight.

Farooq Adam, as a direct participant appears to have reservations about the description of thebattle by A H Amin who was not a participant. He has merely conducted research and has

adequately defended his point of view by quoting his source of knowledge. A H Amin has

quoted Gen Fazle Moqeem who has reflected upon command quality of Brig Ali and how 35 FF

was massacred in Nawa Pind in 1971. To support the opinion of Gen Fazle Moqeem I can quote

one out of several ill planned attacks which fizzled out in initial stages, ordered by Brig Ali in

1965. On the morning of 17 Sept 3rd FF were ordered to attack Jassora with a company. A

detailed discription has been published in May 1998 issue of DJ. For those who could not reach



that edition and also to prove inanity of command I shall describe the attack precisely. The

company was commanded by Capt Raheem Shah and was supported by my troop of three

tanks.

I submitted to CO 3FF that before attacking Jassoran, which was 2000 yards away from Railway

line, we had to clear Buttardograndi half way between Railway line and Jassoran. I alsoinformed him that area Jassoran-Buttardograndi is occupied by a tank regiment supported by

an infantry battalion which I faced on 16 Sept and eventually my troop was shot up by that

force. It was impossible to dislodge an armoured brigade by attacking with a company and

three tanks. My plea was brushed aside with remark that Butterdograndi had been cleared

during the night. As we formed up behind railway line heavy artillery fire was dropped on us

causing casualties to our infantry. In the FUP we located a centurian in Battalion one which was

destroyed. Finally we attacked without artillery. Capt Raheem Shah and his company displayed

tremendous courage.

8 Gharwal was entered in the middle of 5 feet high maze crop. As our men reached the

trenches they were fired at from point blank range. Many of them fell other turned and went to

ground. They were surprised: I saw this massacre standing in cupola from a distance of 50

yards. I moved the tank up and mounted the trenches. By this time I had reached the killing

range of enemy tanks deployed in Jassoran. My tank was shot up and went into flames. My

second tank was also hit and damaged. The third tank turret # 1, tank commanded by LD Kamal

prudently did come up and was saved. In this swift action two enemy tanks were also

destroyed. Here the attack fizzled out.

It is now for the reader to assess the competence of higher command. In my opinion it was

callous act to launch a company and three tank against an armoured brigade. To further

illustrate my point of view, a quotation from a book (Guns of August by Barbara Tuchman) willbe in place.

Quote When the moment of live ammunition approaches, the moment to which his

professional training is directed, the issue of the combat, even the fate of the campaign may

depend on his decision. What is happening in the heart and vitals of a commander. Some are

made bold by the moment, some irresolute, some carefully judicious, some paralyzed and

powerless to act Unquote. I place ours higher in the last category.

After having gone through the letter of Farooq Adam and his two earlier scripts, on the subject

(Hero of Chawinda published in daily The News in April/ May 1992 and THE ALI OFCHAWINDApublished in UNIFORM Sept 1994 issue) I can say that his writing is more of fiction

than honest description of the events on the battlefield. On reading his script of 1992, I

expressed my views which have been published in daily THE NEWS of May 1992. I reproduce

below the opening paragraph of the article which delivers goods to those who are interested to

know the facts.



QuoteOn the outset I shall mention here that I have never served in the direct command of

Brig Ali. Hence there is no possibility of having ill will or malice towards him. However, I feel

that both the writers have tried to aggrandize the revered general out of proportion. I hold this

opinion as I have first hand knowledge about the Battle of Chawinda. I was a troop leader and

squadron commander in 25 cavalry which was a part of Brig Alis brigade. Mr Agha Babar should

show Adams article to his literary friends in Newyork to be appreciated as a good piece of literature. Anyone with little knowledge about army matters and warfare will confront him with

awkward questions such as, Why should Brig Ali ask Col Nisar as to how many tanks did he

have? Was he ignorant of the organisation and deployment of his only tank regiment?. Why did

Farooq Adam leave his defensive position when enemy tanks were still more than a mile away?

Why did he not wait for the tanks to destroy once they reached the killing zone of his ante tank

weapons? Why was Chobara captured and abandoned time and again?. Was a pitched battle

fought at Chobara? If so what was the score of casualties? And many more such

questions.Unquote.

The knowledge which Farooq Adam wants to share with the readers is of no consequence

unless he first fixes his position in a fighting unit. Was he a platoon /company commander or a

staff officer. I have gone through his three scripts mentioned above. Only at one place

(UNIFORM Sept 1994) he said that he was attached to Major Mohammad Hussain whose

company was to follow 25 cavalry tanks on the morning of 8 Sept. Was he attached to Major

Mohammad Hussain to advise him.

I will not go in details here, which of course I have, to prove that whatever Farooq has written is

all truth. Only one example is enough to prove what I state.

On page 59 of the periodical UNIFORM of Sept 1994 he writes while describing the dialogue

between Brig Ali and Col Nisar. How many tanks do you have? One squadron of tanks righthere, another dismounting from transporters nearby. He claims that these words were

exchanged at Chawinda in the morning at Chawinda on 8 Sept. This is totally untrue. The whole

regiment was concentrated at Pasrur. Col Nisar was called by Brig and told enemy had come

think about it. He must have also told him that enemy tanks were advancing on Charwa-

Cawinda track. What happened thereafter has been recorded by me in the form of 8 articles in

D J starting from Oct 1997 to May 1998. 9th and concluding article will appear in near future.

My suggestion to Farooq is to write an account of 17 days as he saw the battle moving day by

day, mere eulogy is not welcomed.

Passing orders is a simple affair.The quality of effort a commander makes to insure theimplementation of the order is what that matters. The extent of personal involvement, his

control and direction of the events, his presence at the place and time where the fate of the

battle is being decided are the factors which go in to assess the competence of a commander.

In this light I found our leader wanting.

Maj (Retd) Shamshad Ali Khan



-----------------------

BRIGADIER SIMONS LETTER OF 2008 BASED ON HIS DISCUSSION WITH VARIOUS DIRECT

PARTICIPTANTS:---

AGHA AMIN AND BATTLE OF SIALKOT-1965

JUL 24, 2008 THU 12:07 PM

I KNOW THE URGENCY AGHA AMIN HAD IN CONTACTING ME REPEATEDLY ABOUT HIS ILOG ON

CHOWINDA, BUT I WANTED CERTAIN CONFIRMATIONS BEFORE PUTTING MY VIEWS. IN THE

COURSE, I TRACED AND TALKED TO SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS BATTLE AND AGREE

THAT AGHA AMINS ACCOUNT IS MOST ACCURATE.

FIRST, HATS OFF AND A TRIBUTE TO THOSE SOLDIERS WHO FOUGHT BRAVELY IN THE BATTLE

OF CHOWINDA DESPITE THE CONFUSION GENERATED BY THE PAPER TIGER COMMANDERS LIKE

GEN. ISMAIL, SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN AND MANY MORE WHO EARNED LAURELS OVER

THE DEAD BODIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS.

1. INDIAN PLANS. YES IT WAS AN FIU OPERATION SUPPORTED BY AN INFANTRY AMBUSH PARTY

THAT CAPTURED AN INDIAN DESPATCH RIDER. THOUGH THE INDIAN OPERATIONAL

INSTRUCTIONS COINCIDED WITH GEN. YAHYAS LEADING HYPOTHESES OF AN INDIAN MAIN

OFFENSIVE IN THIS SECTOR, THESE DESPATCHES WERE RUBBISHED AS DECEPTION BY THE

MASTER PAKISTANI THINK TANK. THE ORIGINAL HYPOTHESIS WAS DOWNGRADED BY THE NEW

GOC 15 DIVISION MAJOR GENERAL ISMAIL, DEPUTY DIVISION COMMANDER BRIGADIER RIAZ ULKARIM, CORPS COMMANDER LT. GEN BAKHTIAR RANA, AND DEPUTY CORPS COMMANDER

DESIGNATE SAHIBZADA YAKOOB ALI KHAN ONCE INDIANS ATTACKED JASSAR.

HOWA KE PEHLEY HE JHONKEY PE HAAR MAN GAI

WOHI CHIRAGH JO HUM NE JALA KE RAKHAY THAY

2. JASSAR ENCLAVE. IT IS AN ENCLAVE WHERE MAJOR OPERATIONS FROM NEITHER SIDE WERE

POSSIBLE AS THE TERRAIN IS DIVIDED BY RIVER RAVI. YET WHEN AN INFANTRY BRIGADE WAS

DESPATCHED IN HASTE TO DEFEND THE BRIDGE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RIVER, THE LEADINGUNIT HAD VERY LITTLE DEFENSIVE POWER IN TERMS OF PREPARATION AND DEFENCE STORES.

CONSEQUENTLY, SOME OF ITS ELEMENTS WERE OVER RUN IN DOUBLE QUICK TIME BY A

DIVERSIONARY ATTACK OF AN INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE PRIOR TO THE MAIN ATTACK ON

LINE CHARWA- CHOBARA- PHILORA. BRIGADIER MUZAFFAR MADE A VERY BIG BLUNDER OF

JUDGEMENT IN HIS ASSESSMENT AND REPORTED IN PANIC THAT AN INDIAN MAIN HAD BEEN

LAUNCHED.. AS A RESULT THE ENTIRE DEFENCE OF SIALKOT SECTOR WAS UNHINGED IN PANIC

AND 24 BRIGADE MINUS 3FF IN SCREENS AND 25 CAVALRY WERE MOVED IN HASTE TOWARDS



JASSAR. THE DEFENCE HAD TAKEN A 90 DEGREE TURN. IN THIS VACUUM WHAT REMAINED

BETWEEN INDIA AND SIALKOT WERE THE SCREEN POSITIONS OF 3FF. ON THE EVENING OF 7TH

SEPTEMBER, GOC 15 DIVISION ORDERED 24 BRIGADE AND 25 CAVALRY TO LAUNCH A COUNTER

ATTACK ON JASSAR. THE RESERVES WERE NEAR NAROWAL AND THE DIVISION HEADQUARTER

PREPARING FOR A WHITE LINEN DINNER, WHEN INDIAN DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY BEGAN

POUNDING 3FF POSITIONS. MAJOR MEHMOOD OF AVIATION THEN TOOK THE RISK OF FLYINGOVER JASSAR ONLY TO REPORT THAT THE BRIDGE OVER RIVER RAVI WAS IN TACT AND IN

PAKISTANI OCCUPATION. A SQUADRON OF 25 CAVALRY UNDER MAJOR SHAMSHAD HAD

ALREADY REACHED THE JASSAR SECTOR WHILE THE TWO REMAINING WERE ON THE MOVE. 15

DIVISION HAD BEEN CAUGHT WITH ITS PANTS DOWN.

3. PHILORI-CHARWA-CHOBARA SECTOR. INDIAN ADVANCING COLUMNS ENGAGED THE

SCREENS OF 3FF ON THE NIGHT OF 7 SEPTEMBER. BY FIRST LIGHT 8 SEPTEMBER THESE

SCREENS AFTER SUFFERING CASUALTIES AND OVER RUN FELL BACK TO LINE PHILORI-CHARWA-

CHOBARA AND ALONG WITH A COMPANY OF 2 PUNJAB TOOK HASTY DEFENSIVE POSITIONS.

THE SAME MORNING INDIAN ARMOUR COLUMNS OVERRAN CHARWA-CHOBARA, BYPASSED

PHILORI AND REACHED 3-4 KMS FROM CHOWINDA. AT 8:30 AM 18 SQUADRON OF PAF

COMMANDED BY SQUADRON LEADER SALAUDDIN SHAHEED CAME INTO ACTION WITH THREE

F-86 FIGHTERS WHO ENGAGED THE INDIAN ARMOUR AND IMPOSED A DELAY OF ONE HOUR

ON INDIAN ADVANCE. THIS ONE HOUR WAS VERY CRUCIAL AS IT PROVIDED TWO SQUADRONS

OF 25 CAVALRY THAT ARRIVED FROM NAROWAL ENOUGH TIME TO REGROUP AND MOVE INTO

BATTLE FORMATION FOR ENCOUNTER BATTLE. IT WAS A VERY BOLD MOVE ON PART OF THE

COMMANDING OFFICER TO TAKE ON THE INDIAN ADVANCING ARMOUR HEAD ON. PAF

PROVIDED CRUCIAL SUPPORT. THE NEXT TWO SORTIES WERE LED BY FLIGHT LIEUTENANT CECIL

CHAUDARY WITH WHOM I TALKED TODAY TO GET THE RECORDS STRAIGHT.

IN THE COURSE OF WRITING THIS, I TRACED OUT SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF THIS ACTIONAND AM CONVINCED THAT ALL ACTIONS OF 8 SEPTEMBER WERE TAKEN SOLELY BY LT. COL

NISAR THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF 25 CAVALRY AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE AND NO ONE ELSE.

THROUGHOUT THIS BATTLE BRIGADIER A A MALIK REMAINED IN A SCHOOL AT PHILORA AND

LET NISAR HANDLE THE SITUATION. AGAIN ON 9/10 SEPTEMBER, IT WERE 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF

THAT REPULSED INDIAN ATTACKS.

4. RELIEF IN LINE. AS IF THE COMEDY OF ERRORS WAS NOT ENOUGH, THE PAPER TIGER THINK

TANK NOW LED BY SAHIBZADA YAKOOB DECIDED TO CARRY OUT RELIEF OF TROOPS ENGAGED

IN BATTLE FOR THREE DAYS. 25 CAVALRY AND 3FF WERE REPLACED BY 11 CAVALRY AND 9 FF

(MOTORISED) ON NIGHT 10/11. IN FACT THERE WAS NO RELIEF AND THE ENTIRE MOVEMENTWAS A FIASCO. INDIANS EXPLOITED THE SITUATION AND LAUNCHED A FIERCE OFFENSIVE ON

THE 11TH MORNING. THE ADVANCING INDIANS WERE FIRST SPOTTED BY MAJOR MUZZAFAR

MALIK OF 11 CAVALRY WHO THEN ALERTED EVERYONE ELSE. IT WAS A TOUGH TASK FOR THE

NEW UNITS BECAUSE THEY HAD MOVED AT NIGHT AND WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE

TERRAIN. BRIGADIER AA MALIK WAS TO REPEAT HISTORY WHEN AS GOC IN 1971, HE

LAUNCHED A JUST ARRIVE 355FF INTO ACTION AT BERA PIND AND HAD IT MASSACRED.



THE BIGGEST LESSON OF THIS BATTLE WAS THAT BOTH ARMIES WERE IN EFFICIENT IN

HANDLING OPERATIONS AT A LARGE SCALE. INDIAN CAUTION AND RELUCTANCE TO PURSUE

AND EXPLOIT SITUATIONS RESULTED IN FAILURE OF THEIR PLAN AND HEAVY LOSSES. IN TERMS

OF CLAUSEWITZ FRICTION, IT WAS MOSTLY THE MENTAL BLOCKAGE ON PART OF

COMMANDERS ON BOTH SIDES THAT RESULTED IN MISTAKES. YET THE CONDUCT OF SMALL

UNITS ON BOTH SIDES WAS OUTSTANDING.

1965 WAS ALSO TO USHER A SPIRIT OF CAMARADERIE AMONGST THE PAPER TIGERS THAT

SURVIVES EVEN TODAY. THEY FORM A MUTUAL PRAISE GROUP WHILE THE MOST HARDY AND

TRUE ONES LIE AROUND TO ROT IN ANONYMITY

THANKS ARE DUE TO AGHA AMIN, BRIGADIER MEHMOOD (EX-SERVICEMEN FAME), GROUP

CAPTAIN CECIL AND MAJOR SHAMSHAD.

Major Shamshad Ahmad Khan (Retired) -2009 July

-----------------------------------------------------------------

MAJOR SHAMSHADS SUMMING UP LETTER OF AUGUST 2008



MEN OF STEEL by Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani

(Retired),[email protected],25 Cavalry

MEN OF STEEL

By

Major Shamshad Ali Khan Kaimkhani (Retired)

25 Cavalry

This was first sent to daily DAWN but they did not have the guts to publish it on grounds that it

involved the president and the army.

The other day I came across a book entitled , MEN OF STEEL,. President General Mushrraf has

graced the book with Foreword while the preface has been written by General Khalid Mahmud

Arif (Retired). The book is based on war diaries supposed to had been maintained by the units

and the staff or the general (late ) Abrar Hussain who commanded 6 Armoured Division in 1965

on Chawinda sector. I cannot reason out as to why the book has been published now when the

event is forty years behind at this point of time. As there is nothing in the book that would have

jeopardized the security of the country, it should have come out immediately after the war.

That was the time when it could provided opportunity to higher command( there is nothing for

junior leaders in the book) to learn from the experience of the one who had fought the greatest

tank battle after world war- II. That would have saved us of many debacles in 1971 and

especially the ones committed in Sialkot sector on western front The book has five parts. Part

three (25% of the book) is the description of the events on the battlefield that is of interest to

students of military history. 75 % of the book comprises of background and statistics regardingcomposition of units /formations, casualties in men and material on both sides, names of

commanders, list of recipients of gallantry awards, photographs and such like details.

I feel that late general Abrar Hussain has not authored the book because he was known to be of

the type who would never indulge in such a travesty. General K.M Arif appears to be the ghost

author of the book.

I was a participant in the events on battlefield mentioned in part 3 of the book and have adifferent version.

To give authenticity to my narration, which will be diametrically opposed to the one given in

the book, it is necessary to state that I was directly involved in the events as a troop leader in C

squadron of 25 cavalry and squadron commander twice on extreme critical moments on the

battle field. I was face to face with enemy every day throughout the war. My location from day

one had been at Gadgor, Phillorah, Chawinda and Butter Dogranmdi where the battle was



fought. It is regretted that I did not have the good luck to see a red tab or even a staff officer on

front line during entire war.

From the text of part three it is clear that the general left his Headquarter, at Bhollowal ten

miles behind the front line, for the first and last time in a helicopter on 11 September in the

evening, By that time our two regiments , Guides and 11 Cavalry, had been badly mauled.. Theright time for the general to leave his HQ was in the morning when he got the news that 11

cavalry was under pressure. Had he been at Chawinda at 1100 hours he could have directed

and controlled the efforts of the three regiments and saved the day. By the evening, while

sitting in the caravan, he had launched two more regiments, Guides and 25 cavalry. Guides was

launched at a time( about 1100 hours) when 11 cavalry had retreated and Indians had taken up

defensives position to shoot up Guides who attacked with high spirits on their first day in

action. Some fine men and officers were lost in this action due to the apathy of commanding

officer who launched the regiment in haste, without artillery and infantry support contrary to

the dictates of terrain.. Lethargy and incompetence of HQ 6 armoured division resulted in our

defeat at Phillorah which was the greatest tragedy on this front.

As if that was not enough, 25 cavalry was launched at 1600 hours with a mission to occupy

Phillorah track crossing which was reported not occupied by the enemy. Thanks to our stars and

battle experience of preceding three days that we got away with loss of only one tank when we

hit against enemy defenses at Phillorah at 1700 hours. This is a classic example how to destroy

ones forces piecemeal.

Now a word about the title of the book.

General Musharraf in the introduction of the book has mentioned that he was proud to be

apart of the force called MEN OF STEEL by its commander. It implies that late general Abrar had

ascribed the title of MEN OF STEEL to his own formation. This never happens, it amounts to

praising oneself. Such an absurdity was not expected of general Abrar who, I am told , was a

different breed.



Titles or honors are always awarded by higher authorities .It was 25 cavalry alone which was

referred to as men of steel by General Ayub Khan during the course of his talk on the eve of his

visit to the regiment immediately after ceasefire, in acknowledgement of our performance. This

had happened on Pasrur airstrip where we were camping .Army, Naval and Air Chiefs were also

present. Since the president was not to visit any other unit or formation head quarter, allofficers in the area were called at the airstrip.

There are tangible, discernable and universally accepted actions of 25 cavalry on the battlefield

that justify the suffix men of Steel with its title. The actions precisely and in short are;

1-It was 25 cavalry alone which clashed headlong with an armored division , north of Fhillorah

crossing at 0800 and pushed it back to Gudgor (2.5miles) by 1200 hours.

2-we attacked, captured Gudgor at 1700 hours and pushed the enemy further back by three

miles to Chobara.,

3- we kept the enemy at bay for another two day with no additional force in our support. Air

support was of course there.

4- On night 10/11 September we were sent to Pasrur for rest and refit On this point of time we

were placed under command 6 armoured division which had taken over Chawinda sector.

5- At about 1100 hours on 11 September C squadron 25 cavalry found itself deployed behind

Chawinda with a mission to stop the enemy at all cost that was believed to be advancing behind

our force that had retreated from Gudgor-Phillorah area in the morning. In fact Div HQ had

accepted the loss of Chawinda and therefore we were deployed behind that town to stop theenemy advance towards Pasror.

After five hours of my insistence that Chawinda was vacant, at 1700 hours we were ordered to

advance and occupy Phillorah, which according to high command was not held by the enemy.

What happened later is along story but it should suffice to say that we hit enemy defenses in

Phillorah where tank to tank battle ensued. In the process our one tank with crew was

destroyed. The skirmish proved to be a deterrent and the enemy did not advance any further

that day.

6- On12, 13,14,and 15 September C squadron along with 3FF was defending area in the northand up to Jassoran in the west of Chawinda. It was through this area that the enemy attempted,

for four days, to penetrate but could not succeed.

7- On 16th the enemy launched an armored Brigade to out flank Chawinda and attacked Butter

Dograndi in the rear of that town. They succeeded because the task force commander (who

later retired as Major General Wajahat Hussain), failed to coordinate with 24 Bde and left

Jassoran unoccupied providing a gap through which the enemy infiltrated and turned our flank.



We suffered heavy losses. Seven tanks were destroyed including two of 33 TDU. In the evening

we attacked Butter Dugrandi supported by artillery. . Destroyed two enemy tanks and some

infantry. Under very critical circumstances we stopped the enemy at Butter Dograndi that was

determined to reach Pasror that day. Artillery played effective roll but never fired on enemy

tanks with open sights on that day as mentioned in the book. We never allowed enemy tanks to

reach that close to our gun areas.

8- It was a troop of 25 cavalry and company of 3 FF who again attacked (without artillery)

Butter Dograndi, midway to our main objective Jassoran, on the morning of 17th and mounted

enemy trenches north of the village. Although we suffered heavy losses and could not reach the

objective, our offensive action forced the enemy to vacate Butter Dograndi and withdraw to

Jassonan in the evening and eventually across the railway line Chawinda Sialkot.(quoted from

official history of 17 Poona Horse that was controlling the operation on Indian side).

9-It was 25 cavalry again, along with 3 Ff who repulsed an infantry brigade attack on night19/20

September. Although some of their troops had crossed over the railway line and hit the track

behind Chawinda at milestone 5, our tanks fired from behind railway line and forced the enemy

to withdraw, leaving behind dead and wounded.

Now where does the 6 armour division appear in this scenario? It has always been a troop or

squadron action through out war accept 11 September that was a fiasco .I can confront any one

who can prove me wrong.

Now the story as to how did 6 armored division becameMen Of Steel.

I served in 6 armored division, of which 25 cavalry was a part , till September 1971. No one

called the Division as men of steel it was only 25 cavalry alone. I was shocked when I visited HQ

6 armoured Div after Indian captivity in 1974. I saw on the name boards of staff officers written

MEN OF STEEL on top. No body could explain how it happened. Knowing general K.M.Arif I can

say that he is behind this happening supported by general Wjahat Hossain(retd) who was

commanding 6 Armored Division in 1973-74.

To face the enemy is the professional obligation of a soldier. To be killed in action, get wounded

and fall prisoner is very much a normal happening in the life of soldier and there is nothing to

be proud or ashamed about it. This ancient and universal concept of soldiering does not hold

good in Pakistan. Here a soldier sitting in trench and killed by artillery fire can be given gallantry

award and also proclaimed a national hero. A gallantry award is justified only for an act

performed beyond call of duty and in the face of enemy.



Major K.M. Arif never left the Divisional HQ which was 10 miles away from front line and the

Div Commander left only once in the evening of 11 September, as mentioned an the book,

when fighting had subsided. Obviously both of them do not deserve the gallantry award.

Major Khalid .Mahmod Arif ( Later general) was GSO-2 operation of 6 armored division in 1965.

.In 1974 he was a Brigadier and held very powerful position in GHQ.

To justify undeserved gallantry awards that he and the Div commander had received and also to

cover-up the blunders committed by Div HQ, he floated the word that general Mosa Khan had

called 6 armored division as men of steel at Pasror airstrip. Knowing his vindictive nature

nobody could dare oppose him.

On his signal this word was continuously and systematically given currency for 20 years. It is

possible that he provided documentary support to this misdeed while he was in power.

It is time that we stopped fabricating and twisting history to serve the vested interests and

record true fact for our posterity.

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COLONEL SARDAR YAHYA EFFENDIS SUMMING UP OF 2008 AFTER READING BRIGADIER

SIMON AND MAJOR SHAMSHADS LETTERS OF 2008



THE GENERAL WHO FAILED WHEN VICTORY WAS AT HIS FEET

ONE OF THE MOST PHENOMENAL FAILURES OF 1965 WAR--MAJOR GENERAL RAJINDER SINGH

SPARROW COMMANDER FIRST INDIAN ARMOURED DIVISION WHO MISERABLY FAILED IN

WINNING THE 1965 WAR,WHEN ON 8TH SEPTEMBER 1965 DESPITE A PHENOMENAL

SUPERIOROTY OF 5 TO 1 IN TANKS AND 15 TO 1 IN INFANTRY HE FAILED TO OUTFLANK A LONE

TANK REGIMENT 25 CAVALRY OF PAKISTAN ARMY



THE TANK REGIMENT COMMANDER WHO EXHIBITED EXTREME COUP D OEIL AND DEPLOYED

HIS REGIMENT TO STOP A WHOLE TANK DIVISION,NOT KNOWING WHT WAS IN FRONT OF HIM



LIEUTENANT COLONEL NISAR AHMAD COMMANDANT OF 25 CAVALRY WHO ENTIRELY ON HIS

OWN JUDGEMENT DEPLOYED 25 CAVALRY ON BROAD FRONT AND BROUGHT THE INDIAN FIRST

TANK DIVISIION TO A HALT

21734172 Who Saved Pakistan in 1965

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Transcript of 21734172 Who Saved Pakistan in 1965